A CYBERNETIC DEVELOPMENT OF EPISTEMOLOGY AND OBSERVATION,

APPLIED TO OBJECTS IN SPACE AND TIME (AS SEEN IN ARCHITECTURE).

A Thesis submitted for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Cybernetics,

at
Brunel University,
Kingston Lane,
UXBRIDGE,
Middlesex.

By
Ranulph Glanville
February 1975

»-
ABSTRACT

This Thesis proposes a new epistemological ontology

which has two peculiar characteristics: Objects in its Universe

are formulated as being self-observers (i. e. reflexive); and the

nature of observation of Objects by others is shosn to contain

the logic for computing relationships between Objects in the

Universe.

This Universe is non-hierarchical, and permits of

mutually contradictory beliefs about its Objects to be simultane-

ously held by different observers.

The logic by which observers construct hierarchies in

the Universe is shown to need only one variable in order to

operate, and to operate from the oscillatory nature of the self-

observing Objects producing. a sense of local time in both observer,

and observed Objects; the times of which must temporarily come

together for observations to be made.

Using these notions of Objects and observations, a

means, based on the potential forobservers to construct

0
hierarchies, is found for analysing arguments, and (potentially)

for the improvement of computer performance.

A way is described for the representation of observa-

tions of Objects to be made, and a conversational idiom is

established to account for communication between different

observers.

The views put forward in this Thesis are demonstrated

by various experiments, stariei, and references.

 ii

THESIS MOTTO

of... If you could finish it. you could rest. . sleep. . not
.
before. oh I know- the ones I've finished thousands and
. ...
one. .. all I ever did. -in my life ... with my life. . saying

to myself finish this one. Ats the right one ... then rest
... .
sleep no more stories no more words ... and finished
.. ... ...
it, and not the right one. 11,
. . .

Samuel Beckett"14).

a
 iii

PREFACE

When I set out on these investigations, I did not

realise that I had been carrying them out already for ten years,

nor did I realise that I would be carrying through such a general

and broad-based piece of work. Nothing was further from my mind

than the formulation of a philosophical system. Nevertheless,

this work has grown itself, and I have, to the best of my ability,

notated it.

The recent origins of this work are in the attempt to

provide a means (by "dimensioning models") of preventing the

drawing of f alse analogies, and the construction of arguments in

which the levels shift, erroneously. From this grew a general

theory of model/object relationships, which, introducing the

object, insisted on an examination of the qualities of an object

that can be modelled. And from these two, the role of the

observer, making the model, became critical, as did the way in

which he could express his model making. Thus, a small work

mushroomed into something rather larger.

Undoubtedly, many of the types of view expressed here

relate to my experience in studying and teaching architecture:

indeed, the stated aim of the work is to examine certain aspects

of space and time in architecture. The concept developed here of

a Behaviour (BP) can be clarly related to difficulties in defining

complex architectural objects, such as cities. Conversely,

Awareness (Ao) can be tied in to experiences of psychological

overload and break-down. And the whole idea of thý- type of

linguistic representation put forward here ties into problems

experienced in expressing spatial experiences.

But equally, many of the ideas I can trace back to

earlier works. The first clear statement I can find stems back

four years, and is a piece of music "Tune into Memories of You"

@ in-the
Appendices
 iv

in which musicians interpret a common tune by playing simultaneously

what each of them considers to be an appropriate accompaniment to

that tune. In this case the tune is an Object with an Essence,

and the accompaniment is the observer's attributed behaviour.

But long before that, I can find stories which refer to this sort

of Universe; not that, at- that time, I saw it at all clearly

this is all post-rationalisation.

I account for this because I believe that the Universe

I propose in this Thesis is to many rather strange, at first sight,

and so I wish it to be known that it has basically grown itself

(with rae being essentially unaware of what was happening), over a

long time-span. And, while I worked on it, I was still unaware

of where the Thesis was going: new areas to look into, new

-questions, new ideas, kept on presenting themselves, and then

making answers. Indeed, at an earlier stage, I had proposed

putting in the text that was thus produced, (the real Experiment

of this Thesis), as the main body of work, since it shows not

only the conclusions, but also the cybernetic work method

(including some necessary revisions of parts for which, when I

was writing them, I could find no appropriate terms) by which the

Thesis came into being.

However, in. the end, a more conventional consideration

for the reader over-rode this idea (although the text may be

examined by anyone who wishes), and the only survivor from that

text to appear here is the collection of stories 'which try to

describe the qualities of this Universe in a more immediate form

that the more philosophical text which is the main theoretical

part of this work.

Having thus appologised and accounted for this thesis,

--and before moving an to acknowledge the substantial and much

appreciated help I have received in its growth, I should like only

to reflect that, in writing this, I feel that as with the pupil in

Reps'"883book, I have been learning to clap one hand.

a
 V

Because of the length of time during which it seems to

me that this work has been developing, I find it impossible to

acknowledge the help and inspiration I have received, with few

exceptions, other than generally.

I should like to thank all those from whom I have learnt.

That I cannot enumerate you does not reduce my gratitude, which is

shown continuously to me by the way your sparks have made this

work.

I would like to thank the people who have helped me

prepare this work itself:

My wife, Tuulikki Leskinen, who has generously suffered and put

up with a great amount during its composition and given me con-

tinuous encouragement and sympathy.

Betty Foxworthy and Hilary Lowday who have typed the text in

various forms - an appaling task.

The Science Research Council who funded my three years research

at Brunel University, where this work assembled itself.

My Supervisor, Professor Gordon Pask, who has been for many years

a valued critic and has taught me to formulate and insist.

My fellow student Dionyssius Kallikourdis who has unravelled many

mysterious and valuable texts for me.

My friend Richard Bunt, with whom I have talked about this work,

more and more valuably, for many years.

My colleague Annetta Pedretti, who has helped me discover and
develop parts of what I was trying to say, has noticed the holes,

and has shown some uses.

Samuel Beckett, whose novels and Plays I have re-read during the

writing of this piece; and who seems to me either to have formed,

or to reflect several of my thoughts.

 vi

Finally, perhaps I can express the hope that this work

help make some sense of the world, to those who try to make
-may
sense of it, and that this will be particularly so for Severi. my

son.
If sparks I have collected from you have gone wrong,

the misfire has been in my head, not yours.

Ranulph Glanville

15th September, 1973 to

14t. h February, 1975

London, Helsinki, Lemlax, Spetisbury

 vii

CONTENTS

Dedication

Thesis Motto

Preface

Acknowledgements v

Reference Marks and Numbering Systems Used In The Text viii

(Excluding Technical Terms in the Glossary)

Terminology ix

Introduction 0

Main Text 14

Explanatory Text 70

Experiment Reports 113

Experiment One: Report (London Knowledge Test) 115

Experiment Two: Report (London Structure Test) 131

Experiment Three: Report (Conceptual Space) 150

Experiment Four: Report (Leadenhall Market) 163

Conclusions 168

Stories 172

When You First See This Place 173

Now That You Can See Me 176

Seeing Is Believing Oblique Killing 179

A Fred Blogg's (R. I. B. A. ) Eye View 181

A Superman's Eye View 183

A God's Eye View 185

Appendices 187

Appendix 1: Correspondence 198

Appendix 2: Signification in Frege's Triangle 192

Appendix 3: Tune into Memories of You 195

Glossary of Terms Used 210

Bibliography 220
 viii

REFERENCE MARKS AND NUMBERING SYSTEMS USED IN THE TEXT

(EXCLUDING TECHNICAL TERMS IN THE GLOSSARY)

Bibliographic references in this text are, denoted by an

asterisk* followed by a number, in brackets one step above the

(*144)
line (i. 'e. ). The references will be found in the

Bibliography listed in numerical order, with the number preceded

by an asterisk. They have been so arranged that they are in

author, then. title, alphabetical order. A certain number of late

additions, however, appear-in the later numbers, out of this order.

The alphabetical ordering is the reason for the bibliographic

reference numbers in the text not being'in numerical sequence.

@
Footnotes in the text are denoted by a raised at or

plus+ sign, and appear at the foot of the page on which they

appear.

Statements in the Main Text are preceded by reference

-,
numbers(similar in form to those used by Wittgenstein). These

have two purposes - they give a unique reference to each statement,

and they highlight the form of the argument.

It a reference number in the Main Text is preceded by a

single apostrophe I, týere is a corresponding number in the

Explanatory Text, expounding on that statement. This may be

found by looking under the same number in the Explanatory Text (in

which all reference numbers are preceded by a double apostrophe

which denotes that the statement belongs in the Explanatory. not

the Main Text).

It is intended that bbth the Main Text and Explanatory

Text can be read alone, or together (though in the case of the

Explanatory Text, terms are assumed and are not described). The

Main Text contains no bibliographic, or other, references (but the

Explanatory Text does).

 ix

TERMTNOLOGY

Like Humberto Maturana(*65), I have defined neither my

terminology nor my formulations, at the outset. Instead, I have

given labels and used them in a number of contexts. You, as a

reading observer, can deduce from these Label-Objects the Objects'

@
behaviour, and thus you will generate meanings for them.

In this, I am being consistent with the general theory

here propounded -a theory of Essence and observer. To define a

Label-Object would be for me to tell you a behaviour I know, and

not to tell you what is.

No behaviour can make up the Essence of the Label-Object,

which is for itself only.

Some readers of various drafts have objected to some of

these terms I have used. For instance, the terms "know" and

"observe" are disliked, since they are applied to all Objects

(inanimate as well as animate). I can only ask that readers so

upset, should bear with the terms used: they areý the best I could

find, and seem to me, in spite of objections, to be appropriate.

If the reader can find better terms, please change them - and let

me know the improved ones.

There is, however, -a Glossary which may be consulted it

meanings do not become clear.

a
INTRODUCTION
 I

INTRODUCTION

This Thesis relates to two seperate and distinct fields.

It consists of an application of a Systems Approach to problems in

both of these fields, each of which can be interpreted as being

within the cybernetic domain.

These two fields may be described (in the common sensical

context) as "Architecture" and "Language". The relationship

between the two of them arises from the need to find a means by

which the perception of some architectural topic (e. g. the loca-

tional structure of a city) can be represented. This involves

the establishment of a system of Object relationships and qualities

that can permit of the expression, simultaneously, by two different

observers, of entirely different and contradictory descriptions of

the topic, without the topic being considered to be absurd as a

result of this incongruence. It also involves the description of

a means by which each observation can be expressed in terms of a

common Language, in such a way that these different observations

may be communicated and*modified, while allowing the essential

difference between both them, and the observersIviews of the

languages they are using. Thus, the examination of the two fields,

"Architecture" and "Language", also involves the formulation of 'an

epistemological theory of ontology, based on observations of conmion

Objects being essentially different; and the justification of

such a formulation on an experiential (and hence epistemological)

basis. The normal approach to both "Architecture" and "Language"
does not permit such incongruence, and therefore, a new approach
has had to be introduced, one of the characteristics of which is

that it is non-hierarchical, and in this manner, permissive of

containing its own description. It is not subject to the

findings *46)
of Cý;del( (that systems may not be assumed to be

simultaneously complete and consistent), largely because it

 2

relegates the concepts consistent and complete to the personal

-:hierarchy building of each observer (for which a method of mapping

Is proposed), allowing that inconsistencies are part of the com-

plete system.

In its non-hierarchical structure, the system may be

seen as'being a theory of an anarchic Universe, in which ordering

Is the personal domain of each observer, but in which each

observer can communicate his own perceptions of his own hierarchies

to others, thus allowing the arrangement of social and concensus

orderings. In this respect, it echos the dominant architectural

philosophy of the '1960's, that of the highly serviced environment

allowing personal mobility, of plug-in and do-it-yourself, and of

:flexibility that was forcef ully, - putIf orwardi In t the-aftgl fill i ldijqes
(*6)
of the Archigram group's magazine theoretical substance
, given
by Banbam ("The *11)
Architecture of the Well-Tempered Environment" ),

and actually practiced most effectively by Cedric Price. The

-architectural climate has since shifted away from such playful

expressions of the Idea, into a realm of political activity based

on a more realistic and socially concious attempt to solve problems,

but the idea still survives and has coloured all architectural
thinking, (*83)
, as in for instance Pawley's "Garbage Housing"

Both "Architecture" and "Language" have been subjected,

jLs fields, to examinations using the Systems Approach, before this

attempt. But the limitations that such attempts as have been

made put on themselves have meant that they have not been of much
use in this context.

the case of "Architecture", the initial application

_-In
of a Systems Approach was long delayed. As Gordon Pask(*80) has

pointed out on innummerable occasions in lectures and conversa-

-tions, there is some considerable similarity between "Architecture"

and cybernetics. However, it was not until Alexander published

his (*2)
epoch making article "A City is not a Tree" that the
 3

strictly non-interactive form of architectural descriptions

became clear, and people, lead initially by Alexander himself,

began to examine (primarily) the City as a system, ("Notes on the

(*4) ,1 (*3)
Synthesis of Form" and "From a Set of Forces to a Form"

and then the research of for instance, the Cambridge Land Use

Centre, 'McLoughlin's "Urban and Regional Planning"(*68)

Chadwick's "A Systems View of Planning""25) and my own "Tapiola

,
(*43)
is a Paper Tiger Expose yourselves It Is Legal"
I

culminating in Broadbent's erudite summarising in "Design in

*20)).
Architecture"

-Paralleling this, there was a development of interest

in the possibility of using the computer in architecture, an

interest that was brought to real prominence in the conference

(*113)
held in York on the subject in 1972 at which various

architectural computers from all over the world gathered. Much

of the work discussed there was banal, showing a remarkable lack

of understanding of the nature of the problem descriptions being

utilised (e. g. non-consideration of Bremmerman's Constant - see

(*7)
Ashby ), or assuming the perfect outcome to a problem-by means
(*79)
of the union of sets of properties (how do you, to use Pask's

term, "sani. tisell these sets, to exclude any incongruences? ) but

,
some was of considerable interest. In particular, the develop-
(*75)(*76)(*77)
ment by Negroponte at M. I. T. of a machine that

could interpret drawings, was a significant step for both

"Architecture" *74)
and A. I. work (summarised in "Hunch" and "The
Architecture Machinell"73), amongst others). Nevertheless, this

work was closely tied into the semi-lattice approach of

(*2)
Alexander and was furthermore concerned with the establishment

of unique conversations, rather than for the formulation of a means

of allowing simultaneously existing contradictory descriptions, as

was also Abells"') work using the computer as an interface in a

Kelly Grid extension technique allowing the regulation of discus-

sions between architects and clients, a piece of work epitomising

 4

the other appirently fruitful approach to the computer and

-"Architecture" union.

Thus, the application of the Systems Approach to the

field of "Architecture" was not relevant to the approach of this

work: and indeed, such attempts as have been made to allow people

to express their views, have been done with the specific purpose

of reducing the discrepancies between such descriptions, rather

than encouraging them. * The whole development of the concept

"Neighbourhood" is an, extension of the adminstrative convenience

of "Zoning", in which people's understanding of local space is

tied together to provide a limited physical area in which a group

of people will co-incide as much as possible (i. e. a ghetto).

And the more recent attempts by Urban Geographers (e. g. Gouldi

(*45)
and White's "Mental Maps , ) to provide means for measuring

locational preferences in people have concentrated quite explicitly

on providing descriptions of group views of area desirabilities,

ignoring the chn acteristics of the personal preferences of each

subject. In other words, the views of people are aggregated by a

coarse grained geographical distinction, according to the location

of each subject, and are then represented as a map of percentage

preference for other areas.

In the area of "Language", the Systems Approach has a

manch longer kistory. Indeed, one of the earliest examples of a

Systems Aý)proach must be that of de Saussure in his "Course on
General Linguisticsft(*93) (see later).

The field of ýLanguagel' I have divided into five areas,

according to the approaches thiy show to "Language": Syntactic,

Semantic; Semiotic; Logical and Psychological; and Artificial

Theories of Language. I shall summarise the approaches taken in

each-of these five areas rather briefly: they are well accounted
for elsewhere.

In the case of syntax, the general linguistic develop-

ments this century were rather un-systemmic until Chomsky's

 5

*28) 50's
"Syntactic Stiuctures" was published in the mid

Previous work had either been "behaviourist" (that is, concerned

with a one-directional S. -R. process, as exemplified, unfairly,

(*97)),
by Bloomfield"'" and Skinner or had been very mechanistic
(the traditional view of a descriptive grammar operating on many
levels from phonemic to clausal). Chomsky introduced a systemmic

approach to linguistics, in that he managed to demonstrate that

it was possible to consider linguistic structures as being not

'but transformaiive In
merely analytical, also and generative.

so doing, he took the position that a grammar does not only account

for the form of a language and its comprehension, it also gives

rise to those things that are utterable. He developed this view,

later, into progressively less I'linguistic""and morerz"social. andu
*27).
political" work( Since his revolutionary (and somewhat

cross-discipliniary) approach was first unveiled, the examination

of syntax has remained essentially in the field of systemmic studies,

and has spawned a massive research program in (and indeed the term)

psycho-linguistics.

By a similar yard-stick, semantics has not really deve-

loped, @.
at'least in the more directly linguistic fields By its

nature, semantics is somewhat lexicographical and hence circular

in form: and in this respect, it has always been systemmic.
Nevertheless-, it seems that semantics has not given full con-

sideration to this circular characteristic, and hence has found it

difficult to turn the form to its own advantage. Certainly,

progress has been made, but there must be some doubts as to the

success of an area which negleýts its own form, and which confines
itself to the examination (no matter how successful) of cross-

cultural parts, and the mechanics of relationship of only its

parts: in this semantics, of course, does not follow the

cybernetic paradigm.
General different field
semantics an altogether - has.
 6

In some respect this failure may be accounted for by

-the development of semiotics, an area often confused (by mathe-

niaticians in particular) with semantics, but in reality one

which has far more chance of producing useful results. The

origins of this area are in de Saussure's "Course in General

(*93)
Linguistics" (in which de Saussure coins the term

"Semiology", meaning the science of signs, and proposes its

initial operational principles. "Semiology"bas been generally

replaced by the Americanised term"Semiotics'. but the essential

intentions are the same). De Saussure's formulation of the

interdependence of the signifier and the signified within the

sign, his insistence on the importance of the temporal context

within which a sign rests to give it a full meaning, and his

rejection of the symbollic nature of the sign, place him in the

forefront of early systemmic thinkers. Indeed, the whole of

semlotics is riddled with systemmic thinking, and with some

--.astonishing parallels and near parallels with cybernetic statements:

(*52)(*53)
e. g. Ejelmslev's continuous scale change in Glossematics

(although he did initially subscribe to an atomic unit, which

(*17)
later became a logical unit for signification) and Stafford Beer' s(*16)
insistence that all viable systems are parts of other viable

systems, and contain viable systems. So much so, that the field

might well be considered a model for much cybernetic investigation.

Furthermore, the self -ref errential nature of semiotic systems

(*22)
closely relates to the "standard" cybernetic form (see Bunt

Psycho-linguistics is a peculiar subject that has only

really been considered self-contained since Chomsky's early

publications, a sequitor of which appeared to be that there was,

In the human brain, a structure onto which a common meta-deep-

structure, which all linguistic systems shared could be maped, one

to one (see "Language and Mind"(*26), Not that the field was
(*86)
previously non-existent, as Piaget's early work on the-

a
 7

acquisition of linguistic skills shows, but its earlier existence

had been confined primarily to the study of either psychology or

linguistics. The establishment of this inter-dependence between

psychology and linguistics had been-most clearly stated before

the mid 30's in terms of philosophy, where, fol. lowing, Ogden-,

(*38 )examinations
and Richard's formulation of Frege's (presented

as his triangle), the whole field seemed for an instant to be

purely an examination of the logic of psycho-linguistics, even: after.

(*108)
Wittgenstein, in his "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" in
,
capping the achievements of earlier researchers, had temporarily

killed off the subject. Indeed, it may be that linguistic

philosophy is to psycholinguistics as semiotics; is to semantics:

in that linguistic philosophy and semiotics are both concerned with

the logical requirements for, relatively, a language system or a

meaning, to exist, whereas psycholineuis tics and semantics are

concerned with the actualities of existence of languages

(communicating) (*54)
and meanings (communicating) (see Houston
(*47)
and Greene

In contrast with these primiarily analytical views of

language, the artificial language area (about which one need say
little) is synthetic: 'it concerns itself with parts of the other

varJous areas, especially syntax and (usually unconciously)

semiotics. Its intention is to find a mapping between natural

language and the coding that a machine can understand and act on
in a given context, so that conversation with such machines is
less painfully unf3uent for the human conversant. The only

reason for including, the area within this cursory 'summary, is that
its success in modelling human language (especially in terms of
Winnograd's"105) (*107)
and Winston's work) manages to confirm
the (*52)(*53)
some of work of especially Chomsky(*28) and 11jelmslev
In this respect, it confirms, by means of an interactive
experiment, the interactive nature of each of these systems.
 8

As we can see from these summaries, the Systems Approach

has had a profound influence of the examination of "Language":

indeed, one might even say that the study of "Language" has had a

profound effect on the Systems Approach. And yet, the approach

is again not of any great help in the terms of this Thesis, for,

with the exception of the preliminary assumption of de Saussure

(of the arbitrary connection), the work is not concerned with the

relationship of the signifier and the signified. And even when

these two components are assembled together, the approach is

usually to consider the nature of the whole, not of their inter-

dependence. One might suspect that this would be covered in the

field of. Psycholinguistics (or in Linguistic Philosophy), but it

(*102)
appears not be the case; even Whorf's research into the

relationship between the richness of North American Indian

vocabulary and fire risk does not clarly make a statement about

the relationship between the Object and that which describes it.

My own "Some Parallels between the Formal Structure of Finnish

(*42)
-Language and Finnish Architecture" comes closer to making

a statement about this relationship (considered as a psychological

system), while the real statements of Linguistic Philosophy,

essentially avoid the question altogether, ! by. stating that using

a Language, the Object itself cannot be examined, merely some

representation of it. *

-Furthermore, the differentiation of the "Language" from

the Object, that is the -establishment of a hierarchy of two levels

of essentially different types of entity, works both against our

statement of a non-hierarchical Universe, and a logic of a

-semiot-ic system. is the study of the minimum

-For, -semiotics
requirements for a sign to exist, and not the study of the nature

of the sign's own existence. And the establishment of a seperate

level for signs is also the prescription of the distinction

between the levels of existence of both sign and Object. Whereas,

the insistence that the observer of an Object and of a Language

41
 9

finds some relationship between these two (the Language being

thus an Object like any other Object), which will be made in this
@1
thesis, removes this difficulty. In this way, Occam's

requirement is satisfied, and there is no longer any need to assume

as Wittgenstein(*108), for instance, does, that there is a one-

to-one relationship between the Object and its signifier, making

up a sign function. And the experiential truth that, depending

on who you are, and where you happen to be, almost anything may

stand for almost anything else (i. e. that an analogy can be drawn

within one's own mind), is more easily accounted for than the assum-

ptioir-of either the simultaneous two level existence, or the level

transference of Objects.

The argument so far, then, ýs that the approaches to

"Architecture", even those which are basically cybernetic, do not

manage to encompass the concerns of this investigation, and that

the same is essentially true for "Language" investigations, no

matter which area of that field one examines, and that there is

therefore a need to Instigate a different framework within which

such work can be situated.

In recording this argument, we should still check 6ver

the means 1hat are currently used for the expression of spatial

constructions, in order to verify that they too suffer the same

short-comings as the approaches to "Architecture" and "Language',

are claimed to suffer. And in doing this, 'we need not restrict

ourselves exclusively to architectural examples, for there have

been a few attempts to explain similarly complex topics, such as

.
sculpture, which may have some relevance.
The traditional method of representing space is a metric

means: that is, a representation is made using an agreed measuie

of length. This results in the standard architect's drawings of

plan, section and elevation, together with the projections,

axonometric, isometric, and perspective. In this form of

@
i. e. that the simpler solution, or the solution- which accounts
for more, is better.
 10

representation, only those aspects of space that can be considered

as Euclidean are represented, and a special skill is needed to

"read" the drawings thus produced. But there are clear examples

where this type of representation fails quite completely to rep-

resent what is significant in some spatial experience, as is

shown in Piaget's work with small children ("The Child's Conception

of Space"(*85) ), and as is also shown in the maps of spatial

(*45)
schemata included in Gould and White's I'Mental Maps"
, as well
as in this Thesis. The realisation that spatial experiences are

not only metric is clearly shown in the refurbishing of a fixed

space that Interior Decorators practice. This type of metric

representation is also that used by cartographers, and the changing

form of maps of the same landscape hiChlights th"e refinements

made in means of measuring using this technique. The use of a

metric is, of course, a sensible means for communicating informa-

tion about a space: it is a common means of representation, which

can be Interpreted by each observer to give a picture of a

spatial experience: but it is not a representation of that

unique experience, because it represents the interpretation of

the yard-stick: indeed, one might say that it is the interpretation

of the metric's experience of the spacel

There have,. however, been other means of representing

spatial experiences: the work of Wilmott and Young ("Family and

(*104)
Kinship in East London" )used one means, a combination of
words and maps, to establish the already mentioned concept of
"Neighbourhood". as a social entity: but, again, this is the

representation of a social, rather than an individual, experience.

A similar method, to express locationally generated views (not

even social ones) was used by Gould and White.

Nevertheless, there is, inherent in some of this work,

the opportunity for each individual to express his own personal
experience of. the space concerned (his own spatial schemata), if

only a "Language", and an appreciation of the nature of the type

a
 11

of Object, and Object-observer relationship, can be discovered;

that is, if a common means of expression can be found without too

strong a set of concensus restrictions, allowing comparable but

diTferent and personal expressions.

Perhaps the nearest approach to this aim has been made

by Laurie Thomas"100). in his work on extended reciprocal Kelly

Grid(*56) techniques (non-verbal as well as verbal), at

St. Martin's School of Art. In this case, a common language of

criticism was established with a small group of sculpture students,

using each other's work as examples. The trouble with this

approach,, however, -(apart from the time needed to establish the

language) is that it is essentially private, and furthermore it

does involve a certain concensus agreement.

Thus, there does appear to be a real and genuine need,

for the establishment of a description of these Objects, Object-

observer relationships, and Languages that. have been pointed to,

and which it is the intention of this Thesis to present. For

any "concensus" description, and the use of any non-personal

metric, avoids permitting the expression of any of the contra-

dictory statements that we all know exist in individual descrip-

tions of Objects, and thus in individual realities.

It might appear that the recently developed techniques

for dealing with statistical information in such a way that the

very hard and fast classes are softened (Zadeh's Fuzzy Set Theory(*109).

and its various extensions and applications) could be exploited to

resolve this problem. But that would be to completely mis-

understand both the character of Fuzzy Sets and Fuzzy Algorithms,

and the requirements we are setting up. Fuzzification is a

process which recognises that the insistence on a small number of

classes is bound, with humans making choices between them, to be

inadequate in the sense that I may find something "more or less

good" (when I have only the choice "good/bad"), or when I find

 12

something "go6d" in some contexts, but not in all, or when I

really cannot decide which class something fits in ("don't know").

