F LI GHT SAFETY FOUNDATI ON F LI GHT S AF E TY DI GE S T AUGUST 1991 1

Safety has always been a paramount concern

in aviation. Safety is not an absolute; rather it
is a relative measure of the risk involved when
flying in an aircraft. Several methods are used
to measure safety, but some can be misleading
and create a perception of a low level of safety
in helicopters. Misconceptions about helicop-
ter safety can cause overly restrictive regula-
tions and prohibit the use of safe aircraft. Thus,
realistic measurement of helicopter safety is
crucial to helicopter operators and the flying
public.
There is a question of whether an occupant is
safer in a single-engine or a twin-engine heli-
copter. Some say that two engines have to be
better than one, arguing that since there are so
many twin-engine aircraft used in commercial
fixed-wing operations, therefore, helicopters
also need two engines. However, the facts do
not support applying fixed-wing thinking to
helicopters. Helicopters are unique and they
are operated in difficult environments; there-
fore, they should be considered differently from
fixed-wing airplanes. One must consider all
Measuring Safety in Single- and
Twin-engine Helicopters
Accurate measurement of helicopter safety is crucial to both
the flying public and the operators of rotary-wing aircraft.
The author questions the veracity of some safety
statistics and he challenges recent ICAO amendments
that would restrict operations in single-engine helicopters in
favor of twin-engine helicopters.
by
Roy G. Fox
Chief Safety Engineer
Bell Helicopter Textron Inc.
causes of accidents and injuries, not just me-
chanical components such as engines or tail
rotor blades.
Accident data from the United States (U.S.),
the United Kingdom (U.K.), and Canada were
analyzed to determine the risk to occupants of
single- and twin-engine helicopters. These three
nations account for about 82 percent of all
known non-Soviet bloc civil helicopters.
Why Measure Safety?
Many important equipment decisions made
by businesses, government agencies and indi-
viduals are based on the perceived safety of
an aircraft. Decisions to buy, use, repair, im-
prove, insure, and sell or replace an aircraft
are related to perceived safety. Likewise, gov-
ernment operational prohibitions are based on
a perceived deterioration of safety. For example,
recent Amendment 1 to ICAO (International
Civil Aviation Organization) Annex 6, Part III
1
establishes three helicopter performance cat-
F LI GHT SAFETY FOUNDATI ON F LI GHT SAF E TY DI GE S T AUGUST 1991 2
egories and recommends certain operational
limitations. The categories are:
Performance Class 1 includes multi-en-
gine helicopters that are capable of con-
tinuing normal operations with one en-
gine inoperative regardless of when the
engine fails.
Performance Class 2 includes multi-en-
gine helicopters that are capable of con-
tinuing flight after one engine fails ex-
cept that a forced landing would be
required following an engine failure
between takeoff and a specified point
and from a specified point to landing.
Performance Class 3 refers to single-
engine helicopter operations; a forced
landing is required after engine fail-
ure.
The ICAO amendment would encourage the
prohibition in member countries (states) against
the use of Performance Class 3 (single-engine)
helicopters for IFR (instrument flight rules)
flights, night flying, flights out of sight of land,
flights with cloud ceilings of lower than 600
feet or visibility less than 1,500 meters, and
flights to elevated structures (heliports). [ICAO
does not regulate; it recommends that individual
states adopt its criteria into their own regulations.
The United States and many other countries have
not adopted the recommendations of ICAO Amend-
ment 1 to Annex 6 Part III. Ed.]
Because single-engine helicopters account for
three out of four helicopters in the world, this
action will have a drastic effect upon the heli-
copter community and upon the public ben-
efit derived from helicopter use. Some single-
engine helicopter operations will no longer be
performed because of the higher costs involved
if twin-engine helicopters are mandated. Most
multi-engine helicopter operations are conducted
in Performance Class 2. Because the accident
data do not discriminate between performance
classes, the safety comparisons of Performance
Classes 2 and 3 from the available data are
accomplished in this discussion by looking at
the differences between single-engine (Perfor-
mance Class 3) and multi-engine (Performance
Class 2 ) operations.
The performance class restrictions on helicop-
ter operations in accordance with the ICAO
Amendment 1 change includes the recommended
prohibition of single-engine helicopter opera-
tions involving transport of passengers, cargo
or mail for remuneration or hire. This prohibi-
tion is based upon a perceived belief that twin-
engine helicopters are always safer than single-
engine helicopters in all environments. Accu-
rate helicopter safety measurements are criti-
cal for perceived safety and actual safety to be
accurately differentiated. Such accuracy also
allows prioritized correction of safety prob-
lems and the evaluation of desirable and un-
desirable aspects of different aircraft configu-
rations. Of personal importance to an indi-
vidual, this can allow a person to determine
his risk of flying in a specific type aircraft.
Why Worry About Safety?
Why do people worry about safety in the first
place? The primary reason is that no one wants
to suffer injury or death. Because we do not
want to think about our own injury or death,
many of us tell ourselves, I am not ever go-
ing to be in an accident, therefore I wont have
to worry about being injured or killed. Avia-
tion accident prevention is based on this con-
cept: If I can prevent the emergency, I wont
have to worry about my pain and my death.
This human coping mechanism works well for
the average individual; but management (avia-
tion and regulatory) must first determine the
actual risk and subsequently manage the risk.
Safety is the management of risk.
Helicopters Respond Differently
To A Power Loss Than Do Air-
planes
If an engine power loss occurs, the resulting
emergency landings are significantly different
for airplanes as compared to helicopters. To
maintain control of an airplane, its airspeed
must stay above the stalling speed of the wing
until ground contact. This means that the
F LI GHT SAFETY FOUNDATI ON F LI GHT S AF E TY DI GE S T AUGUST 1991 3
airplanes airspeed at ground contact will be
typically 60 to 100 knots. This high speed re-
quires a shallow approach angle and a long,
cleared landing site. Any obstructions (trees,
buildings, fences or ground irregularities) can
be impacted by an aircraft with significant crash
forces and cause injuries.
Conversely, helicopters require little more room
than the size of the aircraft for an unpowered,
emergency landing. This is because the heli-
copter can descend under control after engine
failure in a condition known as autorotation,
whereby the pilot decreases the pitch of the
main rotor blades to allow them to be rotated
by the air flowing upwards through the rotor
arc, or disc, similar to the action of wind on a
windmill. The spinning main rotor acts some-
what like a parachute and a near-constant de-
scent rate is maintained. The pilot retains full
control and is able to select the most appropri-
ate landing site. A few feet above the ground,
the pilot flares the aircraft and increases the
pitch of the rotor blades, which increases lift.
This allows the descent to be slowed just be-
fore ground contact to allow a gentle touch-
down at little or no forward speed when ac-
complished properly (Figure 1).
Helicopters Have Different
Missions And Uses
Using U.S. National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) accident data for 1982 through 1985
for U.S.-registered helicopters, the mission under
way at the time of the
accident was determined
2
,
and is shown in Table 1.
This shows that single-
piston, single-turbine and
twin-turbine helicopters
are used in the same mis-
sions but in varying de-
grees. Single-engine, pis-
ton-powered helicopters
have a concentration in
relatively high-risk areas
of flight training, personal
and agricultural work
where low cost is a driv-
ing factor. These uses are
Graphic not available
major contributors to the safety record for single-
piston helicopters. If twin-turbine helicopters
performed similar missions and were oper-
ated as the single-engine, piston-powered he-
licopters, the twin-turbine helicopter accident
rate could rise significantly.
Helicopter Fleet Is Mixed
The U.S. Airmen and Aircraft Registry of Au-
gust 1990 shows the distribution of helicop-
ters (Table 2). There were 34 military surplus
twin-piston helicopters on the registry that were
not included. However, the number of aircraft
on the registry can be misleading because it
includes many aircraft that are wrecked, be-
ing salvaged for parts, under repair, stored or
used as static (nonflying) aircraft. Flight hours
are a better indicator of actual aircraft usage.
Figure 1. Helicopter autorotation
Table 1. Helicopter Missions at Time of Accident (NTSB Data 1982-
1985 percent of accidents)
Single- Single- Twin- All
Type of Operations piston turbine turbine Helicopters
Personal 26.2 24.4 16.0 24.9
Business 9.4 23.6 32.0 14.9
Instruction 21.3 2.0 8.0 14.4
Executive/Corporate 0 5.6 16.0 2.4
Agricultural 29.8 8.8 4.0 21.9
Observation/Survey 5.1 5.2 0 5.0
Public-use 1.1 4.0 8.0 2.3
Ferry 1.9 4.4 16.0 3.2
Positioning 0.4 0.4 0 0.4
Other Work 4.8 21.6 0 10.6
F LI GHT SAFETY FOUNDATI ON F LI GHT SAF E TY DI GE S T AUGUST 1991 4
Flight hours by model series were extracted
from the U.S. Federal Aviation Administra-
tion (FAA) General Aviation Activities and Avi-
onics Survey annual reports for 1984 to 1988.
If the FAA estimated flight hours for a model
for two or more years of the five-year period,
those flight hours were used. The accidents of
that model series were used if flight hours
occurred in the year of the accident. If no hours
or one year of flight hours were estimated by
the FAA reports, the accidents and flights hours
for those affected models were deleted from
the study. The data is considered by the au-
thor to be the best available and is therefore
used in this discussion.
The usable models with their flight hours were
then arranged in groups: single-piston, single-
turbine, twin-turbine helicopters and the most
common helicopter, the Bell Model 206. The
Model 206 flew 45 percent of all helicopter
flight hours during the 1984 through 1988 time
period. The single-turbine en-
gine Model 206 is also included
in the generic single-engine data.
The Canadian, U.K. and U.S.
helicopter fleet flight-hours
shown in Table 3 indicate that
these helicopter fleets are also
varied. The Canadian accident
and flight hour data from the
Transportation Safety Board of
Canada and Canadian Aviation
Statistics Centre were for the
period 1982 through 1987. The
accident data and flight hours
from the U.K. Civil Aviation Authority were
for the period 1980 through 1987. The mixture
of flying in the U.K. fleet is significantly dif-
ferent than in Canada and the United States.
This helps to explain why attitudes about he-
licopter operations vary among ICAO states.
The most common helicopter flying in the U.K.
during the period was the Sikorsky S-61 twin
turbine which accounted for 28.2 percent of
the U.K. flight hours, whereas that for the Model
206 was 12.3 percent.
Disregarding homebuilt and experimental he-
licopters, it is estimated that of approximately
15,200 rotorcraft in the world (excluding the
Soviet bloc states), that 12,511, or 82 percent,
are in the United States, the United Kingdom
and Canada. The helicopter data are presented
by configuration groups of single-piston (SP),
single-turbine (ST) and twin-turbine (TT).
Table 2. U.S.-Registered Helicopters by Engine Type (U.S.
FAA Data)
Number of
Helicopters Flight Hours
(11-31-90 Flown Flight Hours
Type of Engine Registry) 1984-1988 (%)
Single-piston 5,5371 2,961,252 25.9
Single-turbine 3,642 7,035,846 61.5
Twin-turbine 1,108 1,442,116 12.6
Total helicopters 10,121 11,439,214 100
Aircraft with most
flight hours: Bell Model 206
single-turbine only 2,092 5,215,001 45.6
Table 3. U.S., U.K., and Canada Civil Helicopters by Engine Type
(flight-hours flown)
U.S./U.K./
U.S. U.K. Canada Canada
Engine Type (1984-88) (1980-87) (1982-87) Combined Percent
Single-piston 2,961,252 91,737 190,894 3,243,883 21.3
Single-turbine 7,035,846 239,548 2,078,376 9,353,770 61.5
Twin-turbine 1,442,116 932,474 242,696 2,617,286 17.2
Total helicopters 11,439,214 1,263,759 2,511,966 15,214,939 100.0
Bell Model 206
single turbine only 5,215,001 155,648 1,471,675 8,703,602 45.0
F LI GHT SAFETY FOUNDATI ON F LI GHT S AF E TY DI GE S T AUGUST 1991 5
The Next Step Is Measuring Safety
Now that we have some indication of the heli-
copter activities, the next step is to measure
safety, or determine relative risk. There are
various methods in use. Using the total num-
ber of accidents that have occurred for a par-
ticular model may be misleading because it
does not account for fleet size and subsequent
exposure through the years. Accidents per
amount of exposure is a more appropriate method
to determine relative risk.
