{oIm R.

SearIe
chairman, I don't advocate that you be or become chairman; I make you
chairman.
In sum, there are (at least) the following six related difficulties with
Austin's taxonomy. In ascending order of importance, there is a per-
sistent confusion between verbs and acts; not all the verbs are illocution-
ary verbs; there is too much overlap of the categories; there is too much
heterogeneity within the categories; many of the verbs listed in the
categories don't satisfy the definition given for the category; and, most
important, there is no consistent principle of classification.
I don't believe I have fully substantiated all six of these charges and
I will not attempt to do so within the confines of this paper, which has
other aims. I believe, however, that my doubts about Austin's taxonomy
will have greater clarity and force after I have presented an alternative.
What I propose to do is take illocutionary point and its corollaries,
direction of fit and expressed sincerity conditions, as the basis for con-
structing a classification. In such a classification, other features - the
role of authority, discourse relations, etc. - will fall into their appro-
priate places.
IV. Alternative Taxonomy
In this section I shall present a list of what I regard as the basic cate-
gories of illocutionary acts. In so doing, I shall discuss briefly how my
classification relates to Austin's.
Representatives. The point or purpose of the members of the repre-
sentative class is to commit the speaker (in varying degrees) to some-
thing's being the case, to the truth of the expressed proposition. All of
the members of the representative class are assessable on the dimension
of assessment which includes true and false. Using Frege's assertion sign
to mark the illocutionary point common to all the members of this class
and the symbols introduced above, we may symbolize this class as follows:
r tB(p)
The direction of fit is words-to-the-world; and the psychological state
expressed is belief (that p). It is important to emphasize that words
such as "belief" and "commitment" are here intended to mark dimen
sions; they are so to speak determinables rather than determinates. Thm
there is a difference between suggesting that p or putting it forward as
hypothesis that p on the one hand, and insisting that p or solemnly swear
354
A TAXONUMY UI' ILLOCUTI ONAIW ACTS
jng tIwt p Oil the Ot.lI Cr. The degree of helief :md comrnil'1l1cnt lIIay tlP-
proach or even reach zero, but it is cl ear or will become clear tha t
hypothesizing that p and flatly stating that p are in the samc line of
business in a way that neither is like requesting. Once we recognize the
existence of representatives as a quite separate class, based on the notion
of illocutionary point, then the existence of a large number of perform-
ative verbs denoting illocutions that seem to be assessable in the true-
false dimension and yet are not just "statements" will be easily explicable
in terms of the fact that they mark features of illocutionary force which
are in addition to illocutionary point. Thus, for example, consider
"boast" and "complain." They both denote representatives with the
added feature that they have something to do with the interest of the
speaker (feature 6 above) . "Conclude" and "deduce" are also representa-
tives with the added feature that they mark certain relations between
the representative illocutionary act and the rest of the discourse or the
context of utterance (feature 7 above). This class will contain most of
Austin's expositives as well as many of his verdictives for the, by now
I hope obvious, reason that they all have the same illocutionary point
and differ only in other features of illocutionary force. The simplest
test of a representative is this: can you literally characterize it (inter alia)
as true or false. Though I hasten to add that this will give neither neces-
sary nor sufficient conditions, as we shall see when we get to my fifth
class.
These points about representatives will, I hope, be clearer when I
discuss my second class which, with some reluctance, I will call
Directives. The illocutionary point of these consists in the fact that
they are attempts (of varying degrees, and hence more precisely, they
are determinates of the determinable which includes attempting) by the
speaker to get the hearer to do something. They may be very modest
"attempts," as when I invite you to do it or suggest that you do it, or
they may be very fierce attempts as when I insist that you do it. Using
the exclamation mark as the illocutionary-point indicating device for the
members of this class generally, we have the following symbolism:
! t W (H does A)
The direction of fit is world-to-words and the sincerity condition is want
(or wish or desire) . ' The propositional content is always that the hearer
H does some future action A. Verbs denoting members of this class are
35$
J01ln R. Scarlc
order, command, request, ask, question, G beg, plead, pray, cutrcat, and
also invite, permit, and advise. I think also that it is clear that dare,
defy, and challenge which Austin lists as behabitives are in this class .
Many of Austin's exercitives are also in this class.
Commissives. Austin's definition of commissives seems to me unex-
ceptionable, and I will simply appropriate it as it stands with the cavil
that several of the verbs he lists. as commissive verbs do not belong in
this class at all, such as "shall," "intend," "favor," and others. Com-
missives then are those illocutionary acts whose point is to commit the
speaker (again in varying degrees) to some future course of action.
Using C for the members of this class, generally we have the following
symbolism:
C i I (S does A)
The direction of fit is world-ta-words and the sincerity condition is
intention. The propositional content is always that the speaker S does
some future action A. Since the direction of fit is the same for com-
missives and directives, it would give us a more elegant taxonomy if we
could show that they are really members of the same category. I am
unable to do this, because whereas the point of a promise is to commit
the speaker to doing something (and not necessarily to try to get him-
self to do it), the point of a request is to try to get the hearer to do
something (and not necessarily to commit or obligate him to do it).
In order to assimilate the two categories, one would have to show that
promises are really a species of requests to oneself (this has been sug-
gested to me by Julian Boyd) or alternatively one would have to show
that requests placed the hearer under an obligation (this has been
suggested to me by William Alston and John Kearns). I have been un-
able to make either of these analyses work and am left with the inele-
gant solution of two separate categories with the same direction of fit.
A fourth category I shall call
Expressives. The illocutionary point of this class is to express the
psychological state specified in the sincerity condition about a state of
affairs specified in the propositional content. The paradigms of expres-
sive verbs are "thank," "congratulate," "apologize," "condole," "deplore,"
and "welcome." Notice that in expressives there is no direction of fit.