This is not an attempt to avoid making a general statement, nor

is it an attempt to avoid a concensus view: it tries soley to

make the information contained within such a consensus view more

realistic and relevent. On the other hand, our intention is to

allow the statement of an individual experience in some com-

municable form. Thus, we intend to maintain the quality of each

observation at the expense of the concensus view, while a Fuzzy

Theory tries to re-generate a general behaviour from a concensus

view, thus failing to make real individual views, but describing

their range of possibilities.

As a result of these general shortcomings in

"Architecture" and "Language", the existing formulations being

either incapable of sustaining the-type of contradictions that

exist'between different individual views, or too complex to use

easily. and having tried some preliminary experiments to verify

these shortcomings, I decided that it was necessary to put forward

a description of a theoretical philosophy which would permit the

type of Universe we wish to postulate to exist, and which would

also permit the type of expression we are demanding to be made.

This Thesis therefore consists of two main components:

Firstly, a philosophy capable of sustaining the type of

experience and description about which we have talked in this

introduction, and;
Secondly, some exploratory experiments that demonstrate
the usefulness of this philos6phy, and its success at handling the

requirements we have set up for it to account for.

However, by themselves, these two components would not

-provide a clear enough picture of the implications of this

philosophy. And therefore, this format has been extended, for

the philosophy proposed as the theoretical base from which such
 13

descriptions can be made, appears to have much more general

qualities than might be expected from its roots in "Architecture"

and "Language", and seems to generate some techniques that may

have quite general applications. For these reasons, the some-

what curt derivation and statement of the philosophy is

elaborated by a second text (using the same referrential frame-

work), In which the relationship of the philosophy to other

people's work, and its reflection of common experiences, is

explored.

This content is further elaborated by the inclusion of

a set of six Short Stories illustrating the nature of this

Universe, a Conclusion, which is intended to summarise the general

lessons to be leirnt from this work, and point to further areas of

possible development, Appendices (recapitulating the particular

techniques that em rge from the philosophy), a Glossary of main

terms used, and a Bibliographical reference.

 14

MAIN TEXT
 15

'0.0, In order to know something exists we must be -able to

observe it.

0.0.1 If we cannot observe it, we cannot know it exists.

We cannot necessarily affirm its non-existence, either.
10.0,2 If we do not know an Object exists, we can usefully

say nothing about it.

0.0,3 A Thesis says things about Objects.

0.0,31 If we cannot say things about Objects, we have

nothing to say.
10.0,32 If we. have nothing to say, we should not try to

speak.

0.0,41 We state our Universe, thus, as being a Universe of

observation.

0.0,42 We are not concerned with other possible Universes.

10.11 For an Object to exist in our Universe, it must be

observable.

10. i'l The Universe contains only observable Objects.

4
 16

1.0, The least imaginable conditions in which an Object

can know anything are when it is the only Object it

knows in the Universe.

1. O'l To know it is in the Universe, it must observe itself,

11.0,2 Unless an Object can observe itself, it cannot know

it is in the Universe.

1.0,3 If it cannot know it is in the Universe, it cannot

know anything of the Universe as being of that

Universe.

11.0,4 If an Object knows some other Object exist, it must

also know it exists, itself.

1.0,5 All Objects in the Universe are self-observers.

.
'1.2, In order to observe itself, an Object must have both

itself to make the observation, and a means of making

the observation.

1.1.11 Call the Object Oa

.
12. Call the means of making the observation the Model
-1,12
Facility XQ
.@
The small subscript indicates the specific Object
-1.1,13
referred to. OC, is Object Ob is Object b
a,
OCI and Ob are both Objects and are both different.

XQ is the Model Facility of Object Ci

1.2, The Object only knows it has an existence, and there-

fore only has an existence we can discuss, because it

observes itself.

1.2.1 The Object exists by virtue of its own self-

observation.
*1.2,2 The Object observes itself through its Model Facility:

its observation is,

(Xa)Oa
-- .
where the brackets denote an observational operation

being made on that which the brackets contain.

@
The Model Facility's further properties will be investigated

later.
 17

11.2,3 in the Universe of observation, the Object Is what

it observes itself to be,

(0a) [(Xa)Oal,
=
() denote
Where the brackets the commonness of name
II
of the stated Object, the brackets the observation,

and the equal sign the being of observation.

That is to say, that the denoted Object is to the

observer, that which the observer observes with the co-

operation of that part of the Object observed called

the Model Facility.

1.2,4 This is the basic formulation for existence, in the

Universe.
1.3, In observing itself, an Object has recourse to

nothing that is not of its self.

1.3,1 Self-observation is therefore private.

11.3,11 Self-observation is what the Object, and only the

Object, observes itself as.

11.3,12 The Object, being what the Object observes, calls

itself the Essence,

(0a) = [(Xa)Qa]4 Ea,

Where the arrowed equal sign =:) indicates that which

is given rise to by the observer, as his observation

-of the Object

1.3,2 The Object is observed by itself privately, and is

its Essence, to itself. No other Object can see

@
It should be noted that fýr any observer's observations, the

various bracketings and equal-signs are essentially the same:

that is, the normal equal-sign ; 9' could be used, and the

bracket forms omitted. This is because, for the observer

concerned, the Object is the behaviour (or Essence) is the

act of observation, etc.

 18

its Essence.

91.4, Every Object, observing itself, has an Essence.

Without an Essence, there would be no Object,

(Pa ) [(Xa)Oal =4 Ea,
-::
(Ob >= r/vb)0b14Eb-
LV"
1.4,1 In order for an Object to observe any other Object,

it must first observe itself, to know it exists, and

thus to know it can make the observation.

1.4.2 In order for an Object to be observed by any other

Object, it must first observe itself, to exist for the

other-Object to observe.
'1.5, An (externally) observing Object can observe another

Object, but it cannot observe the other Object's

Essence.

1.5,1 The means for observation Is the observed Object's

Model Facility (which the Object used to observe

itself).

11.5,2 The observation that one Object makes of another is

called the observed Object's behaviour. The behaviour

is what the external observer believes the Object to

be,

Ba a) Ob (Pa
1.6, The observing Object cannot see the observed Object's

Essence, but can infer that it must have one.

11.6,1 The Model Facility is common to all observations, and

maintains the specificity of reference of observations

to the observed Object.

1.6,2 The observation is the observer's view of the Object

through the Model Facility, which is, to the observer,

the Object.

1.7, All Objects are self-observers.

a
 19

-s
1.7,1 All Object may be observed by@ other Objects.
@
1.7,2 All Objects may observe other Objects.

1.7,3 When an Object is observing, it is called an observer.

This is a difference of role. The Object's view of

itself may be re-written to show the observing role,
)
4pa =Fat-- [(Xa)Pa Iý [Qýa)Oal
-
11.7,4 The behaviour attributed to an Object by an observer

may be re-written,

(0ý)7-Balý [ýCI)Pbl-
1.7,5 These are forms for all Objects.

1.8, - The Model Facility makes observation possible, and

maintains specificity.
1.8,1 Objects may observe each other.

1.8,11 The result of one observation of an Object by an

external observer is a behaviour.

tl. 8,12 The result of many observations of an Object by external

is the Object's Behaviour,

.observers
(10a)=B0 (-- E Da)Pb]
a
Wl! n)
'l. 9, The Object is its Essence and is its behaviour and is

Its Behaviour,

----(Oa) = Ea.
(0a) = Ba,
(Pa >= Boa-

1.9,11 The Essence is private, in-that it is observed by the

Object itself.

1.9,12 The behaviour is public, in that it is observed by an

external observer.

But need not.

 20

1.9,2 The Object, to be in our Universe, must be observed.

11.9,3 There is a hierarchy in observations: there must be

self-observation for there to be external observations,

in both Object and observer.
1.9,4 The observer, too, is an Object,

(Ob >= Eb'ýý--[(Xb)Pb]-

1.10,1 All inhabitants of our Universe are Objects. The

Model Facility makes them observable. The observer

observes them. The observation is the Object, and is

its existence for the observer.

1.10,2 The observer's view of the Universe is his view.
 21

2.0, The observer is an Object in the Universe. z

2.0,1 The observer observes himself, and that makes him an

Object in the Universe,

(0 b>= Eb (-- [(X b) Pb]-

2.0,11 Because the observer observes himself, he can exist

to be observed by others,

(00= Bb(-- [(Xb)Pa].

.
02.0,12 Because the observer observes himself, he can exist

to observe others,
/n->= Ba ý= [(X ]-
Wu a)Pb
2.1,1 When an observer makes an observation, he attributes

a behaviour to an Object. '

12.1,2 There is, another way to look at this. When an

obserýer makes an observation, he creates for himself

an awareness,

Aci, t-- [(Xb)PCLI=4 ýlb-

12.1,3 To every awareness there is a related behaviour, which

differs only, in role.

2.2,1 For the observer, the awareness is what he believes

the Object of his observation to be.

2.2,2 For the observer an awareness is also part of himself.

2.2,3 'The observer exists on two levels.

12.2,41 The observer's self is his Essence, and

-observation
is private.
2.2,42 The observer's observation is his awareness, and is

public.
2.2,5 The observer makes an awareness through the Model

Facility of the Object being observed.

12.2,6 The sum of many of the observer's awarenesses is his

'Awareness,

(0a) = Aa 0
[(Xb)Pa
n)
 22

2.3, The sum of all Behaviours and all Awarenesses in the

Universe is the same. Only the distribution differs.

2.3,11 In a Universe, for example, of only 3 Objects (all of

which can observe), the following self-observations

are possible,

(Oa )= Ect [(X ],

cl)Pa
'(P 0=Eb [(X b)P b],

(00= Ec 4-- [ýc)Pc ].

2.3,12 The following external observations are possible,

(0a)=Ba t-- [(XCL)Pb] Ab,

=4
(00-Ba ý- [(Xa)Pc ] =4 Ac,
(0b). Bb ý-- [(Xb)Pa I=) A a,
<Ob)-Bb+- [(Xb)Pc] -)Ac,
(00-Bc" [(Xc)Pa] ==)AcL,
(00-BC " [(XC)Pbl -4 Ab.

2.3,21 7be Behaviours of the Objects are,

Boa'ý-[(Xahl * I(Xa)Pcl.
Bob4-- [(X b) r3a]+ [(X b) PC],
0
BC +-[(XC)RL] + [(XC)Pb],
Where the addition sign + signifies both (a logical

form will be developed later).

2.3,22 The Awarenesses of the Objects are,

0
+ [(Xc)Pal,
. -Na(-[ýb)Ral
0 [(XC)Pbl,
+
-Ab'k-(ýa)9b]
0 C-- [ýc, )Pc]+
Ac [(Xb)PC
W
2.3,3 The individual awarenesses and behaviours are the

same. Their method of summation together makes the

difference between the Behaviours and the Awarenesses.

 23

2.4, All observers in our U.niverse are Objects. The Model

Facility of observed Objects makes them observable.

The observer attributes to Objects behaviours that are,
he believes, the Objects. These behaviours are the

observer's awarenesses.
02.4.2 The observer's view of the Universe is his Awareness.

0
 24

3.0. 'the Model Facility is that in an Object which makes

It observable.
13.0,11 The Model Facility In an Object is not the Object

itself, but must be present as a necessary part of the

Object, for the Object to exist.

3. OtI2 The Model Facility may be an Object, too. Then it

will have its own Model Facility in it, to make it

observable,
(Pa)=Xa=[(Xa)Pa]=[(Xa)Xa]-0 Ect.
3.0,13 This Model Facility Object is not the same as the
Model Facility, which is a part of an Object.
3.0,14 Within the Model Facility Object, there is a Model
Facility of the Model Facility Object.

13.0,15 The Model Facility Object can stand as a surrogate

for the Model Facility in our Universe, being of

nothing but the Model Facility.

3.0,2 The Universe of observation consists of Objects.

3.0,3 The Model Facility is not an Object. It cannot be

discussed, but it can be inferred as necessary, and

its necessity may be examined.
3.1, The Model Facility is that part of an Object which

makes the knowing existence of the Object possible.

. 3.1,1 The Model Facility permits observation. The obser-

vation made through it is the Object, in the

observer's belief. The observation of the Object

through it is not a Model, but is the Essence or

-behaviour.
13.1,2 The Model Facility is that within an Object which

gives the Object integrity; permits its form to con-

tinue; maintains it.

3.1,3 The Model Facility is thus a calculus with an inter-

pretation, though which an observer. projecting his
 25

views, can see that of the Object to which his. views

relate.

3.1,4 The Model Facility regulates the projected views: if

an observer's observation does not take account of the

Model Facility, the observation will be false in that

the Object cannot sustain it.

13.1,41 The meaning of cannot sustain it is shown thus: if an

observer predicts that an Object can do something, and

that Object cannot do this something, the prediction

is "untrue", and the observation from which the pre-

diction was made was a "false" observation, for it

lead to an "impossible" behaviour.

3.1,42 In this case, the observation was made without proper

regard for the Model Facility: or, without proper

regard for the calculus with an interpretation that

is the Model Facility.

3.1,5 This is the structure of the Model Facility.

13.1,6 In this structure lies "meaning". An observation

made without proper regard for the Model Facility is

meaningless, that made with proper regard for it is

meaningful.
3.2, All observations of an Object are made through its

Model Facility.

3.2,1 The Object exists by virtue of its own self-

observation through its own Model Facility.

3.2,21 An observation needs an observer as well as an

Object's Model Facility,

(Xa)Pb.
3.2,3 Each observer is Unique and has its own Essence,
Pb [(Xb)Pb] -4 Eb,
(pc > rty
LkA E c)Pc c.
 26

3.2.31 Each observerts observation of the Object is, thus,

differeat,

(0a)l--E3af-[(Xa)Pbl,

(Pa)=BcL4(---[(Xa)Rc].

3.2.4 Each, ebservation is nevertheless made through the

same Nodel Facility.

13.2,41 Each observation of an Object is thus related,

through. the commonness to all observations of the

-Model Facility.

3.2,5 Each observation, being different, is of the same

object.

3.2,51 The Object can thus be a topic of cpnversation since

it can be held in common to different observations.

3.3, For in observation to have Meaning, it must be

related to the Object of observation.

3.3,1 The Model Facility is that which allows the Object to

be observed.

3.3,11 The Model Facility is that which permits observations

of the Object to be held in common.

3.3,12 Th e Nadel Facility thus makes observations relevant.
3.3,2 The Model Facility is thus the location of potential
meaning.

'3.3,21 The action of an observer observing on the Model

Facility creates Meaning.

3.4. Inasfar as the Model Facility makes all observations

of the Object relevant to the Object, It has a

structure.

3.4,1 The structure is the location of potential Meaning.

3.4,11 The observation made with this structure (with proper

regard for the Model Facility), is a Meaning.

3. S. The structure of the Model Facility prevents observa-
tions of other Objects being confused with observations

of the Object of observation.

a
 --<D

27

3.5,1 The Model Facility affects the observations made of

the Object through it,
(0a) 0 [(Xa)Pb]-

3,6, The observer has, similarly, his own Model Facility,

Pd 2:: rfv a )Pa

3.6,1 The observer's Model Facility has a structure, which,

when observed, gives Meaning to the observer's

observation.

3.6,11 The observer observing himself is thus prevented from

making irrelevant observations of himself.

3.7, The observer observes the Object,

r1V
(Pa >= Ba ý-- Pb
LkAa)
3.7.1 The observer and the Object both have Model Facilities

which ensure the relevance of observations,

4)a [(Xa) Pal,
=
PV rty
Lk^b)pbl'
13.7,11 Since an observation of an Object involves both the

Object's Model Facility, and an observer (who exists

by virtue of his own Model Facility), there is an
interdependence between these two Model Facilities,

(0Ci)ý13aý'1(Xa)Pb1`I(Xa)1(X )Pb11-
b
3.7,12 All observations are therefore interactive.

3.7,21 The Model Facility of the observer affects what the

observer believes the Object to be (the Object's

behaviour): as does the Object's Model Facility,

Pb 10(b)pbl,
r-

(Pa)I2Ba ý--'RXa)[(Xb )Pb R

3.7,22 The Model Facility of the Object affects what the

observer believes the Object to be (the observer's

awareness): as does the observer's Model Facility.

r
 28

3.7.23 The Model Facilities of both Object and observer thus

. affect the behaviour and awareness made by the

observation,

. Ba 4'[(X CL)[(X b) Pb 11 -) Ab-

3.7,24 The Model Facilities of both Object and observer thus

affect the Object's and the observer's existence on

the public level,

(0a) = Sa.

-Pb z: Ab-
All Model Facilities in our Universe are necessary

parts of Objects. They are not Objects, but they

can become Objects. Model Facilities affect observer

and Object in an observation. Model Facilities

make observations relevant. The structure of a

Model Facility, which makes observations relevant, is

the source of the Object's potential Meaning.

 29

4.0. There are two levels of existence.

4.0,1 Any Object in our Universe must be observable.

4.0,11 If an Object is not observable it does not exist (in

the Universe).

4.0,12 In order. to allow observation, all Objects have a

Model Facility through which observations are made.
4.0,2 The Model Facility is available to all observers.
'4.0,31 When an observation is made through the Model

Facility by the Object itself, the observation is

private,

(0a>=Ea(--[(Xa)Pa]-
4.0,32 This observation gives rise to the Essence.

14.0,33 When an observation is made through the Model Facility

by another observer, the observation is public,

(0a)= Baf. rfv

LkA
a)P']b -#A b-
4.0,34 This observation gives rise to a behaviour, of the

Object, and an awareness of the observer.

4.0,41 Many behaviours give rise to the Behaviour.

14.0,42 Many awarenesses give rise to the Awareness.

14.0,43 Public and Private are two different levels of

existence.
4.0,44 The Essence is Private. The existence of the
Essence is implicit in any other observation, since
the Object must exist for itself, to exist for other
observers. There is thus'a priority of existences:
the Essence is implicit in*both behaviours and
awareness, behaviours and awarenesses are only
potential in the Essence.
4.0,45 The behaviour and awareness, and the Behaviour and
Awareness are Public.
4.0,5 The term "Public" is chosen because any Public
 30

observation calls for a reference to an Object other

than that being observed.

14.1, There is a priority in these levels of existence.

4.1,1 For an Object to exist it must be observed.

4.1,11 It cannot be observed by any other Object unless it

has a means for being observed.

4.1,12 The Object must exist before it is observed by another

Object.

4.1,13 The Object must therefore first observe itself.

14.1,14 The making of its own self -observation must be through

the means for being observed.

4.1,2 This means must be in the self.

4.1,21 This means is called the Model Facility.

'4.1,3 Until the Object observes itself, it cannot exist,

(0a) = [(X
a)O a]-
4.1,31 Self -observation is existence, (in this Universe).

4.1,32 Existence makes external observations possible,

sa (Pa)=[(Xa)0a]
(S*1)Q Bat-[(Xa)Pb],
Where the letter S denotes a moment in time at which

an observation is being made, and the subscript C1

denotes that Object to which the time belongs.

4.1,4 Observations must be made through the Model Facility,

which is of the Object itself.

4.1,41 No external observation can be made before there is

self-observation.

4.1,5 Public existence depends on private existence being

already established.

4.1,51 Similarly, observation of others depends on obser-

vation of self being already established,

sa (Ob ) =: Pbt--[(Xb )Pb],
(S*I)a (0a)= Ba(==[(Xa)pb].

a
 31

4.2. Existence is through self-observation. Without

self-observation no external observation can be made.

Private existence preceeds Public existence.

 32

5.0, There is a sense of time inherent in this Universe.

5.0,1 It has already appeared in the notion of priority.

5.0,21 An Object must have an Essence in order to have a

behaviour.

5.0,22 An observer must have an Essence in order to have an

awareness.
5.0,3 Thus, time is a constituent of our Universe.

5.1, An Object observes itself.

5.1,1 In its self-observation it maintains its self,

cyclically.

5.1,11 This is an oscillation.

15.1,2 Oscillators necessarily imply-a, time sense in them-

selves.

5.1,21 The observation of the self by the self involves the

Object making Its own time sense.

5.1,22 There must be the possibility-of a change, between the

Object (being what it observes itself as), and the

Object's observation of itself, for self observation

to occur,

(0a) ý [(X Pa I
a)
'5.1,23' Thus, the sense of time in this oscillator consists

in the change of role within the Object (being either

in the role of observed or of observer), which can be

represented,

>= Pa)Pal
S'CL (0a) = [(X
a)
Where S' is the second half of the cycle beginning at

S, (S+1)*
'is the second half of the cycle beginning

(S-1)
at , etc.

5.1,24 These two states are normally compressed into the

one statement,

(0a) ý: [(X Pa
a)
 33

5.1,25 Without these two states, (the half-cycles of the

oscillator), the Object cannot be a self-observer.

For this reason, the whole statement is made, and a

change in time state is normally represented over one

complete oscillation. That is why the statement in

5.1,23 was made at S and S' not at S and (S+J).

, and
5.1,26 A complete oscillation for any Object can be rep-

resented as an are, with comparative lengths

representing comparative time spans in a Reference

Time (which is a convenience to allow expression of

the comparison). Thus, for the Object Oa

Object s
oscillation
Object's
timestate
5 Ls-i)a (s +7ja (s-3)cI(s-4)ct(s-5)cr
a
5.1,27 The different length of the drawn cycle is a com-

parative measure, and only means something to the

external observer using a Reference Time. To the

Object itself, the length of each cycle is the same,

being the time needed by the Object in itself to

change its role, and change back again. To the

Object itself, there is only the difference between

its time state as one cycle following another.

5.1,3 Change involves a "before" and an "after".
5.1,4 Time is a basic component for the operation of our
Universe. It is inherent in our Object.

15.1,5 The output of our oscillating Object would be, if we

could observe it, a tape of an infinite regress.

S. 2, The dependence of this time is on the Object only,

and on no other Object than that of which it is a

function.

5.2,1 Each Object is unique.

05.2,2 Each Object has its unique time.

a
 34

5.2,21 Time is local and belongs to the specific Object of

which it is part.
5.2,3 Reference Time and General Time are not a necessity,
(except for convenient comparison). That each Object

has its owd local time is.

5.3, An observation requires the observer and the Model

Facility of the Object being observed.

5.3,1 The Model Facility allows access to the Object by the

observer.

5.3,2 All Objects have their own times.

5.3,3. For an observation to take place, both Object roles

must be present.

5.3,31 In being present, they construct the Object, at the

level of either the Essence or the behaviour.

5.3,4 If the observer and the Object are the same, they have

the same time. The observation is of the Essence,

(0a)=Eat--[(Xa)Pa ].
5.3,5 The Essence is the Object. Each Object has a time.
5.4, The observer and the Model Facility are part of the

Object.

5.4.1 The observer and the Model Facility have the same time
.
as the Object.

15.4,2 The observer and the Model Facility make ah Object

possible.
5.4,3 When the observer is not the same as the Object, the

observation is a behaviour,
[(Xa)pb
-<0C0=BC14--
5.4,4 All-Objects have a time.
5.4.5 The Object is the behaviour.

5.4,51 The Object has a time.

5.5, The observer is an Object,
(0b )=[(Xb)Pb].
 BEST COPY

AVAILABLE

00

V ri ble print

qI ity
 56

9.2,4 The behaviour of this complex Object, as it is

observed by the observer, contains the relationship

seen between the observations made through the Model

Facilities of the two Objects.

19.2,5 The complex Object is an Object, an observation through

the Model Facility of which is believed by the observer

to contain or eaual the related observations through

the Model Facilities of the simple Objects.

9.2,51 The complex Object is the "result" of the computations

carried out by the observations made on its simples.

9.2,6 The complex Object is an Object like any other in the

Universe, to which the observer gives the role of

complex Object in relationship to those Objects in the

role of simple Objects.

'9.2,61 Thus the result of the "and" connection between two

observations may be shown,

IlBct--[(X(I)PZIIAIE(Xb)pzl:
--ýEýoll(-ýIBclt---[(X)P
C z11)
sirrple sirrple coryptex
11
Where the tall vertical bars indicate groupings,

and where,

(OC>=BC=[(Xc)P
ZI -
is the complex Object.

9.2,62 Similarly, the implication is shown,

JjBcj )Pz]j---)j[(Xb)Pz]=ý
It=[ýC, BbjjHBC ý= [(XC)Pz]l.
simple simple complex-
shown by,

IlBa<=rlva )Pjj
V, P-'-- AU)"ý-"ý BbIl-ý11 4=[(XC)PAj-
simple SWnIP: complex
 35

5.5,11 The observer has its own time.

5.5,12 The observer must connect to the time of the Object

of observation.

15.5,2 The times of the observer and the Object of

@
observation connect. This is a correlation (of time

5.6, Each Object has its own time.

5.6,1 The times of the observer and the Object of

observation correlate.

5.6t2 When the observer is not observing the Object of

observation, its own time does not correlate.

5.6,3 There is correlation during observation.

5.7, Observation is made through the Model Facility and is

the Essence or the behaviour,

Pa )Pal (0a)=B [(Xa)pbl-

--4E=
a aý=
5.7,1 An Object must observe itself, to be observable by

any other Object,

(0a) = Et-- rfv Al

LkAC

Pb = Eb(--: [(Xb)pbl.
5.7,2 The Model Facility is the means by which all

observations are made by all observers.

b. 7,21 The Object's Model Facility is common to all

observations.
5.7,3 The behaviour of an Object correlates with the

Essence of the observer observing it.

5.7,31 The Object observes itself, and correlates with

itself.

The word "correlate" is used in its Dictionary, rather than

its statistical, sense.

0
 36

5.7.4 The Model Facility of both observations is the same,

and is the means for correlation.

5.7,41 In order for both observers (the Object itself and

the external observer), to observe through the same

Model Facility, it must be there for both of them.

5.7,5 There is only one Model. Facility in the Object.

5.7,6 If both observers want the same Model Facility to

observe the same Object, and one observation is

necessary to the other, the other must correlate with

the one.
5.7,61 The observer's time correlates with the time of the

observed behaviour, which correlates with the

Object's own self-observing time.

5.8,1 We can summarise the correlation of observer and

observed roles.
5.8,11 For the Object Oa itself,

SCI /t [(X Pa
a)
S6 I(Oct)= Ea [(X
a)
(s*0a PC,
Cl)
(5*1)'a 1(0a)= ECTý= [(Xa)

(S*2)a [(X "'a

f= a) 1,
Where the heavy boundary indicates the boundary of a

normal Object expression.

