23502 +9 $ls0The editorial team The author: Michael Calvert Michael ert instructed in guerrilla warfare throughout Europe and the Far East from 9 to 1952, and was appoin- da brigadier in Burma at th age of 31. A Civil Engineer, Hallsworth Research Fellow ir Military Studies at the Universit of Manchester, Member of the al titute Studies, he author of and Fight! Art Director Sarah Kingham Sarah Kingham, who studied at John Keegan College of Art ndon in 1934 and educated at the Hornsey London, is of the most o ung designe! Editor-in-Chief Barrie Pitt Contributor to The Encyclopaedia Britannic naval warfare: historical con sultant to The Sunday Times Colour Magazine; Editor Purnell's History of the Second World War; consultant to the producer of the B.B.C. film eries The Great War. arded asone Coll iginal and talented + Wimbledon Cc rs in London College, Oxfo: publishing. As design editor of alised in Ballantine's Illustrated Histories 1960 he has been Senior she has established new stand turer in Military History at the for the and visual material resentati Royal Military books, b hurst. He is John Keegan Edito David Mason rand After some years as a news reporter and feature writer in Fleet Street, he entered book publishing to help launch Ballantine's Illustrated and hi four was born in Taunton lege and Balliol d, where he military history Academy, Sand. the author of history, strategy and international affairs, Chindits - Long Range Penetration) Chindits-Long Runge PemetraiON senceEditor-in-Chief: Barrie Pitt Editor: David Mason Art Director: Sarah Kingham Picture Editor: Robert Hunt Consultant Art Editor: Denis Piper Designer: Nigel Griffiths Ilustration: John Batchelor Photographic Research: Carina Dvorak Cartographer: Richard Natkiel Photographs for this book were especially selected from the following archives; Imperial War Museum, London, Calvert Collection, David Lubin, New York, Keystone, London and Tokyo, US Air Force, Washington, US Army, Washington, Fujifotos, Tokyo Copyright © 1973 Ballantine Books Inc. First Printing: September 1973 Printed in United States of America Ballantine Books Inc. 201 East 50th Street, New York, N.Y. 10022 Contents 6 Introduction 8 The theatre of operations 20 The fly-in 44 Installation of White City 58 The battle for Indaw 68 Indaw and Broadway 84 Death of Wingate 92 Attack on Mawlu 98 Battle of White City 106 From White City to Blackpool 120 The Myitkyina-Bhamo road 128 +The Anglo-American conflict 134 Mogaung 148 ~WithdrawalIntroduction by Barrie Pitt I have always considered myself fortunate in that I spent most of the period 1939-1945 in Europe and North Africa and was thus spared the appal- ling discomforts and trials of the war in Burma. It was thus not until the early 1950s that I first met Michael Calvert, and indeed it was not until the late 1960s that I got to know him at all well, But Td heard a lot about him, both as a Chindit Brigade leader and as the officer who after the war did most to keep alive in the British Army the guerilla tradition in general and the Special Air Service Regiment in particular. And he was always referred to in conversation as Mad Mike. Why? I wondered when I first made his acquaintance and began to get to know him. 6 Well, the physical appearance may at first sight give a clue, for the chest is like a barrel, the arms and shoulders even today obviously of formidable strength, and it would seem that either the boxing ring or the rugger field (or a mixture of both) have taken fair toll of his features. ‘Mike is one of those soldiers who always tries to use his head’, one of his erstwhile col- leagues once said to me, adding reflectively, ‘in the last resort, of course, asa sort of battering ram.” But the incredibly tough exterior is belied by the softness of the voice and the extreme concern which is shown at all times for other people’s feelings and well-being. And it is apparently in this less obvious aspect of Michael Calvert's character that lies the clue to his sobriquet, for soldiers most often give out of genuine affection, nicknames which in other walks of life would be invidious. ‘The following story is told among those who were there at the time. After the death of Wingate, as readers of the pages which follow will learn, the role of the Chindits was- either by misunderstanding or per- haps by professional manoeuvring — changed from that of long-range guerillas almost to that of front line assault troops. The principle that these highly-trained formations should be husbanded and used only for their specialist task was abandoned, and too many times Calvert and other brigade commanders were given orders to take defended positions ‘regardless of cost’. The fact that the brigades had already been operating behind Japanese lines for twice as long as originally intended was ig- nored, the facts that they had already suffered casualties which would have been considered unacceptable to any other units in the same theatre of war was brushed aside as of no account, and that sickness and fatigue had reduced the survivors to walking skeletons was disbelieved. Worst of all for their prospects of survival, one of the chief liaison officers between the brigades and higher command was implacably op- posed to the idea of long range pene- tration and determined to further his military ambitions at the expense of anyone connected with Wingate, by the simple process of capitalising on the dissensions which inevitably exist between Allies in the field, and especially those which develop be- tween supporters of orthodox and unorthodox methods. The study of military history from Caesar to Westmoreland