Questions are directives, since they are attempts to get the hearer to perform a
speech act .
356
A TAXONOMY ()Ii' 1I .1.0CIITIONAHY ACTS
In pcrfOrlllill g all the speaker is ll eiHler tTyill g to gd the
world to mat ch thc words nor the words to match the world; rather
the truth of thc expressed proposition is presupposed. Thus, for example,
when I apologize for having stepped on your toe, it is not my purpose
either to claim that your toe was stepped on nor to get it stepped on.
This fact is neatly reflected in the syntax (of English) by the fact that
the paradigm expressive verbs in their performance Occurrence will not
take that clauses but require a gerund nominalization transformation (or
some other nominal). One cannot say:
* I apologize that I stepped on your toe;
rather the correct English is
I apologize for stepping on your toe.
Similarly, one cannot have
* I congratulate you that you won the race
nor
* I thank you that you paid me the money.
One must have
I congratulate you on winning the race (congratulations on win-
ning the race) .
I thank you for paying me the money (thanks for paying me the
money).
These syntactical facts, I suggest, are consequences of the fact that
there is in general no direction of fit in expressives. The truth of the
proposition expressed in an expressive is presupposed. The symbolization
of this class therefore must proceed as follows:
E cl> (P) (SjH + property)
where E indicates the illocutionary point common to all expressives, cl> is
the null symbol indicating no direction of fit, (P) is a variable ranging
over the different possible psychological states expressed in the per-
formance of the iIlocutionary acts in this class, and the propositional
content ascribes some property (not necessarily an action) to either S
or H. I can congratulate you not only on your winning the race, but also
on your good looks or on your son's winning the race. The property
specified in the propositional content of an expressive must, however,
357
,01111 R. SearIe
be related to S or H. I cannot without some very special assumptions
congratulate you on Newton's firstlaw of motion.
It would be economical if we could include all illocutionary acts in
these four classes and would lend some further support to the general
pattern of analysis adopted in Speech Acts, but it seems to me it is sti11
not complete. There is still left an important class of cases, where the
state of affairs represented in the proposition expressed is realized or
brought into existence by the illocutionary-force indicating device, cases
where one brings a state of affairs into existence by declaring it to exist,
cases where, so to speak, "saying makes it so." Examples of these cases
are "I resign," "You're fired," "I excommunicate you," "I christen this
ship the battleship Missouri," "I appoint you chairman," and "War is
hereby declared." These cases were presented as paradigms in the very
earliest discussions of performatives, but it seems to me they are still
not adequately described in the literature and their relation to other
kinds of iIlocutionary acts is usually misunderstood. Let us call this class
Declarations. It is the defining characteristic of this class that the
successful performance of one of its members brings about the corre-
spondence between the propositional content and reality; successful
performance guarantees that the propositional content corresponds to
the world: if I successfully perform the act of appointing you chairman,
then you are chairman; if I successfully perform the act of nominating
you as candidate, then you are a candidate; if I successfully perform
the act of declaring a state of war, then war is on; if I successfully per-
form the act of marrying you, then you are married.
The surface syntactical structure of many sentences used to perform
declarations conceals this point from us because in them there is no
surface syntactical distinction between propositional content and illocu-
tionary force. Thus "You're fired" and "I resign" do not seem to permit
a distinction between illocutionary force and propositional content, but
I think in fact that in their use to perform declarations their semantic
structure is:
I declare: your employment is (hereby) terminated.
I declare: my position is (hereby) terminated.
Declarations bring about some alternation in the status or condition
of the referred to object or objects solely in virtue of the fact that the
declaration has been successfully performed. This feature of declarations
358
A TAXONOMY OJr n .f. OCU'I'IONAIlY ACTS
distinguishes thcm frOlIl the ot'her categories. III thc hi story of the di s-
cussion of thcsc topi cs sinec Austin's first introduction of his distinction
between performativcs and constatives, this feature of declarations has
not been properly understood. The original distinction bctwcen con-
statives and performatives was supposed to be a distinction between
utterances which are sayings (constatives: statements, assertions, etc.)
and utterances which are doings (performatives : promises, bets, warn-
ings, etc.). What I am calling declarations were included in the class
of performatives. The main theme of Austin's mature work, How to Do
Things with Words, is that this distinction collapses. Just as saying
certain things constitutes getting married (a "performative") and saying
certain things constitutes making a promise (another "performative"),
so saying certain things constitutes making a statement (supposedly a
"constative"). As Austin saw, but as many philosophers still fail to see,
the parallel is exact. Making a statement is as much performing an illo-
cutionary act as making a promise, a bet, a warning, or what have you.
Any utterance will consist in performing one or more illocutionary acts.
The illocutionary-force indicating device in the sentence operates on
the propositional content to indicate among other things the direction
of fit between the propositional content and reality. In the case of
representatives the direction of fit is words-ta-world; in the case of
directives and commissives it is world-to-words; in the case of expressives
there is no direction of fit carried by the illocutionary force because the
existence of fit is presupposed. The utterance can't get off the ground
unless there already is a fit. But now with the declarations we discover
a very peculiar relation. The performance of a declaration brings about
a fit by its very successful performance. How is such a thing possible?
Notice that all of the examples we have considered so far involve an
extra-linguistic institution, a system of constitutive rules in addition to
the constitutive rules of language, in order that the declaration may be
successfully performed. The mastery of those rules which constitute
linguistic competence by the speaker and hearer is not in general suffi-
cient for the performance of a declaration. In addition there must exist
an extra-linguistic institution and the speaker and hearer must occupy
special places within this institution. It is only given such institutions
as the church, the law, private property, the state, and a special position
of the speaker and hearer within these institutions that one can excom-
municate, appoint, give and bequeath one's possessions, or declare war.
359