15.8,12 At S6, (S+1)6 the is "vacant" in
, etb., observer role
0a and may be filled by another observer: thus at
(S Pb OCI it
*')ý - may observe giving a behaviour,
 37

SC, t- [(X Pa ],
a)
S& (0a)=Ec, (=- [(Xa) ' 1,
(S*I)CI, [(Xa)P, 1,
4= a
.
(0a)=Ea ý+(Xa)Pbl
(s*2)a [(X Pa :
Ba.l
a)
5.8,13 For Pb to be able to observe 0a he must be in the

role of Object to his own observation,

Sb 1ý
b)PDI,
S'b 1(0 Tot-- Pb)1,
bEý
(S41)b I
4='[(Xb)pb

5.8.14 For the observation Of Oa by Pb at time (S+J)*a

to take Pb must be in the role of Object of
place,
its observations (i. e. at time S'b )- Thus, the form

of the observation at S'b by Pb Of Oa (giving only

those parts that go into making the behaviour) will

be.

(S-Oct
ý=[(Xa)pa
H:
(S-1)'CL
(q ocý = E
t:
[(Xa)Pb]-- Sb

(s#2). (Oa>=) Ba (S*l)b

1ý=--[(Xa)Pa]

5.8,15 And the form of Pbýs self will be,

-observation

[("ý
4:= b)P b) Sb

(0b) [(X b) 5'b

=
[(Xb)pb (5-1)b
=
 38

S. 8.16 Hence, a summary of the whole process of interaction

Is,
[(Xb)pb Sb

[(X(: Pb=Fb)I "b

I)
(S-2)Ci (0c). (S *1)

5.8,2 Call the

.
E
correlated
E3
times during
[(Xb)pb
which
]
observations
b

take place "shared time", and notate it with a sub-

script from each Object sharing a "shared time".

Thus, if ObjectOCL is observed by observer Pb their

-
"shared time" can be notated,

S(a,b) I (s+1)(a,b)t etc..

5.9, The awareness of an observer is the same as the
behaviour of the Object observed.

5.9.1 The observer's time correlates with the behavioural

observation.
5.9,2 The observer's time correlates with the awareness

observation.

5.10, In making observations, the unique, individual times

of, the Objects involved correlate.

95.10,1 The times only correlate when an observation is

being made.
5.11, All Objects have their own times. Observation

requires correlation between these times. No

observation is possible without correlation. The

times of public and private existence are the same.

a
 39

6.0, The observation made by any observer of any Object,

whether public or private, is personal to that

observer.
6.0,1 No observation that can be made can be made except
with an Object to be observed and an observer to

observe it.
6.0,2 All observations are made through the Model Facility

of the Object being observed,

Bci += [(Xcl )Pb ] Ab
, =ý
6.0,3 There is nothing in an observation that is not of

either the Object or the observer.

.
16.0,4 No Essence can be experienced except by its own Object.
16.0,5 No observation can be experienced except by its own
Object. of observation and observer.
6.0,6 The behaviour and awareness are the observation as
experienced by, respectively, the Object and the
observer.
6.0,7 No observation can be observed other than by the

observer who observes it.

6.1, All Objects can be observed.
6.1,1 Communication is the transmission of an observation
from one observer to another.
6.1,12 ýn
observation cannot be observed by any other observer
than the observer who made it.
16.1,13 Thus, communication by transmission of an observation
itself is'impossible.
16.1.2 Representation is the making of one Object that stands
for another.
6.1,21 Representations must be Objects, otherwise they would
not exist in our Universe.
6.1,22 Representations, being Objects, can be observed.
6.1,23 If an observation can be represented by another Object,
it can be observed.
 40

'6.1.3 Communication Can occur when observations are t

represented by Objects which are observed by other

observers.
6.2, There are two Objects which can be seen by the

observer. Call one Oa the other OC

. ,
(Oa > Ea<==[(X Pa
a
(0 4- [(X
C>EC cPc
6.2.1 The observer Pb observes the two Objects,

Ba rty ) Pb (0c),
LV,a
Bc [(Xc)pbl-(0c)-

6.2,2 If the observer observes both Objects as being the

same, they are identical to him, for these observa-

tions,

4 E)
a)P b] '-: aBCPC)P b],
(Pa >- Ba B c-(O C>,
Where the bi-conditional(--)indicates that -the
behaviour of each Object to the common observer, appear

to be the same. The origin of this computational

ability (and, of all other computation abilities used)

will be covered later.

16.2.21 The two Objects are not identical; each Object has

Its own unique Essence,

(0a) [(X Pa ],
-Ea, (-- a)
<Oc>- Ec(;. [(Xc )PC ].

6.2.3 But for the observer, making these observations, the,

two Objects, that is, the two behaviours' the observer

believes are the two Objects, are the same.
 41

"S. 2.4 Thus, for the observer, one Object can stand for the

other Object, as a surrogate.

S. 3, An cbserver cannot see the observation made by another

observer,

[(Xcl)pbl (--1-4 [(Xa)pdl

Where the negated bi-conditional indfcates that

there is not an identity between the two expressions.

6.3.1 Both observers can see the same Object, each attributing

a behaviour,

(00)- E3a 0-4N Pb]

(6a >- Ba (--[(X Pd

Ct
6.3,11 Both observers will observe the Object differently,

Lad will believe they observe the Object.

S. 3,2 If one observer takes a second observable Object to

stand for his observation of the first Object, the

second observer may also be able to observe that

Object,

E6 4"' Da ) Pb It
(pb)
BC(p [(Xc )Pb
b
(OC) Bqu (OC %
Bc, [(Xa )Pd ],
(pd) -
B 4ý-[(Xc )Pd 1)
('(Pd)'
(OcL>-Bag(--4BC(g
-(Oc).
There the sub-subscripts (%) and, (pd) indicate the

observer attributing the particular behaviour.

6.3,21 By observing the two Objects, the one standing for

the other, the second observer can understand what he

believes the first observer to have observed.

a
 42

6.3,3 Thus, by use of a surrogate Object, Communication

is possible.

6.4, An observer can communicate to another observer, by

means of a surrogate Object.

16.4,1 The other observer will construct a behaviour for both

the Object and the surrogate Object, in order to make

a picture of the observer's observation.

6.4,11 There is no certainty that the second observer will

understand anything similar to the observer's

observation.
16.5, In order for any Communication to take place with

certainty, the second observer must represent the

observation he makes of the first observer's observa-

tion.

6.5,1 The first observer may then try and reconcile what he

believes the second observer observed with what he

observed initially.

16.5,11 This is an error regulator.

6.5,12 This is a conversational idiom.

6,5,13 A conversation WX consists, therefore, in three

stages of representation.
6,5,14 In the first stage the Initial observer states his

observation,

WX(S) PCL's
view
6.5,15 In the second stage the listening observer states his

view of the initial observer's view,

WNSA) PCs view of Pa 's view

6.5,16 In the third stage the initial observer states his

view of the listening observer's view of his own view,

Wx(s+2) Pa's view Of Pb's view of Pa's view

0
 43

6.5,17 Computing the error consists in finding the difference

between WxS and Wx If there is no difference,

(S*2)
Communication is good. If there is a large difference,

Communication is bad,

%S (---) WX(S+'2) good communication,

Wxs'-'-"Wx(s*2) bad communcation,

The means for computing differences of this type are

covered later.

6.5,2 A full explanation of representation in a'conversation

is therefore, as below.

6.5,21 To an Object 0a which is a topic of a conversation,

the observer P, attributes a behaviour and then uses

Y
another Object Ob to represent his observation.

This is,

(0a) [(Xa)Py]=4 Ba(py),

=
(0b) - [(Xb)PY] =) Bb(p ),
Y
Ba(p Bbpy)
Y
(OCI)ý-ý(Qt)- (stage Wx
S).
6.5,22 The second observer attributes a behaviour to this

surrogate Object, and represents the behaviour by

.
another surrogate Object. This is,

(0b) = [(X b) Pz] 4 E3b(Pz))

(0C> = [(X BC
C)PZ] =ý (PZ),
Bb(pZ)(---) Bc(p
z
(P b)'r-40 (stage Wx
c>-
6.5,23 The original observer attributes a behaviour to this

other surrogate Object, and compares this behaviour

to the behaviour he attributed to the initial Object.

 44

This is,

(Oc> = [(X 4 BC(P I

C)PY] Y)
(od>:: [(Xd)pyl=) Bd(Py))
BC(Py)(---)Bd(Py),

(oc>(-ý(od). (stage W4(S+2))*

6.5,31 If there is no difference, the second observer is

assumed to understand,

(Ocý I- Bci(Pyt--ý BdP f: (0d)-

y
'6.5,32 If there is a difference, a new surrogate must be

found, either to re-express the original observation,

or to express the difference,

(00: `Eý(PyX-4 Bd(Py)`Pd>-

6.6.1 A surrogate Object may be used to communicate an

observation made by an observer of an Object. A

surrogate Object is an Object in the Universe like

any other Object, In the role of representing another

Object.

6.6,2 A conversation may be used as a check of the success

of Communication between two observers.

a
 45

7.0, The observation, by an observer, of another Object,

Involves a correlation of times.

7.0,1 The result of such an observation is a behaviour

attributed to the Object by the observer, together

with an awareness developed by the observer itself,

(Pcý ý 13017-'LkXG) Pb Ab-

7.1.1 All observations made in the Universe are made by

Objects, of Objects.

7.1,2 All Objects are self-observers.

17.2, If one observer observes two separate Objects at the

same time by his local clock, there will be two

different behaviours attributed by it (one to each

Object),

(PCL)ýBe--[(XG)Pbl

(Pc>--BaOý[(Xc)Pb]-

Where Pb Is the observer.

7.2,1 Each observed Object has its own time. Observations

are only made with the correlation of the observer's

and the Object's time.

7.2,11 For the twd observations Ba and BCthe shared times

(i. e. the times of the observations) are shown as,

S(a,b),

Both of which have something in common (i. e. the local

time of the observer, denoted by the b in the subscript).

17.2,2 In terms of the local time of Pb the observer, there
I
*
are five ways in which these shared times may relate,

while having something in common. Using the arc to

0
 46

express the shared times, we have these possibilities,

sla,b)
S(CA or. case 0),

S(a,b)
kI
5(c,b) or I case b),
I
b)
-S(a,
S(C. case c)
b)

s(h,b)
'S(C.b) L case d)

NO)
case e)
-s(c,b) I

Where the dotted bar lines indicate the span over

which the comparison is made.

17.2,21 In case a, the observation made through local time

S(a, b) contains s (c, b) , that is, the behaviour of

Object Oa contains the behaviour of Object OC,

attributed by the observer This is the form of

implication,

(Oa>= BCL(-13C= (0c)

17.2,22 In case b, Ba is completely contained by BC
, giving
the reverse implication to case a,

4)a) = Ba Bc = (0c).
--)
'7.2,23 In case c, E3aand E3Coverlap, but neither is wholly
-contained in the comparison, giving a logical "and",
ý%) =BCLHBc = (0c).
.
17.2,24 In case d, 13ais completely contained by, and com-
pletely contains E3c# giving equality, or the bi-
conditional,
 47

(0c) = 13CLA BC = (OC).

'7.2.25 In case e, Ba and [3 overlap and they are both

C
wholly contained in the comparison, giving a logical
"inclusive or",

(Oa) = Ba V BC = (Oc>.
7.3. There is thus, in the necessary existence of each
Object's local time, giving rise to the shared time of

each observation, a computational logic in which

implication in both senses (--->andý-), equality

and logical "and" (A), and "inclusive or"

V is already inherent. There is no negation,

since comparisons can only be made when the observing

Object can observe two other Objects during the some

part of its local time.

7.4,1 We have noted that implication is available in both

senses. This means that cases a and b are the same

computation with a different direction.

'7.4.11 Similarly, allowing a fracturing of the shared times

of case c, we obtain,

S
(a, b) case c)
S(c, b) logical biconditional.

Where the dotted arcs indicate the fractured times.

17.4,12 This is effectively two implications operated succes-

sively in opposite directio-ns. Thus the bi-conditional,

can be treated as the implication,

followed by the reverse, ( (or vice versa).

7.4,13 Applying the same process to case d, we obtain,

(a. b) case d)
S(C.b)
1-1-ý__ 1091CCLI
and.
lk
 48

In which the central section (at which the logical

and operates) now takes the form of case c, and, by

further fracturing can be treated as a pairing of

implications, Each are is, itself,

fractured into two arcs, so that each of the little

arcs is implied by the big are, but only one little

are of which is involved in the computation.

7.4,14 Finally, with case e, we obtain,

SýL.
b) case e)
s (c. b)
togical nclusive or.

This is essentially the same as case d, except that

all the little arcs are involved in the computation.

7.5, In this way, we have established a computational logic

that has only the operation "implication" (with a

reversible direction).

'7.6, The computation of comparisons between observations

made by one observer of two Objects may be executed

by comparing the shared times against the observer's

local clock. All these computations may be considered

as being sequences of directional logical implications

If a fracturing of the shared times is allowed.

a
 49

18.0, The finding of a relationship between observations of

different Objects is the making of a Model.

18. O'l A Model exists In the Universe, and is therefore an

Object.

8.0,2 A Model is an Object placed in the role of a Model to

another Object by an observer.

18.0,3 By being placed in this role, an Object becomes a

surrogate Object to another Object.

S. 0,4 A surrogate Object is used, together with that Object

to which it is surrogate, to communicate an observer's

view.

8.0,5 The relationship is between the observations, that is,

the behaviours, ''

(0a) Ba '(--RX )P b)
2: CL i
(PC)=E3C(--[(Xc )Pbl)

(Oct)=13Q
(--) BC=(0C).
8.0,6 This relationship is one of identity.

'8.1, When the relationship is one of identity, the Model

may be referred to as a Language, and may be denoted

11L A Language is a Model which is, in the

subscript"*
view of the observer, Identical to the Object,

(0C1)=E3C1
ý=[(XCI)Pt)),

<Oc>=Bc ý=[(XC)Pb]=LC.

8.2, There are three other relationships that may hold.

between two Objects.

8.2,1 The first is containment or implication, in which one

Object has all the qualities of the other, while the

other does not have all the qualities of the one,

(0a)=Ba (--[(Xa)Pbl)

(PC>=BC ý= [(Xc)pbl)

(Pa )=;Ba---)B (0
c= c>.
 50

8.2,11 This relationship may operate in either direction.

It is clear that the converse is also possible (while

not the same),

(0a)= BQ(-BC = (0
C).
S. 2p2 The second relationship is logical "and", or sharing

of a common area,
(0a) =B (-- [(X Pý
CL (3)
(OC)=Bc ý=[(XC)Pb1
LV'

A Eý--(Otý.,
(Oc)= E3C,
S. 2,21 Here, only a part of one Object is implied by the

other. Calling this common part Od we have,

,

APa>--Ba 4--RXG)PbJ)

(00=E3C (--[(XC)Pbl,

(od >= Bd ý= RUP

bI
Oct)= Bd- N= (P d),

(0c)= E3cf-Bd=(Pd>#

E3d(--) Bd
-
S. 2.22 Thus, the logical "and" can be seen as the sequential

operation of two implications.

S. 3, The remaining relationship is summationp or the

logical "or". Using Od again to denote the common area.

(Oa>=Ba Pa)Pbh
'ý:

<Oc>ýac (--[(XC)Pbli

(Pd)ý-E3d (--[(Xd)Pbl)

<Pa>= Ba v E3C=KO>j
C
(Oa >= BQ--4 Eýd=(Pd >j

<0 13C Bdý (P

C>= ---) q%

<Od>:: Bd"Bd=(O d
 51

8.4. The difference betweeR the logical "and" and the

logical "or" thus lies not in the logic, but in the

direction of the implications.

8.4,1 The whole logic is made up of a series of implications.

8.4,2 The means by which these logical computations can take

place is through the correlation of the observational

times of the different Objects.

8.5, Where an Object stands as surrogate for another Object,

it is a Model of that Object.

8.5,1 There is only one type of relation that exists between

these two Objects, although the relation may exist in

either direction, and may be applied several times.

The relation is implication.

8.5,11 Equality consists of two implications, opposite in

direction, in which the change from Object Oa to the

Model OC is equalled but reversed in the change from

the Model to the Object,

(0(1)= BC17---)BC=(OC>;

(Oa)=Baý--Bc=(Oc).

8.5,12 Logical "and" consists of two implications, one each

from the Object and the Model, to the area týey share

in common,

(PQ)=;Ba(---Bd=<0d),

(C) BC(-- Býý (0 d >.

c>ý:

S. 5,13 Logical "or" consists of two implications, but in the

reverse direction to Logical "and",

(0a) ýBa--4B d-: (0 d))

<OC>=BC--ýBdý'«) ä>
-
 52

'8.5,2 Using, this one logical operation, together with, its

two directions, we can account for all our computa7

tions. There is no negation because if there, is no

relationship between observations of two Objects, one

may not be surrogate to the other.

8.6, Let us call the type of Model, made by this operation,

according to its direction of implication.

S. 6,1 It the implication is from the Object to the Model,

we have,

(0C)= Bcl----)Bc ý(Oc) = MC

-
Where M denotes the role of an Object being surrogate

to another Object.
PIC
S. 6,11 Put another way, with representing this type of

Model, which we call the Anti-Model, we have,

(0 >7-E3(-- [(X P bl = Mc
c c c) (C),) -
which means the same thing.

S. 6.2 If the implication is reversed, we have

ýOcj)=Ba(--BC= <OC)=MC-

S. 6,22 Putting this another way, with MC representing the

Interior Modelling process, we have,

(Ocl>--E3a'(--
RXQ)Pbl
-
(Oc>=Bc ý=[(XC)Pbl=MC(OC,
).
S. 7. Thus, we use the expression Airti-Model M for a
Model which contains the Object it Models, and the

Interior Model M for is

expression a Model which

contained by the Object it Models.

 53

8.8,7be computing of a relationship between the behaviour

of-two'ditferent Objects can lead to one Object being

placed as surrogate to the other. The surrogate is

called aModel; when the relationship is a bi-

conditional, the Model is called a Language, when

deduction an Interior Model, when inference an Anti-
)Aodel.
 54

9.0, A complex Object is an Object that standsýfor some

-other-Objects, in some way, as observed by an observer.

@ for
9. O'l A Model is an Object that. stands some other

Object. '

9.0,2 A Model and the Object of which it is observed to be

a Model are related by an observed area of commonness.

9.0,3 A Model of a Model is also a Model of the Object of

which the Model is a Model.

9.0,31 A Model of a Model is thus a Model of two Objects: an

Object, and another Object which is a Model of that

Object.

19.0,4 A transformation is a Model of a Model.

9.0,41 Thus, a transformation is an Object which represents'

two other Objects and is a complex Object.

9.1, Objects can be observed by an observer to relate

together.

9.1.1 The parts of Objects through which an observer sees

them, are the Objects' Model Facilities.

9.1.11 If Objects are observed by an observer to relate

together, the relationship observed is in the observa-

tions of the Objects' Model Facilities making the

behaviours the observer believes to be the Objects.

19.1,2 The possible relationships between observations

through the Model Facilities ýf Objects,
observed as

observedby the observer, are four. as already

examined.

0
The word "Model" is used in its Dictionary, rather than its

-Technical, sense.

0
 55

9.1,21 One observation through a Model Facility may share

something in common with another in the observer's

view,

(()Q PZ] A RX b) P
z1-
This is a logical "and".

9.1,22 One observation through a Model Facility may contain

another,

[(Y'ci)pzl--)[(X b) Pz I

This is a logical implication.

9.1,23 - One observation through a Model Facility may equal

another,

((X POHRX b) Pz ]-
--- a)

This is a logical equality.

9.1,24 The possible connection by a logical "or" is

compilation,

F v RXb) Pz]
G)Pzl -
9.1,25 These relationships reflect those between Object and

Model, but with this difference: a Model is an Object

surrogate to another Object while a complex Object is

.
in Object which is the "resdlt" of a computation

between two other Objects (simples).

S. 2,1 Nothing in our Universe that is not an Object can be

observed, and therefore exist.

9.2,21 An observer gives behaviours to the two Objects.

9.2.22 A commonness between these two behaviours can exist.

9,2,3 The commonness is an observation made through the

Model Facility of a complex Object. If it were not

an Object, it would noi exist in the-Universe.

f
 PAGE

NUMBERING

AS ORIGINAL
 57

9.2,64 And the result of the "or" connecti6n is,

jjf3a4-KXa)P+j[(X E3bll4--)IBct--[(XC)Pz]l
b)Pz]=>
simple simple complex
9.2,71 A complex. Object stands for more than one other Object.

9.2.72 A Model or Language stands for one other Object.

9.3, A complex Object is an Object like any other Object

in the Universe.

9.3,1 The representation of an observation in the Universe is

a surrogate Object.

9.3,2 The representation of an observation of a complex

Object must be by a surrogate Object.

9.3,3 ýA complex Object exists, and is observed to be similar

to, the simple Objects to which it is placed in the

role of complex Object.

9.3,4 The expression of this observation of the complex

Object, is by a Model@.
9.4, A Model is an Object like any other-Object in the

Universe.
9.4,1 If a relationship is seen by an observer to exist
between the observations made of two Objects which
are repr6sented by a Model, the relationship may be
represented by a Model.
19.4,11 If the complex Object representation parallels the

relationship between the simple Objects and the complex

Object, in relating to the representations of the
simple Objects, there is a complex Model.
9.4,12 A Model representing a complex-Object need not be a
complex Model.
9.4,13 A Model representing a complex Object will be a

complex Model if it represents the simple-complex

relationship observed between the Objects represented.

@
In this context (9.3,4 to 9.6, ) the term Model includes Anti-

Model and Language (which are types of Model).

4
 58

9.5, Rodel Objects may be observed to have something in

common.
9.5,1 This commonness is embodied in a complex Model.

9.5,2 A Model is an Object like any other Object in the

Universe.

9.5,21 A complex Model is an Object, like any other, in the

role of complex Object, like any other complex Object.

9.5,22 Since a Model is an Object in the role of representing

Lnother Object, a complex Model must represent some

other Object.

9.5,3 A complex Object demonstrates an observed similarity

between two (or more) simple Objects.

9.6, Objects which are observed by an observer to have

similarities, have other Objects called complex Objects

which also have the same similarities. Complex

Objects are Objects ih our Universe like any other

Objects, put in the role of complex Object by the

observer. The representation of a complex Object is

a Model. If the Model representing the complex

Object parallels the relationship to the Models

representing the simple Objects, that Model is a

complex Model. Languages can be related together by

an observer.
.
 59

110.0' There are five basic forms of argument. They are

Deduction, Induction, Abduction, Analogy and

Identification.

10. O'l All arguments may be compounded from these, f ive. f orms.

10.1, All five forms may be derived from our form of

implication.

10. I'l The form of a deduction from an Object to a Model is the

form of an implication from the Model to the Object, or

the form of an Interior Model,

(0Q)=BCt(---; (Od.
-MC'=
10.1,2 The form of an induction is, conversely, an implication
from Object to Model, or an Anti-Model,

<Oci>= Ba--ý M- (Oc

. C=
10.1,3 The form of a tautology is the Implication of a Model

from an Object, and the implication of that same Object

from the Model,

(0(2) =Bct--)Mc= (0d)

(0c) Ma= (0a) Ba)

(0a)= BcI(-4Ma=(0a)= Ba-

That is, an Anti-Model which is itself modelled by an

Interior Model which is the same as the orieinal-Object.
110.1,4 A. tautology can also be achieved by the reversal of
direction of implication,

(0a)=Ba(-Mc=(Odj

KO =M = (0a) = Ba
C> C-ýFAa i
<Oa>=BQ(--)Acj = (0a) = E3cL
-

a
 60

10.1,5 An abduction is a making of an hypothesis, and the

creation of a new statement from that hypothesis. it

is thus the construction of an Anti-Model from an

Object, and the statement of an Interior Model of the

Anti-Model which is not the same as the object,

(0C1)=BQ-AC =(0C>0

(PC>=k*-Md ý(Od) = Bd-

There Od is from OCL more precisely, the

abduced , or.
behaviour Of Odas seen by the observer is abduced from

the behaviour of OCI.

10.1.6 An analogy is the converse of abductibn, that is, it is

the making of an Interior Model, then an Anti-Model

which is not the same as the original Object,

<Oa)=BCL(---Mc
= (0c),
-.
(Oc>ýMc--iýd7-(Od>= Bd-

Where Od is analogous to Oa.

10.2, Thus, all five forms of argument may be achieved by the

operation of our Model making bi-directional implication.

10.3, It will be'noticed that the operation of an implication

between an Object and a Model can be taken as the

operation of a transformation on the Object, producing

the Model (i. e. the transformed Object).

010.4, If we wish to follow the various stages in a Modelling

we may find the notation we have used (especially

-process,
with respect to the similarity, or lack of similarity,

between the Object and one of Its Models) rather long-

winded. It can be abbreviated to show the chain,

read from left to right, using the forms M for Interior

0
 61

Model, M for Anti-Model, and Q for the initial

Object@. The difference between the Object and the

Model can be shown by a marking of the Remainder
(notated R ). That which is omitted from the Object Q

in making an Interior Model M is the Remainder R

Conversely, the Anti-Model adds in the Anti-Remainder

An index-is used for labelling purposes.
10.4,1 Using this notation, we have the following,

10.4,11
01m
ZL--ý3
R deduction.
1.2

10.4,12

inducton.
1.2
10.4.13

0mM where R1,2 )R

2.3
R R2,3 tautology,
1,2

ý3,1,2where R R2,3.
,.
R
1,2 2,3

@
The notation is introduced to abbreviate and simplify the

expressions. It should not be forgotten that we are, however,

talking about one observer's computations carried out with the

behaviours it attributes to the Objects.

 62

20.4,14
R R
where 1,24-*4 2,3
ý, R2,j abducton.
2 -

10.4.15

where R(1)P- 2.3

ý, ancdogy.
3
'10.5, Thus, the form of an argument may be deduced by com-

paring the Model, Object and Remainder.

20.6, Thus. an initial Object can be re-constructed by the

reversing of the process.

'120.7, Argument forms are the results of implications between

the observed behaviours of different Objects. as seen

by one observer. All five basic forms of argument

x2ay be constructed from this one operation, and thus

-the form of arguments can be understood from the Model

types.
 63

11.0, A tautology Is the statement of an identity, yet is is

shown in our logic as the result of two Modelling

operations: two implications opposite in direction,

but. with the same Remainder and Anti-Remainder,

I-
0MM )R
1,2 2,3'
R R
1,2 2,3

k--)M
1 3

QmmR1,2 )R
2,3'
R1.2 R
2,3
01(---) p3

Il. O'l In making this identity, we are taking two opposite

Modelling operations, and with the Remainder and Anti-

Remainder being equal, we are cancelling the two steps

against each other.

In making an abduction or an analogy, in contrast, we

cannot cancel the two steps, since the Remainder and

Anti-Remainder are not the same. If the Remainder

and Anti-R6mainder were the same, the form of the

argument. would be the form of a tautology.

In the case of an abduction, then, ' we have,

MM
1.2 2, V
R1,2 R
2,3
01(7f4M3'

A
 64

111.1,2 In the case of an analogy we have,

0mmR ý2,3'
1,2(-4)
R R
1.2 2,3

11.1.3 Thus, under the circumstances that the Remainder and

Anti-Remainder are equal but opposite, two successive

implications of opposite direction can be cancelled

together.