reveals that circumstances such as these recur with such regularity that one must believe that they form an ineradicable hazard of military life, especially that, of such soldiers as endeavour to intro- duce new techniques of warfare or new strategic or tactical attitudes. Always there is somebody with weight and influence to obstruct, and only too often that somebody is in such a situation that he can prove his point by cold-bloodedly wasting lives. Occasionally however, his machin- ations are perceived, and it is then his life that is placed in hazard. One of the Chindit formations was at this time fighting a particularly grim battle, but in an area which the Staff considered unimportant - in fact at Command there was a general disbelief that much action was taking place there at all. Thus it was com- paratively easy to persuade the liaison officer in question to visit the position; but then arose the problem of how to get him so close to a known danger- point as to run a reasonable risk of becoming a casualty. To Michael Calvert, apparently, the solution was obvious and simple. There was one particularly exposed area across which, after the opening hours of the engagement, no-one had ever successfully passed as Japanese rifle and mortarmen were in positions of complete control. Only the dead occupied it. So Mike took the offending officer there and stood in the middle next to him for five incredible minutes, pointing out the lay-out of the defen- sive positions from which his men watched him aghast, waiting for the blast of fire which would remove what their commanding officer considered the greatest danger to their survival, at what he also considered an accep- table cost. For some reason lost in the files of the Japanese unit concerned, no fire was opened on either of the two men who stood there, one unknowingly, the other inviting death; but the men who watched knew what was hap- pening -and why. And so, now, will the readers of the pages which follow. They will also know why the author is still referred to in conversation between those who served with him, as Mad Mike.The theatre of operations The strategy in Burma in 1944 which brought about the second Chindit operation should be seen against the general background of that time. In 1943 there had been only two offensive operations in Burma, both conducted by the British. The first, in the Arakan (on the Bay of Bengal), was to capture the port of Akyab, and it had been severely repulsed. This had not helped the morale of the Indian Army; the Hindu element had its loyalties con- tinually sapped by the openly stated belief of Gandhi, Nehru and the Indian Congress, that they would prefer Japanese to British rule in India. There was open civil dis- obedience and active sabotage, riots and rebellion all over the Northern Indian plain, threatening the lines of communication to the British-Indian divisions on the Burma front. At one time every road and railway from India to these divisions had been cut through, bridges being destroyed by saboteurs working on behalf of Congress. Since the beginning of the war the best of the Indian divisions (which were normally about one-third British and two-thirds Indian) had been sent to the Middle East. The next best were lost in Hong Kong, Malaya, Singapore and on the retreat from Burma. So the Indian Army was in the process of the mammoth task of re- building. Also in 1943 Bengal was re- covering from a major flood and famine disaster. The whole Indian strategic planning and administrative support had to turn about face and look East. The second offensive in 1943 was a long-range penetration raid by a two- battalion-strong brigade which had been divided into seven columns of about 400 men and 100 mules each. This was 77th Indian Infantry Brigade, raised by Brigadier Orde Wingate. They were known as the ‘Chindits’ after a legendary lion called ‘Chinthé’ A British patrol makes its way througha Burmese paddy field Brigadier Orde Wingate, who raised the 77th Indian Infantry Brigade known as the ‘Chindits’ in 1943 (the ‘Protector of the Pagodas’) which Wingate had chosen to use for their arm badge. Wingate, who had had successes in Palestine in 1938 against the Arabs in revolt, and again in Abyssinia when leading the revolt against the Italians, had been sent into Burma in 1942 by General Wavell to reconnoitre the possibilities of guerrilla action in Burma. This was after Pearl Harbor and after the Japanese had started their invasion of Burma. But Rangoon had fallen and every available man in Burma was being used to delay the Japanese advance. The Japanese had a two-to-one superiority in troops and they were driving the BritishIndian forces rapidly backwards. Wingate realised that there was no time or troops available to raise a force either to resist the Japanese or to form a pattern of guerrilla warfare behind their lines,so he went back to India and reported to Wavell. There he received permission to raise a special 9The legendary Burmese lion ‘Chinthé’, Protector of the Pagodas, which Wingate chose as a symbol for the Chindits’ arm badge experimental force. This became the Tith Indian Infantry Brigade, com- posed of the 13th King’s (Liverpool) Regiment, the 3rd/2nd Gurkha Rifles, 142 Commando, a force of Burma Rifles split between the columns, and signallers, RAF detachments, and Wingate’s headquarters. ‘The 77th Brigade entered Burma in February 1943. The immediate results of their operation were not very great. ‘They destroyed the main railway in a number of places, fought a number of minor separate actions, marched on an average 1,500 miles behind the Japanese lines, gained