Accidents Per Fleet Ratio Is a
Slight Improvement
One means of addressing the effects of fleet
size is to determine the ratio of accidents to
the size of the fleet in existence at the time of
the comparison. For example, this ratio is de-
termined by counting the number of accidents
that have occurred involving a specific model
since its introduction in the United States. This
total accident history number is then divided
by the latest estimated number of active he-
licopters of that model in the United States.
The ratio technique is inaccurate and mislead-
ing; it disregards the changing fleet size over
the years by using only the latest years active
fleet; looks at models in different periods of
their service life; and disregards the different
amount of flying done by various models. Also,
the number of accidents will increase as a model
fleet is utilized. In Figure 2, the Bell Model 47,
which is the oldest civil helicopter model, sug-
gests what may happen to the other models as
they mature in the future. The number of acci-
dents from 1958 through 1963 was estimated
from accident trends before and after that pe-
riod. Since the number of active helicopters
is seldom known, the actual numbers of civil
aircraft delivered with a U.S. registry number
were used. (The last Model 47 was delivered
in 1973 in the United States.)
The total number of accidents grows each year
and far exceeds the number of aircraft deliv-
ered. Obviously, the ratio of total accidents to
the number of aircraft in an existing fleet is
going to be different depending upon when
that ratio is calculated. If the ratio is deter-
mined within two years of model introduc-
tion, it will probably be low. Five, 10 or 15
years later, the ratio will continue to increase
regardless of the true safety of the model. Also
shown in Figure 2 is the annual accident rate
per 100,000 flight hours. Note that the acci-
dent-to-fleet-number ratio continues to climb
to about 160 percent as of 1985 even though
the accident rate is decreasing during the last
three years. This disparity will be present for
all other models and is dependent on when in
the models life cycle the ratio is computed.
Accidents Per Departure Are
More Meaningful
After comparing vastly different types of air-
craft, it became apparent that some aircraft
types were spending the majority of their flight
time in the more hazardous flight phases of
takeoffs and landings. Therefore, the accident
rate per departure (or mission) was decided
upon as a means to measure safety. This ap-
proach answers the question Is the likelihood
of this mission failing greater or lesser for trans-
portation method A versus method B? This
approach is not concerned with how long A or
B takes to accomplish the mission. For example,
if the mission is to transport a passenger from
point X to point Y, any one of the following
methods of travel can qualify for the task: jet
aircraft, helicopter, train, automobile, boat and
walking. The number of accidents that oc-
curred from the time of departure for each
flight from any point X to the arrival at the
corresponding point Y would then be deter-
Graphic not available
Figure 2. Bell Model 47 accident/fleet ratio
F LI GHT SAFETY FOUNDATI ON F LI GHT SAF E TY DI GE S T AUGUST 1991 6
mined for each means of travel. This becomes
the accident rate per departure for that means
of transportation.
Helicopters can perform some missions that
no other means of transportation can achieve.
These unique missions include those that in-
volve hovering or very slow flight, and allow
very short flight times that result in a large
number of takeoffs and landings. Because large
airplanes spend the vast majority of their flight
time in cruise flight rather than in takeoffs
and landings, their exposure to flight hazards
is not directly comparable. A study was done
in 1981 that included a look at U.S. Federal
Aviation Regulation (FAR) Part 135 unsched-
uled air-taxi helicopter safety related to fixed-
wing air carriers
3
; the basic purpose was for
relating duty time to number of daily land-
ings, but the data is applicable to this discus-
sion as well. The surveyed helicopter opera-
tors flew 603 single- and twin-turbine heli-
copters during the subject period (1977 through
1979). The percentage of singles versus twins
is not available; however, the percentage of
single turbines vs. twin turbines is available
for 1983, which is the closest period for which
that type of data is available. The 1983 U.S.
registry indicates a mix of 83 percent single
turbines and 17 percent twin turbines. The
mix in the helicopter survey group was esti-
mated to be similar.
Air Travel Methods Are Compared
The accident rate per flight hour for the com-
bined turbine helicopter fleet compared to the
air carriers is shown in Figure 3A. This illus-
trates that the helicopter accident rate per flight
hour was slightly better than that of commuter
(now regional) air carriers. To account for time
spent in the more hazardous phases of flight
(takeoff and approach/landing), the accident
rate in Figure 3B is based on number of depar-
tures (takeoffs). The resulting helicopter acci-
dent rate per 100,000 departures was 71 per-
cent lower than FAR Part 135 commuter air
carriers, and was much closer to the FAR Part
121 certificated air carriers.
Figure 3C for the fatal accident rate per depar-
ture shows that the helicopter rate was 69 per-
cent lower than that for the commuter air car-
riers
4
. Figure 3D shows comparable data for
fatalities per departure. In this latter case, the
helicopter rate is 71 percent lower than com-
muter air carriers and 79 percent lower than
certificated air carriers. These results indicate
that the helicopter industry in general is safer
than many persons believed, considering the
amount of time rotary-wing aircraft spend in
critical phases of flight.
The offshore oil industry in the Gulf of Mexico
presents an example of the safe operation of
turbine helicopters as shown in Table 4. In
1990, there were 1,855,345 takeoffs and land-
ings, about 1,500,000 of which occurred at off-
shore platforms. There were 3,958,525 passen-
gers moved by helicopter in the Gulf during
the period. Of the 619 helicopters operating
in the Gulf of Mexico, 138 (22 percent) are IFR
equipped, and single-turbine helicopters ac-
count for 349 (56 percent) of the total helicop-
ter fleet. This significant usage of single-tur-
bine helicopters indicates that single turbines
are being operated safely from elevated plat-
forms and over water.
Graphi c not avai l abl e
Figure 3. Accident and fatality rate comparison
(1977-1979)
F LI GHT SAFETY FOUNDATI ON F LI GHT S AF E TY DI GE S T AUGUST 1991 7
The use of departure exposure is accurate for
determining the risk to mission accomplish-
ment, but it is not accurate for determining
safety. Safety is related to freedom from harm,
injury or loss and should be counted in terms
of time of individual occupant exposure.
Counting Accidents Per
Patient Transport
This recent safety measurement variation is
used by the emergency medical services (EMS)
community. It is the number of EMS aircraft
accidents that occur divided by the number of
patients transported during the same time pe-
riod. This approach uses the EMS primary func-
tion of moving patients as the basis for com-
parison with the safety of other modes of moving
patients. This approach is appropriate only
for comparing completions of medical trans-
port missions, not for comparing safety of the
crew and patient; it is used to compare with
Table 4. Gulf of Mexico Helicopter Safety Data
Accidents
Accidents per
per 100,000
Fleet No. of Flight 100,000 Flight-
Year Size Accidents Hours Departures Departures hours
1987 708 17 691,655 2,101,850 0.80 2.46
1988 599 10 455,330 1,384,000 0.65 2.20
1989 608 9 515,770 1,885,571 0.48 1.74
1990 619 9 533,761 1,855,345 0.49 1.69
non-patient-carrying aircraft. Figure 4
5
shows
the annual EMS helicopter accident rates per
100,000 patients transported. Since many of
the EMS helicopter accidents occurred with-
out a patient aboard (e.g., en route to pickup,
returning after transport or repositioning), this
is a mission-oriented measurement (similar to
a per-departure measurement method), rather
than per human exposure method.
Accidents Per Passenger Mile Is
Another Measurement Method
Accidents per passenger mile is another per-
mission measurement with an adjustment for
the distance traveled. Fixed-wing scheduled
air carriers and fixed- and rotary-wing air taxi
operators record passenger-carried informa-
tion from revenue flights; most general avia-
tion and helicopters do not. Thus, compari-
sons are seldom made in this area. Limitations
of per-mission measurements are easily noted
by comparing the safety of an 80-knot aircraft
with a 400-knot aircraft, both having the same
number of passengers and accidents per pas-
senger mile. Some analysts interpret this as
the same level of occupant safety. However,
the slower machine is in the air five times as
long as the faster aircraft for the same dis-
tance. Therefore, using another measurement
method, the slower aircraft experiences only
one fifth of the accident rate per flight hour of
the faster aircraft. This dichotomy results be-
cause the primary concern is per mission and
not related to per human or occupant safety;
accidents per passenger mile is only meaning-
ful if the primary concern is mission comple-
tion of moving a passenger a given distance,
Figure 4. EMS accidents per patient transport
Graphi c not avai l abl e
F LI GHT SAFETY FOUNDATI ON F LI GHT SAF E TY DI GE S T AUGUST 1991 8
not the safety of the occupants.
Accidents Per Flight Hours Is the
Most Common Method
The most common method of determining safety
on the basis of accidents per flight hours is
accident rate per 100,000 flight hours. This
accident rate per hour is the number of acci-
dents of a given model for a specific period of
time divided by the hours flown by those air-
craft over that time period. Accident rate per
100,000 flight hours is a good method to de-
termine the aircraft damage cost expected in a
model fleet or the likelihood of aircraft dam-
age. Table 5 presents the accident rates per
100,000 flight hours for U.S. general aviation
fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft in descend-
ing order.
Helicopter accident rates for the 1980s from
the Unites States, the United Kingdom and
Canada are shown in Table 6. The time period
breakdowns are similar to those in Table 3.
Airworthiness vs. Operational
Issues Judged
The causes of accidents resulting in serious
(major/fatal) occupant injury were determined
6
using NTSB data from 1982 through 1986 for
single-turbine and twin-turbine civil helicop-
ters as shown in Figure 5. Engine material
failure (MF) initiated the crashes that caused
14.8 percent of the serious injuries to occu-
pants of single-turbine helicopters, as com-
pared to only 3.4 percent for the serious inju-
ries to occupants of twin-turbine helicopter
accidents. If only this one piece of information
is considered, the obvious conclusion is that
two engines are better than one.
However, next consider only the cause factor
of material failures other-than engine (non-
engine MF). In this case, only 11.0 percent of
the seriously injured occupants were involved
in single-turbine helicopter crashes initiated
by non-engine material failures as compared
with 31.0 percent of those in twin-turbine he-
licopter crashes. This is an indicator of the
detrimental effects of complexity and more
parts. If one were to consider only this last
piece of information, the obvious approach
should be that one engine is better than two
a reversal of the conclusion in the previous
paragraph.
Actually, the total material failures, engine and
non-engine, should be considered together, which
yields percentages of seriously injured occu-
pants due to all types of MF-caused
accidents of 25.8 percent for occu-
pants in single turbines and 34.4
percent for occupants in twins. This
is consistent with more parts and
complexity being present in twins.
Because causes of deaths and in-
juries cannot be limited only to
those that are engine-related, it is
essential that all other factors be
considered both material fail-
ure and nonmaterial failure (i.e.,
human error).
