The celestial element the aether Lets remember the form of the Aristotelian universe.

. In the celestial region, above the sphere of the moon, there was a series of concentric spheres, each in contact with its nearest neighbors. The outermost sphere was that of the fixed stars. Then working inwards, the spheres of Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, the Sun, Venus, Mercury, and the Moon. These spheres rotate, each around its proper axis, in such a way as to produce the motions which we can observe in the heavens. In reality, this is a simplified version of the Aristotelian system. In the full system, there are many more spheres, to account for various small irregularities in the motions of the heavens. I remind you that, according to Aristotle, the mater which is found in the celestial region is composed of a special fifth element, the quintessence or aether. The aether is immutable and eternal. Its natural motion is circular and always equal to itself. The terrestrial elements earth, water, air, fire The terrestrial region, under the sphere of the moon, is a realm of change and mutation. In this region, change is understood in terms of mixing and separation of the four terrestrial elements, earth, water, air, and fire. Earth and water both have the quality of gravity or heaviness. Their natural motion is in a straight line, down towards the center of the universe. Their natural place is at the center. For them, arriving at the center would be the realization of the fullness of their potentiality. In this sense their natural motion is guided by final causality. Air and fire have the quality of levity, or lightness. Their natural motion is in a straight line, up away from the center. If there were not any disturbance or impediment, these four elements would form themselves into four stable concentric spherical layers. Earth has a greater gravity than water, and fire has a greater levity than air. But there is a disturbance. Movement is communicated inwards to the terrestrial region from the outer celestial spheres, which are self-moving. And there is an impediment. When a solid object moves through a medium, such as air or water, there is a resistance to its motion.

Speed of natural motions, according to Aristotle Celestial element: Terrestrial elements: The motion is always equal to itself, and never changes. V=A/B

V Velocity A The moving cause (the weight or quantity of matter) B Resistence of the medium, due to its density A fundamental distinction: Two types of motion in the terrestrial realm In the terrestrial region, Aristotle distinguishes two types of motion, one fundamentally different from the other: Natural motion: Due to the tendency (which is natural an internal) to realize the fullness of the immanent form. Violent motion (forced): Motion contrary to the natural tendency, due to the action of an external force. For Aristotle, natural motions are never due to the action of an external force. They come about spontaneously, through a kind of natural self-movement. According to his organic concept of the universe, it is natural (and not in need of explanation) that things move or change spontaneously, to realize the fullness of their potentiality. According to Aristotle, violent motions are never spontaneous or self-moving. A violent motion is able to continue only so long as the external force is in action. And an external force is able to act only by means of direct contact there is no possibility of a force acting at a distance. Speed of violent motion, according to Aristotle A D / B C = Constant A B C D Mover, moving force Object moved (the weight or quantity of matter in the object moved) Distance moved Time of the move

Two problems with the Aristotelian theory of motion

We have summarized, in brief, the Aristotelian concept of force and of motion. Obviously, modern science no longer uses these concepts in the same way. We will see that modern science employs different concepts of force and motion. But modern science continues to be influenced by its reaction against Aristotle and also by some Aristotelian presuppositions which continue, in a hidden way. This is a part of the story which we will pursue. Problem 1: Projectile motion According to Aristotle, only for as long as the head is in contact with the ball will there be an external force. During that period, the ball will undergo a violent motion, upwards and to the left. But as soon as the head is no longer in contact with the ball, the external force is no longer in action. In the absence of the action of an external force. The movement should be that which is natural for a heavy object downwards, toward the center. And so according to the theory of Aristotle, the trajectory of the ball should not be a curved line. It should instead consist of two straight lines. The first part of the motion is violent, contrary to the natural motion it is due to the action of an external force. The second part of the motion is natural, towards the center of the universe. However as we all know, that is not the true observed trajectory of a ball that is, of a projectile. A ball follows a curved path. Even though the head is no longer in contact with the ball, the ball continues upwards for a while, in a direction contrary to nature. Aristotle and some of his medieval commentators tried to address this difficulty, in various ways. For example, one could propose that there is a brief period of transition, between the original violent motion and the subsequent natural motion, during which the motion is mixed partly violent and partly natural. And thus during that period of transition the trajectory would be curved. But in order to say this, Aristotle must make an important concession, which is contrary to one of his fundamental principles. He must permit that violent motion continues, though diminishing, even after the external force is no longer in action. That concession could threaten Aristotles clear distinction between violent motion (due to an external force) and natural motion (due to an internal, immanent tendency). Problem 2: Pendulum motion Consider the following thought-experiment. Lets imagine that there is a tunnel through the earth. We release a ball at the opening of the tunnel, letting it fall. What sort of motion will the ball have?

