Unit 4 Critical Theory: 4.0 Objectives
Unit 4 Critical Theory: 4.0 Objectives
Contents 4.0 Objectives 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9 Introduction The Historical Context of Critical Theory The Character of Critical Theory Critical Theory: The Marxian and Hegelian Legacies Max Weber and the Enlightenment Tradition The Critical Theory of Horkheimer and Adorno Neo-Marxists and Orthodox Marxists: Towards Revised Marxism Habermas and Critical Theory Let Us Sum Up
4.10 Key Words 4.11 Further Readings and References 4.12 Answers to Check Your Progress
4.0 OBJECTIVES
In this Unit we attempt to understand what is meant by critical theory. Critical theory, it should be emphasized, does not form a unity, it does not mean the same thing to all its adherents. The tradition of thinking which can be loosely referred to by this label is divided into at least two branches the first centered around the Institute of Social Research and the second around the more recent work of Jurgen Habermas. Therefore, this Unit introduces one to:
the historical context and the character of critical theory explain how the critical theorists follow the Marxian and Hegelian legacies understand the contribution of Max Weber, Horkheimer and Adorno the effort of the Neo-Marxists and orthodox Marxists to revise Marxism the way Habermas attempts to give a new look to the basic objectives and goals of critical theory
4.1 INTRODUCTION
Critical theory in its loose reference centered firstly around the tradition of the Institute of Social Research, established in Frankfurt in 1923, and secondly around the more recent work of Jrgen Habermas. There are many prominent figures associated with the above Institute. The founders of critical theory placed history at the center of their approach to philosophy and society. However, their
47
preoccupation over certain issues included those of the past and looked forward to future possibilities. After the example of Marx they involved themselves with the forces which moved society towards rational institutions. They conceived of these rational institutions as ensuring a true, free and just life, while at the same time being aware of the obstacles which rendered radical change untenable and difficult. Thus their main concern was with interpretation and transformation. The critical theorists were of the view that although all our knowledge is conditioned and shaped by historical circumstances, we can at the same time adjudicate the truth claims independently of our immediate social interests. Having defended the possibility of an independent moment of criticism, they also tried to justify critical theory on a non-objectivistic and materialistic foundation.
With the rise of Nazism and fascism during the period from 1924 to 1933, the liberal and democratic were unable to counter the above movements. Noticing the crumbling force of the Communists, Hitler exploited his chances in Germany and in 1933 the Nazis seized power. The signing of the Hitler-Stalin Pact in August 22, 1939, proved end of an era.
Critical Theory
49
contemporary sociology. Among the members of the Institute of Social Research, the impact was reciprocal, in that, Horkheimer and Adorno impressed each other. While Benjamin influenced Adorno, the latter along with Marcuse left a lasting impact on Habermas.
50
irresponsible. Marx on his part, besides exposing the negative sides of modern societies, had to show how, the true nature of emancipated society was already prefigured in the dynamics, the crisis, and the logic of development of capitalist societies. Marx envisaged that the end of capitalism results in the emergence of a classless, communist society. The future emancipation of humankind, human society which Marx envisages is construed in terms of a historical dialectics. Marx had criticized Hegel for justifying some negative features of the prevailing modern state as being in accordance with a fuller co-operation of reason. Marx believed that with his critique of the ideological justification of capitalist property he could tear down the whole edifice of Hegels political thought, while at the same time finding an alternative explanation of all the phenomena of alienation seen in modern societies. Marx thought that with this new conception he could pave the way for the complete abolition of the dehumanizing features, functional differentiations of the modern state. Subsequently, he hoped that there would emerge unity and solidarity among all human beings in a communist society. However, Marxs historical dialectics seems implausible even for Marxists. Max Weber has reconstructed historical dialectics, that is, negative dialectics of progress and enlightenment.
