Section 16 Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases Padua vs. Ericta (G.R. No.

. L-38570, May 24, 1988) FACTS : Domingo Padua, petioner sought to recover damages for the injures suffered by his eight-year old daughter, Luzviminda, caused by herbeing hit by a truck driven by Rundio Abjaeto and owned by Antonio G. Ramos. Padua was litigating in forma pauperis. Trial of the case having been set in due course, Padua commenced presentation of his evidence on December 6, 1973. He gave testimony on direct examination in the course of which reference was made to numerous documents. At the close of his examination, and on motion of defendants' counsel, the previously scheduled hearing of December12, 1973 was cancelled, and Padua's cross-examination was reset on December 17, 1973. However, the hearing of December 17,1973wasalso cancelled, again at theinstance of defendants' counsel, whopleaded sickness as ground therefore; and trial was once more slated to "take place on March 6, March 7 and 13, 1974, all at 9:00 o'clock in the morning."After defendants' attorney had twice sought and obtained cancellation of trial settings, as narrated, it was plaintiff Padua's counsel who next moved for cancellation of a hearing date. In a motion dated and filedon March 1, 1974, Padua's counsel alleged that he had "anotherhearing on March 6, 1974 in Tarlac

and that the cancellation would "at any rate ... leave plaintiff and defendants two (2) hearing dates on March 7 and 13, 1974;" and on these premises, he asked "that the hearing on March 6, 1974 ... be ordered cancelled " No opposition was filed by the defendants to the motion. Apart from filing this motion on March 1, 1974, plaintiffs counsel took the additional step of sen ding his client's wife to the Court on the day of the trial, March 6, 1974, to verbally reiterate his application for cancellation of the hearing on that day. This, Mrs. Padua did. The respondent Judge however denied the application and dismissed the case. Padua moved for reconsideration, but this was denied. Hence, this petition. ISSUE : Whether or not the respondent judge erred in dismissing the case onthe ground that it violates the right to a speedy disposition of cases. RULING: Courts should not brook undue delays in the ventilation anddetermination of causes. It should be their constant effort to assurethat litigations are prosecuted and resolved with dispatch.Postponements of trials and hearings should not be allowed except on meritorious grounds; and the grant or refusal thereof rests entirely inthe sound discretion of the Judge. It goes without saying, however, that that discretion must be reasonably and wisely exercised, in thelight of the attendant circumstances. Some reasonable deferment of the proceedings may be allowed or tolerated to the end that cases may be adjudged only after full and free presentation of evidence byall the parties, specially where the deferment would cause nosubstantial prejudice to any part. The desideratum of a speedyd isposition of cases should not, if at all possible, result in theprecipitate loss of a partys right to present evidence and either in plaintiff's being non-suited or the defendant's being pronounced liable under an ex parte judgment. Judge's action was unreasonable, capricious and oppressive, and should be as it is hereby annulled.

Flores vs. People (G.R. No. L-25769, December 10, 1974) Facts: Petitioners plea for their constitutional rights to a speedy trial by certiorari where the proceeding of the case for robbery against petitioners dragged on for over a decade without any final judgment rendered by the court. Petitioners sought for the dismissal of the case due to inordinate delay in its disposition. The People in its affirmative defense raised the facts that the case was not properly captioned, as the People of the Phils. against whom it is filed was not a tribunal exercising judicial functions and without the Court of Appeals being made a part to the petition there are insufficient facts to constitute a cause of action. Moreover it defends that the CA took all necessary steps to complete the transcript of stenographic notes of the original trial. Issue: Whether or not the constitutional rights of the accused to a speedy trial was violated. Held: The court referred to previous jurisprudence upholding the constitutional rights of the accused to a speedy trial. It reaffirmed with emphasis that such right is more significant than the procedural defects pointed out by the People of the Philippines that the CA should have been made party-respondent to the petition. Technicalities should always give way to the reality of the situation and that in the absence of a valid decision the stage trial was not completed and the accused should be accorded with the right to contend that they had not been accorded their right to be tried as promptly as circumstances permit. Thus the SC finds merit to dismiss the case against the petitioners.