According to Aristotle, the ball should come to rest at its natural place, which is at the center of the universe. The ball should accelerate when first released. But as it approaches the center of the earth, it should slow down and come to a stop at the center. It should not pass beyond the center. If it were to pass beyond the center, it would be moving upwards. For Aristotle, upwards motion of a heavy object is violent and contrary to nature and it cannot occur in the absence of an external contact-force. However we can imagine a different (non-Aristotelian) path for the ball. We can imagine that the ball will accelerate after being released, and will continue to go faster and faster until it reaches the center. It will continue beyond the center, gradually slowing down, until it comes momentarily to rest on the far side of the earth, at the surface. And then it will fall again towards the center, and the cycle will repeat, with the ball going back and forth. Of course if there is air resistance the motion of the ball will gradually diminish. But the important point is that, on this alternative picture of the motion, the ball does not come to rest at the center it continues beyond the center and goes upwards, away from the center, in what Aristotle would consider to be a violent motion. We are not able to perform this experiment, since there is not a tunnel through the earth. However some ingenious medieval commentators on Aristotle proposed that we can understand what would happen if we see the motion of the ball as being analogous to the motion of a an enormous pendulum. Think of the ball as being fixed at the end of a very long string, the other end of which is fixed high above the earth in the heavens. That is, think of the ball as being a kind of pendulum. It IS possible to observe the motion of pendulums on earth. A pendulum does not come to a stop at the center at the lowest point of its motion. A pendulum continues in motion towards the other side, in an oscillatory cycle. If we can accept the pendulum as a good model for the motion of the ball, then we can resolve the question of what the motion of the ball will be. In that case, we expect that the trajectory of the ball would be akin to that of a pendulum. That is, we expect that the ball would not stop at the center of the earth, but would continue beyond the center, in the manner of pendulum. Summary of the question These are two important examples of difficulties with Aristotles theory of motion. In both cases, a violent motion continues, contrary to nature, even though no external force is acting. Proposed solutions

1. One possible solution was furnished by Aristotle. He proposes that there IS an external force still in action. This external force is due to the action of the medium through which the object is moving that is, it is due to the motion of the air. When the head is in contact with the ball, it causes violent motion not only of the ball but also of the air in the vicinity of the ball. The air in front of the ball is pushed out of the way by the ball, and circles around behind the ball, and pushes it from behind. Just as a series of dominoes continues to fall, even though the force which caused the first domino to fall is no longer in action, in the same way adjacent sections of the air are set into motion, one after the other and they circle around and push the ball from behind. In summary, the principle of continuation of violent motion is located in the air. 2. A second proposed solution was the medieval theory of impetus, as proposed by Jean Buridan and others. According to the theory, the mover confers on the object moved an impetus, which is a tendency to continue to move itself in the same direction. This impetus weakens continuously, due to the resistance of the air (or other medium). Therefore the impetus (that is, the principle of continuation of violent motion) is found in the moved object itself. However, it is not any sort of immanent principle, like a form or a formal cause. Instead its a principle which is internal but not immanent, and rather evanescent. This solution tends to obfuscate the fundamental distinction of Aristotle between natural and violent motions. The way seems to be opened to use the concept of an external force to explain all kinds of motions, without distinguishing between those which are natural and those which are violent. Modifying a theory, in light of empirical difficulties According to the philosopher of science Karl Popper, science advances by means of the empirical falsification of theories. No theory is ever shown decisively to be correct; but theories can be shown decisively to be incorrect. Therefore the best and most scientific theories are those which make bold, risky empirical predictions predictions which could be decisively falsified by empirical observation. This capacity to be falsified is a mark or criterion of scientificity, according to Popper. A theory which doesn't make risky predictions is one which is not really worthy to be called scientific it should instead be called pseudo-scientific. (Poppers favorite examples of pseudosciences were astrology and Marxism. He claimed that, in both fields, the predictions tended to be so vague and general that they could never really be falsified.) Poppers conception of the nature of science is very popular among scientists themselves. It pleases them to think that their scientific work is connected, strictly and directly, to empirical observation.