Table 6. 1980s U.S., U.K., and Canadian Accident Rates
(all causes) (accidents per 100,000 flight-hours)
United
Canada Kingdom United States
Type (1982-87) (1980-87) (1984-88)
Single-piston 33.53 73.79 17.83
Single-turbine (all) 9.86 17.12 5.49
Twin-turbine 4.67 4.83 4.37
Bell Model 206 single-turbine 8.70 14.07 4.28
Table 5. U.S.-Registered General Aviation
Accident Rates (NTSB/FAA Data 1984-1988)
Accident Rate
per 100,000
Type of Aircraft Flight-hours
Single-piston helicopter 17.83
Single-piston airplane 8.55
Single-turbine helicopter (all) 5.49
Twin-piston airplane 5.12
Twin-turbine helicopter 4.37
Bell Model 206 single-turbine helicopter 4.28
F LI GHT SAFETY FOUNDATI ON F LI GHT S AF E TY DI GE S T AUGUST 1991 9
Engine material failures represent just one as-
pect of material failures that cause accidents
(also called airworthiness failures), as shown
in Table 7 and Figure 5. Non-engine material
failures that cause accidents are also repre-
sented. The single-piston accident rate per 100,000
flight hours for non-engine material failure
accidents is the highest rate, followed by twin
turbines, all single turbines, and with the low-
est rate, the Model 206 single-turbine. Table 7
shows the combined engine and non-engine
material failures (all-airworthiness failures),
and indicates that the accident rate for all-
airworthiness failures in twin turbines is much
lower than for single pistons and slightly lower
than for all single turbines. However, the twin-
turbine all-airworthiness-failure accident rate
is 51.4 percent higher than the single-turbine
Model 206 rate. From an overall airworthiness
standpoint, these figures could be used to in-
dicate that there is no justification to require
twin-turbine engines on all helicopters for all
mission applications.
Comparisons of the all-airworthiness-
failure accident rates of three ICAO states
(United States, United Kingdom and
Canada) are presented in Table 8 and
Figure 6, which show the variability
that is a function of the mix of aircraft
models within a type and reflects vary-
ing helicopter utilization in the differ-
ent ICAO states. The rates of twin tur-
bines and Model 206s appear to be quite
consistent. The single-turbine Model 206
has the lowest airworthiness accident
rate in two of the three states and the
second lowest in the remaining one.
Fatal Accidents Per Flight
Hours Are Questioned
Since safety is a condition of freedom from
risk of harm, injury or loss, measurement of
those accidents involving fatal injuries is rel-
evant to the relationship of safety to human
suffering. A fatal accident is an accident in
which at least one person is fatally injured. A
fatal accident rate is the number of fatal acci-
dents per 100,000 flight hours. Figure 7
3
shows
the fatal accident rates for various families of
U.S. general aviation aircraft, plus three indi-
vidual models for 1975 through 1979. Note
that most aircraft types have approximately
the same fatal accident rate. This method of
measuring safety is still inaccurate because it
does not account for the number of people on
board that had the chance of being fatally in-
jured. For example, regardless of a helicopters
seating capacity, there is five times the chance
of someone being killed with 10 people aboard
as there is with two people aboard. This is due
Figure 5. Seriously injured occupants by accident cause
(NTSB)
Graphi c not avai l abl e
Table 7. U.S.-registered Helicopter Accident Rates (Source NTSB/FAA for 1984-
1988) (accidents per 100,000 flight hours)
Engine Only Non-engine All
Type of Aircraft Airworthiness Airworthiness All Causes
ALL HELICOPTERS 1.22 1.08 2.30 8.54
Single-piston 1.99 2.09 4.09 17.83
Twin-turbine 0.35 1.25 1.59 4.37
Single-turbine (all) 1.08 0.61 1.69 5.49
Bell Model 206 single-turbine 0.88 0.17 1.05 4.28
F LI GHT SAFETY FOUNDATI ON F LI GHT SAF E TY DI GE S T AUGUST 1991 10
to the occurrence of 10 people impacting the
ground in one airframe versus two people in
the other airframe. Obviously, then, the num-
ber of helicopter seats is not important; the
number of people aboard is important. There-
fore, fatal accident rates can be misleading
because they are related to aircraft airframe
accidents, not to the occupants.
Risk Around Heliports
Addressed by Neighbors
Some neighbors around heliports have voiced
concern about the safety of helicopters approach-
ing or leaving a heliport. Accident statistics
indicate that these concerns are unfounded.
NTSB data on helicopters for 1970 through
1975 show that approximately five percent of
the accidents occur in the traffic pattern or
within a 1/2-mile radius of an airport or heli-
port. The actual risk to the surrounding neigh-
borhood from helicopters was analyzed
7
to de-
termine the likelihood of a helicopter accident
within a 1/2-mile radius of the heliport or
airport. This analysis was based on the Model
Table 8. 1980s U.S., U.K., and Canadian All-airworthiness-
failure Accident Rates (accidents per 100,000 flight hours)
Canada United Kingdom United States
Type (1982-87) (1980-87) (1984-88)
Single-piston 8.91 18.45 4.09
Single-turbine (all) 2.12 4.17 1.69
Twin-turbine 1.27 1.93 1.59
Bell Model 206 single-turbine 1.43 1.17 1.05
206 rate of 4.33 accidents
per 100,000 flight hours in
the United States for the
period of 1975 through 1978.
One can then calculate the
likelihood of an accident
within the 1/2-mile radius,
which becomes a function
of how many takeoffs and
landings are made.
A conservative three-minute
time period was assumed for time the helicop-
ter spent flying over the 1/2-mile radius dur-
ing an approach or a landing. The term cycle
is used for the combination of a takeoff and
landing (six minutes over the 1/2-mile zone).
Using the average number of cycles per day
for a year, the average number of years be-
tween accidents can be determined using Fig-
ure 8. For example, a busy heliport conduct-
ing five cycles per day (182.6 hours per year
over the 1/2-mile radius), the expected aver-
age interval between accidents should be once
in 128 years.
The likelihood of a helicopter striking a resi-
dence or building within a 1/2-mile radius of
a heliport can be estimated using Figure 9.
The accident frequency used was for all heli-
copter accidents (single-piston, single-turbine,
and twin-turbine) involved in striking a resi-
dence or building. For the five-cycle-per-day
case, a helicopter striking a building or resi-
dence is estimated, on average, once every
4,000 years. Figure 10 shows the likelihood of
Graphi c not avai l abl e
Graphi c not avai l abl e
Figure 6. Airworthiness failure accident rates
for U.K., U.S., and Canada in the 1980s
Figure 7. U.S. general aviation fatal accident
rates (1975-1979)
F LI GHT SAFETY FOUNDATI ON F LI GHT S AF E TY DI GE S T AUGUST 1991 11
an on-the-ground person (not a crewman or
passenger) being injured within this 1/2-mile
radius. For the five-cycle-per-day case, the av-
erage interval between injuries is estimated to
be about 5,000 years.
The heliport operating at five cycles per day
over the period of a year is extremely busy.
For a private heliport or limited-use facility
that averages fewer than one cycle per day
during the year, the risk is significantly lower.
Using one cycle per day as an average, the
likelihood of an accident in the 1/2-mile area,
the likelihood of a helicopter striking a resi-
dence/building, or the likelihood of an on-
the-ground person being injured are once in
635 years, 22,400 years, and 25,000 years, re-
spectively. These average-year values in them-
selves are not important, but their magnitudes
indicate the extremely remote threat from he-
licopters operating over a congested area.
If only airworthiness-failure-caused accidents
Graphi c not avai l abl e
Figure 8. Helicopter accidents within 1/2 mile
radius of heliport
are considered using the Model 206 and twin-
turbine helicopter rates of Table 7, a compari-
son of the likelihood of an airworthiness-caused
accident over a heliports neighborhood can
be done. For a constant five cycles per day
usage, the expected accident frequency within
the 1/2 mile radius of the heliport is an acci-
dent once in 34.4 and 52.2 years for a twin-
turbine helicopter and Model 206 single-tur-
bine helicopter, respectively. The likelihood of
an accident involving either of these helicop-
ter types is extremely remote, although one
should expect the occurrence of a Model 206
accident significantly less often than a twin-
turbine helicopter accident. According to these
figures, there is no more justification to pro-
hibit a Model 206 than there is to prohibit
twin-turbine helicopters from flying over con-
gested (populated) areas.
Study Looks for Causes of Acci-
dents Resulting in Fatalities
A worldwide study of Bell civil and military
turbine-powered helicopter accidents was con-
ducted by the author to determine the acci-
dent causes that resulted in fatalities. The in-
volved period was from January 1970 through
March 1987. The size of the Bell turbine fleet
delivered at the time was approximately 19,700
single-turbine aircraft and 1,800 twin-turbine
aircraft. An engine failure was the initiating
cause that resulted in six percent of all fatali-
ties in single-turbine helicopter accidents and
three percent of all fatalities in twin-turbine
Graphi c not avai l abl e
Figure 9. Helicopter strikes of residence or
building (within 1/2 mile radius of heliport)
Graphi c not avai l abl e
Figure 10. On-the-ground personal injury (within
1/2 mile radius of heliport)
F LI GHT SAFETY FOUNDATI ON F LI GHT SAF E TY DI GE S T AUGUST 1991 12
helicopter accidents as shown in Figure 11.
However, the percentage of fatalities due to
remaining airworthiness failures (non-engine
material failures) was 12 percent and 22 per-
cent for single-turbine and twin-turbine heli-
copters, respectively. Therefore, the total per-
centage of fatalities for all-airworthiness fail-
ures was 18 percent for single-turbine heli-
copters and 25 percent for twin-turbine heli-
copters. More complex twin-turbine helicop-
ters, with more moving parts, will have a higher
total number of material failures (engine and
non-engine) with a corresponding higher to-
tal number of fatal injuries than a simpler single-
turbine helicopter.
Relative Risk of Serious Injury
Considers the Individual
Accident rates compare the frequency of air-
craft that must be reported as an accident be-
cause there is significant damage or there are
serious personal injuries. In the majority of
accidents, there is no serious injury, so the
accident reporting is basically an aircraft damage
mishap frequency. This information is useful
in forecasting the number of aircraft expected
to be damaged, repaired, replaced or other
considerations based on aircraft damage. It
does not address the safety of the occupant.
Risk must be assigned to an individual occu-
pant to be meaningful. Occupant safety must
be determined for each individual occupant
based on individual exposure. This is done
with a formula that gives the relative risk of
serious injury (RSI). RSI is the probability of
an accident occurring multiplied by the prob-
ability of serious (major or fatal) injury. RSI =
probability of an accident X probability of se-
rious injury. It can be calculated by:
The RSI, or an individual occupants risk of
serious injury for every 100,000 occupant hours
of exposure, is shown in Figure 12 for all-
airworthiness failure causes. This is the true
measure of occupant safety related to the air-
craft design.
Therefore, an occupants risk of serious injury
due to accidents caused by all-airworthiness
failures is the same in the generic single-tur-
bine and twin-turbine helicopters. The occupants
risk in a Model 206 single-turbine helicopter
is nearly half that of a generic single-turbine
or a twin-turbine helicopter. The reasons that
risks are generally higher in twins than singles
are:
More parts and increased complexity
yield more non-engine material failures.
There are more free-standing passen-
ger seats and resulting seat failures in
twins.
There are more passenger seats with-
out a shoulder harness.
Figure 11. Percentage of fatalities by accident
initiator
Graphi c not avai l abl e
Figure 12. RSI from airworthiness failures
Graphi c not avai l abl e
Number of accidents
Flight hours flown
X
Number of people witn major or fatal injury
Total number of people on board in accidents
RSI =
with
F LI GHT SAFETY FOUNDATI ON F LI GHT S AF E TY DI GE S T AUGUST 1991 13
More fuel cells lead to increased likeli-
hood of post-crash fires.
The introduction of passenger shoulder har-
nesses, energy attenuating seats for all occu-
pants, and crash-resistant fuel systems may
lower the RSI values. FAA Amendments 27-25
and 29-29 of November 13, 1989 requires shoulder
harnesses and dynamically tested, energy at-
tenuating seats for all occupants in future he-
licopter designs. FAA Notice of Proposed Rule
Making (NPRM) 90-24 in progress is address-
ing a requirement to include crash-resistant
fuel systems in large and small helicopters to
minimize thermal injuries due to post-crash
fires. The result could be that occupants of
future helicopter designs may have even lower
risk of serious injury regardless of what causes
the accidents. [This subject has been addressed
by Flight Safety Foundation since the early 1960s.