Section 17 Right against to Self-Incrimination United States vs. Tan Teng (G.R. No. 7081, September 7, 1912) Facts: The defendant herein raped Oliva Pacomio, a seven-year-old girl. Tan Teng was gambling near the house of the victim and it was alleged that he entered her home and threw the victim on the floor and place his private parts over hers. Several days later, Pacomio was suffering from a disease called gonorrhea. Pacomio told her sisterabout what had happened and reported it to the police. Tan Teng was called to appear in a police line-up and the victim identified him. He was then stripped of his clothing and was examined by a policeman. He was found to have the same symptoms of gonorrhea. The policeman took a portion of the substance emitting from the body of the defendant and turned it over to the Bureau of Science. The results showed that the defendant was suffering from gonorrhea. The lower court held that the results show that the disease that the victim had acquired came from the defendant herein. Such disease was transferred by the unlawful act of carnal knowledge by the latter. The defendant alleged that the said evidence should be inadmissible because it was taken in violation of his right against self-incrimination. Issue: Whether or Not the physical examination conducted was a violation of the defendants rights against self-incrimination. Held: The court held that the taking of a substance from his body was not a violation of the said right. He was neither compelled to make any admissions or to answer any questions. The substance was taken from his body without his objection and was examined by competent medical authority. The prohibition of self-incrimination in the Bill of Rights is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, and not an exclusion of his body as evidence, when it may be material. It would be the same as if the offender apprehended was a thief and the object stolen by him may be used as evidence against him. Villaflor vs. Summers (G.R. No. 16444, September 8, 1920) Facts: Petitioner Villaflor was charged with the crime of adultery.The trial judge ordered the petitioner to subject herself into physicalexamination to test whether or not she was pregnant to prove the determine the crime of adultery being charged to her. Herein petitioner refused to such physical examination interposing the defense that such examination was a violation of her constitutional rights against self-incrimination. Issue: Whether or Not the physical examination was a violation of the petitioners constitutional rights against selfincrimination. Held: No. It is not a violation of her constitutional rights. The rule that the constitutional guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition against compulsory testimonial selfincrimination. The corollary to the proposition is that, an ocular inspection of the body ofthe accused is permissible. Beltran vs. Samson (G.R. No. 32025, September 23, 1929) Facts: Beltran, as a defendant for the crime of Falsification, refused to write a sample of his handwriting as ordered by the respondent Judge. The petitioner in this case contended that such order would be a violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination because such examination would give the prosecution evidence against him, which the latter should have gotten in the first place. He also argued that such an act will make him furnish evidence against himself.

Issue: Whether or not the writing from the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for the purpose of comparing the latter's handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified, constitutes evidence

against himself within the scope andmeaning of the constitutional provision under examination.

Held: The court ordered the respondents and those under their orders desist and abstain absolutely and forever from compelling the petitioner to take down dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of submitting the latter for comparison. Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more serious, we believe the present case is similar to that of producing documents or chattels in one's possession. We say that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself. It cannot be contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioner's handwriting is not granted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is a municipal treasurer, it should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtained genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain specimen or specimens without resorting to the means complained herein, that is no reason for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals may succeed in evading the hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and do not constitute the raison d' etre of the privilege. This constitutional privilege exists for the protection of innocent persons.

Chavez vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. L-29169, August 19, 1968) Facts: Judgment of conviction was for qualified theft of a motor vehicle(thunderbird car together with accessories). An information was filed against the accused together with other accused,that they conspired, with intent to gain and abuse of confidence without theconsent of owner Dy Lim, took the vehicle.All the accused plead not guilty. During the trial, the fiscal grecia (prosecution) asked roger Chavez to be thefirst witness. Counsel of the accused opposed. Fiscal Grecia contends that the accused (Chavez) will only be an ordinary witness not an state witness. Counsel of accused answer that it will only incriminate his client. But the jugde ruled in favor of the fiscal. Petitioner was convicted. ISSUE: Whether or not constitutional right of Chavez against self incrimination had been violated to warrant writ of HC? HELD: YES. Petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in full breach of his constitutional right to remain silent. It cannot be said now that he has waived his right. He did not volunteer to take the stand and in his own defense; he did not offer himself as a witness; Juxtaposed with the circumstances of the case heretofore adverted to, make waiver a shaky defense. It cannot stand. If, by his own admission, defendant proved his guilt, still, his original claim remains valid. For the privilege, we say again, is a rampart that gives protection even to the guilty Pascual vs. Board of Medical Examiners (G.R. No. L-52018, May 25, 1969) Facts: Petitioner Arsenio Pascual, Jr. filed an action for prohibition against the Board of Medical Examiners. It was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an administrative case for alleged immorality, counsel for complainants announced that he would present as his first witness the petitioner. Thereupon, petitioner, through counsel, made of record his objection, relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself. Petitioner then alleged that to compel him to take the witness stand, the Board of Examiners was guilty, at the very least, of grave abuse of discretion for failure to respect the constitutional right against self-incrimination. The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts stressed that it could call petitioner to the witness stand and interrogate him, the right against self-incrimination being available only when a question calling for an incriminating answer is