some intelli- gence information, learned a lot of bushcraft and made many friends 10 mI among the Burmese and the Kachin, Karen and Shan hill tribes, Four months later two-thirds of them re- turned, leaving the rest prisoners or dead. The survivors had all suffered from malaria, dysentery and mal- nutrition, but their morale was high. The fittest of this original 77th Brigade became the nucleus of the second Chindit force, known as “Special Force’. They had found that supply by air was practicable and could be relied on as long as the Allies achieved and maintained air superior- ity, and that British and Gurkha troops could operate successfully be- hind the Japanese in any sort of jungle. Other lessons included methods of signalling, use of mules in the jungle, supply dropping procedure, close air fighter support, evacuation of the wounded, use of various types of weapons, medical precautions, relations with Burmese and, one of the most important of all, diet and rations. ‘The significant benefits for the Allies were that the operation was hailed as a great victory and that the fable of Japanese invincibility in the jungle was now destroyed. The troops in India faced the Japs with a new con- fidence. The other result was that the Japanese were encouraged to try a similar offensive themselves. A plan arose in their minds of ‘a march on Delhi, with first stop Kohima’, How- ever the Japanese planners made one cardinal mistake: they had not grasped the essential proviso that air superiority was a necessity for air: supply to be successful. There were cautious councils amongst them but the global aspect of the war helped to encourage both combatants simul- Tribespeople of the Kachin Hills. The local villagers rendered invaluable aid to the Chindits taneously to embark on two risky, aggressive and novel offensives. The Japanese now felt that their army must achieve a spectacular success to offset the American advance in the Pacific. This could only be done in China or Burma. But China was so vast that a Japanese advance could produce no useful result. On the Allied side Chiang Kai-shek was threatening to withdraw China from the war. The Americans believed that only by opening up the Burma road, followed by an oil pipeline to supply a bomber force, could China’s morale be lifted and China kept in the war. There were twenty-five Japanese divisions in China and the Americans did not want these released for 1Chiang Kai-shek arrives in India for discussions with Nehru ; the subject: a plan to unite the peoples of China and India in the fight against the Axis offensives elsewhere. ‘The Allies were hindered by a lack of landing craft. The obvious way to conquer Burma was to land by sea in the south and capture Rangoon. Then the Japanese forces north of Rangoon could not be supplied and would wither away. But it was made clear quite soon that there were to be no landing craft available. Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten must conquer Burma without the use of the sea. The situation was very much affected by the terrain. North Burma is surrounded by jungle-covered mountains from 7,000 to 8,000 feet high. It is like half a wheel, and the Allied forces were on the wrong side of the rim. When ordered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to attack, the British and Americans in India could think of 12 hi RPA A no suitable method of carrying out these orders other than to agree to General Wingate’s plan of making an air landing operation on the North Burma Plain, accompanied by a general Allied offensive from around the perimeter. Wingate would cut the spokes of the wheel while other forces would apply pressures on the rim. Hopefully, the wheel would then break. The Special Force which Wingate had raised consisted of six Chindit brigades each with four battalions, and a headquarters in India including alarge signals establishment. Wingate trained them in the sparse jungles of Central India. A vital component of this force was the American Air Commando, con- sisting of thirteen Dakota aircraft (C47s), Commando transport aircraft, 225 WACO gliders, 100 light aircraft (L5s), a squadron of twelve medium bombers (B25s), a squadron of thirty Mustang fighter bombers (P51s), and 2 Above : Wingate at HQ in India briefing 1st US Air Commando pilots of Douglas C-47s on invasion plans. Below : One of the 225 Waco gliders of the American Air CommandoAbove : B-25 medium bombers in flight over Burma. Below: Thirty P-51 Mustang fighter-bombers were included in the 1st Air Commando six experimental helicopters. The Chindit ground force included a renovated 77th Brigade; 111th Indian Infantry Brigade which had been raised, trained and commanded by Brigadier Lentaigne while the first Wingate operation was in progress; a West African Brigade which was designed to act as fortress (or airfield protection) troops; and three brigades formed from the 70th British Division which had recently served in the Middle East. Its battalions and artillery units had to be broken up each to form two self-sufficient columns for movement through the jungle, serviced by pack mules which all ranks had to learn to lead and look after. They had to change their whole outlook: from that of an aggressive division in the desert to a set of raiding columns in the jungle. In the argument which later developed on whether the second Chindit operation had paid a sufficient dividend, much depended on the surmise that if this division had not been broken up into unaccustomed Nigerian troops train in India ‘column’ formation but had remained in its original state, it could have achieved very much