11.2, Let us call each implication a dimension@ of Modelling.

It has direction which is shown by the Model form

(Interior Model, Anti-Model).

11.2,1 A tautology has no dimensions, since its two Modelling

stages are opposite and the Remainder and Anti-

Remainder are the same, e. g.,

01 M2 M3 R1,2( )R
2,3'
R R
1.2 Z3

01

11.2,2 By contrast, abduction has two dimension, firstly of

Anti-Modelling, secondly of Interior Modelling,

0M2M3 P1.2 )R
2.3'
R R
1.2 2,3
01 --)M (--M 3'
2

Dimension is used in a sense analogous to that in which it is

used by the Physicist and Engineer. The problem approached

.
here is the starting point of this whole Thesis.

a
 65

M2 is the first Model dimension, M3 is the second.

They cannot be cancelled.

11.2,3 Similarly, analogy has two dimensions, but in the

reverse order,

0M2M3R1.2 ýý R
2,3'
R1,2 R2
ý3
01M2 ----)m 3

M2M3is the first Model dimension, is the second.

They cannot be cancelled.

111.3,1 If two Models of the same sense follow each other,

they may also be cancelled. Obviously, an Interior

Model of an Interior Model of an Object is an Interior

Model of that Object,

M2(--M
3
M3

'11.3.2 Similarly, an Anti-Model of an Anti-Model of an Object

will be an Anti-Mod6l of that Object,

01 )M2-)M3

01 )3.

11.3j3 The Remainder or Anti-Remainder does not affect the

cancellation of one Model into another Model of the

same sense.
 66

'11.4, Thus, strings of Modelling processes may be cancelled

into strings of simplified Model steps. These are

called Model Dimensions.

'11.5, Using this technique of dimensioning, Modelling strings

can be simplified, and analysed into their basic

argument forms. From each pairing of final Dimensions,

the form of the argument may be seen. Thus, keeping

the Dimensions of a Modelling process is a way of

keeping track of the argument set up, and is, with a

record of the Remainders and Anti-Remainders, a means

for ensuring the recreation of the original Object! s

behaviour, at some later time, by the observer, if the

observer should wish to do this.

 67

12.0, The Object must observe itself before any other

observer can observe it.

12.0,1 Nevertheless, its self-observation is private, and

cannot be seen by others.

12.0,11 Thus, public existence is separate from private, but

depends on there being a private existence.

12.0,21 Private existence allows existence in the Universe,

but does not allow others to know of the existence.

12.0,22 Public existence is the knowing by others of the

existence of the Object.

12.0,3 The progress of public existence is the Object's Life-

span.
12.0,31 The first observation of the Object by an external

observer is its "birth". The last is its "death".

12.0,32 There Is no way of knowing "how long" an Object has

observed itself before an external observer observes

It.

12.0,33 There is no way to know if an Object observes itself

after the last external observation.

12.1, The Model Facility is that which permits observations

to be made of an Object.
12.1,1 The Model Facility is that which makes sure observations

made of the same Object are made of the same Object.

12.2,11 An observer observes the Object. The observation is

a behaviour.
12.2,12 The Object observes itself. The observation is the

Essence.

12.2,13 The Essence cannot be observed by the external observer.

12.2,14 The Essence and the Behaviour are made through the same

Model Facility.

12.2.2 As more observations are made by external observers,

the Behaviour increases.
 68

12.2,21 That which is the Behaviour cannot be the Essence.

12.2,22 As the observations' constituting the Behaviour

Increase, the remaining possibilities for the Essence,

remaining unique, diminish.

12.2,23 The Essence must be that which the Behaviour is not.

12.3, As the Behaviour increases, the possibilities for the

Essence diminish.

12.3,1 Without the Essence, the Object cannot exist.

12.3,2 The Object makes its own Essence through its Model

Facility. Other Objects observe this Object through

the same Model Facility and make its Behaviour.

12.3,3 A behaviour cannot be the Essence.

112.3,4 Ultimately, a behaviour must be attributed that is the

same as the Essence, for there will be nothing else

left.

12.3,41 As this point is reached, the Object can no longer be

externally observed. '

12.3,42 When the Object can no longer be externally observed,

it is dead.

12.3,43 The time during which the Object is externally observed

Is its Life-span.

112.4, The same applies to the Awareness of the observer: as the

AFareness increases, the observer's self -observation

(Essence) is "threatened" the 'the observer's other

observations.
112.5, The increase of the Behaviour decreases the possibility

of the Essence remaining private. If the Essence

becomes public it is not the Essence. The Object

becomes unobservable by external observers when the

Essence is the only possible remaining behaviour of

the Object. Once a behaviour has been attributed to

the Objec: t, its Life-span has begun, and it will

gradually tend to. the unobservable.

 69

13.0, In order to know something exists we must be able to

observe it.

13.0,1 If we cannot observe it, we cannot know it exists.

We cannot necessarily affirm its non-existence, either.

13.0,2 If we do not know an Object exists, we can usefully

say nothing about it.

13.0,3 A Thesis says things about Objects.

13.0,31 If we cannot say things about Objects, we have nothing

to say.

13.0,32 It we have nothing to say, we should not try to speak.

13.0,41 We state our Universe, thus, as being a Universe of

observation.
113.0,42 We are not concerned with other possible Universes.

13.1, For an Object to exist in our Universe, it must be

observable.
'13.1.1 The Universe contains only observable Objects.

a
 70

EXPLANATORY TEXT
 71

"0.0, The only way in which we can know things is by a

personal experience of them: and that presupposes

that we can, in some form and sense,, observe that

thing. This view is established by Laing, et

al(*60), and given wider, context by Bannister and

Fransella"12), in their presentation of Kelly, s(*56)

Theory of Personal Constructs. Bannister and

Fransella make the quite reasonable point that it is

difficult to talk about any set of personal constructs,

without assuming a personal interaction with the

World, and thus, personal knowledge. This is,

clearly, the underlying belief of the cognitive view

of the World.

110.0,2 The same view lies at the base of Existential philo-

(*92)
sophies (as colourfully depicted by, e. g. Sartre

in his novels): that is, we r1ay-only speak with

authority about those things of which we hILve

knowledge.

110.0,32 The point thus becomes to eliminate those thirigs of

which we have no knowledge from any attempted discus-

spion. This can be done by pairing the "unspeakable"

with the "unknowable". The same sentiment is used

by Wittgenstein(*108) to terminate the discussion in

his "Tractatus".

1'0.1, This does not, in any way, deny the existance of

other things than those of which we have experience,

but it does insist that we can say nothing about

them (not even that we cannot talk about them, which

is the central paradoxical theme of much of

(*110)
Beckett's work, especially "The Unnamable").

"0.1.1 In this way, we provide the "entry qualification"

to our Universe: that the Universe contains only

observable Objects.
 72

"l. 0,2 Bishop Berkeley's views of our Universe (i. e. the view
(*112)
of the Idealist School as discussed in Passmore ) is

the one that immediately springs to mind. His basic

interest was in the means for keeping Objects in the

Universe observed, and to this end, he invoked God. The

series of Limericks shows the argument perhaps more

clearly than any other statement:

There once was a man who said, "God

Must think it exceedingly odd

If he finds that this tree

Continues to be

When there's no one about in the Quad. "

For which the Idealist answer was,

Dear Sir,

Your astonishment's odd:

I am always about in the Quad-

And that's why the tree

Continues to be,

Since observed by,

Yours faithfully,

God

However, the stance of this Thesis is slightly dif-

ferent, for we insist on the Objects in the Universe

observing themselves (and hence being present In the

Universe);

Dear God,

Why did'you forget me?

I don't need another to see:

I don't need no bod

Around in the Quad:

I'm observing,

Yours faithfully,
@
Tree.

@
See the Appendices
 73

Certain objections are normally set against this

type of self-observing system: a complete descrip-

tion which is consistent, is necessary (as shown by

(*37)),
von Foerster if an Object is to maintain
*46 )
itself in this manner. Yet G6del( argued con-

vincingly that it was doubtful if such a system could

be assumed to exist. (The system put forward in this

Thesis avoids this problem, as will be shown

*106 )
presently). However, Winnograd( has made such

an Object (an algorithm for self-reproduction),

(*64 )
albeit a rather simple Object, and L6ffgren has

demonstrated a theoretical condition for complete

self-reproduction.

111.0,4 This self-observational quality has inherent in it a

concept of priority (which will be covered in depth

later); all Objects in our Universe have to be self-

observers, in order to be In the Universe. Clearly,

for any Object to observe any other (in the Universe),

both Objects must already exist (otherwise they

could not observe/be observed).

1, However. this isolation of each Object, its self-

dependence, means that the Universe is built up of

(*85)
seperate entities, in the manner of Piaget's

child's Universe; each Object observes itself,

regardless of the observations made of it by other

Objects. That is, each Object is isolated, and,

if it has any relationship with another Object, the

relationship is secondary to the Object's isolated

existence.

"l. 1,12 The ability to observe the self is permitted through

the incorporation in the self of the "Model Facility".

In each Object (and it should be noted that this is

a characteristic of all Objects in the Universe, and

 74

not merely "intelligent" ones: it applies equally

to electrons and to elephants. In this respect,

this Thesis is an advance on von Poerster(*36), who

has come nearest to a similar formulation). The

Model Facility within the Object is that which

permits observations to be made - in this respect it

is rather like a Cate into a field - and thus

(*63)
provides a means for Lilly's self-meta-

programming to take place.

111.2,2' Thus, the Object contains, in itself, not only the

Object (of observation), but also the observer, and

.
the means for observation to take place (the Model

Facility).

111.2,3 This is achieved by the cyclic form of the Object,

for the Object observes itself, and is thus both

observer and observed. This involvement of the

observer in the realisation of the Object is a

cognitive view of observation, and its relationship

(*33)
to that which is observed, (von Foerster ).

In other words, we must observe in order to know, and

our observing also forms that which we can know.

The circularity of this form of observation of the

self echos the specification for life put forward by

(*65)(*120)
Maturana and taken as an a priori by von
(*36)
Foerster to the effect that life is that which

sustains life. Other circular descriptive forms

exist (the serpent eating its own tail Is one of

ancient lineage), and Ashby(*8) has shown the need

for this self-observational facility (the Model

Facility) if any form of the necessary control to

main stability is to exist in a system.

"1.3,11 This explanation of the nature of the inhabitants of
 75

the Universe leads to the understanding that Objects

are essentially private, and therefore cannot be fully

explained by any description. The Essence of the

Object lies within the Object itself. Our common

experience in consulting a dictionary (as with the

feeling that we cannot see all), for example, shows

us this: for if we keep on referring to each indivi-

dual "meaning" in the dictionary, we will eventually

end up looking up the original term we could not

understand. This circularity of meanings is

(*79)
reflected in Pask's proposition of a "Knowledge
Entailment Net", and is also parallelled in the form

of our Objects, with their inherent cyclicity, lead-

ing to the view of the Essence.

I'l. 3,12 The privacy of the Essence is an old philosophical

concept, as in, for instance, Ilegel"50).

111.4, The inclusion of the Essence in the formulation of

the Object, indicates the uniqueness o; each Object,

and, indeed, the already talked about privacy of

each Object. This is a spatial distinction between

Objects.

$'1.5 A possible explanation of this Universe is the

SOliPsist! s contention thit'the Univeise Is ihe con- -

struction of the observer. This argument would

make the Essence of each Object basically irrelevent,

but it has been (*37),

well answered by von Poerster

who suggests that, if"I"observe an Object which ýV'

have supposedly invented, and that Object can converse

with"me"(i. e. can form a "mental picture, " of "me"),

then it is difficult to know that it was not he who,

in the first place, invented"me, ' so that "I". could

invent him. If this is the case, there is no point
 76

in accepting the Solipsistic argument, because it cannot

lead us to any conclusions. This pragmatic dismissal of

a point-of-view, as being "inefficient", is a very

cybernetic stance.
"l. 5,2 On the other hand, the statements of this Thesis do not,

either, support the contentions of the archly contrasting

(*97)
Behaviourist School (as exemplified by Skinner

The use we make of the term behaviour is a cognitive use,

involving the interaction of both the observer and the

observed. For this reason, many simultaneous (and

possibly contradictory) descriptions of an Object can

@
exist.

-1.6.1 However, there are limits to the behiviours that can be

attributed to the Objects, and these are limited by the

Model Facility. This is how the Model Facility becomes

the seat of "meaning" within the Object: and the observer

attributing a behaviour to an Object must do so through

the Model Facility. In this respect, the Model Facility

resembles the means for operating at the Lo level in

(*82)
Pask's paradigm.
"l. 7,4 The attribution by an observer of a behaviour to an

'Object is,. however, the Object, to that observer (at the

time). For the observer (not being the Object) has only
this view of the Object. The differentiation in the

text is to show formations and roles. But it should be

understood that the behaviour which an observer attributes

to an Object Is that Object, to that observer.
"1.8,12 Many observations (by many observers and/or at many

This is essential to the intentions of this Thesis, and, for

this reason, any description that dismisses this ric: hness of

views is contrary to our stated aims.

0
 77

times) of an Object can exist, full of apparent con-

tradictions, for they depend on the observer as well

as the Object. Thus, although each individually

attributed behaviour may be clear-cut, the combination

will not be. At the moment, the techniques evolved

for the handling of such loosely defined collections

are not really appropriate to this concept.

Zadehls(*109) Fuzzy Sets are (as has been noted in

the introduction) inapplicable because they fuzzify

after the statements have been forced into a very

tight and simple framework, and they are not capable

of sustaining individual, and contradictory, views.

Nevertheless, they are a better statistical technique

than has previously been available, and the

Behaviouý does share something in common with a

Fuzzy Set.

"1.9, We have now derived three different ways of looking

at our Objects, the Essence, the behaviour, and the

Behaviour: each is, in its own way, the Object for

the observer, and the Object is thus all three.

111.9,3 On the other hand, there is a priority in these

views of the Object: the Behaviour assumes that

there are already some behaviours, and a behaviouý

(as has been explained) assumes the Essence of both

the Object being observed, and the Object observing.

 78

"2.0,12 Observing involves the interaction of the two

participants in the observation: the Object being observed

Is observed through the observer's connection with

its Model Facility. Because of this, no observation

can take place without this change in form: yet the

Essence of the observed Object cannot be seen.

This leads to an Uncertainty (which helps account for -

the different views held by different observers of

(*51)
the same Object), and reflects aspects of Heisenberg's

Principle, in that the Object as observed is not the

Object as it observes itself For the external

observer to observe the Object, involves the observer

taking over the role of observer with the Object's

own form, and producing the observer's view of the

Object. There is thus, whenever an external observer

observes the Object, a necessary change in the

Information inherent in the Object. In the case of

an atom, Heisenberg could talk about this as a photon,

but there is no such physically measurable unit for

epistemological "atoms".

This analogy is perhaps a little farfetched, but it was of

great help in the forming of this Thesis. The Uncertainty

of Heisenberg's Principle comes from an observational problem

In a space of reduced dimensions, and from the problem of

significant energy transfer. Our Uncertainty comes also

from the impossibility of seeing what is, but not because of

energy transfers, which do not concern us. Rather, our

Uncertainty comes from the very identity of the. Object and
the observer. Nevertheless, Heisenberg himself was not at

all averse to pushing analogies like this, especially in

relation to "indeterminate art forms".

 79

"2.1,2 In participating in this observation, the observer

makes A behaviour. f or-the Object. vIcHowever,.. this

behaviour Is equally a product of the observer as it

Is the product of the Object'. The same observation

could, then, be attributed to the observer: and when

this is done, it is called an awareness.

112.1,3 There is thus, a critical difference in roles. The

observation is the same, but it can be related to

the observer just as it can be related to the Object.

Similarly, an Object in the Universe can be in the

role of observing, just as well as it can be in the

role of observed.

112.2,41 And, as with a behaviour, so it is with the matter of

priority In the awareness: for there to be an

awareness, there must be an Essence, in both the

Object, and the observer.

112.2,6 The Awareness also bears a simil arity to a Zadeh(*109)

Fuzzy Set, in the same way as a Behaviour. We are

all aware, as a matter of Common Experience, how we

can hold "inconsistent" and "contradictory views":

to talk about the Awareness in the same way as we

discussed the Behaviour seems therefore to be

reasonable.
112.4,1 In this way, the observer's Awareness becomes his

view of the Universe: that is, an observer's

Awareness is the sum of his views of the Universe,

and is completely subjective. Even a set of

observations of the Universe made by an "objective"

observer would be uniquely and necessarily its own

view, and would be thus subjective.

 so

113.0,11 The totallity of an Object is vital: it needs not

only that which is observed, and that which observes,

but it also needs the means of observation. With-

out all three parts being present together, the

Object does not exist in the Universe.

"3.0,15 In order, then, to consider the Model Facility as an

Object (which it is not: it is part of an Object),

we must turn the Model Facility into an Object itself

(otherwise we cannot talk about it, in this Universe).

We therefore make a "Model Facility Object", by

letting the means of observation both observe, and

be observed by, itself. This deception would appear

to be a possible means of accounting for the re-

* (*65)(*120)
production of organism (viz. Maturana

113.1,2 From the foregoing, it is possible to discuss some

of the properties of the Model Facility, to try and

better understand its character. As with And4eka, Gergely

(*44)
and Nemeti (in their characterisation) the
,
Model Facility (which they refer to as a Calculus)

is the in-built means by which a system calculates

its own characteristics. In order to do this, the

Calculus requires an interpretation in a syntactic

plane. on a semantic domain. In our case the

observer interprets what he sees through the Model

Facility: The Model Facility structure Is the

syntactic plane, in which the semantic domain is

operated on. In other words; the Model. Facility is

that through which relationships (in von Foerster's

g*36)
sens ) are computed.
@
the (observed Object) and the observer have already been

stated to be Objects, and can be formulated as such.

 81

113.1,41 The observer's observation through the Model

Facility is thus regulated by the characteristics of

the Model Facility. An inappropriately attributed

behaviour can therefore be thought of as being

"wrong". However, a "design intention" of'our

Universe is that contradicting behaviours should be

attributable by various observers at various times,

and so the concept "right" cannot be held in the

normal form: for that is an "objective" overview,

and an external observation. Fortunately, Turing's

(! 40))
Test (as reported in George can be used in

this context, allowing the "rightness" of attributed

behaviours while the Object itself does not act in

some contradictory manner (in the observer's view).

113.1,6 Nevertheless, the structure of the Model Facility,

locating, as it does, meaning,, is the seat of

Chomsky, s(*26)(*28) Deep Structure, for it is-through

this that the Object takes on its, existence for each

observer.
"3.2,41 And it is also because of the commonness of the Model

Facility to all observations, that the Object may be

<0a)
named (and notated ), as being the same Object
in all views. Without this', the Object behaviours

would have nothing in common, and we would not be able

to assume any identity in an Object about which we

speak.
(*52)(*53 )"Glqssemell,
"3.3,21 In this manner, 11jelmslev's 'or
basic structural unit of meaning bearing, can be
identified with the Model Facility, which is that

which gives the Object a meaning, when observed.

This is the "atomic" unit of meaning! but it cannot

be. as Hjelmslev would have liked, examined for its
 82

characteristic structures, because an observer's

observation using a Model Facility, yields an Object.

This view is in comtradication, however, to de

(*93 ) between
Saussure's belief that the relationship

the signified and the signifier (being the two

necessary parts of a sign) is arbitrary, because, in

our case, there Is a very clear structure in the

Model Facility that participates in making the

"appropriate" attributions that an observer may draw.

In a certain respect, this view appears to have more

(*95)
in keeping with that of de Selby who takes a

more symbollic view of naming, suggesting that there

is a necessary link between the Object and its name.

It should be pointed out here that we are not usually

talking on exactly the same plane as the works we

have-discussed: they are concerned explicitly with

the representation of some Object, while we are

talking of a pre-2inguistic level, in which we observe

-the Object through its Model Facility, attributing to

it an appropriate behaviour. However, later sections

on representation will make the parallels clear on

the overtly representational level.

"3.7,11 It might appear that there is no'way in which the

observer can "form his view" of the Object (i. e. the

Object might appear to be dominant in this explana-

tion). But this is not the case, because the

observer, being a self-observer, as well, Is constantly

(*63)
reprogramming himself (in Lilly, ý; sense) through

his own Model Facility. Thus, his ability to have

a view of his own, depends on his own Model Facility.

and there is thus an appreciable difference between

a
 83

obsýrvations made, acco rding to each observer's

Model Facility. We would, of course, expect

nothing else, and a considerable quantity of

experimental work bears this out, for instance:

Arbib(*5), in general cybernetic approaches;

Lettvin et al(*62); in the field of physiology;
(*48)
Gregory in perception and bionics; and
(*18)
Berger in art.
 84

114.0,31 Observations may be made by any observer which cares

to make them. That is to say, any observer may try

and observe an Object by means of its Model Facility.

This includes observers outside the Object itself, as

well as-the Object's own self-observation.

The observation which the Object makes of itself

involves no reference to anything that is not a part

of the Object. In this sense; it is a private

observation, in that not only can only the Object

itself make this observation, but there is no external

reference that is involved in making it. It is not

possible to be insistent about this, but it would

appear that this self-observation is probably un-

communicable, and that this is why it is not possible

to get an"laccurate" picture of what any Object really

is. - This is, of course, an anti-objective view of

the Universe: but then, so is the whole of this

Thesis.

114.0,33 On the other hand, an observation made of an Object

by an external observer is a public observation, in

the sense that it is made with a reference to something

outside the Object itself (i. e. the external observer),

and it is most definitely communicable (as we shall

see).

Thus, there are two levels in this Universe: the

private and the public.

This differentiation between the two levels is

reflected in Ashbyls(*9) discussion of the predominance

of the Black Box in his work. The Black Box cannot

a
 85

be examined except from the point of view of its

behaviour (measured as input/output correlation).

This is how we arrived at the use of the term

"behaviour" in describing the Object when observed

by an external observer. What actually happens in

the, Black Box cannot be seen by an external observer

(it is thus the Object's Essence), being private.
Our interaction with this privacy is public, and is

not the same as the private self observation.

"4.0,42 Similarly, there Is a differentiation to be made in

the observer: the observations that are made of the

self are private, while awarenesses are public, in

that they, involve a reference to some Object outside

the observing Object's self.

114.0,43 'These two levels permeate, therefore, the whole

Universe.
114.1, However, these two levels are not on an entirely
equal footing, since one presupposes the other.
Observations in this Universe have been shown to
have certain pre-requisites: in order for an
external observation to be made, we have shown,
there must be already both an observer to make the
observation, and an Object, of which the observation
can be made. Both of these are, of course, Objects,
else they would not inhabit our Universe. Yet, for
an Object to exist in this Universe, it must be a
self-observer. Self-observation is private, external
observation is public, and self-observation must
exist before any external observation can be made.
Thus, an external observation presupposes self-
observation by both the observer and the observed.

a
 86

A sense of priority of this sort is, of course, not

(*78)
unusual. Pask's theory fo intelligent funcion-

ing involves itself in precisely the same sort of

puppositions, where it I'm-individual" 19 the

I
result of the representation of a "P-individual".
"4.1,14 However, both these types of observation are made

through the same Model Facility (if they were not, it

would be difficult to insist that they were of the

same "Object"), and it is this which is essential

to the possibility of there being observations, and

to the establishment of the two levels. In effect,

-the Model Facility acts as the description of the

Object itself, needing the presence of an observer

using it to establish an observation which is (to

that observer) the Object. It is in this way that

the problem of the complete and consistent Universe

-that C;Sdel(*46) questionned is made irrelevant.

Our Objects, containing the form of their own
descriptions (their Model Facilities) do not need to

refer externally to any other'Object, in order to

exist. Each is, as it were, its own axiomatic

system, and needs no elaboration in the form of

theories that may or may not be consistent and

complete.
"4.1,3 The circularity of form of the basic Object

description, that of the Essence, is not itself

(*65)(*120)
this form has been used by e. g. Maturana
--unique:
(in his description of what life is). in order to

get over the problem of a recoursive definition,

returning to some infinite nothingness, or some

atomic axiom (and thus to Godel's problem). Indeed,

the form of circular definition is becoming more

pervasive, no doubt because it does seem to avoid
these problems.
 87

"5.1.2 The nature of an oscillator is to switch consecutively

from one state to another, the switching on of one

state being the trigger which will eventually switch

on the other state (turning off the original state

at the same time). In this switching, the oscil-

lator actually generates a timesense of its own,
based on the property of this state switching. (And4id

nowadays we use this oscillatory motion, at an

atomic level, to provide the yardstick against which

(*94)
we measure a concensus, General Time). De Selby's

experiments with oscillators formed from Objects

their ions in
. and self-observat mirrors, reflect most

accurately the sense in which, our Objects are

oscillators, generating their own times.

115.1,23 Thus, each oscillator has two half-cycles in its

time unit: in our terms, that half when it is the

observer observing, and that half when it is th6 Object

being observed. This half-cycle delay in the

watking of an observation (i. e. between the receiving

of a signal, and its transmission, or, in our terms,

the making of the observation and the being observed)

is a standard feature of almost all computational

and automata theories, especially those which are

based on some biological or neurýphysiological
McCulloch"67), (*39),
understanding, e. g. George
(*5),
Minsky(*71) and Arbib where the receiving of
an impulse (in a neuron) always implies a delay in
the transmission of the impulse by the same neuron.
(The delay is not necessarily a half-cycle, because

the neurologist is talking of the transmission along

a chain. However, the functioning of most neurons

can be described in terms of their own half-cycles:

a
Although de Selby's times are reversed.
 88

that is, the two halves are "being able to receive

an impluse" and "being able to transmit an impulse".

When viewed this way, a neuron is an oscillator, just

as our Objects are).

(*94) (*21)
-15.1,5 As de Selby originally noted, and Brown
(*114) (*49)
Varela and GUnther later reaffirmed, the

output of an oscillator produces an Infinite Regress,

*30)(*31),
of the sort discussed by Dunne( in his

paradox of the painter painting the World. But

whereas Dunne has no method by which to handle this

regress (except for mapping it onto another regress,

which is (temporarily? ) running parallel to the first,

one time unit behind), the subtlty of the form that

we give, here, to an Object, is that it is a machine

that produces this regress (although we cannot observe

the regress itself), and as such can be handled as

an entity.

"5.2,2 The generation of time, in our Universe, is, then,

an inherent result of the actual formulation of a

specification for Objects to exist in the Universe,

and the production of time by each Object depends

soley on the Object itself, and the changing roles

It. must assume, to be able to exist. Time is,

therefore, local, being produced by each Object of

itself. A General Time, of the sort we use for

measuring and for synchronisation, is a construction.

of ours, rather thana general co-ordinating reference,

basic to the Universe. Our common experience

supports this view: for, even when referring to the

reference clock of General Time, we have to say,

often enough, "Oh! Is it really eight o'clock

already? "
 89

"5.4,2 Since time is local to each Object it follows that

the observer and Model Facility parts of the Object

synchronise into the Object's own time (this is how

the Object's time is generated).

