Quarterly Report to the

United States Congress

[ October 30, 2009]

(Public Law 108-106, as amended, and Public Law 95-452)
SIGIR Mission Statement
Regarding U.S. relief and reconstruction plans, programs, and operations in Iraq,
the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction provides independent and objective:
· oversight and review through comprehensive audits, inspections, and investigations
· advice and recommendations on policies to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness
· prevention, detection, and deterrence of fraud, waste, and abuse
· information and analysis to the Congress, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense,
and the American people

_______________________________________________________________________________

The jurisdiction of the Office extends to amounts appropriated or otherwise made available
for any fiscal year to the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, the Iraq Security Forces Fund,
the Commander’s Emergency Response Program; or for assistance for the reconstruction
of Iraq under the Economic Support Fund, the International Narcotics Control
and Law Enforcement account, or any other provision of law.

(Section 3001 of Public Law 108-106, as amended)

Chamchamal Correctional Facility: Completed in March 2009, this $29 million, U.S.-funded prison renovation and expansion project added 3,000 beds to the
Iraqi prison system. SIGIR inspected the facility in June 2009, before the first prisoners were transferred there from overcrowded Baghdad prisons, and found
construction to be adequate. By mid-October, the facility reportedly housed 2,637 inmates.
Special Inspector General
for Iraq Reconstruction

Quarterly Report to the

United States Congress

[ October 30, 2009]

(Public Law 108-106, as amended, and Public Law 95-452)
MESSAGE FROM THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

The next six months will see a substantial reduction in the size of the U.S. military presence in Iraq,
a continuing reorganization of the U.S. Embassy’s reconstruction management, and the election of a new
Iraqi parliament. Among other things, this Quarterly Report—SIGIR’s 23rd—analyzes three key issues that
will shape the continuing U.S. effort in Iraq:

• the transfer of police training from the Department of Defense to the Department of State
• the management and oversight of the billions in remaining U.S. reconstruction funds
• the changing U.S. presence in the provinces

A new SIGIR audit also explores policy issues related to the management of Iraqi funds by the U.S.
government. To date, SIGIR has identified $27.5 million in Iraqi funds for return or potential return to the
Government of Iraq: $13 million was returned in March 2009 to Prime Minister al-Maliki, and this quarter
we identified $14.4 million more that may further be available for return. We plan to soon initiate further
work to examine expired U.S. appropriated funds.

Another SIGIR audit issued this quarter uncovered $4.1 million in potential overbillings by a U.S.
contractor charged with improving the Iraqi Army’s logistical infrastructure. The overbillings included
charging $196.50 for a package of 10 washers; under the terms of the contract, the package should have
cost $1.22. SIGIR also issued an initial report on its ongoing, statutorily mandated forensic review of all
U.S. taxpayer funds appropriated for the reconstruction of Iraq. The forensic audit initiative already has
identified hundreds of suspicious transactions, leading to the opening of six investigations involving
15 subjects.

SIGIR regularly collaborates with Government of Iraq oversight agencies, especially the Board of Supreme
Audit (BSA). This quarter, in a groundbreaking initiative, SIGIR auditors worked with BSA auditors
to evaluate the Iraq-Commander’s Emergency Response Program. SIGIR issued a review finding that
incomplete records inhibited oversight of the program. I will soon depart on my 25th trip to Iraq, during
which I will review the findings with the BSA’s president in Baghdad and ascertain next steps.

SIGIR investigators achieved progress in several ongoing cases this quarter. In one, investigators seized more
than $1.7 million from a safe deposit box leased to a participant in a wide-ranging conspiracy to defraud
the U.S. government of millions of dollars. In another case, two U.S. Marine Corps lieutenant colonels were
found guilty under the Uniform Code of Military Justice of wrongfully disposing of U.S. military property.
A third Marine was found guilty of accepting $67,000 in bribes from contracting companies doing business
in Iraq. To date, SIGIR’s investigations have produced 24 convictions, 31 indictments, and more than
$49 million in court-ordered fines, forfeitures, and recoveries. With 96 active cases, more indictments or
convictions are sure to occur before the end of the year.

400 Army Navy Drive • Arlington Virginia 22202

I am pleased to report that, on October 20, 2009, the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and
Efficiency (CIGIE) recognized SIGIR’s Investigations and Inspections directorates for their superlative
work. SIGIR’s inspectors received the Sentner Award for Dedication and Courage for their commitment to
traveling throughout Iraq to evaluate U.S.-funded reconstruction projects. CIGIE also presented its Award
for Excellence to SIGIR’s investigators for success in fighting fraud in Iraq.

Over the past year, SIGIR provided more than 6,700 hours of administrative, technical, and professional
support to the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) to help this
organization stand up its operations. SIGIR’s assistance to SIGAR wrapped up this quarter, and we wish
SIGAR well as it confronts the challenge of overseeing U.S. reconstruction and stabilization initiatives in
Afghanistan.

Although most of the Iraq reconstruction money is now spent, billions remain to be obligated and
expended. Thus, our oversight mandate is still quite significant, and we continue to be vigilant in
executing it. Moreover, SIGIR’s forensic audit initiative will bear investigative fruit for several years to
come. But, in light of the diminishing reconstruction program in Iraq, SIGIR has begun to implement a
transition program, and we have realized internal efficiencies that resulted in $7 million being returned to
the U.S. Treasury. In fiscal year 2010, the organization will drop in size by one-third, with plans to reduce
by another third in FY 2011 as the mission is transitioned to our permanent oversight partners.

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr.

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
 SIGIR SUMMARY
TABLE
OF PERFORMANCE
OF CONTENTS

SIGIR Summary of Performance

As of October 30, 2009

Audits
Reports Issued 155

Recommendations Issued 393

Dollars Saved and Recovered ($ millions) $82

Dollars Put to Better Use ($ millions) $225

Challenged Payments ($ millions) $19

Inspections
Project Assessments Issued 159

Limited On-site Assessments Issued 96

Aerial Assessments 819

Investigations
Investigations Initiated 448

Investigations Closed or Referred 353

Open Investigations 96

Arrests 24

Indictments 31

Convictions 24

Court-ordered Restitution/Forfeiture $49,163,996

Hotline Contacts, as of September 30, 2009

Fax 18

Telephone 77

Walk-in 111

E-mail 357

Referrals 26

Mail 28

SIGIR Website 133

Total Hotline Contacts 750

Non-Audit Products
Congressional Testimony 27

Lessons Learned Reports Issued 4

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Section 1
SIGIR Observations 1 Diyala 112
Iraq Reconstruction October 2009: Baghdad 114
2
Transition and Change Wassit 117
U.S. Reconstruction Funding and Management 3 Babylon 119
Security Concerns Persist 4 Qadissiya 121
Governance: Elections in the Kurdistan Region 7 Kerbala 122
Governance: Parliamentary Elections 8 Najaf 125
Economy 10 Muthanna 126
Energy Developments 11 Thi-Qar 128
The Water Crisis 12 Missan 129
Anticorruption 13 Basrah 131
Rule of Law 14
International Developments 14
Section 4
SIGIR Oversight 15
SIGIR Oversight 133
The Human Toll 17
SIGIR Audits 134
SIGIR Inspections 144
Section 2 SIGIR Investigations 161
Iraq Reconstruction Funding Sources and Uses 19 SIGIR Hotline 170
Iraq Reconstruction Funding Sources 20 SIGIR Website 171
Reconstruction Management in Transition 34 Legislative Update 172
Use of Contract Personnel 40
Iraq Reconstruction Funding Uses 42
Section 5
Security 44
Other Agency Oversight 175
Infrastructure 56
Introduction 176
Governance 73
Other Agency Audits 177
Economy 82
Other Agency Investigations 184

Section 3 Endnotes 186

Reconstruction by Province 87 Acronyms and Definitions 199
Overview of Provincial Development 88
Provincial Reconstruction Teams 93
Provincial Portraits 96
The Kurdistan Region 98
Ninewa 104
*The complete version of this SIGIR Quarterly Report is available
Tameem 106 on the SIGIR website: www.SIGIR.mil. It is the official version of
Salah Al-Din 108 the Report, containing all appendices and corrections.
Anbar 110
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Appendices

The appendices for this Quarterly Report are not included in the print version of the publication.
They are published on the SIGIR website at www.sigir.mil.

Appendix A cross-references the pages of this Report to SIGIR’s statutory reporting requirements
under Section 3001 of P.L. 108-106, as amended.

Appendix B cross-references budget terms associated with the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund
(IRRF), Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF), Economic Support Fund (ESF), Commander’s Emergency
Response Program (CERP), and international support for Iraq reconstruction.

Appendix C cross-references projects and programs of various U.S. government agencies within
SIGIR-defined sectors.

Appendix D reports on international contributions to the Iraq reconstruction effort.

Appendix E contains a list of SIGIR’s completed inspections of Iraq reconstruction activities.

Appendix F contains a comprehensive list of suspensions and debarments related to Iraq

reconstruction contracts or Army support contracts in Iraq and Kuwait.

Appendix G provides summaries of completed and ongoing audits and reviews by other
U.S. government agencies of Iraq reconstruction programs and activities.

Appendix H contains a list of completed audits, reports, and testimonies on Iraq reconstruction
activities released by SIGIR and other U.S. government audit agencies.
 SIGIR
OBSERVATIONS
Iraq Reconstruction October 2009: 2
Transition and Change

U.S. Reconstruction Funding and Management 3

Security Concerns Persist 4

Governance: Elections in the Kurdistan Region 7

Governance: Parliamentary Elections 8

Economy 10

Energy Developments 11

1
The Water Crisis 12
section

Anticorruption 13

Rule of Law 14

International Developments 14

SIGIR Oversight 15

The Human Toll 17

SIGIR OBSERVATIONS

more transparent and more capable of fighting

Iraq Reconstruction public corruption.

October 2009: To prepare for the new realities in Iraq, the

Transition and Change Department of State (DoS) appointed a Deputy
Chief of Mission (DCM) for Transition Assistance
earlier this year to manage the next phase of the U.S.
In less than three months, Iraq’s citizens will reconstruction program, while the Department of
choose a new Council of Representatives (CoR) in Defense (DoD) progressed with plans to consolidate
the country’s first parliamentary elections since command structures and reduce its footprint.
2005. When the new CoR convenes next year,
its first order of business will be to select a prime Transition Concerns
minister—either the incumbent or someone Transitional periods create vulnerabilities. In an
new—to form the government. The CoR then will August 18, 2009, letter to Ambassador Christo-
have to address an array of significant challenges in pher Hill and Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I)
security, governance, and the economy: Commander General Raymond Odierno, SIGIR
• Security. Under the terms of the U.S.-Iraq Secu- called attention to three potential areas of concern
rity Agreement (SA), all U.S. military forces must that could affect the U.S. reconstruction effort as it
leave Iraq by December 31, 2011. Troop draw- evolves over the next several months:
downs will begin in earnest after the January • Transferring police training from DoD to DoS.
2010 elections. Their phased departures will place Since 2005, MNSTC-I has trained Iraq’s police.
the responsibility for Iraq’s internal and external On December 31, 2009, MNSTC-I will shut down,
security exclusively on the shoulders of the Iraqi and USF-I’s ITAM will formally assume police-
Security Forces (ISF), which currently rely on training duties until 2011, when U.S. Embassy-
substantial U.S. logistical and intelligence sup- Baghdad and DoS’s Bureau of International Nar-
port. Moreover, the Government of Iraq (GOI) cotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) will
must assume full funding responsibility for its assume complete control. Planning is underway
Army, police, and other security institutions. for redesign of the police support mission.
• Governance. National reconciliation remains a • Managing reconstruction as the Embassy and
fragile, ongoing process. The new CoR will need military downsize. Since the establishment of
to resolve disputes over the control of Kirkuk the Coalition Provisional Authority in 2003,
and continue the process of integrating former U.S.-funded reconstruction projects have been
Sunni insurgents into the GOI. It will also be managed by a series of temporary agencies, most
called on to pass a comprehensive package of hy- recently the DoS Iraq Transition Assistance Of-
drocarbon laws, addressing the contentious issue fice (ITAO). DoS reports that ITAO’s responsibil-
of revenue sharing between the national govern- ities will be assigned to the Office of Provincial
ment in Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Affairs (OPA) as early as January 2010. The U.S.
Government (KRG). Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) presence in
• Economy. Iraq’s economy remains almost en- Iraq is also downsizing; the Gulf Region Division
tirely dependent on the state-owned oil industry. (GRD) is deactivating, with its division-level re-
Thus, price shocks in the world’s oil market sponsibilities transferring to the Stateside Trans-
ripple through every sector of the economy. One atlantic Division and construction management
of the GOI’s main challenges in 2010 will be to responsibilities staying with the smaller district
reform its legal infrastructure so as to make it command. With $6.31 billion unexpended from

2 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 SIGIR OBSERVATIONS

the four major funds, management of these reviews encompasses much more than Iraq policy,
continuing reconstruction efforts will need to be their respective findings will affect the future of the
carefully considered. U.S. effort.
• Operating in the provinces. Currently, there • Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development
are 23 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) Review (QDDR). On July 10, 2009, the Secretary
in Iraq managed by OPA. Consistent with the of State initiated the first-ever QDDR to assess
President’s plan to reduce U.S. presence, DoS DoS’s diplomatic and development strategies,
will cut the number of PRTs to 16 by August stressing the need for more effective interagency
2010. This reduction will occur against the back- coordination.
drop of continual U.S. troop withdrawals. With • Presidential Study Directive (PSD) on Global
fewer U.S. troops, the remaining PRTs will face Development Policy. In August 2009, the
greater security challenges, forcing them either President signed a Presidential Study Directive
to operate at a reduced tempo or to accept more authorizing the National Security Advisor and
risk when traveling. the Chairman of the National Economic Council
to lead a government-wide review of U.S. global
New Initiatives development policy.
This quarter, the Administration began two new
studies that may further affect the nature of the
transitions in Iraq. Although the scope of these
U.S. Reconstruction
Figure 1.1
Unexpended Funds
Funding and
$ Billions
Total: $6.31
Management
CERP
$0.35
This quarter, U.S. reconstruction efforts continued
IRRF 6%
$1.11 to focus on increasing the capacity of GOI minis-
18% tries. Since 2003, the United States has committed
$52.80 billion to the Iraq reconstruction program.1
55% ISFF Most of this money has been appropriated to four
$3.47
ESF
22% major funds: the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction
$1.38 Fund (IRRF), the Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF),
the Economic Support Fund (ESF), and the Com-
Note: Data not audited. Numbers affected by rounding. Unexpended
mander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP).
funds include expired appropriations. ISFF data provided by OSD is Figure 1.1 details the unexpended U.S. reconstruc-
preliminary for the quarter ending September 30, 2009. OSD does not
report CERP allocation, obligation, and expenditure data for project tion funds dedicated to Iraq.
categories on a quarterly basis for all fiscal year appropriations; CERP
allocation, obligation, and expenditure data is pulled from IRMS for
project category analysis, and therefore top-line totals here may not
match values found in the Funding Uses subsection of this Report. U.S. Concerns about the Commander’s
Embassy-Baghdad did not provide updated allocation, obligation, and
expenditure data for the Democracy and Civil Society, Iraqi Refugees
Emergency Response Program
(Jordan), and Regime Crimes Liaison Office sectors; values for these
sectors are carried over from the previous quarter.
The Congress authorized CERP to allow local
commanders to support small-scale projects that
Sources: NEA-I, response to SIGIR data call, 10/7/2009; DFAS, response to
SIGIR data call, 4/10/2009; DoS, response to SIGIR data call, 4/5/2007; address urgent relief and reconstruction projects in
Treasury, response to SIGIR data call, 4/2/2009; USAID, responses to SIGIR
data call, 4/13/2009 and 10/14/2009; USTDA, response to SIGIR data call, their areas of responsibility. Since 2004, the Con-
4/2/2009; OSD, responses to SIGIR data call, 10/13/2009 and 10/14/2009;
U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, responses to SIGIR data call, 7/6/2009, 7/16/2009, gress has appropriated $3.65 billion to the CERP
and 10/3/2009; USACE, GRD, response to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2009.

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 3

SIGIR OBSERVATIONS

for projects in Iraq; DoD requested an additional

$300 million for FY 2010.
Interagency coordination on CERP improved
this quarter, with MNC-I asking DoS and the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID)
for input as it considers which provincial projects to
fund. Closer coordination between DoD and DoS
could address some of the questions that SIGIR has
identified regarding the appropriate use of CERP.
For example, CERP has financed:
• a Financial Times-affiliated magazine supple-
ment naming Anbar province’s governor as a
“Global Personality of 2009”
• a sports complex in Baghdad costing several
hundred thousand dollars
• a $2.7 million hotel at Baghdad International Aftermath of the August 19, 2009, bombings of the Ministries of Finance and Foreign Affairs. (ATF photo)

Airport

SIGIR has an ongoing audit examining the

$34 million-plus Baghdad Airport Economic Zone.

Security Concerns
Persist
The security situation remains mixed. This August,
at least 456 people were killed in Iraq—the highest
number of deaths from violence in 13 months. But
in September, violent deaths dropped by more than A concrete blast barrier, known as a “t-wall,” being emplaced in
Baghdad. (MNF-I photo)
half. October brought mass-casualty bombings
to two provinces that had been relatively peaceful In the wake of these attacks, Iraq and Syria recalled
during 2008 and 2009: Kerbala and Anbar. their ambassadors, and Iraq’s Prime Minister pub-
licly blamed Syria for harboring the perpetrators
Bombing of Ministries of Finance of these bombings. These attacks also led the GOI
and Foreign Affairs to backpedal from previously announced plans to
On August 19, 2009—the sixth anniversary of remove the ubiquitous concrete security barriers
the bombing that destroyed United Nations (UN) (“t-walls”) that have become a defining feature of
headquarters in Baghdad—a series of coordinated Baghdad street life.
attacks severely damaged the Ministries of Finance
and Foreign Affairs. These bombings killed at least Violence Trending Down Overall
75 Iraqis and injured more than 750, including Notwithstanding the recent bombings, overall
highly skilled professionals from both ministries. attacks have decreased 85% during the past 2 years,

4 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 SIGIR OBSERVATIONS

Figure 1.2
Significant Security Incidents, 7/1/2009−10/20/2009 Internal Divisions Persist
In recent congressional testimony, MNF-I Com-
July 2009 manding General Raymond Odierno noted that
4 35 11 3 Tuesday, July 8: At least 31 Iraqis killed or wounded in two bombings in Mosul. violent groups continue to try to exploit Iraq’s
Wednesday, July 9: Approximately 52 Iraqis killed or wounded in a series of
25 15 3 40 52 0 6
terrorist attacks in Tel Afar, Mosul, Baghdad, and Kirkuk. internal political tensions, especially in the
35 11 1 55 21 0 5 Tuesday, July 21: At least 15 Iraqis killed and approximately 100 wounded in a northern regions. In an effort to ameliorate these
0 10 115 42 0 0 38 series of attacks in Baghdad.
9 8 209 2 10 92 Friday, July 31: 92 Iraqis were killed and at least 60 were wounded in a series of tensions, MNF-I announced that it is discussing
bombings in Baghdad.
with the GOI and KRG the possibility of tem-
porarily deploying U.S. forces to northern Iraq.
August 2009
Friday, August 7: 48 Iraqis killed and 90 wounded in a series of attacks in Mosul
These troops would operate alongside the ISF
3
26 6 0 7 5 138 2
and Baghdad. and the Kurdish Peshmerga in the disputed ter-
Thursday, August 13: 20 Iraqis killed and 35 wounded in a series of suicide
7 32 31 13 55 4 0 bombings in Sinjar. ritories along the internal Iraq-KRG boundary..4
3 11 3 825 79 22 3 Wednesday, August 19: Multiple bombings partially destroy Iraq's Ministries of According to MNF-I, joint patrols would begin
Finance and Foreign Affairs, killing over 100 people and injuring hundreds more.
2 36 5 9 23 0 52
Thursday, August 20: 6 Iraqis killed and 73 wounded in bombings in Babylon in Ninewa province and then expand to areas
0 0 and Baghdad.
around the city of Kirkuk.
Along with Baghdad, the greater Mosul area
September 2009 in Ninewa province remains the primary site of
0 1 14 73 8 Friday, September 4: 8 Iraqis killed and 65 wounded during a series of continuing violence in Iraq. On October 16, 2009,
bombings near a shrine in Babylon.
12 37 4 6 26+ 46 18
a suicide bomber detonated himself inside a Sunni
Monday, September 7: 8 Iraqis killed and 18 wounded in suicide bombings in
8 33 4 22 18 28 1 Ramadi, Baghdad, and Mosul.
Friday, September 11: 1 prisoner was killed and 40 were wounded during a riot
mosque northwest of Mosul, killing at least 14
5 0 3 12 3 15 3
at Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad. and injuring more than 80. Figure 1.3 displays the
4 9 1 19
Tuesday, September 22: Attacks during the Eid were down this year, with one
attack in Babylon resulting in 3 Iraqis killed. approximate location of this quarter’s most serious
security incidents in Baghdad and Mosul.
October 2009
5 0 0 Wednesday, October 7: 9 Iraqis were killed and 30 wounded during a suicide
13 32 0 41 0 0 0
attack in Falluja. Evolution of U.S. Military Presence
Wednesday, October 14: 9 Iraqis killed and 56 wounded during armed attacks
16 0 22 65 0 94 7 in Baghdad and bombings in Kerbala. This quarter, U.S. troop redeployments continued
2 0 31 Friday, October 16: 14 Iraqis killed and 80 wounded during an attack on a
mosque in Tal Afar.
pursuant to the schedule articulated by the Presi-
Tuesday, October 20: 13 Iraqis killed and 18 wounded during a series of attacks dent in February 2009. However, the Secretary of
throughout Iraq.
Defense stated that this schedule could be accel-
> 60 Casualties 40-60 Casualties 20-40 Casualties 0-20 Casualties erated if conditions on the ground remain rela-
tively stable. As of late September 2009, the United
Note: The numbers represented in the calendar graphic are comprehensive estimates of total Iraqi casualties
throughout the entire country on that particular day. The text to the right briefly describes significant attacks on States had 11 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) in Iraq
select days and does not purport to comprehensively detail all security incidents that occurred on the specified day.
(about 124,000 troops)—down from 14 BCTs (more
Sources: Information presented herein is based on SIGIR's analysis of open source and official English and Arabic
documents, studies, and analyses. All figures based on best available casualty information and represent the sum than 143,500 troops) in January 2009.
of killed and wounded for each incident.
By August 31, 2010, approximately 50,000 U.S.
forces will remain in Iraq—a nearly 60% decrease
from 4,064 in August 2007 to 594 in August 2009.2 from current force levels. This transition force
Further, there were only 19 ethnosectarian attacks will be centered on six Advise and Assist Brigades
this Ramadan, down a remarkable 98% from (AABs) and three division headquarters. AABs are
Ramadan 2006.3 Figure 1.2 charts the approximate structured specifically for training the ISF, working
number of Iraqi casualties by day from July 1, 2009, closely with the PRTs to provide an added element
to October 20, 2009, noting some of the most sig- of security for civilian reconstruction personnel
nificant security incidents that occurred over this operating in Iraq. The 50,000-person training and
112-day span.

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 5

SIGIR OBSERVATIONS

advisory contingent is scheduled to withdraw by repeatedly declared its intention to help integrate
the end of 2011. SOI members, including hiring approximately
19,000 into the ISF, with the remainder being pen-
ISF Manages Security sioned off, hired by other government ministries,
Iraqi forces are responsible for security operations or placed in positions in the private sector.
across the country. As of October 1, 2009, the ISF In May 2009, the GOI assumed full responsibil-
numbers approximately 663,000 personnel, includ- ity for the payment and management of all 95,000
ing 245,000 soldiers and more than 400,000 police.5 SOI. Despite some delays, the GOI reported to
In July and August, the ISF successfully managed MNF-I that all SOI personnel are being paid.6
security for two mass Shia pilgrimages. However, MNF-I reports, however, that the ISF has absorbed
Iraq’s Army and police forces continue to rely on into its ranks only about half of the planned 19,000,
U.S. forces for support in training, logistics, air while an additional 15,600 have found other
operations, and intelligence. employment, leaving more than 70,000 Sunnis un-
certain about their future employment in a country
Update on the Sons of Iraq where the overall unemployment rate is estimated
The Sons of Iraq (SOI) program began in 2007 to be at least 30%.7
as a U.S.-funded initiative to employ former To address this potential problem, U.S. forces
Sunni insurgents as security guards. The GOI has stationed near the restive city of Kirkuk initiated a

Figure 1.3
Baghdad and Greater Mosul: Selected Security Incidents, 7/1/2009–10/15/2009

Represents the
approximate
locations where
at least five
multiple-fatality
incidents occurred.

Baghdad Mosul

Sources: Information presented herein is based on SIGIR's analysis of open source and official English and Arabic documents, studies, maps, and
satellite imagery.

6 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 SIGIR OBSERVATIONS

new program this summer aimed at hiring former

SOI leaders as “employment assistance managers”
(EAMs). These EAMs will be charged with assisting
ex-SOI members in obtaining full-time employ-
ment with either the GOI or with local businesses.

NATO Extends Its Training Mission

On July 26, 2009, Iraq’s Minister of Defense and
the Deputy Secretary General of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization signed an agreement that will
provide the legal basis for NATO to continue train-
ing and mentoring the ISF. NATO Training Mis-
sion-Iraq (NTM-I) was established in November GOI and NATO officials agree to extend NATO’s training mission
in Iraq. (NATO photo)
2004 and has maintained a continuous presence in
Iraq. NTM-I’s training programs emphasize police
tactics, border security, and institutional reform. of the ruling KDP-Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
Currently, NTM-I comprises about 210 personnel (PUK) coalition’s majority. The Kurdistani List—
from 12 NATO countries. the formal name for the KDP-PUK alliance—cap-
tured 57% of the vote and 59 seats, down from
100 seats. The Change List party, led by a former
high-ranking PUK official, won 24% of the vote
Governance: Elections and 25 parliamentary seats. Another opposition
grouping, the Reform and Services List, won 12%
in the Kurdistan Region of the vote and 13 seats. Under the Kurdistan
Region’s constitution, the remaining 11 seats were
On July 25, 2009, voters in the semi-autonomous allocated among ethnic and religious minori-
Kurdistan Region (Erbil, Dahuk, and Sulaymaniyah ties—6 for Christians and 5 for Turkomen. Figure
provinces) elected a new president and parliament. 1.4 compares the 2005 KRG parliamentary election
The elections were the second ever held in the Kurd- results to the 2009 outcomes.9
istan Region. Turnout was high: about 78% of the
2.5 million eligible voters cast ballots at more than The Kurdistan Regional Government
5,400 polling stations.8 All 111 seats in the Iraqi Selects a New Prime Minister
Kurdistan Parliament were at stake. Approximately On September 16, 2009, the Kurdistan Parliament
350 foreign election monitors and more than 7,000 chose the PUK’s Barham Saleh as the KRG’s new
local observers oversaw the elections. prime minister. Saleh, the former GOI Deputy
Prime Minister, won the support of 73 parliamen-
Presidential and Parliamentary Results tarians. In early October, Saleh began forming a
In the presidential elections, the status quo pre- new Kurdish government.
vailed as voters elected incumbent president
Masoud Barzani of the Kurdistan Democratic Party Referendum on New Constitution
(KDP) to another term in office. Barzani garnered for the Kurdistan Region
about 70% of the vote against four other candidates. In June 2009, the Kurdistan Parliament
Opposition parties fared better in the parlia- approved for referendum a new constitution
mentary elections, dramatically reducing the size that would claim Kirkuk as a geographic part

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 7

SIGIR OBSERVATIONS

Figure 1.4
KRG/Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament Election Results, 2005 vs. 2009

KDP-PUK Coalition KDP-PUK Coalition

(and its allies) (and its allies) Change
100 seats 59 seats List
25 seats

Reform and
Services List
13 seats

Christians
6 seats
Others Turkomen
11 seats 5 seats
Others
3 seats
2005 2009
Source: GOI, www.ihec.iq, “KRG FInal Election Results 2005,” “KRG FInal Election Results 2009,” accessed 10/14/2009.

of the Kurdistan Region. The draft constitution

would also augment the powers of the Kurdistan
Region’s president.
In July 2009, Iraq’s Independent High Electoral
Commission (IHEC) postponed a referendum on
this constitution it may be conducted in January 2010.

Governance:
Parliamentary Elections
Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament building. (KRG photo)
Since the Coalition deposed the former regime in
spring 2003, Iraq has had two national elections
(both in 2005) and two provincial elections (in transparent open-list system. The Grand Ayatol-
2005 and 2009). These elections have widely been lah Ali al-Sistani has advocated the adoption of an
regarded as some of the freest and best managed in open-list system.10
the Middle East. The parliamentary elections will see candidates
from 296 political entities vying for all 275 seats in
CoR Considers Changes to Elections Law the CoR.11 Figure 1.5 shows the distribution of seats
As of October 24, 2009, the CoR had not finalized in the CoR after the December 2005 parliamentary
the law that would govern the national parlia- election—a distribution that may be profoundly
mentary elections scheduled for January 16, 2010. altered after the next elections.
The CoR is considering whether to use the 2005
closed-list procedures, wherein voters selected a
party and not an individual, or switch to a more

8 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 SIGIR OBSERVATIONS

Governing Coalition Fractures On October 1, 2009, the Prime Minister trans-

in Run-up to National Elections formed the State of Law Coalition into a trans-sec-
The Shia-led coalition formerly known as United tarian alliance comprising elements of his Da’awa
Iraqi Alliance (UIA) currently controls the CoR. party, other Shia factions, several Sunni parties,
In April 2006, the UIA selected Nouri al-Maliki as some independents, and the Shia Felyi Kurds,
Prime Minister. This quarter, however, the current among others. Notably, the Prime Minister has
governing coalition declined to promise al-Maliki been unable to entice two influential Sunnis into
reappointment as Prime Minister if it wins control running with him: Sheik Abu Risha (one of the
of the CoR next January. Instead, Prime Minister leaders of the Anbar Awakening) and former CoR
al-Maliki’s former UIA allies formed the Iraqi Speaker Mahmoud al-Mashhadani.
National Alliance (INA) without him.
As currently structured, the INA includes many Kurdish Parties Will Participate
of the leading Shia parties, including the Supreme The KDP-PUK alliance will run a slate of can-
Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), the Sadrist Trend, didates in the parliamentary elections. In an
and some allies of former Prime Minister Ibrahim attempt to build on its strong performance in
al-Ja’afari. SIIC, the largest member of this bloc, is July’s regional elections, the Change List also has
itself in transition after the death of its longtime announced that it intends to field candidates for
leader Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim on August 26, 2009. national office next year.
Shortly after Hakim’s death, his 38-year-old son
became the leader of the SIIC. Formation of Iraq’s Unity Alliance
On October 21, Minister of the Interior Jawad al-
The State of Law Coalition Reorganizes Bolani joined forces with Sheik Abu Risha to form
In the January 2009 provincial elections, the Prime Iraq’s Unity Alliance, a new political coalition that
Minister’s State of Law Coalition won majorities will contest January’s scheduled parliamentary
or pluralities on the provincial councils in 6 of the elections. Al-Bolani was formerly affiliated with the
14 contested provinces. The State of Law Coalition United Iraqi Alliance.
was a largely Shia movement, although its rhetoric
was decidedly nationalistic in tone. Governance Gap Redux?
Iraq’s upcoming parliamentary elections will
Figure 1.5 change the current distribution of power in the
Council of Representatives: 2005 Elections CoR. But January’s elections will not produce in-
stantaneous changes: a government must be formed
s
53 sealiat nce of Kurdista thereafter. A prolonged interregnum could occur.
tic Al n
atrio
ocr
atic P
Precedent for such delay exists. On December 15,
D em
2005, Iraq held its first-ever free parliamentary elec-
t
tions, but Nouri al-Maliki was not named Prime
Un
n
Fro
rd s

ite
12 Iraq
cco at

d
i A se

8s iA
Iraq 44

ea llia

Minister until April 22, 2006. Moreover, another

ts nce

month passed until the new Prime Minister named

List

his cabinet ministers in May 2006, effectively para-

25 seats
ational

lyzing the upper echelons of the Iraqi government

25 seatrsties Iraqi N

during the peak of the insurgency. Figure 1.6 charts

the course of Iraq’s democratic evolution.
Pa
Other

Source: GOI, www.ihec.iq, “Final Report of the December 15, 2005, Iraq
Council of Representatives Elections,” accessed 10/14/2009.

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 9

SIGIR OBSERVATIONS

Figure 1.6
Iraqi Elections, 2005–2010
January 30 October 15
Elections for National
(1) an interim referendum July 25
assembly to draft approves new KRG 201?
a constitution constitution parliamentary Referendum on new
and (2) provincial & presidential POTENTIAL constitution for
councils GOVERNANCE elections GOVERNANCE Kurdistan Region
GAP GAP
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

December 15 April 22 January 31 January ???? 201?

First-ever free Nouri al-Maliki Provincial National parliamentary New Parliament Provincial elections
parliamentary named Prime elections in 14 elections names Prime in Tameem and the
elections Minister of 18 provinces (scheduled) Minister 3 majority Kurdish
provinces

Note: All events scheduled to occur after October 31, 2009, are subject to postponement. Their placement on the timeline is only an estimate of when they may take place.

Source: SIGIR, Quarterly Reports to the United States Congress, 1/2006, 7/2006, and 4/2009.

Referendum on Security Agreement disbanded in 1987. Under the provisions of this

In the delicate negotiations leading up to the bill, INOC would report to the CoM—not to the
CoR’s endorsement of the SA, its backers agreed to Ministry of Oil. No action is expected on this
conduct a national referendum submitting the SA proposal until the new CoR is seated in 2010.13
to the Iraqi electorate for approval. The vote was • According to DoS, the CoM approved draft
originally scheduled to be held by mid-2009, but legislation prohibiting senior GOI officials from
the date was pushed back to January 2010 and may holding dual citizenship. If approved, the bill
be postponed again. would affect more than half of Iraq’s cabinet
The referendum’s potential consequences are ministers. Here again, no action is expected on
profound. If Iraq’s voters decline to endorse the this proposal until next year at the earliest.
SA, U.S. forces could be compelled to significantly
accelerate their withdrawal. This quarter, the U.S.
general in charge of redeploying U.S. forces from
Iraq cautioned that an accelerated withdrawal Economy
would require a focus on the logistical challenges of
such a mission at the expense of other tasks, such Oil exports provide the vast majority of the GOI’s
as training the ISF. revenue, making the size of Iraq’s assets—and,
hence, its ability to deliver services—largely depen-
Council of Representatives Activity dent on the global oil market.
The CoR’s Ramadan break limited the number of
sessions it could hold this quarter. It did not pass The Government of Iraq’s 2009
any significant new laws, but there were some legis- Proposed Supplemental Budget
lative developments:12 This quarter, the CoR debated a supplemental
• The chairman of the CoR’s Hydrocarbons Com- budget bill of about $5 billion that would increase
mittee announced that the Parliament will not the overall size of the GOI’s 2009 budget to $63.6 bil-
consider the long-delayed package of hydrocar- lion.14 This proposal was submitted because oil prices
bon laws before next year’s elections. had risen and remained above the $50 price per bar-
• The Council of Ministers (CoM) submitted rel on which the 2009 budget was initially based. In
to the CoR a draft law re-establishing the Iraq mid-October, prices hovered around $75 per barrel.
National Oil Company (INOC), which was

10 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 SIGIR OBSERVATIONS

Figure 1.7 Figure 1.7 shows the relationship between the

Weekly Oil Price, GOI Budget, and Oil Price Assumptions, price of oil and the size of the GOI’s budget be-
2006–2010 tween 2006 and 2010.
If a budget for 2010 is not approved by January
$160 $80 1, 2010—as was the case in 2009—the Ministry of
$140 $70 Finance is authorized to approve one-twelfth of the
funds from the previous year to fund government
$120 $60
operations for the month of January.19

GOI Budget ($ Billions)

Oil Price ($ USD)

$100 $50
Weekly
Oil Price
$80 $40
Oil price
assumption:
$60 $91/ bbl

Oil price
assumption:
$30
Energy Developments
$40 $60/ bbl $20

$20 Oil price Oil price $10

Oil: Output Up
assumption: assumption:
$50/ bbl $50/ bbl Th is quarter, crude oil production averaged
$0 $0
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2.49 MBPD, up 3% from last quarter’s average and
GOI Budget slightly above the previous post-invasion high.20
However, production has yet to reach the 2009 tar-
Note: Oil prices reflect the average weekly price of Kirkuk crude oil. The Iraqi Council of Ministers approved the
2010 budget on 10/13/2009, and it must now be reviewed and approved by the Council of Representatives. get of 2.01 MBPD. From July to September, exports
Sources: U.S. Energy Information Administration, "World Crude Oil Prices: OPEC Average," 9/30/2009, averaged 1.97 MBPD, up 7% from last quarter.21
http://www.eia.doe.gov, accessed 10/5/2009; “GOI Budget” (as approved by TNA and written into last December
2005); U.S. Treasury, responses to SIGIR data call, 1/4/2008 and 4/9/2009; GOI, Cabinet of Ministers, Legal uncertainty caused by the failure of the
http://www.cabinet.iq, accessed 10/14/2009.
GOI and KRG to reach an accord on revenue shar-
ing deterred many of the more risk-averse multina-
First Draft of Iraq’s 2010 Budget tionals from investing in Iraq’s oil industries. One
On October 13, 2009, the CoM submitted its draft consequence of the ongoing dispute between the
budget for 2010 to the CoR. This $66.7 billion KRG and the GOI is that the three international
proposal is 14% more than the 2009 budget of companies operating in the Tawke and Taq Taq oil
$58.6 billion.15 Two crucial assumptions underlie fields have yet to be paid for their services.22
the financial projections made in this draft: On October 9, 2009, the KRG’s Minister of
• Price. The draft 2010 budget is based on the as- Natural Resources announced that oil exports
sumption that oil prices will average $60 per bar- from the Kurdistan Region would be halted until
rel next year.16 This is 20% higher than the export Baghdad honors the contracts signed between the
price of $50 per barrel assumed for 2009. This KRG and the international oil companies operating
quarter, the average price per barrel of Kirkuk there.23 Baghdad regards the pacts as illegal and the
crude oil on the global market was $68.54.17 KRG contends that it cannot afford to pay the firms
• Export levels. The draft budget also assumes ex- for their services.
port levels of 2.15 million barrels per day (MBPD)
for 2010. This is an increase of 7.5% over the Oil: Auctioning Production Rights
2009 target of 2 MBPD. Iraq, however, averaged To Entice Foreign Investment
exports of 1.85 MBPD between October 1, 2008, On June 30, 2009, Iraq auctioned production rights
and October 1, 2009—or 8% less than its desired for 6 oil and gas fields in a bidding process open to
target for 2009 and 16.2% under the 2010 goal.18 foreign companies for the first time in more than
30 years. More than 20 international firms partici-
pated in the June round of bidding, but the only

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 11

SIGIR OBSERVATIONS

development agreement awarded went to a joint pay General Electric for $2.4 billion in electri-
venture between British Petroleum (BP) and the cal infrastructure equipment because the CoR
China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) declined to approve the bond sale that would have
for the Rumaila oil field in southern Iraq. In financed the deal. Subsequently, the Central Bank
mid-October, the CoM reportedly approved final of Iraq allowed the Ministry of Finance to borrow
contract terms with the BP-CNPC consortium.24 funds from Iraq’s banks to fund the purchase of
In late 2009 or early 2010, Iraq intends to this equipment, which is scheduled to be installed
conduct a second round of bidding covering ten between 2010 and 2012.
additional fields, which are largely undeveloped.
As of September 30, 2009, more than 40 foreign oil
companies had pre-qualified to participate in the
second round of bidding, including at least 7 firms The Water Crisis
from the United States, 5 from Japan, 4 from Rus-
sia, and 4 from the People’s Republic of China.25 Another year of below-average rainfall and reduced
water flows into the Tigris, Euphrates, and other
Oil: Transparency in Managing Revenue rivers have caused sustained drought conditions in
Since 2003, Iraq’s oil revenues have been deposited Iraq. The consequences of this include:
into the Development Fund for Iraq, which is over- • a drop in hydroelectric power generation
seen by the UN-appointed International Advisory • the precipitous decline of Iraq’s once-robust date
and Monitoring Board (IAMB). However, the industry
IAMB’s mandate—along with protections against • increased desertification
the seizure of Iraqi oil from creditors—expires at
the end of 2009, at which time it must be renewed, Iraq does not control the headwaters of the
or it will lapse. Tigris and Euphrates rivers, making regional coop-
In July 2009, the UN Secretary General released eration on water issues a matter of great impor-
a report cautioning that “much remains to be done tance for the GOI. Iraqi officials regularly express
before a fully operational control and measurement concern over Turkey’s refusal to release more water
system over oil production, distribution, and export for use by its downstream neighbors. On Septem-
sales can be comprehensively implemented” in Iraq. ber 3, 2009, GOI representatives met with Turkish
It estimated that the earliest such measures could be and Syrian officials to discuss water issues.28 Later
put in place would be 2011.26

Electricity: Record Set

For the first time since 2003, Iraq’s average elec-
tricity output has surpassed the 6,000 megawatt
(MW) goal set in August 2003. The daily electric-
ity supply—including domestic production and
imports—averaged 6,439 MW this quarter.27
This constitutes almost a 10% increase over last
quarter’s supply figures; however, many Iraqis
report that the national grid remains inadequate,
forcing them to rely on costly private generators.
On August 1, 2009, Prime Minister al-Maliki
announced that the GOI would be unable to U.S. forces attached to an Advise and Assist Brigade patrol the
Euphrates River with the Iraqi police. (MNF-I photo)

12 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 SIGIR OBSERVATIONS

in September, Turkey agreed to release more water Figure 1.8

from the Euphrates River to Iraq, but only on a Convictions for Corruption, by Province,
short-term basis. 1/1/2009–8/3/2009

Anticorruption 14

Board of Supreme Audit 6

The Board of Supreme Audit (BSA) is Iraq’s largest

and oldest anticorruption institution. It is charged 45
with oversight of the GOI’s public expenditures. Al-
though the BSA continues to face myriad obstacles 4
1 6
to fulfilling its mandate of preventing, detecting,
and deterring corruption, it is generally regarded as 1
Iraq’s most competent oversight body. 1
Earlier this year, SIGIR and the BSA agreed to
conduct a joint review of the Iraq-Commander’s 2

Emergency Response Program (I-CERP), under

which MNF-I manages reconstruction projects
funded by the GOI. In July 2009, the BSA issued its Note: Numbers refer to individuals convicted in that province’s courts
from January 1 to August 3, 2009. The COI did not provide data on the
own I-CERP report. It concluded that U.S. data on provinces without a number. This should not be construed as implying
that no corruption convictions occurred in those provinces during the
the I-CERP is incomplete, thereby hindering GOI’s specified timeframe.

oversight of the U.S.-managed program. SIGIR’s Source: GOI, Commison on Integrity, “Statistical Report for Baghdad and
the Provinces,” 8/3/2009.
review of I-CERP found that MNF-I has generally
managed the I-CERP program in accordance with
the terms of its agreement with the GOI. Neverthe- In August, the Inspector General met with the
less, SIGIR determined that MNF-I could improve COI Commissioner to work on better collaboration.
the thoroughness of the quarterly reports it is pro- After this meeting, the COI provided SIGIR with
viding to the GOI. For more details on this report, information about recent enforcement activities. Ac-
see SIGIR Audits in Section 4. cording to COI records on individuals convicted for
corruption-related offenses between January 1, 2009,
Commission on Integrity and August 3, 2009:29
Iraq’s Commission on Integrity (COI) has three • 5% of those convicted were found guilty of
primary missions: increasing governmental receiving bribes.
transparency, investigating allegations of corrup- • 12% of the convictions were for embezzlement.
tion against GOI officials, and educating the Iraqi • The amount of the corruption could not be
public about the dangers of public corruption. But valued in 79% of the cases.
the GOI’s anticorruption institutions and judiciary • In the 14 cases where COI could estimate it, the
continue to face difficulties in establishing robust value of the corruption was about $136,000.
enforcement capacities, especially outside of Bagh- • 42% of those convicted were absent from their
dad. Figure 1.8 summarizes the number of persons sentencing hearing.
convicted on corruption charges in 9 of Iraq’s 18 • 12 worked for the Ministry of Defense, 9 for the
provinces from January to early August 2009. Ministry of Finance, 7 for the Ministry of the

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 13

SIGIR OBSERVATIONS

Interior, and 1 each from the Ministries of Oil, this mandate, MNF-I has been regularly transfer-
Transportation, Labor, Justice, Electricity, and ring detainees to Iraqi custody or releasing them.
Displacement and Migration. Since January, more than 5,200 detainees have
• Of the convictions, 42% were for crimes involv- been released, and more than 1,100 others have
ing the use of fake documents or credentials been transferred to the GOI. As of late Septem-
(usually diplomas). ber, the number of Iraqi citizens in U.S. custody
numbered 8,305.32
Corruption within the Government of Iraq On September 17, 2009, MNF-I closed Camp
This quarter, the GOI made some progress in in- Bucca, the isolated desert prison that once housed
vestigating allegations of corruption at the highest more than 23,000 detainees. All remaining prison-
levels of the Iraqi government. ers were transferred to either Camp Cropper or
• In September, a COI operation led to the arrest Camp Taji, the only two remaining U.S.-adminis-
of Iraq’s Deputy Minister of Transportation for tered detention facilities. Camps Cropper and Taji
corruption. He was allegedly videotaped accept- are scheduled to close down in 2010.
ing a bribe of about $100,000 from a company The imminent closure of all U.S.-administered
seeking to do business with the GOI.30 prisons highlights the importance of the GOI’s
• Trial preparations continued in the corruption ongoing efforts to develop corrections facilities
case of the former Minister of Trade who was and trained personnel capable of running modern
arrested last quarter as he tried to fly to Dubai. penal institutions. This quarter, SIGIR issued an
The former Minister is accused of stealing state inspections report assessing the $29 million, U.S.-
funds and mismanaging Iraq’s food-distribu- funded Chamchamal Correctional Facility in the
tion system.31 Kurdistan Region finding that it was well con-
• The CoR resumed questioning GOI ministers structed. As of October 14, 2009, DoS reports that
on matters involving corruption and ineffective Chamchamal houses more than 2,600 inmates, but
management of their departments. Most recent- is still not linked to the national electricity grid.
ly, the CoR questioned the Minister of Electricity
about Iraq’s persistent power shortages.

International
Rule of Law Developments
Thirty-eight judges have been killed in Iraq since This quarter, the newly appointed Special Repre-
2003. Although no judges were killed this quarter, sentative of the UN Secretary-General Ad Melk-
in September an improvised explosive device went ert arrived in Baghdad, and the mandate of the
off in front of the house of a criminal court judge in UN Assistance Mission in Iraq was renewed for
Ninewa province, underscoring the dangers faced another year.
daily by Iraq’s jurists.
International Monetary Fund
Detainees According to DoS, the International Monetary
Under the terms of the Security Agreement, all Fund (IMF) agreed to provide Iraq with $1.8 billion
Iraqi detainees held by the U.S. military must be in assistance funds in late September. A spokesman
released if the GOI has not issued an arrest war- for the Central Bank of Iraq stated that these funds
rant or detention order for them. To comply with would be used to finance infrastructure projects.33

14 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 SIGIR OBSERVATIONS

Iraq also continued to negotiate with the IMF

for a $5.4 billion stand-by arrangement. In early
October 2009, the GOI and IMF held inconclusive
negotiations on the terms of this loan agreement.

SIGIR Oversight
Audits
SIGIR’s Audit Directorate issued six reports this A SIGIR audit identified more than $4 million in potential over-
billings by a government contractor. For example, the contractor
quarter. Since 2004, SIGIR has issued 155 audit charged $196.50 for a package of washers; the price should
have been $1.22.
reports. SIGIR’s audits this quarter reviewed the
following:
• USACE accounting for the DFI funds it • More than $1.1 billion spent under two
received. SIGIR identified a number of policy contracts to the Environmental Chemical
issues related to the management of DFI funds Corporation, primarily for the construction of
that require DoD attention and $14.4 million Iraq security facilities. SIGIR determined that
that may potentially be available for return to the numerous facilities were constructed with these
GOI. Issues that need to be addressed include the funds, but that security concerns and changes
use and disposition of DFI funds that USACE in the nature of the work led to increased costs
and one of its contractors is holding, whether from $655 million to about $1.12 billion.
GOI funds should have been used to pay reim- • DoD’s oversight of invoices for the Global
bursable work order expenses associated with Maintenance and Supply Services (GMASS)
DFI contracts, and how interest that might have contract, which was meant to assist the Iraqi
been earned by several contractors on disallowed Army in improving its logistics capability. As of
payments should be used. September 2009, $683 million had been obligated
• DoD’s management of the Iraq-Commander’s from the ISFF on three task orders issued under
Emergency Response Program (I-CERP). this contract. However, weak invoice-review
MNF-I has generally managed the I-CERP processes and a dearth of experienced personnel
program in accordance with the terms in an left the U.S. government vulnerable to unde-
agreement with the GOI. But although MNF-I tected overcharges. SIGIR’s analysis of selected
is accounting for how the funds are used and dis- GMASS contract invoices showed the contrac-
bursed, it can improve the thoroughness of the tor, AECOM, potentially overbilled or cannot
reports it is providing to the GOI, particularly support about $4.4 million in costs. Specifically,
for those projects valued at $50,000 or more. In SIGIR analyzed purchases of vehicle parts on
these cases, MNF-I provided files on only 206 four invoices totaling $29.9 million and identi-
of the 344 projects, and some of these lacked fied about $4.1 million in potential overbillings.
detailed project information. Moreover, sustain- For example, although the price agreed to in the
ment letters, which MNF-I and the GOI sign contract for a package of 10 washers was $1.22, the
at the start of a project, were missing in 13 files. contractor charged $196.50 for each package. SIGIR
When sustainment letters were included, more also found that the contractor did not provide cost
than 20 lacked a GOI signature, and over 30 support for 31 transactions, resulting in an ad-
lacked a U.S. military signature. ditional $340,000 in questioned costs.

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 15

SIGIR OBSERVATIONS

SIGIR’s enabling legislation requires a forensic their work to unravel the Bloom-Stein conspiracy
audit of all U.S. funding provided for the reconstruc- to defraud the Coalition Provisional Authority of
tion of Iraq, which to date totals about $50 billion several million dollars, which resulted in seven
in program funding. This quarter, SIGIR published convictions or guilty pleas.
the first in a series of reports describing the meth- To date, SIGIR’s investigative work has resulted
odology and preliminary results of SIGIR’s forensic in 24 arrests, 31 indictments, and 24 convictions, as
auditing efforts. The report discusses that SIGIR’s well as more than $49.1 million in fines, forfeitures,
17 audits of major construction contracts involv- and recoveries. Highlights from this quarter’s
ing about $6.4 billion in Iraq reconstruction funds investigative activities included:
identified a number of internal weaknesses, such • On July 28, 2009, Nyree Pettaway pled guilty
as inadequate oversight of contractors and their to conspiring with her uncle, U.S. Army Major
invoices, and excessive changes in numbers of task John C. Cockerham, and others to obstructing
and change orders. Additionally, the report discusses the money-laundering investigation relating to
that SIGIR plans to forensically examine $35.2 bil- Cockerham’s receipt of more than $9 million in
lion in DoD financial transactions under IRRF, ISFF, bribes while he served as a contracting officer in
ESF, and CERP appropriations, and that SIGIR is in Kuwait. Moreover, on September 17, authorities
the process of auditing about 22,000 DoD expendi- searched a safe deposit box leased by Melissa
ture transactions involving about $10.7 billion. To Cockerham, John’s wife, and seized $1.5 million
date, SIGIR has identified a number of anomalous and more than $54,000 in foreign currency.
transactions, such as payments that appear to be du- • On August 5, 2009, William Driver, a New
plicative and payments that appear to be to fictitious Jersey accountant, pled guilty to laundering
addresses and to contractors that were possibly sus- funds stolen from the CPA by his wife, Debra
pended or debarred. SIGIR will continue to provide Harrison, a former U.S. Army lieutenant colonel
reports on its forensic work as appropriate. who served in Hilla.
Finally, SIGIR issued a letter in response to con- • On September 3, 2009, Marine Corps master gun-
cerns raised by the BSA about potential duplicate nery sergeant Luis A. Lopez pled guilty during a
payments paid by the U.S. government to contract- court-martial proceeding to taking $67,000 from
ing companies. SIGIR analyzed reconstruction three contractors while he was stationed in Iraq in
data provided to the BSA and determined that, 2005. Lopez was sentenced to total forfeiture of all
although no duplicate projects or payments were pay and allowances, a $10,000 fine, and 89 days of
identified, the information provided to the GOI confinement. He was also required to return all of
was unclear and gave the appearance of duplicate the money he had received and still possessed.
projects and payments. This reinforces the need to
maintain accurate records on U.S.-funded recon- Currently, SIGIR has 96 open investigations. For
struction initiatives. For more information on these additional details concerning these investigations,
reports, see Section 4. see Section 4.

Investigations Inspections
On October 20, 2009, the Council of the Inspec- In October, SIGIR Inspections received CIGIE’s
tors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) Sentner Award for Dedication and Courage. The
presented its annual Award for Excellence to three award recognized team members who regu-
members of SIGIR’s Investigations Directorate and larly endure significant personal risk traveling
seven of their colleagues from the federal law- throughout Iraq to provide information on relief
enforcement community. The award recognized and reconstruction.