Critical Theory
51
modern society. Further, rationalization with regard to modes of action and interaction signifies a transition from communal to associative forms of social action. Weber critically analyzes the transition to modernity as a process of rationalization. He held that in this process of rationalization the social sciences are bound to play an increasingly important role. His concept of progressive rationalization sheds all utopian perspectives. Webers disciple Lukcs termed reification, i.e., dehumanized systems of new kind into which the progressive rationalization led the modern man. One clearly notices here a paradox in Webers conception of progressive rationalization as it connotes both emancipation and reification simultaneously. Later on Adorno and Horkheimer through their conception of Dialectic of Enlightenment tried to resolve this paradox.
52
Check Your Progress I Note: a) b) Use the space provided for your answer. Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit.
Critical Theory
1) How did the founders of critical theory conceive rational institutions? ................................................................................................................. ................................................................................................................. ................................................................................................................. ................................................................................................................. 2) Write a short note on Lukcs and Korschs criticism of Marxism. ................................................................................................................. ................................................................................................................. ................................................................................................................. .................................................................................................................
53
modernization as occurred in European history and it further exposed the deplorable consequences of capitalism, namely, the ideological deformation of consciousness and the reification of social relationships. The Marxian perspective of a liberated, rationally organized, classless society enabled the thinkers of Frankfurt school, to reconsider the historical dialectics of progress and revolution. Characterizing the dialectic of progress as a negative one, they thought that the former, instead of aiming at the realization of reason, would aim at the destruction of reason. As a result, one could not conceive of a liberated society as the logical or natural unfolding of the contradictions of capitalism. Ultimately, its realization is the break from the bad continuum of progress and a lead into the realm of freedom. The form of critical theory that developed around the Dialectic of Enlightenment identifies the objective historical and social tendencies and mechanisms that point toward the emergence of a post-capitalist society which is liberated.
In the political sphere one of the major events of this period was the degeneration of the Russian revolution into Stalinism. Added to this, Marxism proved ineffective in the West and the Marxist theory often fell into either deterministic objectivistic science or a pessimistic cultural critique. With regard to capitalism one could say that state intervention and profit oriented market became the norm of the time. Though capitalism came to be organized rigorously day by day, public sphere came to be threatened by the growth of instrumental reason and bureaucracy. This growing feature of rationalization of administration has curtailed the freedom and self-determination of human being. Though there are a number of reasons in order to consider technical progress a blessing, there are also equal numbers of reasons to the contrary opinion. At this juncture Habermas thinks what we need to do is not the wholesale abandonment of the achievements of modernity but a careful analysis of the maladies and the pathologies of progress in modernity. During the course of his intellectual journey, Habermas choked out his primary concerns. First to occupy his interest was the need to develop a concept of rationality which is beyond the individualistic and subjectivist premises of modern philosophy and social theory. Secondly he sought to construct a two-level concept of society and thirdly his preoccupation was to sketch out a critical theory of modernity which analyses and accounts for its pathologies in a way that it suggests a redirection rather than an abandonment of the project of enlightenment. Habermas was convinced that with Horkheimer and Adorno, the critical theory had reached its dead end. In order to get over this dead end he proposed a shift of paradigm for critical theory away from the philosophy of consciousness. From 1920s through 1960s Critical Theory moved in a direction which was very different from Marxs development. There was a turn to more generalized critique of instrumental rationality which finally culminated in Adornos negative dialectics. But for Habermas this development threatened the explanatory-diagnostic function of Critical Theory. By virtue of its ability to specify those real potentialities in a concrete historical situation which would further the processes of human emancipation and overcome domination and repression, the Critical Theory had distinguished itself from traditional social theory. In order to achieve this objective it was necessary to undertake the task of a scientific understanding of the dynamics of contemporary society. At this point, the need of the hour for Habermas was to root out the errors in the Marxist legacy and show how it was insufficient in the twentieth-century. He sought to appropriate the most promising developments in the social sciences and integrate them into a critical social science. In spite of the