A successful program to develop a crash-resistant
fuel tank for helicopters was conducted by FSF
through its Aviation Safety Engineering and Re-
search division in 1965, which led to a U.S. Army
retrofit for approximately 5,000 helicopters. S.
Harry Robertson received the FSF Admiral Luis
DeFlorez Award for directing development of the
system that was estimated to be capable of achiev-
ing a 70 percent reduction in loss of life due to
crash fires. Helicopter crashworthiness was the
focus of a 1984 FSF Regional Helicopter Safety
Workshop in Rio De Janeiro, Brazil. Ed.]
A study of U.S. Army helicopter accidents and
injuries
8
found similar results in civil helicop-
ters. Table 9 shows the RSI for the four Army
helicopters in the study. The UH-60 is the twin-
turbine helicopter and the remainder are single-
turbine powered. The risk of injury was found
to be lower in single-turbine helicopters than
in twin-turbine ones. There are several rea-
sons for this, two of which are the greater
complexity of the UH-60 and its higher speeds
at impact. Again, one must be careful to evaluate
all aspects of an aviation system, because im-
provements in one area can have detrimental
effects in another. One of the goals in safety is
to strive for the best mix to produce the lowest
risk.
Safety Is Risk Management
To manage risk, one must first understand the
total risk. Prudent risk management will re-
duce both probabilities in the RSI formula (prob-
ability of an accident and probability of seri-
ous injury) and achieve the lowest possible
risk. Accident prevention programs attempt
to reduce the probability of an accident. Train-
ing, standardization, equipment, maintenance
and positive management attitude toward safety
are key factors in reducing the probability of
an accident. Pre-accident planning, flight fol-
lowing, aircraft/occupant survival gear and
training, and aircraft crashworthiness address
the reduction of the probability of serious in-
jury. Totally effective accident prevention is a
worthwhile goal, but an expectation of abso-
lute elimination of accidents is unrealistic.
Australian CAA Studies Single vs.
Twin Helicopter Transfer of
Marine Pilots
The Australian Civil Aviation Authority (CAA)
conducted a study
9
in September 1989 to re-
spond to a recommendation from within the
CAA and elsewhere to mandate that twin-en-
gine helicopters be utilized for transferring
marine pilots between ship and shore rather
than the single-engine helicopters that had been
used. The study reviewed worldwide accident
data. Applicable paragraphs from the study
findings and conclusions are quoted below:
The CAA believes that greater weight should
be given to actual accident performance fig-
ures (where these are available) than to theo-
retical assumptions about fatal accident rates
derived from, say, engine shutdown. For ex-
ample, it would fail to account for the trade-
Table 9. Relative Risk of Serious Injury in
U.S. Army Helicopters
Type of Helicopter RSI/100,000 Occupant Hours
UH-60 (twin-turbine) 5.11
AH-1 (single-turbine) 4.13
OH-58 (single-turbine) 2.91
UH-1 (single-turbine) 1.36
F LI GHT SAFETY FOUNDATI ON F LI GHT SAF E TY DI GE S T AUGUST 1991 14
off between the extra reliability from having a
second engine and the lower reliability of the
more complex helicopter system .
Informal advice from the industry suggest
that it would approximately double the cost
of transferring marine pilots by helicopter if
twin-engine helicopters were made compul-
sory .
This report does not pursue costing further
because of the lack of conclusive evidence of
twin-engined helicopters leading to lower fa-
tal accident rates .
Marine Authorities have indicated that in some
cases the higher cost of twin-engined helicop-
ters could lead to them reverting to launches
to transfer pilots, which these authorities have
stated is less safe than transfer by helicop-
ter .
Conclusion The CAA believes the proposal
to regulate to make it compulsory to use twin-
engined helicopters for the transfer of marine
pilots to and from ships should be shelved at
this time. The CAA concludes that the pro-
posal should be shelved because the present
very low engine-failure accident rate is ac-
ceptable, and because there is no conclusive
evidence that using twins would result in a
lower fatal accident rate.
Helicopter Accidents at Elevated
Structures Are Considered
The accident histories of turbine-powered he-
licopters at elevated structural platforms were
compared because of the ICAO Annex 6 pro-
hibition of single-engine helicopter operation
from elevated structures. Accident data from
the NTSB for 1984 through 1988 were used.
There were no distinctions made between type
of operations being conducted, such as air trans-
port versus aerial work. ICAO defines air
transport as commercial air transport opera-
tion an aircraft operation involving the trans-
port of passengers, cargo or mail for remu-
neration or hire. Aerial work is defined as an
aircraft operation in which an aircraft is used
for specialized services such as agriculture,
construction, photography, surveying, obser-
vation and patrol, search and rescue, aerial
advertising, etc. Since the vast majority of
helicopter uses are for hire or remuneration, it
is not practical to use the ICAO definitions
because of some overlap and the fact that the
definitions as adopted vary among ICAO states.
Many helicopter operations in the United States
do not fit perfectly into a particular ICAO defi-
nition; also the helicopters in use can change
categories of work several times in a day. For
example, a helicopter used for EMS purposes
can be included in the operational categories
of business, unscheduled air taxi and other
work. If the helicopter owner is a government/
municipal entity or if the civil operator con-
tracts with a government agency for helicop-
ter services, the same helicopter can also be
considered an exclusive lease aircraft. The ac-
cident data should be considered in its en-
tirety to be consistent with flight hours.
Each NTSB helicopter accident narrative for
the latest available data (1984 through 1988)
was used to determine all accidents that oc-
curred on an elevated landing site or approach-
ing/departing the elevated structure. A key
word search was used for the following words
in the NTSB accident narratives. These key
words were
Elevated Helipad Net
Structure Helideck Rail
Platform Heliport Pad
Rig Hospital Raised
Roof Building Deck
The resulting accidents were then separated
into movable landing structures and station-
ary landing structures. Accidents at the mov-
able landing structures that included landing
dollies, trailers, trucks, boats, barges and por-
table landing structures were eliminated as
not being applicable to the safety history of
helicopters operating on an elevated structure.
The stationary elevated structure accidents are
those located at rooftops or offshore platforms.
F LI GHT SAFETY FOUNDATI ON F LI GHT S AF E TY DI GE S T AUGUST 1991 15
There were no single-piston helicopter acci-
dents related to stationary elevated platform
structures, but some occurred on movable land-
ing structures.
There were 15 single-turbine helicopter acci-
dents at stationary elevated platform struc-
tures. Twelve were at offshore platforms and
three at a rooftop sites. Of the 15 accidents,
four power losses were reported. There were
no material failures found during the investi-
gation of two of these power losses. The re-
maining 11 clearly resulted from human causes
as follows:
Takeoff with aircraft tied down
Landing gear caught on safety net
Landing gear caught on deck obstruc-
tion
Main rotor blade strike
Blown off platform during engine start
by wind
Elevator cover not removed prior to flight.
There were 13 twin-turbine helicopter acci-
dents at elevated platform structures. Nine were
at offshore platforms and four were at roof-
tops. Of the nine offshore platform accidents,
two were due to material failures of tail rotor
drive shafts and one pylon mounting failure
that allowed ground resonance. The remain-
ing seven offshore platform accidents were
human factors related as follows:
Tail or tail rotor strike
Main rotor strike
Flight controls restricted (maintenance
error)
Takeoff with wheel in safety net
Flight control loss.
Of the four rooftop accidents, two were power
losses due to fuel exhaustion. A tail rotor strike
accident and a flight controls restricted acci-
dent (loose object in cockpit) made up the two
remaining accident causes. Two of these twin-
turbine helicopter accidents on stationary el-
evated structures were deleted prior to the
accident rate calculation because flight-hours
were not available for the year of the acci-
dents. These accidents involved two twin-tur-
bine Aerospatiale SA-330J helicopters which
were included above to show the types of ac-
cidents (13 accidents) but are deleted in Table
10 when accident rates are used (11 accidents).
All single-turbine accidents (which were Model
206s) on stationary elevated structures were
usable accidents.
Table 10 shows the U.S. elevated structure he-
licopter accident history for 1984 through 1988.
This table also identifies the stationary elevated
structure accidents that were related to power
losses. For all accidents at elevated structures,
the accident rates for the single-turbine and
twin-turbine helicopters were 0.21 and 0.76
per 100,000 flight hours, respectively. There-
fore, the single-turbine rate was 72.4 percent
lower than the rate for twin-turbine helicop-
ters. Considering only those related to power
losses, the single-turbine and twin-turbine he-
licopter accident rates were 0.071 and 0.139
per 100,000 flight hours, respectively. The single-
turbine rate for power loss accidents was 48.9
percent lower than the twin-turbine rate.
The second part of Table 10 is similar to the
first, except that the fleet flight hours used
were for only the models that were involved
in elevated structure accidents. In this analy-
sis, the single-turbine and twin-turbine acci-
dent rates for all causes were 0.29 and 1.18 per
100,000 flight hours, respectively. The single-
turbine rate was 75.4 percent lower than the
twin-turbine rate. Considering the power-loss
accidents, the single-turbine and twin-turbine
accident rates were 0.096 and 0.214 per 100,000
flight hours, respectively. The single-turbine
rate for power-loss accidents was 55.1 percent
lower than the twin-turbine rate. Thus, the
actual helicopter accident experience related
to helicopter operations at a stationary elevated
structure does not justify the prohibition of
single-engine helicopters in such operations.
F LI GHT SAFETY FOUNDATI ON F LI GHT SAF E TY DI GE S T AUGUST 1991 16
Evaluating Offshore Helicopter
Operator Experience
Petroleum Helicopters Inc. (PHI) is the largest
commercial helicopter operator in the world.
Most of the companys flying is for offshore
oil support and is an excellent example of safe
helicopter operations in a difficult environ-
ment. The latest PHI-furnished flight-hour in-
formation and NTSB accident data on PHI he-
licopters from 1984 through 1988 indicate that
single-turbine helicopters are being operated
safely over water and onto elevated platforms.
PHI flight hours in Table 11 show that 66.1
percent of PHIs flying was in single-turbine
helicopters. Table 12 compares the PHI acci-
dent rates for all causes with the U.S. civil
helicopter fleet rates for all causes. The PHI
accident rate for single-turbine helicopters was
65.8 percent and 62.2 percent lower than the
general U.S. single-turbine and twin-turbine
helicopter rates, respectively. This illustrates
that a safe operation can be conducted using
single-turbine helicopters without operational
restrictions as proposed by the recent ICAO
Annex 6, Amendment 1 change.
Time of Accident, Day vs. Night,
Considered as Factors
Since the actual hours flown at specific times
of the 24-hour day are not known, it is diffi-
cult to determine relative safety of night flight
versus daylight flight. However, it is possible
to approximate the distribution of flying at
night by considering the random na-
ture of material failures. For the pe-
riod of 1982 through 1988, the U.S.
distribution of accidents (all causes)
by the time of day from NTSB data
are shown in Figure 13. The break-
points between light and dark were
assumed at 0600 and 1959 hours. This
distribution of accidents is consid-
ered conservative, because most fly-
ing is done during the summer months
Table 10. U.S. Elevated Structure Turbine Helicopter Accident History (1984-1988)
Fleet Power-loss
Flight All All Causes Power-loss Accident
Type of Aircraft Hours Accidents Rate* Accidents Rate*
Single 7,035,846 15 0.21 5 0.071
Twin 1,442,116 11 0.76 2 0.139
Using hours of aircraft models involved in accidents:
Single
Bell Model 206 5,215,001 15 0.29 5 0.096
Twin
222 932,438 11 1.18 2 0.214
AS355
B0105
S58T
S76
* Accidents per 100,000 flight hours
Table 11. Petroleum Helicopter Inc (PHI) Flight Hours
(1984-1988)
Type of Aircraft Flight Hours Percentage of Total
Single-turbine 1,064,439 66.1
Twin-turbine 545,670 33.9
Total 1,610,117 100
Bell Model 206 only 982,611 61.0
F LI GHT SAFETY FOUNDATI ON F LI GHT S AF E TY DI GE S T AUGUST 1991 17
when the length of daylight is highest. This
indicates that 91.8 percent and 82.8 percent of
all single-turbine and twin-turbine helicopter
accidents, respectively, are occurring in day-
light hours.