more than it did. It wasa misfortune that during a vital period of their training Wingate developed typhus and was unable to visit these brigades as frequently as he would have liked. It is easier to convert an unsuccessful force or commander to your ideas than a successful one. This division had been successful in the Middle Bast and General Wingate’s methods and ideas were, from a military point of view, revolutionary and therefore suspect. Many officers of this division entered Burma without full confidence in his theories. In January 1944 the Japanese started a diversionary attack in the Arakan on the coast to draw off British reserves before their main offensive was launched against Imphal and Kohima. With the aid of air supply, and by the rapid airlift of a division as reinforcements, the Japanese 15Lucknow Kohima fyogaung* Myitkyina Imphal CALCUTTA " Mandalay val RM : FRENCH INDO- CHINA THEATRE OF WAR IN 1944 ead oo 700 400 Soo 600 miles Moartaban r T +. — 160 s20 tat e400 aoa 360 kins Above: Gurkhas dig in on a captured hill in the Arakan. Be/ow : Japanese machine- gunners open fire on RAF raiders before launching their main offensive against Imphal and KohimaLieutenant-General Stilwell and Brigadier-General Boatner during an inspection of 38th Chinese division atHO 18 attack in the Arakan was first held and then repulsed. This operation gave great confidence to the British in their use of air supply and rapid air movement of troops. The remainder of the Fourteenth Army front was comparatively quies- cent after the Arakan operation. The American, General Stilwell, with three Chinese Divisions (later in- creased to five) and supported by an American Brigade, ‘Merrill’s Marau- ders’, (sent by General Arnold from the USA for a long-range penetration role under Wingate and which had trained with the Chindits and had then been given to Stilwell) were advancing slowly through the Hukong valley with Mogaung as their ob- In the beginning of 1944 ‘Merrill's Marauders’ were the only fighting formation of the US Army on the Asian mainland jective. Merrill’s Marauders, officially the 53807th Composite Regiment (Pro- visional), were the only fighting for- mation of the US army on the main- land of Asia at that time. On the Salween the Chinese forces, who felt that they had been let down by the British on the retreat from Burma, were very reluctant to advance over this great swift river. A recent Japanese offensive in Central China had also caused them to look over their shoulders. 19‘The fly-in The original intention of the Allied airborne invasion of North Burma as laid down at Quebec was to assist Stilwell’s Chinese-American forces to capture Mogaung and Myitkyina and an area far enough to the south to make these railway towns safe so that a road and pipeline could be opened up from North-east Assam to Yunnan in China. The Japanese had twenty- five divisions in China and the Chinese, who had been fighting the Japanese since 1937, were war weary. Wingate’s main job was to cut the lines of communication of the Japanese facing Stilwell and the Chinese Division on the Salween river to the East. On 5th February Brigadier Bernard Fergusson started out from Ledo in the Brahmaputra valley to march towards Indaw, a distance of 360 miles through the jungle. He started to cross the upper Chindwin on the 28th February finding the going over the Patkai Ranges incredibly hard and very slow. The general plan when Fergusson started his march was that the three Chindit Brigades, 16th (Fergusson), 77th (Calvert) and 111th (Lentaigne) should capture Indaw airstrip and that a regular division complete with artillery and armour should be flown in to hold it. Fergusson was to carry out the original attack while Calvert blocked the northern approaches and Lentaigne prevented any reinforce- ment from the south. This plan naturally absorbed Fer- susson’s mind as he carried out his great march south. But from the time he had left Ledo to the beginning of the airborne operation on 5th March, a great deal had been happening on both sides, and it was difficult to keep Fergusson in the picture. Fergusson had completed the Chindwin crossing by 5th March with the aid of rubber inflatable boats Brigadier Bernard Fergusson, commander of the 16th Chindit Brigade dropped by the RAF, and started the second part of his long march south. On the night of 5th March the air- borne invasion of Burma started. Asa Brigadier, I was then Commander of 77th Indian Infantry Brigade, and in charge of the glider borne force. The account of the invasion which follows Ihave taken from records I kept at the time. ‘Originally my plan had been to land my brigade on two clearings, ‘‘Picca- dilly’? and ‘‘Broadway’’, in order to get the maximum amount of men in the first night before any Japanese reaction took place. Wingate had ordered that no reconnaissance plane should fiy over the proposed landing places once we had chosen them until the last afternoon. As we were pre- paring to enplane watched by General Slim, Commander of the British- Indian 14th Army, Air-Vice-Marshal Williams and other senior officers, a Major Russhon, USAAF, came over with the photographs of the two land- ing grounds. Piccadilly had been blocked by a covering of tree trunks! ‘There was animmediate conference. After some discussion Wingate came over to me and said, ‘‘Are you pre- pared to fly into Broadway and Chow- ringhee?’’ [The latter was another possible landing ground east of the Irrawaddy.] Wingate went on to say, “If we don’t go now I don’t think we shall ever go as we shall have to wait for the next moon and the season is already late. Slim and the airmen are willing for us to go on now and every- thing is ready. What do you think? I don’t like ordering you to go if I am not going myself. At the moment I have told them I would consider it because I wanted to hear your views.”’ ‘I had discussed possibilities with my second-in-command, Colonel Claud Rome, while we were waiting. Rome was to look after the India end while I flew in. I told Wingate, ‘‘I am prepared to take all my brigade into Broadway alone and take the conse- quences of a slower build up as I don’t 21Above: Fergusson completed his crossing of the Chindwin with the aid of rubber inflatable boats dropped by the RAF. Be/ow: Wingate, with Brigadier Calvert (on his right), commander of 77th Indian infantry Brigade, issues instructions before take-off for ‘Broadway’ Meeting at an advanced base on the Indo-Burma front; from left to right, Brigadier-General Old, General Slim, Major-General Wingate, Major Gaitley and Brigadier Tulloch want to split my brigade either side of the Irrawaddy. This change of plan will mean the rebriefing of the crews but I think that this can be done in time if we send those we have already briefed on the Broadway route first.” Colonel Cochran USAAF, who was with Wingate and commanded the excellent American ‘‘Air Commando”’ and was his air adviser, agreed with me. Wingate was still not quite happy and General Slim came over and asked my opinion. I told him that any new split in my brigade would spoil my plans for the attack on the railway which was the real object of the fly-in. After all our main purpose was to attack and the means of getting there were secondary to that attack, I told The ‘Piccadilly’ landing ground, blocked by acovering of tree trunks 23Colonel Cochran, commander of the American Air Commando Wingate I did not think there would be any trouble. If the air forces could land us there we should be all right. ‘That was up to them. Slim made no comment and turned silently away. ‘Wingate came to me a few minutes later saying, “Your whole brigade is going into Broadway as you wanted it. The Americans are rearranging flight paths and schedules so that all gliders will land there tonight. It may cause a bit of a muddle but Alison and Cochrane say they can do it. Best of luck and remember to signal me.” ‘Half an hour later we took off in double tow. I and my brigade head- quarters advance party were in the fifth glider of the third flight. ‘As I sat nervously in the glider I wondered how our plan would work out. It was not due to foolhardiness that I had said that we ought to go in that night. We had gathered together 24 three brigades of 12,000 men, 2,000 mules, anti-aircraft guns, stores, equipment, barbed wire and much other warlike paraphernalia. We had five or six nights of good moon before us in which to land. Our concentration of gliders would soon be noticed by the Japs. In my opinion if we hesitated we were lost. Also there were many doubting Thomases among the senior officers in higher headquarters who did not believe in such an operation nor wanted it to go on. We could never wait for another moon. I had heard that another Japanese offensive was in the offing and, once that started, I felt we would have lost our opportunity because we might get involved in the fighting. Then our idea, our plan in which I fully believed, of penetrating a long way | behind the Japanese lines where he had no fighting troops and destroying Aglider on tow transporting Allied troops into enemy territoryAbove : British, West African and Gurkha troops wait to board transport plonea sng. gliders for the ‘Broadway’ operation. Be/ow : Three brigades, 2,000 mules and muc! war material is gathered for the first fly-in A his communications or blocking them, would not be carried out and proved. ‘We were all eager to put Wingate’s ideas and plans into action. I also felt that we could never again be keyed up to such a pitch morally, physically or materially. Looking through the peephole in my glider I saw the Imphal Plain and then more mountains. We crossed the Chindwin. This was my fourth cross- ing - two by swimming, and one by boat with the Japanese in pursuit. Perhaps this was a better way to go. ‘My job was to cut, and keep cut, all the communications of the Japanese divisions facing Stilwell in order to help his advance south. My Plan was to do this first by establish- img a “Stronghold” which would be our base. Once we had constructed a landing strip Dakotas could fly in and out and take out any casualties at the Same time as they supplied us. My main force of 77th Brigade would advance from that base immediately to establish and maintain a block ‘Broadway’, where the airborne invasion of Burma started in March 1944 across the road and railway between Mawlu and Hopin. A third job was to deny the use of the Irrawaddy to the Japanese. Fourthly, Lieutenant- Colonel Herring, with his Dah force and the 4th/9th Gurkhas, were to cut the other route to the Japanese in the north - the Bhamo-Myitkyina road, ‘I saw the mouth of the Kaukkwe Chaung where’ it met the Irrawaddy. This was our turning point. We turned north. I saw Piccadilly lovely in the moonlight. What would our reception be at Broadway? “Then I could see Broadway below. We cut our tow. There was a sudden tremendous silence. We banked steep- ly and made towards the ground. There was a big bump and we took off again, nose in the air. A crash; a stanchion hit me in the small of the back, and we were down, ‘I joined Alison who was putting out aCrashed gliders of the 1st Air Commando at ‘Broadway’ the petroleum flares to guide the main body of gliders down. Colonel Scott and his party were patrolling. One snag was that there were two lone trees in the centre of the main runway and several ditches which had not shown up on our air photograph. But they were sufficient to remove the under-carriages of gliders. ‘While Alison and his team were putting out the landing lights the remainder of us tried to clear the run- way in order to receive the main body of gliders. However, before we could do this, to our horror we heard the drone of aircraft and more gliders started to land. The first few landed safely, managing to avoid the crashed gliders and other obstacles, but many of them became ditched and immoy- able. Then other gliders crashed into stationary gliders before they had been emptied. 