16 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 SIGIR OBSERVATIONS

SIGIR published five inspection reports this the KRG, SIGIR found it to be well constructed
quarter, including assessments of a prison, an despite some minor “childproofing” issues that
orphanage, a slaughterhouse, an ISF command were rectified. At the time of SIGIR’s inspection
facility, and a secure document-storage complex for in July 2009, the center had been operational for
holding court records of war crimes trials. To date, about five months.
SIGIR has produced 159 project assessments. This • Abattoir (Slaughterhouse) in Qaladze (Kurdis-
quarter’s reports included: tan Region). The aim of this ongoing ESF-funded
• Chamchamal Correctional Facility (Kurdistan $1.1 million project was to build a multi-building
Region). The objective of this $29 million INL- slaughterhouse complex that would provide ap-
funded project was to convert an existing fort proximately 120,000 local residents with regular
into a modern correctional facility that could access to meat prepared in the most hygienic
hold 2,000 medium-security and 1,000 high- manner practicable. SIGIR inspectors identified
security inmates. SIGIR inspectors identified two construction issues, which the contractor
some minor construction deficiencies, but the quickly remedied. Moreover, SIGIR found the
construction work was satisfactory. The project contractor’s three-phase quality-control manage-
was transferred to the Iraqi Correctional Service ment program and the U.S. government’s quality
(part of the Ministry of Justice) in March 2009. assurance program to be effective.
However, when SIGIR visited the site in June • Secure Document Storage Facility (Baghdad
2009, the facility had no guards and housed no Province). The objective of this $1.9 million
prisoners because the KRG had not dedicated IRRF-funded project was to provide a secure
adequate budgetary resources to supplying the storage facility for sensitive documents that have
prison both with a steady supply of electricity been, or will be, used by the Iraqi High Tribunal
and a full complement of correctional offi- (IHT) to prosecute alleged war crimes. SIGIR
cers. The prison opened this quarter, and U.S. inspected the site on three separate occasions
Embassy-Baghdad reports that it currently holds (February, March, and September 2009). On
more than 2,600 inmates, but is still not con- SIGIR’s first visits, inspectors noted several con-
nected to the national power grid. struction deficiencies, including problems with
• Al Kasik Location Command (Ninewa Prov- the roof and the ventilation system. By the time
ince). The purpose of this ongoing $6.3 million of SIGIR’s third visit, however, the contractor had
ISFF project is to design and construct a Loca- fixed these problems. The IHT reports that it is
tion Command complex in Al Kasik for the Iraqi pleased with the facility and has stated that it will
Army. SIGIR inspected the site in May 2009 and help them carry out their mission.
found it to be about 56% complete. While on site,
SIGIR observed several construction issues, in- For more on these inspections, see Section 4.
cluding problems with the sewage system and the
foundation. SIGIR raised these issues with GRD
representatives who stated that corrective actions
would be taken. Overall, SIGIR determined the The Human Toll
results to be consistent with the original objectives.
• Orphanage and Senior Citizen Assisted Living In the first full quarter since U.S. forces stopped
Center (Kurdistan Region). The goal of this patrolling Baghdad’s streets on a regular basis, the
$3.7 million ESF-funded orphanage and senior International Zone remained largely quiet despite
assisted living center was to house 345 children the occurrence of several mass-casualty attacks just
and 60 senior citizens. A showcase project for outside its perimeter.

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 17

SIGIR OBSERVATIONS

GOI Issues First Report Iraqi Penal Code with the August 2009 shooting
on War’s Consequences deaths of two other expatriate security contrac-
On October 13, 2009, the GOI released its first tors. If convicted, he could face the death penalty
comprehensive study of the war’s human costs. The or life in prison.
report, issued by Iraq’s Ministry of Human Rights,
studied casualty data from 2004–2008, estimating Journalists
that 85,694 Iraqi citizens were killed during this On October 21, a journalist was killed in Iraq,
time period and another 147,195 injured. Included bringing the total killed this year to four. From
in the report’s death toll were 269 journalists and 2003 through 2008, Iraq was the deadliest country
263 university professors. The report’s conclusions in the world for practicing journalists. But, as of
were based on the number death certificates issued September 30, 2009, Somalia appears on course to
by the Ministry of Health and did not include data claim this dubious distinction: six journalists were
from 2003 because of the difficulty in obtaining confirmed killed there over the first nine months
accurate information about violent deaths that of 2009.37
occurred those initial chaotic months after the
Coalition deposed the former regime.34 Internally Displaced Persons
The International Organization for Migration in
U.S. Civilians Iraq (IOM) issued a series of reports this quarter
The Department of State reported that six U.S. attempting to measure the scope and nature of the
civilians died in Iraq between July 1 and September problem of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in
30, 2009. This tally includes one civilian contractor Iraq. IOM’s findings included:38
who was shot and killed on September 13, alleg- • 45% of IOM-assessed post-February 2006 IDPs
edly by a U.S. soldier on a military base in northern currently reside in Baghdad.
Iraq. At least 294 U.S. civilians have died in Iraq • 58% of IDP families in Diyala are without a
since March 2003.35 source of income.
• Nearly 5,600 families displaced from their
Contractors homes in Anbar after 2006 have returned to
This quarter, the Department of Labor (DoL) the province.
received reports of 47 new deaths for civilian • More than two-thirds of Ninewa’s IDP fami-
contractors working on U.S.-funded projects in lies are members of Iraq’s religious and ethnic
Iraq. DoL also received reports of 519 injuries this minority communities, including Christians,
quarter that caused the injured contractors to miss Turkomen, and Kurds.
at least four days of work. Since 2003, 1,442 death
cases have been reported to DoL.”36 Regardless of their place of origin or current
Until the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement en- domicile, common problems confront all IDPs,
tered into effect on January 1, 2009, CPA Order including the need for employment and perma-
No. 17 afforded blanket immunity from Iraqi nent housing. Although accurate and consistent
law to contractors working in Iraq. The SA lifted estimates of returned IDPs are difficult to obtain,
this immunity in most instances, but no foreign the most recent statistics from the UN High Com-
contractor has been tried in an Iraqi court for a missioner for Refugees showed that of the approxi-
capital crime. This soon may change. A British mately 2.65 million IDPs protected or assisted by
security contractor may be charged under the the UN, only 195,890 had returned home.39 ◆

18 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 IRAQ
RECONSTRUCTION
FUNDING SOURCES
AND USES
Iraq Reconstruction Funding Sources 20

Reconstruction Management in Transition 34

Use of Contract Personnel 40

Iraq Reconstruction Funding Uses 42

Security 44

Infrastructure 56

Governance 73

2
Economy 82
section
IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING SOURCES AND USES

IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING SOURCES

As of September 30, 2009, nearly $141.01 billion Figure 2.1

had been made available for the relief and recon- Funding Sources
$ Billions
struction of Iraq. These funds have come from
three main sources:40 Total: $141.01 Total International
• Iraqi capital budgets and Iraqi funds that were Funding $17.01
Bilateral $10.96
overseen by the Coalition Provisional Authority Total Iraqi Multilateral $6.05
(CPA)—$71.20 billion Funding
$71.20
• International pledges of assistance from non-U.S.
sources—$17.01 billion Capital IRRF
Budgets $20.86
• U.S. appropriations—$52.80 billion $59.13
Total
ISFF U.S. Funding
See Figure 2.1 for an overview of these fund- $18.04 $52.80

ing sources. ESF $4.18

CPA Era CERP $3.65
$12.07 Other $6.07

Note: Data not audited. Numbers affected by rounding. CPA-Era Iraq

Iraqi and International Funding funds include $1.72 billion in vested funds, $0.93 billion in seized funds,
$9.33 billion in DFI, and $0.09 billion in CERP funds provided by the
Central Bank of Iraq. ISFF data provided by OSD is preliminary for the
quarter ending September 30, 2009. OSD does not report CERP allocation,
As of September 30, 2009, Iraq had provided more obligation, and expenditure data for project categories on a quarterly
basis for all fiscal year appropriations; CERP allocation, obligation, and
than $71.20 billion for relief and reconstruction, expenditure data is pulled from IRMS for project category analysis, and
therefore top-line totals here may not match values found in the Funding
including annual capital budgets and Iraqi funding Uses subsection of this Report. U.S. Embassy-Baghdad did not provide
from the CPA era.41 In 2009, the Government of updated allocation, obligation, and expenditure data for the Democracy
and Civil Society, Iraqi Refugees (Jordan), and Regime Crimes Liaison Office
Iraq (GOI) budgeted $58.6 billion for capital and sectors; values for these sectors are carried over from the previous quarter.

operating expenses. A proposed supplemental Sources: DFAS, response to SIGIR data call, 4/10/2009; GOI, “Republic of
Iraq: Budget Revenues and Expenses 2003, July–December,” 2003; GOI,
budget of approximately $5 billion is pending “GOI Budget” (as approved by TNA and written into law December
2005), 2005; GOI, “Presidency of the Iraqi Interim National Assembly: The
before the Council of Representatives (CoR). Iraqi State General Budget for 2005,” 2005; SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the
United States Congress, 4/2009, p. 26; Treasury, responses to SIGIR data
expenditures of the 2009 budget totaled $16.4 bil- call, 1/4/2008, 4/9/2009, and 10/2/2009; P.L. 108–7; P.L. 108–11; P.L. 108–106;
lion through June 2009, of which $1.6 billion was P.L. 108–287; P.L. 109–13; P.L. 109–102; P.L. 109–148; P.L. 109–234; P.L.
109–289; P.L. 110–28; P.L. 110–92; P.L. 110–116; P.L. 110–137; P.L. 110–149;
expended on capital projects.42 P.L. 110–161; P.L. 110–252; P.L. 111–32.

A SIGIR audit released this quarter identified a

number of policy issues related to the management
of DFI funds that require DoD attention. Although has asked DoD to provide guidance to USACE on
the GOI requested that all DFI funds be returned these issues.43 For more information, see Section 4.
to it, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) As of September 30, 2009, international donors
is holding $3.0 million of DFI funds pending had pledged $17.01 billion—$5.26 billion in grants
final close-out of some contracts, and a USACE and $11.75 billion in loans—most of it pledged in
contractor is holding $2.2 million. Also, USACE 2003. These donors have committed $10.64 billion.
used $9.2 million of GOI funds to cover unpaid The biggest change during the quarter was Japan’s
expenses from earlier reimbursable work orders it commitment of an additional $780 million in soft
believes were the responsibility of the GOI. SIGIR loans to projects in Iraq’s western region.44

20 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING SOURCES

Figure 2.2
Status of Major U.S. Funds
$ Billions
Unexpended Funds
$50 Total: $6.31
CERP
Appropriated $46.73 $0.35
Obligated $44.03 ISFF 6%
$40 $3.47 IRRF
Expended $40.41 18% $1.11
55%

$30
22% ESF
$1.38
$20

$10

$0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Fiscal Year
Note: Data not audited. Numbers affected by rounding. Unexpended funds include expired appropriations. ISFF data provided by OSD is preliminary
for the quarter ending September 30, 2009. OSD does not report CERP allocation, obligation, and expenditure data for project categories on a quarterly
basis for all fiscal year appropriations; CERP allocation, obligation, and expenditure data is pulled from IRMS for project category analysis, and therefore
top-line totals here may not match values found in the Funding Uses subsection of this Report. U.S. Embassy-Baghdad did not provide updated
allocation, obligation, and expenditure data for the Democracy and Civil Society, Iraqi Refugees (Jordan), and Regime Crimes Liaison Office sectors;
values for these sectors are carried over from the previous quarter.

Sources: NEA-I, response to SIGIR data call, 10/7/2009; DFAS, response to SIGIR data call, 4/10/2009; DoS, response to SIGIR data call, 4/5/2007; Treasury,
response to SIGIR data call, 4/2/2009; USAID, responses to SIGIR data call, 4/13/2009 and 10/14/2009; USTDA, response to SIGIR data call, 4/2/2009; OSD,
responses to SIGIR data call, 10/13/2009 and 10/14/2009; U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, responses to SIGIR data call, 7/6/2009, 7/16/2009, and 10/3/2009; USACE,
GRD, response to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2009.

U.S. Funding been expended from the four major funds. Nearly
$720 million had expired from the IRRF.
Since 2003, the U.S. Congress has appropriated The Congress also made $6.07 billion available
or otherwise made available $52.80 billion for through several smaller funding streams.45
reconstruction efforts in Iraq, including the build- For a complete accounting of appropriations,
ing of physical infrastructure, the establishment of obligations, and expenditures as of September 30,
political and societal institutions, reconstitution of 2009, see Figure 2.2 and Table 2.1.
security forces, and the purchase of products and As of September 30, 2009, $6.31 billion in U.S.
services for the benefit of the people of Iraq. appropriations from the four major funds remain
As of September 30, 2009, $46.73 billion had unexpended, including an unknown amount of
been made available through four major funds: expired funds. The ISFF has the largest amount of
• Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF)— unexpended appropriations, at $3.47 billion.46 An
$20.86 billion accurate accounting of unexpended funds from the
• Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF)—$18.04 billion smaller funding streams is not possible, because of
• Economic Support Fund (ESF)—$4.18 billion incomplete data.
• Commander’s Emergency Response Program P.L. 108-106, as amended, requires that SIGIR
(CERP)—$3.65 billion prepare a final forensic audit report on all amounts
appropriated or otherwise made available for the
As of September 30, 2009, $44.03 billion (94%) reconstruction of Iraq. This quarter, SIGIR issued
had been obligated, and $40.41 billion (86%) had the first in a new series of reports to meet this

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 21

IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING SOURCES AND USES

Table 2.1
Prior Fiscal Year Appropriations
U.S. Appropriated Funds
$ Millions
P.L. 109-102,
P.L. 108-7, P.L. 108-106, P.L. 109-148, P.L. 109-289,
P.L. 108-11 P.L. 108-287 P.L. 109-13 P.L. 109-234 P.L. 110-28

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007

Major Funds

Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF 2) a 18,389

Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF) 5,490 3,007 5,542

Economic Support Fund (ESF) b 50 1,545 1,478

Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) c 140 718 708 747

Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF 1) 2,475

Subtotal 2,525 18,529 6,208 5,260 7,768

Other Assistance Programs

Natural Resources Risk Remediation Fund (NRRRF) d 801

Iraq Freedom Fund (Other Reconstruction Activities) e 700

Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) 37 45

International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) 20 91 150

P.L. 480 Title II Food Aid 311 3

Democracy Fund (Democracy) 250

International Disaster Assistance (IDA) 144 8

Iraq Freedom Fund (TF-BSO) 50

Child Survival and Health Programs Fund (CSH) 90

Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) f 7

International Disaster and Famine Assistance (IDFA) 45

Voluntary Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) 50

Alhurra-Iraq Broadcasting 40

Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) 17

Education and Cultural Exchange Programs (ECA) 6

International Affairs Technical Assistance (OTA) 13 3

International Military Education and Training (IMET) 1 1

U.S. Marshals Service (Litigation Support Services) 1

Department of Justice (DoJ) 2

Subtotal 2,153 57 4 119 553

Reconstruction-related Operating Expenses

Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) g 833

Project and Contracting Office (PCO) h 200 630

USAID Operating Expenses (USAID OE) 21 24 79

Iraq Freedom Fund (PRT Administrative Costs) 100

U.S. Contributions to International Organizations (IO Contributions)

Subtotal 21 833 24 279 730

Reconstruction Oversight

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) 75 24 35

DoD Office of the Inspector General (DoD OIG) 5

USAID Office of the Inspector General (USAID OIG) 4 2 3 1

Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) 16

DoS Office of the Inspector General (DoS OIG) 1 2

Subtotal 4 77 3 30 53

Total 4,702 19,496 6,239 5,688 9,104

a $18.389 billion represents the amount appropriated by the Congress for Iraq programs in IRRF 2 under P.L. 108-106, in November 2003. The Congress had initially appropriated $18.649 billion to IRRF 2, but also earmarked
$210 million be transferred to other accounts for programs in Jordan, Liberia, and Sudan. Of the remaining $18.439 billion, the Administration transferred out of the IRRF to other accounts roughly $562 million for
Iraq-related programs that could be implemented only in other accounts, such as $352 million Iraq bilateral debt forgiveness program to the United States that required funding in a Treasury account. The Congress was
notified of all transfers out of the IRRF. In addition, Congress earmarked that $9.95 million of FY 2006 appropriations be transferred into the IRRF from the DoS ESF. This total also reflects a $50 recission in P.L. 110-252.
b FY 2003 reflects $40 million from the ESF base account that was not reimbursed and $10 million from P.L. 108-11.
c Funds appropriated to the CERP are for Iraq and Afghanistan. SIGIR reports DoD’s allocation to the CERP for Iraq.
d Includes funds transferred from the Iraq Freedom Fund (IFF).
e Includes funds appropriated to the Iraq Freedom Fund by P.L. 108-11, Title I, and transferred to reconstruction activities, with the exception of funds transferred to NRRRF, which are recorded under that fund.

22 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING SOURCES

FY 2008 FY 2009

P.L. 110-92,
P.L. 110-116,
P.L. 110-137,
P.L. 110-149 P.L. 110-161 P.L. 110-252 P.L. 111-32 Status of Funds

12/21/2007 12/26/2007 06/30/2008 06/24/2009 Total Appropriated Obligated Expended Expired

Major Funds

IRRF 2 18,389 18,013 17,507 506

ISFF 1,500 1,500 1,000 18,039 16,672 14,569

ESF 123 15 527 439 4,177 3,602 2,796

CERP 339 994 3,646 3,478 3,292

IRRF 1 2,475 2,261 2,249 214

Subtotal 123 1,854 3,020 1,439 46,726 44,026 40,413 720

Other Assistance

NRRRF 801 801 801

IFF (Other) 700 680 654

MRA 20 149 269 520 455 372

INCLE 20 85 20 386 346 144

P.L. 480 Title II 24 338

Democracy 75 325 315 124

IDA 50 45 247 82 35

IFF (TF-BSO) 53 100

CSH 90

NADR 12 16 5 20 60 32 27

IDFA 5 50

PKO 50

Alhurra 40

OHDACA 17

ECA 5 6 16

OTA 16 16 14

IMET 1 2 2 8 4 3

U.S. Marshals 2 3

DoJ 2

Subtotal 64 247 533 42 3,771 2,731 2,174

Operating Expenses

CPA 833 832 799

PCO 830

USAID OE 21 77 222

IFF (PRT) 100

IO Contributions 68 68

Subtotal 21 145 2,053 832 799

Oversight

SIGIR 39 7 180 164 148

DoD OIG 21 26

USAID OIG 3 3 4 18

DCAA 16

DoS OIG 1 1 8 13

Subtotal 4 25 51 7 253 164 148

Total 191 2,147 3,749 1,488 52,803 47,753 43,534 732

f The $20 million reported for FY 2009 was appropriated by P.L. 111-8.
g Excludes $75 million for SIGIR under P.L. 108-106.
h Per conference reports for P.L. 109-234 and P.L. 110-28, reconstruction support funding is provided for Project and Contracting Office (PCO) activites.

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 23

IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING SOURCES AND USES

mandate. The report notes that SIGIR has reviewed SIGIR estimates that the major U.S. reconstruc-
17 major reconstruction contracts to identify tion funds will be depleted at some point during
internal control weaknesses related to the use of FY 2012–FY 2014, given the current rate of obliga-
$6.4 billion. These weaknesses in contract manage- tion and expenditure. Figure 2.3 shows three
ment make programs vulnerable to fraud, waste, projections, based on the following scenarios:53
and abuse. • passage of the Senate Appropriations Com-
SIGIR is currently forensically examining mittee’s recommendation of $200 million for
$35.2 billion in financial transactions related to CERP and $375 for ESF in the regular FY 2010
DoD expenditures under the IRRF, ISFF, ESF, and appropriation
CERP. SIGIR is using data-mining techniques to • passage of the regular FY 2010 appropriation and
examine tens of thousands of financial transac- an additional $1.0 billion in supplemental funds
tions to identify unusual or suspect transactions for FY 2010
that may indicate fraud, waste, or abuse in the • passage of the regular FY 2010 appropriation, the
award or administration of contracts. Detailed in- supplemental, and an additional $1.5 billion in
vestigations and examinations of relevant contract appropriations through FY 2012
files will be prioritized based on risk factors such
as the amount of the transaction, the likelihood of The projections depend on factors that are diffi-
fraud, and a prior history of questionable behavior. cult to estimate, including the timing and amount
The forensic audit project is expected to lead of future appropriations. It should be noted that
to administrative action to recover costs and Figure 2.3 does not include the smaller funding
civil or criminal fraud prosecutions. Moreover, streams, which may become more significant as
the project has helped to provide additional the Iraq reconstruction effort transitions to a more
information for ongoing investigations.47 normal economic and security assistance mission.

Table 2.2
U.S. Appropriations Remaining FY 2010 Appropriations Request and Recommendations
for Iraq Reconstruction $ Millions

House Senate
Fund Request Report/Bill Report/Bill
The provision of U.S. reconstruction funding to
Defense ISFF 0 0 0
Iraq has appropriately declined from its high point
CERP a 300.0 * 200.0
in FY 2004, when $19.50 billion was appropriated.48
Foreign Operations ESF 415.7 400.0 375.0
In FY 2009, $1.44 billion in new reconstruction
INCLE 52.0 52.0 52.0
funding was appropriated.49 Funds available for
NADR b 30.3 * 30.3
expenditure are lower than at any point since the
IMET 2.0 2.0 2.0
passage of IRRF 2 in November 2003.50
Total 800.0 * 659.3
For FY 2010, the Administration requested
$800 million through the regular budget pro- Note: Data not audited. Numbers affected by rounding.
a The House Appropriations Committee recommended $1.3 billion total for the CERP—$200 million
cess. Iraq’s $500 million allocation in the Foreign below the request—but did not recommend specific allocations for Iraq and Afghanistan.
Operations request represents 2% of the bilateral b The House Appropriations Committee did not recommend a specific allocation for Iraq from the
Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) fund.
assistance total,51 and the $300 million requested
Sources: DoD, “Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Request: Summary Justifi cation,” 5/2009, p. 5-19; House
for CERP in Iraq represents less than 1% of the Appropriations Committee Report 111-230, “Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2010,”
7/24/2009, pp. 6, 349; Senate Appropriations Committee Report 111-74, “Department of Defense
request for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).52 For Appropriations Bill, 2010,” 9/10/2009, p. 244; DoS, “Congressional Budget Justification for Fiscal Year
2010,” 5/2009, p. 20; House Appropriations Committee Report 111-187, “State, Foreign Operations,
details on FY 2010 funding for Iraq reconstruc- and Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 2010,” 6/26/2009, pp. 59, 75, 94; Senate Appropriations
Committee Report 111-44, “Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
tion, see Table 2.2. Appropriations Bill, 2010,” 7/9/2009, pp. 9, 48, 57.

24 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING SOURCES

Figure 2.3
Projection of U.S. Funds Available for Iraq Reconstruction
Appropriations Less Expenditures, $ Billions

$12
Actual Projection

$10

$8
Projection with
FY 2010 Supplemental
($1.0 Billion)
$6 Projection with Estimated Future
Appropriations through FY 2012
($1.5 Billion)

$4

$2

$0
FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 FY 2014

Note: Data not audited. Numbers affected by rounding. Projections include CERP, ESF, IRRF, and ISFF and assume that all appropriated funds not yet
expired will be obligated and that all obligated funds will be expended. Projected rates of obligation and expenditure by quarter are based on
historical obligation and expenditure rates in that respective quarter. The projected rate of obligation per quarter is equal to quarterly obligations
divided by available appropriations (appropriations less obligations) as of the beginning of the respective quarter, averaged over the previous four
years. The projected rate of expenditure is equal to quarterly expenditures divided by available obligations (obligations less expenditures) as of the
beginning of the respective quarter, averaged over the previous four years. All three projections assume that the Congress will appropriate the entire
$575 million recommended by the Senate Appropriations Committee for FY 2010. The middle projection assumes that an additional $1.0 billion in
supplemental funds will be appropriated in FY 2010. The final projection assumes $1.0 billion in FY 2010 supplemental funds, $1.0 billion in
appropriations for FY 2011, and $500 million in appropriations for FY 2012.

Sources: NEA-I, response to SIGIR data call, 10/7/2009; DFAS, response to SIGIR data call, 4/10/2009; DoS, response to SIGIR data call, 4/5/2007; Treasury,
response to SIGIR data call, 4/2/2009; USAID, responses to SIGIR data calls, 4/13/2009 and 10/14/2009; USTDA, response to SIGIR data call, 4/2/2009; OSD,
responses to SIGIR data call, 10/13/2009 and 10/14/2009; U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, responses to SIGIR data call, 7/6/2009, 7/16/2009, and 10/3/2009; USACE,
GRD, response to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2009; SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Reports to the United States Congress, 3/2004–7/2009.

Iraq Relief and

Reconstruction Fund
The IRRF was the largest U.S. reconstruction 30, 2009, $20.27 billion (97%) of the IRRF had
fund, comprising $20.86 billion made available been obligated, and $19.76 billion (95%) had been
through two appropriations: IRRF 1 ($2.48 billion) expended.55 IRRF 2 expired for new obligations on
and IRRF 2 ($18.39 billion).54 As of September September 30, 2008.56

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 25

IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING SOURCES AND USES

Iraq Security Forces Fund Figure 2.4

ISFF: Status of Funds
$ Billions
The Congress has appropriated $18.04 billion to the
ISFF to support Iraq’s Ministry of Defense (MOD)
Unexpended Funds
and Ministry of Interior (MOI) in developing the Total: $3.47
Iraqi Security Forces (ISF).57 The Multi-National Se- Infrastructure
Appropriated $18.04 $0.70
curity Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) plans
Obligated $16.67 20%
to hand control of these programs to the Iraq Train- Not
Obligated
ing and Advisory Mission (ITAM) and Iraq Security Expended $14.57
$1.37 39%
Equipment and
Assistance Mission (ISAM) by January 2010.58 23% Transportation
$0.79
As of September 30, 2009, $16.67 billion (92%)
of the ISFF had been obligated, and $14.57 billion
6%
(81%) had been expended. Nearly $3.47 billion re-
5% Training
mains unexpended.59 For the status of these funds, Related $0.20
Activities 7%
see Figure 2.4. $0.17 Sustainment
$0.24

ISFF Quarterly Obligations and

Expenditures by Sub-Activity Group Note: Data not audited. Numbers affected by rounding. Unexpended funds include expired appropriations.
ISFF data provided by OSD is preliminary for the quarter ending September 30, 2009.
Of the $18.04 billion appropriated to the ISFF,
$17.06 billion (95%) has been allocated to four Sources: OSD, response to SIGIR data call, 10/13/2009.

major sub-activity groups:60

• Equipment—equipment and transporta-
tion for security forces and police, force the MOD and $147 million for the MOI. Nearly
protection, vehicles, and communications $381 million was expended on MOI training,
equipment accounting for 24% of new expenditures. The
• Infrastructure—training academies and areas, greatest share of unexpended funds are allocated
military bases, and police stations, and head- to Equipment—$655 million for the MOD and
quarters expenses $597 million for the MOI—although a large
• Sustainment—maintenance, weapons, am- amount of unexpended funds are also allocated
munition, and logistics support for existing to MOD Infrastructure ($576 million).62 For the
investments status of the ISFF by ministry and sub-activity
• Training—military and police training, ministe- group, see Table 2.3.
rial capacity development, instructor support,
medical and office equipment, and information Future Funding Sources
technology and services for the Iraqi Security Forces
The Administration did not request, nor did the
The remainder of the ISFF is allocated to smaller House and Senate appropriations committees
sub-activity groups. Collectively termed “Related recommend, additional appropriations to the ISFF
Activities,” these smaller sub-activity groups for FY 2010.63 However, the $1.0 billion appropri-
include the ISFF Quick Response Fund; disarma- ated for FY 2009 by P.L. 111-32 was released for use
ment, demobilization, and reintegration; detainee in July 2009 and will be available through Septem-
operations; and rule-of-law complexes.61 ber 30, 2010.64 As of September 30, 2009, only
Equipment procurement accounted for 59% of $58 million had been obligated and $300,000
new expenditures this quarter: $795 million for expended from that $1.0 billion appropriation.65

26 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING SOURCES

Table 2.3
ISFF: Status of Funds by Ministry and Sub-Activity Group
$ Millions

Status of Funds Quarterly Change

Ministry Sub-Activity Group Allocated Obligated Expended Obligated Expended
MOD Equipment 4,694.9 4,393.4 4,040.3 326.7 (8%) 795.4 (25%)
Infrastructure 3,272.1 3,088.0 2,695.7 65.0 (2%) 84.7 (3%)
Sustainment 1,940.2 1,833.1 1,649.1 52.0 (3%) 47.6 (3%)
Training 612.8 401.5 326.0 68.0 (20%) 41.1 (14%)
Subtotal 10,520.0 9,716.0 8,711.0 511.7 (6%) 968.7 (13%)
MOI Training 2,585.9 2,398.7 2,272.0 247.3 (11%) 381.0 (20%)
Equipment 1,898.6 1,735.1 1,301.4 243.5 (16%) 146.5 (13%)
Infrastructure 1,447.8 1,379.6 1,067.3 12.5 (1%) 46.9 (5%)
Sustainment 610.5 577.8 519.5 45.0 (8%) 15.2 (3%)
Subtotal 6,542.9 6,091.2 5,160.1 548.2 (10%) 589.5 (13%)
Other Related Activities 976.4 865.2 698.0 39.3 (5%) 32.2 (5%)
Total 18,039.3 16,672.5 14,569.2 1,099.3 (7%) 1,590.5 (12%)

Note: Data not audited. Numbers affected by rounding. ISFF data provided by OSD is preliminary for the quarter ending September 30, 2009.

Sources: OSD, response to SIGIR data call, 10/13/2009; SIGIR, Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress, 7/2009.

The future of funding to support the ISF re- and DoS are currently considering an FMF
mains uncertain. The National Security Council request for FY 2011.69 The International Military
is now leading an interagency process to deter- Education and Training (IMET) fund (and the
mine requirements.66 The Senate Appropriations FMF) could be used to fund professional train-
Committee anticipates requests for additional ing. As of September 30, 2009, only $6.5 mil-
funding for the International Narcotics Control lion had been appropriated for IMET in Iraq.70
and Law Enforcement Fund (INCLE) as DoS Supporting the ISF through DoS funds—INCLE,
assumes programmatic responsibility for the FMF, and IMET—would put DoS in charge of
mission to “advise and assist” the Iraqi police.67 policy and DoD in charge of implementation,
Additionally, according to SIGIR analysis, many which is consonant with historical practice.71
of the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) purchases The MNSTC-I commander’s spending guidance
currently financed by the ISFF could otherwise reflects the dwindling ISFF account balance, fund-
be supported through the Foreign Military ing only “must haves,” while increasing GOI cost
Financing (FMF) program.68 According to DoD, sharing and prioritizing requirements that the GOI
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) can sustain.72

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 27

IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING SOURCES AND USES

Economic Support Fund Figure 2.5

ESF: Status of Funds
$ Billions
Since 2003, the Congress has appropriated
$4.18 billion to the ESF to improve infrastruc-
Unexpended Funds
ture and community security, promote democ- Total: $1.38
racy and civil society, and support capacity build- Local Governance
ing and economic development.73 Program
$0.14
As of September 30, 2009, $3.60 billion (86%) Appropriated $4.18 PRT/PRDC
10% Projects
had been obligated, and $2.80 billion (67%) had Obligated $3.60 $0.12
Not 9%
been expended. Nearly $1.38 billion remained Obligated Community
$0.57 42% 9%
unexpended.74 For the status of these funds, see Expended $2.80 Action Program
$0.12
Figure 2.5.
31%
ESF Quarterly Obligations
Other
and Expenditures by Program Obligated
$0.42
The ESF is allocated to programs in three
tracks:75
• Security—programs focused on reducing
Note: Data not audited. Numbers affected by rounding. Unexpended funds include expired appropriations. U.S.
violence, improving infrastructure security, and Embassy-Baghdad did not provide updated allocation, obligation, and expenditure data for the Democracy and
Civil Society, Iraqi Refugees (Jordan), and Regime Crimes Liaison Office sectors. Values for these sectors are
strengthening the link between the government carried over from the previous quarter.
and the community Sources: U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, responses to SIGIR data call, 7/6/2009 and 7/16/2009; GRD, response to SIGIR data
• Political—activities designed to increase the call, 7/4/2009; ITAO, Essential Indicators Report, 5/14/2009; SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Reports to the United
States Congress, 7/2008–4/2009.
capacity of national and provincial governments
• Economic—programs aimed at increasing the Figure 2.6
GOI’s operations and maintenance capabilities Comparison of ESF and CERP Appropriations
$ Billions
and stimulating private-sector growth
$5
New obligations of the ESF totaled $275 million
this quarter. Quarterly obligations were greatest $4
ESF
for the Local Governance Program, Ministerial $3
Capacity Development, the Community Action
$2 CERP
Program, and National Capacity Development.
Quarterly expenditures followed a similar pattern.76 $1
For the status of ESF by track and program, see
$0
Table 2.4. FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009

Note: Data not audited.

ESF after Transition
Sources: P.L. 108–7; P.L. 108–11; P.L. 108–287; P.L. 109–13; P.L. 109–102; P.L. 109–148; P.L. 109–234; P.L. 109–289; P.L.
During the course of the Iraq reconstruction 110–28; P.L. 110–92; P.L. 110–116; P.L. 110–137; P.L. 110–149; P.L. 110–161; P.L. 110–252; P.L. 111–32.
program, appropriations to the ESF have roughly
equaled appropriations to the CERP. However, if Iraq. For FY 2009, the ESF request was nearly 40%
CERP requirements decrease commensurate with higher than the request for CERP;78 the Senate
the drawdown of U.S. forces,77 and no further Appropriation Committee’s recommendation was
funds are appropriated to the ISFF, the ESF will nearly 90% higher.79 For a historical comparison of
become the main source of bilateral assistance to ESF to CERP appropriations, see Figure 2.6.

28 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING SOURCES

Table 2.4
ESF: Status of Funds by Track and Program
$ Millions

Status of Funds Quarterly Change

Track Program Allocated Obligated Expended Obligated Expended
Security PRT/PRDC Projects 683.0 477.4 353.0 8.7 (2%) 29.3 (9%)
Community Stabilization Program 646.5 646.3 615.4 0.1 (0%) 18.6 (3%)
Local Governance Program 410.5 410.5 271.4 55.0 (15%) 13.4 (5%)
Community Action Program 325.0 311.0 192.9 46.0 (17%) 32.1 (20%)
Infrastructure Security Protection 214.8 179.8 177.6 0.4 (0%) 3.3 (2%)
PRT Quick Response Fund 212.0 200.5 132.0 5.1 (3%) 25.0 (23%)
Subtotal 2,491.8 2,225.5 1,742.3 115.3 (5%) 121.6 (8%)
Political National Capacity Development 309.4 309.4 223.3 45.1 (17%) 32.9 (17%)
Democracy and Civil Society 188.9 185.2 144.5 - -
Economic Governance II, Policy and Regulatory Reforms 127.4 85.0 85.0 - -
Ministerial Capacity Development 103.5 86.3 57.9 49.1 (132%) 30.1 (108%)
Iraqi Refugees (Jordan) 58.0 58.0 36.0 - -
Regime Crimes Liaison Office 33.0 30.1 28.4 - -
Subtotal 820.2 754.0 575.1 94.2 (14%) 62.9 (12%)
Economic O&M Sustainment 291.6 270.0 266.1 -3.3 (-1%) -5.3 (-2%)
Inma Agribusiness Development 124.0 124.0 72.4 31.5 (34%) 10.5 (17%)
Provincial Economic Growth 85.8 85.8 35.8 25.0 (41%) 6.9 (24%)
Targeted Development Program 57.4 57.8 21.3 0.4 (1%) 2.9 (16%)
Plant-Level Capacity Development & Technical Training 48.7 47.8 47.1 0.2 (0%) 0.6 (1%)
Izdihar 23.8 23.8 22.4 - -0.1 (0%)
Planning and Design 19.3 13.7 13.7 11.9 (675%) 11.9 (675%)
Subtotal 650.6 623.0 478.7 65.7 (12%) 27.6 (6%)
Total 3,962.5 3,602.4 2,796.1 275.2 (8%) 212.1 (8%)

Note: Data not audited. Numbers affected by rounding. U.S. Embassy-Baghdad did not provide updated allocation, obligation, and expenditure data for the Democracy and
Civil Society, Iraqi Refugees (Jordan), and Regime Crimes Liaison Office sectors. Values for these sectors are carried over from the previous quarter.

Sources: U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, responses to SIGIR data calls, 7/6/2009, 7/16/2009, and 10/3/2009; USACE, GRD, response to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2009; USAID, response to SIGIR
data call, 10/14/2009.

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 29

IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING SOURCES AND USES

Commander’s Emergency Figure 2.7

Response Program CERP: Status of Funds
$ Billions
Since 2004, the Congress has appropriated
$3.65 billion to the CERP to enable U.S. military Unexpended Funds
Total: $0.35
commanders to provide targeted local relief and
reconstruction throughout Iraq.80
Appropriated $3.65
As of September 30, 2009, $3.48 billion (95%) Obligated $3.48
had been obligated, and $3.29 billion (90%) had Expended $3.29 Not
Obligated
been expended. MNC-I returned $247 million of $0.17 47%
CERP allocations to the Army Operations and 53% Obligated
$0.19
Maintenance (O&M) account in June.81 Nearly
$354 million remains unexpended.82 For the status
of these funds, see Figure 2.7.

CERP Quarterly Obligations

and Expenditures by Sector
DoD obligates the CERP to 20 project categories,83
among which the Water & Sanitation category Note: Data not audited. Numbers affected by rounding. OSD does not report allocation, obligation, and
expenditure data for project categories on a quarterly basis for all fiscal year appropriations. As a consequence,
accounts for $631 million (18%) of known obliga- an accurate account of unexpended CERP obligations by project category is not available.
tions and Protective Measures accounts for Sources: OSD, response to SIGIR data call, 10/14/2009; IRMS, MNC-I Quarterly Report, 10/12/2009.
$429 million (12%).84
DoD does not report allocation, obligation,
and expenditure data for project categories on a House of Representatives has proposed a hold
quarterly basis for all fiscal year appropriations. on $500 million, pending a “thorough review
As a consequence, it is not possible to provide a of CERP, its purpose, use and scope.”87 More-
full account of quarterly obligations and expen- over, it has requested a timeline for reducing
ditures by project category. DoD reported that and eventually phasing out its use in Iraq.88 DoD
as of June 30, 2009, $224 million in CERP had forecasted $300 million in CERP requirements
been expended from the FY 2009 appropriation for FY 2010 and expects that CERP requirements
since the beginning of the fiscal year. The largest will reduce commensurate to the drawdown of
expenditures of the FY 2009 appropriation were forces through FY 2012. The CERP program in
for Temporary Contract Guards for Critical Iraq will end with the withdrawal of U.S. forces
Infrastructure ($41 million) and Civic Cleanup on December 31, 2011.89
Activities ($30 million).85 This year, for the first time, the great majority
For the status of the CERP by project category, of funds requested for the CERP
First CERP Appropriation
5

according to the MNC-I Quarterly Report available are allocated for Afghanistan rather
On August 8, 2004, P.L. 108-287
from the Iraq Reconstruction Management System than Iraq.90 However, with at least
this quarter
years ago

appropriated $140 million to the

(IRMS),86 see Table 2.5. $354 million remaining for expen- CERP to “enable military com-
diture in Iraq, SIGIR has raised manders in Iraq to respond to
Programming and Implementation concerns about whether transition urgent humanitarian relief and
during the Drawdown plans provide for adequate staffing reconstruction requirements.”
The Congress continues to be concerned about to administer the CERP.91 MNC-I Previously, the CERP had been funded by
seized Iraqi funds.
the use and management of the CERP. The reported that the withdrawal of U.S.

30 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING SOURCES

Table 2.5
CERP: Status of Funds, by Project Category
$ Millions

Status of Funds Quarterly Change

Project Category Obligated Expended Obligated Expended
Water & Sanitation 631.2 631.2 8.5 (1%) 1.0 (0%)
Protective Measures 428.9 428.9 0.9 (0%) -
Electricity 350.1 350.1 3.5 (1%) 0.3 (0%)
Transportation 330.0 330.0 2.4 (1%) -
Education 312.3 312.3 4.4 (1%) 0.0 (0%)
Civic Cleanup Activities 186.9 186.9 4.0 (2%) 0.2 (0%)
Other Humanitarian and Reconstruction Projects 138.8 138.8 3.6 (3%) -
Healthcare 102.6 102.6 0.9 (1%) 0.6 (1%)
Rule of Law & Governance 99.1 99.1 0.9 (1%) -
Agriculture 96.6 96.6 1.5 (2%) 0.1 (0%)
Repair of Civic & Cultural Facilities 88.5 88.5 0.9 (1%) -
Economic, Financial, and Management Improvements 98.3 98.3 6.4 (7%) 0.2 (0%)
Condolence Payments 48.3 48.3 0.2 (0%) -
Battle Damage Repair 40.2 40.2 0.3 (1%) -
Telecommunications 28.7 28.7 - -
Civic Support Vehicles 23.9 23.9 0.7 (3%) 0.1 (1%)
Food Production & Distribution 13.6 13.6 0.0 (0%) -
Former Detainee Payments 1.0 1.0 - -
Hero Payments No Data No Data
Temporary Contract Guards for Critical Infrastructure No Data No Data
Subtotal 3,019.1 3,019.1 39.2 (1%) 2.6 (0%)
Unaccounted-for CERP Allocations 458.9 458.9 -23.4 (-5%) 90.1 (12%)
Total 3,478.0 3,478.0 15.9 (0%) 92.6 (3%)

Note: Data not audited. Numbers affected by rounding. OSD does not report allocation, obligation, and expenditure data for project categories on
a quarterly basis for all fiscal year appropriations. The “Unaccounted-for CERP Allocations” row is the difference between the top-line allocation,
obligation, and expenditure data provided by OSD and the categorical data available from IRMS.

Sources: OSD, response to SIGIR data call, 10/14/2009; IRMS, MNC-I Quarterly Report, 10/12/2009.

forces from Iraqi cities will have minimal impact commanders implemented the program prop-
on the movement of Project Purchasing Officers erly.93 Audit results showed that the vast majority
(PPOs), who partner with ISF officials to ensure of projects reviewed were valid. However, USAAA
quality control for ongoing projects within urban identified numerous challenges related to the ap-
areas. They also stated that movement of PPOs plication of CERP guidance provided in the Money
outside urban areas will not be affected.92 as a Weapons System (MAAWS) manual.
The U.S. Army Audit Agency (USAAA) recently Some of the common challenges identified
performed an audit to assess whether the CERP in by the USAAA were missing or insufficiently
Iraq had adequate controls in place to ensure that detailed documents, such as statements of work,

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 31

IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING SOURCES AND USES

memorandums of agreement, financial forms, agencies play important roles. Given the diversity
and letters of justification, which made it diffi- of management and the often complicated way
cult to monitor contract performance.94 In other funds have been transferred, exact amounts are
cases, PPOs from MND-N split large projects into difficult to determine. SIGIR continues to analyze
several smaller projects to keep costs below review this issue.
thresholds. This enabled the PPOs to rush projects The $6.07 billion made available in the smaller
through at year end, but circumvented the addi- funding streams is significant, especially for fund-
tional scrutiny required for larger projects.95 ing niche or specialty programs and for funding
USAAA’s audit also identified lapses in over- the management and oversight of the reconstruc-
sight. Paying Agents (PAs) sometimes delegated tion effort. SIGIR has classified these funding
their duties, risking a loss of control over funds. In streams into three categories:
other cases, PPOs did not accompany PAs when • Other Assistance Programs—$3.77 billion
making payments, or were not co-located with • Reconstruction-related Operating
them, creating opportunities for questionable ac- Expenses—$2.10 billion
tivity that can occur in the absence of dual controls • Reconstruction Oversight—$253 million
over payments.96
The challenges USAAA identified occurred Descriptions of these categories follow. For
primarily because of shortfalls in training and the details on the status of funds, see Table 2.1.
experience level of personnel performing the fund’s
management, oversight, and execution. Generally, Other Assistance Programs
commanders agreed with the audit results and Approximately $3.77 billion in funding for Iraq
took prompt corrective actions.97 MNC-I issued reconstruction has been provided through smaller
prohibitions on project splitting and specified assistance programs—including appropriations
that thresholds are per requirement, not per item made directly to DoS, Treasury, and the Depart-
or project.98 In a July 10, 2009, memorandum to ment of Justice for operations in Iraq—and through
the CENTCOM Commander, MNC-I noted that transfers from larger funds, such as the Iraq Free-
it had expanded PPO and PA training from the dom Fund (IFF). As of September 30, 2009, at least
previous “one hour presentation to an 8–16 hour $2.73 billion had been obligated, and at least $2.17
course that features hands-on training and practi- billion had been expended. For details on the status
cal exercises.”99 Subsequently, MNC-I reported of funds, see Table 2.1.
that it also audits forward elements, holds monthly
program review boards, and periodically reviews Reconstruction-related
the MAAWS manual.100 Operating Expenses
Approximately $2.10 billion has been appropri-
ated directly for reconstruction-related operating
Smaller Funding Streams expenses. As of September 30, 2009, at least
$0.83 billion had been obligated, and at least
The Congress has appropriated, or otherwise made $0.80 billion had been expended. For details on
available, at least $6.07 billion in smaller funding the status of funds, see Table 2.1.
streams for Iraq reconstruction. As of September Operating expenses for some DoS agencies,
30, 2009, at least $3.73 billion had been obligated, notably OPA and ITAO, are part of the supplemen-
and at least $3.12 billion had been expended. Most tal budgets and are not included in the total above.
of these funding streams are managed by the Life support, for example, is paid for through the
DoS, although other departments and temporary Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP).

32 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING SOURCES

Table 2.6
U.S. Mission Operating Expenses, FY 2007–FY 2011
$ Millions

FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 Change,

(Actual) (Actual) (Estimate) (Estimate) (Estimate) Total FY 2009-FY 2011
Security 577.3 319.3 603.5 674.7 712.8 2,887.6 109.2 (18%)
Provincial Reconstruction Teams 336.9 218.0 484.2 636.3 611.8 2,287.2 127.6 (26%)
Logistics Support 194.7 256.7 258.6 244.0 322.2 1,276.2 63.6 (25%)
U.S. Mission Operations 113.3 175.1 184.0 294.7 213.2 980.4 29.2 (16%)
Information Technology 23.8 17.5 21.0 15.3 15.3 92.9 -5.7 (-27%)
Total 1,246.0 986.6 1,551.4 1,865.0 1,875.3 7,524.3 323.9 (21%)

Note: Data not audited. Numbers affected by rounding.

Source: DoS OIG Audit MERO-A-09-10, “Embassy Baghdad’s Transition Planning for Reduced U.S. Military in Iraq,“ 8/2009, pp. 31–32.

Based on International Cooperative Administrative Reconstruction Oversight

Support Services (ICASS) data and a headcount of Approximately $253 million has been appropriated
personnel in Iraq, the DoS Bureau of Near Eastern directly for reconstruction oversight. As of Septem-
Affairs-Iraq (NEA-I) estimates that $1.88 billion ber 30, 2009, at least $164 billion had been obli-
will be spent on operating expenses in FY 2009101 gated, and at least $148 million had been expended.
(DoS OIG estimates $1.55 billion).102 According These funds support SIGIR and the Iraq-related
to DoS OIG data, total operating expenses for the work of other oversight agencies. For details on
U.S. Mission for FY 2007 through FY 2011 dwarfs the status of funds, see Table 2.1. For details on the
appropriations made directly to the temporary oversight of Iraq reconstruction, see Sections 4 and
U.S. reconstruction agencies for that purpose, and 5 of this Report. ◆
overall operating expenses are expected to increase
by $323.9 million (21%) between FY 2009 and FY
2011 as the military draws down.103 For details, see
Table 2.6.

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 33

IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING SOURCES AND USES

RECONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT IN TRANSITION

Although the United States is transitioning to a sistance Office (ITAO) as the capacities of both This is the start of a
more traditional diplomatic and development mis- organizations are simultaneously diminished 12-month period at the end
of which all U.S. combat
sion in Iraq, a substantial portfolio of reconstruc- • downsizing the U.S. presence in the provinces forces will be withdrawn
tion work remains for completion, closeout, and and the capacity for administering more than from Iraq... Over time, as our
transfer to the GOI. $650 million in new reconstruction aid planned programs make progress on
these economic and political
While a general framework appears to be for the coming year goals, we will significantly
emerging, many key decisions related to organi- • shifting responsibility for training Iraq’s police reduce our civilian presence
zational responsibilities, resource needs, program forces from DoD to DoS, under the Bureau of both in the provinces and at
the embassy in Baghdad.108
plans, and coordination mechanisms remain to be International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
made. This quarter, SIGIR received preliminary Affairs (INL) —Ambassador
reports from agencies about imminent transi- Christopher Hill,
tions, but final decisions have not been announced. To support these shifts among U.S. agencies, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq,
September 10, 2009
Under the direction of the Deputy Chief of Mission DoS and DoD must coordinate closely to ensure
for Transition Assistance, U.S. Embassy-Baghdad is that the GOI is willing and able to assume respon-
assessing the status of ongoing U.S. projects, as well sibility for completed projects.
as plans for those not yet started, with the stated
goal of ensuring the best allocation of the $6.31 bil-
lion in U.S. funds that remain unexpended, includ- Shrinking U.S. Capacity,
ing more than $2.70 billion yet to be obligated.104 Shifting Responsibilities
DoS reports that it “may decide to re-obligate mon-
ies from infrastructure projects (handled by GRD) DoD has already begun transitioning its responsi-
to capacity-building projects (perhaps monitored bility for construction, sustainment, and security
by USAID) or return the money.”105 to DoS, which faces its own major reductions
The ongoing transition includes a realignment in capacity.
of organizational responsibilities. DoS and DoD To carry out these additional responsibilities,
managers have announced that some entities that U.S. Mission-Iraq aims to establish a fully indepen-
have played a part in the reconstruction effort will dent embassy operation through the
phase out, while others will adjust their roles. “aggressive use of competitive sourc- IRMO and PCO
5

Lessons learned from SIGIR’s oversight of recon- ing and regionalization/off-shor- Take the Lead
this quarter
years ago

struction efforts over the past six years demonstrate 107

ing.” After adjusting its operations, The newly established U.S.
that, to be successful, transition plans must provide U.S. Embassy-Baghdad expects that Embassy-Baghdad and its Iraq
Reconstruction Management
clear management responsibilities and accountabil- less U.S. military security, commu-
Office had begun working
ity structures. In August, SIGIR communicated to nications, and logistical support will closely with the fledgling Iraqi
Ambassador Hill and General Odierno the poten- be needed. Interim Government to help
tial effects of three major changes in responsibility Numerous staffing changes are the new ministries find direction. A
for reconstruction management:106 planned as part of this “rightsiz- presidential directive had established the
new Project and Contracting Office as a
• adjusting the responsibilities of the U.S. Army ing” action over the next three
temporary Army organization to provide
Corps of Engineers Gulf Region District (GRD) years. Overall, the Embassy expects acquisition and management support
and U.S. Embassy-Baghdad’s Iraq Transition As- to reduce in size, and operational services for Iraq’s reconstruction.

34 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 RECONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT IN TRANSITION

management, information management, and tion, and contract oversight services to replace
security staffs will decrease. Temporary orga- USACE support services.111
nizations, such as ITAO, will be phased out as Also in question is the future of the Iraq Recon-
reconstruction programs are consolidated into struction Management System (IRMS)—a central
permanent structures under DoS and USAID. portal for data on reconstruction projects. In the
Other elements of the U.S. Mission will expand, past, GRD personnel maintained this system at
including the consular section (to meet increased the headquarters of the Multi-National Corps-Iraq
demand for visa services) and Foreign Commer- (MNC-I) in Iraq.112 DoD reported that USACE will
cial Service programs (to continue support for fund the IRMS system management through FY
Iraq’s economic growth).109 2010.113 It is unclear who will maintain and update
Throughout the transition, the Chief of Mission this system in the future.
will retain ultimate responsibility for the direction
and oversight of the U.S. reconstruction program. Downsizing Presence in the Provinces
For an overview of the transition plans announced The Office of Provincial Affairs (OPA) has been
for DoD and DoS reconstruction agencies, chang- working closely with the GOI and Multi-National
es to their current and future responsibilities, and Force-Iraq (MNF-I) to coordinate the programs
permanent staff cuts, see Figure 2.8. of the 23 PRTs and one Regional Embassy Office
(REO) in conducting reconstruction priorities in
Phasing Out Infrastructure the local communities of Iraq’s 18 provinces. OPA
Reconstruction is headed by a senior Foreign Service Officer, who
GRD has completed 4,658 infrastructure projects currently manages 517 DoS personnel.114
in Iraq. As of the end of this quarter, it reported The Commander’s Emergency Response
457 projects ongoing or awarded, at a construc- Program (CERP) provides additional support for
tion cost of $1.5 billion. GRD is now deactivating communities in the areas where U.S. military units
and transitioning management of ongoing con- conduct operations. An additional $300 million
struction work to two districts operating under CERP allocation has been requested for FY 2010.115
the USACE Transatlantic Division. Program However, the U.S. military’s reduced troop pres-
management responsibilities, including responsi- ence in 2010 means that the capability to manage
bility for sustainment of completed projects, now CERP funds will also be reduced.
fall to DoS.110 OPA reported that its personnel have been inte-
Reductions in personnel and resources may limit gral to directing CERP priorities in the provinces,
capacities for sufficient oversight, leaving the last and it has appointed a CERP manager to support
tranche of reconstruction programs vulnerable to planning and oversight of these activities.116 DoD
fraud, waste, or abuse. SIGIR remains concerned has requested additional support from the PRTs,
about whether these programs can be executed in asking that reconstruction personnel embed with
an orderly fashion and with sufficient controls to military units managing the CERP program as
ensure that they will be sustained by the GOI. A MNC-I consolidates its activities under the new
DoS OIG audit released in August concluded that U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I) command structure. The
staff shortages have affected DoS’s ability to carry PRT program, however, is shrinking in overall size
out projects; 216 ITAO projects remain ongoing, and scope, and its teams are shifting to capacity-
valued at almost $700 million. Moreover, the audit building roles that fall more within the purview
found that DoS may need additional funding to of the U.S. Embassy’s Political Section—an office
purchase private-sector design, contract prepara- slated to have eight positions cut this year.117

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 35

IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING SOURCES AND USES

Figure 2.8
U.S. Reconstruction Management in Transition: An Emerging Picture

U.S. Troops
120,000

50,000
by 12/31/2011
0

2009
SEP OCT NOV DEC
2010
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
2011
JAN FEB MAR
Security
DoD MNSTC-I ITAM/ISAM ITAM: 337/ISAM: 91 Personnel
DoD will OSC-I
DoD starts transitioning transfer
training to INL; ongoing 574 IPAs
to DoS by INL: 5 police mission
through September 2011 Oct 2010 supervisors and 52
DoS employees
DoS INL To take over 350-person police training mission, INL says it must grow from 12 NEC staff to 21 in 2010 and 27 in 2011. (3161 or PSC)

Infrastructure U.S. reconstruction goals

in 2011 and beyond will
USACE/Transatlantic Division 457 ongoing projects ($1.5 billion) GRD Personnel Contractor Force be shaped by two
DoD assessments of U.S.
GRD October 1, 2009: 2 Districts April 10, 2010: 1 District foreign-assistance policy
launched in summer 2009:
Program management, t
"
1SFTJEFOUJBM
4UVEZ

including sustainment
of completed projects, USACE will fund the IRMS through
%JSFDUJWF
14%

PO
(MPCBM

now falls to DoS.
FY 2010, but it is unclear who will %FWFMPQNFOU
1PMJDZ

maintain and update the system. reviewing U.S. global
development policy as a
whole
DoS ITAO 216 ongoing projects ($700 million) t
"
%P4
2VBESFOOJBM

ITAO’s Diplomacy and
responsibilities
will be Development Review
assigned to 2%%3

XIJDI
XJMM

Provincial Reconstruction OPA in
January
evaluate DoS’s diplomacy
2010 and development
DoD MNC-I USF-I strategies.