115.5,2 Equally, the times of external obs*ervatioýs must

related to the times of the Objects being observed,

at the moments of observations: otherwise, there

would be no way in which the (external) observer

could correlated with the time sense of the Object

being observed, and thus observe the Object, in the

way our formulation decrees. The correlation

between the observer and that which is observed is

(*30)(*31)
another point which we have in cominon with Dunne

115.8,12 Thus, the external observer, slipping into a vacant

slot in the formulation of the Object which is being

observed, can only observe during the half-cycle when

that observational slot Is vacant. This characteri-

(*84)
stic of observing has been argued by Petri in

his proposal for a temporally based system of computa-

tion. His computation is, in this respect, very

(*30)(*31)
similar to our observation. Dunne
. also
depicted a' similar means of observation, which he

related to Heisenbergls(*51) Uncertainty Principle,

explaining that the minimum photon necessary fof the

making of an observation, could only be transmitted

when there was this observational correlation of

times, and that, in this time sense, lay the neces-

sity of the incomplete observation.

The correlation of these times (that of the observer

and that of the observed) is familiar in the latch-on

effect that occurs between independent physical

oscillators running at similar (but not identical)

frequencies,
,

a
 90

'IS. 10,1 It is important that the times of observer and

-observed only correlate when there is an

observation being made, for, since this temporal

correlation provides the means for making

observations, and for computing relationships, a

general correlation could imply a constant obser-

vation of all Objects by all other Objects, all the

time! It could also be seen to imply an Object

which was not like all other Objects in the Universe,

a General Time which controlled all other Objects.

-The same process of temporal correlation can if

treated in this temporarily correlative way, account

for memory (and that we do not remember everything
C*69)
all the time, or everything all at once). Miller's

somewhat ngive paper on the rnumber i of parillel -.data7, we can

process in our brains at one time, suggests a

physiological and psychological limit to the number

of simultaneous observations one observer can make,

at any one time on his local clock: aýd, although one

may disagree with his detailled conclusions (i. e.

7ý2 independent simultaneous data), one must agree

that a type of limited parallel processing does

appear to operate in the human brain's performance.

 91

1'6.0,4 The privacy of self-observation has already been estab-

lished. Objects can observe themselves, and these

observations, being only of the Objects' selves, are

private.
116.0,5 Equally, the observations made by external observers of
Objects, are public, involving reference to an Object
(observer) outside the Object being observed.
However, this is not to say that the observation made on

the public level of existence can be seen by any observer:

for, in itself, each observation is made only by one

observer, of one Object. Thus, each observation is

.
unique, and, leading to a behaviour (and an awareness),
it Is made only of the observer and the Object.

"6.1,13 Thus, an observation cannot, in itself, be observed by

any observer other than that which makes it, and

observations cannot be transmitted. Yet, we can transmit

messages, as we know from Common Experience, and so our

theory should account for this. The necessity of our

accounting for communication is further emphas. ised by the

(*96)
development of a whole Communication Theory (Shannon

with which our theory has certain differenceýo, -as will be

ýxplained later.

"6.1,2 If we cannot transmit the observation (i. e. the behaviour)

itself, we must find another means by which we can trans-

mit our messages. If we suggest a second Object, which

the observer observes to be similar to the first, we have

a means for the communication *of messages: for a second

observer may also observe the two Objects, the one of

which is similar to the other, and may thus compute a

similarity. This second Object that stands for the

first, is called a representation. In this respect, we

@
because'it has-, different concernsi
 92

(*108)
Wittenstein he talks of the non-
agree with , when
observation of the Object itself, but the observation of

a representation of that Object (which stands in an

assumed one-to-one relationship výith that Object).

However, our agreement only extends to the communication

of observations, not (as does Wittgenstein's) to the

actual observations themselves.

116.1,3 We therefore require the presence of some second Object,

for which a behaviour can be constructed which is to the

original observer similar to that of the original Object,

in order for communication to be possible. This reflects

Pask's(*79) test for learning (i. e. the understood com-

munication of behaviours) in a conversation, where the

learner is required to construct an Object with a

similar behaviour to the behaviour of the part of the

system he is learning, in order to show he has understood

the system. Pask refers to this as a Modelling Facility:

but this should not be confused with our Model Facility.

116.2,21 What we are communicating, therefore, is not the Object

itself, but a similarity that we compute between the

behaviours we attribute to two quite seperate Objects.

And in this construction of the behaviours must lie the

me.ans for the computing of similarities, for we have

recourse, In our formulation, to*no other things than the

two Objects, and the common observer. (How this is done

will be covered later).

116.2,4 Communication is by observation of two Objects, one of

(to (*73)(*77)
which is surrogate use Negroponte's word)
to the other. This is rather like Turing's Test, (as
(*40)
recorded by George ) for intelligence: where if a

communicating Object behaves as Intelligent, it must be

assumcd tc; be intelligent

t
 93

"S. 4,1 However, pointing out some similarity between two

Objects to a second observer (to whom the first observer

wishes to communicate), does not mean that the second

observer will make the same observations as the first:

indeed, as we have already discussed, he cannot. But he

will be able to observe the two Objects, attribute his

own behaviours, and then compute a similarity between

them.

5, ffince the observations of the two communicating observers

are not the same, the first observer needs more than to

be able to transmit his message in order to be confident

.
that he has communicated: but,. If the second observer

can transmit back to the f irst observer what he (the

second observer) believes the first observer intended (by

means of the same sort of surrogation), the first observer

has the possibility 61 judging if the second has construc-

ted a similar similarity to his own. This is known as a

conversational idiom, and was initially developed by

(*60)
Laing
, whose
idea has been extended and justified by

Pask"793(*82), through th6 extensive development of

)
Reacher ,s(*89 Logic of Commands.

5,11 The initial observer now has both his view of the Object,

wmd the second observer's view of his view: and this Is,

of course, an error regulator, for he can act in order to

correct the difference (if any) in these views.

Ashby(*9)(*10) has examined the means for such corrections
to be applied, but this is not our concern here. What

we have established is a conversational form that is

(*70 )
similar to Miller et al. 's TOTE unit. The presence

of the TOTE unit (Test Operate Test Exit) here confirms

Pask's"81) belief that it is not just a mechanism, but

tar an. underlying form of cybernetic (and hence communica-

tive) systems.
 94

'16.5,32 In this sense, we have come up with a theory of com-

munication which, while not matching the formulation

of Information Theory (and, particularly, as we shall

see later, allowing for new and unpredictable outcomes

(*103)
in situations), does match the requirements of Wiener

for a cybernetic system.

a
 95

"7.2, An bbserver must be able to attribute behaviours to

several Objects at once, if It is to be able to transmit

inessages In the manner described. This is made possible

by the oscillatory nature of Its roles (observed/observer)

In its self-observation. When, in its self-observation,

It is observed, it can observe other Objects. The limits

to the number of observations that can be made at once

*69)
(maybe 7 12 for humans - see Miller( ) depends not on
the nature of the process of observation, but the nature

of the observer.
"7.2.2 Observations of Objects require the correlation of the

iimes of the external observers and the Objects being

observed. And it is in the relationships between these

correlated times that we have an in-built means for the

pf similarities (and other logical relation-

-computation
ships). 'The -partial overlapping of observations (made at
the same time in respect of the observer's half-cycle)

gives a 3neans for the inclusion of one observation within

another. Thus our logical operators develop from the

necessary times of observations, giving us a temporal logic

(see Baer"111)). So, it is the behaviours, and not the

Objects, which are related through the times of observa-

t1JDnS. In this way, of course, the observer is establishing
his own hierarchy from a set of non-hierarchically

organised Objects. In this respect, our Universe consists

of a vastly large number of little isolated things,

.
arranged -non-hierarchically, and for which behaviours,

being attributed by different observers, are non-predictive:

(*108)
another -reflection of Wittgenstein
.@
"7.2,21 Our means of combination, so gathered, account for the

logical counectives of our Universe. Thus, the impli-

cation, for instance, from the Object "Light Green",

infers the Object "Green",
@
Personally, I find this very depressing.
 96

1'7.2,22 or its reverse from the Object "Green" deduces the

Object "Light Green".

117.2,23 The logical operation "and" can be demonstrated by the

Object "Green" and the Object "Box" combining to form

"Green Box",

"7.2,24 while equality can be exemplified by the Object "Finnish"

and the Object "The Language of the Finns".

"7.2,25 Finally the logical operation "inclusive or" can be shown

in Object "Green Field" or Object "Green Plant" combining

to "Green Field or Plant"'k, iaa* 11;

"7.4,11- However, all these operations can be "fractured" into

a chain of implications (facing either direction), giving

us but one logical operation facing in two directions.

This fracturing is a descriptive convenience, and is not

necessarily contained by our temporal logic which operates

by the different possible relationships between two

different observations.
"7.4,12 Nevertheless, this means of representing the relationships
(especially reflecting the bi-conditional), matches the
(*49) *64) *78)
techniques of GZnther LBffgren( and Pask(
, ,
In (*46)
explaining a cyclic means of evading G8del's problem
by making a Model of a Model of an Object which is the

same as the Object itself.

117.6, The notable peculiarity of this logical system is that

it has only one relator (although this has two directions).

Previously, Brown(*21) had evolved a logic of two

variables, based on the repeated crossing or the re-

crossings of a line of distinction (although Varela(*114)

has recently shown a third variable of self-reference to

be necessary to complete the system, which Patrick Welles

Is actually using In simulations at Columbia University).

The reason forvi the need for only one variable would seem
 97

to lie in the absence of the concept of negation, which

Is missing because a negation is not the computation of

a similarity. A'negation is being stated at any moment

when two observations are not being made.

 98

"a. 0, Using this computational relator, we can make Models of

Objects - but Models which are extremely abstract, since
they are not concerned with detailed mappings between

Objects and Models. This does not imply any contra-

diction with the work of, for instance, Klir(*59), and
Robinson(*90) an Model Theories; our interest assumes
the mappings of which they talk without investigating

their classifications.

I'$. O'l Not that this implies any hierarchical structure - for a

Model must be an Object just like any other Object, in

-order to Inhabit the Universe.

fta. 0,3 This role taking is very important: what it means is

that the "real world" is at whatever Objects one wishes

to place It, and any Model Is equally real - but is

placed In a relationships to an Object that reflects the

observer's hierarchy, and thus appears, to the observer,

not to be "real". Any Object with an Essence (i. e. any

Object in the Unvierse), is, therefore, potentially in

the "real world" of the observer. It is for the observer

to choose those Objects that, at any one time, will be

considered by him to be "real". In this way, the con-

sideration of Models is essentially insignificant.

fts. 1, Nevertheless, there is behind this a profound. truth:

that it is never the Object which is observed, and that

any insistent representation of any objective form of

reality Is false: for the Object itself (i. e. its

Essence) is never observed: instead, behaviours, attribu-

ted by the observers, are treated as a reality, and other
behaviours which are also attributed by the observer are
treated as supplementary, in that observer's view. This is

4n', 10'Diftlogues
reflected Beckett IsC*", with,, Geoig6bLDfifhuit11
t7here are many ways in which the thing I am trying in vain
 99

to say, may be tried in vain to be saidle). Nevertheless,

there is not a total arbitrariness in the attribution of

behaviours to Objects, for the "meaningfulness" of

attributed behaviours is regulated by the Model Facility.

In this respect, our Thesis is in agreement with

C*52)C*533,
Chomsky(-*283- and Hjelmslev as opposed to
@
C*93)
de Saussure for we assert that verifiably at-
,
irlbutable behaviours (and their representationg)frely*on.

Internal structures of the observer and the Objects

observed.

"8.5,2 , This is how all Model and Language representations of any

Object in the Universe may be made: by use of the one

logical operation, with two. senses of direction (i. e.,

implication).

although it appears that de Saussure's insistence on the

arbitrariness of the relationships was Itself rather arbitrary.

He certainly never investigated this claim.
 100

"9.0,4 A Model has something in common with the Object of which

it Is a Model, since it results from the computation of

an Implication between the behaviours observed by one

observer of two Objects. In this way, a Model is,

itself, a transformation of the Object. But, more

normally, a Model is made, so that, by means of a Model

being made of that Model, there is a transformation of
(*8)(*9)
the Object. In this, we echo Ashby
.
119.1,2 Our means for computing these relationships between

Objects and Model (and indeed between Object and Object),

grows directly from the formulation of the nature of

Objects In our Universe. This is a direct contrast

with the work of most philosophers who invent a special

class of inhabitants of their Universes, in order to

account Yor these

sorts of computations, called relation-
C*108)
ships. Wittgenstein again, epitomises this

stance, but he is not alone, developing, as he does,

(*38 )
Frege's division, and, himself, leading to Husserl s(*55)
distinction in his phenomonological view. Perhaps this

Is because these philosophers were concerned with a view

that stems from logic and hence possible relationships
between Objects, and their meanings, rather than a concern
f9r the Object itself, from which a logic can be developed.

In this way, perhaps it is thd work of Russell(*91), in

his attempts to reduce the whole of mathematics to a set

of logical functionings, which is the key to the approach

of these philosophers. However that may be, it was

obviously a valuable approach, resulting in a final

clarification of the issue of the complete reduction of

*46)
systems by G6del(

"9.2,5 Nevertheless, there are relationships drawn between

Objects, iýhich result in the setting up, by the observer,

 101

of, hierarchies of Objects (which themselves are non-

hierarchical). This is a cognitive process, executed

by the observer, and is essential If there is to be any

communication between different observers, of the

observations they make.

"9.2,61 The setting up of complex Objects (i. e. Objects that

result from the, logical operatilDm on two simple Objects:

or, rather, Objects :for whIch a beahavlour is attributed

by an observer. which is computed by the observer as

being the same as some area -of ovexlap of the behaviours

attributed by the observer to two other Objects, at the

'same time), which can be communicated to another observer,

involves a sense of communication vhich is distinct from

*96).
that of Shannon( Yor 'Shamman's description never

allows the development of the pTevious-ly unknown (i. e.

the probabilities can never exceed one) But, in our

Universe, observers can continuously construct new com-

plex Objects, each of which. is Itself a aimple Object,

like anyýother, butwhich Is put in the role of complex.

Purther, as we have pointed out, Objects can have no

certain predictions :made about t-h-e behaviours that will

in future be made of them, :from those that have already

been made. For this reason, lone Df the greatest weak-

nesses of probabilistic descripiions -must be overcome,

(434)(*36)
and it would appear that von :Fo-exster's Bug-

gestion of a measure of "Diversity" could be capable of

this.

"9.4,11 Since we insist on the equa2ity of jLU Objects in our

Universe, with only a structuring by the observer, we

must re-affirm that, regardless of the Tole in which an

observer places an Object, in building or representing

his hierarchy, complex Object, Model, or complex Model,

all the inhabitants of our Universe are simple Objects,

in themselves, and are only put Into their roles by the

observer.

@
Hence, the Law of High Numbers.
 i

102

"10.0, There are five forms of argument in this scheme of logic.

These are (as listed in Reichenbach(*87)), deduction,

IrLductioa, abduction, analogy and identification. This

is not to say that there cannot be other logical operators,

but they are not used in this system. Notable omissions

are negation (since we observe overlaps between Objects

to, make computations negation is simply the lack of an

observation), and the existential operator, 3, which is.

used to make statements of existence. In a way, this

existential operator is similar to our Object formu-

lation: the form,

3 x, M x.
Is quite similar to our formulation,

Qa=KXa)O
a] -
where 3 (together with, ) corresponds to X cor-

responds to Oa (f) to (X
, and a) -
These five forms are, in themselves, not basic units, for

induction and deduction are the same operation,

(implication), applied in opposite directions., and the

athers can be taken as the application of chains of

impl1cations, in both directions.

"10.1,4 The difference between the three argument forms that are

made of chains of implications lies in two factors.

Firstly, the difference between an abduction and an

analogy, lies in the sequence of the implication

directions: if the first implication is deductive, the

form is an analogy, while if it is inductive, the form

is an analogy. For a tautology, this sequence is ir-

reIer-ant (i. e. a tautology can begin with either an

@
Induction or a deduction). The difference between a
tautology and, on the one hand, an analogy, or on the

other, an abduction, lies in what is omitted and included

Although an- initial induction is easier, because none of the

original character is obliterated.
 103

in the two operations. If that which is included in

one operation is the same as that which is omitted in

the other operation, the form is a tautology. If not,

it is an analogy or abduction.

The form of the tautology is a'vital form, in any Model

theory. For, while Models are not the same as the

Objects for which they perform the Modelling role,

whether the Model is (in our terms) an Interior or an

Anti- Model,
ý., the mut t ý,be able
-Object,: -to'*-be- re-creatddzby
reversing the Modelling process. And the reversal of

the process, together with the original process itself,

is the form of a tautology. In this Thesis, the

reversal of the process of making the Model, is called

physicallisation, since Models are usually made, - in

order to execute some form of transformation of the

Object, and, without physicallising the Object from the

Model, the Object will not be transformed.

There is another way in which the tautology Is of funda-

-mental Importance in this Universe. For, as we have

pointed out, the circular form of definition (which we

use to formulate an Object: tritely translated from

the formulation as The Object is what it thinks the

Object is ),
.. .

Oa=N)OCI
is a nowadays common form used by, amongst others,
(*65)(*120) ' *46) *36)
Maturana Giinther( von Foerster( and
(*64)
lZffgren In particular, the tautological

relationship of a system and Its description, allows

(*46)
CTSdel's problem to be overcome, by making the Model

,of a Model of an Object identical to that Object.

Pask(*79)(*82), in developing his Entailment Nets, makes

extensive use of the tautological form (on a vast scale),

related to this system and description arrangement.

a
 104

1110.4, In making an Interior Model from an Object, that which

Is omitted is called the Remainder. Conversely, making

an Anti-Model, we include the Anti-Remainder. This

Remainder (or Anti-Remainder: but we will refer in

general only to the Remainder for the sake of simplicity)

is made up of potentially two parts. There is the

Information which is omitted (referred to as "I"), and

the means by which that Information was omitted (referred

to as the algorithm "f"). Thus, the Modelling process

can be shown as,

N-)MMI

However, it is possible that, in certain circumstances,

the Information is contained within the means of opera-

tion of the algorithm on the Model, i. e. the algorithm

is reflexive,

aM
R
Q(-)M(f)

The difference between these two cases is a difference of

self-containedness, or reflexivity, and is paralleled in

the assumptions of Semiotics and Linguistics (which is

assumed to be a special branch of Semiotics, as well as

a General Model). In general, the Semiotic approach to

a system of meanings, assumes that there need be no

external referent in the system. while the Linguistic

(*22)
assumption is of some sort of referent (see Bunt

We will therefore refer to the two modelling systems, In

order, as Linguistic and Semiotic, respectively. As

 105

(facile) exemplars, we may cite the following two

Firstly, a Linguistic system in which Q is

examples.
4, M is 2, f is +, and I is 2:

Q (--4m (f) I
4 (----)2 W2
Secondly, a Semiotic system, in which () is M is
-4
(2):
2 and f is square

0(---)M (f)

)2
Notice how it Is possible, even Q and M the same,
with

to find different ways of formulating f and

depending on the need for a Linguistic or Semiotic system

(althoueh this may not always be possible): and notice

also how the Semiotic system is a generative system, and

uses far less storage; an understanding exploited by

(*115)
computer programmers (especially Jackson ) in

reducing Memory storage requirements, and "kidding"

computers that their memories are larger than they are.

"10.5, The omission or inclusion of the Remainder in making

-Models also identifies what sort of Modelling proceduree

we are using (Interior or Anti-), and may thus be used

to compute the form of an argument, by computing the

difference between the Object and the Model, or looking

to see if we are left with a-Remainder or an Anti-

Remainder.

"10.7, It is because of the simplicity of this computation of

the form of arguments, involving only one type of logical

operation, the direction of which can be Interpreted

from the type of the Remainder in a Modelling process,

that this technique would seem to have a potential at

the level of a direct application in computer technology.

 106

Not only is it, apparently, very simple, but it is also

very fast. Furthermore, because the computer can analyse

the form of an argument being put to it, so simply, it

would seem that there is the possibility of it developing

an understanding of new terms when introduced in an

argument, and hence of extending both Its vocabulary and

Its understanding of its vocabulary. If this is so, it

would seem that we have stumbled on, not only a method

for mapping cognitive processes and arguments (which will
be detailed later), but also a means to make more ef-
ficient and more "intelligent" (according to Turing's

Test) the operation of our computers.

a
 107

-11.1,2 In using the technique of measuring the Remainders in

order to find the forms of arguments (i. e. do they

cancel, are they Remainders or Anti-Remainders initially? ),

we highlight a common experience in techniques of

Ineasuring: that is, measurement by the comparison of

Objects for their differences. And this provides us

vith a means for cancelling various parts of argument

strings together.

1111ý Z1,1 This technique of cancellation is, however, more simply

with the cancellation together of two con-

-introduced
Secutivp Models of the same type: thus Interior Model

lollowed by Interior Model gives Interior Model: this

(*21)
Us a clear parallel to Brown's law of crossing
(that a crossing made once is the same as that crossing

:made again).

Itat this is so, is immediately clear, upon reflection:

An Interior Model of an Interior Model of an Object must
be entirely contained within the original Object, and
the first Interior Model, of which it is an Interior

Model, and must thus be an Interior Model of the Object,

as vell as of the Interior Model. of which-itzis an

Interior Model.

3,: n Sizailarly, an Anti-Model of an Anti-Model of an Object,

:is an Anti-Model of that Object ,.

And cancellation of implications of, opposite direction

tan occur when the Remainders are the same, giving a

'tautology, (as already explained), but 4nalogies and
abductions cannot be cancelled (if they could, you would
loose the whole form of the argument).
 108

@.
1111.41 Tixis Is Xodel
-Dimensioning
This -recording of the Model Dimensions of processes of
'5'
zmaking Models (and, indeed, of making complex Objects)

-11--d to -several things: firstly, it leads to an

,economy the processes of Modelling, for chains of

-in
,nimila (and on occasion, contrary) Models may be

adumbLrated under one heading, and one stage, thus

:removing any extra steps that may have been included.

Semandly., this record may be used to help make sure that

-1he. pTocess of physicallisation is properly carried

a=t., axnd 71hat arguments are fought on similar levels.

Mh-ixdly, It allows a computer (or anyone elso) to unravel

the lorm nf, a -long argument. Fourthly, it shows the

mue-ans vf building hierarchies used by some observer, and

In -this is a map of the cognitive process that that

cibm=, veT -used (in this sense, it might f ulf ill the
(*29)
-requirement set up by Cowan for machines to act

AmtellIgently; and it clearly relates to the mapping of

7the Aevelopment of grids of several Constructs as seen

(456)
Am Xe: lly ). It also refers back to the concept of

a "treality", Inasf ar as it can demonstrate the construe-

(*33)
ti= cof mrealities (in von Foerster's sense) by

Mhe 31imenslanIng mf Models, the correlation and adumbration of

!Mode2s, :also 2eads us to the conclusion that we have a non-

;hl. exarchical -Universe: for, if some stages in hierarchical

st. Tuctures can be removed, where is the hierarchy - and at what

31ervel ±n the hierarchy are these Objects to be found? Our non-
kdexmxzhir_a: l ',Universe has produced a logic for the construction

qof (peTsonal) hierarchies which is, in itself, essentially non-

bleraz-chical and depends on a non-hierarchical ordering. One

Is tem pted -to say *'IQ.-E. D. 11!

 109

individuals, and it also shows that, in our non-

hierarchic -Universe, it is possible for individual

observers to create hierarchies, and that, from th6ir

points of view, their starting points are their "real

bases".

It has been the continuing concern of science to dis-

cover Models, for which the Dimensions are known, and

in which the Remainder is designed so that material can

bo fed in, and the output of this process of physical-

lisation will be the "reality" of the world around us.

In general, the fields of science manage this well

enough: yet there are areas outside those normally

thought of as sciences, where this attempt to provide

means of physicallising Models is being tried. In

(*2)(*3)(*4) *32)
particular, the work of Alexander Flemming(
,
(*41)(*43)(*121) 7)(*58) (*99)
Glanville Klee(*5 and Thompson
, .-. ,
has attempted to deal with this problem, of re-creating

a "reality" from a Model (i. e. of re-creating the Object

from which the Model was made, from the Model itself).

In these attempts, a record of the Remainder, and a set

of Model Dimensions, is of the greatest importance.

 110

"12.3.4 The number of descriptions of an Object made and com-

municated by different observers has a rather peculiar

effect on the Object described: for, as the Behaviour

increases, so the precision of understanding of the

Object becomes less. Thus, we are left with the seem-

intly strange belief that, the more we describe Objects,

the woollier they become. In this respect, our use

of the dictionary is interesting, for the dictionary is

an attempt to give one behaviour an authority over the

others, and thus to limit the Behaviour. Hence, the

need for Objects to 'Ire-define" themselves.

1112.4, By the same taken, the effect of a large number of

awarenesses seem to be reflected in the need that humans

have to 'Ire-define" themselves, when they let their

brains run wild, and they have too many influences on

them at one time. If they do not do this, they "break-

down" (usually quite literally, in a psychological sense),

overburdened with awarenesses.

"12.5, The implication of this might seem to be that there can

be no generous people: but this may not be the case,

for a generous person, being one who assembles large

numbers of- awarenesses, might not break-down if his

(unobservable to us) Essence was reflected outwards.

However, this is all pure speculation, and is only
intended as a passing thought.

a
 ill

(*24)
1113.0,42 Cage reports a debate between Dr. D. T. Suzuki,

and a Hindu lady, on the nature of reality, and of the

Universe that such a reality implied. After a long and

heated argument, Dr. Suzuki and the lady left, arm in

arm, and Dr. Suzuki, turning to the lady, said, "You

know, that's why I like philosophy: nobody wins".

This whole Thesis has only concerned itself with the one

Universe. It is not the only one, and it is not argued

that this is the only one; only that it seems to be a

useful one to look into. But it does appear to have

one interesting characteristic: it seems that, in

permitting the erection of hierarchies by observers in

the Universe, it may be able to contain many different

Universes. It can certainly contain many different

views of the City, at once, and without any conflict.

1113.1.1 As a parallel to this multiplicity of views of the City,

)
Pirs ig(*116 discusses the nature of the multiplicity of
(*117)
views of a motorcycle, with reference. to Kant's
(*118)
extension of Hume's Solipsistically based

empiricism. Kant specifies the"a priorillinternalised in

the observer's mind, as that against which empirical

knowledge-is arranged. Our twist on this is to inter-

nalise each a priori to its own observation, but not

(necessarily) for others, by making it a self-observer,

which can also be observed by others. Thus Pirsig's

"Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintanancell poses a

problem of the multiplicity of views of the motorcycle

(or the motorcycle's Zen), which we solve in a manner

at once similar to, but different from,. Kant.