28 two code words. If everything was going well I would send the message “Pork Sausage”. If things were going badly the message was “Soya Link”. (A Soya Link was a sort of pseudo- sausage made out of soya beans which we thought was the worst thing that could happen to us if we received this in our rations during training.) ‘I knew that many of the first wave had not turned up at all. I saw quite a large number of men in front of me killed or wounded. The glider path was jammed with broken gliders. A second wave was due to take off. Our com- munications with base were unpre- dictable. I sent the fateful message “Soya Link”, ‘Alison and I had a look round and counted up our assets and losses. Our total losses on the ground amounted to about thirty killed and twenty-one wounded including British troops and US air crews and engineer personnel. Of the fifty-four gliders that took off thirty-seven had landed at Broadway, six fell into Japanese occupied terri- tory in Burma, and the remainder force-landed in British held territory in Assam. On roll call I found I had 350 all ranks under command and available to fight. ‘About half the passengers and crews of the gliders which had forced- landed in Burma managed to return safely to India or to march on to us in Broadway. One glider load under the At ‘Broadway’ (left to right) ; Colonel Alison, Calvert, Wingate’s ADC George Borrow, Wingate, Colonel Scott and Major Francis Stuart “The crescendo of gliders and tumult reached its peak and died down. There was a silence broken only by the cries of the wounded and the shouts of the helpless. The first wave had landed. By this time I felt ex- hausted and dispirited. Colonel Alison’s wireless officer had managed to set up communications to our base in Assam and Wingate was on the line. This was Wingate’s first experience of the loneliness of high command. He had had a night-long vigil wonder- ing whether his plans were working and was powerless to do anything’ about it. ‘General Slim sat at the table with: Wingate’s Chief of Staff, Brigadier Derek Tulloch, and my second in command, Colonel Claud Rome, who! was organising the take-off. Claud later told me that General Slim wi a tower of strength - absolutely calm. I had arranged with General Wingat a code in case I had to speak to him élear in an emergency. I had made upThompson Caliber .45-inch Model 1928A1 Submachine gun. Calibre: .45-inch. Method of operation : delayed blowback, selective fire. Overall length : 33.75 inches. Barrel length :10.5 inches. Feed system : 20- or 30-round staggered row detachable box magazine, or 50-round drum. Weight :10.75 Ibs. Muzzle velocity : 920 feet per second. Cyclic rate of fire : 600 to 725 rounds per minute. Later models were produced without a compensator on the muzzle, simple L-type rear sight in place of the adjustable leaf sight and radial cooling fins on the barrel. The main drawback of the weapon was its complicated and precise manufacture, which resulted in the gun not being as sturdy as it might, and also in high cost The Rifle No. 4 Mk 1 was theoretically the standard weapon, though photographic tl : Qt evidence shows that the SMLE rifle was in extensive use by British forces in the Far East (it was also still the standard Australian rifle). The No. 4 Mk1 was produced in enormous quantities in Bri n, Canada and the US durin: ti nad 1g the Second World War and was subject to many minor variations, particularly in the sighting arrangements Bren LMG Mk; Calibre : 303 ; System of Operation: Gas, Selective fire; Length : 45 8 inches ; Barrel Length :25 inches; Feed Device : 30-round box or 100-round drum ; Front Sights : Blade with ears ; Rear Sights : Aperture with radial drum Weight : 22.12\bs ; Muzzle Velocity : 2,440 feet per second ; Cyclic Rate: 500rpm 30 -30-inch M1 Carbine. Calil . Calibre : 30-inch. Method ie on arbine. fe od of operation : gas, set i areal fength 35.6 inches. Barre//ength : 18 inches. Feed system :15- or a0-round , row detachable box magazine. Weight: 5.5 lbs. Muzzle velocity :1,970 feet per second 31pe US Army engineer Lieutenant Brockett prepares alanding strip for Dakotas at ‘Broadway’ command of Lieutenant-Colonel Peter Fleming (the author) landed near a Japanese headquarters. After causing a diversion which made the Japanese think that they were the targets of this airborne landing he led his party back over one hundred miles to India losing only one man in the crossing of the Chindwin. All who got back to India straight away boarded the nearest aircraft to return to their units now in Burma. ‘At Broadway Lieutenant Brockett, the engineer in charge, found that besides his two bulldozers which were undamaged he had one jeep and scraper and about seven men. His other officer and men were killed. A further officer and party had been killed in practice in a glider a few days previously. As dawn broke Brockett reported to me and said that he had 34 Pea