CERP: $354 Million Unexpended

(with additional funds to come in FY 2010)
DoD has requested that PRTs embed
reconstruction personnel to support USF-I
units managing the CERP.
OPA OPA is concerned that reduced PRT and MNC-I resources could lead to problems, including reallocation of PRT resources to maintain necessary oversight of CERP projects.
DoS $484 M $636 M $611 M
16 PRTs 7 ePRTs 16 PRTs 6 PRTs
Goals for PRT initiatives directed by OPA coordinators: ESF: $1.38 Billion Unexpended PRT role shifts to those
Rule of Law OPA attorney (via RoLC Office) DoS plans call for the GOI’s Iraqi Associates to more typical of Embassy’s
Economy Economics Officer assume responsibility for active ESF projects once Political Section
Governance Governance Advisor U.S. managers leave.
Infrastructure CERP Manager

Note: Estimated operating costs shown above the PRT footprint were reported by DoS OIG in Audit MERO-A-09–10, released in 8/2009. The audit reported $484 million for FY 2009,
$636 million for FY 2010, and $611 million for FY 2011. The nature of these transitions are still in the planning stages, and final decisions have not been made.

Sources: OSD, response to SIGIR data call, 9/30/2009; DoS OIG Audit MERO-A-09-10, “Embassy Baghdad’s Transition Planning for Reduced Military in Iraq,” 8/2009, pp. 1–22; House
Appropriations Committee Report 111-230, “Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2010,” 7/24/2009, pp. 6–7, 349–350; Commander, MNF-I, testimony before the House Armed
Services Committee, “The Status of Ongoing Efforts in Iraq,” 9/30/2009; U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, cable 2694, 10/7/2009; GRD, “Cumulative Reconstruction Fact Sheet,”
www.grd.usace.army.mil, data as of 9/1/2009; Inspector General Stuart Bowen, letter to U.S. Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy-Iraq, and Commanding General, MNF-I, 8/18/2009; U.S.
Embassy-Baghdad, responses to SIGIR data call, 10/4/2009 and 10/6/2009; GRD, response to SIGIR data call, 10/15/2009.

36 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 RECONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT IN TRANSITION

of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF); this support will

include the current duties of the Multi-National
Security Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) when it shuts
down on December 31, 2009.118
The Iraq Security Assistance Mission
(ISAM)—an enabling agency that facilitates
procurement of equipment, services, and training
(formerly the Security Assistance Office)—will be
ramping to 91 personnel, performing those roles:
• Enhancing Force Capability. Facilitate procure-
ment to equip police forces and assist the equip-
ping of a self-defense capability.
• Force Professionalization and Specialization.
Expand training programs and ensure adequate
resources; translate Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
Letters of Request and Letters of Acceptance;
facilitate the development, processing, and
preparation of candidates for the International
Military Education and Training Program and
for training and service abroad.
• Enhancing Ministerial Capacity. Improve stra-
As U.S. forces in Iraq withdraw, DoD reconstruction manag- tegic planning and policy development, improve
ers have begun to transition projects and programs. By
2010, remaining MNF-I units will become part of the USF-I GOI resource management, and expand regional
command structure. Commanding general for the 2nd Marine
Logistics Group Forward (MLG-F) salutes the 2nd MLG-F staff exercises and engagement programs in support
during a transfer of authority ceremony held in west Bagh- of a future security cooperation relationship with
dad, Iraq, on September 1, 2009. (2nd Marine Logistic Group
Public Affairs photo) the GOI.

Transitioning Reconstruction The Iraq Training and Advisory Mission

in the Security Sector (ITAM)—comprises 337 personnel assigned
In accordance with presidential directives and to support the MOD and MOI, along with 574
the bilateral Security Agreement (SA), U.S. forces International Police Advisors (IPAs) to train the
in Iraq must draw down from 120,000 troops to Iraqi police forces. DoD defined these roles for
50,000 by August 31, 2010, and to zero by December ITAM:
31, 2011, unless the U.S. and the GOI mutually agree • Enhancing Force Capability. Develop a com-
to extend the U.S. military presence. The current petent and professional police force; enhance
planning schedules maintain the majority of forces screening to control Iraq’s borders; improve
through the January elections and seating of the command and control throughout Iraq;
new Iraqi government, followed by a rapid rede- develop a credible self-defense capability; and
ployment to reach the September 2010 deadline. enhance ISF medical, logistics, and maintenance
On January 1, 2010, remaining MNF-I units will programs.
become part of the USF-I command structure, but • Enhancing Ministerial Capacity. Improve
the missions of these units will change little in the strategic planning and policy development; syn-
coming year. Two new entities will perform train- chronize planning and programming decisions;
ing, advisory, and assistance missions in support improve GOI resource management; develop

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 37

IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING SOURCES AND USES

life-cycle management programs; improve re- USF-I transitions its missions for enhancing minis-
cruiting, training, manning, and equipping; and terial capacity, force capability, and police primacy
expand engagement and strategic communica- to U.S. Embassy-Baghdad control, under the Office
tions programs. of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I) in 2011.119
• Force Professionalization and Specialization. However, even at a 20% reduction of the 2010
Expose Iraqis to Western values and culture to JMD strength, DoD cautions that ITAM “would
promote tolerance, expand training programs lose nearly all capability and capacity” to meet
and ensure adequate resources, increase in- its objectives. Moreover, cuts to ISAM would risk
teroperability with U.S. or Coalition forces, and failure to adequately equip the ISF and would likely
improve medical training and equipment. delay or halt procurement for logistics infrastruc-
• Rule of Law Primacy. Strengthen anticorrup- ture and would force ITAM to “rely more heavily
tion programs, improve leader accountability, on stateside security assistance agencies, which
enhance judicial security, and improve inspec- have inherently more deliberate processes and
tion programs. fewer dedicated resources.”120
Already, ITAM has begun transitioning respon-
Potential Challenges to Success sibility for training all ISF troops below the division
DoD states that the 2010 Joint Manning Document level to the Advise and Assist Brigades (AABs), and
(JMD) represents adequate personnel strength re- it plans to cut efforts in the ministries from “advise
quired for ITAM and ISAM to achieve their strate- and assist” to “advise only.” DoD has emphasized
gic objectives. At this time, further force reduction that any reduction of ITAM or ISAM capabilities
of ITAM and ISAM is not scheduled to occur until before transfer to the OSC-I, now two years away,

Figure 2.9
Transition of Iraqi Police Training, 8/2009–12/2011
August−October 2009 January 2010
Police Training Assessment Consolidate Border Enforcement
Advisor contracts with IPA contract
August 2009
Begin IPA drawdown March−April 2010 July 2011
via attrition IPA Reorganization INL has full IPA
& Basing contract
management
September 2009 April−October 2010 January 2011 responsibility
Develop Specialization Steady-state Begin hiring 52 DoS positions
Training Team Mission
requirements January 2011
April 2010 Task order awarded
October 2009 Form Provincial Police October 2010− September−
Integrate INL Asst. and Regional Border July 2011 December 2011
Directors into ITAM Training Teams Basing ITAM Transition
Police & MOI consolidation to Security Cooperation
Structure

2009 2010 2011

MNSTC-I ITAM/ISAM
October 2009 DoD starts transitioning
MNSTC-I Change training to INL; ongoing OSC-I
of Command through September 2011
INL
AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC

Note: The nature of this transition is still in the planning stages, and final decisions have not been made.

38 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 RECONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT IN TRANSITION

would pose a high risk to the strategic objective of a support the Ministry of Interior and Iraqi police
“sovereign, stable, secure, and self-reliant Iraq.”121 forces. SIGIR has observed that the core capabili-
ties necessary for successful police training require
Police Training Continues sustained coordination between ITAM/ISAM and
in Coordination with INL INL to ensure that the latter’s role remains consis-
As the police training mission evolves, U.S. forces tent with its capacities.
partnering with Iraqi police forces will change to INL believes that the basic components of
meet SA provisions that require that the military’s training the Iraqi police services have been largely
operations be conducted with the agreement of the accomplished, and it reports that it will focus on
GOI and fully coordinated with Iraqi authorities.122 executive development, managerial training, and
The plan for providing necessary life support, other specialized programs such as forensics.123
transportation, and force protection for these According to current plans, by 2011 the police
teams must then be fully integrated with MNF-I’s training mission will have decreased its presence
drawdown planning. from 38 primary training centers to just 3 hubs:
MNSTC-I/ITAM has been working in conjunc- Baghdad, Erbil, and Basrah.124 For a timeline of
tion with the INL Police Training Program Direc- the planning milestones driving the transition,
tor to plan for a gradual transition of programs to see Figure 2.9. ◆

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 39

IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING SOURCES AND USES

USE OF CONTRACT PERSONNEL

Contractors continue to play a substantial role in Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT)— DoD, State, and
USAID continue to face
supporting U.S. military and diplomatic opera- which allows real-time tracking capability for
challenges in tracking
tions and sustainment, as well as reconstruction managers in theater.129 contractor personnel and
programs, in Iraq. DoD reports that as of August DoD has mandated that contingency contrac- contracts in Iraq.130
2009, almost 174,000 contractor personnel were tors, as well as their personnel, be registered in
—U.S. Government
working in Iraq. For a breakdown by agency, see SPOT if their work is contracted for longer than Accountability Office,
Table 2.7. These numbers reflect a 10% reduction in 30 days or if the value of the contract exceeds October 2009
the contractor footprint in Iraq since last quarter.125 $25,000. In addition, CENTCOM has mandated
DoD has expanded the use of contractors in its that contractors must have SPOT-generated
acquisition process to aid in program management
functions and has relied heavily on contractors to Table 2.7
carry out operations in Iraq.126 U.S. policymakers Contractor Support for Iraq
continue to express concern over the oversight of Third-country Iraqi Total
Iraq contracts for several reasons, including the ex- Agency U.S. Citizens Nationals Nationals Contractors
DoS 4,079 – – 4,079
pense and difficulty of managing logistical support
contracts as well as allegations of contract waste, DoD 31,541 56,125 32,040 119,706

fraud, abuse, and financial mismanagement.127 Others 9,381 35,053 5,627 50,061

This quarter, MNF-I reports that its contrac- Total 45,001 91,178 37,667 173,846

tor force has been reduced by about 5%; as it

Note: Information on third-country and Iraqi nationals contracting under DoS was not available.
draws down over the next 11 months, it expects to
Source: Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Program Support, “Contract Support in
maintain a ratio of about one contractor for each Contingency Operations,” 8/2009, p. 4.

of its personnel in Iraq. But some categories of

contractors may increase temporarily to provide Figure 2.10
sufficient numbers of logisticians, engineers, and DoD Contractors in Iraq, as of 6/30/2009
119,706 Total Contractors
transportation specialists. DoD reports that it will
be emphasizing limiting contractors in all areas,
National Origin Type of Service Provided
transitioning from hiring non-Iraqi contractors
to hiring Iraqi contractors and “reducing costs in Other
15,560
every way possible.”128 Translator/
26% U.S. Citizens
Interpreter 13%
For a breakdown of DoD contractors by na- 31,541
9,128
tional origin and type of service they provide, see Iraqi 8%
27% Nationals
Figure 2.10. 32,040 Security 11%
13,145

Third-country
47% Nationals 8%
Construction
Contractor Tracking 56,125
10,090
60%

Life Support
71,783
DoD is working with the U.S. Central Com-
Note: Numbers affected by rounding. These numbers reflect DoD contractors only. Totals for reconstruction
mand (CENTCOM) to continue the transition contractors working in other agencies are not available.
from manual accounting of contractor person- Source: DoD, Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Program Support, “Contractor Support of U.S.
nel to a web-based data tool—the Synchronized Operations in USCENTCOM AOR, Iraq, and Afghanistan,” 8/2009.

40 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 USE OF CONTRACT PERSONNEL

Figure 2.11
Contractor Deaths in Iraq, by Quarter, 1/1/2004–9/30/2009

150

120

90

60

30
No data available
0
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Sources: DoL, responses to SIGIR data call, 7/1/2009 and 10/2/2009; SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Reports to the United States Congress,
7/2004–4/2009.

Letters of Authorization (LOAs) to be deployed to Contractor Deaths

Iraq and be authorized users of Government Fur-
nished Services (GFS). As a result, DoD reports Since 2003, more than 1,442 contractor employees—
having a high confidence level that most contrac- Americans, Iraqis, and third-country nationals—
tors are in SPOT. For contractor personnel who have died in Iraq.135
do not receive GFS but have a need to access an According to GAO’s audit, SPOT currently does
installation, OSD has developed a bridge between not have the capability to track all of the required
SPOT and the Biometric Identification System for contract information or readily generate historical
Access used in Iraq.131 reports on the total number of killed or wounded
A Government Accountability Office (GAO) contractor personnel. Moreover, the audit found
audit released in October 2009 found that not that not all deaths and injuries reported under the
all contractor personnel were being entered into Defense Base Act would be regarded as contrac-
SPOT as required under a memorandum of agree- tors killed or wounded within the context of the
ment signed by DoD, DoS, and USAID; their de- NDAA for FY 2008. In addition, some contractor
partment regulations; and the NDAA for FY 2008. deaths and injuries may not be reported to the
In addition, currently not all contractor personnel Department of Labor, as required. In particular,
need LOAs—particularly most local nationals. the deaths and injuries to local and third-country
Agency officials informed GAO that many of those contractors may be underreported.136
personnel were not yet being entered into SPOT.132 As part of an effort to address such gaps, DoD
DoS officials informed GAO auditors that prior to reports that the January 2009 release of SPOT pro-
FY 2009, DoS did not systematically track contrac- vides better functionality. Specifically, the system
tor personnel in the SPOT. Instead, DoS bureaus now has a more visible killed-in-action/wounded-
conducted periodic surveys of their contractors; in-action status under a drop-down menu, which
however, each bureau’s survey covered different time must be updated by contractors upon change of
periods. Even relying on a combination of periodic personnel status.137 Notwithstanding this recent
surveys and SPOT, it appears that DoS underreport- change to SPOT, SIGIR has reported historically on
ed its contractor personnel numbers.133 USAID re- contractor deaths from information provided by
lied entirely on periodic surveys of its contractors.134 DoL (See Figure 2.11). ◆

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 41

IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING SOURCES AND USES

IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING USES

SIGIR classifies the major U.S. reconstruction funds will be discussed in the following pages of this
by their use into 4 reconstruction areas, compris- Report. For the status of U.S. reconstruction
ing 17 sectors. Developments in the Security, funding by use, see Table 2.8. For an overview
Infrastructure, Governance, and Economy areas of U.S. reconstruction funding sources and uses,
see Figure 2.12. ◆

Table 2.8
Status of Major U.S. Reconstruction Funds by Use
$ Billions

Status of Funds Quarterly Change

Area Sector Allocated Obligated Expended Obligated Expended
Security Equipment 7.29 6.82 6.03 0.57 (9%) 0.94 (19%)
Training 6.11 5.68 5.45 0.31 (6%) 0.42 (8%)
Infrastructure 5.81 5.55 4.84 0.08 (1%) 0.13 (3%)
Sustainment 2.55 2.41 2.17 0.10 (4%) 0.06 (3%)
Rule of Law 1.50 1.48 1.27 - -
Related Activities 1.27 1.15 0.97 0.04 (4%) 0.03 (3%)
Subtotal 24.52 23.09 20.72 1.10 (5%) 1.59 (8%)
Infrastructure Electricity 5.16 4.99 4.86 - 0.01 (0%)
Water and Sanitation 2.74 2.63 2.47 0.01 (0%) 0.01 (0%)
Oil and Gas 2.06 1.92 1.91 - -
General Infrastructure 1.25 1.24 1.24 - -
Transportation and Communications 1.15 1.09 0.99 - -
Subtotal 12.35 11.88 11.47 0.01 (0%) 0.02 (0%)
Governance Capacity Development 2.50 2.29 1.91 0.12 (6%) 0.15 (8%)
Democracy and Civil Society 2.03 2.04 1.66 0.10 (5%) 0.05 (3%)
Public Services 1.93 1.91 1.73 0.01 (1%) 0.01 (0%)
Humanitarian Relief 0.82 0.82 0.75 - -
Subtotal 7.28 7.06 6.04 0.24 (3%) 0.20 (3%)
Economy Economic Governance 0.82 0.80 0.74 0.01 (1%) -
Private Sector Development 0.74 0.74 0.57 0.06 (9%) 0.02 (4%)
Subtotal 1.56 1.54 1.32 0.06 (4%) 0.02 (2%)

Total 45.72 43.57 39.54 1.41 (3%) 1.83 (5%)

Note: ISFF data provided by OSD is preliminary for the quarter ending September 30, 2009. OSD does not report allocation, obligation, and expenditure data for project categories on
a quarterly basis for all fiscal year appropriations. The “Unaccounted for CERP Allocations” total is the difference between the top-line allocation, obligation, and expenditure data
provided by OSD and the categorical data available from IRMS. U.S. Embassy-Baghdad did not provide updated allocation, obligation, and expenditure data for the Democracy and Civil
Society, Iraqi Refugees (Jordan), and Regime Crimes Liaison Office sectors. Values for these sectors are carried over from the previous quarter.

Sources: NEA-I, response to SIGIR data call, 10/7/2009; DFAS, response to SIGIR data call, 4/10/2009; DoS, response to SIGIR data call, 4/5/2007; IRMS, MNC-I Quarterly Report,
10/12/2009; Treasury, response to SIGIR data call, 4/2/2009; USAID, responses to SIGIR data call, 4/13/2009 and 4/14/2009; USTDA, response to SIGIR data call, 4/2/2009; OSD, responses to
SIGIR data call, 10/13/2009 and 10/14/2009; U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, responses to SIGIR data calls, 7/6/2009, 7/16/2009, and 10/3/2009; USACE, GRD, response to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2009;
SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress, 7/2009.

42 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING USES

Figure 2.12
Allocations of Major U.S. Reconstruction Funds, as of 9/30/2009
$ Billions

IRRF ISFF ESF CERP

$20.72 $18.04 $3.96 $3.65

$24.52 $12.35 $7.28 $1.56

Security Infrastructure Governance Economy

$0.65
Unaccounted-for
CERP Allocations

Note: ISFF data provided by OSD is preliminary for the quarter ending September 30, 2009. OSD does not report allocation, obligation, and expenditure data for project categories on a
quarterly basis for all fiscal year appropriations. The “Unaccounted for CERP Allocations” total is the difference between the top-line allocation, obligation, and expenditure data provided
by OSD and the categorical data available from IRMS. U.S. Embassy-Baghdad did not provide updated allocation, obligation, and expenditure data for the Democracy and Civil Society,
Iraqi Refugees (Jordan), and Regime Crimes Liaison Office sectors. Values for these sectors are carried over from the previous quarter.

Sources: NEA-I, response to SIGIR data call, 10/7/2009; DFAS, response to SIGIR data call, 4/10/2009; DoS, response to SIGIR data call, 4/5/2007; IRMS, MNC-I Quarterly Report, 10/12/2009;
Treasury, response to SIGIR data call, 4/2/2009; USAID, responses to SIGIR data calls, 4/13/2009 and 10/14/2009; USTDA, response to SIGIR data call, 4/2/2009; OSD, response to SIGIR data call,
10/13/2009; U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, responses to SIGIR data calls, 7/6/2009, 7/16/2009, and 10/3/2009; USACE, GRD, response to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2009.

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 43

IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING SOURCES AND USES

SECURITY

Despite positive developments, Iraq continues to in several parts of the country.140 On August Although security is improv-
have a dangerous security environment. National 19, 2009, car bomb attacks in Baghdad killed ing, it is not yet enduring.
There still remain underly-
reconciliation and accommodation continue to over 100 people and injured hundreds more. ing, unresolved sources of
be hindered by ethnosectarian divides over the Similar attacks that same week around Kirkuk potential conflict. I call these
distribution of power and resources. A tenuous and Mosul killed more than 20 people and drivers of instability.142

peace is challenged by the Arab and Kurd split left many more injured.141 In general, incident —General
over key issues: disputed internal boundaries, levels remained high in the disputed territories Raymond Odierno,
property rights and restitution, the status of the of northern Iraq as armed opposition groups Commander MNF-I,
September 30, 2009
Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG’s) Pesh- continued exploiting tensions. For more informa-
merga militia, the status of Tameem province, tion on deaths associated with multiple-fatality
and the framework for a hydrocarbons law. Ten- bombings, see Figure 2.13.
sion between the Iraqi Army and the Peshmerga Overall attacks have decreased 85% over the
in and around disputed territories remains a past two years—from 4,064 in August 2007 to
flashpoint for potential violence, and the long-
standing Sunni-Shia discord remains.138 Figure 2.13
On June 30, 2009, under the requirements of Deaths Associated with Multiple-Fatality Bombings in Iraq,
the bilateral Security Agreement (SA), the United by Group Targeted, 1/1/2007–9/20/2009
States turned over all domestic security responsi- U.S./Coalition,
bilities to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). As part ISF, GOI Indiscriminate/
Shia Sunni Kurd Personnel Unknown
of that transition, U.S. military forces left urban 2007
centers, with the exception of small contingents
that remains in the cities to train, advise, and
coordinate with the ISF.139
Although there has not been a significant
increase in insurgent activity overall this quarter,
al-Qaeda and other extremist groups conducted
a series of high-profile mass-casualty attacks

2008

2009

Total 3,903 1,090 822 1,596 1,901

1 person represents 100 deaths.

Note: Totals correspond with attacks that targeted a particular group or occurred in an area in which the group
was in the majority. “Indiscriminate” bombings occurred in areas with mixed sectarian populations. “Unknown”
corresponds with attacks where no sectarian information or location was reported.
On August 27, 2009, U.S. soldiers arrive to help the Iraqi Army
provide humanitarian assistance in Basrah. (MNF-I photo) Source: Brookings Institution, Iraq Index, 9/22/2009, pp. 9–10.

44 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 SECURITY

594 in August 2009. In September management of U.S. programs is also in transition.

6

Bombing of UN Mission
On August 19, 2003, a bomb 2009, there were 565 attacks during MNSTC-I will hand over responsibility for Iraqi
this quarter
years ago

attack on the Canal Hotel in the same time period, U.S. military military training to the new Iraq Training and
Baghdad claimed the lives of deaths have decreased by 93%, ISF Advisory Mission, facilitated by the Iraq Security
22 UN staff members, includ-
deaths have decreased 79%, and eth- Assistance Mission, and Iraqi police training will
ing the world body’s top envoy
in Iraq, Sergio Vieira de Mello,
nosectarian killings have decreased continue under DoS’s Bureau of International Nar-
and wounded more than 150 people. 88%.143 However, the GOI declared cotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL).147
Six years later, the UN General Assembly that August 2009 was the highest As of September 30, 2009, the United States had
commemorated the event by designating month for civilian casualties in more allocated $24.52 billion, obligated $23.09 billion,
August 19 World Humanitarian Day. than a year.144 For information about and expended $20.72 billion for programs and
daily and annual security incidents projects to develop the ISF, construct related infra-
since January 2004, see Figure 2.14. structure, and support increased capacity for the
rule of law in Iraq.148 For a summary of obligations
and expenditures, see Figure 2.15.
Status of U.S. Funding
for Security Programs
Overview of Security Forces
U.S. efforts to build the capabilities and capacities
of the Iraqi military and police forces have been Current plans call for MNF-I to draw down its
funded primarily through the ISFF in recent years. presence in Iraq to 50,000 troops by August 31,
FY 2009 appropriations decreased by two-thirds 2010. Under the command structure of the new
from the previous year, and no new appropria- U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I), three Division Headquar-
tions for ISFF have been requested for FY 2010.145 ters and six “Advise and Assist” Brigades (AABs)
$1.37 billion remains unobligated, and $3.47 will continue to support the Ministry of Defense
billion remains unexpended from the ISFF.146 The (MOD) and Ministry of Interior (MOI) programs

Figure 2.14
Average Daily Incidents and Estimated Average Daily Fatalities,
1/2004–9/2009

250

200
Daily Security
Incidents
150 Daily Fatalities

100

50

0
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Note: Incidents include attacks against Iraqi infrastructure and government organizations; bombs that are found and cleared (including IEDs and mines);
detonated bombs; sniper, ambush, grenade, and other small arms attacks; and mortar, rocket, and surface-to-air attacks. After June 30, 2009, the GOI
began providing information on security incidents as part of the bilateral Security Agreement. MNF-I now includes this data as part of its reporting.

Sources: MNF-I, response to SIGIR data call, 9/30/2009; Brookings Institution, Iraq Index, 9/22/2009; Commander, MNF-I, testimony before the House
Armed Services Committee, “The Status of Ongoing Efforts in Iraq,” 9/30/2009, p. 2.

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 45

IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING SOURCES AND USES

to develop the ISF. Since January 2009, U.S. force Figure 2.15
strength has been reduced by nearly 14% (consoli- Security: Status of Funds
$ Billions
dating from 14 Brigade Combat Teams to 11), and
100 bases were closed. DoD reported that in reduc-
Unexpended Funds
ing its contractor force from 149,000 in January to Total: $3.80
just more than 115,000 (as of September 30, 2009),
Allocated $24.52 Equipment
it now spends $441 million less.149 $0.79
Obligated $23.09 21%
After U.S. military forces left the cities this sum- Not
Expended $20.72 Obligated
mer, DoD began implementing phase two of its $1.43 38%
transition plan, which calls for withdrawing 80,000
19% Infrastructure
troops and their equipment and reducing the civil- $0.71
ian contracting force to 75,000 by August 2010.150
23%
Over the next year, roughly 200 U.S. bases are
slated for consolidation and closure. By Septem- Other Security
Sectors
ber 2010, DoD expects to have only 6 large supply $0.86
support bases and approximately 20 smaller bases,
called spokes.151
Since the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom Note: Data not audited. Numbers affected by rounding. Unexpended funds include expired appropriations.
ISFF data provided by OSD is preliminary for the quarter ending September 30, 2009. OSD does not report CERP
through September 2009, 4,345 U.S. military per- allocation, obligation, and expenditure data for project categories on a quarterly basis for all fiscal year
sonnel have been killed, and more than 32,000 have appropriations; CERP allocation, obligation, and expenditure data is pulled from IRMS; therefore, totals may not
match top-line values found in the Funding Sources subsection of this Report. U.S. Embassy-Baghdad did not
been wounded in action. For a timeline of casualties provide updated allocation, obligation, and expenditure data for the Regime Crimes Liaison Office; values are
carried over from the previous quarter.
sustained by Coalition forces, see Figure 2.16.
Sources: DFAS, response to SIGIR data call, 4/10/2009; DoS, responses to SIGIR data call, 4/5/2007 and 9/17/2009;
MNF-I has entered a period of transition as its IRMS, MNC-I Quarterly Report, 10/12/2009; NEA-I, response to SIGIR data call, 10/7/2009; OSD, response to SIGIR
data call, 10/13/2009; U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, response to SIGIR data call, 7/16/2009.
forces adjust to redeployment and take on security
operations ahead of Iraq’s national elections in Jan-
uary. Commanders report that despite changes to
the operating environment, their mission remains Figure 2.16
the same, and they continue to conduct a wide Military Fatalities in Operation Iraqi Freedom, 3/2003–9/2009
Cumulative Fatalities
range of operations with their Iraqi partners.152 For
the status of security personnel operating in Iraq,
5,000
see Table 2.9.
4,345
4,000

Private Security Contractors U.S. Fatalities

3,000

Although lethal attacks in Iraq are down signifi-

cantly since they peaked in 2006 and 2007, the 2,000

security situation remains difficult. Personnel

under Chief of Mission authority benefit consider- 1,000
Non-U.S. Coalition Fatalities
ably from the security umbrella provided by the 316
U.S. military forces in Baghdad and other major 0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
cities in Iraq. Thus far, the protection mission and
Note: Excludes Iraqi Security Forces fatalities.
planning function of the U.S. Embassy Regional
Security Office (RSO) has not been noticeably Source: Brookings Institution, Iraq Index, 9/22/2009, pp. 15, 17.

46 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 SECURITY

Table 2.9
Security Forces Protecting Iraq, as of 9/30/2009

Assigned
Service Personnel Trend Status

Drawdown continues—100,000
U.S. Forces 120,000
by end of 2009

DoD continues to reduce the

a
Private Security Contractors 25,500 number of contracted security
personnel
Iraqi Security Forces

b All combat operations now

Ministry of Defense Iraqi Army (IA) 218,300
conducted with the IA

Implementing a training
assessment program and
Training and Support 23,452
generating a new Training
Assessment Manual
Developing Airmen cadre;
Air Force 2,100 foundational capability expected
by 12/2010

Initiatives underway to counter

Navy 1,900
2009 budgetary constraints

Total MOD 245,752

b Continues to work toward

Ministry of Interior Iraqi Police 292,400
independent force management

Renamed this quarter from

Iraqi Federal Police 53,200
National Police

Preparing for the drawdown

Border Enforcement 42,431
of U.S. forces

Budgetary constraints keep hiring

Oil Police 29,411
freeze in place

Pending reform legislation to

Facility Protection
c 90,000 make FPS a formal department
Service (FPS)
under MOI

Total MOI 507,442

Pending CoR reform legislation

Counter-Terrorism Special Operations 4,160
to become a new Iraqi ministry

ISF Total 757,354

Grand Total 902,854

Note: Numbers affected by rounding.

a PSC numbers shift continually based on changing contract activity and level of security services required.
b Assigned numbers illustrate payroll data; they do not reflect present-for-duty totals; approximately 112,000 MOI employees are not included
in ISF numbers.
c FPS personnel are not counted in the official MOI rosters because they are contracted, and reform legislation has not been passed.

Sources: SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Reports to the United States Congress, 1/2009, 4/2009, and 7/2009; OSD, response to SIGIR data call,
4/2/2009; DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, 12/31/2008; OSD, responses to SIGIR data calls, 7/1/2009 and 9/30/2009.

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 47

IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING SOURCES AND USES

affected by the military drawdown. In addition Figure 2.17

to the 1,900 guards who make up the Embassy’s Estimated ISF Force Strength, Cumulative, by Quarter
security force, RSO relies on approximately 1,300
personal security specialists contracted under the 800,000
second Worldwide Personal Protective Services
contract, worth nearly $2 billion.153 600,000
Thousands of private security contractor (PSC)
personnel in Iraq, many of whom are foreign Forces
400,000 Authorized
nationals, continue to support DoD and DoS. Con-
gressional concerns about the selection, training, Forces Trained
equipping, and conduct of PSC personnel in Iraq 200,000
are reflected in a provision in the FY 2008 National
Defense Authorization Act that directs DoD to
0
develop guidance on PSCs. The Department of 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Homeland Security has directed U.S. govern-
Note: Cumulative number of Iraqi Army, Air Force, Navy, Iraqi Police, National Police, Border Enforcement, and
ment agencies to establish minimum background Special Operations Personnel. June–September 2009 data are SIGIR estimates.

screening requirements before issuing access Sources: DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, 7/2005, 10/2005, 2/2006, 5/2006, 8/2006, 11/2006, 3/2007,
6/2007, 9/2007, 12/2007, 3/2008, 6/2008, 9/2008, 12/2008; DoS, Iraq Status Report, 3/18/2009; OSD, responses to
credentials. And although a recent audit by GAO SIGIR data call, 7/14/2009 and 9/30/2009; Commander, MNF-I, testimony before the House Armed Services
Committee, “The Status of Ongoing Efforts in Iraq,” 9/30/2009.
found that DoS and DoD have developed policies
and procedures to conduct background screenings
Iraqi Security Forces
2
of U.S. citizens working in Iraq as PSCs, only DoS Halfway to Force Strength
has done so for foreign nationals.154 According to As of September 3, 2007,
this quarter
years ago
approximately 359,600 Iraqi per-
DoD, MNF-I has developed all department-wide As of September 30, 2009, more than
sonnel had received U.S.-funded
procedures for conducting background screenings 663,000 personnel were serving the training and equipment out of a
of its foreign national PSC personnel.155 ISF in the MOD, MOI, and Iraqi train-and-equip authorization of
DoD reported that as of August 31, 2009, National Counter-Terrorism Force 390,000. Given the persistence
12,250 personnel performed security-related (INCTF).157 For a timeline of ISF of violence by insurgents, terrorists, and
militias, the Iraqi forces would require
services in Iraq.156 force strength, see Figure 2.17.
additional force structure, continued
Since adoption of the SA, the ISF training, seasoning, and equipment over
has assumed more responsibility for the next two years to assume control for
providing security. All U.S. combat security operations.
operations are now conducted with
the Iraqi Army; and in areas of Iraq
that are generally secure and have a low threat of
violence, the ISF is almost fully in the lead. Where
the threat requires major operations, MNF-I takes
a larger role in partnering with the ISF to conduct
“clear-hold-build” operations.158
According to MNF-I Commanding General
Raymond Odierno, the Iraqi Army and Federal
Police continue to improve their implementation,
New Muthanna Air Base: On September 29, 2009, the Iraqi
Air Force began fully independent C-130 air operations, planning, and execution of counter-insurgency
coincident with the deactivation of the U.S. Air Force’s 321st Air efforts. In some cases, police primacy has been
Expeditionary Advisory Squadron. (MNF-I photo)
established in the cities, but this is still a work in

48 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 SECURITY

progress. Modest improvements continue in logis-

tics and the sharing and integration of intelligence
and operations through regional Operations Cen-
ters and Provincial Joint Coordination Centers.159

Sons and Daughters of Iraq

The GOI plans to transition 20% of the 95,000 Sons
of Iraq (SOI) members into the ISF and reintegrate
the remaining 80% into public or private employ-
ment, a goal unchanged since the initiative began a
year ago. As of September 30, 2009, however, only
about half of the 19,000 members slated to enter the
ISF have transitioned, about 6,800 have gone to the Members of the Daughters of Iraq wait in line to be paid.
(MNF-I photo)
GOI, and about 8,800 members have transitioned
into jobs outside of the security sector.160 The GOI
assumed responsibility for paying the SOI in May made appropriate organizational adjustments
2009, reporting that payments continue in all during recent operations. But it emphasizes that
provinces where the SOI have been operating.161 the ISF will not be fully self-sufficient until it at-
DoD reports that the slow pace of integration has tains greater sustainment and logistical support
the potential to undermine Sunni confidence in capability at the operational and strategic lev-
the GOI, and if not corrected, could undermine els.166 The MOD continues to develop a national
security progress.162 supply and distribution network, with a Location
In response to the increased use of female Command in support of each IA division. The
suicide bombers in Iraq, the Multi-National Corps- MOD plans to co-locate regional life-support
Iraq (MNC-I) and community leaders began assets at these sites to enhance warehousing and
calling for women to join the Daughters of Iraq distribution capacity. Eight of these Location
(DOI), a female counterpart to the SOI community Commands are nearing completion of construc-
policing program. Although the DOI force remains tion or refurbishment. The remaining three
at 800, this progressive initiative has attracted bases are under construction and expected to be
much attention.163 operational by the end of 2009.167
On May 16, 2009, SIGIR performed an on-site
Foreign Military Sales assessment of the Al Kasik Location Command
As of September 2009, the Foreign Military Sales project. The overall objective of this $6.3 million
(FMS) program reported that 130 Iraqi-signed project was to design and construct a new Iraqi
cases, valued at $5.5 billion in GOI funds, were be- Army Location Command in Ninewa province.
ing executed. The total value delivered to the GOI The project includes construction of several stor-
since 2005 exceeds $4.5 billion.164 The U.S. govern- age facilities and installation of power lines and
ment continues to explore options to assist the GOI water and sewer hookups for new buildings, as
with force generation and equipment through the well as perimeter fencing. The project also requires
FMS program.165 the demolition of some existing buildings and
repair and refurbishment.168
Logistics and Sustainment Capabilities At the time of the site visit, the project was
DoD reported that ISF units have become more approximately 56% complete. SIGIR observed
competent and self-sufficient over time and have ongoing construction work, such as concrete

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 49

IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING SOURCES AND USES

formwork and preparation for concrete placement.

SIGIR observed a number of construction issues,
which are described in Section 4 of this Report.169
However, the results to date are consistent with the
original project objective.

U.S. Advise and Assist Mission

The United States is reconfiguring Brigade Combat
Teams to focus on advising, assisting, and devel-
oping ISF units. MNF-I Commanding General
Odierno has said that this path is “the right way to
go as we move from counterinsurgency and full-
spectrum ops to our strategy of being done with
combat operations for U.S. forces in August 2010.” Iraqi Army Commander briefs commandos on the first day of a four-week War Fighter exercise in
Thi-Qar province on October 3, 2009. (U.S. Army photo)
The first four AABs will deploy this fall in support
of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and ISF
training, undertaking these roles:170 U.S. Rule of Law Programs
• Advise and assist in fielding enablers (medical,
engineering, aviation, intelligence, and other Although judicial security is improving, a lack of
assets) in 2009. resources and continuing threats of violence im-
• Advise and assist in developing Iraqi budget- pede Iraq’s implementation of a comprehensive ju-
ing and programming capability to support ISF dicial security plan. Insurgent-linked elements and
force-management objectives. others often intimidate judges and their families.
• Support and assist in identifying equipment Moreover, limited judicial capacity has resulted in
requirements for purchase to support 2010–2011 an overwhelming backlog of pre-trial cases, which
ISF force requirement objectives. has led to abuses, including detainees being held
• Advise and assist in fielding and developing for unlawfully long periods of time.
training for the M1A1 tank program. To reduce the intimidation of judges and ac-
• Establish a management office to serve as a foun- celerate case reviews, the Higher Judicial Council
dation for other systems. (HJC) has hired additional guards for some jurists,
and notwithstanding delays in obtaining minis-
Spend Plan To Support the ISF terial approval and funding for judicial security
This quarter, DoD reported no change for the plans, the GOI continues with interim implemen-
ISFF spend plan. Capacity development for force tation efforts. INL continues to work with the HJC
generation at the MOI continues as U.S. funding to improve its security capacity, supporting the
shifted from sustainment and training to provision assessment of 22 courthouses by judicial security
of more equipment and transportation support. professionals. With the information collected dur-
MNSTC-I continues to support the development of ing these security evaluations, INL is collaborating
MOI and MOD professional training capacities.171 with the HJC Judicial Security Project Board to
For a summary of FY 2009 revised budget line develop security-related curricula for the Iraqi Judi-
items, see Table 2.10. cial Educational Development Institute (JEDI).172

50 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 SECURITY

Table 2.10
Iraq Security Forces Fund Spend Plans • Department of Justice (DoJ) National Security
$ Millions Division and Criminal Division
FY 2008/FY 2009 FY 2009/FY 2010 • Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Terrorism
Previously FY 2009 Unit in Washington D.C.
Approved Revised Bridge Spend
Sub-Activity Group (9/2008) Spend Plan Request Plan • FBI in Iraq
MoD Sustainment 154.7 173.9 91.8 91.8
Equipment 917.9 925.0 1,030.1 260.1 The Justice Attaché’s office also works with the
Training 116.1 192.4 234.0 196.5 MOI and HJC to assist with judicial security and to
Infrastructure 298.5 298.5 — — encourage the adoption of a judicial security plan
Subtotal 1,487.2 1,589.8 1,355.9 548.4
for Iraq. The United States continues to assist in se-
MoI Sustainment 106.0 66.0 20.0 20.0
curing courthouses and protecting judges and their
Equipment 392.0 432.0 125.6 125.6
families by locating judges in secure complexes
Training 650.0 650.0 417.2 231.0
throughout Iraq, but several challenges remain:173
Infrastructure 110.0 110.0 — —
• The Rule of Law Coordinator (RoLC) reports
Subtotal 1,258.0 1,258.0 562.8 376.6
that the Embassy’s RoL section lacks dedicated
funding to support its efforts. RoLC is slated
Other Related Activities 254.8 152.2 96.2 75.0
to receive some direct funds in FY 2010 from
Total 3,000.0 3,000.0 2,014.9 1,000.0
DoJ, but they will not be available for use until
Note: Data not audited. Numbers affected by rounding.
January 2010.
Source: OSD, responses to SIGIR data calls, 7/2/2009 and 9/30/2009.
• The challenge of endemic corruption remains.
The Embassy’s RoL section reports working
closely with the Anti-Corruption Coordination
Office (ACCO) to build the capacity of Iraqi legal
institutions and to promote stronger anticorrup-
tion safeguards.
• Iraqi infrastructure has yet to fully recover
from deterioration permitted by the prior re-
gime and war damage. This quarter, the Cham-
chamal Correctional Facility began operating
in Sulaymaniyah province. Able to house up to
3,000 prisoners, this facility was constructed
as part of the INL prison construction pro-
gram. On September 19, 2009, the first inmates
SIGIR inspects Chamchamal Correctional Facility in Sulaymaniyah province. arrived—a group of 360 prisoners from Camp
Bucca prison—along with 10 Iraqi Correctional
U.S. Embassy-Baghdad’s Rule of Law (RoL) Officers (ICOs). As of October 12, 2009, there
section focuses primarily on operational matters are 2,637 inmates and 240 ICOs at Chamchamal
to assist U.S. investigations and cases pertaining to Correctional Facility.
Iraq, including cases involving fraud, corruption,
violent crimes, and terrorism. It works in conjunc- On June 20, 2009, SIGIR conducted an on-site
tion with these entities: assessment of the Chamchamal Correctional Facility
• Ministry of Interior renovation project in Chamchamal, Iraq. The project
• Central Criminal Court of Iraq (CCC-I) was funded by INL. To protect the U.S. govern-
• U.S. Attorneys Office ment’s investment of approximately $29 million,

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 51

IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING SOURCES AND USES

SIGIR recommended that the INL Director continue Figure 2.18

to coordinate with the KRG to provide the power, Rule of Law Assistance to GOI's Judicial System
staffing, and operating budget to open and run the
facility.174 This recommendation has been met, and
the prison opened in September. Dahuk

For the locations of U.S. RoL offices, see

Figure 2.18. Ninewa
Erbil

Tameem Sulaymaniyah
Court Reconstruction Update
Salah Al-Din
Central Criminal Court of Iraq
The CCC-I operates two facilities in Baghdad, one Diyala

in Rusafa and one in Karkh. In addition, there are Baghdad

Anbar
Major Criminal Courts (MCCs) located in all of
the provinces. The U.S. government has provided Kerbala Babylon
Wassit

significant logistical and technical support to both

Qadissiya
CCC-I Karkh and the Rusafa Investigative Court.175 Missan

Thi-Qar
Najaf
Rusafa Investigative Court
Chief Judge Medhat commissioned the Justice Basrah
and Law Enforcement Assistance (JALEA) pro- Muthanna

gram to develop a model court plan based on its

analysis of the Rusafa court. Initial analysis has PRT Rule of Law Advisor
New or Upgraded Courthouse
been completed in three areas, including judicial
education, case management, and judicial security. Source: DoS, “INL Report on Courthouses,” 10/2008; U.S. Justice Attaché, response to SIGIR data call, 10/15/2009.

The judicial education component is designed to

facilitate the training of all the investigative judges, courts expedite criminal proceedings. During
judicial investigators, and prosecutors who work this quarter, attorneys interviewed approximately
in the Investigative Judge (IJ) court. The second 850 detainees and reached the milestone of 10,000
area pertains to a case records and management interviews conducted since the inception of the
system, including a record management system for Defense Center. The center also provides reintegra-
the court that is independent of the MOI. Finally, tion assistance to detainees who have been released
JALEA is working on a judicial security program, from custody. The Legal Defense Center program
designed to provide training for the security staff at was intended to be a pilot program and is cur-
Rusafa and acquisition of security equipment, such rently being used as a model for similar programs
as mirrors and wands. JALEA is continuing its throughout the country.
work with the HJC and hopes to receive approval to The HJC has developed an Oracle-based case
fully implement the proposed programs at Rusafa. tracking system that is compatible with the Iraqi
The Baghdad Legal Defense Center continues Justice Integration Project’s data dictionary. INL
to provide legal defense services to Rusafa detain- is assisting the MOI and MOJ to develop, imple-
ees. Defense Center attorneys interview detainees ment, and manage similar databases, with rollout
and review their investigative files to help the in October 2009.176

52 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 SECURITY

CCC-I Karkh of Iraq that lack sufficient judicial personnel to ad-

MNF-I’s Task Force-134 (TF-134) assists the GOI equately process the high volume of cases resulting
to prosecute serious offenders when there is evi- from security operations.179
dence to support the charges and also to speed the U.S. government personnel are also working
release of those who are being held with the MOI and the Iraqi courts—IJs in par-
on insufficient evidence. It maintains ticular—to improve the operating relationships
4

Saddam Hussein Trial

On July 17, 2005, formal charges a liaison office with CCC-I Karkh between IJs and police. One goal of this ongoing
this quarter
years ago

were filed against Saddam Hus- to assist in the prosecution of cases effort is to mitigate the delay caused when inves-
sein and other co-defendants where Coalition forces are victims of tigative files are transferred between police and
in connection with government
criminal offenses or where Coali- judges for further investigation. To this end, Rule
atrocities committed against the
people of al-Dujail. The former tion forces investigate serious crimes of Law Advisors (RoLAs) working in the Provincial
leader’s trial began on October 19, 2005; against Iraqi military or civilian Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have established
he was convicted on November 5, 2006; victims. The office coordinates the Criminal Justice Coordination Councils to en-
and he was executed on December 30, appearance of detainees and wit- courage Iraqi police, judges, and military to work
2006.
nesses and assists the Iraqi investi- together and share information.
gative officers in the collection and In the long term, INL is developing the Iraq
presentation of evidence, as well as participating to Higher Judicial Council Court Administration
resolve juvenile justice issues. Project, which will allow the HJC to increase its
The Justice Attaché’s office within the RoL capacity in all aspects of judicial administration, in-
section continued to support CCC-I Karkh in a cluding standardizing a national case management
number of ways, including providing advice to the system (initially, via a manual system, and thereaf-
judges on the investigations of officials in Diyala ter, through a phased-in computer system).180 The
province and other high-priority cases.177 HJC currently lacks a central system for case man-
agement, and often there is little case tracking.181
Court Docket Backlog SIGIR produced an inspection report this
Courts hearing the most serious insurgent crimes, quarter on the Secure Document Storage Facility
particularly in Baghdad, report being over- for the Iraqi High Tribunal (IHT), in Baghdad,
whelmed. Although approximately 5,500 Rusafa Iraq. Half of the $1.9 million IRRF-funded project
detainee cases have been processed in the past 12 was supposed to provide secure rooms to store
months, approximately 9,000 pre-trial detainees sensitive documentation that has been or will be
remain in Baghdad detention facilities awaiting used for prosecution of former regime members
trial. The courts’ ability to process cases fairly for crimes against humanity; the other half was
and quickly is hampered by the sheer number of supposed to provide open office and administra-
criminal cases, the lack of timely and complete tive space for IHT staff.
investigations, insufficient detainee files, poor court SIGIR found that the contractor did not provide
administration, and judicial intimidation. Accord- the contractually required “pre-engineered build-
ing to DoD, the CCC-I offices located at Karkh and ing.” After a structural failure occurred during
Rusafa have shown some improvement in case- construction, an evaluation indicated that the
processing time, but more must be accomplished.178 structure would collapse under its own weight. A
The U.S. government has taken multiple steps to pre-engineered building would have included the
assist the HJC in mitigating docket backlog. In the appropriately sized steel frame members. More-
short term, RoL advisors in many provinces assist over, the design did not provide for a sustainable fa-
by providing basic logistical assistance. MNF-I also cility because required insulation was not installed.
transports detainees to court and judges to regions However, on a follow-up site inspection, SIGIR

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 53

IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING SOURCES AND USES

determined that the contractor had remedied the The U.S. military withdrawal and subsequent
previously identified warranty deficiencies.182 transfer of detainees will ultimately affect five areas
where ICITAP advisors provide assistance to the
Major Crimes Task Force Iraqi Correctional Service (ICS). So will reduced
The joint GOI-U.S. Major Crimes Task Force funding for the ICITAP corrections mission, which
(MCTF) develops capacity to investigate high-pro- has resulted in a 51% reduction of advisors, and the
file crimes, including corruption. The GOI assigns further reductions scheduled through 2010.185
experienced investigators to the task force from The number of Iraqi detainees in U.S. cus-
MOI Internal Affairs, MOI Office of the Inspector tody dropped to 8,974 after the transfer of 107
General, National Information and Investigations detainees to the GOI on August 27, 2009. This
Agency, and Criminal Investigation Division, as is the lowest number of Iraqi detainees in U.S.
well as an investigative judge from the CCC-I. The custody since March 2005. The SA mandates that
U.S. government provides federal agents from these detainees must be released if they do not have
agencies to train and mentor the Iraqi participants: arrest warrants or detention orders issued by the
• FBI GOI. MNF-I and the GOI review every detainee’s
• Drug Enforcement Administration file to determine if a warrant should be issued.
• Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Since January 2009, 5,236 detainees have been
Explosives released, and 1,179 others have been transferred
• U.S. Marshals into GOI custody.186
• Defense Criminal Investigative Service For an update on U.S. prison projects, see
• Army Criminal Investigation Command Table 2.11.

At the request of GOI’s National Investigations Amnesty Releases

and Intelligence Agency, MCTF is working to es- As of September 30, 2009, amnesty review commit-
tablish a full-time, eight-person evidence response tees had approved approximately 132,000 amnesty
team as a component of the task force.183 petitions and denied 33,000. Despite the high
number of approved petitions, only 7,946 detainees
Detention Facilities have been confirmed as having been released from
and Detainee Releases detention facilities since January 2009 under am-
The DoJ’s International Criminal Investigative nesty release orders. The total number of petitions
Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) has gradu- is much higher than the number of individuals in
ally been re-focusing its mission to parallel the U.S. detention because some individuals have multiple
military withdrawal from three major detainee convictions or investigations initiated against
camps in Iraq—Camp Bucca, Camp Cropper, and them, and each one receives a separate amnesty
the Taji Theatre Internment Facility Reintegra- consideration. Thousands of amnesty applications
tion Center. Camp Bucca was the first to close on are for those who have been charged for crimes but
September 17, 2009, after opening six years ago.184 have not been detained or brought to trial.187 ◆

54 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 SECURITY

Table 2.11
Ongoing INL-funded Prison Construction
Cost % Complete Est. Date of Est.
Prison ($ millions) Location (as of 9/30/2009) Completion Capacity Cause of Delay
Basrah Central 9.7 Basrah 45% 12/2009 1,200 Delayed after contractor failed to submit
detailed design for approval by USACE.
Chamchamal 28.7 Sulaymaniyah 100% Completed 3,000 See SIGIR’s inspection in Section 4
of this Report.
Fort Suse: Phase I 6.0 Sulaymaniyah 93% 9/2009 689 Delayed awaiting the ICS sign-off on
renovated areas.
Fort Suse: Phase III 11.1 Sulaymaniyah 60% 12/2009 500 USACE has descoped portions of
the project at the direction of INL
because engineers revealed structural
deficiencies in the lower levels of the
existing fort.
Nassriya: Phase II 8.7 Thi-Qar 90% — 400 Delays caused by work stoppages.

Note: The total project cost for the Chamchamal Correctional Facility was reported in SIGIR’s project assessment, PA-09-177, “Renovate and Expand Chamchamal Correctional Facility,
Chamchamal, Iraq,” released in October 2009.

Source: U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, INL, response to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2009.

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 55

IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING SOURCES AND USES

INFRASTRUCTURE

As of September 30, 2009, the U.S. government Figure 2.19

had allocated $12.35 billion to rehabilitate Iraq’s Infrastructure: Status of Funds
$ Billions
infrastructure, including projects in the energy,
water, transportation, and communications sec-
tors. More than $11.88 billion has been obligated, Unexpended Funds
and $11.47 billion has been expended.188 For the Total: $0.89
Water and
status of U.S. infrastructure funds, see Figure 2.19. Allocated $12.35
Sanitation
$0.16
As U.S. reconstruction projects wind down, GOI 18%
efforts to fund Iraq’s infrastructure development Obligated $11.88
Not
and attract foreign investment remain central to Expended $11.47 Obligated Electricity
15%
$0.47 53% $0.13
progress—particularly in the energy sector.
Increased oil and electricity production in the 12% Transportation and
Kurdistan Region and the growing use of natural Communications
$0.10
gas to fuel electricity generation were prominent 2%
developments this quarter. But the progress Other Obligated
$0.02
achieved thus far in rebuilding Iraq’s infrastructure
and providing essential services has not always
matched Iraqi’s expectations—a theme that
surfaces with greater intensity as the country Note: Data not audited. Numbers affected by rounding. Unexpended funds include expired appropriations.
OSD does not report CERP allocation, obligation, and expenditure data for project categories on a quarterly
approaches national elections in January 2010. basis for all fiscal year appropriations. CERP allocation, obligation, and expenditure data is pulled from IRMS;
therefore, totals may not match top-line values found in the Funding Sources subsection of this Report.
Moreover, the prolonged drought, together with
Sources: DFAS, response to SIGIR data call, 4/10/2009; IRMS, MNC-I Quarterly Report, 10/12/2009; NEA-I, response
reduced inflows of water from neighboring to SIGIR data call, 10/7/2009; USACE, GRD, response to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2009; USAID, response to SIGIR data
call, 4/13/2009.
countries, has had a negative effect on supplies of
drinking water, irrigation for crop production, and
power generation at hydroelectric plants.
In addition, the Ministry of Oil named the third
Director General of the South Oil Company in
Energy 18 months,192 and the KRG suspended oil exports
until an agreement could be reached with the GOI
Oil and Gas over paying international oil companies operating
As of September 30, 2009, the U.S. government had in the Kurdistan Region.193
allocated $2.06 billion, obligated $1.92 billion, and
expended $1.91 billion to rehabilitate the oil and gas Crude Oil Production and Exports
sector in Iraq.189 Iraqi crude oil production this quarter averaged
This quarter the second round of bidding on 2.49 million barrels per day (MBPD), slightly
service contracts for 10 additional groups of Iraqi exceeding the previous post-invasion record in the
oil fields was rescheduled,190 while a proposal to April–June quarter of 2008.194 This was a 3% in-
reconstitute the Iraq National Oil Company (part crease over last quarter,195 but just below the GOI’s
of the pending hydrocarbon laws) apparently is 2009 production goal of 2.5 MBPD.196 By compari-
on hold until after next year’s national elections.191 son, crude oil production averaged 2.16 MBPD in

56 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 INFRASTRUCTURE

Figure 2.20
Crude Oil Production and Exports, by Month, 6/2003–9/2009
Million Barrels per Day

3.0
Production
2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0
Exports

0.5

0.0
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Note: This data does not include crude oil production in, or exports from, the Kurdistan Region. Neither the KRG nor the MOI release
official statistics on oil production and exports from the Kurdistan Region. According to the KRG Minister of Natural Resources, the KRG
has demonstrated the capacity to produce 100,000 barrels per day for export. Actual production, however, is not known.