asked of a witness. They likewise alleged that the right against self-incrimination cannot be availed of in an administrative hearing. Petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his plea that he could not be compelled to be the first witness of the complainants, he being the party proceeded against in an administrative charge for malpractice. Hence, this appeal by respondent Board. Issue: Whether or Not compelling petitioner to be the first witness of the complainants violates the Self-Incrimination Clause. Held: The Supreme Court held that in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-incrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent. The Court found for the petitioner in accordance with the well-settled principle that "the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand." If petitioner would be compelled to testify against himself, he could suffer not the forfeiture of property but the revocation of his license as a medical practitioner. The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence: "The accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption of his guilt." It is the right of a defendant "to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free genuine will." The reason for this constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objectives should not be accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality. More and more in line with the democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. The constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government ... must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens.

Section 19 Prohibited Punishment People vs. Estoista (G.R No. L-5793, August 27, 1953) FACTS - Accused Esparas was charged with violation of RANo. 6425 as amended by RA No. 759 for importinginto the country 20 kilograms of "shabu" in CriminalCase No. 94-5897 before the RTC of Pasay City, Br.114. After arraignment, the accused escaped from jail and was tried in absentia. On March 13, 1995,the trial court found her guilty as chargedand imposed on her the death penalty. The accusedremains at large up to the present time. ISSUE WON the Court will proceed to automatically reviewher death sentence HELD YES The power of this Court to review a decisionimposing the death penalty cannot be waived eitherby the accused or by the courts. Ours is not only thepower but the duty to review all death penaltycases. No litigant can repudiate this power which isbestowed by the Constitution. The power is more of a sacred duty which we have to discharge to assurethe People that the innocence of a citizen is ourconcern not only in crimes that slight but even more,in crimes that shock the conscience. This concerncannot be diluted.- We have always reviewed the imposition of thedeath penalty regardless of the will of the convict.Our unyielding stance is dictated by the policy thatthe State should not be given the license to killwithout the final determination of this Highest Tribunal whose collective wisdom is the last,effective hedge against an erroneous judgment of aone-judge trial court. This enlightened policy oughtto continue as our beacon light for the taking of lifeends all rights, a matter of societal value thattranscends the personal interest of a convict. Theimportance of this societal value should not beblurred by the escape of a convict which is a problemof law enforcement. Neither should this Court bemoved alone by the outrage of the public for the risein statistics of heinous crimes for our decisionsshould not be directed by the changing winds of thesocial weather. Let us not for a moment forget thatan accused does not cease to have rights justbecause of his conviction. This principle is implicit inour Constitution which recognizes that an accused, tobe right, while the majority, even if overwhelming, has no right to be wrong Echagaray vs. Secretary of Justice (G.R No. 132601, October 12, 1998)

Section 20 Non-Imprisoment for Debt Serafin vs. Lindayag (A. M. No. 29-MJ, September 30, 1975) Facts: Plaintiff failed to pay a simple indebtedness for P1500 Carmelito Mendoza, then municipal secretary and his wife Corazon Mendoza and therefore an estafa case was filed against her. Complainant admitted complaint. Now complainant filed a case against respondent Judge for not dismissing the case and issuing a warrant of arrest as it falls on the category of a simple indebtedness, since elements of estafa are not present. Further she contended that no person should be imprisoned for nonpayment of a loan of a sum of money. Two months after respondent dismissed plaintiffs case. (Judge here committe d gross ignorance of law. Even if complainant desisted case was pursued.)

Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation committed by the judge when it ordered the imprisonment of plaintiff for nonpayment ofdebt?