ete enough equipment if I could provide him with labour to make a Dakota strip by evening. Both Alison and rather doubted this, but on the strength of it and after seeing in day- light the full extent of what wi possible and not possible, I sent a cheerful ‘Pork Sausage” message to) India and later spoke to General Wingate. ‘I was still perturbed about the number of missing gliders but when J heard that many had landed in Indi because they could not get over thi mountains I saw that our losses were not so great as I had thought. On keen officer took off three times in different gliders but each time thé pilot crashed or force-landed nearby. One glider load had landed near a British headquarters and its passen: gers and crew, who thought they had landed among the Japanese, kept British troops at bay until dawn thinking they were the enemy. ‘Sixty-six officers and men we missing and did not, return. Some of these men may have been taken prisoner. However, there was one un- expected dividend. Many of these gliders landed among the Japanese forces on their way to attack Imphal and Kohima. The landing of these gliders thoroughly confused the enemy and made some of them pause in their march forward. It was not for some time that they knew of our whereabouts and of our full strength. ‘During that day while Alison set up his ground organisation for bringing in the aircraft that night I established my headquarters. I had chosen a site for the defence of Broadway in a peninsula of trees which jutted out into the open plain. Here I told Scott to dig in while sending out patrols in all directions to obtain any informa- tion of the enemy. A pleasant stream ran through this area. ‘In the middle of the day twelve light planes arrived under the command of Major Rabori, USAAF. I had been worried over our wounded whom we could not possibly carry if we were attacked. We had seven days’ rations each. If we could evacuate our wounded I would be happy either to fight or march if the worst came to the worst. ‘Rabori gallantly offered to fly the wounded back ~ this meant 400 miles of daylight flying over enemy terri- tory by pilots who had never seen Burma before. By skimming over the trees and setting a clever course over wild country all the planes returned safely. This was our first experience of these very gallant light plane pilots, one of whom was Sergeant Jackie Coogan of Charlie Chaplin and The Kid fame. ‘All that day Brockett and his men worked without cease. Alison had been in touch with Assam. An hour after dusk Brigadier-General Old, USAAF, landed with the first load. Sixty-three more Dakotas landed that night under the excellent air control of Alison and his staff. British troops during the construction of the strip, completed in one day‘A wounded Gurkha is carried roam waiting aircraft for evacuation to India éDouglas C-47s prepare to take off for BurmaSergeai hn ‘Jackie’ Coogan (earlier the famous child star of the silent nitdShnBackia® i gan (earli s child si il len o Force fly over the Burmese jungles wer een), o1 ne of the many gallant light plane pilots Vultee L-5s of the 1st Air Command: m ‘Broadway’ during the evacuation of wounded fro!A Gurkha column going forward from ‘Broadway’ come in the next night. From then on for the next few days over one hundred Dakota aircraft landed each night. There were no accidents, no enem, of enemy patrols ‘General Wingate landed on the d night. I took him around and he was happ; fter an initial set 42 8 well. ‘Also during those first few nights 1th Indian Infantr ade under oe Lenta landed at Chowringhee which was across the Irrawaddy and south of us. ‘In a few days the Chindits had 00 men and 2,000 mules, masses of equipment and anti-aircraft and field ablished behind the now in ish gun crew ii Q rer roadway’ gun crew installs a Bofors anti-aircraft gun at ‘Broadway’White City ‘As the Battalions of 77th Brigade landed they were led off by guides to their concentration areas. By midday the following morning the columns started their march towards their objective, the railway. ‘During training these columns had marched hundreds of miles and every man and mule knew his position in the column and his position in bivouac in the evening. ‘I had reconnoitred the railway twice in a B25 Mitchell Bomber from the region of Indaw railway junction to Hopin. I had found two possible Places for a block across the road and railway. One was at Nansiaung, half way between Mawlu and Mawhun. The other was where there wasa collection of small hills like mole hills just North of Mawlu. At Nansiaung there 77th Brigade’s objective on the day after their landing : the railway Men and mules ‘in the guts of the enemy’ was one dominating jungle-covered hill. At Henu, just north of Mawlu, the small collection of jungle-covered molehills presented a good defensive position because the little valleys in between gave cover for all our admini- stratiye details such as mules, wire- less sets, medical centre, and so on. ‘My plan was for one column of the Lancashire Fusiliers under Major Shuttleworth to advance on the road and railway south of Mawlu in the neighbourhood of Pinwe and blow up and harass the railway in that area. The other column of Lancashire Fusiliers under Colonel Christie would do the same in the neighbourhood of Mawhun and Kadu. These would be diversionary raids to keep the Japan- ese garrisons in Indaw and Mohnyin busy while we installed the main block 45wre THE LANDING AT BROADWAY AND THE INSTALLATION OF THE WHITE CITY Railways Roads Lines of Advance Pr in Oh If UE Sia ud i39cRM in between. “This left me two battalions and Brigade Headquarters