But this is an ideal which is not realized in reality. As Thomas Kuhn and many subsequent philosophers of science have observed, scientific theories have a tendency to resist falsification. An anomalous empirical observation usually does not, by itself, falsify a theory. More often it is discarded or ignored or it is accommodated by means of an ad hoc modification of the theory. This is not a bad thing. We shouldnt expect a scientific theory to be perfectly correct, right from the start. We should expect that there will be a process of refinement and accommodation to the data. But one who proposes a new theory hopes that at least the heart of the theory will survive intact. Lets return to the modifications proposed for Aristotles theory of violent and natural motion, in light of the difficulties pertaining to projectile motion and pendulum motion. Are the proposals in the realm of merely ad hoc modifications? Or are they attacks on the very heart of Aristotles theory? As I see it, the first proposed modification is not an attack on the heart of Aristotles theory. By saying that the movement of the air is the cause of the continuation of the violent motion of the projectile, Aristotle maintains, in principle, his fundamental distinction between natural motion (unforced) and violent motion (forced). But when it comes to the medieval theory of impetus, its another story. The supporters of the theory of impetus wanted to stay within Aristotles world-view. But they admit that tendency to continue in violent motion can be a principle internal to a body. That undermines the criterion of intelligibility that is at the heart of Aristotles world-view, which is expressed in his theory of the four causes. Impetus theory is a kind of explanation which, speaking strictly, cant fit into the scheme of the four causes. But this tension or incoherence is not an obstacle. Medieval commentators accepted impetus theory and made use of it even within Aristotles thought-world. Its worthwhile to ask how it was that Aristotles world-view was able to remain so firmly in place, despite challenges of this sort. What made it so stable? This is a large historical question. I would like to address just one aspect of an explanation. A hermeneutical vision of reality The Bible, the Word of God, has been seen (by Christians) as an important vehicle of knowledge. Though many centuries, knowledge concerning the Bible was elaborated by means of written commentaries. The biblical text was literally embedded within the commentaries. The commentaries sought to explain things which were obscure, and also to resolve apparent contradictions in the Bible. The assumption was that everything in the Bible must somehow be true, since it is the Word of God. Therefore in the final analysis there could be no real contradictions in the Bible.

This reconciliation of apparent contradictions was facilitated in part by an ingenious and rich method of interpretation which was developed in the patristic period, the Quadriga. In this method, there are four possible levels of truth. Each verse of the Bible must be true in at least one sense, and perhaps in multiple senses. Apparent contradictions between diverse verses of the Bible can be resolved by determining that both verses are true, but on different levels that is, they are true in different senses. The consequence was that the Bible became enmeshed in a vast network of connections and associations, various parts of the Bible with each other and with the world. And the vehicle of this network the space in which it existed was the written commentaries. What happened with the Bible also happened with the works of other ancient authorities which entered into the medieval culture for example, the texts of Aristotle and Galen. Their writings where incorporated into a vast network of commentary, on a model similar to the network of commentary about the Bible. A method similar to the Quadriga was used at times to explain texts from Aristotle and Galen, and to resolve apparent contradictions. The consequence was that the scientific content of the texts of Aristotle and other authorities was often interpreted in hermeneutic terms. And the authority of ancient authors and their texts was seen as the criteriorn of truth, more than empirical observations. This had the effect of rendering knowledge extremely stable. When each element of knowledge is enmeshed, via many connections, in a robust network physically embodied in written commentaries it becomes very difficult to adjust one element of knowledge without adjusting the entire network. It was this hermeneutic conception of knowledge which disappeared from science during the scientific revolution. For example consider a text from Conrad Gesners Historia animalium (1555). This was a work in natural history. For Gesner, if you want to really understand or know about the peacocke, you must understand not only what the it looks like, but also what its name means, in every language. You must understand what kind of proverbial associations it has, and what it symbolizes to both pagans and Christians. You must understand the sympathies or antipathies which it has with other animals. And you must understand any other possible connection it might have with stars, planets, minerals, numbers, coins, or whatever. But in Joannes Jonstons Storia naturale (1650-53), written a century later, the treatment of the peacocke is much more brief, only two pages. Theres a complete description of its appearance and its uses in medicine and in the kitchen. But theres nothing about emblems, proverbs, or hieroglyphics. For Gesner, there was just no idea that the peacock should be studied in isolation from the rest of the universe. There was no sense that scientific inquiry should be limited to anatomy, physiology, and physical description. This notion was completely foreign to the medieval and Renaissance hermeneutic mode of thought. But for Jonston, it was obvious that the peacocke should be considered in isolation, apart from its network of hermeneutic connections.

An important element of what changed during these 100 years, from 1550 to 1650, the early heart of the scientific revolution, was that the hermeneutic approach to reality was left behind. The natural world was no longer seen as a text to be read, studied, and commented upon. The focus turned to contemporary empirical observation. This is what I was pointing to last week, when I said that there was a new kind of empiricism in the scientific revolution. Its not that Aristotle was not empirical. Its not that his medieval commentators were not empirical. But those commentators saw the world primarily in hermeneutical terms. That is, they saw the world as if it were an authoritative text, to be read and interpreted according to hermeneutical terms, instead of as something to be measured and discovered.