Held: Yes. Since plaintiff did not commit any offense as, his debt is considered a simple loan granted by her friends to her. There is no collateral or security because complainant was an old friend of the spouses who lent the money and that when they wrote her a letter of demand she promised to pay them and said that if she failed to keep her promise, they could get her valuable things at her home. Under the Constitution she is protected. Judge therefore in admitting such a "criminal complaint" that was plainly civil in aspects from the very face of the complaint and the "evidence" presented, and issuing on the same day the warrant of arrest upon his utterly baseless finding "that the accused is probably guilty of the crime charged," respondent grossly failed to perform his duties properly. Lozano vs. Martinez (G.R. No. L-63419, October 12, 1998) Facts: A motion to quash the charge against the petitioners for violation of the BP 22 was made, contending that no offense was committed, as the statute is unconstitutional. Such motion was denied by the RTC. The petitioners thus elevate the case to the Supreme Court for relief. The Solicitor General, commented that it waspremature for the accused to elevate to the Supreme Court the orders denying their motions to quash. However, the Supreme Court finds it justifiable to intervene for the review of lower court's denial of a motion to quash.

Issue: Whether or not BP 22 is constitutional as it is a proper exercise of police power of the State. Held: The enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt. The offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the lawpunishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but anoffense against public order. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exerciseof its police power.

Section 21 Double Jeopardy People vs. Obsania (G R. No. L-24447, June 29, 1968) Facts: The accused was charged with Robbery with Rape before theMunicipal Court of Balungao, Pangasinan. He pleaded not guilty. His counsel moved for the dismissal of the charge for failure to allege vivid designs in the info. Said motion was granted. From this order ofdismissal the prosecution appealed. Issue: Whether or Not the present appeal places the accused inDouble Jeopardy. Held: In order that the accused may invoke double jeopardy, the following requisites must have obtained in the original prosecution, a) valid complaint, b) competent court, c) the defendant had pleaded tothe charge, d) defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. In the case at bar, the converted dismissal was ordered by the Trial Judge upon the defendant's motion to dismiss. The doctrine of double jeopardy as enunciated in P.vs. Salico applies to wit when the case is dismissed with the express consent of the defendant, the dismissalwill not be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense because his action in having the

case is dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right/privilege for the reason that he thereby prevents the Court from proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a judgment of conviction against him. In essence, where a criminal case is dismissed provisionally not only with the express consent of the accused but even upon the urging of his counsel there can be no double jeopardy under Sect. 9 Rule 113, if the indictment against him is revived by the fiscal. Paulin vs. Gimenez (G. R. No. 1003323, January 21, 1993) Facts: Respondent and Brgy Capt. Mabuyo, while in a jeep, were smothered with dust when they were overtaken by the vehicle owned by Petitioner Spouses. Irked by such, Mabuyo followed the vehicle until the latter entered the gate of an establishment. He inquired the nearby security guard for the identity of the owner of the vehicle. Later that day, while engaged in his duties, petitioners allegedly pointed their guns at him. Thus, he immediately ordered his subordinate to callthe police and block road to prevent the petitioners escape. Upon the arrival of the police, petitioners put their guns down and were immediately apprehended. A complaint grave threats was filed against the petitioners (CriminalCase No. 5204). It was dismissed by the court acting on the motion of the petitioners. Mabuyo filed a MOR thus the dismissal was reversed. Thereafter, petitioners filed for certiorari, prohibition, damages, with relief of preliminary injunction and the issuance of a TRO (CEB-9207). Petition is dismissed for lack of merit and for being a prohibited pleading and ordered to proceed with the trial of the case. Hence, this instant petition.

Issues: (1) Whether or Not the dismissal of 5204 was a judgment of acquittal. (2) Whether or Not the judge ignored petitioners right against double jeopardy by dismissing CEB-9207.

Held: For double jeopardy to attach, the dismissal of the case must be without the express consent of the accused. Where the dismissalwas ordered upon motion or with the express assent of the accused, he has deemed to have waived his protection against double jeopardy. In the case at bar, the dismissal was granted upon motion of the petitioners. Double jeopardy thus did not attach. Furthermore, such dismissal is not considered as an acquittal. The latter is always based on merit that shows that the defendant is beyond reasonable doubt not guilty. While the former, in the case at bar, terminated the proceedings because no finding was made as to the guilt or innocence of the petitioners. The lower court did not violate the rule when it set aside the order of dismissal for the reception of further evidence by the prosecution because it merely corrected its error when it prematurely terminated and dismissed the case without giving the prosecution the right to complete the presentation of its evidence. The rule on summary procedure was correctly applied.