for the main block. Major Shaw (as he then was) 3rd/6th Gurkhas, was directed on to Nansiaung while Lieutenant-Colonel Richards and Major Degg of the South Staffords advanced on Henu. My Brigade Headquarters and brigade defensive company under Captain MacPherson followed on behind. ‘On the high escarpment at Rit Pun I received confirmation that Shaw had had a brush with the enemy at Nansiaung and that the station there appeared to be occupied by the Japanese. So I directed Colonel Skone, who commanded the 3rd/6th Gurkhas, to advance with his column to re- inforce Richards and instal the block at Henu forthwith. I told Major Shaw to rendez-vous with me in the valley &S a reserve close to the block, and we Would watch the situation develop. ‘The two columns of the Lancashire Fusiliers north and south of us had had dificulty getting through the dungle and I had not heard yet if the Chindits prepare to demolish a railway bridge railway had been blocked to prevent reinforcements coming towards us to the main block. As my headquarters neared the main block I heard heavy firing. At that time I received a message that Christie had also become engaged and had blown the railway at Kadu. ‘Over the wireless I learned the situation at Henu. Degg was on the railway line first and had asked for the consolidation supply drop con- sisting of barbed wire, picks and shovels, and much ammunition and food. Unfortunately the supply drop- ping procedure for once did not work well and much of these stores were dropped on the hillside close to where we were and it was not until a week later that I could retrieve this drop by means of a team of elephants we had appropriated. ‘Degg had rapidly been joined by Skone and Richards. They started to dig in with what they had - kukris, 47‘ Above : Supplies for the jungle forces are flown over enemy territory. Below: Chindits bring in a supply drop in the Kachin Hills dahs and bayonets. Freddy Shaw’s operation at Nansiaung had kept the Japanese in that area busy thus allowing the consolidation of the plock to take place, for a while, un- disturbed. On the 14th March I decided to push forward with my Brigade Headquarters and Shaw's column. We reached a small hill where we could see Mawlu, Henu and the railway line. The Japanese appeared to be occupy- ing a small hill with a pagoda on top, and Ron Degg the forward slopes of a nill opposite it to the north. In between was a small valley and the Japanese appeared to be penetrating up this valley into the jungle on Degg’s left flank. I had gone ahead with a small party, including Shaw, Squadron-Leader Bobby Thompson, my senior RAF officer, Lance-Corporal Young, my Hong Kong Chinese bat- man and Corporal Paddy Dermody, my groom from the Irish Free State Army. I told Shaw that we would run across and contact Ron Degg and that he was to bring up the remainder of the Gurkhas including the Brigade Defence Company under MacPherson and to conform to whatever I did. ‘We tied our orange handkerchief maps on to a tall pole as a recognition signal which I carried and the four of us ran across the valley behind the Japanese to where Ron Degg’s column had dug in. Having dropped their picks and shovels on the hillside miles away their slit-trenches were very shallow and they had received a number of casualties on the bare forward slopes. I had realised coming from the flank where there was good observation that the Japanese were not in very great strength, but also that the South Staffords were in an exposed Position. So I stood up and ordered the South Staffords to fix bayonets and charge the Pagoda hill. My orders Were not immediately understood in the uproar of firing as they were rather Unusual. However I repeated them and Started gingerly down the slope with My little party. The South Staffords soon understood what I meant. They fixed bayonets and charged past me. ‘We climbed up thirty or forty feet to the top of the Pagoda hill where the Japanese were. Instead of remaining lying on the ground (they were not dug in) and shooting at us, they foolishly followed our example and charged us with a Banzai. I heard firing on my left flank where Shaw with his Gurkhas were engaging the Japanese who had tried to penetrate the South Staffordshire position. ‘On the top of Pagoda hill, not much bigger than two tennis courts, an amazing scene developed. The small white pagoda was in the centre of the hill. Between that and the slopes which we came up was a mélée of South Staffords and Japanese bayonetting, fighting with each other, with some Japanese just throwing grenades from the flanks into the mélée. Young, Dermody and Thomp- son were close around me protecting me as far as possible from the Japs. Nearby I saw Lieutenant Cairns have his arm hacked off by a Japanese officer whom at the same time he shot. He picked up the sword although his armpit was spurting with blood and carried on hacking away among the Japanese around him until he sub- sided on the ground. I knelt and spoke to him before he died just as the Japanese were being driven behind the pagoda. Five years later he was awarded the VC. ‘We drove the Japanese behind the pagoda and there was a short pause while grenades were lobbed backwards and forwards. At that moment Freddie Shaw came up and said, “I have six platoons of Gurkhas at your service, Sir.” The Japanese were shouting at us in English and so I practised a slight deception. I shouted to the South Staffords that we would retire “South Staffords in that direction”, and I pointed one side of the pagoda, and the “Gurkhas on that side”. I repeated this and they understood. When I shouted “Now!” the South 49