Figure 14 shows the time of accident distribu-
tion of airworthiness-failure accidents (all
material failures including the engine). For
all-airworthiness-failure accidents, 98.2 per-
cent and 94.1 percent of single-turbine and
twin-turbine helicopter accidents, respectively,
are occurring in daylight hours. The two fig-
ures have similar distribution; therefore, acci-
dents due to material failures do not appear to
be adversely affected by lighting, and there-
fore, there is insufficient justification to pro-
hibit single-engine helicopters from flying at
night.
The major difference in helicopter and fixed-
wing aircraft emergency landings is that the
fixed-wing aircraft requirement for a long cleared
Table 12. Petroleum Helicopter Inc. (PHI) vs. U.S.
Helicopter Accident Rates* (accidents from
NTSB, hours from FAA and PHI, 1984-88)
Type of Aircraft U.S. (NTSB/FAA) PHI (NTSB/PHI)
Single-turbine 5.49 1.88
Twin-turbine 4.37 1.65
Bell Model 206 only 4.28 1.73
* Accidents per 100,000 flight hours
landing site increases the likelihood of in-
jury during the final phase of the emer-
gency. Conversely, a helicopter (regard-
less of the number of engines) can use a
landing site that is quite small in com-
parison to the needs of the fixed-wing air-
craft. Likewise, visibility at night is not as
critical in a helicopter as in a fixed-wing
aircraft due to the helicopters lower speed
and greater maneuverability during auto-
rotation.
Likelihood of a Material Fail-
ure Accident at Night Examined
Assuming a Model 206 and a twin-turbine he-
licopter flew during 10 hours of darkness ev-
ery night throughout one full year, each heli-
copter would fly 3,652.5 hours during that time.
Using the NTSB/FAA accident data for 1984
through 1988 (Table 7), the likelihood of an
accident due to a material failure (which in-
cludes engine) for the twin-turbine helicopter
is estimated at once in 17.2 years, whereas the
likelihood in a Model 206 is estimated at once
in 26.1 years. Thus, the likelihood of any ma-
terial-failure-caused accident is 51.4 percent
higher in a twin-turbine helicopter than in the
single-turbine Model 206. There is insufficient
justification to support the prohibition of night
flights using single-engine helicopters with
respect to material failures.
Figure 13. Time of accidents due to all causes
Graphi c not avai l abl e
Figure 14. Time of accidents due to airworthi-
ness failures
Graphi c not avai l abl e
F LI GHT SAFETY FOUNDATI ON F LI GHT SAF E TY DI GE S T AUGUST 1991 18
Human Error Accidents Related to
Weather Considered
Analysis of human error accidents involving
weather show a changing trend in the United
States. NTSB accident data and FAA flight hours
for 1984 through 1988 were divided into an
early period of 1984 through 1986 and com-
pared to the later period of 1987 and 1988. The
results are represented in Table 13. The year
1987 was when Bell Helicopter Textron Inc.
began concentrated safety training programs
to reduce human error accidents. The range of
human error accident rate reductions due to
poor weather decisions in the most recent time
period have been significantly reduced by be-
tween 45 and 72 percent. Bell believes that
this reduction is due to safety training, not to
mandatory regulations.
Bell Institutes Safety
Training Approach
Accident data analyses can be used to deter-
mine if safety programs or other factors are
making a change in the accident frequencies.
Two out of three accidents are not caused by
airworthiness failure but are basically due to
human error. Accidents caused by human er-
ror (otherwise called pilot error) present an
Table 13. U.S. Human Errors Accidents Involving Weather
Bell Model
Single- 206 Single-
Single-piston turbine Twin-turbine turbine
Flight Hours
1984-86 1,899,081 4,167,156 821,679 2,997,911
1987-88 1,062,171 2,868,690 620,437 2,217,090
HE WX Accidents
1984-86 26 40 7 25
1987-88 8 8 2 5
HE WX Accidents per
100,000 Flight Hours
1984-86 1.37 0.96 0.85 0.83
1987-88 0.75 0.28 0.32 0.23
HE WX Rate Reduction -45.3% -70.8% -62.4% -72.3%
HE = Human Error
WX = Weather
extremely complex problem with a large num-
ber of root causes and an even larger number
of potential solutions. Engineers and regula-
tory agencies are comfortable working on me-
chanical problems because their performance
and failure modes are fairly predictable. Thus,
aviation safety efforts in the past have made
significant gains in minimizing airworthiness
failures.
More attention is now being made toward the
understanding, and eventual reduction, of human
error accidents. A worldwide engineering study
in 1985 and 1986 into human error accidents
of Bell civil helicopter models found that poor
judgment was the common factor in all of these
accidents
2
. Two directions of concentrated ef-
fort at Bell were launched in 1987 to aggres-
sively attack the complex human error prob-
lem, with the emphasis on judgment training.
The companys Human Factors Engineering
staff took the approach of developing an arti-
ficial intelligence-based software program that
would allow a pilot to use a personal com-
puter (PC) as a judgment (decision-making)
simulator. This program, called the Cockpit
Emergency Procedures Expert Trainer (CEPET),
also includes emergency procedures training.
A CEPET was developed for the Bell JetRanger
(206BIII) and LongRanger (206L-3), with one
F LI GHT SAFETY FOUNDATI ON F LI GHT S AF E TY DI GE S T AUGUST 1991 19
completed late in 1990 for the Model 212/412.
A CEPET package is provided with each new
Bell aircraft delivery; pilots can also purchase
a separate CEPET package.
The other direction focused on concentrated
safety education. Bells System Safety Engi-
neering personnel developed a three-hour safety
briefing for immediate use with groups of pi-
lots and managers. This safety briefing includes
how to measure ones risk, what happens in a
crash, how one can improve the chances of
survival, causes of accidents, root causes of
human error, and judgment training. Judgment
training emphasizes the use of all resources
available to the pilot
The emphasis of judgment training is on situ-
ational awareness and internal pilot monitor-
ing. Portions of the FAA study, DOT/FAA/
PM-86/45, Aeronautical Decision Making for
Helicopter Pilots
10
, are used in this safety brief-
ing and the FAA report is given to the student
for further self study. The safety briefing is
given at operator meetings and regional safety
seminars, and is included in Bells weekly Model
206 pilots ground school as part of the
HELIPROPS (Helicopter Professional Pilots
Safety) program.
The companys chief training pilot also con-
ducts customer HELIPROPS safety briefings
on safety awareness, professionalism and
managements role in safety. These safety brief-
ings are held at the factory, customer sites and
regional safety seminars. The Customer Sup-
port and Service Department (CSSD) initiated
the HELIPROPS program to add continuity
and coordination of these safety education ef-
forts in 1988.
The worldwide effects of this four-year safety
education effort on the human error accident
rate since the Model 206 effort was initiated in
1987 is shown in Table 14. There have been
more than 5,000 Model 206 series helicopters
produced, or 70 percent of Bells entire civil
turbine helicopter model fleet. Bell also con-
ducts flight training in Model 206s. Based on
these two factors, the concentrated safety edu-
cation effort has been directed at Model 206
pilots. For comparison, the same worldwide
data for Bells medium civil helicopters mod-
els (204B, 205A1, 214B, 212, 214ST, 222, and
412) are also shown in Table 14. These me-
dium helicopter data indicate some reductions
in human error causes, but were offset by non-
human-error causes; thus the accident rate for
all causes was basically the same during the
two four-year periods.
Conversely, accident rates due to human error
in a Model 206 for the four-year period before
the initiation of this safety effort (1983-1986)
compared with the four-year period since then
(1987-1990) show a 36.2 percent reduction in
human error accidents. This is a significant
safety improvement and only a small portion
of the worlds Model 206 pilots have been reached
so far. The overall (all causes) Model 206 acci-
Table 14. Worldwide Bell Turbine Accident Rates (per 100,000 flight hours)
Causes of Accidents
Aircraft and Non-human
Period Flight Hours Human Error and Unknown All Causes
Bell Model 206
1983-1986 7,903,072 3.90 2.05 5.95
1987-1990 9,341,573 2.49 1.89 4.38
Percent change -36.25% -7.8% -26.3%
Bell Medium Helicopters
1983-1986 2,438,515 2.62 2.01 4.63
1987-1990 2,472,091 2.31 2.39 4.69
Percent change -11.8% +18.9% +1.3%
F LI GHT SAFETY FOUNDATI ON F LI GHT SAF E TY DI GE S T AUGUST 1991 20
dent rate was reduced by 26.3 percent. Be-
cause many pilots fly other helicopters in ad-
dition to the Bell Model 206, some spillover of
the beneficial effects of judgement training can
be expected that should affect the overall heli-
copter industry accident rate.
Judgment training is also called pilot decision
making (PDM) and aeronautical decision making
(ADM). The Canadian government is integrating
PDM into its pilot training requirements as of
April 1991. PHI introduced judgment training
as an integral part of its internal training about
when Bell introduced its judgment training
program in 1987, and has subsequently cut its
accident rate in half. The company expects
further accident rate reductions as the pro-
gram continues. Judgment training has more
safety improvement potential than the total
elimination of all-airworthiness failure causes.
A reflection of the success of the safety educa-
tion efforts by several manufacturers of heli-
copters in the United States is found in Table
15. This shows a significant reduction in hu-
man error accident rates in the turbine heli-
copter fleet, although more work is needed in
the single-piston fleet. Since safety education
is an ongoing effort, it will take several years
to benefit all helicopter pilots.
The Helicopters Uniqueness Must
Be Taken into Account
Helicopters behave differently than fixed-wing
aircraft after an engine failure. The helicopters
ability to autorotate allows the selection of
suitable landing sites and a low-speed emer-
gency landing from an engine failure.
Safety decisions on any one aspect of helicop-
ters should not be made without considering
all the other safety aspects, as well as the hu-
man causes. The safety measurement method
to consider is strictly determined by the sub-
ject of primary concern. The denominator of
the frequency rate will include this primary
concern. If aircraft damage frequency is the
primary concern, then an accident per aircraft
flight hour method is appropriate. If the mis-
sion is the primary concern, then accidents
per mission (takeoff, departure, takeoff, flight,
trip, passenger mile or patient transport) is
appropriate. If the primary concern is the risk
of an accident in a neighborhood without re-
gard to the aircraft occupants, then years-be-
tween-accidents measurement for that specific
neighborhood exposure is appropriate. With
the safety of the aircraft occupant as the pri-
mary concern, the relative risk of serious in-
jury per occupant flight hour is the best method.o
References
1. Amendment No. 1 to International Stan-
dards and Recommended Practices, Opera-
tion of Aircraft, Annex 6 to the Convention
on International Civil Aviation, Part III,
International Operations Helicopters, In-
ternational Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO), March 1990.
Table 15. Safety Education Effects on Human Error Accident Rates
NTSB/FAA (U.S.-registered)
Rate* Before Rate* Since
Type of Helicopter (1984-86) (1987-88) Percent Changes
Single-piston 11.16 10.92 -2.2%
Other Than Bell Model 206 single-turbine 4.11 3.07 -25.3%
Twin-turbine 2.56 1.61 -37.1%
Bell Model 206 single-turbine** 3.40 1.76 -48.2%
* Human error accidents per 100,000 hours
** Concentrated HELIPROPS safety education
F LI GHT SAFETY FOUNDATI ON F LI GHT S AF E TY DI GE S T AUGUST 1991 21
2. Fox, R. G., Helicopter Accident Trends,
American Helicopter Society/Helicopter As-
sociation International/FAA Seminar, Ver-
tical Flight Training Needs and Solutions,
September 1987.