1113.2, "Before studying Zen, lien are lien, and Mountains are
Mountains.

While studying Zen, all is confused.

4
 112

After studying Zen, Men are Men, and Mountains are

Mountains.

The difference is that, in the former case, the feet

(*23)
were a little bit off the ground" (Cage Reps(*88)).

or,

"Before studying Cybernetics, Men are Men, and

Mountains are Mountains.

While studying Cybernetics, all is confused.

After studying Cybernetics, Men are Men, and Mountains-

are Mountains.

The difference is that, in the former case, the feet

were a little bit off the ground".

 113

EXPERIMENT REPORTS

(London Knowledge Test)

(London Structure Test)

(Conceptual Space), -
(Leadenhall Market)

I
 114

FOREWORDTO THE EXPERIMENT REPORTS

The experiments reported on in the following sections

were executed by the author, with the assistance of

Annetta Pedretti (experiment three) and Tim Richardson@ (experi-

ment four). The subjects for the first three experiments were

students in Grahame Shane's first year study unit (Urban Topics)

at the Architectural Association School, London. The fourth

experiment's subjects were clerks at Lloyds of London.

The results of the experiments were sets of drawings,

some of which are included in each report. These drawings have

been subjected to a coarse analysis, presented in (in general)

simple tables, or summarising drawings.

The results have not been subjected to a rigorous

statistical analysis: the form of the data makes this both

difficult and irrelevant. Difficult because it is hard to count

discrete units in freehand drawings. Irrelevant because the

drawings themselves present the findings in the-clearest possible

way.

Kany drawings have been re-drawn: the originals, drawn

In pencil, would not print up properly. The re-drawing makes no

difference to the main content (from the point of view of the

experiments).

Their work Is included with their permission.

 115

4?

EXPERIMENT ONE: REPORT

REPRESENTATION OF THE BEHAVIOUR (B) OF AN OBJECT BY THE BEHAVIOUR

(B) OF ANOTHER OBJECT, ACTING AS SURROGATE FOR THE FIRST OBJECT.

(LOI,i9DQNKNOWLYDGE TEST).

Aims of Test

There were two main aims. for this test. The first was

to persuade individual observers to attribute Behaviours to a common

Object, and to represent these by behaviours attributed to another

common Object. These behaviours may themselves be collected to

Iorm a Behaviour (B9), containing the contradictions that exist,

between the different observers' different views. Contained in

this aim, was the intention that the observers should be shown that

their attributed behaviours will be different, but that this is not

since they can nevertheless represent their beliefs.

-Important,
The second aim was to demonstrate a means for an

approximate expression of the Object's own view of itself (its

Essence) by the used of a formalised version of the Behaviour (Do):

unless this can be done, no inarticulate (and maybe no Object at

all) Object can talk about itself, and it becomes very difficult to

consider the Object in any generally agreed manner (without setting

up the behaviours of both the Object and the Surrogate, for each

observer, on each occasion: and then holding a conversation about

these views until a concensus is reached). And, having set up

this representation of the Object, to carry out an. assessment of

the "correctness" of the different views of the Object, based on

the concensus view of the Behaviour. Contained in this aim, was

the intention that the observers should realise that they could

cone of them have the Object's own self-view, and that they could

survive an interaction with the Object in spite of this difference

of view.
 116

Origin of Alms

The origin of the aims of this experiment lies in the

frequent arguments that arise amongst architects as to the exact

location of places within the City. The ability of every person

living in a City to use it. in spite of these differences in view,

also needs to be expressed (i, e. not knowing where, for Instance,

Biggin Hill, is, will not prevent anyone getting there), In this

way, it seemed that a form of expression that, did show the different

behaviours attributed, and a means of refering them to some

standard picture of the Object itself, would be valuable.

Method: conditions

The Exp6riment was given to twenty-one students, in the

first year course at the Architectural Association School, in

November 1973. These were all students who claimed to have a

particular interest in Urban Problems. The students were given a

blank form, and invited to locate the nineteen specified areas of

London on an outline map of the G. L. C. 'O boundary, showing also the

River Thames. The nineteen areas were chosen to mix well- and

less well-known areas, to take areas, fairly randomly from those

_and
which constitute London.

The students were given. fifteen minutes in which to locate

the specified places, and were then shown an Ordinace Survey Map

against which they could judge their results. At a later date,

their results were measured more precisely by the author.

The students whose work is analysed here in detail, were

0
Greater London Council - the administrative London.
+ The official in the U. K.
cartographic survey
2

117

part of a larger sample of one hundred and twenty students, a

coarser analysis of whose work reveals no significant difference

in results.

Method: Language, Object and question forms

In this test, both the Language and the Object. to which

behaviours were to be attributed,. were pointed to. The Object was

said to be "the location of the following nineteen places which are

within London", followed by a list of the places arranged .

alphabetically. The Language was pointed to by "marks made on

this Map of the, G. L. C.. area, with the River Thames marked in".

The question that the students were asked to answer was "where are
the places to be located best represented on the map of London".

Thus, both the Object, to which the students were to. -

attribute behaviours, and the Language in which they were to

represent the behaviours by drawing comparisons between the

behaviours of the Object, and the behaviours of the Language, were

specif ied.

One might expect, specifying both the Object and the

Language to which the students had to attribute behaviours, that

there might be mis-match. That is, that students might not be able
to attribute behaviours to the Object and/or the Language, or that

they might not be able to draw a comparison.

That this was the case is shown by the results. Not

one student was able to attempt to locate all nineteen places. named.
Within terms of this test, it' is not, possible to state that the

perceptual difficulty was with either attributing the behaviour to

the Object, or to the Language, nor is it possible to state that

there were difficulties in drawing the comparison (or surrogating

the Language Object to the Object itself).
 118

Method* test methods and ineasurements

The test was set 'to the students in a group, all at the

same time. The instructions were verbal and written: the list of

places to locate came on the same form as the Language outline.

Results were measured initially by students themselves,

from an Ordinance Survey Map. However, certain students allowed

themselves some degree of licence in this, and a map showing the

areas as 4 Km (nominal) diameter circles, and then as 8 Yin circles,

was produced by the author against which the Language representation

was measured (by over-laying the correction map). The most

generous interpretation of all the student representations was

taken. The two scales were used to check on the refinement of

the experimental checking.

This correction map is an interesting item. In order to

show the difference in the different representations, it is only

necessary to take one as being "correct", and demonstrating the

others in its framework, or to map all representation together

(this is the complete and articulate statement of the Behaviour

attributed to the Object by the group of observers at that time).

However, the use of a common referent was chosen instead. There'

is a very good reason for this: not one student located all nine-
teen places, so that not one student's map could be used as the

referent. And the graphical difficulties of representing the full

Behaviour (Bo) would be immense It was therefore simpler to use

one "artificial" referent, and this choice of tactic was further

strengthened by the advantage that thig has in allowing the dif-

ference between the best possible representation of the Object's

@
i. e. to represent say twenty-one different represented locations

for nineteen places would be extremely difficult (but see

Experiment Four).
 119

self-view, and the observer's view, to be seen. For, an Ordinance

(which is what was used as the measure) is the result, of
-_Survey-Map
a eoncensus; operation making a very large Behaviour (Bo), accumul.; -.

ated over many years, by many observers, (almost all of whom manage
to use the Language representation thus developed to represent the

Object), -which permits the expression of many attitudes, and which

be Interpreted back by many observers into many attributed
b,ehnviours; which can be related to the Object's behaviours; hence

Its authority.

lbipeyirnental data

The results of the experiment have been edited, and

certain Language Objects are presented here as being in some way

"'typical" or "exceptional".

Pirstly. the "correction" map is presented. This is

derived, as has been stated, from the Ordinance Survey, and is con-

sidered the nearest approximation that the external observer can

acIiieve to the Object's self-observation (although it is not this

self-observation).
A further seven maps are presented. These are chosen to

show the difference between substantially "correct", and substan-

tially "incorrect" maps (although the most correct map probably

only achieves its accuracy by means of graphical laziness), changes

In degree of "correctness" depending on which scale (4 or 8 Km) was

used (and thus showing the effect of the experimental checking's

refimement), in the f) +, the

and, case-of student effect of allowing
a shift in the marking sheet to the East of normal place; it could
be argued that the increase in accuracy thus afforded to

4, Student f) is also shown in the tables as student v). The

reasons are explained in the tables.

 120

student f) indicates that, in his case, there was a genuine

difficulty in attributing behaviours to the Language (it's not a
problem of observing the Object's behaviour).

Maps (See over)

 121

LONDONKNOWLEDGE
Measure Sheet (derived from Ordnance Surve.y Maps)

S,

rL

41 04A
4 I
Pý4

I Kim

STUDENT'r)
Very high accuracy comparedto places located (14 located: 6 accurate within 4km,
11 within 8km). This may be partly accounted for

$Y4

S
çc)

o4"
0 2.4 6 M(

L=Cl Vc

a
 122,

STUDENT p)
Increase from 3 correct to 12 correct with scale change from 4 to 8km.

t,&- tMDA

C>1
ukk! 3"

CLAhthm

1,
.4 1"ES
ISR%U-
. A,
W< 0+
*i44 sm
r I-
,. 0

c)
-STUDEKT
Places known correctly increases dramatically from 2 at 4km to 6 at 8km.

)C,rtM CN'ROW
z
3CIbVib )eL64TUN

Olt
K-1 tlAlq
5

Ix
JWAES
-. ..
gi MW
aL N"
0+*
M

LCrDM Vc ILIM^T
 123

STUDENT g)
No change in acpracy with the change in scale from 4 to 8km.

V.

tU Kift

A4
ýA

STUDENTf)
go
FIT
LMDC! VC FL':r: '!

(also known as STUDENTv))

An Eastward shift of the measure gives an increase from 0 places located to 7.

rl
IZ
I
Cýj

0+9ý it, F,%%

h-n4-ya-r--4

I-ernollXT ILIM^3
 124

STUDENT a)
Very Inaccurate at both 4 and 8km scales.

IVA F-S j
STUDENT
k)
Remarkable for the peripheral markings, and the extreme inaccuracy.

HxrnmerS LA, twio'"Y

-Z

C5
M

0x46, tm

LameT X: -c a--DIE
 125

Experimental Results

The results of the experiment carried out on the twenty-

one students is shown in the following tables.

Table One shows the results by students. Each student

is labelled (and those, samples of whose work appears have a cross
by their reference letter). The student's success at representing
the location of places is given on both scales, and taking both the.

total number of places named, and the total number of places located

by each student as a denominator. The difference in these two

denominators could be a type of confidence estimate However,

this may be, the experiment does not clearly differentiate between

confidence and "correctness", nor between the behaviour of the Object,

and that of the Language (other-tests do this). It is Intended

to make different points.

Table One (See Over)

@
Relating to the observer's ability to either observe the Object,

or to represent the Object's behaviour in the Language.

 126

TABLE ONE

Table of test results (by students)

Cor- Cor-
No. of No. No. % Cor- Cor-
Stu- Places Places rect rect rect rect
with- with- 4 Km/ 8 Km/
dent Loca- in in Ioca- 4 K/ 'm 8 Km/
Places Places
ted 4 Km 8 Km ted Total Total
LoCa- Loca-
Places Places
ted ted

a)+ 15 0 0 78.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

b) 18 4 6 94.7 21.0 31.6 22.2 33.3

0+ 3 1 1 15.8 5.3 5.3 33.3 33.3

d) 14 2 3 73.7 10.5 15.7 14.3 21.4

e) 17 2 6 89.5 10.5 31.6 11.8 35.3

@
f) +@ 10 0 0(7) 52.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

g)+ 5 2 2 26.3 10.5 10.5 40.0 40.0

h) 12 2 5 63.1 10.5 26.3 16.7 41.7

1) 15 3 10 78.9 15.7 52.6 20.0 66.7

J) 3 1 2 15.8 5.3 10.5 33.3 66.7

k) + 8 0 1 42.1 0.0 5.3 0.0 12.5

1) i5 6 7 78.9 31.6 36.8 40.0 46.7

in) is 1 5 94.7 5.3 26.3 5.5 27.7

n) 7 0 2 36.8 0.0 10.5 0.0 28.6

0) 6 0 1 31.6 0.0 5.3 0.0 16.7

P)+ is 3 '12 94.7 15.7 03.2 16.7 66.7

q) 7 2 2 36.8 10.5 10.5 28.6 28.6

+ 14 6 11 73.6 31.6 57.9 42.9 78.6
r)
11 0 4 57.9 0.0 21.1 0.0 36.4

t) 5 1 2 26.3 5.3 10.5 20.0 40.0

U) 10 2 4 52.6 10.5 21.0 20.0 40.0

+@ @ 0.0 70.0
V) 10 0 7(0) 52.6 0.0 36.8
.

+ included
student's work as example.
@
student f) is student v). In the case of v), an Eastwards

distortion was allowed on the 8 Km measurements.

a
 127

Table Two shows, by contrast, the data arranged by

location for. In this, it reflects the Object's (and

asked

Languagels) side, rather than that of the observer. It is clear

that the behaviours attributed to the Object and Language are very

different from this table. The previous table showed that each

attribution of behaviours was different (in this, it

observer's

showed a difference in the observer's awareness).

TABLE TWO

Table of Test results (by places)

4 Km 8 Km Marked Unmarked

Acton 3 3+25 8 8

Bigginhill 1 1+45 7 9

Bromley 2 2+35 12 4

Clapham 3 3+58 7 6

Dagenham 3 3+58 5 8

Dulwich Village 2 2+68 3 10

Edmonton 1+4-5 6 10

Hammersmith 8 8+2- 10 7 4

Ramps tead 3 3+4-7 13 1

Hornehurch 3 3+6-9 5 7

Leyton I I+4-5 9 7

Millwall 0 0+2-2 10 9

Morden 3 3+2-5 9
.7
Richmond 3 3+3-6 9 6

Sideup 4 4+1-5 10
.6
Soho 5 5+3-8 8 5

Streatham I I+5-6 8 7

Tottenham 2 2+5-7 9 5

Uxbridge 1 1+3-4 8 9
 128

Results

The results of this experiment are shown in the following

tables. Table Three is a table of the results by students;

TABLE THREE

I
Highest 1%places located = 94.7 (students b, M, P)

Lowest % places located W 15.8 (students c, J)

Highest % places correct (4 Km) - 31.6 (students v, r)

Lowest % places correct (4 Km) - o0.0 (students a, f, k,

n , o , s , v@)
Highest % places correct (8 Km) - 63.2 (student p)

Lowest % places correct (8 Km) W 0.0 (students a, I@

Highest % correct 4 Km/places located - 42.9 (student r)

Lowest % correct 4 Km/places located - 0.0 (students a, f k,

n , 0 , S , v@)
Highest correct 8 Km/places located - 78.6 (student r)

Lowest correct 8 Km/places located - 0.0 (students a, f@)

These results show clearly the difference in each

ztudent's expression. of attributed behaviours, as a g6neralisation

of the data in Table One, which itself is an ordering of the

Information submitted, in the form of a map, by each student. In

doing this, Table Three shows the differences in student awarenesses,

and also shows the way In which the measuring of "correctness"

affects the understanding we (as the experimenter observing the

statements of the students) have of the student's statements (i. e.

some students seem to be much more "correct" given a larger

measuring scale, and almost all gain by a measurement against the

places they locate as opposed to those they are asked to locate).

It also shows student attributed behaviours In comparison to the

Behaviour of London through the use of the concensus represention

of this Behaviour (and hence the Object's self-view).

@
Students f) and v) are the* same.
 129

Table Four shows the results by places;

TABLE MUR

Place most often correctly marked at 4 Km - Hammersmith 43.0%

Place most often correctly marked at 8 Km - Hammersmith 47.5%

Place most often incorrectly marked at 4 Km - Hampstead 62.0%

Place least often marked - Dulwich

Village

Edmonto 47.5%

Sidcup

These results show the differences in the behaviours

attributed to each of the places that the students were asked to

locate. In this, it shows different behaviours attributed to the

Object, and expressed through the Language. It also shows the

effect of the measurement, and it expresses the different accuracy

of place location against the general concensus Behaviour description.

The results are quite amusing: Hammersmith (because of its

Motorway and riverside locations? ) is most accurately located -

although the best increase in location is Dulwich Village (two at

4 Km to six at 8 Km - increase of 300%). Surprisingly, perhaps,

Hampstead is most often inaccurately placed - although that may be

because, itý name being famous, students tried to locate It by

guessing. The three joint least known places are perhaps less

surprising (Dulwich Village, Edmonton and Sidcup), although

Dulwich also appears as the "most improved" place in the change in

measuring scale.
 130

Conclusions

The main, conclusions to be drawn from this experiment are

that it Is indeed possible to set up a situation in which, in spite

of the Object and the Language being the same for all observers, it

is possible to show that each observer represents his observation

of the Object differently in terms of the Language. In this way,

the aims of the experiment have been fully realised. The partici-.

pating students, on being shown the test results' were astonished at

the "Inaccuracy" of their views. Nevertheless, they have all

survived. (and continue to survive) in the "alien" environment,

about which they know so little.

 1 131

EXPERIMENT TIVO: REPORT

REPRESENTATION OF THE BEHAVIOUR (B) OF AN OBJECT BY THE BEHAVIOUR

(B) OR AN0711ER OBJECT, THROUGH DIFFERENT TIMES. (LONDON STRUCTURE

TEST).

Aims of Test

The aims of this test are obviously rather closely

related to those of the previous experiment. This test permits

the statement of contradictory but simultaneously held views of a

common Object. But the main interest is not In this necessary part

of the test, although it is an aim. By inviting the students to

perform the test live times during the Academic Year 1973-4, it was

possible to show the students the way in which their views had

changed, that is, to demonstrate the effect of different observa-

tions and making different behaviours of an Object. (The students

used were from the same group as those in the previous test).

Bowever, there was also another aim, related to the

previous test: for In that test, we found we could not decide if,

when a student could not represent one of the locations, the

problem was in observing the Object, of the Language, or if, perhaps,

the problem lay in seeing a similarity between them (for Instance,

I might have a good "picture" of a map of London, and I might have

a Knowledge of one of the places as being on the tube map, and I

might not be able to relate the tube organisation to the London

map).

So the other main aims of this experiment were to show

examples of difficulty in relating to Object, or in finding a

suitable Language in which to express the observations made. And

to this end, although the Object was pointed to, the Language in

which representations were to be made was not specified.

a
 132

Origin of Aims I

This test originated as a teaching aid, evolved informally

by the author and Leon van Schaik, to help students make statements

about beliefs they held of the role of things in the city. It was

made expressly clear to them that there was no sense in which any

of their statements were more correct than any others; correctness

is an irrelevant concept for them. It was further developed as a
teaching aid, not only in helping students make their own views

clear to themselves, but also to allow them, from their own

statement. of view, to investigate the implications of their views,

and the limitations.

However, there is, in contrast to this somewhat pragmatic

Ideal, also a pedagogical intention in the experiment, stemming

from its roots In the view held by the author that, in looking at

complicated objects (and now, at all Objects, in the sense of this

Thesis), it is not possible to talk about any degree of

"rightness"; rather, one should talk abýut the need for a subjec-
tive knowledge to show itself appropriate, and for an understanding

of the implications inherent in any view.

Metbod: conditions

The experiment was given to twenty-four students in the

first year course at the Architectural Association School, on five

occasions during the Academic Year 197i-4, as a part of their

course. The students are substantialfy the same as those who took

part in the First Experiment;

The students were given a blank form to fill in, and

asked to represent what they thought London's structure was, on

this form. In order to help them, five architypical structures

were shown them, as follows,

 133

a II

--
,
EH
concentric grid semi-lattice radial

IE

zone
They were told that they did not have to use one, or any,

of these, that they were only shown them to help with the

explanation of the task.

The students were allowed between five and ten minutes to

complete the task, and the representations were then taken away from

them, without any further comment, except the observation that they

were all different, in spite of the Object being-the same.

The five occasions during which the students were tested

break up into three groups. The initial test, carried out at the

beginning of the course, may be largely discounted as familiarisa-

tion@. The second two tests were used to re-inforce the students'

views: after the second test, the students were asked to state

which of the live architypes (above) their views most resembled,

and then to go away and prove that this view was the only correct

one. The third test was carried out at the end of this exercise.
There followed a long period of intensive teaching input, during

which many different ways of looking at the city were developed,

@ leavers:
The Test was a rather unusual one, for school and they

needed a chance to even understand what was being asked of them.

a
 134

after which the fourth test was applied. The fifth test was

carried out at the end of the course, and serves mainly to re-

inforce the view expressed in test four, where the major change in

view would be anticipated.

Method: Language, Object and questlon forms

In this test, the Object to which a behaviour was to be

attributed was pointed out, while the Language to be used as a

representation was not pointed out. The Object was said to be

"The Structure of London", and was further exemplified by the five

architypes mentioned above. The Language was to some extent

inferred by the diagrammatic representation of the five architypes,

and the request for drawings, but it appears that these requests
did not have an oýerpowering effect.

By not specifying the Language, it was intended to over-

come the ambiguity re mis-match that was possible in Experiment

One: if a student could observe the Object, thus giving it a

behaviour, but could not represent It, we would thus know that the

problem lay In the finding of an appropriate Language behaviour:

and the student could say this. If, on the other hand, the

Language represented something that was not a Structure, it was

clear that the student had problems in observing that particular

Object, and thus in giving it a behaviour. (There could be many

reasons for this: not only difficulty In observing the Object,

but boredom, reluctance to try, etc. ).

Method: test methods and measurements

The test was set to students In a group, all at the same

time. The instructions were verbal, written, and drawn, with the

five architypes appearing on the sheet the students were asked to

fill in.
 135

The completed sheets were taken from the students and

ýny later date.
filed. The stude nts had no access to them at

Consequently, the students could not copy an earlier form of rep-

resentation, but had to create a new one every time. Some

students clearly tried to repeat the same representation every

time, but even in these cases, there were changes in the

representational form that could be given significance, (i. e. the

differences had an interpretable meaning).

The sheets were divided into three groups, according to

when the tests were taken, as has already been explained. While

there was a difference between every representation, difficulties

of expressing this difference in any general way led to the

adoption of a simple means of differentiation, and also in the main

change in representation being looked for betweýn the pairs of tests

two and three, and four and five. The initial test was largely

discounted as familiarisation, since the idea of a "Structure" for

something like London was a hard one for new students to get hold

of. Each student's representation was classified as being either

of the form of one or more of the archetypes,. or as being "Trivial"

(i. e. the Object was not observed), "Special Language" (i. e. the

observation made of the Object needed a special representation,

that is, a non-archetype Language), or "Unexpressed" (i. e. the

student could not find a Language behaviour which resembled his

Object behaviour). This is a very coarse measurement of differences,

but it adequate to make the general points that it is the

Iseems
intention of this experiment to make. There there is a "Special
Language", and there is a significant difference between various
"Special Language" representations, these are marked by a numerical

subscript.

Experimental Data

The Experimental results have been edited, and certain

a
 136

Language Objects are presented here as being in some way. "typical"

or "exceptional".

Initially, examples are presented of Language Objects

which are "pure" examples of each of the five archetypes, to show

that each one was found to be applicable. ' (This is almost

certainly a peculiarity of London: it is doubtful if a city with a

much more defined physical form, such as Manhatten Island in

New York@, would offer itself to such a variety of understandings,

partially since most architects are taught to think of form as an

essentially physical phenomenon). It will be noted that four of

the five examples were taken from the first test (familiarisation),

during which time students probably did not fully understand the

intentions of the experiment.

There then follow a further three Language Objects, one

representing each of the three other categories into which the

representations were sorted: ("Trivial", "Special Language", and

"Unexpressed"). These tended to come from later tests, and

reflect the students' development of much more subtle ways of

looking at the Object "London's Structure" than were Initially

expressed by the archetypes. (The shortage of means of expression

in Architecture is, of course, one of the major concerns of this
Thesis: the paucity is here brought out).
Finally, there are sets of test representations from

three different students, showing, In this order, virtually '"no

change" in the Language Object, "extensive change" in the Language

Object, going from one view to another completely different one,

@
at least in terms of Its street layout an effect hightened by
-
both its maps and its block numbering system. But the Bronx

may be a different story!

 137

and the "refinement-and development" of a view as shown by the

Language Objects. It should be pointed out, nevertheless, that

in the "no change" case, there are differences of some significance:

the Thames has been removed, and the centre of the Zone is omitted,

and then re-included. The complexity of the structure also

changes.

Experimental Results

The results obtained from the experiment apart from the

samples of Language Objects already discussed, were In line with

the expectations expressed at the beginning. They are summarised

in Table One.

As will be seen, even with the very coarse categorisation

used, we only have two students who have not changed their rep-

resentations across the specified pairs, (students e) and h)).

Four students did not provide enough data to determine If their

representations changed, or not (students b), q), s), and x)).

But, as has been shown in the case of student e), a detailed look

at the evidence demonstrates that there is a difference between the

various representations, and it is only one coarseness of our

differentiation, for measuring, that does not show this.

As to the difference of views expressed by different

observers, the total of their five observations may be taken as

the observer's Awareness (Ao),, of the Object (London's Structure).

Each of these is different, even given our coarse categorisat. ion

(as can be seen in Table Onel. The Behaviour of the Object

can be seen as the total of observations recorded in the table,

and clarly contains contradictions: it is hard to reconcile the

structure of Zone with that of Semi-Lattice.

Furthermore, the expected results as regards the choice

of Language were found: students did indeed provide their own

 138

Languages in which they made their statements (which is one of

the-reasons for the difficulty we have in categorising these

statements). And the evidence of students i) and w) point out

the possibility of differentiating between students who cannot

observe the Object, and those who cannot find an appropriate

Language in which to express themselves.

Maps and Table One (See over)

 139

Examples of each of the prototype forms appearing in ansWrs.

STRUCTURE:
LONDOWS

STUDENTu)
CfIMCENTRIC

Toct I

SwULN1P)
GRID

Test
 140

ST.1iDENTa)
LATTICE

Testl

:0

STUDENTv)
RADIAL
11"
Test I

b
cr

I
 141

STUDENTI
ZONES

Test 5

r4ki

sw
Moclu*Irlý. 1
84
se
j
%'ý,Vrlas
swig

z3w

6
 142

Ikor-les of each of the non-prototype froms appearing in the answers.

STUDENTi)
'TR,JVI AL

'Test
.5

STUDENTn),
:NDN- fTWMTPE REPRESENTATION

Test A

:STUDENTw)
INAPPROPRIATE1;, NGUAGE

'Test 5

110ý

4L -C4, -

71
jZf

a
 143

OF NOCPANGL
EXAMPLE bET"ER TESTS

STUDENT
c)

Test 2: Zones

Test 3: Zones

Jest 4: Zones

Test 5: Zones
 144

TESTS
EXAMPLEOF GREATCHANGEBETWEEN

STUDENTt)

Test 2: LIKE I-sus,

-Vo"E
RadISI. Cc,ncentr.