differences between him and Horkheimer and Adorno, he however shared their preoccupation with the way in which enlightenment (in the form of instrumental or means-end rationality), turns from a means of liberation into a new source of enslavement. We can mention three directions in which this preoccupation of Habermas took and which we can clearly notice in his early works. First of all, he took to the thorough reading of the classical philosophical texts. Secondly, due to his preoccupation with technology, he attempted to construct an alternative to the technological determinism. Thirdly, he engaged himself with rational political discussion or practical reason in modern technocratic democracy. Habermas started to chart a course for himself, beginning in the 1960s. He sought to retain the power of his predecessors critique of modern life. This affinity required that one has to clarify a distinctive conception of rationality. He worked
Critical Theory
55
towards the notion of just or emancipated society. In general Habermass philosophical journey commences with a clear cut departure from the positions of Horkheimer and Adorno. Habermass views have changed over time and, indeed, are still in the process of development. He often gives his positions a tentative and programmatic status they are part of an ongoing project. A major concern of Habermas has been the spread of instrumental reason to many areas of social life. The rise of technocratic consciousness, with its disintegrative effect on the public sphere, is discussed at two fundamental levels. At the level of social theory Habermas argues that the increasing tendency to define practical problems as technical issues threatens an essential aspect of human life; for technocratic consciousness not only justifies a particular class interest in domination, but also affects the very structure of human interests. Accordingly, reflection on this state of affairs must, penetrate beyond the level of particular historical class interests to disclose the fundamental interests of mankind as such. At the level of the theory of knowledge, Habermas investigates the way instrumental reason has dominated modern thought. Focussing on the dissolution of epistemology and the ascendance of positivism during the last century, he examines the way the significance of the epistemic subject and the capacity for reflection by the subject on his or her activities has been gradually eclipsed. He argues, that if emancipation from domination is to remain a project of humanity, it is essential to counter this tendency and to reaffirm the necessity of self-reflection for selfunderstanding. Habermas contends that knowledge is historically rooted and interest bound. He develops a theory of cognitive interests (or knowledge constitutive interests) and this is the first stage in his elaboration of the relationship of knowledge to human activity. It is his contention that the human species organizes its experience in terms of a priori interests. He argues that there is a basis of interests. He understands humans as both toolmaking and language using animals. They must produce from nature what is needed for material existence through the manipulation and control of objects and communicate with others through the use of intersubjectively understood symbols within the context of rule-governed institutions. Thus, mankind has an interest in the creation of knowledge which would enable it to control objectified processes and to maintain communication. There is however, a third interest: an interest in the reflective appropriation of human life, without which the interest-bound character of knowledge could not itself be grasped. This is an interest in reason, in the human capacity to be selfreflective and self-determining, to act rationally. As a result of it, knowledge is generated which enhances autonomy and responsibility. Hence it is an emancipatory interest. The theory of congnitive interests, as developed in Knowledge and Human Interests represents Habermass initial attempt to specify the relation between knowledge and human activity. He has however, recognized the need to examine this relation further, particularly, the distinction between processes of constitution and justification. This he has attempted to do in the theory of communicative competence. In this theory he argues that all speech is oriented to the idea of a genuine consensus a discursively achieved consensus which is rarely realized.
56
The analysis of consensus, he claims, shows this notion to involve a normative dimension, which is formalized in the concept of what he calls an ideal speech situation. A consensus attained in this situation, referred to as a rational consensus, is, in his opinion, the ultimate criterion of the truth of a statement or of the correctness of norms. The end result of this argument is that the very structure of speech is held to involve the anticipation of a form of life in which truth, freedom, and justice are possible. On Habermass account, the critical theory of society makes this its starting point. Critical theory, therefore, grounded in the normative standard that is not arbitrary, but inherent in the very structure of social action and language. It is just a normative standard for a critique of distorted communication. It is Habermass contention that in every communicative situation in which a consensus is established under coercion or under other similar types of condition, we are likely to be confronting instances of systematically distorted communication. This is, in his view, the contemporary formulation of ideology. The process of emancipation, then, entails the transcendence of such systems of distorted communication. This process, in turn requires engaging in critical reflection and criticism. It is only through reflection that domination, in its many forms, can be unmasked. Check Your Progress II Note: a) b) Use the space provided for your answer. Check your answers with those provided at the end of the unit.