3. Fox, R. G., Relative Risk, the True Mea-
sure of Safety, Flight Safety Foundation,
Proceedings of the 28th Corporate Aviation
Safety Seminar, April 1983.
4. Commuter Airline Safety, Special Study,
National Transportation Safety Board, Re-
port NTSB-AAS-80-1.
5. Collett, H. F., Accident Trends for Air Medi-
cal Helicopters, Hospital Aviation, Febru-
ary 1989.
6. Fox, R. G., Helicopter Crashworthiness,
Flight Safety Foundation, Proceedings of the
34th Corporate Aviation Safety Seminar, April
1989.
7. Fox, R. G., Helicopters Are Safe Neigh-
bors, Helicopter Association International,
1990 Helicopter Annual, January 1990.
8. Shanahan, D. F. and M. O., Injury in U.S.
Army Helicopter Crashes, October 1979 to
September 1985, Journal of Trauma, April
1989.
9. Pardy, B. T., Preliminary Safety Impact
Statement Twin-Engined Helicopters for Ma-
rine Pilot Transfers, Australian Civil Aviation
Authority, Report A SR-2, September 1989.
10. Adams, R., and Thompson, J., Aeronauti-
cal Decision Making for Helicopter Pilots,
Federal Aviation Administration, DOT/FAA/
PM-86/45, February 1987.
About the Author
Roy G. Fox directs the System Safety Engineering
Group as Chief Safety Engineer for Bell Helicopter,
Textron. He joined Bell in 1966 immediately after
graduation with a Bachelor of Science Degree in
Mechani cal Engi neeri ng f rom New Mexi co
University. In addition to his work in safety
engineering, Fox has been deeply involved in crash
survival of military and civil helicopters. In this
field, he has directed the Crashworthiness Project
Group for the helicopter industry.
Fox is a member of the General Aviation Safety
Panel for seat restraints and post-crash fire protection,
and participates in the SAE committees on seat
and restraint requirements. He is a lecturer on
crash survival and human performance at the Bell
Training School and the U.S. Federal Aviation
Administration Helicopter Safety and Accident
Investigation course.
F LI GHT SAFETY FOUNDATI ON F LI GHT SAF E TY DI GE S T AUGUST 1991 22
Aviation Statistics
The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
has reported that near midair collision inci-
dents, air traffic controller operational errors
and pilot deviations continued to show a de-
cline in 1990 as compared with those recorded
in previous years, but runway incursions showed
an increase two years in a row. This informa-
tion was provided in the final report, 1990
Aviation Safety Statistics, prepared by the FAAs
office of the assistant administrator for avia-
tion safety.
A near midair collision refers to an incident
associated with the operation of an aircraft
during which a possibility of collision occurs
as a result of a proximity of less than 500 feet
Near Midair Collisions, Operational
Errors and Pilot Deviations
by
Shung C. Huang
Statistical Consultant
from another aircraft, or an official report is
received from an air crew member stating that
a collision hazard existed between two or more
aircraft. The 452 near midair collisions, re-
ported during last year, were 606 (57) percent
less than the 1,058 recorded in 1987 and was
the lowest level since 1984. The 1990 figure
represents the third consecutive year that near
midair collision reports dropped since the FAA
upgraded its reporting system in 1985 to en-
sure more complete data collection on these
incidents.
Figure 1 shows the downtrend of near midair
collision incidents for the past six years, and
Figure 2 illustrates how midair collisions hap-
pened more often in the summertime than any
other time of the year. In the months of July,
August and September, air traffic for both civil
and military were the heaviest during each
year.
An operational error refers to an occurrence
attributable to an element of the air traffic
control system which results in less than the
applicable separation minima between two or
more aircraft, or between an aircraft and ter-
rain or obstacles and obstructions as required
by FAA Handbook 7110.65 and supplemental
instructions. Obstructions include vehicles,
equipment, personnel or runways. Beginning
in 1984, the FAA began installing computer
software in all domestic air route traffic con-
trol centers that automatically records viola-
tions of the agencys aircraft separation stan-
dards. The 881 operational errors made by
Figure 1. Near Midair Collisions 1985-1990
Graphi c not avai l abl e
F LI GHT SAFETY FOUNDATI ON F LI GHT S AF E TY DI GE S T AUGUST 1991 23
controllers in 1990 were the lowest since 1983.
Figure 3 shows the trend of air traffic control-
ler operational errors for the past six years.
Air traffic controller operational errors dropped
from a high of 1,406 in 1985 to 881 in 1990,
down by 524 errors, or 37 percent. Figure 4
shows the occurrence of operational errors by
month for the past six years. Note that the
monthly frequency of operational errors ap-
pears to have an almost identical pattern each
year. Air traffic controllers usually commit-
ted fewer operational errors in January and
February. The frequencies of operational er-
rors increased in March and April, dropped in
May and continued to rise into July; they went
up again in August and gradually declined
from September to the end of the year.
Pilot deviation refers to those actions of a pi-
lot that result in the violation of U.S. Federal
Aviation Regulations or airspace violation of
a North American Air Defense (NORAD) Com-
mand Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ)
tolerance. Figure 5 shows the trend of pilot
deviations over the past six years. Pilot de-
viations increased from 1,800 in 1985 to 3,625
in 1987, the highest in recent years, then de-
creased to 2,460 in 1990. Although the 2,460
pilot deviations in 1990 were only slightly lower
than those in 1989, the figure is well below the
1987 level. Figure 6 shows the annual fre-
quency of pilot deviations by month which
also indicates that pilots committed more er-
rors during the summer of each year.
Runway incursion refers to an occurrence at
an airport involving an aircraft, vehicle, per-
Figure 2. Near Midair Collision Reports by
Month 1985-1990
Figure 3. Air Traffic Controller Operational Er-
rors 1985-1990
Figure 4. Air Traffic Controller Operational Er-
rors by Month 1985-1990
Graphi c not avai l abl e
Graphi c not avai l abl e
Graphi c not avai l abl e
F LI GHT SAFETY FOUNDATI ON F LI GHT SAF E TY DI GE S T AUGUST 1991 24
son or object on the ground that created a
collision hazard or resulted in loss of proper
separation with an aircraft taking off, intend-
ing to take off, landing or intending to land.
Against the downtrends of other safety indi-
cators, runway incursions steadily increased
from 179 in 1988, to 233 in 1989 and to 267 in
1990. Figures 7 and 8 show the trend and
annual frequency distribution by month of run-
way incursions. Almost every year in the past
four years, runway incursions were relatively
higher in March, June, August, October and
December and often relatively lower in Febru-
ary, April, July, September and November.
During the most recent 15 months, there were
five fatal accidents at U.S. airports, involving
U.S. air carrier aircraft, accounting for 33 fa-
talities. That was the highest number of fatal
accidents in any 15-month period in U.S. air
carrier safety records. Three of the fatal acci-
dents were ground collisions between aircraft.
One pedestrian was killed on a runway by an
aircraft during takeoff and one mechanic was
fatally injured by a tug during towing. o
Figure 5. Pilot Deviations 1985-1990 Figure 7. Runway Incursions 1987-1990
Figure 6. Pilot Deviations by Month 1985-1990
Graphi c not avai l abl e
Graphi c not avai l abl e
Graphi c not avai l abl e
Graphi c not avai l abl e
Figure 8. Runway Incursions by Month 1987-
1990
F LI GHT SAFETY FOUNDATI ON F LI GHT S AF E TY DI GE S T AUGUST 1991 25
Reports Received at FSF
Jerry Lederer Aviation Safety Library
Reference
Federal Aviation Regulations, Part 135-Air Taxi
Operators and Commercial Operators; Change 38.
Washington, D.C. : United States. Federal Avia-
tion Administration [1991].
Summary: This change incorporates Special
Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 38-6, Cer-
tification and Operating Requirements, effec-
tive June 5, 1990, and Amendment No. 135-39,
Minimum Equipment Lists (MEL), effective June
20, 1991, in Federal Aviation Regulation Part
135.
Reports
Aircraft Accident Report: Avianca, the Airline of
Colombia, Boeing 707-321B, HK 2016, Fuel Ex-
haustion, Cove Neck, New York, January 25, 1990/
United States. National Transportation Safety
Board. Washington, D.C. : U.S. National
Transportation Safety Board; Springfield, Vir-
ginia, U.S. : Available through NTIS*, Adopted
April 30, 1991, Notation: 5255B. Report NTSB/
AAR-91/04; NTIS PB 91-910404. vi, 6 p. : ill.
Key Words
1. Aeronautics Accidents 1990.
2. Aeronautics Accidents Fuel
Exhaustion.
3. Aeronautics Accidents Pilot Lan-
guage Proficiency.
4. Aeronautics Accidents Air Traffic
Control Procedures.
5. Aeronautics Accidents Pilot Fatigue.
6. Aeronautics Accidents Windshear.
7. Aeronautics Accidents Flight
Planning.
8. Aeronautics Accidents Takeoff/
Landing.
9. Avianca Airlines Accidents 1990.
Summary: On January 25, 1990, at approxi-
mately 2134 eastern standard time, Avianca
Airlines flight 052, a Boeing 707-321B with
Colombian registration HK 2016, crashed in a
wooded residential area in Cove Neck, Long
Island, New York. AVA052 was a scheduled
international passenger flight from Bogota,
Colombia, to John F. Kennedy International
Airport, New York, with an intermediate stop
at Jose Maria Cordova Airport, near Medillin,
Colombia. Of the 158 persons aboard, 73 were
fatally injured, including all three flight crew
and five of six cabin crew members. Because
of poor weather conditions in the northeast-
ern part of the United States, the flight crew
was placed in holding three times by air traf-
fic control for a total of about 1 hour and 17
minutes. During the third period of holding,
the flight crew reported that the airplane could
not hold longer than five minutes, that it was
running out of fuel, and that it could not reach
its alternate airport, Boston-Logan International.
Subsequently, the flight crew executed a missed
approach to John F. Kennedy International Air-
port. While trying to return to the airport, the
airplane experienced a loss of power from all
four engines and crashed approximately 16
miles from the airport.
The NTSB determined that the probable cause
of this accident was the failure of the flight
crew to adequately manage the aircrafts fuel
load, and their failure to communicate an emer-
gency fuel situation to air traffic control be-
fore fuel exhaustion occurred. Contributing
to the accident was the flight crews failure to
use an airline operational control dispatch system
to assist them during the international flight
into a high-density airport in poor weather.
Also contributing to the accident was inad-
equate traffic flow management by the Fed-
eral Aviation Administration and the lack of
standardized understandable terminology for
pilots and controllers for minimum and emer-
gency fuel states.
F LI GHT SAFETY FOUNDATI ON F LI GHT SAF E TY DI GE S T AUGUST 1991 26
Recommendations A-91-33 through A-91-38 and
A-90-9 through A-90-11 were issued as a re-
sult of this accident. [executive summary]
Aircraft Maintenance: Additional FAA Oversight
Needed of Aging Aircraft Repairs. Vol. I and II.
Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Avia-
tion, Committee on Public Works and Trans-
portation, House of Representatives/United
States. General Accounting Office (GAO).
Washington, D.C., U.S. : U.S. General Accounting
Office*, May 24, 1991.Report GAO/RCED-91-
91A and GAO/RCED-91-91B, B-242727.71 p. ;
57 p. ; ill.
Key Words
1. Air Planes Maintenance and Repair
United States.
2. Jet Transports Maintenance and Repair
United States.
3. Aeronautics, Commercial Safety
Measures United States.