Lattice
JýQINL )aT
iowcrn
TO _rP
'JA
06ik

Ill ES ACIES
Test 3: ACC49 WMi allrM 5'MflTle-
Zones, Lattice

PLZCZS

Tes t 4:
Lattice,
Radial ,I

cob. fr4
{tt4t
*ct4a2Lt

F49
 145

7est, -4:
Non - Prototype Representation
(1
D9
.9

9)

69
0* 0

a
 146

EXAMPLEOF REFINEMENTAND DEVELOPMENT

OF ONE REPRESENTATION

MUST f)

Test 1: Radial 1

Test-2: Radial
Wey,

7est 3: Lattice
-Radial, 14

Vc- A
Lý,
ý-tt-,
ý- -?

a
 147

TABLE ONE

Table of Test Results

Test Test Test Test Test

Change
Stu dent 1 2 3 4 5
1-3/4-5?

a) L - - RC GRC yes
b) L CL C NIA

C) w2 w2 yes

d) RC L L LC yes

e) L z z z z no

f) R R R RL yes

g) CL RCL RC yes
h) RCL RCL RC no

i) T L L GCR T yes

J) LC LC LC ZLRC yes

k) L RC RCG N1 w2 yes
1) CL L L z yes

M) L L w T yes

n) T v1 w2 w3 T yes

0) CL yes

P) G GW x yes
L ZG ZL N/A

r) L LG yes

B) LC L L X/A
.
t) RLC ZL LZRC w yes

U) C C CR yes

V) R RLG RLC LGC yes

W) RC RCGL RCGL x x yes

X) RCGL CW Cw N/A
2 2
Introduction Before main After main course
course

a
 248

Key to Table One

C Concentric prototype used

G Grid prototype used

L Lattice prototype used

R Radial prototype used

Z Zone prototype used

T Trivial (i. e. not observed)

w Special Language

x Unexpxessed

a
 149

Table Two summarises these results in a concise way.

TABLE TWO

RESULTS (out of 24) No. Students

Not enough evidence to decide 4 16.7 b, q, so x

change

No change 2 8.3 e, h

Significant change 18 75.0

Difficulty' with representation 2 8.3 Pt w

(on occasions)

Cannot observe (oq occasions) 3 12.5 1, M, n.

Need other Models than proto- 8 33.3 c, k, m, no o,

types (on occasions) po to x

Did all five tests 5 20.8 e, i, k, no w

Conclusions

The conclusions that can be drawn from this experiment

are that it is possible for observers t9 observe a Common Object,

and to present not only different views of the Object. but also to

find quite different Languages in which to make these statements.

Indeed, it is possible that observers sometimes cannot observe the

Object, or else they cannot express their observation in a Language,

and the difference between these two problems can be pointed out

from the form of statement made.

Not surprisingly, it was found that the observers' views

changed in time, and that different observers could hold apparently

contradictory views of the same Object simultaneously.

 150

EXPERIMENT THREE: REPORT+

REPRESETTATION OF THE BEHAVIOUR (B) OF AN OBJECT IN TERMS OF THE

LANGUAGE REPRESENTING THE BEHAVIOUR (Bo) OF THAT OBJECT. (CON-

CEPTUAL SPACE).

Aims of Test

The Aims of this experiment were to find a means', held

in common by several observers (i. e. a Language), by'which these

observers could express an experience of "Conceptual Spacell'of a

common Object. Secondarily, these expressions should be capable''

of being transformed in form into another Language, representing

(as closely as possible) a generally tenable view of the Object,

so that the differences between the individual experiences, and

the generally tenable view become clear. Tertiarily, these two

expressions in the same Language should then be discussable.

Thus, the aims of this experiment were not to produce classifiable

"results", but rather a means which allowed the expression of

personal "spatial concepts" in a manner which highlighted the

difference between the "mental pictures" (for want of a better

word) which we have, and the "true nature" (! ) of the Object being

observed

The work reported here was designed and executed by

Annetta Pedretti under my tutillage. The report, which I

wrote, has been agreed and approved by Miss Pedretti.

@
Work being carried out this year by Miss Pedretti is designed

to find ways of defining these differences, and of expressing

them in a common Language. Initial results are promising.
 151

Origin of Aims

The origin of the aims of this experiment lie in the

difficulty found by, amongst others, architectural students, of

expressing their concepts of space in a non-cartographic metric

(and, indeed, of even believing such concepts to be possible).

Furthermore, the few attempts that have been made to permit of

such expressions of personal space (other than those mentioned

herel have rapidly moved from the personal experience to a loose

generalisation that tallies very weakly with that experience (as.

elaborated in the Introduction). Yet, space, whether on an urban

or a domestic, a mystic or an atomic level, is a matter of personal

experience, &ad therefore worthy of examination, even if only by

ourselves, in this way. I

Previous attempts at providing means for the articulation

of such views (excepting those in the previous two sections, which

did allow such an expression, but which had different aims) have

Iken.ded to stumble because of three difficulties: difficulty in

explaining to experimental subjects what is wanted of them;

dIfficulty on the part of the subjects in actually finding a means

of expression for their personal spaces (the influence of the

cartographic metric is so profound that the construction of maps

is virtually always assessed by the subject against a cartographic

model as being "correCtn or "incorrect"); and the difficulty in

actually comparing the expressions of different subjects on the

occasions that sucl. expressions occur, because of the differences

in Languages.

Condttions and Repeats

- The mrperiment involves the participants in two stages.

la the first stage they were invited to mark in locations on a

form, which they felt were equi-distant from each other, in the

directions shown. given a basic scale against which to make their

f
 152

judgements. (For fuller details, see later). This form filling

was done individually, without any reference woiks (e. g. maps)

being available. The experimenter then takes these forms, and,

using the locations given on them, prdducesta map, 'in, which the

locations are marked in their positions using the cartographic

metric (in this case an Ordnance Survey map of London at 2JII to

the Mile was used). The lines used in the forms were then

projected onto these maps, through the locations as they appear on

the cartographic metric, resulting in a "distortion", of Ahe form

of the forms as their locations were transformed from the equi-

distant relationship shown, in a personal space to the irregular

relationship shown in a cartographic metric. These transformed

maps were then shown to the participants by the', experimenter, in

a group, and a (taped) general discussion and interpretation

allowed, in which the participants were encouraged to state their

surprise, and account for the "irregularities".

The experiment has been carried out three, times: twice

with students and staff in the first year course at the

Architectural Association School, using each of the two forms

designed; and once with faculty and students in the post-

graduate courses in Cybernetics, Education, and Psychology at

Brunel University. In this report, we will only detail one of the

tests with the Architectural students, since the other two tests

confirm the findings - although we will briefly describe them.

Form of Languages and Questions ,

The test was put to the participants In the following

manner. Two form types were prepared (as attached). One,

consisted of a regular gr. idded matrixlof, 9 x9 nodes (i. e. 81
total). The other of a regular radiation of 8 lines. from a

common centre. with 5 equi-distant points marked on each of the 8

lines, giving a total of 33 nodes. (It is with this form that we

4
 153

shall primarily concern ourselves in this report). The centre of

each of these forms was described as the location of Centre Point,

in London. One of the lines in the radial form was called the

tube station in Camden Town. The centre point of one side of the
@
matrix was similarly referred to

The participants were given a form and asked, starting

with the line Centre Point to Camden Town, to state the location

of the 1, j and I way points on this straight line, as they

understood it. Keeping the angles and pattern as shown in, the

forms (i. e. grid or radial), they were asked to name the locations

of the other nodes, regularly distributed.

The nodal locations on the thus-filled-in were then

ýforms

marked on a sheet laid over an Ordnance Survey Map, according to

their cartographic co-ordinates, and the connecting lines drawn

between the thus-rharked points. In the case of the radial form,

rings were drawn round the centre node, connecting points equal

distances out from the centre, making "circles". This was intended

to highlight the distortions.

These maps are the maps that were shown to the participants

to engender discussion.

At this point, it is worth briefly discussing the

various Language forms.

Tpe participants had an Object pointed to, to which they

attributed a behaviour (B). This obsefved behaviour was stated

in a Language (also pointed to), to which was attributed a

behaviour (B), held to be identical to the Object's behaviour (B),

@
In the case of the Brunel experiment, in which the matrix was

used, these fixed locations were intentionally omitted. The

distortions in the cartographic transformations were not

affected.
 154

as seen by that observer. All observers were given the same

Language (the form) and the same Object (location of places in

London according to distance and direction).

The Object's observation of itself was represented, not

by the invisible Essence, but by a representation of a
Behaviour (Bo), through a consensus observation of a Behaviour (Bo)

of a Language - in this case the Ordnance Survey Cartographic

Metric-Projection.

The representations by individual participants were

transformed into representations using the consensus Language

Behaviour (B 0 ), and these new forms of representation were shown

again to the individual participants. The difference between the

observer's attribution of "equi-distant and equi-directional", and

the attribution as seen in the consensus representation "non-

equi-distant and non-equi-directional" produced a genuine surprise

amongst the participants.

Experiments - Results, typical evidence

The results of the experiments can be summarised as

follows (again, we are discussing the radial form in detail, but

the statements hold generally true for other experiments con-

ducted). In general, the following characteristics were found

in almost all of the transformed maps produced:

a) The transformed maps were marked didtortions of the regular

forms the participants were asked to produce.
b) The distortion tended to be, primarily, along one axis, rather
than "random".

C) Almost all participants found an area for which they could not

make locations at all.

d) There was a tendency to invert places in one of two ways;

either directly inverting (i. e. location I way along axis

should, cartogrkphically, actually be outside the end point);

or locations were "switched" across axes.

 155

e) The (cartographic) areas covered by each participant were very

different (in spite of the f ixed given scale) in the total

,
size of the area covered.

f) Each participant marked in quite different locations (even

along the fixed axis).

The attached examples bring out these points.

Forms and Maps (See over)

 156

-subjectivespace
radial form

name date
(D annetta pedretti 74
 157

subjective space
grid form

CT

name date
(D annetta pedrett 74
158
159
160

Z
 161

An unusually regular. small scale map.

The main distortion can be seen in the SE direction (where the map
crosses over the Thames.

-->Z
 162

Irt the discussions following the presentation to the

participants of these transformed maps, there was one underlying

tendency (apart from astonishment)!

Almost all participants tried to invent reasons for

themselves, and for each other, to explain these distortions: and

some of the invented explanations were completely fantastic

because they involved one participant extrapolating from another

participant's map, a reason, stated as a necessary fact, about an

aspect of that participant's life of which they were usually in

complete ignorance, and which turned out, eventually, to be

"untrue" of that participant.

-Improvements in the tests are currently being tried,

which are intended to (amongst other things), improve the giving

of explanations of these distortions.

Conclusions

The experiments carried out have shown that, using the

forms provided as Languages, and transforming the results into the
Language of a consensus cartographic map, it is possible for

observers to make statements of their personal conceptions of

space - and for different observers' views to be compared. Not

surprisingly, the view expressed by each observer was found to be

different. But, in their present forms, the experiments do not
.
in any way account for the differences bf*these personal spaces.
 163

EXPERIMENT FOUR: REPORT

SIMULTANEOUS REPRESENTATION OF SEVERAL BEHAVIOURS (B) OF ONE

OBJECT (LEADENHALL MARKET). '

Included in this experiment is an example of the

successful representation, together, of several views of one

place. The individual maps, etc. have been left out, since they

are not critical. The picture has been assembled from'their

contradictions and ambiguities, by simply putting the various

alternatives together (as can be clearly seen).

This work was produced by Tim Richardson; a student at

the Architectural Association, under the tutillage of myself and

Leon van Schaik. It is included, virtually verbatim, with the

maps omitted (as noted), with his'permission.

 164

Leadenhall Market

APPROACH: I chose to study the mental space of the

market. The method adopted was one much advocated by the current

Bible-- "Mental Maps" - basically asking people to draw maps of an

area, comparing and extra-polating.

I chose this for a simple reason. I was fortunate

enough to have a whole mine of map-drawers right next to the market

in Lloyds Building. My father works there, and his Right Arm,

Mr. Adams, was willing to spare a few minutes to help me. asked
,I
him to draw a map of Leadenhall Market showing the routes and

shops. Okay so far, until the work started. After a fast start

things got decidedly rough around the stationers and almost ground

to a halt by the pet shop. However, dogged determination pre-

vailed and a detailed map was produced. I don't know which of us

was more fascinated, Mr. Adams feeling, sure he could see until he

looked, or me discovering what an exhilarating and educational

experience this can become to the drawer. I thought that '-

Mr. Adams's next trip through the market would be wide-eyed and
discovering. After this I introduced a memory game - giving

questions. related to things I had noted while walking through the

market as 'things not immediately seen'. I asked for the-position

of two clocks in the. market. The clock by the centre was know,
but the clock by the Butcher's was more difficult to remember.
This was interesting since I had found the Butcherlsoclock to be

much more visual. However, on a later trip, in the evening, I

could hardly find the Butcher's clock because of the bad lighting

and the tangle of butchers' hooks hiding it. Lighting may account
for a universal lack of knowledge as to what was sitting on the

columns surrounding the crossroads of the market. The Gryphon

managed to elude everyone's memory. The tracery motif was known

by quite a few of the contestants to exist at the ceiling of the

entrance arch to the market. Fourth question - how many doors

a
 165

to the Lamb pub? This was dropped because it was a trick

question, one set of doors being closed by a fruit machine. The

last question was asking the name of the Supermarket opposite the

Lamb. Every person said immediately that they had no idea about

the names of any of the places.

Mr. Adams's enthusiasm thus aroused, we headed for the

canteen in the basement, where four members were accosted and

asked to draw a pap in five minutes. Although four people

together found it easier to do it than four individuals, they did

comment that it was surprisingly difficult to do and, a, good test

of the memory. Týe response so far rosy we headed upstairs,

Mr. Adamsis five minutes having already extended to a half hour,

and started going through the offices looking for map drawers.

Altogether eight people managed to draw a map. Again I think the

contestant gained as much from it as me, one person going so far

as to thank me for making him realise how little he knew. A five

minute deadline was set, and then the questions were asked. Again

most people got the clock at'the cross-roads but not at the

butchers, the Gryphon was identified as either a lion, a dragon or

a mouse, and the Supermarket drew a complete blank.

The attached written Guide, to. Market-. vwas

-Leadenhall,
assembled from the eight maps provided by the eight contestants.
 166

A Guide to Leadenhall Market

(Compiled from the memories of, over eight esteemed gentlemen of

Lloyds and thus considered a fair assessment).

First there is a pub at a crossroads called the Lamb.

There'is a Post Office separated from the pub by a blank space.

There is a cafe separated from the Post Office by a blank space.

Next to the pub on the other street is a cheese shop or possibly

a supermarket or possibly a huge dominating Lloyds Old Building,

or Lloyds might come af ter the cheese shop/supermarket or there

may be, no Lloyds at all. Next to one of these there is a bank

which may in fact be Lloyds (not the bank). This bank forms a

corner to Lime Street and the street leading to the Lamb. The

rest of the bl6ck is occupied by Lloyds, unless Lloyds occupies

the entire block apart from the Post Office.

Secondly, the block to the north of the pub: (the bank-

pub axis continues northwards, or eastwards, so probably north but

in fact west, which is in fact irrelevant). On the right the

block consists of butchers/poulterers and a tailor at the top

called either Acumen or Aquascutum forming a corner with

Gracechurch Street. A clock on this street is definitely non-

existent, but there is one at the crossroads.

On the eastern axis the butcher at the corner opposite
the pub might be next to a blank space or a stationer or the

stationer might be a cafe or the cafe might come after the

stationer.

On the left-hand side of the north axis. of the cross-

roads is another block. Opposite the poulterers/butchers are

more poulterers/butchers. Moving northwards there may be a fish

shop, then a florist, then a pub forming a corner with

Gracechurch Street, but this corner may also contain a tailor or

nothing at all. If we look at this block on a West-East axis

 167

and look at its southern flank, this contains, from right to left,

a grocer, then a petshop, or it may be the other way round. What

comes next is a subject of intense discussion, but it is thought

that the following shops, in order unknown, may exist: cafe,

bookmaker, florist, greengrocer, tailor, electrician.

The fourth block is split by alleyways - one or two in

an East-West direction and one in a South direction, forming an I,

shape since the South alley does not reach Lime Street. These

will form one or two 'islands' but more likely one. It is evenly

divided as to whether the fourth corner of the crossroads contains

a supermarket or a grocer. Moving downwards (opposite pub-bank)

there is either a chemist or a cafe, or there may be a greengrocer

in an alley. Then there is an electrician followed by a cafe,

fruit shop and building site, the building site forming a corner

with Lime Street.

On the north facade of the block, left of the alley is

a sweet shop, but the alley only contains a chemist, and maybe a

cafe opposite the chemist. Moving right to left from, the sweet

shop memory starts to fade, but there may be a bookshop, butcher

or grocer, followed by a beauty salon, then an electrician next to

a cafe, then a tailor where the street joins to Lime Street - this
block might be triangular. At this point the gentlemen are tiring

and anyway have more pressing business to attend to, so a halt Is

called to the proceedings.

a
 168

CONCLUSIONS
 169

CONCLUSIONS

The aim of this Thesis was to produce a philosophy that

better accounted for the contradictions in views of Architecture

held by different observers, -and to permit means of expression of

such views (observations) to be made; and to apply such a

philosophy to demonstrate that its theoretical claims could be

substantiated (i. e. that it could be made to work).

The reports on the Experiments (and especially

Experiments 1 to 3, Experiment 4 (executed by Tim Richardson)

being primarily an example of a means of aggregating the expres-

sion of many views in such a way that their differences are

maintained), show that the aims claimed for the Thesis have been

achieved in several different contexts: in the first example,

the different behaviours attributed to an Object, their contra-

dictions, and th6 use of a consensus referent were demonstrated;

in the second, the change in behaviours at different times of

observation, and the creation of appropriate languages for the

expression of the observations were shown (as also were. dif-

ficulties in observing the Object, and in finding an appropriate

language): and in the third (an experiment designed and conducted

by Annetta Pedretti) a means for demonstrating to participants
the difference between their attributed behaviours, and the

behaviour attributed by a consensus metric (accepted generally,

as "true", and representing, as closely as we can, the Object's

self-observation) were shown.

In this way, the main intentfons of our philosophy were

shown to be operational. But the construction of the philosophy

itself produced various unexpected side-effects (some of them not

so peripheral), which can be pointed to here. We will not,

however, summarise other findings of the Thesis here - that was

done at the time in the Main Text, and also In the Abstract.
 170

Initially, then, the self-observing Object was shown to

support different behaviours, made by different observers. But

the observer, to be an inhabitant of the Universe, had also to be

an Object. The functioning of a self-observing Object, being

shown to be similar to that of an oscillator, generates, for each

Object, its own time sense. Yet the observer, and the observed
Object, have to correlate with each other for an observation to

occur. Thus, not only does our Thesis produce, in each Object,

its own sense of local time, but also these times are obliged to

correlate for an observation to occur.

The same can be said for any other Object, including

one, the behaviour of which will represent the behaviour

attributed to the initial Object, by the observer. And it is

through the types of correlation of these times of observations

that we can produce the logical systems through which Models and

Languages can represent Objects, and through which individual

observers can construct hierarchies of Objects, logically related,

and hence their own cognitive structures. In this, we believe

this Thesis to be unique, for no other philosophical work of which

we know can derive its own logic from its system of units.

-The process by which these observations are made was

also subjected to an analysis that arrived at a system for

analysing forms of argument, reducing them to their most economic

form (through reference to the same logic of relations that was
derived in the philosophy), and dimensioning the Modelling stages,
from which it was suggested that a means of mapping cognitive
processes, and a method for improving the performance of

computers, might be developed.

Other problems were also resolved: G8del's was shown to

be essentially irrelevant, for example, and Wittgenstein's
insistence on the unobservableness of the Object was negated.
The problem of psychological overload was accounted
 171

for, as was the gradual loss of definition of Objects, as they

are observed more and more.

These "peripherals", peripheral only in the sense that

they were not primary design considerations in the construction

of this Universe, leave areas for follow up, to further test the

physical viability of this Thesis. Over the years, I may

attempt some. And the list here is not intended as exhaustive:

the possibility of using versions of the Experiment forms

contained here to assess, or to let students assess, progress,

leaving style (as Pask does), understanding, and their own con-

ception of a field (e. g. "Architecture") is also open: indeed,

it is the inclusion of work by students of mine which Validates

this claim (and there is much more being done now).

This Thesis moves outside its fields of "Architecture"

and "Language": indeed, these fields are, in many ways, now

irrelevant to it. Substantial claims might be made for it, on

hunches. But this has been only an attempt to account for its

relationship to its two initial fields of investigation: to

discuss some of its surprises: and to mention some extensions.

The testing of its value, and the checks of these projected

experiments, lie ahead, in the hands of others.

 172

STORIES

(When You First See This Place)

(Now That You Can See Me)

(Seeing Is Believing Oblique Killing)

(A Fred Blogg's (R. I. B. A. ) Eye View)

(A Superman's Eye View)

(A God's Eye View)

 173

WHEN YOU FIRST SEE 71ITS PLACE:

When you first see this place it is all dark but growing

instantly lighter - in the gloom you can see nothing but your own

buzzing. But you can't be elsewhere in other buzzings than yours.

Little lights glimmering, brighter brighter, each one

buzzing as it admires itself, looking over its shoulder and saying
This is how I look to others, This is what I am, This is what they

are. But they are not, and it is not.

As little lights, growing brighter brighter, ochre coming

out of the pitch blue dark, stars of wider dimensions, infinitely

small, shining dim ochre in vacuous night sky as far and as near,

as little lights shine, they buzz, or so it seems to me looking at

my own little light buzzing.

I stop and look over my shoulder where I can be, and

survey the frozen landscape of voids.

Little lights which buzz, near, near, all is near, all is

far, bigger than the stars while infinitely small, looking at them-

selves and therefore buzzing, equally spaced and yet near. Who

said the caveman's magic lanterns just-out-of -reach were incorrect?

And what of the sound? A little murmering of each ochre,

dimly vibrating, invisibly and inaudibly, so indistinct that there

is only a hint of a suggestion, as each ochre sways in its appointed

place, murmering its buzz to the vacuoucity of others.

Growing brighter, sound growing louder, this place seems
to become accessible each time I am there looking, seemingly I can

it 6
see all and hear it all, but I can't there. I look over my

shoulder, pat my back, and that is what I am doing there. But

that is not, and it is not.

Each light makes its pure ochre, swaying in the pitch

blue, each light makes its murmer inaudibly heard by others, the

buzz buzz of this world, frozen in its eternity, noticing its

 174

multiplication one moment from the next, and its paling as it fades

In parts while I see it more clearly and hear it with louder

inaudibility.

With each light growing brighter in its dimming, buzzing

its murmer, there becomes clear a difference in each, at least to

me where I am, for, buzzihg, and travelling in the pitch blue, the

vacuous silence, sometimes two pass through each other visibly and

with a difference never colliding on the way, passing with a

loneliness so total as to be chilling, were it not that this place

is cold already, with only the buzzing ochres searing hot if one

were to touch them, but you can't be there.

Passing through each other, it appears they don't even

notice their intrasection while they don't collide; perhaps it is

me?

And yet, I can't be there. I am looking at myself over

my shoulder, pat on the back, the loneliness of the lone description

silently divorcing itself one step at a time, shedding a mock

silent tear to its own audience, lost in the searing chill of

ochre murmers, reporting to myself the fact of this aloneness of

all as if I could see it all, and each buzzing's buzz.

While looking then at my searing ochre murmers, suddenly

neon lines start drawing and undrawing themselves around some or

more of the buzzes, weaving patterns, pushing them into small herds

of indifferent differences, collecting them together, and this with

the process of intrasection hiding some ochre lights while colouring
them around with blue, green, red and yellow racers, enlivening
this place with a kinesthetic game of automatic playing, causing
the little lights to all but disappear on occasion, so diverting
is this game enlivening the twilight of pitch blue.

And yet, even this diversion pales, and gives no solution

to the sadness of the isolation, for ultimately it is a very sad

world: ultimately there is no possible communication between the

4
 175

little oebres,. murmering. searing, buzzing, neon-lining:

ultimately each is alone, quite alone, unique. The rest is an

illusion to fill in the ceaseless fading time and space.
When you first see this place you are lost.
 176

NOW THAT YOU CAN SEE ME

Now that you can see me, let me first tell you what

you've done to me, lying here on my clean adjustable table, in my

white tiled room, surrounded by you, glazed tiles glaring, grey

metal filing drawers sliding in and out, High Speed Morgue, now that

you can see me, all of you shining eyes, turn off the lights.

Now that you can see my white, bright, whiteman flesh,

my spurting red blood, my vague blue eyes, my long mouse hair, my

white clean overalls, my cleaned cut nails, now that you can see

all that, let me tell you what you've done to me.

This room is vast, white, speckless, boundless. Floors,

tiled in white glazed tiles, trimmed with drains, meeting walls,

tiled in white glazed tiles, only with this difference, an inter-

spersal of grey metal filing drawers. The ceiling may be there

but is hidden behind a downpour of bright electric light and cannot

be seen. The whole very clean, damp, cold, bright. And in it

you, thousands of you, millions, busy acting. For this room is

the theatre in which you operate on me.

Sitting secured on my table, there is nothing. I can do

about this, even if I would, no way I act on you, can exert

pressure. You are a thousand free agents and I am your corpse.

Now you can begin.
Taking a thousand identical taUles, a thousand free

agents set to work, with a whirring instantness.

You, brown eyed man, with green and purple striped

flesh, let me watch you your actions.
On the table you build - facsimile me - as the coconut
postage stamp is the Carribean tree : opening a grey drawer, take my
arm, screw it to an imaginary corpse, wrong way round, or right;

another drawer, another arm, a leg, a testicle, a beard : kidney-

less you build me and gutless, to carry out your experiment.
 177

Comparing now the new-me to the old-me, you see the same,

same but for the things you don't want, you dontt see, the-same all
through, the grey drawers can keep the rest.
Transform.

S. ý.
ll pump attached to belly button - no danger there,

the new-I is gutless you pump. At the same time a creyidrawer

opens, there's another limb, screw it on, 3 arms, 11 testicles,

7 beards. Now, am I how you want me?

Compare to original. - suddenly, mysteriously, old-I has

3 arms, beards, balls. Maybe no guts though - the kidneys have

walked off - but what price is that to pay for your pleasure.

Set me up -I walk in your mock field, I collapse, done

for, little grey drawers opening and closing with the fury of an

amok juke box.

Or you take me, assembling your facsimile, life-like

(except for the kidneys no barm : not to piss is a blessing in

-
disguise). beautiful, true, bleed me like a pig, wrench off the

arm, break the back, cause me to walk and I flop.

And all the time the counter point of wretched. breaths,

the drumming of terrified hearts, the clatter of slamming drawers,

the din of your knives.

Transformed.

Even the original cannot survive this blight.