Sources: ITAO, Monthly Import, Production, and Export Spreadsheet, 1/2008; U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, response to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2008;
DoS, Iraq Status Report, 5/27/2009 and 10/14/2009; NEA-I, response to SIGIR data call, 7/2/2009.

the same quarter of 2007 and 2.47 MBPD in the participated in 8 consortia.205 Round one produced
same quarter of 2008.197 only one accepted bid—offered for the Rumaila
Crude oil exports this quarter averaged oil fields by a consortium led by British Petro-
2.01 MBPD,198 almost 7% above last quarter’s leum (38% stake) and China National Petroleum
export level and just above the GOI’s 2009 target of Corporation (CNPC) (37% stake).206 The British-led
2.0 MBPD.199 By comparison, crude oil exports consortium will partner with an Iraqi oil company,
averaged 1.95 MBPD in the same quarter of 2007 which will have a 25% stake.207
and 1.73 MBPD in the same quarter of 2008.200 Round-two bidding for 10 additional groups of
For crude oil production and export levels from oil fields has been rescheduled several times and
2003 to 2009, see Figure 2.20. will reportedly take place in either late 2009 or
early 2010.208 The Ministry of Oil held meetings in
Bidding for Service Contracts Istanbul to generate interest and announce several
The GOI has set a goal of increasing national oil key changes to its contract terms, including:209
production to 6 MBPD by 2017.201 To accomplish • reducing the amount of signing bonuses paid to
this, Iraq launched two rounds of bidding on oil the GOI by winning bidders
service contracts.202 The service contracts offer for- • changing some production plateau terms,
eign companies a fee for each barrel of oil produced including the length of time operators would
in excess of an agreed-upon goal,203 rather than a have to maintain a target production rate
production stake in the Iraqi oil fields.
In the first round, held this past June, 22 in- Also notable is the number of state-owned oil
ternational oil companies formed 14 consortia to companies pre-qualified for bidding. For a list of
share the risk and submit bids.204 Chinese compa- companies pre-qualified to bid in the second round,
nies were the most active: 4 Chinese companies see Table 2.12. In addition, press reports indicate

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 57

IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING SOURCES AND USES

Table 2.12
Companies Approved To Bid in the Second Round

State-owned Companies Privately Owned Companies

Country Company Country Company
Angola Sonangol (partially state-owned) Australia BHP Billiton Ltd.
China* CNOOC Ltd (66% state-owned) Woodside Petroleum Ltd.
China National Petroleum Corp. Canada Nexen Inc.
Sinochem Corp. Denmark Maersk
India Oil and Natural Gas Corp. (74% state-owned) France Total SA
Oil India Germany Wintershall BASF
Indonesia PT Pertamina Italy Edison SpA
Italy Eni SpA (30% state-owned) Japan Japan Petroleum Exploration Co Ltd.
Japan Inpex Corp. (29% state-owned) Mitsubishi Corp.
Japan Oil, Gas, Metals Corp. (established by the government of
Mitsui Oil Exploration Co.
Japan in 2004)
Kazakhstan JSC KazMunaiGas Exploration Production Nippon Oil Corp.
Malaysia Petronas Korea Korea Gas Corp.
Norway StatoilHydro ASA (63% state-owned) Russia OAO Lukoil Holdings
Pakistan Pakistan Petroleum Limited (partially state-owned) OAO Tatneft
Russia OJSC Rosneft Oil Co. (75% state-owned) Spain/Argentina Repsol YPF
OAO Gazprom (50% state-owned) UK BG Group Plc
Turkey Turkiye Petrolleri AO BP Plc
Vietnam PetroVietnam Carin Energy
UK/Netherlands Royal Dutch Shell Plc
USA Anadarko Petroleum Corp.
Chevron Corp.
ConocoPhillips
ExxonMobil Corp.
Hess Corp.
Marathon Oil Corp.
Occidental Petroleum Corp.

Note: Percentage ownership stakes of national oil companies from Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, 12/1/2008.
*SINOPEC, a Chinese oil company heavily backed by the Chinese government, has reportedly been banned from the second round.

Source: Petroleum Contracts and Licensing Directorate of the Iraqi Ministry of Oil, 9/15/2009.

that the Ministry of Oil is pursuing separate and Korea Gas Corporation; its Iraqi partner will be
negotiations with the highest bidders for fields not the Southern Oil Company.212
awarded in the first round.210 Italian-based Eni SpA
announced on October 13, 2009, that its consortium Efforts To Increase Oil Production
had been awarded the license for the Zubair field and Refining in Kurdistan
that was initially offered in the first round.211 The Neither the KRG nor the GOI releases official
Eni SpA consortium includes Occidental Petroleum statistics on oil production and exports from the

58 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 INFRASTRUCTURE

export from the Kurdistan Region until an agree-

ment with the GOI over payment is reached.218 The
failure to pass the package of national hydrocarbon
laws means that this disagreement remains unre-
solved; a senior member of the Iraqi Parliament
recently announced that the CoR would not take
up the package of hydrocarbon laws until 2010.219
Because of this, the three international com-
panies operating the Taq Taq and Tawke fields—
Addax Petroleum Corp., DNO International, and
Genel Enerji—have not been paid for the oil they
have produced.220 On October 2, 2009, Addax
Petroleum was acquired by China’s SINOPEC.221
Although SINOPEC (which is heavily backed by
the Chinese government) claimed it had permis-
sion to participate in the second round, officials
On July 18, 2009, the Erbil Refinery, owned by KAR Oil Refining Ltd., received its first oil from the
Khurmala Dome oil field. (KRG photo) from the Iraqi Ministry of Oil indicated that
SINOPEC will be barred unless it divests itself of
Kurdistan Region.213 The KRG Minister of Natural the KRG contracts.222 According to U.S. Embassy-
Resources, however, noted in a letter dated October Baghdad, SINOPEC has been banned from the
5, 2009, that the KRG has demonstrated the capac- second round.223
ity to produce 100,000 BPD for export over the past Notwithstanding current disputes over oil rev-
several months, and that this amount could easily enue sharing, the KRG continues to push oil devel-
be doubled.214 This claim cannot be substantiated at opment contracts in its territories. The KRG offers
this time.215 companies a production stake in the fields they
An informal arrangement between the GOI and develop and, in some cases, the KRG received
KRG allowed Iraq’s State Oil Marketing Organiza- shares in the companies awarded oil exploration
tion (SOMO) to sell the crude oil and development contracts.224 The KRG Minister
3

Ambitious produced by the Tawke and Taq Taq of Natural Resources stated on October 9, 2009,
Hydrocarbon Goal fields for export.216 No agreement that “over 30 companies have been awarded oil
this quarter
years ago

On July 27, 2006, Iraq and the

was reached, however, between the contracts” in the KRG region.225 For a timeline
United Nations jointly launched
the 5-year International Com-
KRG and the GOI about who should of recent oil activity in the Kurdistan Region,
pact with Iraq, which set the pay the international oil companies see Figure 2.21.
goal of approving the Hydrocar- operating the fields.217 The GOI On July 18, 2009, the KRG launched the flow
bon Law by the end of 2007. contends that the KRG is responsible of oil produced from the Khurmala Dome, part of
for paying the international firms out the Kirkuk oil field, to a new refinery in Erbil via
of its share of the proceeds because the KRG does a 40-kilometer pipeline.226 During the inaugural
not submit its oil contracts to the GOI for approval. ceremony, the Prime Minister of the KRG said
The KRG’s position is that the GOI should pay the that, “the facility is the first private-sector refinery
international oil companies because the oil pro- in the Kurdistan Region and throughout Iraq that
duced is Iraqi oil exported through Iraqi pipelines. operates at a serious capacity.”227 The refinery was
Underscoring the contentiousness of this issue, the originally a Ministry of Oil project that the min-
KRG’s Minister of Natural Resources said on Oc- istry could not complete. The project was handed
tober 9, 2009, that no more oil will be pumped for over to the KRG, which established a public-private

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 59

IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING SOURCES AND USES

Figure 2.21
Timeline of Recent 2009 Oil Activity in the Kurdistan Region

June 1, 2009 July 27, 2009 August, 2009 September 8, 2009

KRG ceremony inaugurating Canadian firm Longford Energy, Heritage Oil completes Talisman Energy announces that future plans
crude oil exports from the Inc., announces acquisition of a testing of Miran West-1 to develop new projects in the Kurdistan
Kurdistan Region.a stake in the Chia Surkh block in discovery in the Region will wait until after the KRG and the
the Kurdistan Region.d Kurdistan Region.f GOI reach agreement on oil revenue issues.g

JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT

July 18, 2009 July 20, 2009 August 31, 2009 September 8, 2009 October 9, 2009
The KRG launches the flow of Gulf Keystone Petroleum, Ltd. Bayou Bend Petroleum Oil Search Ltd announces KRG announcement that
oil produced from the is awarded two more announces agreements initial results for its Shakal-1 no more oil would be
Khurmala Dome oil field to a production sharing contracts with the KRG for exploration well, located on pumped for export from
new refinery in Erbil.c in the Kurdistan Region. exploration and a block it acquired in the the Kurdistan Region
development of three Kurdistan Region in 2008.h until an agreement with
oil blocks.e the GOI over payment is
reached.i
Sources:
a
Kurdistan Regional Government, press release, http://www.krg.org/articles/detail.asp?lngnr=12&smap=02010100&rnr=223&anr=29807, accessed 10/26/2009.
b
Gulf Keystone Petroleum, Ltd., Kurdistan Update, 7/20/2009, www.gulfkeystone.com, accessed 10/21/2009.
c
Remarks of the KRG Prime Minister at the opening of the Khurmala Dome oil project, 7/18/2009,
http://www.krg.org/articles/detail.asp?lngnr=12&smap=02010100&rnr=223&anr=30604, accessed 10/16/2009.
d
Longford Energy Inc., press release, 7/27/2009.
e
Middle East Economic Survey, Weekly Report, Vol LII, No. 36, 9/7/2009, p. 2.
f
Heritage Oil Plc, press release, 8/17/2009.
g
Talisman Energy, Inc., investor open house presentation, 5/2009; “Talisman Energy plans new projects in Iraq and Papua, New Guinea,” Energy Business Review, 9/8/2009.
http://oilgasexploration.energy-business-review.com/News/talisman energy plans new projects in iraq and papua new guinea 090908/, accessed 10/18/2009.
h
Oil Search Ltd., Drilling Report, 9/7/2009.
i
Remarks by the KRG Minister of Natural Resources, 10/9/2009, http://www.krg.org/articles/detail.asp?lngnr=12&smap=02010100&rnr=223&anr=31849,
accessed 10/19/2009.

partnership to complete it.228 The refinery is ex- Iraq National Oil Company
pected to provide the Kurdistan Region with diesel On July 29, 2009, Iraq’s Council of Minis-
and kerosene for domestic consumption.229 ters (CoM) approved a draft bill (part of the
hydrocarbon laws) to reestablish the state-run
Oil Infrastructure Security Iraq National Oil Company (INOC).236 The
and the Iraqi Oil Police INOC reportedly would be governed by a Board
The GOI has full responsibility for funding and of Directors,237 and the Board’s CEO would hold
maintaining pipeline security.230 This includes cabinet rank and report directly to the CoM—not
training and equipping the Oil Police, who provide the Ministry of Oil.238 Action on the bill is not
security for Iraq’s oil infrastructure. This quarter, expected until after the January 2010 elections.239
1,342 Iraqis attended training and graduated from
the North Oil Police Training Center.231 Natural Gas Update
Thus far in 2009, there have been eight attacks In September 2008, the Ministry of Oil and Royal
on Iraq’s oil infrastructure, only one of which DoD Dutch Shell reached a heads of agreement to cre-
assessed as effective,232 and there have been no ate a joint venture to capture, process, and utilize
such attacks this quarter.233 Since September 2007, natural gas produced in Basrah province.240 Large
there have been no attacks against any pipeline in volumes of natural gas associated with crude oil
a Pipeline Exclusion Zone (PEZ).234 As SIGIR has production are currently flared because Iraq lacks
previously noted, PEZ projects have been among the infrastructure to harness it.241 The agreement
the most successful of all U.S.-funded infrastruc- would form the Basrah Gas Company (BGC),
ture projects.235 with the South Gas Company taking a 51% stake,

60 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 INFRASTRUCTURE

Shell taking a 44% stake, and Mitsubishi taking a of providing 6,000 megawatts (MW) of power at
5% stake.242 Although a one-year time limit was system-wide peak—a milestone reached five years
set to complete negotiations, no contract had been after its target date.
finalized or approved by the September 21, 2009, Because demand for electricity also has grown
deadline.243 No action is reportedly expected until since 2003, the gap between supply and demand
after the January 2010 elections.244 is roughly twice what it was six years ago; and
though the situation has been improving over
Electricity the past two years, Iraqis cannot yet count on the
Since 2003, the United States has allocated national grid to meet all their energy needs. Dur-
$5.16 billion, obligated $4.99 billion, and expended ing a visit this quarter, Deputy Prime Minister
$4.86 billion to help Iraq improve its generation, for Services Rafe al-Eissawi told the Inspector
transmission, and distribution of electricity.245 General that access to electricity remains a seri-
Table 2.13 provides a breakdown of ous problem in Iraq. The people of energy-rich
6

The 6,000-Megawatt Goal U.S.-funded projects by project type. Iraq continue to endure power outages, and those
In an address to the Iraqi people These expenditures—together with who can afford to do so supplement the public
this quarter
years ago

on August 29, 2003, Ambassador

contributions by the international supply with power from “backyard” or neighbor-
L. Paul Bremer III announced,
“About one year from now, for community, efforts by the Iraqis, and hood generators.
the first time in history, every Iraqi a decline in attacks on the electricity
in every city, town, and village will infrastructure—have resulted in in- Electricity Supply
have as much electricity as he or she can creased electricity supplies through- This quarter, electricity supply to the national grid,
use; and he will have it 24 hours a day,
out most of the country. which includes both domestic production and
every single day.” This translated to a goal
of adding some 1,600 MW of power to
For the fifth straight quarter, imports, averaged about 6,439 MW, or 154,500
the national grid by the summer of 2004 average electricity supply on Iraq’s megawatt-hours (MWh) per day. This is an almost
to achieve a total peak electricity supply of national grid achieved a new 10% increase from the previous quarter and a 43%
6,000 MW. It was not achieved until five post-invasion high. Supply now increase from the same quarter in 2007.246 For
years later. exceeds Ambassador Bremer’s domestic production and imports, relative to esti-
goal, announced in August 2003, mated demand, since January 2004, see Figure 2.22.

Table 2.13
Value of U.S. Electricity Projects, by Project Type
$ Millions

Project Category Completed Ongoing Not Started Total

Generation 2,032.47 21.54 9.89 2,063.90
Distribution 1,228.04 9.47 25.24 1,262.75
Transmission 919.65 106.10 67.46 1,093.22
Sustainment and Spare Parts 300.87 2.84 0.70 304.41
General Infrastructure 278.58 11.37 3.94 293.90
Monitoring and Control 131.13 — 11.59 142.71
Other 20.76 8.90 3.72 33.38
Total 4,911.50 160.23 122.54 5,194.27

Note: Numbers affected by rounding. This list of reconstruction projects is based on IRMS data, which is not fully accurate or complete.
Project totals therefore do not reconcile with top-line obligations and expenditures provided by the agencies.

Source: IRMS, Global Benchmark, 10/9/2009.

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 61

IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING SOURCES AND USES

Figure 2.22
Average Iraqi Electricity Supply and Estimated Demand, by Month, 1/2004–9/2009
MWh per Day

250,000

200,000 Estimated Demand

150,000
Total Supply

100,000
Imports
50,000
Power Plant Production

0
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Sources: ITAO/ESD, Electric Daily Performance Reports, 6/1/2006–9/30/2009; DoS, Iraq Status Report, 10/25/2006, p. 11, and 5/9/2007, p. 11.

Figure 2.23 output taking into account the condition of the

Sources of Electricity Supply, 2007 vs. 2009 plant, type of fuel used, and other ambient condi-
Average for Quarter Ending September 30, MW
tions. This quarter, Iraq’s power plants operated at
38% of their nameplate capacity and 52% of their
7,000 feasible capacity, modest increases from the same
6,439 MW
560 560
quarter in 2007.247
6,000
669 1,011
Of the 1,951 MW of supply added to the grid
5,000 over the past two years, slightly more than half can
4,488 MW 379
290
be attributed to the refurbishment or expansion of
Contributors to
4,000 1,951 MW Growth GOI-owned power plants,248 on which the U.S. gov-
ernment has spent more than $2 billion.249 About
3,000 5,209 Privately Owned 29% of the increase came from two new power
Power Plants
2,000
4,198
Imports
plants built by private investors in the Kurdistan
MOE Power Plants Region, and 19% came from electricity imported
1,000 from neighboring countries.250 For an overview of
the sources of increased electricity supply over the
0
2007 2009 past two years, see Figure 2.23.
Note: Numbers affected by rounding.
Sources: ITAO/ESD, Electric Daily Performance Reports, 7/1/2007–9/30/2009. Privately Owned Power Plants
The first of the two privately built and operated
Iraq’s nameplate generating capacity averaged power plants, the Erbil Gas plant, began supply-
15,300 MW this quarter, and feasible generating ing electricity to the grid in 2008. The Sulay-
capacity averaged about 11,150 MW. Both were 4% maniyah plant came on line next, in spring 2009,
above last quarter’s levels. Specified by the manu- and its output is expected to increase later this
facturer, nameplate capacity is a generating unit’s year when the third and fourth generating units
maximum output when it is operating under opti- are brought on line. Both of these combustion
mal conditions. Feasible capacity is the maximum turbine plants are owned by Mass Global

62 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 INFRASTRUCTURE

The Erbil Gas power plant, privately built and operated, had The Qudas power plant, an MOE-run plant on which the United States
an average output this quarter of 368 MW, which is 75% of its has spent more than $250 million, had an average output this quarter
nameplate capacity. (KRG Ministry of Electricity photo) of 429 MW, which is 47% of its nameplate capacity. (USACE photo)

Company and are fueled primarily by natural gas Turkey have decreased by almost one-fourth, and
piped from the Khor Mor gas field in Sulaymani- imports from Iran have more than quadrupled,
yah.251 These two plants currently have a com- averaging about 537 MW (80% of total electricity
bined nameplate capacity of 738 MW (excluding imports) this quarter.257 For changes in electricity
the two generating units that are not yet com- imports since 2004, see Figure 2.24.
pleted) and produced, on average, about 560 MW
(76% of capacity) this quarter.252 By compari- Supply-Demand Gap
son, the recently expanded Qudas plant in With the growth rate of electricity supplies outpac-
Baghdad, on which the United States has spent ing the rate of increased demand over the past two
more than $250 million,253 has a nameplate years, Iraq has been able to reduce the gap between
capacity of 910 MW and had an average output of supply and demand. Electricity supplies can be
429 MW (47% of capacity) this quarter.254 measured, but because of the supply shortfall,
According to press reports, Mass Global Com- electricity demand in Iraq can only be estimated
pany recently entered into a “build-own-operate” using computer models or other methods. Based
contract with the KRG for construction of another on ITAO’s estimates, load served was about 69%
plant, this one in Dahuk.255 Once this plant is of the country’s estimated demand this quarter,
completed, each of the Kurdistan Region’s three up from 54% in the same quarter two years ago
provinces will have a privately owned power plant (Figure 2.25).258
connected to the grid, compared with none in the Four out of five Iraqis live in provinces where
rest of Iraq.256 the gap between available electricity supply and
estimated demand has been narrowed, to some ex-
Electricity Imports tent, over the past two years. However, as discussed
Electricity imports into Iraq averaged 669 MW in Section 3 of this Report, disparities still exist
this quarter, about 2% lower than last quarter but among the provinces.259
131% more than the amount imported during the The supply-demand gap may have been gener-
same quarter in 2007. This electricity was gener- ally reduced, but it still affects Iraqis in many ways:
ated at power plants in Turkey and Iran. Two years • In a March 2009 poll, Iraqi residents said they
ago, almost 60% of the imported electric power received an average of eight hours of electricity
came from Turkey. Since then, imports from per day.260

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 63

IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING SOURCES AND USES

Figure 2.24
Electricity Imports, by Month, 1/2004–9/2009
MWh per Day

20,000

15,000

Total Imports

10,000

Imports from Iran

5,000

Imports from Syria Imports from Turkey

0
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Sources: ITAO/ESD, Electric Daily Performance Reports, 6/1/2006–9/30/2009; NEA-I, Iraq Weekly Status Report, 10/25/2006, page 11.

• Of the 284 Iraqi Army bases, only one is con- portable generators or purchase power from
nected to the national grid, and all rely on expen- private generation units that serve neighbor-
sive on-site generator-produced power.261 hoods. To get a more accurate picture of the
• The team leader of the PRT in Babylon reports extent to which Iraqi households are relying on
that every meeting he has attended in govern- non-grid electricity, U.S. Embassy-Baghdad and
ment offices has been interrupted by power the Ministry of Electricity (MOE) sponsored a
outages.262 study of private generation in Baghdad Central.
About 5 million people, or 75% of Baghdad’s
Small-scale Private Generators population, live in this area. The survey found
Because power from the national grid is unable that approximately 4,900 private generation units
to meet demand, many Iraqis buy their own serve about 466,000 households in Baghdad
Central,263 or roughly 3 million residents.264 Most
Figure 2.25 of these generators run on diesel fuel purchased
Estimated Demand for Electricity Met at subsidized prices from the Ministry of Oil. To-
by Power from National Grid, by Month, gether, they supply about 4,000 MWh of electric-
7/2007–9/2009
ity each day—roughly 10% of the energy supplied
100%
to Baghdad Central by the grid. On average,
however, the amperage is too low to power air
80%
conditioners or other heavy appliances. In theory,
60% if these generators were able to supply their
40% maximum output during any given hour, and
if they integrated with power from the grid, the
20%
supply-demand gap in Baghdad Central would
0%
2007 2008 2009
completely close—with power to spare.
Despite the benefits of these neighborhood
Note: Load served is measured at the substation level and is the amount
of electricity that enters the local distribution systems; because of
generation units, they present environmental
transmission losses that occur between power plants and substations,
load served is less than total electricity supply.
and safety hazards. The survey found that most
private generators are located in open areas without
Sources: ITAO/ESD, Electric Daily Performance Reports, 7/1/2007–9/30/2009.

64 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 INFRASTRUCTURE

to U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, the Treasury Attaché’s

office monitored the situation and encouraged the
GOI to fund the most recent payment to GE, and
payments are current as of September 30, 2009.268
According to the MOE, these new turbines will
be installed at 20 locations in Iraq (Figure 2.26).
Every province, except for those in the Kurdistan
Region, will get at least one new power plant.269
Construction is expected to begin in late 2010
or early 2011, with the new capacity coming on
line two to six years later.270 To move this project
forward, the MOE held a conference in Erbil on
October 1, 2009, with interested engineering and
construction firms.271
The 10,000 MW of planned new capacity is
almost five times the amount added over the past
A tangle of consumer-installed electric wires carries power from private generators to at least half two years and would increase the country’s current
the households in Central Baghdad. (Parsons Brinckerhoff photo)
nameplate generation capacity by about two-
protective containers. Many sites are covered with thirds.272 As SIGIR has previously reported, sub-
fuel that has spilled or has leaked from inadequate stantial increases in generation capacity will need to
storage tanks. Minimal effort is made by operators be accompanied by upgrades to Iraq’s transmission
to control fumes, smoke, and noise. And because and distribution systems; otherwise, these systems
consumers are responsible for running wires from will not be able to handle the increased loads.273 The
generating units to their homes, the connections Embassy is not aware of any contracts in place to
are generally disorganized and unsafe.265 facilitate the installation of the equipment or for the
upgrades necessary to the national grid.274 Further-
GOI Efforts To Expand Generating Capacity more, the availability of adequate and optimal fuel
and Production supplies will determine how well these new plants
The financing impasse that had delayed the MOE’s can perform. New combustion turbine plants fueled
plan to significantly expand Iraq’s generating by natural gas, such as the plants in Erbil and Sulay-
capacity apparently was resolved this quarter. In maniyah, have been operating twice as productively
December 2008, the MOE entered into agreements as the average power plant in Iraq—76% of name-
with GE and Siemens under which these two com- plate capacity versus 38%.275
panies would provide 72 combustion turbines, as As the MOE prepares to launch its ambitious
well as related equipment and services, that would capacity-expansion project, it continues to make
add more than 10,000 MW of nameplate generat- incremental additions to electricity supplies
ing capacity to the national grid.266 with other, smaller-scale projects. For example,
In its spring 2009 legislative session, however, production from two floating power plants—one
the CoR did not approve the sale of treasury bonds located in Khor al-Zubair, the other near the port
to pay for this expansion. In August, after Prime of Umm Qasr—may come on line by the end
Minister al-Maliki called attention to the delay, the of 2009. These power ships are being provided by
Central Bank of Iraq agreed to allow banks to lend Kartet, a Turkish company. They will have a com-
to the Ministry of Finance from their reserve re- bined capacity of 250 MW and will burn heavy
quirements to finance the expansion.267 According fuel oil to generate electricity.276

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 65

IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING SOURCES AND USES

Figure 2.26
Existing and Planned Power Plants in Iraq
Current Nameplate Capacity: 15,300 MW
Projected (2016 or later) Nameplate Capacity: 25,300 MW

Kasak (250 MW)

Erbil Gas (492 MW)
Mosul Main (750 MW) Mullah Abdullah–new (222 MW)
Mosul Pumping (240 MW) Mullah Abdullah–old (240 MW)
Mosul Gas (260 MW) Taza (260 MW)
Al-Qayyarah (500 MW) Dibis (320 MW)
Dokan (400 MW)
Kirkuk (325 MW)
Baiji Gas (477 MW) Sulaymaniyah Gas (492 MW)
Baiji (1,320 MW)
Baiji (960 MW) Darbandihkan (249 MW)
Baiji Mobile (184 MW) Mansuriya (250 MW)
Samarra (238 MW) Al-Sadir (320 MW)
Haditha Dam (660 MW) Qudas (910 MW)
Qudas (250 MW)
Anbar (500 MW)
Baghdad South Gas–old
(246 MW) Doura (640MW)
Baghdad South Gas–new Doura 3 (750 MW)
(280 MW)
Baghdad South (355 MW) Wassit (250 MW)

Diwaniya (500 MW)

Al-Qaryat (750 MW)
Amara (250 MW)

Nassriya (500 MW)

Al-Musayab (450 MW) Nassriya (840 MW)
Al-Musayab (500 MW)
Hartha (800 MW)
Al-Musayab (1,200 MW)
Hilla (160 MW) Najebia (200 MW)
Haydariya (500 MW)
Rumaila (1,300 MW)
Shatt Al-Basrah (750 MW)
Najaf Gas–old (189 MW) Al-Zubair (498 MW)
Najaf Gas–new (250 MW)
Existing Power Plants
Planned Power Plants
Al-Samawa (500 MW)

Sakar (182 MW)

Note: Map includes only plants with nameplate capacity greater than 150 MW. Planned power plants include
only those that are part of the MOE’s integrated plan to build new combustion-turbine generating units.

Sources: ITAO/ESD, Electric Daily Performance Reports, 7/1/2009–9/30/2009; MOE, General Directorate for Gas
Power Plants Projects, http://www.gppproject.com, accessed 9/14/2009.

66 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 INFRASTRUCTURE

Renewable Energy Resources to completing construction of the Ramadi 132-kV

Hydropower remains the only significant renew- substation ($30 million) and rehabilitation of the
able resource used for electricity generation in Iraq, 132-kV substation in Falluja ($17 million). Only one
though its contribution is still suppressed by the large generation project remains: the $28 million
effects of the drought and decreased water flows project to provide parts for the Qudas power plant
in the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. Hydroelectric and hot gas path inspections at the Baghdad South
production this quarter was 9% below what it was power plant.282
last quarter and 43% below what it was in the same
quarter two years ago.277
Solar energy continues to be used in niche Water
applications:
• This summer, the Ministry of Industry and The availability of potable water in Iraq is a press-
Minerals signed a contract with a European firm ing humanitarian need as the recent drought
to supply solar panels, each capable of generating has created problems in all areas of water use.
250 watts of electricity.278 This quarter, the UN Educational, Scientific, and
• Working with MNSTC-I, GRD is overseeing Cultural Organization (UNESCO) reported that,
construction of a system designed to use both since 2005, more than 100,000 people in northern
solar and wind energy to supply drinking water Iraq have fled their homes as a result of a major
and electricity to a remote border security check- decline of water flow in karez (underground aque-
point southeast of Baghdad.279 duct) systems. These systems have supplied Iraqis
• This quarter in the Ghazaliyah district of Bagh- with water for hundreds of years, but 70% of them
dad, the 2nd Heavy Brigade Combat Team com- are now dried up due to drought and the overex-
pleted installation of a system that enables the ploitation of groundwater. By August 2009, 116 of
New Iraqi Clinic to operate solely on solar power. 683 karez systems were still supplying water.283
When it was dependent on the national grid for As of September 30, 2009, the United States had
electricity, the clinic reportedly received only allocated approximately $2.74 billion, obligated
about two hours of power each day. The brigade $2.63 billion, and expended $2.47 billion for water
also is working on a solar-powered courthouse projects in Iraq.284 GRD reported the comple-
in Abu Ghraib.280 tion of 697 water supply, water treatment, and
• In July, GRD completed the second phase (val- irrigation projects (37 projects remain ongoing)
ued at $2 million) of a CERP project to install in addition to 188 wastewater treatment, sewage
solar-powered streetlights in Falluja, and it collection, and solid-waste projects (13 projects
expects to complete the third phase (valued at remain ongoing).285 According to ITAO, the cur-
$3 million) in June 2010. 281 rent design capacity of U.S.-funded water treat-
ment and distribution facilities is 2.4 million cubic
Ongoing U.S. Projects meters, serving 8.3 million people, and the current
As of September 30, 2009, GRD had 19 ongoing design capacity of U.S.-funded wastewater treat-
electricity projects with a total value of almost $180 ment and collection facilities is 1.2 million cubic
million. More than three-fourths of those expendi- meters, serving 5.3 million people.286 For a list of
tures are for transmission and distribution projects. U.S.-funded water projects completed this quarter
The largest project, construction of the Farabi and and major, ongoing U.S.-funded water projects, see
Jamila 132-kV substations in Sadr City, is expected Table 2.14 and Table 2.15.
to be completed in November 2009 at a total cost of In response to the water shortage, the GOI
almost $50 million. GRD also reports that it is close has taken an increasingly aggressive posture

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 67

IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING SOURCES AND USES

Table 2.14
GRD Water Projects Completed This Quarter
Project Name Province Date Completed Program Cost ($ Millions)
Wassit Compact Water Treatment Unit Wassit 8/24/2009 ESF 1.00
Fadhilyah Water Compact Unit Thi-Qar 8/2/2009 IRRF 0.80
Rania Water Project Sulaymaniyah 7/30/2009 ESF 2.41
Al Mussayib Water Treatment Plant Babylon 9/19/2009 CERP 1.32
Abu Newas Water Treatment Plant Baghdad 8/25/2009 IRRF 0.40
PRDC Athreban Water Project Tameem 8/8/2009 ESF 1.00
Water Project - Sadr City 7 Sectors Baghdad 7/7/2009 IRRF 3.02
Al Jehad 200m3/hr Water Compact Unit Basrah 8/24/2009 ESF 1.15
CD-ITAO – Task 9 – World Bank Logistical Support Baghdad 9/30/2009 ESF 0.15

Note: Numbers affected by rounding.

Source: GRD, responses to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2009 and 10/15/2009; GRD, www.grd.usace.army.mil/news/releases/NR09-09-03.pdf, accessed
10/15/2009.

Table 2.15
Major Ongoing GRD Water Projects
% Complete
Forecast Date Cost as of
Project Name Province of Completion Program ($ Millions) 10/2/2009
GRANT Eastern Euphrates Drain Muthanna 11/1/2009 IRRF 38.62 73%
Fallujah Sewer System Anbar 12/31/2009 IRRF 31.10 89%
GRANT Meshkab Water Supply Project Najaf 3/31/2010 IRRF 23.48 65%
Al Kibla Sewer and Storm Network Basrah 9/23/2010 ESF 12.40 0%
Establish Sanitation Network –
Basrah 7/1/2010 ESF 12.04 9%
Alabbas
Fallujah Sewer Pump Station F1 and F2 Anbar 12/31/2009 CERP 11.13 87%
Garma Water Reverse Feeding Basrah 1/28/2010 ESF 10.87 92%

Note: Numbers affected by rounding.

Source: GRD, responses to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2009 and 10/15/2009.

to secure access to riparian sources beyond its Turkish refusal to increase water flows to address
borders. On September 3, 2009, the Minister of Iraq’s need. Turkey’s Energy Minister countered
Water Resources (MoWR) led an Iraqi delega- Iraqi pressure by maintaining that Turkey is also
tion that met with the governments of Syria and dealing with a drought and that, as a humanitar-
Turkey. Participants focused on the issues of ian gesture, it has been releasing more water than
shared water and water conditions, the recent is customary.288
drought, and the fluctuations of the Euphrates Among other actions to address the effects
River at a time when below-average flows in of the drought, the MoWR has undertaken a
both the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and 40% campaign to plant 60,000 shrub and tree seedlings
below-average rainfall have caused shortages.287 near dams and lakes throughout Iraq to conserve
The GOI delegation expressed frustration over a soil moisture.289

68 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 INFRASTRUCTURE

In Madain, a remote region on the outskirts of

eastern Baghdad, the U.S. Army set up a solar-
powered system for filtering water and taught local
residents how to operate it. These small filtration
systems can purify about 6,000 gallons of water
per day,294 and the U.S. Army intends to provide
more of these systems to residents in the greater
Baghdad area.295

Wastewater Treatment
GRD reported that the $23.5 million, IRRF-funded
Construction continues on the Meshkab Water Supply Project. Meshkab Water Supply Project in Najaf province,
(GRD photo)
which began on January 24, 2007, is 65% complete
and is expected to enhance the ability to collect
Water Treatment grey and sewage water from the surrounding area
As of October 1, 2009, GRD reported that, for treatment and subsequent return to the river.296
through projects funded by the IRRF, it has This grant project with the GOI’s Ministry of
increased Iraq’s water treatment capacity by one Municipalities and Public Works is expected to be
million cubic meters per day, serving more than completed by the end of March 2010.297
five million people. Efforts to provide an addi-
tional 100,000 cubic meters of water treatment
capacity are still ongoing.290 For example, GRD Transportation and
reported that work on the $10.1 million, ESF- Communications
funded Garma Water Reverse Feeding Facility in
Basrah, due for completion on January 28, 2010, is As of September 30, 2009, the United States has
currently 92% complete and is expected to provide allocated $1.15 billion, obligated $1.09 billion, and
potable water for up to 220,000 people.291 expended $0.99 billion to improve Iraq’s transpor-
On August 24, 2009, a $1 million, ESF-funded tation and communications systems.298
water treatment plant was officially opened in
Wassit province. The plant was the result of a joint Ports
effort undertaken by GRD and the local govern- As of October 1, 2009, GRD had completed eight
ment; GRD expects it will serve 35,000 residents.292 port projects in Iraq, including work on the
This quarter, GRD also reported that, in partner- GOI-funded Umm Qasr Pier and Seawall Proj-
ship with the GOI, work is ongoing on the Karkh ect.299 The United States also continues to support
Water Treatment Plant—an $8.3 million project Iraqi port operations by providing security at key
to rebuild the plant’s electrical backup-generator terminals. The U.S. Navy and Coast Guard are still
system, which was damaged in a 2005 insurgent charged with the protection of the Al Basrah Oil
attack. Repairs to the twin Rolls-Royce jet turbines Terminal (ABOT). Although not a traditional port
are complete, but testing remains ongoing. Ac- (ABOT is located about 30 miles off Iraq’s coast in
cording to GRD, the project is expected to allow the Persian Gulf), it serves as Iraq’s main terminal
the plant to continue to produce water for 40% for shipping oil exports.300
of Baghdad residents during outages of the main In addition to U.S. efforts, this quarter the
electrical service. It is expected to be completed on Ministry of Transportation (MOT) opened the first
November 30, 2009.293

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 69

IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING SOURCES AND USES

stage of berth construction at Abu-Floos Port as According to MNF-I, the ICAA is not yet ready to
part of the MOT’s Investment Plan Projects.301 take full control of civil aviation operations.309
OTA reports that Iraq has not provided
Roads and Bridges sufficient funding to maintain and upgrade its air
As of October 1, 2009, GRD had completed traffic control (ATC) infrastructure. The hiring of
274 expressway and village road projects, and an additional 75 controllers is in progress, but is
33 remain ongoing.302 GRD reported highlights still more than a year behind schedule. The ICAA
of three projects completed in mid-August: received $17 million in special Iraqi funding for
• Funded by $360,000 from the ESF, the Al Khdir several critical contracts. The $9 million WCG
Pedestrian Bridge provides a crossing over the contract extension covers ATC training and
Euphrates River for the 50,000 habitants of the provides the number of trained controllers
city of al-Khdir, in Muthanna province.303 required to control airspace above 24,000 feet over
• A $3.4 million ESF project to construct four new the next year. DoS agreed to continue funding life
lanes of highway was completed in Baghdad’s support for this contract, and the GOI agreed to
Hilla business district.304 cover salaries and transportation. The remaining
• A $1.1 million ESF project to widen the $8 million is for five separate contracts, all
al-Hindia Jadawal al-Gharby Road was currently in final negotiations, to support various
completed in Babylon province.305 aspects of the aviation system. MNF-I reported
that the ICAA was expected to sign
Railroads three contracts with Boeing-owned Iraqi Airways Resumes

5
There are 2,400 km (approximately 1,500 miles) of Jeppesen on October 15, 2009, and Flights after 14 Years

this quarter
years ago
On August 23, 2004, Iraqi
open rail lines in Iraq. This quarter, U.S. Embassy- that bids for the remaining contracts
Airways made its first test
Baghdad’s Office of the Transportation Attaché are under review. The ICAA is not flight from Amman, Jordan, to
(OTA) reported improvements to the Umm Qasr currently compliant with Interna- Baghdad since UN sanctions had
to Mosul line and the al-Kashat to Tikrit line. In tional Civil Aviation Organization grounded the air carrier in 1990.
addition, approximately 2,500 passengers currently standards. MNF-I reports that Today, Iraqi Airways operates several
aircraft with flights to destinations in the
travel on the Baghdad to Basrah line each week.306 compliance will require a commit-
Middle East and Europe.
As of October 1, 2009, GRD had completed ment to significant increases in
112 railroad renovation projects.307 funding and the hiring of new
employees over several years.310
Aviation OTA is working with the ICAA to develop a
A major milestone in Iraq’s aviation sector occurred national traffic-counting requirement for all towers
this quarter when the Iraqi Civil Aviation Authority and radar-control facilities, thus allowing Iraqi
(ICAA) took control of some civil aviation opera- aviation officials to better understand the current
tions on August 25, 2009. Prior to the turnover, state of aviation in Iraq.311 Currently, air carriers
DoD’s Regional Air Movement Control Center desiring to operate in or over Iraq are required to
(RAMCC) had been coordinating the movements inform and gain the approval of the ICAA.312
of all civilian aircraft in the Baghdad region—more Following a bilateral agreement between Iraq
than 400 daily flights—as well as assisting the ICAA and the UK, British airline BMI expressed interest
in developing and normalizing its civilian aviation in commencing flights to Iraq, though the UK
capacity.308 After the turnover, the ICAA’s eight government currently does not permit British air
certified air traffic controllers, with the assistance of carriers to fly to Iraq—a situation that is unlikely
U.S.-based Washington Consulting Group (WCG), to soon change. However, Iraqi Airways may
began controlling the airspace above 24,000 feet. commence flights to the UK in the near future.

70 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 INFRASTRUCTURE

An engineless Iraqi Airways jet parked at Baghdad International Airport in 2003. (DoD photo) Iraqi Airways jet taxis at Baghdad International Airport in 2008.
(DoD photo)

For security reasons, direct flights from Baghdad elections. Iraq’s Ministry of Communication
will not be permitted, and maintenance issues will (MOC) is also continuing efforts to create a new
likely require Iraqi Airways to lease other aircraft. state-owned mobile company that would compete
For example, passengers en route to the UK might with privately owned providers already in the
deplane in Istanbul, be rescreened for security, and market—a plan opposed by the U.S. government.
continue on to the UK via Turkish Airlines. This Nevertheless, the U.S. Embassy-Baghdad reports
is a costly option, but it demonstrates progress in that the MOC continues to actively participate in
rebuilding Iraqi Airways’ services.313 the Strategic Framework Agreement process,
As of October 1, 2009, GRD had completed which provides U.S. and GOI officials opportuni-
27 aviation projects aimed at improving the overall ties to collaborate on a wide range of economic,
function of 5 airports in Iraq.314 The ICAA website social and political issues.316
lists 23 airports currently operating in Iraq.315 The contract for the $18.3 million, IRRF-funded
al-Mamoon Exchange and Telecommunications
Telecommunications Center in Baghdad was re-awarded on July 31, 2009.
The chair of the CoR’s Services Committee has Originally started in 2006, the initial contract was
indicated that a draft telecommunications law terminated for lack of progress. This project, which
would support the Communications Media GRD estimates at 50% complete, is expected to
Commission (CMC) that Prime Minister al-Maliki provide the MOC with a state-of-the-art business
recently staffed with the appointment of commis- center to meet MOC’s vision for a national commu-
sioners. The CMC, an independent regulatory nications complex. The planned completion date for
body, has recently been given a draft of the this project is August 15, 2010.317
telecommunications law for review. In light of
upcoming national elections, however, it is unlikely Phone and Internet Service
that any progress will be made on telecommunica- Mobile phones remain the primary vehicle for Iraqi
tions-related legislation until after the January 2010 access to telecommunications. The U.S. Embassy

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 71

IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING SOURCES AND USES

reports that there are nearly 19.5 million mobile Table 2.16
telephone subscribers, approximately 1.25 million Main Mobile Phone Service Providers in Iraq
landline users, and approximately 1.5 million
Number of Subscribers
Internet subscribers.318 For a breakdown of the Company Name (millions)

main mobile phone service providers in Iraq, see Zain (formerly Iraqna) 10.2
Table 2.16. ◆ Asia Cell 7.1
Korek 2.0

Note: Numbers affected by rounding.

Source: U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, response to SIGIR data call, 10/4/2009.

72 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 GOVERNANCE

GOVERNANCE

The United States fully Iraq continues to rank toward the bottom of World This quarter, the governance programs that
understands—recognizes,
Bank and Brookings Institution compilations of saw the most activity were funded by the ESF. The
and supports—the notion
that there’s a sovereign governance indicators (see Figure 2.27). According National Capacity Development program, which
Iraqi government. But we to these indicators, Iraq faces significant challenges seeks to build capacity of key Iraqi ministries,
stand ready to use our good in addressing the issues of political stability, rule of develop management skills, and institutional-
offices to support Iraqi
national unity. Above all,
law, and control of corruption. ize training activities,321 had $45 million in new
the United States remains U.S. assistance in the area of governance obligations and $33 million in new expenditures.322
committed to a long-term, encompasses elections, anticorruption, human The Community Action Program, which fosters
bilateral relationship with a
rights, health care, education, capacity develop- citizen involvement at the grassroots level,323 had
united Iraq.319
ment, legislation, and programs to support refugees $46 million in new obligations and $32 million in
—Vice President and internally displaced persons (IDPs). Since new expenditures.324 Other programs with signifi-
Joseph Biden, Erbil, Iraq,
2003, the United States has allocated approximately cant quarterly obligations and expenditures include
September 17, 2009
$7.28 billion, obligated $7.06 billion, and expended Ministerial Capacity Development, PRT/PRDC
$6.04 billion for governance activities in Iraq.320 For Projects, and the PRT Quick Response Fund.325
the status of these funds, see Figure 2.28. For an overview of quarterly obligations and

Figure 2.27
Governance Indicators
Percentile of Countries
Political Stability
Voice and & Absence of Government Regulatory Control of
Accountability Violence/Terrorism Effectiveness Quality Rule of Law Corruption
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%

KUWAIT KUWAIT
JORDAN
JORDAN JORDAN JORDAN
KUWAIT SAUDI ARABIA SAUDI ARABIA
KUWAIT SAUDI ARABIA
SAUDI ARABIA
KUWAIT

JORDAN PAKISTAN
KUWAIT SAUDI ARABIA SYRIA SYRIA
SYRIA PAKISTAN IRAN
JORDAN
IRAN PAKISTAN
IRAN
PAKISTAN PAKISTAN
12% IRAQ IRAN 15% IRAQ
AFGHANISTAN SYRIA SYRIA
IRAN PAKISTAN AFGHANISTAN
SAUDI ARABIA AFGHANISTAN 6% IRAQ AFGHANISTAN 3% IRAQ
SYRIA IRAN 1% IRAQ AFGHANISTAN
0.4% IRAQ AFGHANISTAN
0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%

Voice and Accountability—the extent to which citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, freedom of expression and association, and free media
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism—the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means
Government Effectiveness—the quality of public services, quality of the civil service and its independence from political pressures, and quality of policy formulation and implementation
Regulatory Quality—the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private-sector development
Rule of Law—the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular, the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts
Control of Corruption—the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption

Note: The aggregate governance indicators reflect a statistical compilation of responses on the quality of governance given by a large number of enterprise, citizen, and expert survey
respondents. Countries are ranked relative to each other, but relative positions are subject to margins of error.

Sources: Worldwide Governance Indicators Project, “Aggregate Governance Indicators 1996–2008,” 6/2009, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/wgidataset.xls, accessed 10/19/2009;
Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi, “Governance Matters VIII: Governance Indicators for 1996–2008,” World Bank Policy Research, 6/2009,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1424591, accessed 10/19/2009; CIA, World Factbook, www.cia.gov, accessed 10/14/2009; World Health Organization, Country Profiles,
www.emro.who.int, accessed 10/13/2009; U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, response to SIGIR data call, 10/3/2009.

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 73

IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING SOURCES AND USES

Figure 2.28
expenditures for governance sectors and selected Governance: Status of Funds
$ Billions
programs, see Table 2.17.

Unexpended Funds
Anticorruption Total: $1.25
Allocated $7.28
Not Capacity
Corruption remains a very serious problem in Obligated $7.06 Obligated Development
$0.23 18% $0.39
Iraq, and GOI efforts to address corruption issues 31%
Expended $6.04 Humanitarian
are ongoing, but are not yet sufficiently effective. Relief 6%
$0.07
Draft legislation to strengthen Iraq’s anticorruption
14%
institutions and a proposed comprehensive anticor-
ruption law are still awaiting CoR approval. A GOI 31%
campaign that began in June 2009 is starting to ad- Public
Services Democracy and
dress the critical issue of bribery in government.326 $0.18 Civil Society
$0.38
Recent efforts to hold senior GOI officials ac-
countable for corruption may indicate a growing
GOI commitment to the issue. In September 2009,
Iraq’s Higher Judicial Council (HJC) announced Note: Data not audited. Numbers affected by rounding. Unexpended funds include expired appropriations.
OSD does not report CERP allocation, obligation, and expenditure data for project categories on a quarterly
that it had received 445 corruption-related cases to basis for all fiscal year appropriations; CERP allocation, obligation, and expenditure data is pulled from IRMS;
date in 2009. On September 2, 2009, the Commis- therefore, totals may not match top-line values found in the Funding Sources subsection of this Report. U.S.
Embassy-Baghdad did not provide updated allocation, obligation, and expenditure data for the Democracy
sion on Integrity (COI) announced the arrest of and Civil Society and Iraqi Refugees (Jordan) sectors; values for these sectors are carried over from the previous
quarter.
Deputy Transportation Minister Adnan al-Ubaidi
Sources: DoS, response to SIGIR data call, 4/5/2007; IRMS, MNC-I Quarterly Report, 10/12/2009; NEA-I, response
on bribery charges. Al-Ubaidi was arrested and to SIGIR data call, 10/7/2009; U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, responses to SIGIR data calls, 7/6/2009, 7/16/2009, and
10/3/2009; USACE, GRD, response to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2009; USAID, response to SIGIR data call, 4/13/2009.
is awaiting trial after receiving part of a $500,000
bribe that he had demanded for extending a pri-
vate security contract for services at the Baghdad commissioned from U.S. accounting and consult-
International Airport. COI officials indicated ing firm PricewaterhouseCoopers.328
that capacity-building assistance provided by
the United States made the arrest possible. Also UNCAC Compliance
awaiting trial is former Trade Minister Abdul The U.S. Embassy’s Anti-Corruption Coordina-
Falah al-Sudani, who was arrested in May 2009 tion Office (ACCO) continues to support anti-
after resigning amid allegations of corruption. corruption initiatives aimed at improving Iraqi
Judicial authorities indicate that he will be tried capacity and transparency at both national and
in Baghdad, while other senior Trade Ministry sub-national levels. In September 2009, senior
officials arrested on corruption charges will be anticorruption officials, assisted by UN experts
tried separately in Muthanna province, where the under a U.S.-funded project, met
2

case originated.327 to finalize the GOI’s new anticor- Judge Radhi Leaves Iraq
On August 23, 2007, Judge
There are growing reports of anticorruption ruption strategy for achieving
this quarter
years ago

Radhi al-Radhi, head of one of

activities being carried out by provincial authori- compliance with the United Nations Iraq’s main anticorruption agen-
ties, including the September 2009 conviction and Convention Against Corruption cies, the Commission on Public
imprisonment of four officials in Kerbala province (UNCAC). The new strategy, which Integrity, left Iraq because of
for embezzlement of provincial funds. In July replaces the 18-point plan issued by increasing threats on his and his
2009, the KRG unveiled a strategy for good gover- the GOI in January 2008, is ex- family’s lives. He was granted asylum in
the United States.
nance and transparency based on an assessment pected to be released in October and

74 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 GOVERNANCE

Table 2.17
Quarterly Obligations and Expenditures for Governance Sectors,
with Selected Programs
$ Millions

Governance Sector Program Status of Funds Quarterly Changes

Capacity Development Obligated 309 45
National Capacity
Development (ESF) Expended 223 33

Ministerial Capacity Obligated 86 49

Development (ESF) Expended 58 30

Obligated 477 9
PRT/PRDC Projects (ESF)
Expended 353 29

PRT Quick Response Obligated 201 5

Fund (ESF) Expended 132 25

Community Stabilization Obligated 646 0

Program (ESF) Expended 615 19

Planning and Design – Obligated 12 12

PRDC (ESF) Expended 12 12

Other Capacity Obligated 559 1

Development Expended 512 1

Democracy and Civil Society Obligated 311 46

Community Action
Program (ESF) Expended 193 32

Local Governance Obligated 411 55

Program (ESF) Expended 271 13

Other Democracy Obligated 1,320 0

and Civil Society Expended 1,194 0

Humanitarian Relief Obligated 819 4

Expended 747 0

Public Services Obligated 1,906 11

Expended 1,728 5

Note: Data not audited. Numbers affected by rounding. OSD does not report CERP allocation, obligation, and expenditure data for project
categories on a quarterly basis for all fiscal year appropriations; CERP allocation, obligation, and expenditure data is pulled from IRMS; therefore,
totals may not match top-line values found in the Funding Sources subsection of this Report. U.S. Embassy-Baghdad did not provide updated
allocation, obligation, and expenditure data for the Democracy and Civil Society and Iraqi Refugees (Jordan) sectors; values for these sectors are
carried over from the previous quarter.

Sources: DoS, response to SIGIR data call, 4/5/2007; IRMS, MNC-I Quarterly Report, 10/12/2009; NEA-I, response to SIGIR data call, 10/7/2009; U.S.
Embassy-Baghdad, responses to SIGIR data calls, 7/6/2009, 7/16/2009, and 10/3/2009; USACE, GRD, response to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2009; USAID,
response to SIGIR data call, 4/13/2009; SIGIR, Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress, 7/2009.

to mark a step forward in anticorruption efforts.329 activities and is monitoring approximately

The GOI plan had not, however, been released by 30 activities, including USAID/Tatweer programs
the time this report was published. to train OIGs, DoJ training programs at the COI,
and DoD mentoring of inspectors general at the
Other U.S. Anticorruption Initiatives Ministries of Defense and Interior.330 For the status
ACCO coordinates with USAID, DoD, and U.S. of ongoing U.S.-funded anticorruption programs,
Embassy offices on anticorruption projects and see Table 2.18.

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 75

IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING SOURCES AND USES

Table 2.18
Ongoing U.S.-funded Anticorruption Programs
Program Project Cost ($ millions) U.S. Agencies Description
Program to strengthen local
Provincial Accountability governments’ anticorruption capacity
2.36 ACCO
and Governance Program and instill a culture of transparency,
accountability, and good governance.
UNDP/UNODC Promotes achieving compliance with
8.00 ACCO
Anticorruption Work Plan UNCAC requirements.
University of Utah Assists COI and CoR in reforming Iraq’s
2.00 Embassy/ACCO
Anticorruption Program existing legal framework.
Commission on Integrity Promotes capacity building of AC
15.17 DOJ/ICITAP/ACCO
Program bodies.
Conduct a multi-pronged public
Anticorruption Outreach 0.65 Embassy/ACCO diplomacy effort and assist the GOI in
developing public outreach programs.

Source: U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, ACCO, response to SIGIR data call, 10/7/2009.

Elections Overview • The National Democratic Institute (NDI)

partnered with an Iraqi organization to con-
Iraq’s Independent High Electoral Commission duct vote tabulation assistance for the KRG’s
(IHEC) is currently preparing for the CoR elections July 2009 presidential and parliamentary
expected in early 2010, ramping up voter-awareness elections. NDI is currently training members
efforts and deploying mobile registration units of political entities on negotiation strategies for
to reach remote areas and IDPs.331 However, on entering a coalition in advance of the January
October 11, 2009, the Special Representative of the 2010 elections.
UN Secretary-General for Iraq (SRSG) expressed • The International Republican Institute (IRI) pro-
concern that, with elections fast approaching, the vided pre-election training for both major parties
CoR has yet to clarify the elections’ legal framework and emerging entities committed to democratic
in an Election Law.332 As of September 20, 2009, development in competing for seats at the munici-
the UN reports that 296 political entities had been pal, district, and national levels, while also work-
certified by the IHEC to run in the upcoming elec- ing with civil society organizations to conduct
tion, including 250 groups and 46 individuals; 166 grassroots and broadcast media voter education,
are new and 130 were recertified.333 including for the voter registration update.
• The International Research and Exchanges
DoS Bureau of Democracy, Human Board (IREX) conducted workshops throughout
Rights, and Labor Support for Elections the provinces on election reporting, verifying
As of September 30, 2009, the DoS Bureau of campaign promises, examining party statements,
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) learning the rules and procedures of the IHEC,
has obligated approximately $59.4 million for and supporting broadcast elections program-
provincial, KRG, and national election assistance ming on the television and radio on the KRG
in Iraq. DRL expects to obligate an additional elections.
$11.8 million from the FY 2009 Supplemental in • The Institute for War and Peace Reporting
support of the January 2010 elections. Recent and (IWPR) trained 75 reporters on elections cover-
ongoing DRL-funded initiatives conducted by its age in preparation for the KRG elections and
partners include the following:334 continued to provide on-the-job training for
40 reporters, editors, and photojournalists.