Summary: Volume I describes that portion of
the U.S. aircraft repair industry that performs
heavy airframe maintenance on large trans-
port aircraft. Specifically, it examines increases
in demand for heavy airframe maintenance;
constraints on supply, including parts, skilled
mechanics, and hangar space; and air carriers
efforts to comply with new requirements for
agi ng ai rcraft and the Federal Avi ati on
Administrations (FAA) oversight of air carri-
ers as they attempt to comply with the new
rules. Volume II provides the questionnaire
response of the 48 air carriers and 35 indepen-
dent repair stations participating in the re-
view on the issues examined in Volume 1. [In-
troductory letter]
To improve FAAs oversight of aging aircraft
AD compliance, GAO recommends that the
Secretary of Transportation direct the Admin-
istrator, FAA, to (1) require domestic air carri-
ers to submit periodic reports on their imple-
mentation of FAAs new rules for aging air-
craft, (2) submit to the chairmen of the avia-
tion authorization subcommittees in the U.S.
House and Senate a semiannual report on the
industrys progress in complying with FAAs
aging aircraft mandates, and (3) explore op-
tions for extending compliance deadlines or
granting alternative means of compliance when
warranted by resource shortages and ensured
airworthiness of each aircraft. [recommenda-
tions]
Annual Review of Aircraft Accident Data. U.S.
Air Carrier Operations, Calendar Year 1988/United
States. National Transportation Safety Board.
Washington, D.C. : U.S. National Transpor-
tation Safety Board; Springfield, Virginia, U.S.
: Available through NTIS*, April 18, 1991.Re-
port NTSB/ARC-91/01, NTIS PB91-176040. 76
p.; charts, graphs.
Key Words
1. Aeronautics Accidents 1988.
2. Aeronautics Accidents Statistics
1988.
3. Aeronautics Accidents United States
1988.
4. Aeronautics, Commercial Accidents
United States.
Contents: Introduction 14 CFR 121, 125,
127 Operations Scheduled 14 CFR 135 Op-
erations Nonscheduled 14 CFR 135 Opera-
tions Midair Collision Accidents Explana-
tory Notes Cause/Factor Table-14 CFR 121,
125, 127 Cause/Factor Table-Scheduled 14
CFR 135 Cause/Factor Table-Nonscheduled
14 CFR 135 NTSB Form 6120.4.
Summary: Presents the record of aviation ac-
cidents involving revenue operations of U.S.
air carriers including commuter air carriers
and on-demand air taxis for calendar year 1988.
[author abstract]
Aviation Safety: Changes Needed in FAAs Service
Difficulty Reporting Program. Report to the Chair-
man, Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S.
Senate/United States. General Accounting Office.
Washington, D.C., U.S.: U.S. General Ac-
counting Office*, March, 1991. Report GAO/
RCED-91-24; B238393. 16 p.
Key Words
1. Jet Transports Airworthiness.
2. Jet Transports Inspection United States.
3. Aeronautics Accidents United States.
F LI GHT SAFETY FOUNDATI ON F LI GHT S AF E TY DI GE S T AUGUST 1991 27
Summary: GAO evaluated the effectiveness
of t he pa r t of t he Fe de r a l Avi a t i on
Administrations (FAA) Service Difficulty Re-
port (SDR) program related to large, airline-
operated aircraft. GAO found that several factors
stemming primarily from FAAs management
inattention limit the programs usefulness.
Information that one airline considers report-
able may go unreported by another airline;
useful information does not reach subscribers
for more than six weeks because of delays in
manual data processing through a paper-based
system; FAA does not analyze the data, as re-
quired by FAA policy, to detect malfunction
trends in specific aircraft models or focus the
efforts of FAAs inspection work force because
of insufficient staff and unreliable data. Alter-
natives do exist, such as major equipment manu-
facturers managing the program. Several policy
issues regarding cost, liability and the manu-
facturers roles in regulating air safety need to
be addressed before an alternative is chosen.
[Results in brief]
Donning Times and Flotation Characteristics of
Infant Life Preservers: Four Representative Types.
Final Report/Gordon E. Funkhouser and Gre-
gory W. Fairlie (Civil Aeromedical Institute).
Washington, D.C. : United States. Federal
Aviation Administration Office of Aviation
Medicine; Springfield, Virginia, U.S.: Available
through NTIS*, April, 1991. Report DOT/FAA/
AM-91/6. 12 p. : ill.
Key Words
1. Aeronautics, Commercial Safety
Measures.
2. Survival (After Airplane Accidents,
Shipwrecks, etc.).
3. Life-preservers.
4. Drowning Prevention Equipment and
Supplies.
5. Infants.
Summary: Four currently available represen-
tative types of infant life preservers were tested
to assess the donning times and flotation char-
acteristics for infant subjects (six months to
two years old). Donning times were recorded
from the time the unwrapped device was handed
to the parent until the last connection or ad-
justment was made. The device that was most
quickly donned was an inflatable type with a
vest attached to the top of the upper chamber
(median donning time was 28.8 seconds). This
infant life preserver also exhibited good body
support with the head well above the water.
The two fixed-foam devices were designed to
have approximately one-third of the buoyancy
of the two inflatable types and relied on assis-
tance from an adult to maintain the infant in a
safe flotation attitude. It appears that the fixed-
foam infant life preservers would provide more
thermal protection than the inflatable life pre-
servers. [author abstract]
Electronic Checklists: Evaluation of Two Levels of
Automation/Everett Palmer (U.S. National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration (NASA)-Ames
Research Center) and Asaf Degani (San Jose
State Foundation). Moffett Field, Califor-
nia, U.S.: NASA Ames Research Center, 1991.
6 p. ; ill.
Key Words
1. Airplanes Piloting Automation.
2. Airplanes Piloting Checklists.
3. Airplanes Cockpits Automation.
Notes
Paper presented at the Sixth International Sym-
posium on Aviation Psychology, April 29-May
2, 1991, Columbus, Ohio, U.S..
Summary: Two versions of an electronic check-
list, differing in degree of pilot involvement
in conducting the checklists, and a paper checklist
(as a control condition) were evaluated in line-
oriented simulation. Two aircrews from one
major air carrier flew a routine, four leg, short-
haul trip. This paper presents and discusses
the portion of the experiment that was con-
cerned with measuring the effect of the degree
of automation on the crews performance. It
discusses and presents evidence for a poten-
tial downside of implementing an electronic
checklist that is designed to provide fully re-
dundant monitoring of human procedure ex-
ecution and monitoring. [modified author ab-
stract]
Philosophy, Policies, and Procedures: The Three
Ps of Flight-deck Operations /Asaf Degani (San
F LI GHT SAFETY FOUNDATI ON F LI GHT SAF E TY DI GE S T AUGUST 1991 28
Jose State University Foundation) and Earl L.
Wiener (University of Miami). Moffett Field,
California, U.S.: NASA Ames Research Cen-
ter, 1991. 8 p.
Key Words
1. Aeronautics Accidents Human
Factors.
2. Aeronautics Accidents.
3. Airplanes Operational Procedures.
3. Airplanes Piloting Human Factors.
Notes
Paper presented at the Sixth International Sym-
posium on Aviation Psychology, April 29-May
2, 1991, Columbus, Ohio, U.S..
Research was supported by NASA Ames Re-
search Center Grants NCC2-327 to the San Jose
State University Foundation and Grant NCA2-
441 to the University of Miami.
Includes references.
Summary: Standard operating procedures (SOP)
are drafted and provided to flight crews to
dictate the manner in which tasks are carried
out. Failure to conform to SOP is frequently
listed as the cause of violations, incidents and
accidents. However, procedures are often de-
signed piecemeal, rather than being based on
a sound philosophy of operations and policies
that follow from such a philosophy. A frame-
work of philosophy, policies and procedures
is proposed. [author abstract]
The Use and Design of flight crew Checklists and
Manuals. Final Report/John W. Turner (EF&G
Dynatrend) and M. Stephen Huntley Jr. (U.S.
Department of Transportation Research and
Special Programs Administration). Wash-
ington, D.C. : United States. Federal Aviation
Administration Office of Aviation Medicine;
Springfield, Virginia, U.S. : Available through
NTIS*, April, 1991. Report DOT/FAA/AM-
91/7. 75 p. : ill.
Key Words
1. Airplanes Piloting Checklists.
2. Airplanes Piloting Handbooks,
Manuals, etc.
3. Airlines Operational Procedures.
4. Air Pilots Handbooks, Manuals, etc.
5. Aeronautics, Commercial Safety
Measures.
Summary: A survey of aircraft checklists and
flight manuals was conducted to identify im-
pediments to their use and to determine if
standards or guidelines for their design were
needed. Information for this purpose was col-
lected through the review of checklists and
manuals from six Part 121 and nine Part 135
carriers, review of NTSB and Aviation Safety
Reporting System (ASRS) reports, analysis of
an Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) survey
of air carrier pilots, and by direct observation
in air carrier cockpits. The survey revealed
that some checklists and manuals were diffi-
cult to locate and were poorly designed for
use in the cockpit environment, the use of check-
lists by flight crews was not always well de-
fined, the use of checklists interfered with other
flight operations and flight operations often
made it difficult to use checklists effectively.
The report contains recommendations for the
format and content of checklists and manuals,
their use by flight crews, and areas of research
relevant to checklist design. [author abstract]
*U.S. Department of Commerce
National Technical Information Service (NTIS)
Springfield, VA 22161 U.S.
Telephone: (703) 487-4780
*U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO)
Post Office Box 6012
Gaithersburg, MD 20877 U.S.
Telephone: (202) 275-6241
F LI GHT SAFETY FOUNDATI ON F LI GHT S AF E TY DI GE S T AUGUST 1991 29
This information is intended to provide an aware-
ness of problem areas through which such occur-
rences may be prevented in the future. Accident/
incident briefs are based upon preliminary infor-
mation from government agencies, aviation orga-
nizations, press information and other sources.
This information may not be accurate.
Accident/Incident Briefs
Air Carrier Air Carrier
Who Left the
Door Open?
Boeing 747: Minor damage. No injuries.
The widebody aircraft was preparing to de-
part the terminal for a regularly scheduled
flight. The flight was being operated during
the daytime, early in the afternoon.
After all pre-taxi checks had been completed,
the aircraft was being pushed back from its
parking position at the terminal gate. A left
front passenger door, that had inadvertently
been left open, collided with the jetway and
was damaged as the aircraft rolled back. The
aircraft had to be taken out of service for re-
pairs and the passengers transferred to other
flights.
Overshot Altitude While
Looking for Traffic
Boeing 737: No damage. No injuries.
The air carrier had just departed the airport
and was climbing to its initially assigned alti-
tude of 14,000 feet. The captain was provid-
ing initial operating experience for a new first
officer who was flying the aircraft.
As the aircraft approached the 13,000-foot level,
air traffic control (ATC) issued a traffic advi-
sory for a target at 11 oclock at 15,000 feet. At
first, neither pilot was able to see the reported
traffic and both were distracted looking for it.
As a result, the aircraft continued climbing
through its assigned clearance level of 14,000
feet. The pilots received an altitude alert, and
an ATC altitude deviation advisory at 14,300
feet and were able to reverse the climb by
14,500 feet. Despite a quick return to the cleared
altitude, legal vertical separation of 500 feet
had been lost between the 737 and the other
aircraft.
Among lessons learned are ensuring that some-
one is flying the aircraft at all times, that the
rate of climb is closely monitored during the
last 1,000 feet of climb, and that procedures be
established for receiving clearances and set-
ting the altitude alert system.
Strange Noise at Night
Makes Flight Interesting
Fokker F.27 Friendship: No damage. No injuries.
The aircraft was departing on a scheduled flight
during the night. The aircraft and systems
had checked OK during preflight checks.
Air Taxi/
Commuter
Air Taxi
Commuter
F LI GHT SAFETY FOUNDATI ON F LI GHT SAF E TY DI GE S T AUGUST 1991 30
However, after rotation the noise level in the
cockpit increased substantially. The sound
became worse as the aircraft increased speed
during the climbout. The flight crew investi-
gated the sound and the noise appeared to be
coming from the first officers side window.