But now the others - all thousand of you 999 now -

-
emergency emerging, all at once, drawer open, blood spurts, limbs.

fly, you've got his leg, confused intrasection, a thousand, sorry,

999, spewing anomolies like war veteraný, all at once I
- what can
do?
, -N
You do unto me as you would do unto me.
Clean theatre, white, sterilised, hygenic, your operating

space. All wildly screwing, bleeding, blowing, tables and

originals, transform.
 178

Small beady eyes Peering around, a thousand pairs, under

that bright deceiving ceiling light, looking at the home brewed

me's.

And all the time the counterpoint of wretched breaths,

the drumming of terrified hearts, the clatter of slamming drawers,

the din of your screams.

And now, I, still there, changed and mutilated, constant,

what type of animal am I?

Flash of the old grey bulb, parting of, tbdiblinds.

Now that you can see me - tell me.

0
 179

SEEING IS BELIEVING OBLIQUE KILLING

Erasing the mistake of life, seeing is believing

oblique killing.

In the shining blue darkness, surgical tables gleaming,

flashing like the old film, flicker visible invisible alone. The

buzz of each an endless din, the buzz of each flickering while the

lights shine searing.

Tables, adjusted, objects, squealing, you adjust to suit

your whim, buzz buzz together yet all is the same in the dif-

ferences you execute. Limbs fly through neon lines, passed round

like the proverbial buck, fantasies projecting out of the

amputated ochre, flicker buzz flicker buzz the blinds part.

At each parting, grey plates absorb the situation, white

beards flash, looking at the new limbs, where they are now, the

little ochre lights out of reach and on the tables, their

introverted shimmerings contradicting their flickering projections,

projections you give them.

Little voice, quietly insisting with a tongue of wagging

silence, ochre purple, screw on leg, new picture now goes out,

broadcast movie, flicker in the shutter, grey blinds close.

Message passed, picture seen, message passed, medium,

medium, he i's there, that being discovered in the searing buzzer.

the flicker of ochre, the blood spewing Victim, the green and

purple object of the multiple amputations, lobotomised, born, no

doubt there, no longer alone, talking gibberishly a din of

rubbish, and attacking you too.

-reverberant
Now he too is there, now he is in the battle, conscripted

to live and chatter, chilled teeth in chilled ice, quiet messages

emanating, chewing others. Multi-storey theatres, parked

bodies, flickering ochre, silent din, savage thrusts cutting

through to. projectzthe SeVe'red., utabilicAlzsilence,

 iso

Each little body, screaming as it buzzes ochre, caught

in the parting grey blinds, each little body, loaded with limbs,

blood drunk by vampire surgeons, inflate now to the neon racer,

shine green, what is left of that body on the rack, stretched over
barbed wire and pulled by a thousand free agents' mad deceptions

projecting skywards like the ancient candles. WalkIpg., fore-

shortened corpses, burdened with images, legs collapsing, handling

projections and skinning themselves on the way, the survivors of a

cross-country extravaganza of insistent pain. Each little body

drinking its own blood, the blood of others, any blood, operational

and limbless.

And yet the neons cut, fields hedged, each amputated

body, each string of motion pictures projecting, swamping the

isolated target, buzz buzz, the murderous hacking at the isolated

corpses.

Chill cold pitch blue around the glaring white glazing,

the opening closing grey metal drawers permeating space, bisecting

neons, the blood spurting from the ochre buzzers, the fluttering

of the flickers, the lies told and projected, the weight-of the

false limbs, the body dies from prolonged application, the light

blinding, the body dies, and so do you, weighed down by the icy

false chattering in the dim silent din, by the projections sliced

by neon.

You build yourself up to your own death killing others.

Seeing is believing oblique killing for companionship in

the impossible vacuiun.

 181

A FRED BLOGGS'S (R. T. B. A. ) EYE VIEW:

Fred Bloggs can see himself, and he can see that he sees

himself, and what he sees is his Essence, but he doesn't know that

it is his Essence, or that it is any different to the observations

he makes about other Objects in the Universe. Nor does it occur

to him that maybe he doesn't see the whole thing; what he sees is

the truth, and a fact.

So Fred can't see that others see things differently and

that they can't see things just like he does, and he certainly

can't see that his view of himself cannot be shared by others.

What Fred does see, however, is not the Objects themselves, (he

can't guess this of course), and he thinks he sees the Objects,

but then he doesn't understand about Essences. What Fred does

see is the Model Facilities of the Objects he believes he sees,

and that's what he believes the Universe Is made of: Objects

which are Model Facilities but which he believes are Objects.

Fred won't easily accept that there could be such a person as

Superman or a God. Not that he minds God; its more that he

isn't really interested in him.

However that may be, Fred can definitely see things,

and he knows them, and he knows that. Ile can see just what
things are, and what they can do, and what their properties are.
Not that he decides these properties - that's obvious - the things

speak for themselves, don't they? Well, they don't, but Fred

won't worry about that. Each thing has its appointed place, and
Fred is not one to interfere with that.

So that, while Fred does attribute behaviours, he Is not

aware of this, but believes the converse. And thatts partly why
Fred finds it so hard to see all the other views, or to allow that

there might be others which make sense. But at least its unlikely
Fred will want to become a surrealist, and attach inappropriate

4
 182

attributes, and Dadaist he could never be.

Fred can also communicate his views, vehemently and

without any great interest in discussion. He can, given generous

conditions, carry on a conversation, but he doesn't often bother:

he Is more content to make statements of facts, not that they are

facts, nor that anyone but the most closely attuned fellow could

really understand what he was talking about. But, under such

closely controlled, and perfectly fitted conditions, Fred can

actually carry out a conversation with another and he can even begin

to appreciate the behaviour that another gives to an Object, and

which Fred believes is the Object. On a really good day, Fred may

even learn something from another view, thinking that it was his

all the time.

And Fred has a memory, which of course he does really

have. And he unde'rstands his own individual time. Not that

Fred is in any way to be belittled or put down by anyone, else, least

of all me: he is happy, and he gets on very well in the Universe.

Why should he ask Superman's questions anyway?

To Fred, the world consists of himself, and other Objects

which aren't himself, and which have properties he can see, and

which are self-evident. He can also remember them, and talk about
them to close friends, modifying them occasionally. That the

Objects are really Model Facilities, that he is his Essence, that

properties are behaviours, that language is an Object, doesn't

matter to him, and why should it?

 183

A SUPERMAN'S EYE VIEW

Superman arrived from another Universe, and he can

occasionally remember that, and that's why he can see so much more.
Not that coming from somewhere else makes him invincible, far from

it. Ile can be cut down by green kryptonite, and he doesn't know

how to get rid of that inconvenience. Anyhow, Superman, having

come from somewhere else, realises that he can never really be like

everyone else; that he is really alone and isolated and that he

can never really know others.

-Superman, however, does have some special powers, as his

name and antecedents might suggest. Ile can outguess most people,

and he can see their point of view, sometimes, and that they have

one, often.
Superman can also see that he, being unique, has no

reason not to assume that others are also. Indeed, having come
from other worlds, he understands that there are things clear to
him that no-one else can see or understand; and that there is no
way that he can understand or see the whole of anyone else. So
he does see that he has an Essence, and that everyone else has an
Essence, and that that's private, and that he can't see anyone

else's Essence, (or even that it is there: all he can see is that

there is a need for it to be there). And seeing that there must

be Essences for all things, Superman can see that that is not
what he can observe about them, nor is it what any other observing
Object can see, unless it is'looking at itself, and that that is

noncommunicable. So that he sees that whatever a. characteristic

of an Object is is not what the Object thinks it is itself, at
least as far as other observers are concerned: so he thinks that

the behaviour of an Object is attributed by the observer, and that

each observer has his own way ýof looking at things. and that is

why he can sometimes perform feats of great strength, and even

predict things before they happen.
 184

However that nay be, Superman knows that he can talk to

people about what they think, not in terms of the way he thinks,

after all that's from another Universe, but by using another

Object to put things in terms of. So he knows about language

being an Object just like any other Object, acting as a surrogate

for discussions, and he knows that there are discussions too,

with conversational idioms and conventions, so that he can listen

to what he thinks the other side says. And he measures the

difference, and adjusts his views, and he learns from what others
have found, which is a good thing, because it he did not, he might

never have been able to understand anything about the strange

Universe into which he was plunged when the planet Krypton exploded.

Being a star, Superman knows too that everyone looks at

him, too, and that they build up a behaviour they attribute to him.

too, and being kind, he tries to stick to what he understands of

their picture, not that it is the same as his picture, of himself:

it isn't, but it is the best that can be done, and he knows that,

too. In fact. he is quite aware of the things that can be known,

and those that can't be, and that some of the unknowables are

necessary for any theory of this Universe to exist.

And, knowing as he does, that he came f rom anothor world,

and that he occupies his own place and time, he reallses that his

sense of space is unique, Is part of himself, and that everyone

else has something like that too. And that language Is a means

of transposing this, using a space; to map your ideas onto, and

synchronising the clocks while the conversations happen. Time is

something he is aware of, at least when he tries to talk.

Superman can follow the logic of his views and experience

thought, and he knows he is of his own space and time. But he can

see others, not as they see themselves, but in the same way that
they see him. Superman has a double identity. Come in,

Clark Kentl

0
 185

A GOD'S EYE VIEW:

"Given the existence as uttered forth in the public

works of Puncher and Wattman of a personal God qua qua qua qua

with white beard qua qua qua qua beyond time without extension? ......
When his white beard is not blowing in front of his

eyes, and when he happens to be looking, God has a grandstand view

of things, if there is anything to see, and if he wants to look

hard enough to see the little vibrations happening beneath the

surface, and the lines re-aligning themselves.

From his grandstand seat, he can see all the Essences,

they have no secrets from him, if he wants to look into them.

Not that they will know this, or that he is looking, he is like a

spy in their midst, or a grass. He can see all the Inhabitants

too, obviously, since he can see their Essences. And so he can

be like them all at any time, and he can see all the combinations,
because he can see all the Essences of all the Objects.

Similarly, he can see all the possible Model Facilities,

all the possible Objects, and every possible language and con-

versation: not that he needs to, of course, seeing all the

Essences, he needn't discuss the Objects anyhow, Ile understands

them all and doesn't need to do any exploring, because he has

..... "the kAby". Similarly, he can see all the possible Objects

and all the behaviours, and every assembly and attribution. Not

that he needs to - for he has "the key".

......
"The key" is the view and is the clock. God. behind

his white beard, has a special clock, a universal clock which ticks

for everyone all the time, and yet which doesn't tick for God;

who can see it all at once, seeing the roles of the inhabitant

Objects and observers, and who is bored because he has all the
a
Beckett(*119)
 186

possibilities, all the facts, and not even any time to fill in.

God doesn't spend much time looking, anyway. He hides behind his

beard, invisibly. Ile goes to sleep, disinterested in a qURgmire

of simultaneous synchronities, not being interested in the time.

He can control nothing. Ile is bored.

Poor God, he can't exist anyway. He is in an impossible

position. He is just so ordinary and he is not there.

If he is in the Universe, he is one of its subjects, and

he cannot see the Essences of other Objects.

If he can see the Essences of other Objects, he isn't in

the Universe.

If he can see the Essences hý is not in the Universe, and

he cannot be talked about or observed.
If he cannot be talked about how can we say what he
knows?
If he is not in the Universe, how can he see the Essences

which are the direct product of the Universe.

God is a very sad figure: God is our saddest most alone

inhabitant: he is nowhere, not sure if he is part of the Universe,

not sure if he can see and be seen, or if he doesn't really exist

at all.

I'm glad I'm not God.

 187

APPENDICES

(Correspondence)

(Signification in Frege's Triangle)

(Tune into Memories of You)

4
 188

APPENDIX I

CORRESPONDENCE

+ There "God
once was a man who said,
Must think it exceedingly odd
If he finds that this tree

Continues to be

When there's noone around in the Quad".

+Dear Sir,

Your astonishment's odd:

I am always around in the Quad

And that's why the tree

Continues to be,

Since observed by,

Yours Faithfully,

God.

Dear God,

Why did you forget me?

I don't need another to see:
I don't neeO no bod
Around in the Quad:

I'm observing,

Yours Faithfully,

Tree.

+ Traditional.
 189

@
Dear Sir,

I'm astonished to see

A pretentious address from a tree.

If I wasn't there

There'd be noone to hear

Let alone make remarks.

Yours,

Jahweh.

Dear Jahweh,

-I see that your name

Makes you assume you can claim

That a pretentious Tree

Can continue to be

Only because it's your aim.

@
Dear God,

Here's a real hot potato!

Alright; forms are enough - but just wait, though!

If you don't have to see

To conceive of a tree
Why create?
Yours Ideally,

Plato.

Dear Sir

Your Ideals are wrong.

A potato can't be hot for long.

Of the tree you evince

We have not caught a glimpse.

Your creations were myths all along.

0
Composed by Stephen Mullin, and included with his permission.
 190

@
Dear Sirs,

I'm afraid to report

You are all of you quite "Out of Court".

Since you're all in my dream

You can't be what you seem

To believe that you are, N

Aleph Nought.

If I am what you think I am,

You may find that you have to ram

The words that I thought

About "Aleph Nought"

Down your throat: and, if not, I am.

Dear Sir,

As a God who can see

That I am not, myself, quite a tree,

I feel that you've caught

My friend, Aleph Nought,

By the short hairs,

(Yours Barberously. )

Dear Tree,

I'm astonished to think

That you'd dream of the way that I sink

Into depths of despair.

Having trimmed my short hair,

Aleph's Samson Act's now on the blink.

a
Composed by Stephen Mullin, and included with his permission.

a
 191

Dear Sir,

Now I find myself equal

To trees, and, no doubt, also treacle;

To Platonic forins,

Odd Quads and norms.

Yours Faithfully,

God. (Or His sequel).

Pear God,

I am sorry to hear
Of the depth and the width of despair
Which is wracking your brain
With increasing pain
Since observing me, Tree! It's unfair!

Dear Sir,

I am bound to admit
That I think that this discourse lacks wit.
The Logic of Thoughts

Which herein one sports

Can hardly substantiate it.

Dear Sir, Gpd and Tree,

I must say
That I feel you are drifting away
From the meanings you meant
Before Limericks bent,

Re-inventing your thoughts in this way.

As the Tree which started this spiel

I find I'm beginning to feel

That it's useless to say

That I see it "This way":
For, ultimately, all is real.
 192

APPENDIX 2

SIGNIFICATION IN FREGEIS TRIANGLE

In developing his logical theories of meaning,

Gottlob Frege made use of three elementary concepts: "sign",

"sense" and "reference" (loosely translated).

Ogden and Richards later assembled these three together

in the form of a triangle, known as Frege's triangle, summarising

the stances that can be taken within Frege's Universe, with his

three elementary concepts. This triangle is:

sign

reference-sense
In terms of the work of this Thesis, it Is interesting

to note that we also have three basic "Object types": Objects,

observers, and Languages (or Models). And, the ways in which we

observe in our Universe are quite similar to Frege's terms.

Thus, Frege's "reference" is our "Object", and Frege's "sign" is

our "'Language". The "sense" is an observer generated "Meaning".

Our Universe has the three basic "Object types",

Object, Language, and observer. which also relate together as a

triangle:

Language

ýýver
b
 193

However, this representation does not fully describe

our Universe, because of its two levels. Nor does our triangle

work in quite the manner of Frege's, because it is based on

operational roles which may be switched around between the parts.

Our triangle could be more accurately represented by a

change in terms which represent the relationships between the

components. Thus, -it is not the Language or the Object which is

observed, but the behaviour of each which is then equated:

Language
behaviour

Object
behaviour observer
This can now be re-represented to reflect the level

structure of our Universe (using our familiar representations).

Urguage 4(P
L
0
RX
%..c)
Vz -0
I&

<OCL>=E Ob

Object observer
Oa Pb

We may also wonder why we have the Language Object: in

-our Universe, there is no assignation of the 'role Language with-

out some purpose: which is, of course, to communicate to another

observer an observation about an Object. We may therefore add a

 194

fourth point, and build a square. But we will not show all

possible relationships - merely those used for the observer Pb

to communicate his observation of an Object 0a via a Language

Lc to a second observer P (and thus all Essence and Object
d'
statements are being omitted).

listener
Pd 6 Ad(Lcj'--[Pd
14,4Language
V LC
"U
0 rr

Cr
CL
'&0
n
Object Ai
Pa Q-10 observer
v Pbl=) Ab(0& Ov Pb

Thus, Frege's triangle, In discussing purposive

signification becomes a square, and operates on two levels, 'In our

Universe.
 195

APPENDIX 3

TUNF INTO MEMORIES OF YOU

Instructions for Performance

This piece is for three orchestral groups, each of

eightplayers.

The groups should be placed at three points around the

edge of the auditorium, forming the apexes of an equilateral

triangle.

The audience should be allowed to sit where they like

in the room.

The groups should be made up of homogeneously timbred

instruments, as, for example: cellos and violas (violins should

not be used in this piece unless essential), cellos and trombones,

clarinets and saxophones, trombones and french horns, flutes and

french horns, whistles and recorders, clarinets and trumpets, and

other similar combinations. There is no reason why there should

be only two types of instrument, as long as they all blend: e. g.
trombones, cellos, violas or clarinets, horns, saxophones and

trumpets could be excellent. Each group should have aýsimilarainake-

up. -

The score consists of one continuous tune of seventeen

minute's duration, with no rests. There is also, in the score,

a blank stave for writing in analytical notes and other useful

Information, although parts should not be written out (see later).

Each group should choose one starting place. (lettered

A to F). The individual groups shoul4 choose secretly, and for

every run through.

The piece will start 120 seconds before this point (if

there is a tied note at that point, the tie will be disregarded).

The introductory 120 seconds will be a slow crescendo to the level

shown at the chosen starting point. The score will then be

 196

followed round once, cyclically, until the starting point is

reached again. There will then be a further 120 second

diminuendo after this. The piece will thus be exactly 21

minutes long in performance.

The performance consists in IMPROVISING a suitable

accompaniment to the tune. The tune is thus not played (except

where the performer considers that his accompaniment co-incides

with the tune. Rests may, of course, be left in the accompaniment,

and key phrases may be written down and referred to.

The performers will need a time keeping device, in the

form of a conductor, a team of conductors, stop watches, light

display, programmed tapes or whatever. They can decide on the

best way of dealing with the timing and synchronisation.

It is recommended that there are rehearsals, and that

performers are experienced in improvisation.

4
 197

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198

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199

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 200

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 201

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 202

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 203

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 205
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 206

t, ý-rA es ->

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 207

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 :208

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 209

lj_ to)
#44.. OK or

S4
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AC-7/tf"'N 0 IL IL W.. t., I.. d A

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a
 210

GLOSSARY OF TERMS 'USED

 211

GLOSSARY OF MAIN TERMS WITH SIGNS (where relevant)

Ll gn No-me and Meaning

Algorithm

The Algorithm is that which connects Information to a

Model, thus re-creating the Object,

In the case that the Model is reflexive (that is, the

Information can be extracted from the Model itself), the

Algorithm shows how this is done,

Qý-4M(f)

awareness
An awareness Is an observation made of another Object by

an observer, recorded from the observer's viewpoint. it

complements a behaviour,

Abl('-ý[(Xa)Pb]

An awareness is made by the observer and the observed

Object, and no others may share it.

0
A Awareness
The Awareness of an observer is the sum of many

observations of other 6bjects made by that observer,

recorded from the observer's viewpoint. The sum of all

Awarenesses in the Universe is the same as the sum of all
Behaviours,

0
2: 1QPb]
---A b"
 212

Anti-Hodel

An Anti-Model is a primary Model type in which the Object

is wholly contained within the Model. It is designated

thus,

Q
An Anti-Model may adumbrate many Anti-Models within itself.

Anti-Remainder

That which is added to the Object when making an Anti-

Model of the Object. The Anti-Remainder constitutes the

Information and the Algorithm,

Q
R

behaviour

A behaviour is an observation made of an Object by an

external observer, recorded from the Object's point of

view. It complements an awareness. It is what the

-observer believes the Object being observed to be, during

the observation,

KXa)pbl-
BC1(--
A behaviour*is made by the observer and the observed
Object, and no others may share it.

BO Behaviour
The Behaviour of an Object is the sum of all observations

of the Object made by external observers, recorded from

the Object's view point. The sum of all BehaViours in
the Universe is the same as the sum of all Awarenesses,

0 [(Xci)PJ
a b.(lm)

AD
 213

ConversRtion

A Conversation is a paradigm by which communication can

take place between two observers, with some degree of

certainty of understanding. It involves the formulation

of the views of observer one about some Object, the con-

sequent formulation of observer two of observer one's

views, and finally the formulation of observer one's

views of observer two's views (of observer one's views).

With these three steps, observer one can compare his

original view to his view of the other observer's view,

and thus adapt his formulation of his view until it

appears that observer two has understood.

Essence

The Essence of an Object is the observation of an Object

made by itself, and referring only to itself, it is unique

and private to that Object observer. It is what the

'Objecp believes itself to be,

E&=FCýPcj].

The Essence and the Behaviour are mutually exclusive.

The Essence and the Awareness are equally so.

Information

That which makes the difference, when connected to the

Model by the Algorithm, between the Model and the Object.

In the case of an Interior Model, Information will be

added to make the Object: in the case of an Anti-Moael,

---subtracted,

0 (--4 MMI

Q(-ýPml

In some cases, there is no visible Information, it being

a part of the Model.

 214

Interior Model

A primary Model type, which is wholly contained within

the Object. The Interior Model is designated thus,

0 (--M

An Interior Model may adumbrate many Interior Models

within itself.

Language

A Language is an Object put in a role surrogate to

another Object by the observer. This is achieved by the

observer observing a behaviour which appears to be the

same for both the Object and the Language,

<Oh)=BW=KXa)pbjj

Lc =Bc(--[(Xc)Pý.

Pa ( )Bc*

A Language is similar to a Model, but it has a different

role: a Language permits an observation to be observed

by others.

Level
Our Universe has two levels of existence: the "private"
(which is the Object's self -observation); and the "public"
(which is the external observer's observation of the
Object, or the observer's observation of an external
Object). The terms "private" and "public" refer to the
self-containedness of the observation, and not to its

communicability. "Private" existence of-both observer

and observed is an a priori requirement for a "public"
existence.
 215

Lifespan

Lifespan is the measure of the growth of an Object's

Behaviour. An Object is "born" when it is first

observed by an external observer. An Object "dies"

when the next observation made by an external observer

through its Model Facility would result in an observation

the same as the Essence. This can never happen, but it

can be approached. The "time" between "birth" and

"death" is the Lifespan.

Model

A Model'is gn Object put in a role surrogate to another

Object by an observer. This is achieved as with a

Model's surrogate role.

A Model is similar to a Language, but it has a different

role: a Model permits a transformation to be applied,

via the surrogate Object (the Model), to an Object (as

observed). Models may be typed as either Interior, or

Anti, according to it they are, when seen from the view-

point of the transforming observer, smaller or larger than

the Object of which they are'Models.

X Model Facility

The Model Facility is the means by which an Object is

observable (both by itself and by external observers).

It is a necessary part of an Object, but cannot exist by

itself. Thus,

Bcý--[()QFq [(XcýOa]=ýEý
A Model Facility can become an Object by observing itself,
Xa ý N) YQ
-
This Object can then be observed by other observers.
The Model Facility also unifies all observations by making
them all relevant to the same Object. From the Model
Facility, Meanings are created by observers.

a
 216

Object

A basic unit-describing all inhabitants of our Universe,

usually taking the role of that which is observed. For

an Object to exist in our Universe, it must be observable.

For to be observable by others, it must be

something

there in order that it maybe observed. An Object must

therefore observe itself,

FG) 0a]
-
The Self-observer's view of the Object is the Essence.

while the external observer's view is a behaviour,

(W=[N) Oa] Ea

'(Ocý=[(Xq)Pb] Bc,

A behaviour of an Object is also that which is represented

by a Language or Model.

observer

An observer is an Object in our Universe, taking the role

of observing (as opposed to being observed), and thus

attributing to those Objects, behaviours, and to themselves

awarenesses,

Ba 4--[(Xa)Pb]4Ab

Object

When talking about making Models, it is more convenient to

refer to the Object by the letter Q, meaning that there

is. between the Object and the Model a relationship of

behaviours. The use of Q in a string reminds us,

therefore, that we are talking about relationships

between behaviours, but we are not notating this fully.

 217

Physi ca Il is at ion

In making a Model of an Object, a Remainder is added or

subtracted by the operation of an Algorithm. The Model

is then transformed (usually). However, in order for

this transformation to be carried through to the Object,

the Remainder difference between the Object and the

Model must be made up. The process of subtracting or

adding the Remainder by the operation of the Algorithm

is Physicallisation.

Remainder

That which is omitted from an Object when making an

Interior Model of the Object. The Remainder constitutes

the Informatiom and the Algorithm,

M
R

Representation

An Object which is surrogate to another Object. is a

representation of that Object. Thus Languages and

Models represent Objects. A representation is an

Object, and both representation and original Object are

connected by an act of the observer making a similarity

between the behaviours.

S time state

A time state is measured in our Universe by a local

individual clock in each Object, such that each self-
vIDGervation of an Object advances its local clock one
time state (consisting of two half-cycles), and the
output of each Object's self -observation is an infinite
regress. An Object has also an ability to correlate
its clock with the clocks of other Objects, and thus to
 218

observe and represent. An Object can observe itself

and another Object simultaneously. Each complete self-

observation is marked by a gain of one*time unit (hence

S (S - 1) (S - 2) (S +3) Each half-cycle is marked by a

dash (hence S (S+I) (S+2 ) (s+3)).

Universe

The Universe of our investigations Is the Universe of

existence of Objects by knowledge. All inhabitants of
the Universe are Objects, and all know they exist. No

Object that does not know it Exists is a part of the

Universe. This does not mean to say that it cannot

exist, in some other Uaiverse.

 219

GLOSSARY OF MAIN OPERATIONS USED

SiLyn SImple Translation

"gives rise to".

"implies" (in this case, that which is on the left-hand

is conditional upon thai which is on the right-hand side:

the direction of the arrow is reversible).

"equals" (the bi-conditional).

O'does not equal".

A "and".

'for" (inclusive or).

"the sum of".

that which is contained within the brackets is named.

that which is contained within the brackets is operated through.

that which is contained within the brackets is the

observation.

11
used for large groupings.
 220

BrBLIOGRAPITY
 221

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Off-print from paper from Portsmouth Polytechnic.

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(*3) ALEXANDER, C.: "From a Set of Torces to a Tormll: Trom

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ALEXANDER, C.: "Notes on the Bynthegls of Tormll:

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.

ARBIB, M. : "The Metaphorical Brain": Wiley Interscience:

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ARCHIGRAM GROUP: "Archigram Magazines Nos. 1-611: in

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4
 222

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(*20) BROADBENT, G.: "Design in Architecture": Wiley:

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4
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ADDITIONS TO BIBLIOGRAPHY

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a
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nlE END