76 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 GOVERNANCE

• American University (AU) continued to provide KRG Presidential and

basic voter education in Ninewa, Salah Al-Din, Parliamentary Election
and Anbar provinces, with a specific focus on The KRG is the governing body of the autonomous
women, IDPs, and illiterate voters. Kurdistan Region in northern Iraq. Encompassing
an area larger than 15,000 square miles, the
USAID Support for Elections Kurdistan Region has a president, prime minister,
USAID has obligated approximately $103 million and an elected parliament—the Iraqi Kurdistan
for its existing electoral support program, which is Parliament (IKP). On July 25, 2009, more than
implemented by the International Foundation for 1.8 million voters (about 80% of the eligible voters)
Electoral Systems (IFES). Of this amount, USAID cast their ballots in the Kurdistan Region’s presiden-
estimates that approximately $42 million will be tial and parliamentary election.340 Voters in
expended in 2010. IFES is developing information Kurdistan also take part in Iraq’s national elections.
and communication systems for tallying election
results and updating voter registration records.335
USAID’s Elections Support Program has assisted Human Rights
the IHEC in administering four major electoral
events since 2004.336 The human rights environment in Iraq continues
In preparation for the January 2010 elections, to be an area of concern. Although Iraq’s legal
USAID and IFES have been working to respond to framework provides for broad protection of hu-
training, supply, and equipment needs outlined in man rights, extrajudicial harassment and violence
a needs assessment of the IHEC’s provincial level are rampant. A new USAID initiative for 2010 is
offices, referred to as Governorate Electoral Offices currently being designed to improve Iraqi citizens’
(GEOs). USAID’s electoral support program will access to the justice system, especially for vulnerable
be conducting electoral administration training for groups, through widened civil society advocacy,
IHEC and GEO staff, supporting the continued de- legal assistance activities, and improved legal educa-
velopment of the public outreach office, IT depart- tion. Funding for this initiative currently stands at
ment, and Data Entry Center. In the post-election $24 million from FY 2009 supplemental funds, and
period, USAID will continue to provide institution- further obligations are expected to bring the total
al and capacity-building support to the IHEC.337 obligated amount to $60 million.341 In addition,
following the January 2010 elections, the focus of
UN Support for Elections many DRL-funded programs is expected to shift
On August 7, 2009, the UN Security Council toward addressing the issues of sectarian recon-
adopted Resolution 1883 to extend for another year ciliation, providing mediation training, advising
the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq political parties on consensus-building issues, and
(UNAMI).338 UNAMI continues to provide the strengthening the capabilities of the Ministry of
IHEC with electoral experts who help manage the Human Rights, CoR, judicial system, and media.342
electoral process. According to the SRSG, more than
250,000 Iraqis had visited the 1,082 voter registration GOI Efforts To Address
centers in Iraq as of September 5, 2009. This year, on Human Rights Issues
average, around 4,750 forms for additions, deletions, On October 6, 2009, Iraq’s Minister of Defense
and changes to the Voter List are being issued per hosted a human rights conference in Baghdad
day, compared with 2,500 forms last year. The IHEC to address human rights and the fair treatment
is continuing to distribute 18 million voter informa- of prisoners. Iraqis, including officials from the
tion cards to registered Iraqis.339 Ministry of Human Rights and Ministry of the

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 77

IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING SOURCES AND USES

Interior, reiterated the GOI’s commitment to SIGIR reported that the hospital project was behind
detainee rights. Iraq’s Interior Minister stated that schedule and had construction deficiencies.351As of
490 investigations into missing or dead detainees August 2009, OHA, in coordination with GRD and
had been initiated.343 ITAO, reported that progress is being made to re-
solve construction challenges and medical support
Persecution and Violence and operational issues by Iraq’s MOH.352
against Homosexuals
In August 2009, the non-profit human rights Maternity and Obstetrics Care
advocacy group Human Rights Watch (HRW) This quarter, GRD completed construction of
released a report on the situation facing members the ESF-funded Mussayib Maternity Hospital.
of the gay community in Iraq. In the report, HRW However, the MOH asked to delay the opening
describes roving gangs of “death squads” that ceremony until the hospital has been adequately
target men suspected of engaging in homosexual equipped and staffed. PRT Babylon is working with
behavior. These groups are suspected of being tied the MOH on the procurement of equipment.353
to militias operating in Iraq, notably Muqtada al- This hospital will be coming online at a critical
Sadr’s Mahdi Army. Furthermore, HRW reported time. Babylon province is in a baby boom, with
that Iraqi authorities have done little to stem the Director General of Health reporting a 300%
violence against homosexuals.344 increase in births since 2003. The facility may be
needed to serve as many as 5,000 births and at least
25,000 child well-care visits per year.354
Health Care In August 2009, the UN Population Fund turned
over to the GOI 31 maternity wards as part of the
The GOI still struggles to meet the health care Emergency Obstetric Care Project. The wards will
needs of its people and lacks a widely accepted vi- enable 24 hospitals and 7 PHCs to provide services
sion and strategy for implementing a public health to an estimated 4 million Iraqi women.355
care system.345 According to the World Health Or-
ganization (WHO), in 2008 Iraq had 6.1 physicians H1N1 Influenza
and 12.6 hospital beds per 10,000 persons.346 By OHA, in collaboration with the MOH, continues
comparison, in 2007 Saudi Arabia had 21 physicians to monitor and report disease outbreaks. Current
and 22.1 hospital beds,347 and Jordan had 26.7 phy- efforts include the pandemic H1N1 influenza. In
sicians and 18 hospital beds per 10,000 persons.348 coordination with Centers for Disease Control
GRD reported that as of October 1, 2009, and Prevention and Naval Medical Research,
133 Primary Healthcare Centers (PHCs) funded by training continues to be offered to Iraqi public
the IRRF had been turned over to the GOI health technicians from the Ministries of Health
Ministry of Health (MOH). GRD estimates that and Agriculture. In August 2009, a coordinated
these PHCs treat approximately 4.6 million training activity was held in Amman, Jordan,
outpatients annually. GRD also reported that it for 42 Iraqi public health and veterinarian
completed 47 hospital renovations, and 6 projects professionals.356 Additionally, USAID is currently
remain ongoing. GRD estimates that these providing technical assistance to the MOH to
hospitals serve 6.6 million patients each year.349 increase its capacity to design and implement an
Recently, the U.S. Embassy’s Office of the Health effective H1N1 influenza awareness programs. This
Attaché (OHA) has been working with the GOI to program is also expected to strengthen the overall
determine its level of commitment to the ESF- capacity of the MOH to respond to any infectious
funded Missan Surgical Hospital.350 Last quarter, diseases affecting Iraq.357

78 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 GOVERNANCE

Figure 2.29 the younger generation. According to 2007–2008

Intermediate and Secondary School Enrollment Rates data from Iraq’s Central Organization for Statis-
tics and Information Technology, primary school
Intermediate School Enrollment Secondary School Enrollment enrollment for 6- to 11-year-olds was 84.8%, with
(12–14 year-olds) (15–17 year-olds)
the lowest rate for rural girls at 70.1%; however, en-
45.5% rollment rates markedly decline at the intermediate
41.5%
and secondary school levels (See Figure 2.29). 360
28.8%
The DoS Bureau of Educational and Cultural
25.8% 25.1% Affairs (ECA) supports education, democracy,
16.6%
14.5%
civil society, and cultural heritage activities in
7.2%
Iraq through educational and cultural exchanges.
Approximately $12.47 million was allocated for
Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls
Urban Rural Urban Rural ECA programs in Iraq in FY 2009. The majority
Source: USAID, response to SIGIR data call,10/3/2009.
of funds supported cultural grants, including high
school and undergraduate leadership programs
($3.0 million) and educational advising ($1.25 mil-
In August 2009, UNAMI’s Health Sector Out- lion). More than $3.39 million supports English
come Team, working through WHO and Iraq’s language teaching. Since 2003, approximately
MOH, responded to the spread of the H1N1 virus 170 Iraqis have been awarded Fulbright Student
by ramping up disease monitoring and health scholarships, including 29 in FY 2009, to allow
education activities. In the Kurdistan Region, the for completion of a Masters Degree in the United
MOH, supported by UNICEF, has been preparing States. Students are expected to return to Iraq to
to air a series of television and radio spots on H1N1 share new knowledge and expertise with col-
and seasonal influenza preventive measures.358 leagues; however, ECA is concerned that partici-
pants may try to avoid returning to Iraq following
program completion. Other educational exchange
Education programs support mid-career professional train-
ing, and leadership development.361
Iraq’s population is young and growing rapidly. GRD reported that as of October 1, 2009, it
More than 40% of the population is currently has completed 1,130 U.S.-funded school projects
under 15 years of age; and over the next two throughout Iraq, and 41 remain ongoing. These
decades, the youth population in Iraq is expected projects provide new construction as well as
to grow by almost 3 million, from 5.8 million in renovation of existing facilities.362 For a list of U.S.-
2005 to a projected 8.6 million in 2025. On aver- funded school-construction projects completed
age, Iraqi women tend to marry and begin child- this quarter, see Table 2.19.
bearing at a young age, giving birth to between
four and five children.359
Currently, the largest numbers of illiterate young Legislation
people in the Middle East are found in Iraq, Yemen,
and Egypt; girls represent more than two-thirds of The CoR reconvened on September 8, 2009, for
that group. Iraq’s education system, once regarded its fall session and is currently considering draft
as the best in the Middle East, has been in gradual legislation for the January 2010 election cycle. In
decline since the mid-1980s. Thus, the current older addition to an Elections Law, the CoR faces a legis-
population in Iraq has had more education than lative agenda that includes the 2009 supplemental

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 79

IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING SOURCES AND USES

budget, the CY 2010 budget, investment and Table 2.19

hydrocarbon framework laws, and approval of a GRD School-construction Projects Completed this Quarter
security agreement with the United Kingdom.363 Project Name Location Date Completed Fund Project Cost ($ millions)
Amer Bin Yasir
Baghdad 7/13/2009 ESF 1.33
Elementary School

Refugees and IDPs Zaryland Secondary

School
Dahuk 7/30/2009 ESF 1.11

Abu Ghraib
Baghdad 7/28/2009 ESF 0.94
As of September 23, 2009, 33,565 Iraqis had been Kindergarten
resettled in the United States, including 18,135 in FY Al-Thawab School Anbar 7/8/2009 ESF 0.63
2009, surpassing the goal of 17,000 set for the year. Source: GRD, response to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2009.
The majority of resettled Iraqi refugees have been
processed from third countries—mainly Jordan and
Syria—with 1,488 having been resettled from the in-
country refugee processing program in Baghdad.364
The use of different methodologies to track the
movement of IDPs and refugees can yield varying
and occasionally inconsistent findings. UN High
Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) reports that
approximately 2.65 million Iraqis remain displaced
inside Iraq, and approximately 1.90 million Iraqis
are refugees residing outside Iraq, as of January
2009.365 For the location and number of Iraqi refu-
UNHCR Goodwill Ambassador Angelina Jolie at an IDP camp
gees and IDPs, see Figure 2.30. outside of Baghdad in August 2009. (UNHCR photo)
The plight of Iraqi refugees and IDPs has
received increased attention in 2009. On July 23, household returnees, building on a previous
2009, American film actress and UNHCR Good- $10 million contribution for a related program
will Ambassador Angelina Jolie made her third trip targeting returnees more broadly.368
to Iraq to highlight the needs of Iraq’s IDPs and to This quarter, UNHCR initiated partnerships for
appeal for more aid.366 UNHCR reports that only home reconstruction or rehabilitation for 2,000 re-
48% of its goal of $299 million for Iraq and the turnee families in Baghdad, Salah Al-Din, and Di-
region has been funded by donors—a shortfall that yala provinces, as well as rehabilitation of 100 IDP
may affect future programs.367 and refugee shelters in Ninewa’s capital of Mosul.
This quarter, the DoS Bureau of Population, UNHCR continued to assist returnees through its
Refuges and Migration (PRM) contributed six Returns, Integration and Community Centers
$73 million to UNHCR’s revised appeal for Iraq (RICCs) in Baghdad and is working with partners
and the region surrounding Iraq. Of this, $13 mil- to open additional RICCs in Mosul and in south-
lion was earmarked for returns and reintegration ern Iraq. UNHCR also collaborated with Iraq’s
programming inside Iraq, bringing the total for Ministry of Migration and Displacement to provide
IDP-related initiatives to $33 million. The remain- emergency supplies to 200 families affected by the
ing $60 million brought PRM’s total un-earmarked August 19, 2009, bombings as well as 200 families
contribution to $165 million to support refugees affected by early August bombings in Ninewa.369
in the region and IDPs inside Iraq. PRM also con- On August 14, 2009, President Obama an-
tributed $2 million to the International Organiza- nounced the appointment of a new Senior Direc-
tion for Migration (IOM) to assist female-headed tor for Multilateral Affairs and Human Rights

80 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 GOVERNANCE

Figure 2.30
Iraqi Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in 2009

TURKEY Refugees Leaving Iraq

7,000
Refugees Returning to Iraq
UNITED STATES
19,910 270 540

SYRIA 13,310
1,200,000
IRAQ 3,990 IRAN
LEBANON
2,647,251 58,000
50,000 Internally
245 Displaced
Persons (IDPs)
in all of Iraq
JORDAN
450,000 1,860

1,370

150

150,000
SAUDI ARABIA Gulf States
EGYPT (refers to Bahrain,
40,000 Kuwait, Oman, Qatar,
EGYPT Saudi Arabia, and UAE)
40,000
Note: Excludes refugee statistics for Europe and Australia.

Sources: UNHCR, "Country Operations Profile," www.unhcr.org/pages/49e486426.html, accessed 10/8/2009; USCIS, "Iraqi Refugee Processing Fact Sheet,"
http://www.uscis.gov/files/article/iraqi_refugee_fs_11feb09.pdf, accessed 10/8/2009; U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, response to SIGIR data call, 10/3/2009.

at the National Security Council to coordinate U.S.-funded partners, including UNHCR, the
U.S. efforts to assist Iraqi refugees and IDPs. The International Committee of the Red Cross, IOM,
new White House official is working with U.S. Mercy Corps, the International Medical Corps,
Embassy-Baghdad to make IDP and refugee the International Rescue Committee, and others
issues a more urgent policy matter for the GOI provide a wide range of humanitarian, legal, and
and to provide greater resources for their aid. livelihood assistance to refugees and IDPs.370 ◆

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 81

IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING SOURCES AND USES

ECONOMY

Iraq continues to rely on its oil resources as the Figure 2.31

country’s predominant source of economic growth Economy: Status of Funds
$ Billions
and government revenue. This quarter, the UN
Security Council endorsed a recommendation that
Iraq assume greater responsibility for oversight Unexpended Funds
of its oil revenues, which are currently deposited Total: $0.25
Allocated $1.56
in the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI).371 This Obligated $1.54
is a step in the direction of eventually transfer-
ring oversight of the DFI from the International Expended $1.32
Not
Obligated 67% Private Sector
Advisory and Monitoring Board (IAMB) for Iraq $0.02 9% Development
$0.17
to the GOI’s Committee of Financial Experts
(COFE)—an economic milestone that would give
24%
Iraq full control of its oil revenues for the first time
since 2003.372 Other developments affecting Iraq’s Economic
Governance
economy this quarter included a moderate rise $0.06
in oil prices, an upturn in food prices, and the re-
ported rescheduling of the second round of bidding
on oil service contracts.
Note: Data not audited. Numbers affected by rounding. OSD does not report CERP allocation, obligation, and
As of September 30, 2009, the United States had expenditure data for project categories on a quarterly basis for all fiscal year appropriations; CERP allocation,
allocated $1.56 billion, obligated $1.54 billion, and obligation, and expenditure data is pulled from IRMS, and therefore totals may not match top-line values found
in the Funding Sources subsection of this Report.
expended $1.32 billion to support Iraq’s economic
Sources: IRMS, MNC-I Quarterly Report, 10/12/2009; NEA, response to SIGIR data call, 10/7/2009; Treasury,
development.373 The following are among recent response to SIGIR data call, 4/2/2009; U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, response to SIGIR data call, 10/3/2009; USAID,
responses to SIGIR data call, 4/13/2009 and 10/14/2009; USTDA, response to SIGIR data call, 4/2/2009.
examples of U.S. government efforts:
• Employment of Iraqi nationals on U.S.-funded
projects (excluding CERP-funded projects) Key Economic Indicators
increased slightly this quarter—from 85,960
reported in the week of July 3, 2009, to 86,136 During the quarter ending September 30, 2009,
reported for the week of September 26, 2009.374 the Iraqi economy benefited from rising oil prices
• The United States has made a special effort and a modest increase in oil production and
to support economic empowerment for Iraqi exports. Prices for Kirkuk crude oil reached a
women across a wide spectrum of fields and high of $73.35 and averaged $68.54 per barrel this
social classes in every province.375 For examples, quarter.376 Revenue from Iraqi oil exports totaled
see Section 3 of this Report. $12.01 billion this quarter, up from $8.45 billion
posted last quarter.377 According to the Central
For the status of U.S. funds supporting eco- Bank of Iraq (CBI), year-to-date oil revenue
nomic governance and private-sector develop- through September 30, 2009, was $26.3 billion.378
ment, see Figure 2.31. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) revised
its real gross domestic product (GDP) growth
forecast for Iraq from 6.9% to 4.3% in 2009.379
Overall inflation remained low, but volatile.

82 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 ECONOMY

Table 2.20
GDP Infl ation and Exchange Rates in Iraq
GDP (annual percent change) 10% Aug
The Iraqi economy continued to grow in 2009, but at a slower pace than 2008, when record oil prices 2009
spurred growth to an estimated 9.5%. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) revised its real GDP 4% Jan
growth forecast for Iraq from 6.9% to 4.3% in 2009. 2005
-2%

Overall Inflation 80%

Year-on-year comparison of monthly averages for the overall consumer price index. Through prudent
fiscal policies, the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) has helped drive inflation downward from record high Aug
35%
2009
averages of 53% in 2006. Jan
-10% 2005

Core Inflation
Year-on-year comparison of monthly averages for the core consumer price index that excludes fuel, 50%
electricity, transportation, and communications. Core inflation has fallen for most of the first three Aug
quarters of this year, with the exception of volatile food prices. 25% 2009
Jan
0% 2005

Exchange Rates
This year, the CBI has held Iraq’s exchange rate at approximately 1,170 dinar per dollar. The dinar has 1,500
appreciated against the U.S. dollar by more than 24% since November 2006, when the CBI began tar- Aug
geting interest rates to control rising inflation. 1,300 Jan 2009
2005
1,100

Sources: IMF, “World Economic Outlook: Sustaining the Recovery,” October 2009, Statistical Appendix, p. 175.
Central Bank of Iraq, Key Financial Indicators 9/16/2009, www.cbi.iq, accessed 10/6/2009.

The year-on-year core inflation rate rose from 8.8% of the DFI when IAMB’s mandate expires in
in June 2009 to 10.8% in August 2009,380 driven December 2009.384 COFE has established a website
largely by rising food prices.381 As core inflation (www.cofe-iq.net) that includes financial reports
(which excludes volatile food and energy prices) and meeting minutes. The UN report, however,
fell during most of the first three quarters of this detailed ongoing concerns about the lack of trans-
year, CBI cut interest rates from 14% in January parency and accountability in Iraq’s reporting and
2009 to 7% in June 2009.382 The CBI continued to management of its oil revenues.385 The UN Secu-
hold Iraq’s exchange rate at 1,170 dinar per dollar, rity Council must act before the end of this year to
after it spurred a large appreciation in the dinar last continue the IAMB’s oversight of the DFI.386 The
year.383 For more on recent trends for key economic immunity of DFI assets from attachment enacted
indicators in Iraq, see Table 2.20. by the UN also expires on December 31, 2009.387
There is a U.S. Executive Order, however, that ex-
tends immunity for Iraqi assets held in the United
Oversight of Iraqi Oil Revenues States until May 2010.388
The Secretary-General’s report noted that
On August 24, 2009, the UN Secretary-General in 2004 the IAMB recommended that the GOI
issued a report on the DFI, noting IAMB’s as- strengthen internal financial controls by install-
sessment that COFE is ready to assume oversight ing metering systems in all oil fields, oil terminals,

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 83

IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING SOURCES AND USES

Figure 2.32
GOI Budget and Budget Execution, 2006–2010
$ Billions

$80

$70

$60

$50
Oil price
$40 assumption:
$91/ bbl
Oil price Oil price
$30 assumption: assumption:
$50/ bbl $60/ bbl
Oil price
$20 assumption:
$50/ bbl

$10

$0
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Operating Budget Executed
Capital Budget

Note: Budget execution for 2009 includes expenditures through 6/30/2009. The Iraqi Council of Ministers approved the 2010 budget on 10/13/2009, and
it must now be reviewed and approved by the Council of Representatives. Oil price is in $USD.

Sources: “GOI Budget” (as approved by TNA and written into law December 2005); U.S. Treasury, responses to SIGIR data call, 1/4/2008, 12/31/2008, 1/6/2009,
1/16/2009, 4/9/2009, and 10/3/2009; IMF, “Country Report No. 03/383,” 12/2008, pp. 19, 21; GOI, Cabinet of Ministers, www.cabinet.iq, accessed 10/14/2009.

and oil refineries.389 Yet, as of December 31, 2008, or other mechanisms. The Thi-Qar refinery
IAMB external auditors placed the level of oil- measures oil quantities using a depth bar, and
metering installations in Iraq at only 33% of total the Missan refinery, which does not have any
capacity.390 At a July 2009 IAMB meeting, Iraq’s meters, has established a committee to deter-
Board of Supreme Audit (BSA) reported on the mine measurements. The BSA report noted that
status of the metering program:391 59 meters are required for southern refineries,
• Only 2 of the 34 meters installed on 21 North Oil but until recently, there were no letters of credit
Company oil sites were functional and cali- on record to purchase meters, and only 4 orders
brated. A letter from the company dated August were reportedly in progress.
1, 2009, claimed that metering systems will be
installed in a majority of sites and tanks recali-
brated in the last quarter of 2009. The Iraqi Budget for 2009–2010
• The Missan Oil Company had no meters in-
stalled on pipelines pumping to export termi- The GOI’s 2009 budget is $58.6 billion, based on
nals, but the company reported that the process an oil price of $50 per barrel.392 During the third
to solicit bids and award contracts for this equip- quarter of 2009, a supplemental to increase the
ment had been initiated. budget by approximately $5 billion was introduced
• The South Refinery Company did not have in the CoR.393 The CoR has had only one reading of
meters to measure outputs and inputs between the supplemental budget and has not yet approved
depots, production departments, and beneficia- it.394 The 2009 GOI budget shortfall is estimated to
ries, relying instead on radar-metering systems be as high as $16 billion, which could be offset with

84 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 ECONOMY

Key Economic Sectors

Agriculture
Agriculture, the second largest sector of Iraq’s
economy, is suffering from the effects of a two-year
drought and declines in water flowing into Iraq’s
rivers from neighboring countries.400 This year, the
situation worsened as Iran continued to divert the
paths of the Karun and Karkha rivers for local proj-
ects and completely cut the flow from the Karun
into Iraq’s Shatt al-Arab River.401 The lower water
levels have led to increased salinity that is damag-
ing agriculture and poisoning fish and animals.402
Addressing Iraq’s use of surface irrigation water
could mitigate reduced river flows. Conservative
estimates are that much of the land devoted to ag-
USAID’s Inma program purchased six million fingerlings, under a $3 million agreement for the riculture is over-irrigated by as much as 25%–50%
Euphrates fish farm. The growing interest in aquaculture underscores the importance of adequate
water resources for Iraqi agriculture. (USAID photo) and that 25% percent of surface water supply is lost
in the delivery system.403
To address the need for better management
accumulated fiscal reserves estimated to be approxi- of Iraq’s water resources, the U.S. Department of
mately $21 billion as of the end of 2008.395 Accord- Agriculture, the Iraqi Ministry of Agriculture, and
ing to U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, the GOI had released several other GOI ministries hosted a National Soil
50% of total provincial budgets by the end of June Salinity Conference on July 15–17, 2009. During the
2009, and the provinces had spent approximately conference, senior GOI officials agreed to an outline
30% of their capital investment budgets.396 GOI of GOI actions to address the issue, which the Iraqi
budget expenditures for this quarter are not avail- Ministry of Agriculture has agreed to as well.404
able, partly because of the August 19, 2009, attacks USAID continues to support the four most
that severely damaged the Ministry of Finance.397 profitable agricultural sectors in Iraq—perennial
Highly skilled professionals from the ministry were fruits, annual vegetables, aquaculture and
injured or killed, and a significant number of paper poultry, and beef and lamb. This support is
and electronic files were lost.398 provided through a $92.5 million Inma agribusi-
On October 13, 2009, Iraq’s Council of Min- ness program that began in May 2007 and ends
isters (CoM) approved a 2010 budget of approxi- in August 2010. This quarter, Inma signed 6 feedlot
mately $67 billion, based on an oil price of $60 per and 3 packing shed grants, trained nearly
barrel and exports of 2.15 MBPD, and a deficit of 100 Iraqi fish farmers in advanced aquaculture
approximately $15.3 billion.399 The budget now techniques, made possible $1.5 million in
goes to CoR for review, amendment, and approval. agricultural micro-finance loans, and held
Figure 2.32 provides details on GOI budgets and several national agricultural conferences on
budget execution from 2006–2010. finance, livestock, and poultry.405

Foreign Investment and Privatization

Many challenges remain to foreign investment and
privatization in Iraq. As noted in the World Bank’s

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 85

IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING SOURCES AND USES

“Doing Business 2010: Reforming Through Dif- Table 2.21

ficult Times,” Iraq ranks 153 out of 183 countries Doing Business 2010: Reforming
in terms of enacting reforms that promote private- through Difficult Times
sector growth and investment.406 An example of Country Ranking
the unfavorable business climate in Iraq is that Saudi Arabia 13

while more than 85 firms have filed for investment Kuwait 61

licenses in Iraq, few have moved to the investment Turkey 73

execution phase.407 Table 2.21 shows Iraq’s ranking Jordan 100

compared with its neighbors, which places it at the Iran 137
bottom of the region.408 Syria 143
In August 2009, the Center for International Iraq 153
Private Enterprise released a survey of 120 Iraqi
Source: World Bank, “Doing Business 2010: Reforming Through
business leaders. It sampled opinions on six groups Difficult Times,” http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEW
S/0,,contentMDK:22301788~pagePK:64257043~piPK:437376~theSite
of Iraqi business laws, identifying some of the PK:4607,00.html, accessed 10/14/2009.
major challenges:409
• lack of effective legal and regulatory systems The KRG has taken steps to make the invest-
• poor enforcement of private property rights ment climate more attractive, such as passing an
• administrative corruption that adds 20%–30% to investment law that allows 100% foreign owner-
the cost of doing business ship of land (except for land containing oil, gas or
• bureaucratic red tape mineral resources).413 The KRG also contributes
• difficulty in obtaining basic business necessities, to the cost of basic infrastructure (water, electric,
such as international letters of credit sewerage, public road, telecom-
munications, etc.) related to foreign
Encouraging Private-
1
Respondents particularly singled out the investment projects.414 In contrast, Sector Development
this quarter
year ago

Import/Export Law as encouraging corruption the GOI restricts foreign ownership On July 1–2, 2008, key GOI Min-
because it is ineffective in setting up a framework of land in most of Iraq and requires istries, UN agencies, and other
for fair and competitive trade dealings.410 To pub- foreign companies to bear the economic institutions met for the
first time to coordinate economic
licize investment opportunities in Iraq, the U.S. cost of basic infrastructure when
reform based on diversification
Departments of State and Commerce, in collabo- investing in Iraq.415 U.S. Embassy- and private-sector development.
ration with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, held Baghdad reports that land-use
a major Iraq-American business conference in issues are the most commonly cited
Washington, D.C., on October 20–21, 2009.411 A reason inhibiting project execution.416 While
key accomplishment of the joint U.S.-GOI Trade the KRG has been more active in addressing the
and Investment Working Group this quarter was legal obstacles to foreign investment, corruption
securing the participation of hundreds of U.S. remains an obstacle to private-sector develop-
and Iraqi government and private-sector leaders ment in the Kurdistan Region, just as it is in the
to participate in the conference.412 rest of Iraq.417 ◆

86 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 RECONSTRUCTION
BY PROVINCE

Overview of Provincial Development 88

Provincial Reconstruction Teams 93

Provincial Portraits 96

The Kurdistan Region 98

Ninewa 104

Tameem 106

Salah Al-Din 108

Anbar 110

Diyala 112

3
Baghdad 114

Wassit 117
section
Babylon 119

Qadissiya 121

Kerbala 122

Najaf 125

Muthanna 126

Thi-Qar 128

Missan 129

Basrah 131
RECONSTRUCTION BY PROVINCE

OVERVIEW OF PROVINCIAL DEVELOPMENT

As Iraqis sought to build on the success of provin- tribal leaders through peaceful dialogue. Ninewa
cial elections last January and regional elections this regressed in the national unity category because of
quarter, U.S.-funded projects in many provinces an ongoing boycott of the PC by Kurds. The PRT
continued to migrate toward government capacity downgraded Baghdad’s rating for individual free-
building and away from large brick-and-mortar doms, a subcategory of political development in the
construction. On the security front, Provincial CMM, because of a “chilling effect on individual
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) coordinated their expression and behavior” caused by the reappear-
movements with Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) amid ance of “extremist militia elements.”419
sporadic violence. Several PRTs expressed concern
that their movements have become more restricted
because of the June 30 redeployment of U.S. troops. Governance
This quarter, the PRTs released a new assessment
of the progress that each provincial government is Preparations for the 2010 national elections,
making toward self-reliance, including rankings of including reconfiguration of political alliances,
progress in five categories—governance, rule of law, continued to occur throughout Iraq’s provinces
political development, economic development, and this quarter. Registration proceeded smoothly
national unity (formerly called reconciliation)— in most provinces; in Tameem the PRT reported
using a tool called a Capability Maturity Model resistance to register to vote from Turkomen
(CMM). Some metrics and targets are incorporated and Arab representatives.420 In Diyala, there was
into the CMM, but the main input is subjective concern that registration may be hampered by
evaluation by the PRTs.418 The most recent assess- ethnosectarian divisions. The issue of Tameem and
ment covers the period from March 1 to May 31, the disagreement over internal boundaries affected
2009. The results of this latest assessment, includ- politics in the northern-most provinces, includ-
ing a comparison with the previous assessment, are ing Tameem, Ninewa, Diyala, and Salah Al-Din,
shown in Figure 3.1. as well as Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, and Dahuk in the
The only province to achieve self-reliant status in Kurdistan Region.
any category was Wassit, which went from low de- On July 25, 2009, Iraqis in the Kurdistan
veloping to high developing in the governance cat- Region elected Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)
egory after firing an underperforming provincial candidate Masoud Barzani as president of the
director-general of electricity. Babylon scored well
in governance because of increased transparency
in decision-making, but scored poorly in political
development because the new Provincial Council
(PC) chairman did not effectively communicate
with the PC. Missan began hiring based on techni-
cal competence rather than tribal or party affilia-
tion, earning the province higher scores in political
development and governance. The situation im-
proved in Qadissiya in the national unity category The INL Judicial Security Team in Anbar province with the
Marines from MNF-West performing a courthouse security
after the new governor resolved differences with assessment in Karmah. (US Embassy-Baghdad photo)

88 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 OVERVIEW OF PROVINCIAL DEVELOPMENT

Figure 3.1
PRT Maturity Assessments, 2/2009 vs. 5/2009

Kurdistan Region Ninewa Tameem Salah Al-Din

Self-Reliant
Performing
Sustaining
Developing
Beginning

GOV PD NU ECON RoL GOV PD NU ECON RoL GOV PD NU ECON RoL GOV PD NU ECON RoL

Anbar Diyala Baghdad Wassit

Self-Reliant
Performing
Sustaining
Developing
Beginning

GOV PD NU ECON RoL GOV PD NU ECON RoL GOV PD NU ECON RoL GOV PD NU ECON RoL

Babylon Qadissiya Kerbala Najaf

Self-Reliant
Performing
Sustaining
Developing
Beginning

GOV PD NU ECON RoL GOV PD NU ECON RoL GOV PD NU ECON RoL GOV PD NU ECON RoL

Muthanna Thi-Qar Missan Basrah

Self-Reliant
Performing
Sustaining
Developing
Beginning

GOV PD NU ECON RoL GOV PD NU ECON RoL GOV PD NU ECON RoL GOV PD NU ECON RoL

2/2009 Assessment 5/2009 Assessment

GOV= Governance; PD= Political Development; NU= National Unity; ECON= Economic Development; RoL= Rule of Law

Source: OPA, responses to SIGIR data call, 4/17/2009 and 10/1/2009.

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 89

RECONSTRUCTION BY PROVINCE

Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in the helping to create human resources departments,
first direct elections for that office.421 Seventy-eight mapping the life-cycle of strategic projects, and
percent of the electorate turned out to vote.422 establishing rules on ethics and transparency.
Simultaneous elections for the Iraqi Kurdistan Par- USAID’s Tatweer program worked with minis-
liament (IKP) yielded a victory for the ruling KDP terial directors general in 10 Iraqi ministries to
in alliance with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan improve management and administrative skills,
(PUK). But the new Change List party, a splinter of as well as the delivery of government services.
the PUK headed by a former PUK deputy secretary To date, USAID reported that Tatweer had
general, won a large enough slice of the vote poten- completed 3,566 courses for 58,391 government
tially to redefine politics in a region that has been workers. This quarter, Tatweer completed the
dominated for decades by Masoud Barzani’s KDP work necessary to open satellite offices in four
and the PUK, headed by Jalal Talabani.423 provinces. USAID’s Iraqi Community-based
A simultaneous vote on a referendum to adopt Conflict Mitigation project (ICCM) supports
a new constitution for the Kurdistan Region was peace-building efforts.425
initially set for election day. However, on July 6,
the Independent High Electoral Commission
(IHEC) announced that the referendum question Security and Rule of Law
would not be included on the ballot. 424 A separate
nationwide referendum on the disputed province DoD reported in early July that Iraq had the lowest
of Tameem remains on hold, and a date has not level of violence in six years including decreases
been set for district and sub-district elections in in U.S. military deaths, Iraqi Security Forces
the provinces. deaths, and ethnosectarian deaths.426 Several major
PRTs continued to work with most provincial bombings occurred this quarter in Ninewa, Anbar,
governments to help them develop transpar- Diyala, Tameem, and Babylon. In Baghdad, the
ent and efficient methods of governing. USAID Ministries of Interior and Finance were bombed.427
oversaw several programs designed to improve In July, the chief of the Baghdad Operations Com-
governance and economic development at the mand Advisory Team noted that the Arab-Kurd
central, provincial, and district levels, including dispute over Iraq’s internal boundaries continued

Figure 3.2
Annual Security Incidents per 10,000 People, by Province

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

> 20 incidents 10–20 incidents 2–10 incidents 0–2 incidents

Note: Incidents include attacks against Iraqi infrastructure and government organizations; bombs that are found and cleared (including IEDs and mines);
detonated bombs; sniper, ambush, grenade, and other small arms attacks; and mortar, rocket, and surface-to-air attacks.

Sources: MNF-I, responses to SIGIR data call, 10/6/2008, 7/2/2009, and 9/30/2009; CENTCOM, response to SIGIR data call, 1/10/2009.

90 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 OVERVIEW OF PROVINCIAL DEVELOPMENT

to create security challenges.428 Security for judges Program (IRAP) and has a limited number funded
and lawyers remained a challenge in several prov- by CERP. Some PRTs reported their Iraqi interlocu-
inces, particularly in Ninewa and Diyala.429 For tors had asked for large-scale “legacy” projects such
trends in security incidents in the provinces since as dams or medical centers.430 For a breakdown of
2004, see Figure 3.2. infrastructure project costs by province and sector,
see Table 3.1.
The provision of essential services—particu-
Infrastructure larly the continuing inability of the government
to meet demand for electric power—has become a
Of the large infrastructure projects ongoing in the leading campaign issue as Iraqis prepare for Janu-
provinces, most were in the electricity, sewer, and ary 2010 elections. Although 80% of Iraqis live in
water categories. Much of the effort has shifted to provinces where the electricity supply-demand
helping Iraqis sustain completed projects. An- gap has narrowed over the past two years, the gap
bar, for instance, has no active brick-and-mortar nation-wide remains greater than it was in 2003,
projects supported with funding from the Quick and some provinces are better off than others. In
Response Fund (QRF) or Iraq Rapid Assistance 2007, the greatest disparity was between Baghdad

Table 3.1
Infrastructure Project Costs, by Province and Sector
$ Millions

Water and Transportation and General

Province Electricity Sanitation Oil and Gas Communications Infrastructure Total
Dahuk 61.40 8.34 - 0.93 7.63 78.30
Erbil 102.54 201.67 0.08 5.07 2.46 311.82
Sulaymaniyah 49.03 15.28 - 2.98 1.06 68.35
Ninewa 118.74 126.87 0.08 66.06 6.97 318.71
Tameem 362.23 42.87 187.39 21.09 8.47 622.05
Salah Al-Din 311.19 59.51 71.52 65.75 7.37 515.35
Anbar 251.58 188.88 - 70.15 3.92 514.53
Diyala 80.66 143.47 2.89 23.79 6.24 257.05
Baghdad 1,504.22 755.31 40.60 282.17 341.68 2,923.97
Wassit 45.38 30.21 - 19.18 10.23 105.01
Babylon 121.65 47.63 - 36.01 3.49 208.78
Qadissiya 86.78 30.46 - 21.75 2.65 141.63
Kerbala 46.99 39.00 - 4.88 1.58 92.45
Najaf 72.79 60.84 - 14.26 4.43 152.31
Muthanna 15.02 189.79 0.07 19.12 3.87 227.87
Thi-Qar 106.67 399.69 0.43 21.42 13.06 541.26
Missan 76.31 20.26 0.06 14.06 6.32 117.01
Basrah 543.46 238.32 558.55 171.80 8.39 1,520.52
Nationwide & Regional 1,115.10 487.18 916.14 418.14 28.16 2,964.71
Total 5,071.73 3,085.58 1,777.81 1,278.60 467.97 11,681.69

Note: Data not audited. Numbers affected by rounding. This list of reconstruction projects is based on IRMS data, which is not fully accurate or complete. Project totals therefore do not
reconcile with top-line obligations and expenditures provided by the agencies.

Source: IRMS, Global Benchmark, 10/9/2009.

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 91

RECONSTRUCTION BY PROVINCE

and Anbar. In Baghdad, load served met 37% of Figure 3.3

estimated demand, compared with 89% in Anbar. Load Served as Percentage of Estimated Demand
That gap has narrowed, and this quarter both for Electricity, by Province, 2007 vs. 2009
provinces were slightly below the national average
of 68%. Only four provinces—Sulaymaniyah,
Erbil, Basrah, and Diyala—received more than
80% of estimated demand, with Sulaymaniyah
now ranking highest in its ability to meet demand,
at 99%. Wassit ranked lowest at 51%.431 For a com-
parison of electricity load served versus estimated
demand in 2007 and 2009, see Figure 3.3.

Economy
7/2007–9/2007 7/2009–9/2009
Provincial Investment Commissions (PICs), Iraqi
governmental bodies associated with the National < 40% 40% - 60% 60% - 80% > 80%
Investment Commission, have worked on tailoring
Note: Load served is measured at the substation level and is the amount of electricity that enters the local
development of local private enterprise or invest- distribution systems. Because of transmission losses that occur between power plants and substations, load
served is less than total electricity supply.
ment in state-owned enterprise to the specific
economic circumstances and natural resources of Source: ITAO/ESD, Electric Daily Performance Reports, 7/1/2007–9/30/2009.

their provinces. Anbar and Muthanna sought to

develop oil initiatives, and several provinces sought
to develop tourism. Most PRTs focused their efforts
in two areas:432
• improving business environments by develop-
ing business centers and roundtables to attract
local and foreign investors, as well as helping to
create bank lending to small- and medium-sized
businesses
• developing or implementing agricultural-
improvements projects in such areas as animal
husbandry and vaccination, and water-saving
techniques for growing crops
Iraqis in the Kurdistan Region line up to vote in presidential
and parliamentary elections on July 25, 2009. (U.S. Embassy-
USAID continued its efforts to stimulate pro- Baghdad photo)
vincial private sectors through its Tijara program,
which provides grants to banks that loan to small-
and medium-sized businesses, and assists with introducing new technologies to farmers. USAID
micro financing, among other projects. Inma pro- reported that its Inma projects will generate 7,100
grams concentrated on agribusiness development, permanent jobs and more than $120 million in
including training, improving market systems, and gross revenue in 2009 and 2010.433 ◆

92 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS

PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS

PRTs in Transition Figure 3.4

Provincial Reconstruction Teams,
The evolving U.S.-Iraqi relationship is affecting 11/2005–9/2009
the security situation, as well as the roles of the
23 PRTs, ePRTs, and the Regional Reconstruc- November 2005 4 PRTs
tion Team (RRT) conducting reconstruction
activities in the provinces. RRT Erbil is the only
August 2006 5 PRTs
regional team; each of the PRTs operates in a single
province, and some used to operate out of Regional
Embassy Offices (REOs), but all of the REOs have December 2006 10 PRTs
closed except Hilla in Babylon province. The Office
of Provincial Affairs (OPA) has described the PRT July 2007 10 PRTs 15 ePRTs 7 PSTs
work as critical to U.S. efforts to achieve a “stable,
peaceful, united, and secure Iraq with a developing
economy, participatory governance under the rule December 2007 10 PRTs 15 ePRTs 7 PSTs
of law, and civil order.”434
This quarter, U.S. Embassy-Baghdad discussed
August 2008 14 PRTs 13 ePRTs 4 PSTs
plans to continue PRT teams in Iraq’s provinces
for at least two more years. At some point in
2010–2011, some PRTs may relocate from provin- November 2008 14 PRTs 11 ePRTs 4 PSTs
cial capitals to accomplish most of their work from
regional hubs. PRT leadership will still be respon-
March 2009 14 PRTs 10 ePRTs 4 PSTs
sible for directing the implementation of policy
and programs in their provinces.435 Under current
planning, the number of PRTs will be reduced to 16 July 2009 16 PRTs 7 ePRTs
by August 2011 and to 6 by December 2011.436 This
quarter OPA reported it was working with MNC-I
and the U.S. Embassy-Baghdad to develop plans for September 2009 16 PRTs 7 ePRTs
PRT and ePRT drawdown and closures, includ-
ing closing ePRTs or converting them to satellite
offices of the partnered PRT not later than August
Sources: GAO Report 09-86R, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams in
2010, reducing staff, and creating a timeline for the Afghanistan and Iraq,” 10/1/2008, pp. 4–5; DoS, Iraq Status Report,
8/9/2006, slide 29; SIGIR Audit 07-014, “Status of the Provincial
drawdown and closure of supporting FOBs and the Reconstruction Team Program Expansion in Iraq,” 7/28/2007, p. 2; SIGIR,
Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress,
related PRTs.437 1/30/2008, p. 81; SIGIR Audit 09-013, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams’
Performance Measurement Has Improved,” 1/28/2009, p. 2; SIGIR Audit
OPA is focusing PRT resources in support of 09-020, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Developing a Cost-tracking
prioritized U.S. strategic interests in each province, System Will Enhance Decision-making,” 4/28/2009, p. 2; U.S. Embassy-
Baghdad, response to SIGIR data call, 7/6/2009; OPA, response to SIGIR
and discretionary activities are being reduced. Al- data call, 10/1/2009.

though CERP is a DoD program, OPA noted that

the PRTs were heavily involved in MNC-I’s CERP
process, including the identification, coordination,

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 93

RECONSTRUCTION BY PROVINCE

and oversight of CERP projects. OPA reported PRT-related Audits

its concern that reduced PRT and Multi-National
Corps-Iraq resources in provinces could lead to In an audit released in August, DoS Office of the
problems in the administration of CERP-funded Inspector General raised several concerns about
projects or could require reallocation of PRT the costs and security risks of operating the PRTs
support resources to maintain oversight of CERP and REOs. The report noted that there were rough-
projects. OPA reported it was taking a number of ly 4 support contractors for every staff member in
steps to reduce the potential problem, including 3 offices—or 1,027 support personnel for 265 staff.
adding a CERP control officer and coordinating Moreover, RRT Erbil is housed in inadequate and
with MNC-I to reduce CERP projects in advance unsafe offices in a suburb of Erbil City that DoS
of a PRT drawdown.438 fire inspectors found lacking in proper electrical
For information about the PRT footprint over wiring and escape routes. The offices and living
time, see Figure 3.4, and for current locations, see quarters are dispersed among local residences and
Figure 3.5. businesses, which complicates security. DoS is
As the transition of reconstruction management reluctant to relocate the facilities or approve repairs
accelerates, U.S. Embassy-Baghdad has redefined until a decision is made as to whether the RRT will
the roles of the PRTs:439 continue in the Kurdistan Region.441
• Support elections and act as a platform for the On August 16, 2009, USAID’s Office of the
UN and other international organizations. Inspector General (USAID OIG) released a sepa-
• Serve as “honest brokers” to mediate and man- rate audit of USAID’s IRAP. Funded by the ESF
age communal tensions. and USAID’s Civil Society and Conflict Mitiga-
• Assist Iraqi civil society and governmental insti- tion Program, IRAP is designed to provide PRTs
tutions in strengthening their ability to protect in Iraq with a flexible mechanism for funding
the rule of law, confront corruption, and deliver the initiatives of community-based leaders and
basic services. local Iraqi institutions to improve access to public
• Support displaced persons. services, education, and economic opportunities.
• Encourage foreign investment and economic USAID OIG found that IRAP is achieving its goal
diversification. for at least 75% of grants it reviewed. However,
the audit determined that some grants had not
PRT expenses are currently included in U.S. fully achieved their intended results and identified
Embassy-Baghdad’s expenses. A process is under- financial irregularities, such as fictitious invoices
way to track expenses specifically earmarked for and indications of improper billing practices. As
the PRTs. DoS reimburses DoD for additional sup- of March 31, 2009, approximately $165 million had
port costs. Estimated 4th quarter reimbursements been obligated through the program, and $64 mil-
made by DoS were $5 million, including personnel lion had been expended. The USAID OIG recom-
costs through July 1, 2009.440 mended improvements for monitoring procedures
and controls that would ensure grants were ex-
ecuted properly through its implementing partner,
Development Alternatives, Inc. It concluded that
USAID had addressed these concerns.442 ◆

94 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS

Figure 3.5
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Footprint, September 2009

Dahuk

Erbil

Ninewa

Tameem Sulaymaniyah

Salah Al-Din

Diyala
Baghdad

Anbar
Wassit
Kerbala Babylon

Qadissiya Missan

Thi-Qar
Najaf

ePRT 7
U.S. PRT 14 Basrah
Muthanna
U.S. RRT 1
Coalition PRT 1
Total 23

Satellite Office 27

Source: U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, response to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2009.

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 95

RECONSTRUCTION BY PROVINCE

PROVINCIAL PORTRAITS

The following pages provide snapshots of activities For a province-level comparison of key indica-
in each of Iraq’s 18 provinces, beginning with the tors, see Table 3.2. For details of U.S. reconstruc-
Kurdistan Region and its three provinces. Much tion, governance, and rule-of-law projects in each
of the information was provided to SIGIR by PRT province, as well as PRT observations, see the
leaders, but these snapshots also draw from infor- provincial portraits that follow.
mation provided by U.S. brigade commanders,
GRD, USAID, and others.

Table 3.2
Selected Comparisons of Iraq’s Provinces
Ethnoreligious Composition Electricity Data (7/1/2009–9/30/2009)
Average
Pop. IDPs Average Daily Daily Average Load
Density Returned Electricity Estimated Daily Served (MW
Area (people/ (from January to Load Served Electricity Demand per 1,000,000
Province Population (sq km) sq km) Shia Sunni Kurd Other August, 2009) (MW) Demand (MW) Met People)

Dahuk 895,000 6,553 137 0% 0% 90% 10% - 132 203 65% 147
Erbil 1,409,000 15,074 93 0% 0% 95% 5% 30 356 411 86% 252
Sulaymaniyah 1,574,000 17,023 92 0% 0% 95% 5% 10 352 357 99% 224
Ninewa 2,820,000 37,323 76 5% 55% 15% 25% 3,160 491 851 58% 174
Tameem 1,129,000 9,679 117 15% 20% 40% 25% 60 222 324 68% 196
Salah Al-Din 1,158,000 24,075 48 3% 96% 1% 0% 60 275 385 71% 238
Anbar 1,427,000 138,228 10 5% 95% 0% 0% 670 219 329 67% 154
Diyala 1,323,000 17,685 75 25% 55% 10% 10% 39,170 196 236 83% 148
Baghdad 6,995,000 4,555 1,536 70% 29% 0% 1% 69,210 1,718 2,571 67% 246
Wassit 1,056,000 17,153 62 90% 5% 5% 0% 720 155 304 51% 147
Babylon 1,574,000 5,119 307 85% 15% 0% 0% 800 240 425 56% 152
Qadissiya 1,033,000 8,153 127 98% 1% 0% 1% - 150 253 59% 146
Kerbala 902,000 5,034 179 85% 15% 0% 0% 30 164 273 60% 182
Najaf 1,113,000 28,824 39 99% 1% 0% 0% - 216 375 58% 194
Muthanna 650,000 51,740 13 98% 2% 0% 0% - 137 202 68% 210
Thi-Qar 1,687,000 24,075 70 100% 0% 0% 0% 10 289 405 71% 171
Missan 944,000 16,072 59 95% 1% 0% 4% 80 145 273 53% 154
Basrah 2,408,000 19,070 126 85% 15% 0% 0% 600 806 929 87% 335

Note: Data not audited. Numbers affected by rounding. U.S. ongoing and completed project costs include “Nationwide” projects, not identified by province; IRMS Global Benchmark
project cost totals do not equal total expenditures found in the Funding section because not all projects are reported in IRMS.

96 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 PROVINCIAL PORTRAITS

Farmer in Tameem province suits up to look at the beehives he received through a USAID grant. (2nd Brigade A woman carries harvested winter wheat near Tarmiyah. (MNF-I photo)
Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division Public Affairs photo)

U.S. Ongoing and

2009 Iraqi Provincial Capital Budget Completed Project Costs ($ Millions) Security Incidents
Average Average %
Budget Total Number of Number of Change
Budget Allocation Actual Project Attacks per Attacks per from
Allocation per Capita Expenditures % Costs Week (Previous Week (Current Prior
($ Millions) ($) ($ Millions) Expended CERP ESF IRRF ISFF Total (per Capita) Quarter) Quarter) Quarter
N/A N/A N/A N/A 12.2 21.1 95.7 7.9 136.9 152.9 0.5 0.2 -68%
N/A N/A N/A N/A 80.9 36.1 338.7 42.6 498.3 353.6 0.2 0.4 90%
N/A N/A N/A N/A 12.3 30.1 163.5 16.0 221.9 141.0 0.3 0.0 -100%
236 84 0 0% 212.9 19.9 454.2 363.5 1,050.5 372.5 65.5 53.1 -19%
99 88 54 55% 183.6 110.4 648.6 142.9 1,085.5 961.5 20.9 19.8 -5%
97 84 17 18% 263.2 93.8 407.3 106.9 871.2 752.4 25.2 25.8 3%
112 78 78 70% 428.6 81.4 512.4 840.3 1,862.7 1,305.3 14.5 9.2 -37%
104 79 24 23% 217.6 13.4 455.3 246.3 932.7 705.0 24.7 17.8 -28%
551 79 182 33% 1,165.9 779.0 3,202.0 1,612.7 6,759.6 966.3 74.8 63.1 -16%
91 86 36 40% 56.0 26.5 300.9 64.7 448.1 424.4 1.5 1.1 -32%
134 85 55 41% 178.2 32.6 194.9 20.5 426.3 270.8 3.9 5.1 29%
86 83 47 54% 76.1 15.8 140.5 27.4 259.7 251.4 0.4 0.9 128%
78 86 23 29% 55.0 16.2 86.6 1.0 158.9 176.1 0.3 0.4 14%
93 84 29 32% 42.2 17.4 182.2 29.6 271.4 243.8 1.2 0.4 -70%
56 86 16 28% 28.1 13.5 256.8 2.6 301.0 463.0 0.2 0.3 71%
143 85 69 48% 46.5 34.1 734.7 62.4 877.8 520.3 1.6 1.6 -3%
80 85 30 37% 27.0 26.0 169.5 38.2 260.8 276.2 3.4 2.4 -30%
201 83 50 25% 256.3 108.8 1,557.8 152.9 2,075.8 862.1 5.2 4.1 -21%

Sources:
Population—U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, response to SIGIR data call, 3/29/2009.
Area—OCHA, Governorate Profiles, 3/2009—7/2009.
Sect—U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, responses to SIGIR data call, 3/29/2009, 7/6/2009, and 7/16/2009.
IDPs—U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, response to SIGIR data call, 10/3/2009.
Security Incidents—MNF-I, response to SIGIR data call, 9/30/2009.
2009 Provincial Budgets—MNF-I, response to SIGIR data call, 6/30/2009; MNC-I, response to SIGIR data call, 10/13/2009.
U.S. Project Costs—IRMS, Global Benchmark, 10/9/2009.
Electricity Data—ITAO/EFC, Electric Daily Performance Reports, 7/1/2009–9/30/2009.