Critical Theory
1) Explain briefly Habermas theory of cognitive interests. ................................................................................................................. ................................................................................................................. ................................................................................................................. 2) What do you understand by distorted communication? ................................................................................................................. ................................................................................................................. .................................................................................................................
The primary concerns of critical theory are rooted in the writings of Kant, Hegel and Marx. Horkheimer and Adorno, Max Weber and Benjamin Marcuse, these latter personalities had tried to make Marxism more viable and suited to their own time. However, their conception of what a critical theory should be was implausible for Habermas. He tries to revise Marxist tradition and reformulate it. Habermas was clearly aware of the major events that characterized the twentieth century history. One of the apparent features of his philosophical project has been from the very beginning its radical democratic character in order to expand the sphere of freedom aimed at harmony between theory and practice. He basically understands that knowledge is historically rooted and interest bound. In this theory of communication he contends that all speech is oriented to the idea of genuine consensus. For him critical theory is grounded in a normative standard that is inherent in the very structure of social action and language.
Historical Materialism
After the example of Marx the founders of critical theory involved themselves with the forces which moved society towards rational institutions. They
conceived of these rational institutions as ensuring a true, free and just life, while at the same time being aware of the obstacles which rendered radical change untenable and difficult. Thus their main concern was with interpretation and transformation. The critical theorists were of the view that although all our knowledge is conditioned and shaped by historical circumstances, we can at the same time adjudicate the truth claims independently of our immediate social interests. Having defended the possibility of an independent moment of criticism, they also tried to justify critical theory on a non-objectivistic and materialistic foundation. 2. The determinist and positivist interpretation of were the main issues for Lukcs and Korsch. They argued that the positivist interpretation, that is, the suitability of the methodological model of the natural sciences for understanding the stages of historical development, was rejected by Marx himself. This form of materialism corresponds to contemplative materialism in Marxs understanding, but it neglects the central importance of human subjectivity. They were of the view that the traditional standpoint of orthodox Marxism failed to comprehend the significance of examining both the objective conditions of action and the ways in which these conditions are understood and interpreted. Another prominent drawback of the Marxists was their underplaying of human subjectivity and consciousness and missing of those factors which were so crucial to prevent the emergence of revolutionary agent.
Critical Theory
Answers to Check Your Progress II 1. The theory of congnitive interests, as developed in Knowledge and Human Interests represents Habermass initial attempt to specify the relation between knowledge and human activity. He has however, recognized the need to examine this relation further, particularly, the distinction between processes of constitution and justification. This he has attempted to do in the theory of communicative competence. In this theory he argues that all speech is oriented to the idea of a genuine consensus a discursively achieved consensus which is rarely realized. The analysis of consensus, he claims, shows this notion to involve a normative dimension, which is formalized in the concept of what he calls an ideal speech situation. A consensus attained in this situation, referred to as a rational consensus, is, in his opinion, the ultimate criterion of the truth of a statement or of the correctness of norms. The end result of this argument is that the very structure of speech is held to involve the anticipation of a form of life in which truth, freedom, and justice are possible. It is Habermass contention that in every communicative situation in which a consensus is established under coercion or under other similar types of condition, we are likely to be confronting instances of systematically distorted communication. This is, in his view, the contemporary formulation of ideology. The process of emancipation, then, entails the transcendence of such systems of distorted communication. This process, in turn requires engaging in critical reflection and criticism. It is only through reflection that domination, in its many forms, can be unmasked.
59
2.