The crew reduced the airspeed and it was de-
termined that the first officers window was
ajar, even though the locking handle was in
the down and locked position. When it had
been visually inspected during the preflight
checks, the window had appeared to be closed;
but the locking bolts had not been engaged
properly.
The first officer opened the window and closed
it properly and the noise stopped. The flight
was continued without further incident.
Too Busy Talking
To Passenger
Piper PA-31 Navajo Chieftain: Substantial dam-
age. No injuries.
The aircraft was inbound on an approach. There
were a pilot and two passengers aboard. The
pilot had total of 13,000 flying hours, 1,500 in
type and 200 during the previous three months.
The aircraft was cleared for a straight-in ap-
proach to land. The pilot was explaining the
pre-landing checks to one of the passengers.
During the conversation, the pilot noticed that
the nose gear landing lights were not illumi-
nated. Because he thought the landing gear
had been placed down, he assumed that the
landing gear indicator bulbs had failed.
The pilot continued the approach and the
aircraft landed with the landing gear retracted.
There was no fire, but the aircraft sustained
substantial damage to the propellers, flaps and
underside of the fuselage. There were no inju-
ries to the occupants.
The pilot reported that he forgot to lower the
landing gear, and that the power setting was
too high for the warning horn to actuate.
Man-made Windshear
Snaps Gear Leg
Cessna 303 Crusader: Substantial damage. No
injuries.
The aircraft was approaching to land after a
morning flight. There were a pilot and three
passengers aboard the twin-engine aircraft.
The pilot had obtained destination airport
weather information en route that reported
wind from 280 to 300 degrees magnetic at 20
knots, gusting to 34 knots. He would be using
runway 25. Approaching the airport, he at-
tempted to contact the Unicom to determine
weather conditions, but there was no operator
available.
During final approach, the aircraft descended
rapidly from a height of approximately 100
feet and struck the ground hard enough that
the right main gear assembly broke away. The
pilot elected to abort the landing and continue
to his home base airport where better emer-
gency and repair facilities were available. A
short time after the aborted landing, the wind
at the airport was reported to be gusting from
20 to 36 knots from the northwest.
After a flyby of the control tower at the home
airport it was confirmed that the right gear
was missing. The runway was foamed and
the pilot accomplished a gear-up landing with
no further difficulties. The aircraft sustained
further damage due to the landing but the
passengers deplaned with no injuries.
The pilot was cited for failing to adjust the
airplanes approach speed for the gusty wind
conditions at the airport where the gear had
been damaged. He was familiar with the air-
Corporate
Executive
Corporate
Executive
F LI GHT SAFETY FOUNDATI ON F LI GHT S AF E TY DI GE S T AUGUST 1991 31
port and the accident report stated that he
should have been aware of a published cau-
tionary warning that there was a possibility of
windshear when landing on runway 25 with
northwest winds in excess of 10 knots.
The windshear pilots are cautioned about is
caused by buildings and farm silos near the
threshold of the runway.
Severe Icing Is a
Severe Threat
Beech 65 Queen Air: Aircraft destroyed. Fatal
injuries to 1.
The aircraft was carrying cargo across the south-
east corner of Australia some time after 0300
hours in July, winter season down under. The
area forecast included a freezing level at 4,500
feet east of an approaching front, moderate to
severe icing in cumulus clouds, visibility less
than four miles in heavy rain showers and less
than 1,000 feet in snow showers.
After a normal departure, the pilot flew the
aircraft to a cruising level of 8,000 feet. He
reported passing his first checkpoint and was
given further clearance. This was the last con-
tact air traffic control personnel had with the
pilot.
Persons sleeping in the path of the planned
flight were awakened by very loud engine noises
from an aircraft that was obviously flying at a
very low altitude in an approximately south-
ern direction. They saw a flash of light fol-
lowed almost immediately by the sound of a
thud.
The weather in the vicinity of the accident
included snow and fog.
Several hours later, searchers found the wreckage
of the aircraft; it had been destroyed and the
pilot was fatally injured. The aircraft had
struck power lines at a height of 100 feet and
crashed. Weather in the area included snow
and fog. Other pilots flying in the vicinity had
reported encountering rime icing that some-
times was severe.
Forced Landing Practice
Taught Another Lesson
Cessna 206: No damage. No injuries.
The aircraft was being used for dual instruc-
tion. An instructor and a student were the
only persons aboard the single-engine aircraft.
The maneuver was forced landing practice and,
although the terrain was not suitable for an
actual emergency landing, the instructor re-
duced power by pulling back the throttle and
declared a simulated power failure. The stu-
dent pilot accomplished the proper procedures
and established a landing approach to a stretch
of road. When the aircraft had descended to
within a couple of hundred feet of trees, the
instructor ordered the student pilot to add
power and end the simulated forced landing
approach. The student applied full power.
The engine did not respond.
The instructor checked the position of the fuel
selector and called for the fuel boost pump to
be activated, while watching an automobile
moving in the section of road intended for the
simulated forced landing. The engine started
before an actual landing was necessary and
the aircraft climbed back to altitude without
further mishap. The flight was completed and
neither pilot thought further about checking
out the reason for the engines failure to re-
spond during the forced landing practice.
The aircraft sat for a week without being flown.
During preflight engine runup prior to a long
flight, the pilot advanced the throttle rapidly
and the engine died. Remembering the prac-
tice forced landing episode, the pilot recalled
Other
General
Aviation
Other
General
Aviation
F LI GHT SAFETY FOUNDATI ON F LI GHT SAF E TY DI GE S T AUGUST 1991 32
from the station towards which he was headed.
The pilot reported continuous light rime icing
and was cleared lower to 7,000 feet, the mini-
mum radar vectoring level. Upon levelling
off, however, the pilot requested a still-lower
level but that was not available and ATC of-
fered a vector to the south off the airway and
toward lower terrain. The pilot declined the
offer, and the controller questioned if the air-
craft was picking up ice and whether the pilot
could maintain his altitude. The pilot reported
that the icing was light and that the flight was
OK.
Within the minute, the pilot requested a lower
altitude and was observed to have descended
to 6,000 before the clearance was given two
minutes later. The controller indicated there
was an alternate airport eight miles away and
asked if he could maintain that altitude, to
which the pilot answered yes.
Almost immediately, the pilot announced that
he had an engine problem and could not maintain
altitude. He requested a vector toward the
alternate airport and advised that one engine
was shut down. The aircraft disappeared from
radar coverage and that was the last radio
communication from the aircraft.
Subsequently, the aircraft entered heavy rain
and showers of ice pellets as it descended be-
neath the clouds and, unable to maintain alti-
tude, the pilot made a successful forced land-
ing in rugged terrain. One passenger was in-
jured seriously, and the other occupants sus-
tained minor injuries, but they all were able to
exit the aircraft before post-impact fire destroyed
it.
At no point during the incident did the pilot
declare an emergency to ATC.
The basic cause of the accident was that the
pilot continued flight into severe icing condi-
tions in an aircraft that was not properly
equipped. Contributing factors were that he
was advised of the severe icing by a previous
flight along his route and that by not declar-
ing an emergency, he precluded timely assis-
tance.
previous trouble with the engine fuel pump.
During an engine change 200 hours previously,
the fuel pump had not responded well to pressure
adjustment, and maintenance personnel had
been having trouble adjusting the idle mix-
ture recently. Further checking by the over-
haul shop disclosed that the fuel pumps low-
pressure adjustment screw was loose and it
was not possible to maintain pressure adjust-
ments; an excessive amount of adjusting had
caused the screw to become loose.
Lessons learned included paying attention to
signs that the engine was not functioning prop-
erly; that practice forced landings should be
made where good approaches to actual land-
ing sites are available in case the engine fails
to respond; and that the engine should be cleared
properly during idle descent to ensure its avail-
ability for the go-around.
One Engine Out in Ice
But no Emergency
Piper PA-23-250 Aztec: Aircraft destroyed. Seri-
ous injuries to one, minor injuries to three.
The pilot and three passengers were returning
home from a skiing vacation in the light twin-
engine aircraft.
After receiving a telephone weather briefing,
the pilot filed an instrument flight rules (IFR)
flight plan for 12,000 feet and, after ATC re-
ported severe turbulence and heavy icing in
the general area he requested a higher alti-
tude. Cleared to 14,000 feet, the pilot remained
in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC).
The pilot then requested a descent and was
cleared to 10,000 feet even though severe tur-
bulence and moderate to heavy icing was re-
ported at that altitude. He reported that he
was only experiencing light rime icing at the
time.
During the descent, the VOR navigation re-
ception from the station behind the aircraft
was interrupted and the pilot was given radar
vectors to help him stay on the airway until
reliable VOR reception could be established
F LI GHT SAFETY FOUNDATI ON F LI GHT S AF E TY DI GE S T AUGUST 1991 33
Dead Tree
Snags Helicopter
Bell 206B Jetranger III: Substantial damage. No
injuries.
The pilot was on the way from his home base
to pick up a passenger at a small airstrip in a
wooded area. Arriving at the destination, he
overflew the landing site at a height of ap-
proximately 500 feet and began a wide, de-
scending approach to a downwind leg.
While turning to base leg, the pilot heard a
thump sound and noticed that both lower vi-
sion bubbles were broken. He assumed the
helicopter had struck a bird and checked the
engine instruments and caution lights but noth-
ing was amiss, so he continued the landing.
After touching down, the pilot left the engine
running while he inspected for damage. There
was damage to the lower vertical tail fin but,
with the tail rotor still turning, he did not
inspect the area closely. He cancelled the pas-
senger flight, and cleaned the cockpit area around
the broken plexiglass, throwing out broken
pieces of the canopy and some pieces of wood
he assumed had blown in during the landing.
Lifting off into a hover, the pilot checked that
there were no unusual vibrations and flew back
to home base.
Inspection by maintenance personnel after the
aircraft had been shut down at the home facil-
ity revealed widespread damage to the main
and tail rotor blades, dents and scrapes else-
where on windshield and metal skin of the
rotorcraft and a damaged antenna. There were
no feathers or blood indicative of a bird strike;
however, bits of wood and bark pointed to a
tree strike.
A visit to the landing site revealed that the
helicopter had collided with the top of a 150-
foot-high dead tree approximately 250 feet away
from the center of the landing strip. Although
much taller than surrounding trees, the dead
tree had no leaves to draw attention to it.
There were numerous contributing factors in-
volved. The company was short of pilots and
the workload was high; the pilot had worked
a demanding 12-hour schedule the previous
day. He had just returned to work from a
holiday that involved visitors in the home and
a sick wife, resulting in his having to assist
with the childrens schooling needs. The day
of the tree strike, the pilot had begun work at
0545 and flew five attention-demanding flights;
the accident flight was expected to be an easy
one and he was relaxed. He made a wide left
traffic pattern to give himself plenty of room
for the approach, and in a helicopter that has
a blind area on the lower left, failed to see the
tree.
Third Autorotation
Was Not a Charm
Bell 206B: Substantial damage. No injuries.
The aircraft was being used for autorotation
training. A flight instructor and a student
pilot were the only occupants.
The student had successfully completed two
autorotations to touchdown and was nearing
the ground on a third simulated power-off ap-
proach. At a height of three feet, the student
began applying cushioning collective pitch and
leveled the rotorcraft. Then, when the aircraft
was one foot above the ground, the student
applied aft cyclic control, causing the rear portion
of the landing skids to hit the ground. Both
the instructor and the student applied forward
cyclic control and the aircraft rocked back and
forth through several cycles. By the time it
came to rest, the helicopter had sustained sub-
stantial damage. The instructor and the stu-
dent pilot were not injured. o
Rotorcraft Rotorcraft