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 97

RECONSTRUCTION BY PROVINCE

The Kurdistan Region

The Kurdistan Region comprises Iraq’s three
northernmost provinces—Erbil, Dahuk, and
Sulaymaniyah. The population of the region, an
estimated 3.9 million (12.9% of Iraq’s popula-
tion), is dominated by ethnic Kurds. The three
provinces are relatively stable and secure and
offer oil, agriculture, and tourism as economic
drivers that support the region internally and
serve as an export base.443 The host province of
RRT Erbil receives some of the highest CMM
ratings in Iraq for governance, political develop- Iraqis in the Kurdistan Region line up to vote in presidential and parliamentary elections on
July 25, 2009. (OPA photo)
ment, national unity, economic development, and
rule of law.444
The KRG governs the three provinces, and They are expected to present a united front in the
35 representatives from the Kurdistan Region are 2010 elections, minimizing their differences and
members of the GOI’s Council of Representatives attempting to draw the newly formed PUK break-
(CoR). The region also elects its own president and away party—the Change List—into some kind of
parliament, called the Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament alliance as a strategy to strengthen Kurdish posi-
(IKP), formerly known as the Kurdistan National tions in disagreements with the GOI.446
Assembly. Elections in the Kurdistan Region were This quarter, KRG elections dominated U.S.
held this quarter on July 25, 2009. support activities. Throughout the region, RRT staff
The KRG’s relationship with the GOI has members acted as election monitors and supported
been strained by disagreements over the status of training sessions organized by the Independent
internally disputed boundaries (IDB) in provinces, High Electoral Commission (IHEC) and the Na-
including Tameem, that lie outside the boundaries tional Democratic Institute (NDI).447 Iraqis in the
of the Kurdistan Region. The relationship was fur- Kurdistan Region engaged in self-funded capacity-
ther affected this quarter by Prime Minister Nouri building initiatives as well. Before the July elections,
al-Maliki’s call for amending Iraq’s constitution to outgoing KRG Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani
strengthen the central government and statements launched an initiative to review government capa-
by KRG President Masoud Barzani favoring a cen- bilities and create an action plan to combat corrup-
sus and referendum, as provided by Iraq’s constitu- tion and inefficiency.448 PricewaterhouseCoopers
tion, prior to resolving IDBs.445 partnered with the KRG on this “good governance
and transparency initiative.”449
Governance
The Kurdistan Region, like the rest of Iraq, is KRG Election Results
preparing for national elections set for January On July 25, 2009, longtime KDP leader Masoud
2010. By September 2009, 15 parties in the region Barzani was elected president of the KRG with
had registered to run in the CoR elections. The Re- about 70% of the vote. GOI President Jalal Talaba-
gion’s two main parties, the Kurdistan Democratic ni’s brother-in-law, Halo Ibrahim Ahmed, came in
Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan third with 3.5% of the vote—far behind the newly
(PUK), recently united as the Kurdistani List. formed Change List presidential candidate Kamal

98 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 PROVINCIAL PORTRAITS

PRT voter education mobile teams reach out to Iraqi farmers ahead of the July 25, 2009, elections in the Kurdistan Region. (OPA photos)

Mirawdeli, who received about 25% of the vote.450 replaced Nechirvan Barzani (a nephew of Masoud
For presidential election results, see Table 3.3. Barzani), who had served as prime minister since
In simultaneous parliamentary elections, the 2006. It remains to be seen what influence the
united KDP-PUK Kurdistani List captured 53% Change List—whose power base is principally in
of the seats, while the Change List received about Sulaymaniyah—will have on the two established
25% of the votes cast.451 The KDP’s strong showing Kurdistan parties.
in both presidential and parliamentary elections For parliamentary election results, including
solidified its power in the Kurdistan Region. To open seats and seats reserved for minority parties,
a lesser extent, the influence of the PUK was also see Table 3.4.
preserved by its alliance with the KDP following the
split within its ranks that resulted in the creation of The Change List and the PUK Split
the Change List. The Change List was created by Nawshirwan Mus-
Following the elections, the new parliament tafa following his resignation as deputy secretary-
elected PUK member Barham Saleh (recently general of the PUK in 2006, but the seeds of dissent
Deputy Prime Minister of the GOI) as prime began much earlier, as the Kurdistan Region gained
minister—an indication of the PUK’s power in a greater degree of independence following the U.S.
the alliance despite its reduced numbers. Saleh invasion of Iraq. Mustafa took on an active role

Table 3.3
July 2009 KRG Presidential Election Results

Name Affiliation Percentage of Votes Won

Masoud Barzani KDP Alliance 70%
Kamal Mirawdeli Change List 25%
Halo Ibrahim Ahmed Progress List 3.5%
Safeen Sheikh Mohammed Independent 1.4%
Hussein Karmiani Independent <0%

Source: KRG, ”Electoral Commission Announces Final Results of Kurdistan Region elections,” www.krg.org, 9/15/2009.

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 99

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Table 3.4
July 2009 KRG Parliamentary Election Results
Percentage Seats
Party Affiliation of Votes Won in Parliament
Open Seats Kurdistani List KDP-PUK Alliance 57% 59
Change List PUK Splinter Group 24% 25
Services and Reform List Islamic Coalition 12% 13
Islamic Movement Moderate Islamic party >2% 2
Social Justice and Freedom Secular, progressive party >1% 1
Total Open Seats 100
Seats Reserved for Turkoman Democratic Movement Turkoman >2% 3
Minority Groups
Turkoman Reform List Turkoman >1% 1
Turkoman Erbil List Turkoman >1% 1
Chaldean Assyrian Syriac Council Inter-Christian Coalition >2% 3
Al-Rafidain List Assyrian Christian Coalition >2% 2
Aram Shahin Dawood Bakovian Armenian Christian >1% 1
Total Seats Reserved for Minority Groups 11
Total Seats in Parliament 111

Source: KRG, ”Electoral Commission Announces Final Results of Kurdistan Region elections”, www.krg.org, 9/15/2009.

Figure 3.6
Timeline of the KRG from 2003–2009 November August
Referendum scheduled for The PUK’s Barham Saleh is appointed
November 15 to determine status of prime minister of the KRG; he resigns his
internally disputed boundaries is post as deputy prime minister in Iraq’s
postponed indefinitely central government
January May May
Residents in the Kurdistan Region Security for the Kurdistan Region KDP and PUK form
hold parliamentary elections for a handed over to ISF units united Kurdistani List
new Iraqi Kurdistan Parliament comprised mostly of Kurds and
(then known as the Kurdistan Peshmerga forces April
National Assembly) Mustafa announces Change
December List will compete in
PUK internal elections July 25, 2009, elections

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

April
Iraq’s parliament selects Kurdish leader
Jalal Talabani as GOI president December March
Nawshirwan Mustafa resigns Jalal Talabani
June as deputy secretary-general announces he won’t
Masoud Barzani sworn in as president of the PUK; founds the Wisha seek a second term as
of the KRG; Nechirvan Barzani, Company, a media president of the GOI
nephew of Masoud Barzani, elected conglomerate he uses to
prime minister of the KRG launch a splinter party he June
March calls Change IKP approves draft Kurdistan
U.S. forces invade Iraq; Kurds join Regional constitution
U.S. and British forces; four Kurds, January
including Masoud Barzani and Unification Agreement signed July
Jalal Talabani, appointed by the on January 21, 2006, Elections for president and
U.S. to the Interim Iraqi establishes terms by which parliament of the KRG held
Governing Council KDP and PUK will share power on July 25

Sources: CRS, “The Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq,” 2/5/2008, pp. 2–4; SIGIR, Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress, 7/2009.

100 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 PROVINCIAL PORTRAITS

Figure 3.7
Dominant Political Party Influence in the Kurdistan Region Constitutional Impasse in the Kurdistan Region
and Tameem Province The KRG may come under pressure to change the
most recent draft of the constitution governing
Majority supports KDP party the Kurdistan Region, a controversial document
Dahuk
Majority supports PUK and that lays claim to disputed territories outside the
Change List parties
Disputed Territory;
boundaries of the Kurdistan Region, as a result of
Most Kurds support PUK and the elections. On June 24, seven members walked
Change List parties
Erbil out of a (pre-election) parliamentary vote on the
draft; 96 of 111 members of the IKP favored it.453
Five days later, 50 members of the CoR signed a pe-
Ninewa tition criticizing the draft constitution, saying it was
Sulaymaniyah not compatible with Iraq’s federal constitution. One
Tameem Kurdish member of the CoR urged leaders of the
GOI and the KRG to open a national dialogue on
the sensitive subject.454 The nature of the long-sim-
mering dispute suggests the two sides are unlikely
to reach an agreement anytime soon on recom-
mendations for a resolution to disputed territories,
including Tameem.455
Diyala
Governance Capacity Building
The United States funded several other projects in
the Kurdistan Region this quarter:
Anbar
• A $20,000 Quick Response Fund (QRF) grant
to the “Kids’ House,” a non-religious school and
activity center for internally displaced children
Source: SIGIR analysis, KRG, “Change in the Air,” www.investorsiraq.com, accessed 10/16/2009; KRG, whose families fled violence in Baghdad and
“Electoral Commision announces final results of Kurdistan Region elections,” www.krg.org, accessed 9/15/2009.
Ninewa provinces.456
representing the KRG’s position in discussions with • The Sabean Mandean Cultural Center received
the GOI. Dissension in the PUK ranks grew further a $25,000 QRF grant for educational materials
after the 2005 elections in the Kurdistan Region and and musical instruments. Many members of the
again in 2006 during the PUK’s internal elections. Sabean Mandean community in Erbil are IDPs
In 2006 Mustafa founded the Wisha Company, a from southern Iraq.457
media conglomerate, which he used as a platform to • In September, the PRT opened the 12-classroom
spread his campaign message of change.452 Zaryland School in Dahuk City. Funded by
In April 2009, Mustafa announced that his PUK $1.1 million of the ESF, this school will host
splinter movement would run as an independent classes in English and serve as a magnet school
party, called Change. Most of his support comes for more than 1,000 exceptional students.458
from Sulaymaniyah province, the traditional
stronghold of the PUK. The PUK is also heavily Security and Rule of Law
supported in Tameem, located south of the Kurd- Security in the Kurdistan Region was stable this
istan Region. For a breakdown of party influence quarter with only sporadic outbreaks of violence
by province, see Figure 3.7, and for a historical reported mostly in the lead-up to regional elec-
timeline of KRG leaders since 2003, see Figure 3.6. tions. There were four incidents in which two

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 101

RECONSTRUCTION BY PROVINCE

Security Incidents in the Kurdistan Region

(Resulting in Two or More Deaths)
7/1/2009–10/15/2009

years ago
Exodus from the village of Qaladze (left) during the al-Anfal Campaign in 1988; Qaladze (right)
as it looks today. (old photo, courtesy of the KRG; recent photo, SIGIR)

Qaladze: A Story of Perseverance On June 26, 1989, Saddam Hussein’s troops

destroyed the city of Qaladze as part of the notorious al-Anfal campaign to punish Iraqi
Kurds for their support of Iran. The Iraqi Army dynamited and bulldozed the town’s
houses, stores, schools, and hospitals. The original 70,000 residents either fled to Turkey
or Iran, or were forcibly moved to settlements where they could be closely monitored.
During this period, some residents simply disappeared. Twenty years later, SIGIR found the
city of Qaladze fully rebuilt and thriving with multiple-story buildings and paved roads.

or more people died. In neighboring disputed

territories, however, the situation remains tense—
particularly in Ninewa province, where a plan was
put forth to invite Kurdish Peshmerga forces to
patrol joint checkpoints with Iraqi Security Forces
(ISF). RRT Erbil reported that KRG government
officials had urged the establishment of the joint
checkpoints. This proposal prompted an outcry
from Arab provincial officials in Ninewa who
opposed allowing the Peshmerga to operate these
checkpoints with the ISF.459
Kurds receive crutches and wheelchairs from a QRF-funded
According to the Internation Organization for program to aid victims of war and torture. (OPA photo)
Migration (IOM), the Kurdistan Region hosts
39% of IDP families belonging to ethnoreligious The RRT’s Rule-of-Law (RoL) section helped to
minorities, including Kurds. Almost half of establish a Justice Training Institute that aims to
IOM-assessed IDPs in Dahuk are Christian. Most provide training and continuing legal education for
hail from Ninewa and Baghdad, and more than judges and lawyers in the region. Elsewhere, RoL
half reported that they would prefer to resettle continued in its efforts to create a legal curriculum
permanently in the province.460 Arab Sunnis and at the region’s law schools, but plans to develop a
Kurds who fled their homes after being targeted 10-year road map for legal reforms including link-
for ethnosectarian reasons also constitute some ages between the KRG and GOI judiciary, were on
of the IDP population in the region. Many IDP hold awaiting QRF funding.462
families are living in tent camps, and 10% are USAID developed a gender-based violence
female-headed households.461 tracking and documentation system to identify

102 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 PROVINCIAL PORTRAITS

how victims are negatively impacted by laws and U.S. Infrastructure Spending
practices that discriminate against women, as well in the Kurdistan Region
$ Millions
as laws that are protective but widely ignored.463
Sector Total
Infrastructure Electricity 212.97
According to the KRG, the Kurdistan Region’s first Water and Sanitation 225.29
privately owned oil refinery began operating in Er- Oil and Gas 0.08
bil this quarter.464 On July 18, the prime minister’s Transportation and Communications 8.98
office also announced that the central processing General Infrastructure 11.15
station and refinery had opened at the Khurmala Total 458.47
fields.465 Among the notable ongoing U.S.-supported
brick-and-mortar projects were:
• Erbil Emergency Hospital (completion expected noted that were corrected. SIGIR’s report did not
in April 2010)—the project is designed to add contain any recommendations for additional cor-
100 beds, more than doubling capacity for emer- rective action. The $3.7 million ESF-funded center
gency treatment.466 will provide a modern, safe, and comfortable liv-
• Zakho Emergency Hospital in Dahuk—targeted ing space for orphans and senior citizens, includ-
for completion in October 2009, the hospital will ing 345 children and 60 senior citizens.470
provide 30 beds and become the primary access A SIGIR inspection of the partially completed
point for emergency cases in the province.467 Qaladze Abattoir (slaughterhouse) this quar-
• Phase I of Fort Suse Prison in Sulaymaniyah— ter found that the contractor had already taken
targeted for completion in October, 2009, the corrective action to the construction deficiencies
prison will relieve an acute shortage of prison previously found, and the completed project met
space in the province.468 the construction standards of the contract.471

SIGIR published three inspections of projects in Economy

the Kurdistan Region this quarter (for details, see The region is rich in oil, but the absence of a hydro-
Section 4 of this Report): carbon agreement with the GOI has tempered ef-
forts to exploit oil resources. This quarter, disputes
SIGIR issued an inspection report on the over revenue rights with Iraq’s central govern-
Chamchamal Correctional Facility, a $29 mil- ment affected extraction agreements with foreign
lion U.S.-funded prison located in Sulaymaniyah companies as the central government threatened to
province that was turned over to the Iraqis last blacklist firms doing business with the KRG. The
March. In September, the prison was opened, and dispute has also held up payments to international
360 inmates were transferred to the facility from firms exporting oil from the Kurdistan Region.472
a Baghdad prison following a prisoner riot. SIGIR The KRG has marketed itself as a secure and
found that the Iraqi Ministry of Finance had al- business-friendly location within Iraq.473 This
located $11.1 million per month to run the facility quarter, President Barzani met with Egypt’s invest-
and that its operations were being overseen by the ment minister and sent an economic delegation
KRG. SIGIR’s report contained no recommenda- to Britain.474 Deals were struck with several small-
tions for corrective action.469 and medium-sized oil firms in Canada, Australia,
A SIGIR inspection of the Orphanage and Britain, and Turkey, with the KRG reportedly seek-
Senior Assisted Living Center in Erbil found ad- ing equity shares in some of the ventures rather
equate construction with some minor safety issues than operational involvement for local oil firms.475

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 103

RECONSTRUCTION BY PROVINCE

Although the new oil deals could increase produc-

tion and boost the local economy, the Economist
Intelligence Unit (EIU) has forecast that disputes
with the central government over oil contracts and
royalties are likely to continue to delay exports.476
Among the U.S.-funded activities supporting
economic development this quarter, USAID’s Inma
program reported these activities:477
• small business development courses for about 40
women in Erbil province working in the dairy
industry (courses for 120 total are planned)
• funding a beef and lamb feedlot in Dahuk prov-
ince to speed the growth of calves and lambs to PRT Ninewa joins a Ramadan “Iftar” dinner with members of several groups in the province.
(OPA photo)
more efficiently supply the Iraqi market with
more red meat about command and control, delaying implemen-
• training for farmers in drip irrigation methods tation of the initiative.482
Soldiers and police who were legal residents
of the Kurdistan Region but who are stationed
in Ninewa cast absentee ballots in the July 25,
Ninewa 2009, presidential and parliamentary elections in
the Kurdistan Region. The PRT monitored the
Governance elections. The PRT also talked regularly to Kurd-
Ninewa’s boundaries are in dispute with Dahuk ish leadership in the province to address other
and Erbil provinces of the Kurdistan Region.478 The cross-provincial issues. In September, the PRT
province’s ethnoreligious demographic mix has led sponsored a Ramadan feast that brought oppos-
to tensions between Arabs and Kurds with a signifi- ing factions together, including dozens of politi-
cant influence on provincial politics and security.479 cal, military, and business leaders from different
Despite these obstacles, the PRT organized a suc- ethnoreligious groups.483
cessful first dialogue between Arab and boycotting
Kurdish members of the Provincial Council (PC).480 Security and the Rule of Law
Members of the Kurdish-backed Ninewa PRT Ninewa reported that the security situa-
Fraternal List (NFL) continued their boycott of tion remained “kinetic and unpredictable.” Most
the PC in response to the lack of a power-sharing security incidents took place in the northeastern
agreement with the majority al-Hadbaa Gathering section of the province, in territory claimed by
after the provincial election.481 During the quarter, both Kurds and Arabs. The PRT reported that
the PRT worked with both sides in an effort to get the unstable political environment had created
the NFL to end its boycott. In addition, the PRT an insecure band of territory that insurgents were
coordinated with U.S. forces to garner political able to exploit, carrying out a series of high-profile
support for a proposal to include the Kurdish bombings this quarter.484
Peshmerga, the ISF, and U.S. forces in joint patrols Armed groups targeted political opponents. In
of disputed areas of the province. In August, August, gunmen reportedly killed a member of
Peshmerga forces, which operate in the Kurdistan the Al-Hadbaa Party.485 Much of the violence was
Region, were poised to man joint patrols with the directed toward minorities: On August 10, 2 truck
ISF but the central government raised concerns bombs detonated in an ethnic Shabak Shia area

104 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 PROVINCIAL PORTRAITS

under de facto control of the KRG, killing 41. Three The Iraqi Police began to address corruption
days later, 2 suicide bombers blew up a café in an issues and maintain law and order, but the PRT
ethnic Yazidi enclave, also under KRG control, reported that crime scene investigations were
killing 21.486 Minority Shabaks were targeted as poorly conducted and evidence was frequently
were other Shia neighborhoods and mosques. An tainted, altered, destroyed, or lost. The severe short-
August bombing killed 38 people as they left a Shia age of police in the province results in the Iraqi
mosque near Mosul. At least 20 Kurds were killed Army being first responders to crime scenes, the
in a suicide bombing in Wardek, south of Mosul. PRT reported. The IA lacks sufficient training in
Tal Afar’s mayor and a judge survived separate crime scene methods, resulting in loss of evidence.
assassination attempts. The PRT reported U.S. The Mosul Crime Lab is not sufficiently staffed or
military training with the ISF had increased secu- equipped to have a meaningful effect on criminal
rity, but the province remained vulnerable in the prosecutions, and judicial security continues to be
absence of a durable political solution.487 a significant concern.489
The PRT’s RoL section indicated progress this
quarter, reporting that legal institutions that had Infrastructure
limited impact or public trust were now “semi- USAID worked with Iraqis to develop water,
effective” and operating with “sufficient” public sewer, school, and road programs and assisted the
support. Judges permanently located in Ninewa local government in Tal Afar to create a Farmers’
began to hear cases this quarter, and traveling Business Training Program. USAID also trained
judges from Baghdad were no longer required. The the PC’s legal committee to develop bylaws and
PRT considers the Ninewa Bar Association to be charters.490 According to the MND-N brigade
strong, with a contingent of well-educated lawyers. commander, improvements to basic infrastructure
Courthouses were usually open to the public on were in the works in Mosul this quarter:491
regular working days.488 • Electricity—70% of homes in Mosul have elec-
tricity service. Two CERP projects were under
Security Incidents in Ninewa construction to expand the distribution network.
(Resulting in Two or More Deaths)
7/1/2009–10/15/2009
• Water—50% of the people receive water
through pipes, 33% by truck, and the remain-
der by other sources. This quarter, 8 water
pump stations and water main projects were
completed, providing water by pipe to 42,000
9
people.
33
• Sewage—3 sewage projects were completed in
4
August, providing sewage disposal to 20,000
Iraqis.

Economy
Ninewa’s economic base is dependent on agricul-
ture, oil, asphalt, textiles, and sugar. The Provincial
Investment Commission hopes to capitalize on the
area’s potential for development in the petrochemi-
cal and sulfur industries. State-owned enterprises
include factories for cotton, sugar, dairy, and hand-
made carpets.492

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 105

RECONSTRUCTION BY PROVINCE

U.S. Infrastructure Spending in Ninewa

$ Millions

Sector Total
Electricity 118.74
Water and Sanitation 126.87
Oil and Gas 0.08
Transportation and Communications 66.06
General Infrastructure 6.97
Total 318.71

Among the U.S.-funded activities supporting

economic development this quarter were:
• a retail market at a Forward Operating Base, Members of the Ard Al-Barka farmers association receive QRF
grants. (OPA photo)
including opportunities for women and
minorities493 Tameem reported that the province's unresolved
• a training course for 30 women belonging to the issues hindered progress in governance and the
first all-woman agricultural association494 investment climate.499
• micro-grants and micro-purchases awarded Though they did not participate in the elections,
to internally displaced communities living in Kurdish groups in Tameem keenly observed them,
disputed areas of the province495 and PRT Tameem reported that the vote is likely to
• small QRF grants to help young people start have a lasting effect on the distribution of power in
farms and to provide farm equipment to agricul- the province. Although the final impact remains
tural associations496 to be seen, there appeared to be a reduction in the
influence of the KDP-PUK monopoly on politics
as some residents openly supported the Kurdistan
Region’s new Change List party.500 The party plans
Tameem to open two offices in Tameem under the supervi-
sion of the former PUK provincial chairman.501
Governance On the national front, the PRT helped organize
Tameem’s administrative status remains in dispute voter registration for upcoming January 2010 elec-
because the territory is claimed by both the GOI tions—another difficult topic of discussion with
and KRG. Iraqi and international efforts to find a local Tameem leaders. The PRT expressed con-
solution have thus far been unsuccessful. Article cern that potential voter apathy among Arab and
140 of the Iraqi Constitution provides a path for a Turkoman communities might produce dispro-
resolution beginning with a national census and portional results that favor Kurds, whom the PRT
a nationwide referendum, but to date, no census described as more politically organized than other
is scheduled. Because of the dispute, Tameem ethnoreligious groups.502
residents did not vote in either the provincial elec-
tions held last January or in the Kurdistan Region's Security and Rule of Law
elections held this quarter.497 The Special Envoy The security environment remained poor in
of the U.S. Ambassador for Northern Regions Tameem province, with continued bombings
relocated to Tameem this quarter to focus on find- and murders concentrated around the provincial
ing a resolution to the territorial dispute.498 PRT capital, Kirkuk. At least 17 incidents resulted in the

106 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 PROVINCIAL PORTRAITS

communication on law-enforcement issues.504 The

section worked on a project to open a women’s
legal clinic and initiated a review of courthouse
security that will be conducted by USACE.505 The
RoL section also met with the provincial Com-
mission on Integrity (COI) to discuss strategies for
the use of confidential informants during inves-
tigations.506 In an attempt to decrease the level of
provincial corruption, the section has drawn up
a CERP-funded proposal to strengthen the COI
office. The section also won CERP approval for a
campaign against honor killings and an extension
on a women’s legal aid clinic.507
A tractor deposits trash at the Kirkuk Solid Waste Transfer Station #1 in Tameem province. (GRD photo)

Infrastructure
Security Incidents in Tameem Construction continued this quarter on the al-
(Resulting in Two or More Deaths)
7/1/2009–10/15/2009
Rasheed Wastewater Treatment Plant.508 Accord-
ing to the MNC-N brigade commander, a second
water treatment plant in Hawijah was completed
this quarter and has increased Kirkuk City’s water
output by 30%. The new plant will also redistribute
water to rural areas via canals. The brigade com-
13
mander noted that there were still no operating
sewage treatment facilities in the province, but
there was reported progress this quarter toward
completing a sewage facility in south Kirkuk City
that will service 50,000 people.509
Work was 25% complete this quarter on a major
road leading to a provincial airfield. The contrac-
tor, however, was issued a stop work order due to
inefficiencies in the plans submitted and a lack of
contract understanding.510
USAID worked this quarter on a solid
waste management plan in Hawijah, trained

deaths of two or more people. Police were gunned U.S. Infrastructure Spending in Tameem
down by assailants in Kirkuk and a roadside bomb $ Millions

killed a police chief in the neighboring town of Sector Total

Amirli. Gunmen kidnapped a former hospital Electricity 362.23
administrator. The PRT also reported a growing Water and Sanitation 42.87
sense of fatigue among PC members to address the Oil and Gas 187.39
province’s political situation.503
Transportation and Communications 21.09
The PRT’s RoL section held a joint meeting of
General Infrastructure 8.47
judges and police officials this quarter to improve
Total 622.05

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 107

RECONSTRUCTION BY PROVINCE

supervisors on waste management practices, and

helped the municipality of Kirkuk create waste
collection zones. USAID also helped the munici-
pality design and initiate construction on a $1.5
million solid waste transfer station.511

Economy
Tameem’s economic growth relies heavily on oil
production. Aside from oil, Tameem relies on
agriculture, plastics manufacturing, woven carpets,
and livestock.512
To support the agricultural sector, CERP
funds were allocated to complete the Mesopota- PRT Salah Al-Din meets with the provincial governor and
members of the Provincial Council. (OPA photo)
mia Strategic Silo in Taza, considered a key node
in the agricultural infrastructure of Tameem.
In turn, facility managers have committed to candidate, which they attributed to a high level of
renovating and expanding a corn-seed process- understanding of the democratic process.518
ing plant.513 PRT projects focused more on government
This year, continuing drought has prevented a capacity building this quarter, though politi-
rise in grain production, and the PRT Economic cal divides between the two main parties, and
Development team worked this quarter to bring the possible removal of the governor, distracted
drip irrigation to farmers.514 USAID, through its the PC from its governance goals.519 The PRT
Inma program, facilitated a grant to a beef feedlot interacted regularly with the PC, reporting a
that will use farming methods that help calves greater willingness among local leaders to visit
grow faster and gain weight quicker. The program U.S.-funded project sites. The PRT reported
also issued eight agricultural loans totaling more improvement in effectiveness and transparency
than $25,000.515 of the provincial government. In early September,
the PC voted the governor out of office, and an
appeal is underway.520
At the district level, however, the PRT noted that
Salah Al-Din governments were often not viewed as legitimate or
as representative of the will of the people. District
Governance governments still exhibited poor planning and
PRT Salah Al-Din reported that its relationship budgeting practices, and provincial and local of-
with provincial leaders changed this quarter with ficials reportedly do not communicate well.521
the redeployment of U.S. forces outside major
urban centers. The PC Chairman indicated he was Security and Rule of Law
ready to engage his province in a more “normal” As the home province of former President Saddam
bilateral relationship—particularly as it relates to Hussein, Salah Al-Din has been one of Iraq’s least
foreign investment, jobs, critical infrastructure, secure places, but this quarter the level of violence
and civil capacity building.516 Provincial leaders was low. The province has suffered from waves
often referred to the PRT as “U.S. Embassy of- of sectarian violence since the Golden Mosque
ficials”517 USAID noted that the citizens had elected was bombed in 2006 and again in 2007. Though
40 new PC members, and reelected only one the mosque’s dome and minarets are once again

108 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 PROVINCIAL PORTRAITS

Security Incidents in Salah Al-Din

(Resulting in Two or More Deaths)
7/1/2009–10/15/2009

The Golden Mosque in Samarra after the February 2006

bombing. (GOI photo)

standing, positively transforming a once painful

symbol of nationwide sectarian violence, roadside
bombings occurred throughout the province this
quarter, particularly in the eastern half of the terri-
tory. In August and September, the PRT reported On March 6, 2009, pilgrims visit the Golden Mosque in Samarra,
under construction following bombings in 2006 and 2007.
a spike in insurgent activities in Tooz and that the (GOI photo)
residents of the district traded in illegal weapons.522
However, the PRT reported that Samarra, the continued to discuss the transfer of Iraqi detainees
provincial capital, enjoyed relative peace and from U.S. to Iraqi control.526
stability this quarter due to reconciliation efforts
between local officials, Sons of Iraq leaders, and Infrastructure
the Samarra Operations Center established in the PRT Salah Al-Din described the province’s transi-
wake of the 2006 and 2007 Golden Mosque bomb- tion from heavy construction projects to govern-
ings. With appropriate security protection, PRT ment capacity building as in its “infancy.”527 The
members were generally free to travel anywhere MNC-N brigade commander reported that most
in the province, but unreliable IP escorts and the sewage systems were in disrepair and that two new
inaccessibility of certain venues for tactical vehicles water treatment facilities were providing water for
remained obstacles to movement.523 6,000 Iraqis per day.528 USAID worked with munici-
The PRT’s RoL team leader traveled to Erbil this palities in Tikrit and Tooz to improve management
quarter to attend a judicial conference involving 40 of water and solid waste infrastructure facilities.529
judges from the seven northern-most Iraqi prov-
inces.524 Subjects included security arrangements Economy
following the redeployment of U.S. forces, jail Salah Al-Din’s largest industries are animal hus-
segregation, and judicial security.525 The PRT also bandry and oil refining. This quarter, the province

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 109

RECONSTRUCTION BY PROVINCE

U.S. Infrastructure Spending in Salah Al-Din

$ Millions Anbar
Sector Total
Electricity 311.19
Governance
Water and Sanitation 59.51
Anbar’s politics began realigning this quarter with
Oil and Gas 71.52
the appearance of several new political blocks.
A Shia alliance was formed in July and an “anti-
Transportation and Communications 65.75
sectarian, nationalist” coalition was founded by a
General Infrastructure 7.37
Sunni tribal sheik in August. Both new parties plan
Total 515.35
to compete in the January 2010 national elections.
In another shift, the Iraq Awakening Council
sought to expand into the tourism industry announced its affiliation with Prime Minister
through the preservation and promotion of ancient al-Maliki’s State of Law Coalition.537 Despite this
archeological sites, including the Assyrian city of activity, the PRT reported a low level of citizen
Ashur and several Islamic shrines.530 response to voter registration drives ahead of the
The Provincial Investment Commission hoped national elections.538
to boost the economy by restoring a power plant The PRT reported that Anbar’s Provincial
and supporting petrochemical businesses. The Council, meanwhile, focused on corruption this
council is in negotiations with a UK investor to quarter, scrutinizing projects authorized by the
develop an airport at a former air base outside previous government and highlighting contracts
of Tikrit.531 The governor and PC leaders also awarded without a competitive bidding process.539
visited Turkey seeking new investment for other PRT Anbar’s governance section met with the
projects.532 Final preparations are now in place to chairmen of two city councils in western Anbar,
award CERP-funded micro-grants to merchants who complained that they were frustrated with
near the Golden Mosque.533 the lack of services and budgetary support from
USAID and the PRT focused this quarter on the central government.540 USAID projects in the
agriculture, including: province focused on helping the PC complete its
• a grant program to provide a $6,000 “hoop bylaws, and assisting the council and governor’s
house” to 30 farmers willing to invest some of offices with budget planning.541
their own money534
• the rehabilitation of the Balad Canning Factory, Security and Rule of Law
which employs more than 160 workers535 Anbar remained one of Iraq’s least secure prov-
inces this quarter with security incidents concen-
Despite these efforts, the PRT reported eco- trated in the far eastern corner of the territory.
nomic challenges throughout the province, includ- Suicide bombers targeted policemen and people
ing minimal access to business credit, ongoing waiting at checkpoints. At least 26 incidents left
drought conditions, and a lack of familiarity with two or more people dead. PRT Anbar limited its
free markets and investment planning. Agricul- movements in the provincial capital, Ramadi,
tural successes varied from region to region with following the June 30, 2009, redeployment of U.S.
some parts of the province experiencing surplus forces. All PRT movements this quarter required
harvests for which markets are inadequate and IP escort, which sometimes caused delays, though
others reporting low levels of output.536 movements in rural areas were unaffected.542 PRT
Anbar reported its monthly movements were
about one-fifth what they were last winter.543

110 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 PROVINCIAL PORTRAITS

Provincial leaders, meanwhile, moved to crack Security Incidents in Anbar

(Resulting in Two or More Deaths)
down on imams, or prayer leaders, who sought 7/1/2009–10/15/2009
to use the pulpit to foment political dissent. The
PRT reported that the provincial governor is now
requiring imams to obtain approval from govern-
ment religious authorities before they can give
sermons. In September, government authorities
prevented seven prayer leaders from conducting
Friday prayers because they did not have govern-
ment permission.544
The PRT’s RoL section reduced its contact with
the province’s judicial leadership to twice-montly
meetings, reporting that Anbar’s judiciary was op-
erating independently and did not seek mentoring
or close association with the PRT. The RoL team
continued to use USAID/IRAP grants to establish
a legal aid clinic in Ramadi and other projects,
such as purchasing law books for courthouses.545
The PRT reported a substantial backlog of cases in
Anbar’s judicial system due to the session closing of
the criminal court in Falluja.546
U.S. Infrastructure Spending in Anbar
Infrastructure $ Millions

Several CERP projects identified this quarter, Sector Total

including eight "biological lagoon" wastewater Electricity 251.58
treatment systems.547 Water and Sanitation 188.88
Additionally, the provincial director general of Oil and Gas –
railroads agreed to a cost-share arrangement for
Transportation and Communications 70.15
the reconstruction of a Ramadi passenger train ser-
General Infrastructure 3.92
vice. The agreement provides for the Iraq Republic
Total 514.53
Railroad to rebuild the tracks and the U.S. govern-
ment to construct the train station and platform.
A proposal using CERP funds for this project were by the province’s business-minded governor.
approved in August.548 Although many of the ideas were still in the plan-
USAID worked to resolve infrastructure prob- ning stages, the governor won recognition from
lems related to water, electricity, solid waste, and fDi Magazine, a publication of the Financial Times,
roads in Rutbah District, and conducted repair as- which declared him Global Personality of the Year
sessments of 18 water treatment plants. USAID also 2009.550 The cost of the Financial Times supplement
provided advice to more than 25 potato farmers.549 was funded by an MNF-W CERP initiative.551
The Provincial Investment Commission, mean-
Economy while, issued eight business licenses to companies
Impoverished and drought-prone, Anbar sought interested in operating in Anbar, including two
international investment this quarter on oil, hous- housing projects, a hotel in Ramadi, various manu-
ing, petrochemical, and electricity projects touted facturing concerns, and an oil refining plant.552

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 111

RECONSTRUCTION BY PROVINCE

Engineers from GRD inspect the progress of work at the Muhammadi Police Station in Anbar province. (GRD photo)

PRT Anbar focused this quarter on agriculture this, and despite CMM scores that fall largely below
projects, ordering diagnostic kits that can detect sustainability levels, the PRT reported that the PC
disease in poultry and concluding a wheat project was slowly increasing its ability to govern.555
aimed at increasing crop yields.553 The PRT reported that the upcoming January
A $1 million USAID/Inma grant was awarded 2010 elections could become a flashpoint for ethno-
this quarter to the Iraqi Company for Small- and sectarian tensions in Diyala. The PRT noted with
Micro-Enterprise Finance so that it can make concern allegations that voter registration of Sunnis
bank loans to small- and medium-sized agricul- was slow in areas where an IHEC official was Shia.
tural enterprises. With CERP funding, the Zozik Similarly there was concern that Sunni sheiks re-
Company, in coordination with provincial leaders, sponsible for distributing voter registration packets
trained 65 local agronomists in modern wheat might not distribute them adequately in Shia and
farming techniques, including fertilization, use of Turkoman areas.556 In PRT Diyala’s view, the long-
machinery, and safe application of pesticides.554 term political stability of the province may depend
on the degree to which the public views the results
of the 2010 elections as credible and legitimate.557
The continued arrests of Sunni provincial of-
Diyala ficials have undercut efforts by Diyala’s government
to institute anticorruption reforms and modern-
Governance ize government management and oversight, the
PRT Diyala reported that mass arrests of Sunni PRT reported. Last quarter there were so many
politicians continued this quarter, including the ar- arrest warrants outstanding that the PC elected a
rests of a deputy governor and two members of the professor who was not identified with any party
PC, despite assurances by the central government as governor because he had no arrest warrant
that candidates running in last January’s provin- outstanding.558 PRT Diyala described the wave of
cial election had been cleared of wrongdoing. In arrests as “depriving Diyala of moderates whose
addition to the arrests, a power play within the PC participation in the political process is essential for
pitted opposition groups, including Prime Minister the establishment of a sustainable democracy.”559
Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law Coalition, against a Of particular concern was the attempt of a local
ruling coalition of Kurds and Sunni Arabs. Despite Iraqi commander to take over civilian government

112 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 PROVINCIAL PORTRAITS

Security Incidents in Diyala

(Resulting in Two or More Deaths)
7/1/2009–10/15/2009

A U.S. Army soldier hands candy to Iraqi children in Diyala province. (MNF-I photo)

functions, effectively creating a structure within

the Iraqi Army that paralleled the elected civilian
government, despite the PRT’s efforts to highlight
the predominance of the PC over security services
on matters of governance.560 Despite these difficul-
ties, the PRT reported the provincial government security has improved, the situation remains more
had made a “good start” instituting modern man- tenuous than in most other areas of Iraq.564
agement practices.561 PRT Diyala reduced its engagements with local
officials following the June 30, 2009, withdrawal
Security and Rule of Law of U.S. forces from Iraqi cities, often because of
Diyala’s security situation remained volatile this a lack of IP escorts. The PRT reported that it was
quarter with at least 20 bombings, including the unclear whether ISF would be able to adequately
mid-July bombing of the office of a Sunni political secure the province.565
party, killing five.562 Continued arrests and violence The PRT reported that the creation of the Diyala
against Sunni leaders cast a shadow over provincial Defense Clinic was a key step toward developing
politics. The deputy governor returned to his duties a more functional judicial system. According to
in September after several weeks in hiding due to the PRT, many members of the Sunni majority in
threat of arrest; a defense lawyer was gunned down Diyala view the courts and prisons as badly biased
outside a courthouse; a PC member’s son was kid- against them, and many prisoners often either do
napped and killed; and another member survived not receive defense lawyers or do not trust them.566
an apparent assassination attempt.563 Diyala’s di- Although court cases appeared to be moving for-
verse ethnic composition of Kurds, Turkoman, and ward—the PRT’s RoL section found fewer prison-
Arabs has led to widespread security problems and ers at Ba’quba Prison than two months ago—there
internal displacement. Approximately 80% of IDPs were still complaints of torture and abuse.567
living in Diyala are originally from Diyala, having
fled to other parts of the province to avoid being Infrastructure
targeted for their ethnoreligious or political al- The PRT reported that poor security has caused
legiances. Disputed boundaries with the Kurdistan Diyala to lag behind many provinces in reconstruc-
Region also contribute to tensions, and although tion of its infrastructure. Bombings, kidnappings,

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 113

RECONSTRUCTION BY PROVINCE

U.S. Infrastructure Spending in Diyala again provide bird stock to poultry farmers. The
$ Millions grant will fund a modern feed mill and subsidize
Sector Total the price of feed for one year.573
Electricity 80.66
• The PRT also aided the Provincial Investment
Water and Sanitation 143.47
Commission, whose offices were taken over by
Oil and Gas 2.89
the Iraqi Police, and assisted the Chamber of
Commerce in efforts to organize a series of busi-
Transportation and Communications 23.79
ness development workshops in September.574
General Infrastructure 6.24
• The Aruba Market, Diyala’s major commercial
Total 257.05
center, opened this quarter and is projected to
create 1,000 new jobs.575 Several QRF grant ini-
and attempts on the lives of GOI officials has left tiatives continued or were launched this quarter
Diyala without an opportunity to develop brick- to develop economic opportunities for women,
and-mortar projects to the degree the safer security including training on agriculture and livestock
situation has offered other PRT teams. Portions of breeding for 500 women through a $150,000
the 2006, 2007, and 2008 capital budgets remained grant to the Iraqi Women’s Gender Equality
unexecuted in late 2008 largely because of the organization.576
security situation.568
Some projects have moved forward, however.
Provincial officials this quarter accepted a PRT
solid-waste proposal that includes six landfills Baghdad
and a wastewater system. The project is designed
to increase the province’s severely limited sewer- Governance
age. Currently, sewage drains from many homes PRT Baghdad reported the peaceful transfer of
into the streets, creating impassable, trash-filled power to a new PC had continued this quarter with
swamps.569 The majority of ongoing CERP and the resumption of what the PRT described as “tra-
I-CERP infrastructure projects this quarter ad- ditional frictions” between provincial institutions
dressed issues in the water sector.570 and national ministries over authority, money, and
organization. The PRT leader noted that govern-
Economy ment inexperience among most PC members,
Diyala’s economic base is mainly agricultural, budget challenges, security concerns, a reduced U.S.
with citrus trees, dates, pomegranates, and fishing military presence, and political positioning for the
among its primary industries. The province’s capi- January 2010 parliamentary elections shaped the
tal, Ba’quba, is powered by electricity from Iran. political atmosphere this quarter.577
State-owned companies employ factory workers The PRT reported these specific concerns:578
making bricks and electrical products.571 • Iraqi NGOs remained fragile, facing the chal-
USAID worked with provincial officials on lenges of limited capacity as they shifted funding
drought-mitigation activities and assisted in to Iraqi and non-U.S. multinational sources.
obtaining funding for 146 wells.572 PRT Diyala has • There remained a slow chain of action between
built on the province’s agriculture base. CERP and national ministries and provincial governments
Inma funds were earmarked for projects such as in developing and approving infrastructure
feed mills and poultry production: projects and land transfers.
• One Inma project continuing this quarter aided • The rural districts remained low on most minis-
a family-owned company in its quest to once try priority lists.

114 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 PROVINCIAL PORTRAITS

Amid these concerns, PRT Baghdad helped to Security Incidents in Baghdad

(Resulting in Two or More Deaths)
develop a $2.5 million program for the Amanat 7/1/2009–10/15/2009
Training Academy to upgrade the skills of 14,000
municipal employees. QRF proposals emphasized
sustainability and the planned transfer of projects
to Iraqi funding. The PRT executed a shift in
focus away from municipal areas and toward the
agricultural periphery.579 USAID worked closely
with the provincial government to monitor the 76

delivery of government services and facilitated

meetings between local sheiks and international
donors to implement a literacy program. USAID
also distributed children’s books, trained
27 officials to track infrastructure projects,
and provided consultation to NGOs active in
women’s issues.580
PRT Baghdad’s perception was that Iraqi
expectations of U.S. assistance were shifting away
from brick-and-mortar projects, and that depen-
dence on U.S. funding support for fuel, salaries,
and maintenance had eased. On the other hand, in the city, with the exception of Baghdad’s Sadr
the bureaucratic difficulties of executing QRF City neighborhood, where U.S. forces are not able
and CERP projects—both from the U.S. and Iraqi to visit.583 The PRT expressed concern about the
sides—appeared to have grown, delaying projects reappearance of extremist militias and their effect
intended to meet emergency needs.581 on social behavior.584
This quarter, the PRT’s RoL team continued to
Security and Rule of Law train law school faculty and judicial officials and
Roadside bombs, targeted killings, and kidnap- to support and fund brick-and-mortar projects in
pings continued in Baghdad province this quarter, outlying areas of Baghdad. PRT-Baghdad executed
including two large coordinated bombings of the QRF micro-purchases to fund books for public law
Foreign and Finance Ministries on August 19, libraries in the two largest courthouses, and was
2009. Several Baghdad churches were bombed on developing CERP-funded projects for the Rusafa
July 11, 2009.582 The violence was concentrated Courthouse.585 The RoL team noted two projects of
in Baghdad City, with few incidents occurring in concern:586
rural areas. At least 20 people were killed when • The Women’s Legal and Social Clinic (funded by
a car bomb exploded outside a Shia mosque. A the Targeted Development Program) reported
member of former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi’s expenditures not in accordance with its grant
Iraqi National List was shot dead. Four people were agreement, and PRT-Baghdad remains con-
killed in a bombing in a popular market. cerned that the levels of service provided do
The PRT and ePRTs reduced movements in not meet those expected under the grant terms.
Baghdad City this quarter and facilitated travel These concerns have been reported to the ITAO
through informal, local understandings. The ISF grant managers.
has mostly cooperated to provide PRT and ePRT • The Coupon-Funded Legal Assistance Program
movement to government facilities and project sites (funded by USAID’s Community Stabilization

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 115

RECONSTRUCTION BY PROVINCE

Program/Conflict Mitigation) appears to have U.S. Infrastructure Spending in Baghdad

overwhelmed the managerial abilities of the $ Millions

grantee, the Iraqi Jurist Union (IJU). DAI, the Sector Total
USAID-contractor charged with oversight and Electricity 1,504.22
implementation of the CSCM program, has been Water and Sanitation 755.31
working with the IJU to address its management Oil and Gas 40.60
deficiencies. Transportation and Communications 282.17
General Infrastructure 341.68
The RoL team suggested the implementation of Total 2,923.97
management training for NGO-focused programs
to reduce future accounting and management issues.
Operations Cell and Economic Section to try to
Infrastructure obtain international financing for a $500 million
The PRT reported that its efforts had increasingly expansion of the Karkh Wastewater Treatment
shifted to sustainable government capacity build- Plant, which was last operational in 2005. Currently
ing in the province. CERP obligations by MND-B raw sewage bypasses the facility and is dumped into
declined to $128 million, and further reductions the Tigris River.591
were expected in 2010. Remaining CERP projects
included a $600,000 plan to restore a failed sewer Economy
main and a plan to repair a highway span that Baghdad province’s main industries include oil re-
has been delayed by ethnic violence and contrac- fining, financial services, processed food, tobacco,
tor default.587 and construction, among other light manufactur-
MND-B’s Brigade Commander reported that ing. The Provincial Investment Commission sees
CERP funding faces so many administrative hurdles potential growth in tourism, retail, health care,
that the program is no longer flexible and responsive. and information technology.592 Agriculture is also
The commander said that burdensome paperwork a main economic component for about a million
hampered the allocation of available funds and im- inhabitants in the province’s outlying areas. PRT
posed so many limitations on Iraqis that there was a Baghdad focused its attention this quarter on rural
reluctance, and sometimes refusal, to accept CERP areas, working to complete a poultry-to-market
money.588 MNC-I, however, noted that mechanisms project and a drip-irrigation project. The PRT has
were in place to prevent execution of unnecessary also supported a small business association and five
projects, and that projects required GOI commit- women’s centers that provide a range of services.593
ment to sustaintment prior to completion.589 The PRT reported that economic challenges re-
The PRT reported that some infrastructure mained, including a commercial lending structure
projects had moved ahead this quarter. The PRT that often relied on political and personal contacts,
worked to link the Qa Qa Water Treatment Facility unrealistic privatization plans for state-owned
to the Shi Shi Bar pumping station to improve the enterprises, and poor irrigation. Small manu-
delivery of potable water in the province. In all, facturers reportedly complained of unregulated
PRT Baghdad reported it had managed the memo- imports and unfair competition from subsidized
randums of agreement with Baghdad’s municipal state-owned enterprises.594
authorities governing $40 million in CERP projects
in the last year.590
Also in the water sector, PRT Baghdad
worked with the Embassy’s Joint Reconstruction

116 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 PROVINCIAL PORTRAITS

Security Incidents in Wassit

Wassit (Resulting in Two or More Deaths)
7/1/2009–10/15/2009

Governance
The PRT reported that Iraqi officials continued
this quarter to press for large-scale “milestone”
and “legacy” projects such as dams, major research
hospitals, and industrial installations. The PRT
clarified that a new phase in the provision of as-
sistance had shifted priorities toward government
capacity-building efforts. The news of the PRT’s
transition was met with mixed reactions: Many
Iraqi government institutions welcomed the gov-
ernance focus of the initiatives, while others noted
the unfinished job of infrastructure and capital
project reconstruction.595
The PRT also reported a meeting with key
supporters of Muqtada al-Sadr who expressed
willingness to engage with the PRT, a develop- The PRT reported that as both a significant revenue
ment the PRT described as an “unusual dynamic source and a potential point of controversy about
in Iraq.” The PRT saw this as an opportunity for transparency and corruption, the trucking opera-
outreach to al-Sadr’s followers in ways that could tion invited continued scrutiny.597
potentially reduce political tensions, bolster secu- USAID’s Tatweer program trained nearly 400
rity, and increase support for political reconcilia- provincial officials in public administration and
tion in the province.596 management, and worked with district officials
Regarding budgeting, the PRT reported that and citizens to identify community needs and ef-
the provincial coffers had received a substantial fective ways to respond to those needs at the lowest
infusion of cash this quarter from a government- levels of government.598
run truck-staging area in the province, though how
much cash had been collected remained unclear. Security and Rule of Law
PRT Wassit reported that the security situation
in the province was generally stable this quarter
despite an increase in security incidents directed
against FOB Delta and convoys traveling in the
province after June 30. Two separate bombings
reportedly killed 15 Iraqi civilians in August—the
first such attacks in some time. There were few
security-related restrictions on movement this
quarter, though certain communities presented
greater relative danger to the PRT than others. The
PRT predicted that as U.S. troops begin to with-
draw further, its ability to travel throughout Wassit
will decrease, and reconstruction efforts will need
PRT Wassit shared a Ramadan “Iftar” dinner with residents of a to be redirected to the most vital areas.599
farming village as part of an outreach and reconciliation effort
in the province. (OPA photo)

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 117

RECONSTRUCTION BY PROVINCE

The PRT’s RoL section continued this quarter to U.S. Infrastructure Spending in Wassit
engage judges and prosecutors on a regular basis $ Millions

at six courthouses under renovation. During one Sector Total

visit, a judge brought up the issue of detainee treat- Electricity 45.38
ment at the jail, including a case of prisoner abuse. Water and Sanitation 30.21
RoL reported that judges appeared increasingly Oil and Gas –
aware of due-process issues. Iraqi police continued Transportation and Communications 19.18
training in the mechanics of crime scene inves- General Infrastructure 10.23
tigation and the issuance of arrest warrants. The Total 105.01
PRT sponsored symposia this quarter to educate
Iraqi attorneys.600
Additionally, a CERP-funded project to reha-
Infrastructure bilitate the al-Muntanabi Primary School was in
The PRT reported that only 2 of 10 “CERP surge” its final stages.603 Some $4.8 million in I-CERP
projects submitted for approval by the end of the funds were earmarked for rehabilitation of the
quarter had been granted. Obtaining approval Jassan-Dabuni canal pump station, which will aid
for the remainder was among the PRT’s most communities in western and northern Wassit.604
important remaining priorities.601 The MND-S USAID provided technical assistance and main-
brigade commander reported 35 ongoing projects tenance to the al-Shuahmiyah water pump station
this quarter and another 29 in the planning phase. that will provide uninterrupted water flow to about
The focus was on improving the water supply for 40,000 people.605
drinking and irrigation, building courthouses and The GRD reported that the Wassit Engineering
schools, and border security, including:602 College Laboratory was 98% complete this quarter.
• an ISFF grant to provide solar and wind power Scheduled for completion on October 15, 2009, the
at a border outpost, which could be duplicated at project will install new laboratory equipment and
other outposts supply faculty training for modern computer labs,
• an ISFF project designed to reduce smuggling by soil and asphalt testing labs, and a surveying lab at
creating a customs point of entry Wassit University Engineering College.606
• a water pumping station along the Hahwar canal
that will provide water for agriculture, cooking, Economy
and bathing The PRT reported that Wassit’s agricultural sector
was beset with serious problems, such as declining
water resources, increasing soil salinity, poor irri-
gation methods, a lack of modern equipment, and
demographic shortfalls that have forced farm-
ers to abandon land and head to urban areas.607
The PC this quarter asked PRT Wassit to focus
on agricultural projects.608 The PRT’s economics
section conducted a lengthy brainstorming meet-
ing with the Chamber of Commerce’s board of
directors to identify companies to approach about
possible investment in the province.609 PRT Was-
sit inspected a CERP-funded market and refined
the management of a QRF-funded tractor rental
Al-Jihad Water Compact Unit produces 200 cubic meters of
water per hour in Wassit province. (OPA photo)
118 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION
 PROVINCIAL PORTRAITS

program.610 USAID’s Tijara program provided muted, and the popular mood was a mix of “indif-
technical assistance to two small-business devel- ference” and “apprehension” over security.618 The
opment centers.611 PRT characterized provincial security as “good”
Wassit’s Provincial Investment Commission and the province as “stable,” but also reported a
considers agriculture among the province’s most slight uptick in roadside bombs in July.619 Also in
important industries, employing 38% of the work July, unknown gunmen attacked police in two dif-
force, growing wheat, barley, fruit, and dates. ferent incidents, and an SOI checkpoint came under
Tomato paste and fisheries are also important areas fire.620 In August, 8 car bombs exploded (killing 3
of production.612 To aid in this sector, PRT Wassit and wounding 39), a grenade exploded at the office
organized an agricultural conference, facilitated of the Iraqi National Stream party, gunmen killed
agriculture training this quarter, and sponsored a the brother of a ministry director, and the PRT re-
workshop on greenhouse technology.613 ported potential for an increase in tribal disputes.621
A modern auto dealership opened in Wassit this One local politician warned that late payments to
quarter as a result of an earlier PRT-sponsored Op- SOI members could jeopardize security.622
portunities Fair that attracted a Lebanese company. The PRT reported that the rise in violence rep-
The dealership uses auto financing and has plans to resented a change from previous quarters. Babylon
open a parts and services department—two firsts had been relatively safe—safe enough that less
for the province.614 than half of the IDPs residing in the province told
pollsters that they wanted to return home, though
a portion hoped to resettle in a third location.
Despite the deteriorating security situation, the
Babylon Shia holiday of Shabaniya was celebrated without a
significant security incident.623
Governance
The PRT reported that attendance by the PC was so Security Incidents in Babylon
(Resulting in Two or More Deaths)
poor last quarter that the chairman threatened in 7/1/2009–10/15/2009
July to start fining members who missed sessions.615
The government staff, meanwhile, recommended
creating a provincial secretary position, which PRT
Babylon and USAID viewed favorably as a way
to improve transparency, reduce corruption, and
increase public participation in PC activities.616
Despite budgetary problems, the PRT reported
that the PC had allocated funds to purchase a new
SUV for each PC member shortly before firing a
municipal director to save public funds from being
wasted. In a separate issue, the provincial minister
in charge of civil-society organizations claimed
that 300 of the 400 registered NGOs in the prov-
ince were “fictitious.”617

Security and Rule of Law

PRT Babylon reported that public reaction in Baby-
lon to the June 30 redeployment of U.S. forces was

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 119

RECONSTRUCTION BY PROVINCE

A survey conducted by the PRT-supported

al-Meezan Legal Newspaper revealed a wide-
spread perception that the centralized Adminis-
trative Court is “overwhelmed and inefficient.”624
In mid-September, a Center for the Defense of
Arbitrary Detainees opened with support from
the European Union, the United Nations, and an
Italian organization.625

Infrastructure
PRT Babylon reported that the transition from
brick-and-mortar projects was underway this
quarter, and there were no plans for additional PRT Babylon hands over the keys to seven new water tanker
large structures. Still under construction were two trucks to Babylon’s governor. (OPA photo)

primary schools, two secondary schools, and one

regional courthouse. The Mussayib Civic Center, According to the MND-S brigade commander,
the last large structure to be built with U.S. funds, is there were 29 projects in progress and 31 more in
scheduled for completion in August 2010. The new development this quarter, including a $1 million
Hillah Courthouse project was nearing completion ESF project to improve security of the local police
this quarter and is scheduled to open in 2010.626 force in the northern town of al-Khidr.630
In the areas of electricity, water, and sewage, the The GRD reported that the al-Eskan Water
PRT and USAID worked this quarter on: Compact Unit was 70% complete this quarter
• sustaining the finished Jebalah substation and with a scheduled completion date of April 5,
the al-Karya al-Asryah water project by training 2010. Once complete, the unit will treat water,
Iraqi officials and testing equipment627 provide storage tanks, and sludge lagoons. The
• preventing a cholera epidemic due to drought project is expected to provide potable water for
conditions and poor water quality628 up to 10,000 people.631
• bringing water tanks to rural areas that have
contaminated or poor quality water and helping Economy
to construct solar-powered water filtration units As the cradle of Iraq’s ancient civilization, Babylon
to purify contaminated irrigation water629 is rich in historic ruins that could form the basis of
a tourist industry. To that end, the State Ministry
U.S. Infrastructure Spending in Babylon of Tourism and Antiquities allocated $500,000
$ Millions this quarter to renovate archeological sites with
Sector Total the goal of opening them to the public soon.
Electricity 121.65
Disagreement remained on how to preserve the
Water and Sanitation 47.63
archeological heritage while making the site avail-
Oil and Gas –
able to tourists.632 Other than archeology, Babylon
Transportation and Communications 36.01
is known for its dates, and agriculture employs
General Infrastructure 3.49
roughly 25% of the population.633
Total 208.78
This quarter, the PRT and USAID assisted in
economic development through these projects:
• the Abu Ghurak Market—third in a series of six
neighborhood markets being provided through

120 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 PROVINCIAL PORTRAITS

a collaborative effort between the PRT and the Security and Rule of Law
provincial government634 The PRT reported that Qadissiya enjoyed a relatively
• a private business-development initiative to stable security environment, though this quarter
provide credit to small- and medium-sized there was an apparent assassination attempt on the
enterprises635 director general for agriculture.641 The province is
• restructuring of the Babylon Velvet and Sewing secure enough that almost half of the province’s
Factory that will provide 450 jobs and potential IDP population reported that they hoped to stay in
annual revenue of $20 million636 Qadissiya despite poor infrastructure and limited
job opportunities.642 PRT Qadissiya’s movements
The PRT noted that potential investors face the around the province were sometimes hampered
challenges of obtaining credit, as well as tourism by the absence of an IP escort on missions within
monopolies and red tape at the provincial and the provincial capital. Occasionally, the problem
national levels. The PRT predicted difficulty chang- prevented the PRT from visiting project sites and
ing a provincial attitude that assumed the central meeting with Iraqi officials in their offices.643
government could solve business problems.637 PRT Qadissiya reported that it has not had a
full-time RoL advisor for several months. Nonethe-
less, the PRT worked on a number of RoL activities
this quarter, including visits to the province’s chief
Qadissiya judge and to several courthouses. The PRT is cur-
rently working with CERP funds to rehabilitate the
Governance offices of the provincial COI.644
PRT Qadissiya reported that it had conducted
urban planning and community management Security Incidents in Qadissiya
(Resulting in Two or More Deaths)
training at the district levels this quarter. Mayors 7/1/2009–10/15/2009
of four districts participated in the program,638
which teaches government officials how to envision
and plan for community development by targeting
available financial resources. The PRT reported
that the new governor and PC were more open to
working with the PRT than the previous provin-
cial administration. In this environment, the PRT
has been able to offer new ideas for best practices,
including a strategy for changing government and
public attitudes toward NGOs, which had been
viewed with suspicion. The PRT also reported that
the provincial Commission on Integrity had begun
anticorruption efforts.639
USAID reported that about 310 provincial
officials participated in its Tatweer program,
which sought to improve governance capabilities
through courses on leadership, human resources,
project and fiscal management, procurement,
and anticorruption.640

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 121

RECONSTRUCTION BY PROVINCE

nearly 500 students attending this school, new

bathrooms, and a courtyard.648 Two other schools
received new QRF-funded bathrooms, desks,
chairs, and air conditioners.649

Economy
Agriculture is at the core of Qadissiya’s eco-
nomic activity, and the PRT sought to strengthen
this sector by training farmers to use advanced
technology to map the province’s limited water
resources. Funding was approved for a soil-testing
laboratory, and the PRT reported improvement in
Water tank installed at Al-Zahour, Qadissiya province. (OPA the province’s agricultural capabilities to ensure
photo)
better water allocation and grow crops that are less
dependent on water.650
Infrastructure In August, the PC chairman announced a deal
The PRT reported that the provincial government with Hyundai to buy 10,000 cars for unemployed
focused this quarter on improving its water and residents and recent college graduates for use as
electricity delivery systems. To that end, the PRT taxis or as transport while seeking employment.651
obtained CERP funding for the mechanical refit- The Iraqi National Investment Council reported
ting and filter replacement of the Diwaniya Water that the provincial government also sought this
Treatment Plant, as well as four electrical feeder quarter to build a sports arena and an international
line projects.645 When complete, the plant should airport.652 Officials consulted private investors
provide drinking water to the provincial capital, interested in transforming the historic Niffar
Diwaniya. In all, there were 10 projects being exe- archeological site into a tourist attraction, although
cuted and 16 others in planning stages this quarter, the PRT reported that the idea could have disas-
according to the MND-S Brigade Commander.646 trous effects on the site, which has yet to be fully
In addition to the water plant, there were three excavated and preserved.653
planned sewer improvement projects and four IP
stations under construction.647
In July, the project to refurbish and expand
the al-Akhlaas Primary School was completed, Kerbala
including 6 new classrooms that will accommodate
Governance
U.S. Infrastructure Spending in Qadissiya PRT Kerbala reported that preparations for the
$ Millions January 2010 national elections were underway
Sector Total this quarter. Election officials reported that 85% of
Electricity 86.78
Kerbala voters had received updated voter registra-
Water and Sanitation 30.46
tion cards by mid-August.654
Oil and Gas –
The PRT also reported it had worked with
Transportation and Communications 21.75
provincial officials this quarter to implement
General Infrastructure 2.65
advanced technology systems designed to aid in
Total 141.63
government planning and agriculture, and that
the PC was supporting these efforts. However,

122 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 PROVINCIAL PORTRAITS

Iraqis in Kerbala province celebrate the Shia holiday called Shabaniya. (OPA photo)

the provincial finance director refused to pay for Security Incidents in Kerbala
(Resulting in Two or More Deaths)
data entry personnel for the systems, forcing the 7/1/2009–10/15/2009
PRT to underwrite a short-term project to pay for
the extra workers.655 Generally, the PRT reported
improved PC governance, including activity to
form a committee to ensure that decisions are car-
ried out and completed, as well as new anticorrup-
tion efforts undertaken in conjunction with the
governor’s office.656
In July, the PC reported that it had received
$23 million from the central government to cover
an estimated 2009 budget of $77 million.657 By
August, the PC had received 60% of its budget.
To plug budget shortfalls, provincial officials were
considering establishing a tax on religious tourism
to the province.658 Some 420 officials attended
USAID training sessions on public administration
and management, including fiscal management,
procurement, and anticorruption.659

Security and Rule of Law were restricted over the holiday, but not at other
PRT Kerbala reported that security concerns times.660 Kerbala’s relatively calm security situation
remained low this quarter. There were two road- and predominantly Shia population have led many
side bombs, but neither caused damage or injury. Shia fleeing the violence in Baghdad and Diyala to
Similarly, no security problems were reported dur- seek refuge in the province.661
ing the Shia holy day of Shabaniya, which drew an The RoL section reported several women’s initia-
estimated six million to seven million pilgrims to tives, including:662
the province’s main shrine. The ISF implemented a • A proposal from Women for Women International
successful security plan that included an addition- to establish a program for women in war and
al 20,000 security personnel, emergency medical post-conflict zones. Under funding review for an
support, and air surveillance. PRT movements IRAP grant this quarter, the proposed year-long

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 123

RECONSTRUCTION BY PROVINCE

course is designed to help women learn to cope

with the effects of war, to teach basic human
rights principles, and to offer vocational training.
• A project to develop job skills, literacy, and
human rights awareness among women in
western Kerbala.
• Expansion of a project to provide free legal service
to women through funding of the NGO, “Women
for Justice.” The PRT reported that the NGO was
meeting a request from the Family Courts to pro-
vide a secure environment for parental visits with
children in custody and divorce cases.663 Iraqis in Kerbala province attend a ceremony to inaugurate a
new road. (OPA photo)

Additionally, the PRT visited Baghdad Police (transformers, a courthouse, a laboratory, a ma-
College’s Forensics Training Lab to arrange a terials testing facility, a youth sports complex, a
future tour of the facility for members of Kerbala’s school renovation, and cold storage facilities).668
legal community.664 PRT members visited the MND-S Brigade Commander reported that
main jail and found adequate, though crowded, there were 14 projects underway and another 16 in
housing and generally good conditions. The PRT the planning stages this quarter, including school
was awaiting approval of CERP and I-CERP fund- and courthouse construction. Four schools were
ing for projects to build the Hindiyah Courthouse entering the “groundbreaking” phase, while two
and the Ayn Tamr Courthouse.665 USAID hosted courthouses were being planned.669
20 conflict resolution workshops for 575 people, USAID selected an alfalfa forage demonstration
including local sheiks, human rights activists, and site, registered five Kerbala fish farmers for training
law professors.666 in neighboring Babylon province, and made two
agricultural micro-finance loans totaling $8,000.670
Infrastructure
PRT Kerbala reported that it had been instructed Economy
to maintain a high level of CERP activity through Home to a major Shia shrine, Kerbala is one of
August 2010.667 Progress continued this quarter Iraq’s foremost tourist destinations. The PIC
on seven I-CERP projects (five schools, a clinic, boasted of a thriving hotel industry, including 62
and a courthouse), three CERP projects (school resorts. Additionally, the province produces large
bathrooms), and seven “CERP-surge” projects quantities of wheat, barley, and dates.671 In July the
PIC announced an $18 billion residential and com-
U.S. Infrastructure Spending in Kerbala mercial development on a lake funded by a UAE
$ Millions developer. The plan still requires approvals from
Sector Total the NIC and an allocation of land.672
Electricity 46.99
The PRT reported efforts this quarter to help
Water and Sanitation 39.00
Iraqis develop bank lending programs for small-
Oil and Gas –
and medium-sized businesses in the province.
Transportation and Communications 4.88
A business roundtable conducted this quarter
General Infrastructure 1.58
recommended improving the process for new
Total 92.45
business registrations. A second roundtable is
planned for early December.673 PRT Kerbala

124 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 PROVINCIAL PORTRAITS

participated with USAID on two initiatives this Najaf and nearby Kufa, due to the influence of Iran
quarter: and the presence of the Mahdi Army, the armed
• technical assistance on three horticultural wing of Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr’s party.679
projects designed to import seedlings and vines, In RoL, lawyers working for the Women’s As-
establish greenhouses, and improve post-harvest sistance Project opened 30 new cases. Since May
handling of fruits and vegetables 2009, the project has accepted representation on
• a project to educate local farmers on forage man- behalf of 483 widows and completed 47 cases.680
agement and to introduce salt-tolerant Bermuda PRT Najaf reported it had made progress with ac-
grass into Iraq674 cess to counsel for detainees and legal services for
orphans through PRT-supported NGOs.681
The PRT also met with German investors in- The MND-S Brigade Commander reported that
terested in establishing car dealerships in Kerbala. there were 6 projects being executed in Najaf and
These investors were staying in local hotels, travel- another 56 projects in the planning phase this quar-
ing in unarmored cars, and without a security ter. One project underway will purchase eight gen-
detail, which PRT Kerbala interpreted as welcome erators with CERP funds to provide more electricity
signs of investor comfort with local security and to commercial buildings. Four health clinics were
the provincial investment environment.675 under construction this quarter, and 27 vehicle and
pedestrian bridges were in the planning stage.682

Infrastructure
Najaf The PRT reported that the Najaf Reconstruction
Council, an Iraqi engineering organization, agreed
Governance to provide professional engineers at their own cost
Najaf’s provincial government continued to
receive relatively high marks this quarter in the Security Incidents in Najaf
(Resulting in Two or More Deaths)
CMM compiled by the PRT. Though the PRT did 7/1/2009–10/15/2009
not rank Najaf self-reliant, it gave relatively high
marks to the PC for national unity and politi-
cal development.676 USAID trained more than
500 government officials in administration and
management, including human resources and
anticorruption.677
The PRT reported that the PC regularly asked
for assistance in building infrastructure projects,
particularly in the areas of water and electricity.
Though the PRT is no longer seeking large-scale
brick-and-mortar projects, the team oversaw I-CERP
projects this quarter and provided advice on tech-
nical issues.678

Security and Rule of Law

The PRT reported that security incidents were rare
in Najaf this quarter, but noted that its movements
were limited in some areas, such as the old city of

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RECONSTRUCTION BY PROVINCE

U.S. Infrastructure Spending in Najaf

$ Millions

Sector Total
Electricity 72.79
Water and Sanitation 60.84
Oil and Gas —
Transportation and Communications 14.26
General Infrastructure 4.43
Total 152.31

Female lawyers at the Iraqi Women’s Assistance Project work

with clients in Najaf province. (OPA photo)
the alfalfa flowers. The site is projected to provide
at all Najaf I-CERP sites.683 Also this quarter, the 10 harvests per year and approximately 2,000 met-
PRT reported that work on four district health ric tons of alfalfa.688
clinics continued on schedule and on budget, with In other areas of agriculture, PRT Najaf reported
more than 50% of work completed. Clinics are ex- it had worked with the Najaf Agricultural Com-
pected to be handed over to the Ministry of Health mittee to obtain plastic greenhouses, promote drip
next quarter.684 irrigation systems, and diversify crops.689
The PRT confirmed that $62 million worth of
electric generators had been installed at the Gasak
Power Plant. With the installation of the new gen-
erators, the Gasak plant will generate an additional Muthanna
250 MW of electricity.685
The PC asked the PRT to help oversee I-CERP Governance
projects for schools and health centers this quarter. The PRT reported that the PC functioned “rea-
The PRT reported that most of the current QRF sonably well” and “without the use of violence,”
and USAID funding (IRAP) is now targeted to- though there were incidents of tribal conflict this
ward government capacity building or small proj- quarter, including the brief kidnapping of a tribal
ects and away from brick-and-mortar projects.686 sheik, who was released unharmed.690 The pro-
vincial government agreed to a five-year plan pri-
Economy oritizing capital investment, which the PRT plans
Najaf hosts a major Shia shrine and a cemetery to use as a mechanism to better identify possible
that attract millions of pilgrims each year, and it CERP projects in closer cooperation with pro-
produces large quantities of wheat, barley, rice, vincial officials. The PRT’s subject matter experts
and dates. A state company producing tires and began taking more of a supporting role, advising
rubber employs about 2,400 people. The PIC hopes government officials only when invited.691
to expand the province’s potential for foreign PRT Muthanna met this quarter with pro-
investment, noting interest from Arab companies vincial leaders, including the Iraqi Governorate
in commercial complexes and hotels.687 Election Office director, to assess how the PRT
PRT Najaf this quarter facilitated a visit by could support the January 2010 parliamentary
several agricultural specialists who toured a feedlot elections, including using QRF/CERP funds to
forage site where alfalfa is being grown. The site support voter education.692
was supplied with deep wells providing clean water.
The next step is to introduce beehives to pollinate

126 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 PROVINCIAL PORTRAITS

Security and Rule of Law Security Incidents in Muthanna

(Resulting in Two or More Deaths)
PRT Muthanna reported that the security situation 7/1/2009–10/15/2009
in the province remained calm this quarter. The
PRT’s RoL section assisted with literacy training for
prisoners and advised provincial officials on ways
to alleviate overcrowding in the prison.693

Infrastructure
The PRT noted that Muthanna suffered in particu-
lar from a lack of water. Water-borne disease is a
problem because of low water levels in the Euphra-
tes River. This quarter, there was at least one out-
break of typhoid, which the PRT said was probably
due to degraded water quality. The PRT assessed
inoperative water plants and discussed emergency
distribution of water, development of wells, and
repair of water plants.694
This quarter, the PRT reported progress on the
following projects:695
• distribution of water purification units to hospi-
tals, youth centers, and orphanages
• construction of the Rumaytha Slaughterhouse training to 45 veterinarians and 100 others in the
and the Warka Slaughterhouse agriculture industry, and promoted an artificial
• funding for seven projects, including water dis- insemination program that has increased the prov-
tribution, roads, and a four-classroom school ince’s cattle herd.697

In addition, the GRD reported that a fuel station Economy

was 88% complete this quarter that would allow for Sparsely populated, Muthanna’s vast desert con-
refueling and resupplying of vehicles and equip- tains oil and salt, and the province is Iraq’s main
ment used by the Department of Border Enforce- producer of cement. Provincial farmers breed
ment in remote areas of the province.696 poultry and produce large quantities of dates. This
USAID worked with local officials to vaccinate quarter, the governor announced plans to develop
more than 110,000 sheep and cattle, provided new oil wells with private investment funds, while

U.S. Infrastructure Spending in Muthanna

$ Millions

Sector Total
Electricity 15.02
Water and Sanitation 189.79
Oil and Gas 0.07
Transportation and Communications 19.12
General Infrastructure 3.87
Total 227.87
Iraqi children attend the grand opening of the Women’s Training
and Rug Display in Muthanna province. (OPA photo)

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 127

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the Ministry of Oil expanded its oil refinery in the Security Incidents in Thi-Qar
(Resulting in Two or More Deaths)
provincial capital, Samawa, that is projected to 7/1/2009–10/15/2009
produce 10,000 barrels per day.698
The PRT reported that Muthanna’s PIC was suc-
cessful this quarter in licensing well over $1 billion
in investment deals. The PRT also reported that
if heavy industrial projects to produce cement,
plastics, salts, cleaning products, and medical
oxygen come to fruition in the next few years, the
province has the potential to substantially change
its economic landscape.699 One impediment to in-
vestment noted by the PRT has been the PIC’s lack
of access to public land.700

Thi-Qar
Governance
PRT Thi-Qar reported that the province enjoys a
relatively well-developed political climate where
the PC is able to mediate competing political goals to use technology to build cases and did not coop-
in a relatively peaceful manner.701 The PRT also erate with one another.705 Training continued in
reported success in anticorruption efforts after an this area, however, with ISF members from seven
influential tribal sheik and three others were jailed provinces attending a one-day seminar on the col-
for extortion in an alleged reconstruction contract- lection, preservation, and exploitation of forensic
ing scheme. The PRT leader characterized the case evidence found at bombing sites.706
as proof of the effectiveness of Iraq’s legal system.702
USAID trained 280 local government officials to Infrastructure
deal with the effects of political and tribal affilia- PRT Thi-Qar sought CERP funds for water and
tions on governance.703 veterinary care, among other sectors this quarter,
The PRT and USAID reported aiding the PC including:
in its preparation of the provincial budget and • a proposal to construct a surgical unit at the
training in governance issues, including the use Thi-Qar Veterinary Hospital 707
of technology, and the formulation of a provincial • a proposal for a reverse osmosis system to
development strategy.704 upgrade existing water networks708

Security and Rule of Law PRT Thi-Qar reported working with the
Thi-Qar had few security incidents this quarter, provincial government to draw up proposals for
though local police found caches of weapons and CERP-funded brick-and-mortar projects.709
defused bombs. Despite the success touted in the
arrest of the sheik on corruption charges, the PRT Economy
reported that the province’s chief judge complained The PRT funded several agricultural training pro-
that provincial police and judges did not know how grams this quarter:

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U.S. Infrastructure Spending in Thi-Qar to what the PRT called the “profligate spending”
$ Millions of the previous PC.715 One PC member asked
Sector Total specifically for assistance for reconciliation
Electricity 106.67
workshops intended to help tribal leaders resolve
Water and Sanitation 399.69
disputes peacefully.716
Oil and Gas 0.43
The PRT worked with provincial leaders regard-
ing voter registration in the January 2010 elec-
Transportation and Communications 21.42
tions and met with representatives from the NGO
General Infrastructure 13.06
“Towards Democracy” to discuss voter education
Total 541.26
program proposals.717 As the elections draw near,
the PRT plans also to focus on increasing contacts
• Ten farmers from Suk al-Shuyukh and Chubaish with political parties and journalists to facilitate
were trained at Camp Mittica in the production political reporting.718
of dairy product. The Farmers Union will dis- USAID completed training on bylaws for PC
tribute the milk and cheese during Ramadan.710 members, setting up committees and assisting
• Students from the Akad Palm Station were them in creating budgets. USAID also trained
trained in procedures for safer date harvesting, about 680 provincial officials in public administra-
including mechanized harvest techniques.711 tion and management, including fiscal manage-
• The Farmers Union received 6,000 newly ment, procurement, and anticorruption.719
hatched chickens this quarter, and all chicks at
the Nassriya rearing site were vaccinated.712 Security and Rule of Law
• A CERP funding request was pending for the The PRT reported an “improved yet irregular”
construction and outfitting of a fish hatchery, security situation that included more willingness by
which is designed to have an output of 10 million Iraqi Police escorts to assist in movements around
carp fingerlings to supply juvenile stocks for all the province. However it reported continuing small-
the fish farms in Thi-Qar.713 arms fire directed against the U.S. military’s FOB.720
Despite the lack of an RoL advisor for some of
The PRT reported that in an absence of national the quarter, the PRT reported it had developed
policies that would create a more propitious an excellent working relationship with provincial
environment for a market-led, entrepreneurial judges and was able to arrange for two investigative
business environment, economic development judges to participate for the first time in two days of
remains a challenge. 714 training on evidence collection methods conducted
by the U.S. military.721

Infrastructure
Missan The PRT reported that provincial leaders were
relying this quarter on the successful completion
Governance of several large building projects, including the 70-
PRT Missan reported that access to provincial bed Missan Surgical Hospital and the 23-kilometer
government officials continued to improve this Amarah-Maimouna Carriageway—but the status
quarter, and that the governor had encouraged of both projects has been in question:
provincial leaders to work with the PRT. It also • Missan Surgical Hospital: Health Attaché staffers
reported that this was due in part to significant worked with the GOI this quarter to determine
cuts in the 2009 provincial capital budget and the Iraqi government’s level of commitment to

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Security Incidents in Missan U.S. Infrastructure Spending in Missan

(Resulting in Two or More Deaths) $ Millions
7/1/2009–10/15/2009
Sector Total
Electricity 76.31
Water and Sanitation 20.26
Oil and Gas 0.06
Transportation and Communications 14.06
General Infrastructure 6.32
Total 117.01

Elsewhere in the province, responsibility for

operating two water compact unit rehabilitation
projects was turned over to provincial leaders this
quarter. These $300,000 projects are intended to
improve the public health and quality of life of
more than 22,000 residents in the area. The units
had been operating at 50% of capacity before the
renovation and are now functioning at 100%.725

Economy
the ESF-funded hospital. Last quarter, SIGIR Missan has suffered from a crumbling infrastruc-
reported that the hospital project was behind ture and poor access to resources.726 But its eastern
schedule and had construction deficiencies, side has large oil fields and the province produces
and there was concern that further work on the large quantities of wool, fish, sugar, and paper. The
hospital might be cancelled.722 But the Health PIC hopes to exploit natural gas as well as oil.727
Attaché reported that construction was under The PRT reported that its economic advisor met
way and progress was being made to resolve with members of the Mobile Agricultural Training
outstanding issues.723
• Amarah-Maimouna Carriageway: GRD an-
nounced this quarter that the Maimouna Car-
riageway project would not be reactivated after a
GRD-selected contractor defaulted in early 2009
at approximately 80% completion. Citing lack of
funds to correct deficiencies and complete the
project, as well as the challenges of operating in
Missan, GRD proposed terminating the project
or turning it over to some other U.S. government
entity if additional funding can be identified. The
PRT reported that the provincial government
considers the carriageway project its #2 prior-
ity and is eager to assist the U.S. government in
completing the project.724
Soldiers from the 7th Engineering Battalion inspect a bridge in Missan province. (MNF-I photo)

130 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 PROVINCIAL PORTRAITS

Team who provide training, information, and

assistance to women and girls in rural agricultural
communities. The team has asked the PRT for
assistance in delivering their programs to women
and girls residing in the rural areas.728

Basrah
Governance A consortium of Iraqi and American companies discuss the Bas-
rah Sports City Project prior to the groundbreaking ceremony on
PRT Basrah reported this quarter that the province July 15, 2009. (OPA photo)
lagged behind many others in governance, eco-
nomic development, and the RoL, which the PRT
attributed to years of war and repression. The PRT Security Incidents in Basrah
(Resulting in Two or More Deaths)
reported that overcoming these governance and 7/1/2009–10/15/2009
economic problems was critical because roughly
50% of Iraq’s GDP originates in Basrah, primar-
ily in the oil industry, but also in other areas. The
majority of Iraq’s trade transits Basrah’s pipelines,
ports, and roads.729
PRT Basrah reported it was working this quar-
ter to steer Iraqi stakeholders away from reliance
on U.S. government funding to improve essen-
tial services. In anticipation of Basrah obtaining
budget resources from the national government
in 2010 to fund operations and the most urgent
capital investment needs, PRT Basrah has begun
transitioning to a strictly government capacity-
building role.730 The PRT also reported that the
stable security situation had allowed the PRT and
USAID to focus on improving the ability of local
officials to govern.731

Security and Rule of Law movements and allow the PRT to move during
There were few security incidents in Basrah this the January 2010 elections.732
quarter, with only three incidents occurring in The PRT reported that RoL efforts in Basrah
which more than two people were killed, includ- have a brick-and-mortar component, including
ing the murder of two minority Mandaeans. The the U.S.-funded construction of a $10 million
PRT reported that COB Basrah continued this provincial courthouse, two other major court-
quarter to receive indirect fire and that one such house construction projects, and the construc-
attack had killed three soldiers in July. Military tion of a prison. The PRT reported that these
movements also came under attack. The PRT projects had led to significant goodwill among
noted a need for additional troops to secure local judges, corrections officials, and police. It

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 131

RECONSTRUCTION BY PROVINCE

also reported what it called a “strategic need to U.S. Infrastructure Spending in Basrah
inoculate against malevolent Iranian influence” $ Millions

by showing the populace that essential services Sector Total

are improving under the new Iraq.733 Electricity 543.46
The PRT also reported that judicial intimida- Water and Sanitation 238.32
tion and corruption remained concerns. The PRT Oil and Gas 558.55
noted a lack of identified and trustworthy civil
Transportation and Communications 171.80
society RoL partners. The relationship with the
General Infrastructure 8.39
local Iraq Bar Association and Iraqi Jurist Union
Total 1,520.52
was poor because of recalcitrant and obstructive
leadership, despite a $300,000 project to renovate
the IJU’s building in 2008. The PRT sought this Economy
quarter to change these relationships.734 The PRT reported two important events this
quarter that were likely to affect Basrah’s economic
Infrastructure development and business environment: 737
PRT Basrah continued this quarter to oversee • construction of a $485 million sports center
the implementation of more than $100 million • refurbishment of the Rumaila oil field under the
in brick-and-mortar projects.735 The Garma contract awarded in the first round of bidding
Water Reverse Feeding project was 92% complete for oil service contracts
this quarter. Once completed, the facility will
be capable of providing potable water for up to The PRT worked with the PIC to leverage these
220,000 people in Basrah.736 events to bring foreign investment to the province.◆

132 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 SIGIR
OVERSIGHT
SIGIR Audits 134

SIGIR Inspections 144

SIGIR Investigations 161

SIGIR Hotline 170

SIGIR Website 171

Legislative Update 172

4
section
SIGIR OVERSIGHT

SIGIR AUDITS

From August 1, 2009, to October 30, 2009, SIGIR • the first in a series of interim reports describing
completed six new audit products; since March the methodology and results of SIGIR’s forensic
2004, SIGIR has issued 155 audit reports. This auditing efforts
quarter, three reports directly respond to a leg- • a report examining expenditures on the Global
islative mandate that SIGIR complete a forensic Maintenance and Supply Services (GMASS)
audit report on all amounts appropriated or contract to determine if potential overcharges
otherwise made available for Iraq reconstruc- may have occurred
tion, and three reports address management of • a report to determine if USACE properly ac-
reconstruction activities: counted for DFI funds it received
• a report on the costs, outcomes, and oversight of
$1.12 billion in task orders awarded to the Envi- For a list of these audit products, see Table 4.1.
ronmental Chemical Corporation to construct
facilities for the Iraqi Security Forces SIGIR currently has 14 ongoing audits, and
• a non-audit service analysis of management others are expected to start this quarter. SIGIR
information systems, responding to concerns performs audit work under generally accepted
raised by the President of the Iraq Board of government auditing standards.
Supreme Audit that duplicate project and pay- SIGIR’s reports have produced scores of recom-
ment data is being reported in U.S. government mendations designed to achieve management
management information systems improvements and corrective actions needed in
• a report on the extent to which Multi-National reconstruction and relief activities. The implemen-
Force-Iraq met the terms of the Memorandum tation of audit recommendations is crucial. SIGIR
of Understanding with the Government of Iraq auditors regularly follow up on open recommenda-
and the extent to which Multi-National Corps- tions, seeking to achieve their full implementation
Iraq has maintained I-CERP project records in to the extent practical.
accordance with requirements

Table 4.1
SIGIR Audit Products since 7/30/2009
Report Number Report Title Date Issued
Iraqi Security Forces Facilities: Environmental Chemical Corporation Projects Achieved
10-001 10/2009
Results, but with Significant Cost and Schedule Increases
10-002 Data Provided to the Government of Iraq on U.S. Reconstruction Projects Lacked Clarity 10/2009
Iraq-Commander’s Emergency Response Program Generally Managed Well, but Project
10-003 10/2009
Documentation and Oversight Can Be Improved
Iraq Reconstruction Funds: Forensic Audits Identifying Fraud, Waste, and Abuse
10-004 10/2009
Interim Report #1
Iraq Security Forces Fund: Weak Contract Oversight Allowed Potential Overcharges by
10-005 10/2009
AECOM To Go Undetected
Development Fund for Iraq: Policy Guidance Needed To Enhance Accountability of
10-006 10/2009
USACE-managed Funds

134 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 SIGIR AUDITS

For information on all SIGIR audit products emphasizing issues related to vulnerabilities to
issued as of October 30, 2009, see the SIGIR fraud, waste, and abuse.
website: www.sigir.mil. This audit focuses on the use of $1.12 billion
SIGIR’s work is well coordinated with other audit spent for task orders issued from April 2004 to
entities engaged in Iraq-related work. SIGIR hosts March 2008, primarily for constructing numerous
a quarterly meeting of the Iraq Inspectors General facilities for the Iraqi Security Forces throughout
Council (IIGC) to discuss audit activities, prevent Iraq. Issued under two contracts to the Environ-
duplication of effort, and share information and mental Chemical Corporation (ECC), the task
experiences. The most recent meeting was held orders were funded with $350.87 million from the
on August 19, 2009, via teleconference. Inspector Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund and $768.82
General Bowen opened the meeting from Iraq. The million from the Iraq Security Forces Fund. They
following organizations attended the meeting: were managed and overseen by the Multi-National
• CENTCOM Inspector General Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I)
• Defense Contract Audit Agency and the Air Force Center for Engineering and the
• Department of the Army Office of Inspector Environment (AFCEE).
General
• Department of Defense Office of Inspector Results
General SIGIR noted that numerous facilities were con-
• Department of State Office of Inspector General structed under the ECC task orders, but costs
• Government Accountability Office increased, schedules were delayed, and some funds
• SIGIR were wasted. The major causes were work changes
• U.S. Agency for International Development and security issues—inherent consequences of
Office of Inspector General (USAID OIG) constructing facilities in a contingency environ-
• U.S. Army Audit Agency (USAAA) ment. SIGIR further noted that management and
• Commission on Wartime Contracting oversight were generally sound, identifying just a
few concerns.
Under 38 task orders, ECC constructed head-
Final SIGIR Audit Products quarters buildings, barracks, dining halls, clinics,
for this Quarter and police buildings. However, costs for these task
orders increased from about $655 million to about
Iraqi Security Forces Facilities: $1.12 billion (about 71%). The costs for three task
Environmental Chemical Corporation orders increased more than 400%, a total increase
Projects Achieved Results, but with of more than $150 million. Also, schedule delays
Significant Cost and Schedule Increases were significant: 14 task orders were delayed by 18
(SIGIR 10-001, 10/2009) months or more.
By analyzing the costs and outcomes of the
Introduction work, SIGIR identified these key causes of cost and
SIGIR has a legislative requirement to prepare schedule changes:
a final forensic audit report on amounts made • After award, task orders were significantly modi-
available for Iraq reconstruction. To help fulfill fied to change the scope of work and, in some
this requirement, SIGIR has undertaken audits cases, the locations of facilities. This increased
examining major Iraq reconstruction contracts to costs and resulted in wasted funds; SIGIR identi-
determine contract costs, outcomes, and oversight, fied three examples totaling about $1.71 million.
MNSTC-I and AFCEE officials stated that the

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 135

SIGIR OVERSIGHT

wartime environment, the undeveloped Iraqi award and unstable security conditions—have been
Army, and the fluid situation resulted in task addressed. Accordingly, SIGIR includes no recom-
orders being awarded before plans were finalized mendations or lessons learned in this report.
and then modified as needs changed. The procurement integrity issues that MNSTC-I
• The need for security resulted in paying more identified but did not pursue have been provided to
than $150 million to private security subcon- SIGIR Investigations for consideration.
tractors—about 14% of total costs. In addi-
tion, security issues delayed performance and Management Comments and Audit Response
increased contractors’ payrolls and subcontrac- For management comments, see this audit report
tors’ costs. The total effect of security conditions at www.sigir.mil.
on costs and schedules could not be quantified.

AFCEE and MNSTC-I shared management Data Provided to the Government of Iraq on
and oversight of the task orders and contracts. U.S. Reconstruction Projects Lacked Clarity
AFCEE awarded 26 of the 38 task orders to ECC (SIGIR 10-002, 10/2009)
using a competitive process and provided justifi-
cations when competition was not used. Further, Introduction
contract and project files provided extensive evi- This report responds to concerns raised by the
dence of the management and oversight of ECC’s President of the Iraq Board of Supreme Audit
performance. However, a MNSTC-I investigation (BSA) that duplicate project and payment data is
of procurement irregularity by one of its officials being reported in U.S. government management
identified inappropriate relationships and other information systems. The SIGIR analysis of the
integrity issues, but the recommended follow-up system’s data did not identify duplicate projects or
was not conducted. Also, the Defense Contract payments; nevertheless, the data provided to the
Audit Agency has extensively audited ECC and Government of Iraq (GOI) was unclear and gave
identified about $5.71 million in questioned costs; the appearance of duplicate projects and payments.
nevertheless, some critical audits of ECC systems SIGIR’s analysis reinforces the need to maintain
were not performed. clear and accurate data on U.S. Iraq reconstruc-
SIGIR found that some fees—profits—paid to tion projects and illustrates the issues that can arise
ECC appear excessive. Fees were paid on modifica- when unclear data is provided to GOI representa-
tion cost increases that were not for added work, tives or other users of reconstruction project data.
the specified basis for increased fees. ECC received SIGIR conducted this review during September
$80.36 million in fees as profit, including $40.55 2009 as a nonaudit service.
million in fees for modification cost increases.
AFCEE officials believed that the fees were justified Results
because changing work requirements and security The Iraq Reconstruction Management System
issues caused cost increases. (IRMS) data provided to the Board of Supreme Au-
dit lacked clarity and appeared to show duplicate
Recommendations project and payment information regarding U.S.
Previous SIGIR reports have included recommen- reconstruction projects. Although SIGIR found no
dations and/or lessons learned to address issues re- multiple payments, the appearance of duplication
lated to cost increases and schedule delays on Iraq illustrates the need to provide better quality control
reconstruction projects. The major issues identified of reconstruction data provided to the GOI and
in this report—the changes in work scope after other database users. The Board’s concerns and the

136 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 SIGIR AUDITS

results of SIGIR’s analysis reinforce our previous the MOU. Moreover, MNC-I data indicates that
report findings and recommendations. MNF-I is accounting for how the funds are used
and disbursed. Nevertheless, MNF-I can improve
Recommendations the thoroughness of the quarterly reports it is
SIGIR did not provide any recommendations in providing the GOI, particularly for projects valued
this report. at $50,000 or more. In these cases, MNF-I provided
detailed project information, called storyboards,
Management Comments and Audit Response on only 206 of the 347 projects; however, some of
For management comments, see this audit report these lacked detailed project information, such as
at www.sigir.mil. funds obligated and expended, project number to
help identify the activity, and U.S. and GOI contact
officials. Moreover, sustainment letters—which
Iraq-Commander’s Emergency Response MNF-I and the GOI sign at project initiation and
Program Generally Managed Well, document GOI support for a project—were missing
but Project Documentation and Oversight in 13 storyboards. When sustainment letters were
Can Be Improved included, more than 20 lacked a GOI signature,
(SIGIR 10-003, 10/2009) and more than 30 lacked a U.S. military signature.
MNF-I has not, however, met the MOU require-
Introduction ment to train GOI officials to manage the pro-
In April 2008, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) gram and transfer I-CERP management to them.
and the Government of Iraq (GOI) signed a memo- Officials cite the lack of additional GOI funding to
randum of understanding (MOU) establishing the maintain the program in the long term as a pos-
Iraq-Commander’s Emergency Response Program sible reason that this training has not and may not
(I-CERP). Since then, more than 800 projects have need to take place.
been completed, and approximately $229 million Despite efforts to improve accountability and
of the initial $270 million allocated for I-CERP has documentation of the I-CERP program, numer-
been obligated. Under I-CERP, MNF-I executes ous MNC-I project files lack critical internal
GOI funds for reconstruction and other projects control documentation because of insufficient
for the benefit of Iraqi citizens. MNC-I oversight and unclear and incomplete
The objectives of this report are to examine the guidance on document requirements. In some
extent to which MNF-I met the terms of the MOU cases, project files lacked essential internal control
with GOI and the extent to which Multi-National documents, such as receipts for cash payments and
Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) has maintained I-CERP proj- electronic funds transfers. To illustrate, of the 103
ect records in accordance with requirements. SIGIR files sampled, 87 lacked receipts for cash payments.
and Iraq’s Board of Supreme Audit (BSA) agreed to Moreover, MNC-I has not provided the oversight
conduct a joint review of I-CERP; however, in July necessary to ensure that U.S. military units are
2009, BSA issued a separate I-CERP report. documenting these critical management actions
and decisions and including them in project files.
Results These inconsistencies are caused by unclear guid-
MNF-I has generally managed the I-CERP pro- ance. As a result, these projects are vulnerable to
gram in accordance with the terms in the MOU fraud, waste, and abuse.
by allocating projects to provinces as required and Iraq’s Board of Supreme Audit also reported
building the type of infrastructure stipulated in that U.S. data was incomplete, thereby hindering
the GOI’s oversight of U.S.-managed programs

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 137

SIGIR OVERSIGHT

like I-CERP. SIGIR did not review the BSA report be reported cumulatively, and a final report will
for accuracy. encompass total reconstruction funds.
Over the past 2 years, SIGIR has conducted a se-
Recommendations ries of 17 audits of major reconstruction contracts.
SIGIR recommends that the Commanding General, These audits were intended, in part, to identify
MNF-I, improve I-CERP program management by internal control weaknesses that could provide
1) requiring major subordinate commands to pro- opportunities for fraud, waste, and abuse. SIGIR
vide comprehensive information on all completed used the results of these audits to develop targeted
I-CERP projects with a value of at least $50,000, and forensic auditing approaches to identify potential
2) determining if there is a continuing need to train instances of wrongdoing.
ISF and provincial government personnel to man- SIGIR recently initiated forensic audits of
age the I-CERP program, as required in the MOU. all Iraq relief and reconstruction expenditure
SIGIR also recommends that the Commanding transactions made by the Department of De-
General, MNC-I, improve I-CERP accountability fense, Department of State, and U.S. Agency for
and oversight by 1) clarifying the 2010 guidance International Development. These audits are
revision and specifying which documents must be systematic examinations of Iraq reconstruction
included in I-CERP project files; and 2) requiring program expenditures to identify anomalies in
MNC-I to review I-CERP project files for compli- transactional data that may indicate fraud, waste,
ance with existing guidance. or abuse. SIGIR’s approach combines automated
datamining with standard audit and investigative
Management Comments and Audit Response techniques to detect questionable transactions and
MNF-I deferred comments to MNC-I. MNC-I develop relevant evidence for use in administrative
concurred with four of the report recommendations actions or civil or criminal fraud prosecutions.
but did not concur with a draft recommendation SIGIR has also initiated a review of Iraq relief
that it establish a system for tracking I-CERP proj- and reconstruction program areas known to have
ect file location. MNC-I stated that such guidance weaknesses in internal controls. This proactive
was in its budget execution guidance. SIGIR’s final effort, the SIGIR Audit/Investigative Initiative,
report does not include this draft recommendation. focuses on programs that afford easy access to cash
with weak controls over expenditures. The SIGIR
forensics team is now managing several proactive
Iraq Reconstruction Funds: Forensic Audits projects and has identified a number of instances of
Identifying Fraud, Waste, and Abuse, questionable activity.
Interim Report #1
(SIGIR 10-004, 10/2009) SIGIR’s Methodology and Preliminary Results
SIGIR’s 17 audits of major reconstruction contracts
Introduction involving about $6.4 billion in Iraq reconstruc-
Public Law 108-106, as amended, requires that tion funds have identified a number of common
SIGIR prepare a final forensic audit report on all or crosscutting internal control weaknesses,
funding provided for the reconstruction of Iraq, including:
which to date totals about $50 billion. To keep the • high turnover of contracting officials and inad-
Congress apprised, this first in a series of interim equate staffing for oversight of contracts
reports describes the methodology and results of • inadequate oversight of contractors and
SIGIR’s forensic auditing efforts. The results will subcontractors
• inadequate review of contractors’ invoices

138 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 SIGIR AUDITS

• missing invoices and other documents The results of SIGIR’s forensic audit efforts will
• excessive numbers of task and change orders generally be reported in the aggregate; specific
• inadequate accounting for property or inventory findings will be included where appropriate and
useful. SIGIR will also provide lessons learned
These types of control weaknesses make that can be applied to the use of other contingency
programs vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse. funding, such as in Afghanistan. These reports
SIGIR’s initial work indicates that such activities will not present detailed information regarding
may have occurred. ongoing criminal investigations or activities of a
SIGIR plans to forensically examine $35.2 billion potentially criminal nature.
in DoD financial transactions related to expen-
ditures under the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Recommendations
Fund, Iraq Security Forces Fund, Economic Sup- SIGIR makes no recommendations; this is an
port Fund, and Commander’s Emergency Response informational report only.
Program appropriations. To initiate this effort,
SIGIR is in the process of auditing about 22,000 Management Comments and Audit Response
DoD expenditure transactions involving approxi- For management comments, see this audit report
mately $10.7 billion and has identified a number of at www.sigir.mil.
anomalous transactions, including:
• payments that appear to be duplicates
• payments to fictitious or generic vendors Iraq Security Forces Fund: Weak Contract
• notable variances in payment activity Oversight Allowed Potential Overcharges
• payments occurring prior to or on the date of by AECOM To Go Undetected
invoice (SIGIR 10-005, 10/2009)
• sequentially numbered contractor invoices
• payments to firms with what appear to be ficti- Introduction
tious addresses SIGIR conducted this study as part of its efforts to
• payments to contractors that were possibly sus- meet a congressional mandate to forensically audit
pended or debarred U.S. funds spent on Iraq reconstruction activi-
ties. This report examines expenditures on the
SIGIR is in the process of determining whether Global Maintenance and Supply Services (GMASS)
any of these transactions are actually fraudulent or contract, which supports a program of the Multi-
improper. To do this, SIGIR is conducting a detailed National Security Transition Command-Iraq to
examination of transactions, including reviews of assist the Iraqi Army in developing a self-sufficient
relevant contract files. Examinations of transactions logistics capability. This is one of the largest con-
will be prioritized based on risk factors such as the tracts funded by the Iraq Security Forces Fund.
type and amount of the transaction, and a prior his- As of September 2009, the U.S. government had
tory of questionable activity. obligated more than $683 million and disbursed
In addition, SIGIR’s proactive review of pro- more than $567 million on the GMASS contract.
grams known to have internal control weaknesses In a prior audit of this contract, SIGIR could not
has identified a number of instances of question- find support in contract documents or other
able activity. A team of investigators, analysts, and records for all costs charged by the contractor, AE-
auditors is reviewing pertinent information to COM Government Services (AECOM). In particu-
determine whether further action is warranted. lar, SIGIR could not reconcile Army and AECOM
financial data on repair parts purchases.

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 139

SIGIR OVERSIGHT

SIGIR’s reporting objective was to determine stated that they did not review AECOM’s invoices
whether potential overcharges may have occurred for these types of potential overbillings, either be-
for selected GMASS contract invoices. fore or after they improved their review process.
In addition, AECOM provided cost support
Results for 239 transactions, but did not provide support
The U.S. Army Contracting Command had a pro- documentation for 31 transactions that SIGIR
cess for reviewing invoices for the GMASS contract, requested. Some of these transactions are in-
and that process improved over time. Nonetheless cluded in other SIGIR calculations of questionable
the Contracting Office did not have enough expe- costs. However, about $0.3 million is not counted
rienced personnel to review invoices thoroughly, elsewhere, and SIGIR questions those costs. At the
leaving the U.S. government vulnerable to unde- conclusion of SIGIR’s field work, AECOM was still
tected overcharges. In particular, invoices reviewed trying to locate the missing documentation.
earlier in the contract received less scrutiny than Given the billing problems identified during
those reviewed later. Once the invoice process was SIGIR’s limited review, weaknesses in invoice
improved, the Contracting Office denied payment review procedures, and the GMASS contract costs,
of as much as 33% from invoices, compared to only the U.S. government was highly vulnerable to hav-
0.1% from invoices prior to that time. ing paid other questionable costs.
SIGIR’s analysis of selected GMASS contract in-
voices showed that AECOM potentially overbilled Recommendations
or cannot support about $4.4 million in costs. SIGIR recommends that the Executive Director,
AECOM’s invoices for the GMASS contract U.S. Army Contracting Command, direct the
contained numerous errors, according to docu- GMASS Contracting Officer to:
mentation from the contracting office and SIGIR’s 1. Determine whether about $4.4 million in bill-
analysis. From July 2005 to September 2009, ings and costs questioned by SIGIR should be
AECOM submitted 139 invoices for payment disallowed and recovered.
totaling $567 million. SIGIR examined purchases 2. Initiate an audit of the costs billed under the
of vehicle parts totaling $29.9 million on four of contract to determine whether additional
these invoices and identified about $4.1 million in amounts should be recovered from AECOM
potential overbillings, including: for overbillings and unsupported costs on the
• about $2.1 million for prices above the contrac- GMASS contract.
tor’s cost plus allowable markup
• more than $0.3 million for prices above contrac- Management Comments and Audit Response
tually agreed amounts For management comments, see this audit report
• about $1.5 million for prices above market value at www.sigir.mil.
• about $0.2 million in duplicate and triplicate
work orders
Development Fund for Iraq:
For example, although the agreed-to price for Policy Guidance Needed To Enhance
a package of 10 washers was $1.22, the contractor Accountability of USACE-managed Funds
charged $196.50 for each package. AECOM officials (SIGIR 10-006, 10/2009)
stated that billing errors occurred early in the con-
tract and that a cumulative adjustment was made; Introduction
however, SIGIR questions the adequacy of this The Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) was cre-
adjustment. Further, Contracting Office officials ated by UN Security Council Resolution 1483 for:

140 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 SIGIR AUDITS

(1) economic reconstruction of Iraq, (2) con- were not established to segment DFI from other
tinued disarmament of Iraq, (3) costs of Iraqi funding sources.
civilian administration, and (4) other purposes Although all DFI funds were to be returned to
benefiting the Iraqi people. The funds were to be the GOI by December 31, 2007, USACE continues
used in a transparent manner. During the Coali- to hold about $3.0 million of DFI funds pending
tion Provisional Authority’s (CPA) administration final close-out of some DFI contracts. This situation
of Iraq, the CPA Comptroller managed DFI funds. occurred because USACE entered into contracts
CPA Regulation 2, “Development Fund for Iraq,” that made the U.S. government responsible for all
describes the responsibilities for the administra- costs through the close-out of the contract. SIGIR
tion, use, accounting, and auditing of the DFI. understands that USACE may require funds associ-
When the CPA was disestablished in June 2004, ated with the DFI contracts. However, DoD policy
responsibility for administering DFI funds shifted guidance is lacking on whether it is appropriate to
to the U.S. Army’s Joint Area Support Group- hold or use DFI funds to meet these obligations.
Central. The U.S. government’s stewardship of the SIGIR notes a USACE contractor is holding $2.2
DFI ended on December 31, 2007, and all remain- million in DFI funds. Specifically, in November
ing funds were to be returned to the Government 2006, USACE issued contract modifications that led
of Iraq (GOI) per a GOI request. to three contractors—Perini Management Ser-
Several Department of Defense (DoD) compo- vices, Washington Group International, and Fluor
nents received DFI funds, including the U.S. Army Intercontinental—receiving about $11.2 million for
Corps of Engineers (USACE). The purpose of this costs that had not been incurred prior to the time
audit is to determine if USACE properly accounted they submitted vouchers. The Defense Contract
for DFI funds it received. Audit Agency (DCAA) subsequently disallowed
the payments, and Perini and Fluor returned their
Results funds, which were returned to the GOI. However,
SIGIR has identified a number of issues related to Washington Group returned only about $3.0 mil-
the management of DFI funds that require DoD lion of the $5.2 million it received and continues to
attention. To date, SIGIR has identified $27.5 mil- hold about $2.2 million for work it said was com-
lion in DFI funds for return or potential return to pleted but not yet approved for payment. DCAA is
the GOI—$13.1 million was returned in March currently auditing the contractor’s vouchers. DoD
2009 based on earlier SIGIR work. This report may have an opportunity to collect interest earned
identifies $14.4 million that may potentially be on funds provided by USACE to several contrac-
available for return. tors but later disallowed by DCAA.
After some delays, USACE provided a listing USACE stated it has used $9.2 million of GOI
of DFI-funded contracts totaling $2.4 billion and funds to cover unpaid expenses from earlier
is working on providing a listing of its expendi- contracts that it believes were the responsibility of
tures. However, SIGIR did not confirm this data the GOI: $8.9 million for actual contract costs, and
at the time the audit work was completed. USACE $0.3 million for labor and overhead. This payment
assumed responsibility for many DFI activities may be inconsistent with guidance from the Under
initiated by earlier reconstruction organizations, Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Finan-
and a transaction-based accounting system was cial Officer stating that residual advanced seized
not used early in the U.S.-reconstruction program. funds should not be used for this purpose. During
Instead, data was recorded on spreadsheets, and the review SIGIR has been unable to separately
cash was disbursed but not entered into USACE’s account for DFI funds and seized asset funds
database. In addition, separate accounting codes because the funds have been commingled. SIGIR

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 141

SIGIR OVERSIGHT

also has not been able to verify whether GOI funds Ongoing Audits
should have been used to pay these expenses. SIGIR is currently working on these audits:
• Project 1001: Audit of the Iraq Reconstruction
Recommendations Management System
The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruc- • Project 9007A: Audit of Outcome, Cost, and
tion (SIGIR) recommends that the Under Secretary Oversight of Contracts with Wamar Internation-
of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer al, Inc., for Inspections of Power Stations in Iraq
provide guidance to USACE on the following: • Project 9007B: Audit of Outcome, Cost, and
1. the use and ultimate disposition of DFI funds Oversight of Contracts with Wamar Internation-
that it and one of its contractors are currently al, Inc., for Delivery of Armored Vehicles to Iraq
holding • Project 9011B: Audit of Transaction Data for the
2. whether GOI funds should have been used to Development Fund for Iraq
pay reimbursable work order expenses • Project 9019: Audit of Efforts under a Stanley
3. how interest that might have been earned by Baker Hill Contract To Address Deficiencies in
several contractors on disallowed payments U.S.-funded Health Projects
should be used. • Project 9020: Audit of Department of Defense
Obligations Supporting U.S. Efforts in Iraq
Management Comments and Audit Response • Project 9023: Audit of the Use of U.S. Iraq
SIGIR received comments from the Office of the Security Forces Fund (ISFF) to Train, Equip,
Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller) and and Develop Iraqi Air Force, Navy, and Special
USACE on a draft of this report. The comptroller Operations Forces
concurred with the report recommendations. • Project 9024: Audit of DoS Management Practic-
USACE provided detailed comments, which SIGIR es Related to International Republican Institute
included as appropriate. and National Democratic Institute Grants for
Democracy Building Projects in Iraq
• Project 9025: Audit of the DynCorp Interna-
Ongoing and Planned Audits tional Task Orders for the Iraqi Police Training
Program
SIGIR primarily conducts performance audits • Project 9026: Audit of the Commander’s Emer-
that assess the economy, efficiency, effectiveness, gency Response Program Projects within the
and results of Iraq reconstruction programs, often Baghdad International Airport Economic Zone
with a focus on the adequacy of internal controls • Project 9027: Audit of the U.S. Army Corps
and the potential for fraud, waste, and abuse. This of Engineers Gulf Region Division and Joint
includes a series of focused contract audits of major Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan Plans
Iraq reconstruction contracts, which will allow for Collection and Turnover of Government
SIGIR to respond to congressional direction for a Furnished Equipment
“forensic audit” of U.S. spending associated with • Project 9028: Audit of the Management Practices
Iraq reconstruction. for the Iraqi Police Training Program
• Project 9029: Audit of Refurbishment and
Construction Contracts for the Taji National
Maintenance Depot
• Project 9030: Audit of Plans to Transition and
Maintain Iraq Reconstruction Contract Files to
Permanent Storage Facilities

142 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 SIGIR AUDITS

Ongoing Forensic Audits SIGIR’s strategic plan recognizes the legisla-

• Project 9012: Examination of DoS Appropria- tive mandate, discussed earlier in this section, to
tion, Obligation, and Expenditure Data Related complete a forensic audit report on all amounts
to Iraq Relief and Reconstruction appropriated or otherwise made available for Iraq
• Project 9013: Examination of USAID Appropria- reconstruction. As part of that effort, SIGIR has
tion, Obligation, and Expenditure Data Related completed 15 focused contract audits dealing
to Iraq Relief and Reconstruction with outcomes, costs, and the oversight associat-
ed with major reconstruction contracts in Iraq, as
Planned Audits well as vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, and abuse.
SIGIR’s audit planning is aligned with three key Additional contract audits are ongoing, as noted
goals contained in its strategic audit plan: above, and others are planned. These audits will
• improving business practices and accountability increasingly focus on contracts funded by the
in managing contracts and grants associated Iraq Security Forces Fund and the Economic
with Iraq reconstruction Support Fund.
• assessing and strengthening the economy, effi- SIGIR also is turning more of its resources to its
ciency, and effectiveness of programs and opera- forensic auditing initiatives and has published the
tions designed to facilitate Iraq reconstruction first report on its efforts. Moreover, to continue to
• providing independent, objective leadership and provide leadership and recommendations or poli-
recommendations or policies designed to address cies designed to address deficiencies in reconstruc-
deficiencies in reconstruction and stabilization tion and stabilization efforts in Iraq, SIGIR will
efforts in Iraq address issues related to the downsizing of the DoD
presence in Iraq and the transition of reconstruc-
tion activities to DoS.◆

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 143

SIGIR OVERSIGHT

SIGIR INSPECTIONS

This quarter, the Special Inspector General for Iraq whether sustainability was adequately planned for
Reconstruction (SIGIR) completed five project as- and whether it is likely to continue.
sessment reports: SIGIR’s in-progress construction assessments
• Secure Document Storage Facility, Baghdad addressed these general questions:
• Renovate and Expand Chamchamal Correc- 1. Were the project components adequately de-
tional Facility signed before construction or installation?
• Orphanage and Senior Citizen Assisted Living 2. Did the construction or rehabilitation meet the
Center, Erbil standards of the design?
• Abattoir (Slaughterhouse) in Qaladze 3. Were the contractor’s quality control and the
• Al Kasik Location Command U.S. government’s quality assurance programs
adequate?
To date, SIGIR has completed 159 project as- 4. Were project sustainability and operational
sessments covering 147 project sites. This quarter, effectiveness adequately addressed?
SIGIR teams assessed relief and reconstruction 5. Were the project results consistent with the
projects funded by the Iraq Relief and Reconstruc- original objectives?
tion Fund (IRRF), the Economic Support Fund
(ESF), the Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF), and Since the Inspections program began four years
the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law ago, SIGIR has also completed 96 limited on-site
Enforcement Affairs (INL). inspections and 819 aerial assessments.
SIGIR’s sustainment assessments focus on Security has significantly improved in Iraq,
whether the projects delivered to the Iraqis were but the risk of violence persists. SIGIR’s ability
operating at the capacity planned in the original to conduct on-site assessments of reconstruction
contract or task order objective. To accomplish this, projects continues to be facilitated by the transpor-
SIGIR determined whether the projects were at tation, security escort, and life support provided
planned capacity when accepted by the U.S. govern- by the Multi-National Force-Iraq, Multi-National
ment, when transferred to Iraqi operators, and dur- Corps-Iraq, Multi-National Division-North, and
ing the assessment. In addition, SIGIR determined the local offices of the Gulf Region Division of the

Table 4.2
Five Projects Assessed this Quarter
$ Thousands
Assessment Budgeted Executing Funding GRD
Project Name Type Province Cost Agency Source Contractor Region
SIMA
Secure Document Storage Facility Sustainment Baghdad $1,916 GRC IRRF Central
International
Renovate and Expand Chamchamal Correctional Facility Sustainment Sulaymaniyah $28,691 GRN INL Local North
Orphanage and Senior Citizen Assisted Living Center in Erbil Sustainment Erbil $3,725 GRN ESF Local North
Abattoir (Slaughterhouse) in Qaladze Construction Sulaymaniyah $1,100 GRN ESF Local North
Al Kasik Location Command Construction Ninewa $6,311 GRN ISFF Local North

144 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 SIGIR INSPECTIONS

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). Although Figure 4.1

it has not been possible for SIGIR inspection teams Project Assessments
to spend as much time on site at some of the project
locations as would be possible for locations in the 3

United States, every effort has been made to enable 1

1 8
and assist SIGIR inspections. 13
4
This quarter, SIGIR conducted three sustain- 2

ment assessments and two in-progress construc- 1

16

tion assessments. The results were similar to 1

1
SIGIR’s findings in previous sustainment and 41

construction assessments:
14
• Long-term operations and maintenance prac- 1
10
tices were not always being accomplished. 1
3
• Proper budgeting by the Iraqi ministries has not
1
been carried out. 14
• Routine maintenance was not always performed. This Quarter
23
Other Quarters

For a list of the project assessments that SIGIR

completed this quarter, see Table 4.2. For a com-
plete list of project assessments from previous Approximate locations of projects assessed this quarter and
quarters, see Appendix E. location by province of previous quarters’ assessments.

Figure 4.1 shows the approximate location of

each project assessed this quarter and in previ- used for prosecution of former regime members
ous quarters. for crimes against humanity; the other half will
provide open office and administrative space for
IHT staff.
SIGIR Project Assessments
Conclusions
This section provides summaries of SIGIR project On February 9, 2008, USACE Gulf Region Central
assessment reports completed this quarter. For the (GRC) transferred ownership of the SDSF to the
full reports, see the SIGIR website, www.sigir.mil. Regime Crimes Liaison Office (RCLO), which is
responsible for providing technical and logistical
assistance to the IHT. The Transfer and Accep-
Secure Document Storage Facility, tance Letter, signed by GRC and RCLO represen-
Baghdad, Iraq tatives, stated:
SIGIR PA-08-166 The asset(s) or services listed herein have been com-
pleted in accordance with the contract documents
except as noted in the attached documents, if any.
Project Objective This contract was awarded and completed under
The overall objective of this $1.9 million IRRF- contingency circumstances and that all available
project deliverables have been turned over to the ap-
funded project was to provide a Secure Docu- propriate facility representative(s).
ment Storage Facility (SDSF) for the Iraqi High Beneficial occupancy of this asset was achieved
Tribunal (IHT).738 Half of the facility will on 9 February 2008 and was turned over to the ap-
provide secure rooms to store sensitive war propriate asset/facility managers. The Government/
Facility Representatives retain all rights under the
crime documentation that has been or will be “Warranties Clause” of the Contract.

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 145

SIGIR OVERSIGHT

Settling crack. Poorly installed door at the Secure Document Storage Facility.

Project file documentation did not include • The design calculations for the steel frame
either the final inspection performed by the GRC make the assumption that there is no moment
International Zone (IZ) Resident Office or an at- transfer739 between the steel column base and the
tached document with any noted deficiencies and reinforced-concrete pedestal. This configura-
punch list items outstanding. In addition, the proj- tion is typical for moment frame740 construction;
ect file lacked any photographs of the facility on however, restraint of the column bases must be
the day of the final inspection to document either provided. The foundation details do not provide
the correction of previous/outstanding deficiencies any method for lateral restraint.
or the condition of the facility at turnover.
According to GRC IZ turnover documentation, Further, SIGIR identified an issue with the
the warranty period for this project expired on load criteria for the project. In a review of the
February 9, 2009. contractor’s engineering design calculations, GRC
During the construction of this project, the identified issues with the original design loads for
contractor experienced two work stoppages result- the building. The original design live load741 for
ing from a structural failure and the contractor’s the building was set at five pounds per square foot
failure to construct the facility in accordance with (psf). The design engineer justified this design load
the structural improvement plan developed after by incorrectly categorizing the structure as “fabric
the structural failure. SIGIR reviewed the contrac- construction supported by a light weight rigid
tor’s initial design submittal and identified two skeleton structure.” The correct design load for this
significant omissions that contributed to the initial type of structure, as identified by GRC, is 20 psf.
failure of the structure and the subsequent need The increase in live load by a factor of four would
for reinforcing: significantly affect the design of the structure.
• The original design calculations indicate that the On July 26, 2007, a GRC structural engineer per-
center of the frame was to be supported with a formed an inspection of the construction to date. An
column, but the contractor’s original drawings observation report identified several construction
omit any support at the center of the frame. deficiencies, and all structural work again stopped

146 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 SIGIR INSPECTIONS

carefully process and log the voluminous amount

of important evidence, it was being transferred
incrementally to the SDSF. IHT converted the
remaining storage vault rooms into additional
office space and a museum.
SIGIR’s first site visit identified construction de-
ficiencies, such as cracks in the interior and exterior
walls; tile buckling in the bathrooms; loose heating,
ventilation, and air-conditioning (HVAC) duct
insulation; roof leaks; and fire alarm system mal-
functions. In addition, the SDSF manager reported
other construction deficiencies, such as non-oper-
ational HVAC units and interior/exterior door-
frame damage. The SDSF manager stated that the
contractor provided used HVAC units and poorly
installed door frames; this resulted in the door and
Exterior support damage at the Secure Document Storage Facility. frame falling off. The SDSF manager stated that
two HVAC units became non-operational shortly
while the contractor performed another structural after IHT took occupancy. IHT made numerous
evaluation. In September 2007, the contractor pre- telephone calls to the contractor to correct the
sented GRC with structural improvements, includ- units, but the contractor never responded, accord-
ing a structural analysis indicating that the proposed ing to the SDSF manager. As the stifling summer
improvements would provide a stable structure un- heat approached, IHT maintenance personnel
der eight different loading conditions. The proposal attempted to repair the units.
included a row of columns to be constructed along SIGIR’s site visit occurred only days before the
the centerline of the facility, as well as other strength- contractor’s warranties expired; therefore, SIGIR
ening improvements, such as corner bracing, cross notified GRC about these construction deficien-
bracing, and a strongback742 wall. cies. GRC representatives visited the SDSF, and on
On February 3, 2009, SIGIR conducted an March 7, 2009, directed the contractor to remedy
on-site assessment of the project. At the time of these warranty items:
the site assessment, IHT had occupied the facility 1. Repair the floor in all four bathrooms.
for almost a year. SIGIR observed IHT personnel 2. Repair the HVAC duct insulation and recon-
conducting daily business, including research- nect the flex duct to the registers.
ing and preparing for future criminal trials. The 3. Repair the metal seam by caulking and replace
SDSF manager stated that due to the number of one fastener to correct the small roof leak.
upcoming criminal trials, the size of the IHT 4. Reset and trouble-shoot the facility fire alarm.
workforce increased from approximately 100
to 200 personnel; however, the SDSF provided GRC gave the contractor a deadline of March 17,
enough working space for the increased person- 2009, to remedy the warranty issues.
nel. At the time of the site visit, only one stor- Regarding the HVAC and door frame issues,
age vault was being utilized to store evidence. GRC concluded that the air-conditioning issue
According to the SDSF manager, most of the was not covered under the contractor’s warranty
evidence to be used at current or future trials was because of the “tampering, poor maintenance and
still being kept at another location. In order to unskilled personnel working on this equipment”;

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 147

SIGIR OVERSIGHT

and the door frames reattached by IHT mainte-

nance personnel were a “user modification and
not a warranty item.” SIGIR could not determine
the causes for the non-operational HVAC units or
door frame damage for two reasons:
• There was no final inspection report document-
ing the complete testing of the HVAC system
(including the operation of each zone for a speci-
fied period of time).
• The contractor-installed door frames were cov-
ered with plaster.

Because the SDSF manager acknowledged that

IHT maintenance personnel performed repairs
of the HVAC units and door frames rather than
having them done by contractor representatives, Museum interior at the Secure Document Storage Facility.
the warranty for each item is no longer valid.
On September 27, 2009, SIGIR performed a Corps of Engineers and the Multi-National Force-
followup site inspection and determined that the Iraq concurring with the draft report. SIGIR
contractor had remedied the previously identified appreciates the concurrence with the draft
warranty deficiencies. The SDSF manager stated report by the Gulf Region Division of the U.S.
that the GRC IZ Resident Office did an excellent Army Corps of Engineers and Multi-National
job of requiring the contractor to return to the Force-Iraq.
facility three times to ensure that each warranty
issue was adequately addressed. IHT used its own
funding to correct some of the other issues not Renovate and Expand Chamchamal
covered by the warranty, such as the HVAC units Correctional Facility, Chamchamal, Iraq
and the interior/exterior doors. SIGIR PA-09-177
The SDSF manager told SIGIR that IHT was
very happy with this facility, which will continue to Project Objective
play a vital role in providing a secure place to store The overall objective of this $28.7 million INL-
critical documents to be used at upcoming trials of funded project was to increase the bed count
former regime members. of the Iraqi Correctional Service (ICS) for the
Ministry of Justice by renovating, expanding, and
Recommendations converting an existing fort at Chamchamal into
Because GRC required the contractor to correct the a safe, secure, and humane correctional facility.
construction deficiencies SIGIR identified, the draft Specifically, the Chamchamal Correctional Facil-
report did not contain any recommendations for ity will provide approximately 2,000 medium-
further action, and comments on the draft report security, dormitory-style adult-male prison beds,
were not required. and 1,000 high-security, cell-style adult prison
beds to help alleviate overcrowding in the Iraqi
Management Comments prison system. The Kurdistan Regional Govern-
Though not required, SIGIR received comments ment (KRG) requested assistance in undertaking
from the Gulf Region Division of the U.S. Army this project.

148 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 SIGIR INSPECTIONS

March 31, 2009. According to project file docu-

mentation, the contractor corrected all previously
identified deficiencies.
Before the site visit, SIGIR reviewed the
contractor’s design submittals for this project.
Overall, the design submittals appeared to contain
adequate detail to construct the various buildings
and systems for the Chamchamal Correctional
Facility. The designs included drawings used for
correctional facility construction—civil and site
utilities, architectural, electrical, mechanical,
plumbing, and structural drawings. The overall
site layout showed the general layout of the project
site, including the locations of the buildings and
parking areas, security fence, and site utilities. The
Ongoing construction at Chamchamal. architectural plans identified the location, dimen-
sions, and proposed uses of various spaces within
According to project file documentation, the the facility. The architectural plans appeared com-
improved security situation throughout Iraq has re- plete, with detailed information for the individual
sulted in the capture of a large number of terrorists cells, visitor areas, guard barracks, and ancillary
and criminals. But the Iraqi penal system does not support buildings—including electricity, plumb-
have a sufficient number of correctional facilities to ing, and mechanical. In addition, the contractor
adequately house the growing number of captured gave special consideration to issues such as toilets,
terrorists and criminals. In addition, Iraqi prisons showers, and sinks because correctional facility
do not meet the human rights standards prescribed controls require that these items be durable and
by the United Nations. impossible to disassemble.
Although the contractor’s design submittals
Conclusions adequately met the requirements of the contract’s
On March 18, 2009, the U.S. Army Corps of Engi- Statement of Work (SOW), SIGIR noticed that the
neers (USACE) Gulf Region North (GRN) Kirkuk SOW did not address the original facility’s external
Area Office (KAO) officially turned over the Cham- expansion joints. Considering that the external
chamal Correctional Facility project to ICS. The walls are exposed to extreme climatic conditions
contractor, the Commanding General of USACE (excessive heat in the summer and snow in the
Gulf Region Division, and an ICS representative winter), SIGIR’s opinion is that external expansion
signed a Memorandum for Record, which stated: joints should have been part of the SOW.
All work has been inspected, certified and accepted On June 20, 2009, SIGIR conducted an on-site
by the US Army Corps of Engineers. Construction assessment of the project. Because of the size of the
of the facilities is complete. No other work is to
be performed under this contract unless noted in site, the complexity of the project, and time limita-
paragraph 5 below. tions (approximately two hours on site), SIGIR
performed only an expedited assessment of the
Paragraph 5 identified deficiencies found project. The inspection included a representative
during the final inspection of the facility by the sample of the completed buildings and systems at
GRN KAO. The turnover document required the the correctional facility. Specifically, SIGIR inspect-
contractor to correct all outstanding deficiencies by ed several medium-security dormitory-style cells

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 149

SIGIR OVERSIGHT

Ongoing construction at Chamchamal site. Metal cage protects the HVAC, light, and electrical wiring at Chamchamal.

(50 or fewer prisoners per cell) and high-security expansion joint system and a tripping hazard
cells (1-4 prisoners per cell). However, a complete outside the kitchen building. In addition, in the
review of all work completed was not possible. refrigeration room, the contractor designed and
The U.S. government completed construction constructed the room without any electrical outlets.
and officially transferred this project to ICS in The provisional warden expressed concern that the
March 2009; nevertheless, at the time of SIGIR’s absence of electrical outlets will nullify the intent
site visit, the Chamchamal Correctional Facility of the refrigeration room. The warden stated that
did not house any prisoners or guards and was not perishable food would have to be stored somewhere
operational. The U.S. government was responsible else or long extension cords would need to be run
for the construction of the correctional facility; from another room into the refrigeration room. The
however, the KRG was responsible for an opera- warden is concerned that high foot-traffic in this
tional budget to provide for a staff and electrical area could increase the potential for the extension
power to run the facility. cords to be unplugged or cut, which could lead to
Since the Chamchamal Correctional Facility spoiled food or a fire.
was not operational at the time of the assessment, Aside from these minor construction issues,
SIGIR could conduct only a limited assessment—or SIGIR concluded that the construction of the
no assessment at all—of the building’s systems, Chamchamal Correctional Facility was adequate.
including: At the time of SIGIR’s assessment, U.S. govern-
• potable water distribution ment representatives were concerned about the
• wastewater conveyance/disposal KRG’s inability to provide power, staffing, and an
• electrical power production and distribution operating budget for this project. Approximately
• voice and data communication half of the contractor’s one-year warranty for any
• external security lighting system construction defects had expired without a single
prisoner or guard using the facilities—sinks, toilets,
SIGIR’s site visit identified minor construc- showers, electric lights and outlets, etc.—to identify
tion deficiencies, such as an incomplete building latent defects. Representatives of INL stated that

150 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 SIGIR INSPECTIONS

Pre-existing external expansion joints.

the KRG has committed to identify additional inmates from Baghdad to Sulaymaniyah, and the
guards and provide electrical power and an operat- ICS handled all ground logistical movement to
ing budget to run the facility. the correctional facility site. The MOJ transferred
240 ICOs on a temporary basis; ICS is vetting and
Actions that Made the Chamchamal training a group of guards from the Chamchamal
Correctional Facility Operational town to replace the temporary guards. According
In September 2009, a prisoner riot at the Bagh- to the Chamchamal Correctional Facility provi-
dad Central Prison743 resulted in the death of one sional warden, 620 guards have been hired for the
prisoner, various injuries to as many as 40 prisoners, facility, of which 460 are currently in training. The
and fire damage that left the prison facility “un- Iraqi Ministry of Finance has allocated 13 billion
inhabitable.” The Ministry of Justice decided to tem- Iraqi dinars ($11.1 million) per month to the ICS
porarily transfer the inmates to other Baghdad cor- for operation and sustainment of the Chamchamal
rectional facilities, such as Rusafa and Khadamiya. Correctional Facility; these funds are currently be-
On September 19, 2009, the Ministry of Justice ing used to provide power and logistical support for
(MOJ) relocated 360 inmates and 10 Iraqi Correc- the inmates and ICOs at the site.
tional Officers (ICOs) from the Baghdad Central
Prison to the Chamchamal Correctional Facil- Recommendation
ity. Over the next week, the MOJ continued to In the draft report, SIGIR recommended that INL
transfer additional inmates to the Chamchamal take action to make the $29 million U.S.-funded
Correctional Facility to alleviate overcrowding in Chamchamal Correctional Facility operational. Be-
Baghdad prisons. According to the Chamchamal cause the facility is now operational, SIGIR has elimi-
Correctional Facility provisional warden, as of Oc- nated this recommendation from the final report.
tober 12, 2009, there were 2,637 inmates and 240
ICOs at the Chamchamal Correctional Facility. Management Comments
According to U.S. government representatives, During the SIGIR review, INL representatives
the U.S. military provided the aircraft to fly the stated that they were in constant contact with the

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 151

SIGIR OVERSIGHT

Orphanage and Senior Citizen Assisted Living Center adminis- Central rotunda primary stairwell.
tration building.

KRG regarding the operation and sustainment of orphanage and senior center. The project showcases
the Chamchamal Correctional Facility. Once it the government’s ability to address the basic needs
became operational, INL representatives provided of the population and will provide a safe home for
SIGIR the actual dates and number of inmates and 345 children (165 boys and 180 girls) and 60 senior
correctional officers transferred to the Chamcha- citizens. The project will result in a living center
mal Correctional Facility. benefiting destitute orphans and senior citizens by
In addition, SIGIR received comments on the providing a safe and clean living environment.
draft report from USACE GRD, indicating that it The project comprised an administrative build-
concurred with the draft report. SIGIR lauds the ing, a multipurpose hall, a girls’ residential house, a
prompt actions taken by INL to encourage the boys’ residential house, a senior citizens’ residential
Government of Iraq to begin using the Cham- house, play areas, a pool, a guard house, a water
chamal Correctional Facility. SIGIR also appreci- tank, a garden, a fence, driveways and walkways, a
ates the concurrence with the draft report by the parking area, and other support buildings.
USACE GRD.
Conclusions
On February 7, 2009, the Gulf Region North
Orphanage and Senior Citizen (GRN) Erbil Resident Office officially turned over
Assisted Living Center, Erbil, Iraq the Orphanage and Senior Citizen Assisted Living
SIGIR PA-09-178 Center project to the Director of the Ministry of
Social Affairs, Erbil province. The Certificate of
Project Objective Deliverables noted that the director received the
The objective of the project was to provide a mod- operation and maintenance manuals, as-built
ern, safe, and comfortable facility for the most vul- drawings, and the warranty documents.
nerable citizens of Erbil, Iraq. Valued at approxi- According to GRN documentation, authorized
mately $3.7 million, this ESF-funded project will GRN Erbil Resident Office personnel conducted
result in a first-of-its-kind facility—combining an pre-final inspections on December 27, 2008, and

152 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 SIGIR INSPECTIONS

Exterior view of residential house for boys. Primary circuit breaker panel with no barrier, Orphanage and
Senior Citizen Assisted Living Center.

January 15, 2009. The pre-final inspections noted report, which was prepared by a local construction
minor problems for the contractor to correct in the laboratory. The report contained information on
buildings. The final inspections for the buildings the borings, physical and chemical properties of the
commenced on December 28, 2008, and were fi- soil, and the allowable soil-bearing capacity.
nalized on January 23, 2009. The final inspections SIGIR’s review of the design documentation
showed that the work required by the contract was determined that the initial design and construc-
accomplished without any noted deficiencies. tion of the project appeared adequate. SIGIR
On July 9, 2009, SIGIR conducted an on-site identified a number of potential safety concerns
assessment of the project, accompanied by the during the site inspection, but they were rectified
Project Engineer of the GRN Erbil Resident Office, prior to the preparation of the final report.
personnel of the Kurdish Regional Ministry, and SIGIR concluded that the construction of the
staff of the Orphanage and Senior Citizen Assisted facility was adequate; aside from the minor safety
Living Center. During the site visit, the Orphan- concerns noted, the project was operating at the
age and Senior Citizen Assisted Living Center was capacity provided for in the contract. At the time
occupied and functioning. of the site visit, the Orphanage and Senior Citi-
Based on the detailed Statement of Work and zen Assisted Living Center had been operational
the inclusion by reference of other applicable codes for approximately five months.
and standards, adequate information was provided
in the specifications for the contractor to complete Recommendations
the final design and construct the facility. In addi- SIGIR’s report contains no recommendations for
tion, the contractor provided detailed final design corrective action; therefore, management com-
drawings and plans with specific information for ments were not required.
the construction of the Orphanage and Senior
Citizen Assisted Living Center. Management Comments
Although the contract did not require a geotech- Although management comments were not
nical report, the contractor supplied a geotechnical required, SIGIR received comments from the

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 153

SIGIR OVERSIGHT

Gulf Region Division of the U.S. Army Corps be separated from the smaller amount of human
of Engineers concurring with the draft report. waste. The animal waste will be collected in
SIGIR appreciates the concurrence of the Gulf tanks and sent away for proper handling and
Region Division with the report. disposal.
Overall, the design submittals appeared to
contain adequate detail to construct the facility
Abattoir (Slaughterhouse) in Qaladze, and the various systems within the facility.
Sulaymaniyah, Iraq
SIGIR PA-09-179 2. At the time of the site visit, the project was ap-
proximately 35-40% complete; consequently,
Project Objective construction work on the abattoir was still ongo-
The overall objective of this $1.1 million ESF- ing. In general, the observed construction work
funded project was to design and construct an appeared to meet the standards of the Statement
abattoir (slaughterhouse) in the Qaladze area in the of Work. SIGIR identified two construction
province of Sulaymaniyah. The project included deficiencies—an incomplete expansion joint
the construction of a slaughter hall, winter and system for the facility’s exterior and interior floor
summer halls, two guard houses, a leather store, a and parapet744 and an improperly constructed
disembowelment hall, a meat store, an administra- riser for a concrete stair unit that caused a trip-
tion facility, a laboratory, a general store, a refrig- ping hazard. As a result of the persistence of the
eration room, and a crematory. KRO, the contractor has already taken corrective
actions to remedy these deficiencies.
Conclusions Aside from these two construction issues,
The assessment determined that: SIGIR concluded that the construction work
1. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region exhibited good-quality material and above-
North (GRN) Kirkuk Resident Office (KRO) average workmanship and attention to detail.
provided SIGIR with the project designs for
the abattoir project, including site utilities. The
general site design showed the general layout of
the site, including the location of the buildings
and parking areas, security fence, site utilities,
site lighting, and landscaping. The architectural
plans identified the location, dimensions, and
proposed uses of various spaces within the facil-
ity. The architectural plans appeared complete
and contained detailed information for the
buildings and individual rooms. In addition,
the overall design demonstrated a high level of
planning between the contractor and the KRO.
For example, the contractor designed the project
to have separate waste disposals—one for small
amounts of human waste (from the bathroom)
and another for the animal product wastes,
such as blood and excreta. Because the animal
Ongoing contruction at the abattoir.
waste poses significant health hazards, it must

154 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 SIGIR INSPECTIONS

3. The contractor’s quality control (QC) manage- document construction and highlight deficien-
ment program was effective. The contractor cies, the QA representative also supplemented
instituted a three-phase QC control system the QA reports with detailed photographs that
(preparatory, initial, and follow-up phases) to reinforced the narrative information.
ensure that construction complies with the In addition, when construction deficiencies
requirements of the contract. The contractor were identified, the KRO quickly contacted the
submitted QC reports on a daily basis, which contractor to determine corrective actions to
were reviewed by the KRO project manager. remedy the issues. The KRO’s QA program is
The QC representatives supplemented the daily ensuring the successful completion of the abat-
QC reports with photographs that reinforced toir project.
the information provided in the daily reports.
Further, the QC representatives were also 4. Sustainability was addressed in the contract
present for all significant pours and testing and requirements. The Statement of Work included
followed up on the test results. sustainability elements to assist the Iraqi min-
The government quality assurance (QA) pro- istry ultimately responsible for operating this
gram was effective in monitoring the contrac- project after turnover. The contract requires
tor’s QC program. The KRO QA representative the contractor to provide a warranty for con-
maintained daily QA reports that documented struction work for one year after the date of
any deficiencies noted at the site. For example, final acceptance of the work. In addition, the
the QA representative also identified and contract specifications require the contractor to
documented the contractor’s construction provide and certify warranties in the name of
deficiency with the concrete stair unit riser the appropriate ministry for all materials and
that SIGIR found. Based on SIGIR’s review, the equipment. Upon completion of each facil-
QA representative’s reports were sufficiently ity, the contractor must prepare and furnish
complete, accurate, and timely. In addition as-built drawings, which will be a record of the
to containing project-specific information to construction as installed and completed.

Interior view of the slaughterhouse room. Partially completed security fence surrounding the abattoir.

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 155

SIGIR OVERSIGHT

5. To date, the abattoir project results are con-

sistent with the original contract objectives.
An abattoir presents significant health and
environmental hazards to local communities
because of the discharge of waste and highly
polluted effluents. Before this project, the city
of Qaladze did not have an abattoir to kill and
process meat in a safe and sanitary environ-
ment. When construction is completed, this fa-
cility will benefit the 120,000 local city residents
by providing them with access to fresh and
processed meat produced in the most hygienic
manner possible.

Recommendations
Since the KRO has already required the contrac-
tor to take corrective actions to the construction Aerial overview of the abattoir project.

deficiencies SIGIR identified during the site visit,

the draft report did not contain any recommenda- • a bulk lubricant storage facility
tions for further action, and comments on the draft • a power line to new buildings
report were not required. • water and sewer hookups to new buildings
• perimeter fencing
Management Comments
Though not required, SIGIR received comments The project also requires the demolition of exist-
from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf ing buildings. Because this project called for new
Region Division, concurring with the draft report. construction within an existing facility, repair and
SIGIR appreciates the concurrence with the draft refurbishment were also required.
report by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
Conclusions
The assessment determined that:
Al Kasik Location Command, Al Kasik, Iraq 1. The U.S. government provided the prelimi-
SIGIR PA-09-182 nary design to the contractor. The Statement
of Work (SOW) required the contractor
Project Objective to develop the preliminary package into a
The overall objective of this $6.3 million ISFF- complete design package. Specifically, the
funded project was to design and construct a new SOW required the contractor to review the
Iraqi Army Location Command in the Al Kasik preliminary designs and “correct any conflict
area Ninewa province. The project includes the or deficiency, also provide any missing or
construction of: required details or drawings.”
• a reclamation platoon facility SIGIR reviewed the contractor-generated
• a warehousing platoon facility drawings, which contained specific informa-
• a bulk storage facility tion on the proposed buildings, fuel storage
• a petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) distribu- facilities, site utilities, site drainage, sewage
tion point collection system, and other project features.

156 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 SIGIR INSPECTIONS

Maintenance garage prior to completion of exterior panel installation at Al Kasik. Bond beam increased depth in lieu of lintel in latrine building
at Al Kasik.

SIGIR determined that there was adequate and that all legs are securely fastened to the
information to complete the final design and floor slab.
construct the facility. • The water and sewer piping create a conflict
with the installation of the sanitary man-
2. During the site assessment on May 16, 2009, hole and could potentially contaminate the
SIGIR observed ongoing construction work, water supply.
such as concrete formwork and preparation for • The raft foundation contained no provisions
concrete placement. SIGIR observed a number to continue the reinforcing steel through the
of construction issues, including: construction joint or provide fuel proofing
• The bracing for the pallet racks745 was not to prevent leaks.
completely installed.
• The water and sewer piping were placed in The GRN Mosul Area Office personnel stated
the same trench. that the contractor would perform a final
• The raft foundation746 contained no provi- check of the rack system after construction is
sions to continue the reinforcing steel complete to verify that all bracing is installed
through the construction joint. and that all legs are securely fastened to the
floor slab. The other issues would be addressed
SIGIR discussed the following issues with throughout the project, and corrective action
personnel from the Gulf Region North (GRN) would be taken as necessary.
Mosul Area Office of the Gulf Region Divi-
sion (GRD), U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 3. The contractor’s quality control (QC) plan was
(USACE): sufficiently detailed to effectively guide the
• The contractor should perform a final check contractor’s quality management program.
of the rack system after construction is com- The contractor submitted a QC plan, which
plete to verify that all bracing is installed GRN accepted as meeting the standards ad-
dressed in Engineering Regulation 1180-1-6

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 157

SIGIR OVERSIGHT

Column base plate prior to placement of non-shrink grout at Al Kasik. Raft foundation for benzene storage at Al Kasik.

(Construction Quality Management). The QC addition, the contractor is required to perform

representatives monitored field activities and operations and maintenance training appropri-
completed daily QC reports that presented a ate to the facilities and equipment installed,
brief background on the number of workers constructed, or rehabilitated in the scope of
on site, work activities performed, and major this project, along with providing operations
equipment on site. and maintenance manuals. Further, upon
The U.S. government quality assurance completion of each facility, the contractor must
(QA) program was effective in monitoring the prepare and furnish as-built drawings, which
contractor’s QC program. GRN Mosul Area will be a record of the construction as installed
Office employed local Iraqi QA representatives and completed.
to monitor field activities and complete daily
QA reports. The daily reports documented the 5. As of SIGIR’s site assessment, the Al Kasik
number of workers on site and the daily work Location Command project was approxi-
performed. SIGIR reviewed the QA reports and mately 56% complete. The results are consis-
found that the QA representatives did an effec- tent with the original project objective to con-
tive job identifying and correcting construction struct a new Iraqi Army Location Command
deficiencies at the project site. in the Al Kasik area in Ninewa province.

4. Sustainability was addressed in the contract Recommendations

requirements. The contract included sustain- The report did not contain any recommendations
ability elements to assist the Iraqi ministry for corrective action; therefore, management com-
ultimately responsible for operating this project ments were not required.
after turnover. The contract specifications
require the contractor to provide and certify Management Comments
warranties in the name of the appropriate Although management comments were not
ministry for all materials and equipment. In required, SIGIR received comments from the Gulf

158 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 SIGIR INSPECTIONS

Figure 4.2 Table 4.3

Aerial Imagery Assessments Imagery Assessed Supporting SIGIR Project Assessments and
Other Directorates
16
3
Number of
22
Project Type Products
114 3
1 Abattoir in Qaladze 16
46
5 2
16 Restoration of the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier 4
41
Emergency Hospital in Zahko 3
7
26
Humer Kwer Health Center 3
134
5 5 Orphanage and Senior Citizen Assisted Living Center in Erbil 2
Penjween 18 Classroom School 2
143 11
9 Additional Products
1
7 27
Diyala Province—Ba’quba 3
72
16 Diyala Province—Sa’adiyah 2
38
This Quarter Center of City of Sulaymaniyah 2
45
Other Quarters KRG Government Offices in Erbil 1
Baghdad Province 1
Ninewa Province 1

Approximate locations of SIGIR’s aerial imagery assessments con-

ducted this quarter and the locations by province of assessments
from previous quarters.

Region Division of the U.S. Army Corps of Engi- current information on remote site locations and
neers and the Multi-National Force-Iraq concur- to track construction progress at project sites
ring with the draft report. SIGIR appreciates the throughout Iraq.
concurrences with the draft report. No additional This quarter, SIGIR conducted imagery analysis
comments are necessary. of 57 images and created 40 imagery products, us-
ing satellite imagery and limited contract informa-
tion. The imagery provides visual assessment of
Aerial Project Survey Program progress at reconstruction site locations through-
out Iraq. For an overview of the imagery products
The SIGIR Satellite Imagery Group, based in produced this quarter, see Table 4.3.
Arlington, Virginia, performs aerial assess- In partnership with the National Geospatial-
ments of U.S.-funded reconstruction project sites Intelligence Agency and the National Ground
throughout Iraq. The SIGIR satellite imagery Intelligence Center, SIGIR imagery analysis has
analyst provides current imagery, imagery-based resulted in 819 cumulative satellite imagery as-
intelligence, and map products to the SIGIR sessments and products. For an overview of the
directorates—Inspections, Audits, and Investiga- approximate locations of these assessments, see
tions. This program has enabled SIGIR to provide Figure 4.2. ◆

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 159

SIGIR OVERSIGHT

Aerial imagery time lapse from September 10, 2008 (right) to March 21, 2009 (left) of the Emergency Hospital in Zahko, a project to be assessed later this year.

Aerial imagery of the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, to be assessed in a future Aerial imagery taken June 10, 2009, of the Orphanage and Senior Citizen
quarter, taken August 30, 2009. Assisted Living Center in Erbil assessed this quarter.

160 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 SIGIR INVESTIGATIONS

SIGIR INVESTIGATIONS

This quarter, SIGIR Investigations continued • A Department of State employee was arrested for
actively pursuing a wide array of allegations of soliciting and receiving illegal payments from
fraud, waste, and abuse in Iraq, with 96 open Iraqi contractors.
investigations. SIGIR has 8 investigative personnel • The U.S. Army Procurement Fraud Branch sus-
assigned to Baghdad, 13 at SIGIR headquarters in pended 4 individuals, proposed 14 individuals
Arlington, Virginia, and 14 in offices in Pennsyl- and companies for debarment, and debarred 16
vania, Maryland, North Carolina, Florida, Texas, companies and individuals for fraud and corrup-
Ohio, Michigan, and California. To date, the work tion in Iraq reconstruction. The U.S. Air Force
of SIGIR investigators has resulted in 24 arrests, 31 and U.S. Navy each suspended one individual.
indictments, 24 convictions, and nearly $50 million
in fines, forfeitures, recoveries, and restitution.
This quarter, SIGIR continued to conduct a Two Marine Officers Accept
number of significant criminal investigations Non-judicial Punishment
related to Iraq reconstruction, working closely with in Bribery Investigation
prosecutors, U.S. partner investigative agencies,
and Coalition-partner investigators. As a result of As a result of a SIGIR task force investigation, on
SIGIR investigations, 5 defendants are awaiting August 18, 2009, two U.S. Marine Corps lieutenant
trial, and 12 defendants are awaiting sentencing. colonels underwent non-judicial punishment
For a comprehensive list of convictions compiled under Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military
by the Department of Justice, see Table 4.4 at the Justice (UCMJ). They were found guilty of
end of this subsection. dereliction of duty, wrongful disposal of U.S.
SIGIR notes these significant investigative out- military property, issuance of orders to commit
comes this quarter: unlawful conduct, failure to report fraud, and
• Two lieutenant colonels in the U.S. Marine wrongfully influencing testimony of subordinate
Corps accepted non-judicial punishment as a personnel while stationed in Iraq. A U.S. Marine
result of a task force bribery investigation. lieutenant general presided at the Article 15
• A U.S. Marine was charged, convicted, and sen- hearing.
tenced for taking funds from contractors in Fal- This case is a part of a task force investiga-
luja, Iraq; $60,000 in stolen cash was recovered. tion being conducted jointly by Naval Criminal
• Investigators seized more than $1.7 million in Investigative Service (NCIS), SIGIR, and Defense
illegal proceeds from a safe deposit box. Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS).
• Money judgments were ordered for $14.1 million
as the result of a massive bribery investigation.
• The niece of a contracting officer pled guilty U.S. Marine Pleads Guilty
to obstructing an investigation into money and Is Sentenced for Taking
laundering. Funds from Contractors
• A contractor was indicted for bribery, conspira-
cy, and failure to appear in court. As a result of a SIGIR task force investigation, on
• The husband of a former Army officer pled guilty September 3, 2009, Master Gunnery Sergeant Luis
to laundering money stolen from Iraq. A. Lopez, USMC, pled guilty to three specifications

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 161

SIGIR OVERSIGHT

of Article 134 (graft) under the Uniform Code

of Military Justice (UCMJ) during court-martial
proceedings at Marine Corps Base, Camp Lejeune,
North Carolina. Lopez was charged with taking
money from three contractors while deployed to
Iraq in 2005. The UCMJ defines graft as compensa-
tion for services performed in an official matter
when no compensation is due.
Lopez pled guilty to taking $67,000 from three
contracting companies that provided supplies and
services in Iraq. Lopez was sentenced to repri-
mand, total forfeitures of all pay and allowances,
a $10,000 fine, reduction to pay grade E-6, and
89 days of confinement. Investigators recovered
$60,000 from Lopez.
This case is part of a task force investigation be-
ing conducted jointly by NCIS, SIGIR, and DCIS. More than $1.7 million in currency seized in Cockerham case.

More than $1.7 Million from U.S. District Court

Cockerham Conspiracy Seized Orders $14.1 Million
in Money Judgments
On September 17, 2009, investigators searched a
bank safety deposit box leased by Melissa Cocker- On September 22, 2009, the U.S. District Court in
ham and seized $1,776,966.37—$1,508,900 in U.S. San Antonio, Texas, ordered three separate money
currency and $268,066.37 in foreign currency. The judgments totaling $14.1 million, arising from the
investigation determined that Melissa Cockerham’s Cockerham case.
spouse, Major John Cockerham, had received the The court ordered that $9.6 million be forfeited
money from contractors in return for awarding to the United States, representing the proceeds of
U.S. government contracts to the companies. The the conspiracy and money-laundering charges in
seized U.S. and foreign currency was retained in John Cockerham’s indictment.
the custody of U.S. officials for processing and The court also ordered that the United States
forfeiture proceedings. was entitled to the forfeiture of any other assets
This investigation is being conducted jointly by owned by Cockerham up to the amount of the
SIGIR, the Major Fraud Procurement Unit of the judgment, and that at the time of sentencing, the
U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID- money judgment be included in the judgment of
MPFU), DCIS, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), his criminal case.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and The court issued similar judgments for Carolyn
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Blake (for not less than $3.1 million) and for Me-
For a complete account of this investiga- lissa Cockerham (for not less than $1.4 million).
tion, see SIGIR’s July 2007 Quarterly Report and This investigation is being conducted jointly by
Semiannual Report to Congress and subsequent SIGIR, CID-MPFU, DCIS, IRS, ICE, and FBI.
Quarterly Reports.

162 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 SIGIR INVESTIGATIONS

Contracting Officer’s Niece charged Chidiac with two counts of conspiracy to

Pleads Guilty to Obstructing commit bribery.
Investigation into Money According to the indictment, from approxi-
mately July 2006 to March 2007, Raman and Chi-
Laundering diac gave money and other items to Baker in return
On July 28, 2009, Nyree Pettaway pled guilty to one for the award of DoD contracts at Camp Victory.
count of conspiring with U.S. Army Major John C. In a second conspiracy, which took place from ap-
Cockerham (her uncle), Carolyn Blake (her aunt proximately November 2006 to March 2007, Baker
and Cockerham’s sister), and others to obstruct the canceled contracts awarded to third-party contrac-
investigation of money laundering related to Cock- tors and fraudulently re-awarded them to Chidiac.
erham’s receipt of more than $9 million in bribes as Baker then authorized Chidiac to receive cash pay-
a contracting officer in Kuwait. ments for those contracts, even though Chidiac had
Pettaway admitted that in late 2006, when Cock- not delivered any goods and had not performed
erham learned he was under investigation, he so- any services. In return, Chidiac gave some of the
licited her assistance to create cover stories for the money back to Baker.
millions of dollars he had received and to return Baker was sentenced on September 30, 2009, to
$3 million in cash to co-conspirators for safekeep- 70 months in prison and ordered to pay $825,000
ing. Pettaway admitted she traveled to Kuwait, in restitution. Raman was sentenced on January 30,
received the cash from Blake, and gave it to others 2009, to a $500,000 fine.
to hold for Cockerham. She also admitted that she This investigation is being conducted jointly by
delivered fraudulent documents to contractors in DCIS, CID-MPFU, ICE, U.S. Postal Inspection
Kuwait in an attempt to make the bribe payments Service, and SIGIR.
appear to investigators to be legitimate loans.
This investigation is being conducted jointly by
SIGIR, CID-MPFU, DCIS, IRS, ICE, and FBI. Husband of Former Army Officer
Pleads Guilty to Laundering
Money Stolen from Iraq
Contractor Indicted for Bribery,
Conspiracy, and Failing On August 5, 2009, William Driver, a New Jersey
To Appear in Court accountant, pled guilty in U.S. District Court for
the District of New Jersey, Trenton, New Jersey,
On October 7, 2009, a federal grand jury in Okla- to laundering portions of more than $300,000
homa City, Oklahoma, indicted Elie Samir Chidiac acquired as part of his role in the Bloom-Stein con-
in a superseding indictment charging him with spiracy. The funds were stolen from the Coalition
bribery, conspiracy to commit bribery, and failing Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq and brought
to appear in court. In 2006 and 2007, Chidiac was back to the United States by his wife, Debra Har-
an Iraq site manager for Raman Corporation, a rison, a former U.S. Army lieutenant colonel. From
Lebanese company with a Texas affiliate, Raman April through June 2004, Harrison was the deputy
International Inc (Raman). According to the in- comptroller and acting comptroller of CPA-South
dictment, Chidiac participated in two conspiracies Central Region (CPA-SC).
in which he bribed Army Major Theresa Jeanne At the plea hearing, Driver admitted that Harri-
Baker in connection with contracts awarded at son stole money from the CPA-SC and transported
Camp Victory, Iraq. This indictment supersedes an it to their home in Trenton. Driver then contracted
indictment returned on January 22, 2008, which a home improvement company to build a deck

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 163

SIGIR OVERSIGHT

on their home; from October through December data related to the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction
2004, he and Harrison used the stolen cash to Fund for fiscal years 2003-2008. In March 2009,
make four payments of $9,000 each to the contrac- SIGIR expanded that initiative to include expendi-
tor. Driver also admitted that he and his wife made tures by the Department of State (Project No. 9012)
cash payments to evade transaction-reporting and the U.S. Agency for International Development
requirements when the contractor deposited the (Project No. 9013).
funds at a bank. Driver is scheduled to be sen- The objective of the project is to examine options
tenced on December 3, 2009, in U.S. District Court, for combining automated transaction data and data-
Trenton, New Jersey. mining techniques to review the appropriateness of
This investigation is being conducted jointly by expenditures for Iraq relief and reconstruction. The
SIGIR, IRS, and ICE; the case is being prosecuted forensic audit project is expected to lead to SIGIR
by the Public Integrity Section of the Department follow-on efforts, products, and investigations.
of Justice. This quarter, the Council of the Inspec- Working in concert with SIGIR Audits, SIGIR
tors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) Investigations opened a proactive investigation.
presented the Bloom-Stein investigation the CIGIE SIGIR special agents and auditors have coordinated
award for investigative excellence. this effort and are working with various contract
administration, financial management, audit and
investigative components in DoD, DoS, USAID,
Department of State Employee U.S. Postal Service, and the Department of the
Arrested for Illegal Payments Treasury (IRS and Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network). SIGIR has expanded that effort, identify-
On October 16, 2009, SIGIR agents arrested a ing five major avenues of specific investigative
Department of State (DoS) employee based on a interest and inquiry.
complaint filed with the U.S. District Court alleg- In partnership with the other agencies, SIGIR
ing conspiracy, illegal receipt of kickbacks, illegal auditors and investigators are examining tens of
receipt of bribes, and wire fraud. The complaint thousands of documents to identify unusual or sus-
alleged that as a contractor and later as a DoS pect financial transactions that may indicate fraud
employee this individual solicited and received il- or corruption in the award and administration of
legal kickbacks and bribes from Iraqi contractors in contracts and grants. So far, SIGIR has identified
return for facilitating their receipt of U.S. govern- a number of instances of suspect transactions that
ment contracts. warrant more in-depth analysis. The project has
This investigation is being conducted jointly by also been helpful in providing additional informa-
SIGIR, DCIS, ICE, and the DoS Office of Inspector tion for investigations already underway.
General.

Defense Finance and Accounting

SIGIR Continues Forensic Audit Service—Rome, New York
This quarter, SIGIR Audits and Investigations This quarter, SIGIR continued to support the ongo-
continued a joint initiative, begun in December ing invoice review project of the Defense Finance
2008, to review DoD Appropriation, Obligation, and Accounting Service (DFAS) in Rome, New
and Expenditure Transaction Data Related to Iraq York. DCIS initiated this proactive project to ana-
Relief and Reconstruction (Project No. 9005). This lyze several billion dollars in payments related to
special forensic audit project is designed to review U.S. Army purchases that have supported the war

164 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 SIGIR INVESTIGATIONS

effort in Iraq. To aid in the efficient processing and • suspended four individuals based on allegations
retrieval of contingency vouchers, DFAS deployed of fraud in Iraq and Kuwait
scanners to Iraq and Kuwait to scan new vouchers • proposed 14 individuals and companies for
into a DFAS database. In addition to the daily scan- debarment based on allegations of bribery, wire
ning of new contingency vouchers and supporting fraud, theft and money laundering found in ma-
documents, DFAS began to scan into the same terials provided to PFB by criminal investigators
database all of the historical vouchers related to and the Department of Justice
contingency payments stored at DFAS-Rome. The • debarred 16 companies and individuals based
historical contingency documents comprise about on criminal convictions and fact-based inquiries
800,000 vouchers, with a value of approximately provided by PFB to the Army Suspension and
$13 billion to $14 billion. The scanning of these Debarment Official
documents has begun and is expected to continue
until at least December 2010. In addition, a review of records kept by PFB
SIGIR has assigned one senior criminal inves- showed that five proposals for debarment—which
tigator to DFAS-Rome to coordinate the review of resulted in five debarments during January
the historical contingency documents in support 2009—were not previously included in the totals
of ongoing investigations, as well as to develop new provided as part of PFB’s quarterly submissions
criminal investigations. DFAS has provided SIGIR to SIGIR.
and its partner investigative agencies full access To date, the Army has suspended 88 individuals
to its electronic databases. Data-mining tech- and companies involved in sustainment and recon-
niques are being used to analyze the documents struction contracts supporting the Army in Iraq
in the DFAS database. The DFAS Rome Project is and Kuwait. A total of 96 individuals and compa-
actively developing cases and providing support nies have been proposed for debarment, resulting
to ongoing investigations to SIGIR and its partner in 78 finalized debarments, ranging in duration
investigative agencies. This is an integral part of from nine months to ten years. PFB is aggressively
the SIGIR forensic audit. pursuing additional companies and individuals as-
sociated with fraud associated with Army contracts
in Iraq, Kuwait, and other locations in Southwest
Suspension and Debarment Asia, with additional suspension and debarment
actions projected during 2009.
Since December 2005, SIGIR has worked closely Suspension and debarment actions related to
with the Department of Justice, CID-MPFU, DCIS, reconstruction and Army support contract fraud in
and the Army Legal Services Agency’s Procure- Afghanistan are reported to the Special Inspector
ment Fraud Branch (PFB) to suspend and debar General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR).
contractors and government personnel for fraud Cases originating in Afghanistan—previously
or corruption within the Army, including those listed with cases originating in Iraq, Kuwait and
involving Iraq reconstruction or Army support other locations in Southwest Asia—were removed
contracts in Iraq. These cases arise as the result of from PFB’s submissions to the SIGIR in the third
criminal indictments filed in federal district courts quarter of 2009 and are now included in the quar-
and allegations of contractor irresponsibility that terly report produced by SIGAR.
require fact-based examination by the Army’s For a list of debarments, see Table 4.5. For a
Suspension and Debarment Official. complete list of suspensions and debarments, see
Since SIGIR’s July 2009 Quarterly and Semiannual Appendix F. ◆
Report to Congress, the PFB has taken these actions:

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 165

SIGIR OVERSIGHT

Table 4.4
Convictions (as compiled by the Department of Justice)
Date of
Name Charges Conviction Sentence
Robert Jeffery Conspiracy and theft 8/11/2009 Pending
William Driver Money Laundering 8/5/2009 Pending
Nyree Pettaway Conspiracy to Obstruct Justice 7/28/2009 Pending
Robert Young Conspiracy and theft of Government Property 7/24/2009 Pending
Tijani Saani Filing false tax returns 6/25/2009 Pending
6 months in prison; 12-month house
Diane Demilta Wire fraud 5/27/2009 arrest; 2 years supervised release;
$20,000 fine; and $70,000 restitution
Benjamin R. Kafka Misprision of a felony 5/18/2009 Pending
Elbert George Theft of government property; conspiracy 5/18/2009 Pending
Roy Greene Jr. Theft of government property; conspiracy 5/18/2009 Pending
Stephen Day Conspiracy to defraud the United States by misrepresentation 4/13/2009 Pending
Jeff Alex Mazon, Contractor,
Major fraud against the United States and wire fraud 3/24/2009 Pending
KBR
Carolyn Blake,
Conspiracy and money laundering 3/19/2009 Pending
Sister of Maj. John Cockerham
Michael Carter, Project
Engineer, Force Protection Violating the Anti-Kickback Act 1/25/2009 Pending
Industries
Harith al-Jabawi, Contractor Conspiracy, bribery, and false statements 1/22/2009 Pending
Maj. Christopher Murray,
Bribery and false statements 1/8/2009 Pending
USA Contracting Officer
Maj. Theresa Baker, 70 months in prison;
Conspiracy and bribery 12/22/2008
USAR Contracting Officer $825,000 restitution
Col. Curtis Whiteford,
USAR Senior Official, CPA- Conspiracy, bribery, and wire fraud 11/7/2008 Pending
South Central Region
Lt. Col. Michael Wheeler, USAR Conspiracy, bribery, wire fraud, interstate transportation of
11/7/2008 Pending
CPA Reconstruction Advisor stolen property, and bulk cash smuggling
David Ramirez,
50 months in prison; 3 years supervised
Contractor, Readiness Support Bulk currency smuggling and structuring transactions 10/9/2008
release; $200 special assessment
Management, Inc.
Lee Dubois, Contractor,
Future Services General
Theft of government property 10/7/2008 Pending
Trading and Contracting
Company
1 year probation; 180 days home
confinement; 104 hours community
Jacqueline Fankhauser Receipt of stolen property 8/28/2008
service; $10,000 fine; and $100 special
assessment
Robert Bennett Contractor,
Violating the Anti-Kickback Act 8/28/2008 Pending
KBR
Maj. James Momon, Jr.,
Conspiracy and bribery 8/13/2008 Pending
USA Contracting Officer
Lt. Col. Debra M. Harrison, Conspiracy, bribery, money laundering, wire fraud, interstate
30 months in prison; 2 years supervised
USA Acting Comptroller for transportation of stolen property, smuggling cash, and 7/28/2008
release; and $366,640 restitution
CPA-South Central Region preparing false tax returns
Continued on the next page

166 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 SIGIR INVESTIGATIONS

Date of
Name Charges Conviction Sentence
1 year in prison;
Capt. Cedar Lanmon, USA Accepting illegal gratuities 7/23/2008
1 year supervised release
Maj. John Lee Cockerham, Jr.,
Bribery, conspiracy, and money laundering 6/24/2008 Pending
USA Contracting Officer
Melissa Cockerham,
Conspiracy and money laundering 6/24/2008 Pending
Wife of Maj. John Cockerham
Lt. Col. Levonda Selph,
Conspiracy and bribery 6/10/2008 Pending
USAR Contracting Officer
Raman International Corp. Conspiracy and bribery 6/3/2008 $500,000 fine and $327,192 restitution
Capt. Austin Key,
Bribery 12/19/2007 Pending
USA Contracting Officer
10 years in prison; 3 years supervised
Maj. John Rivard,
Bribery, conspiracy, and money laundering 7/23/2007 release; $5,000 fine; and $1 million
USAR Contracting Officer
forfeiture order
Kevin Smoot, 14 months in prison;
Managing Director, Violating the Anti-Kickback Act and making false statements 7/20/2007 2 years supervised release; $6,000 fine;
Eagle Global Logistics, Inc. and $17,964 restitution
Anthony Martin, 1 year and 1 day in prison;
Subcontractor Administrator, Violating the Anti-Kickback Act 7/13/2007 2 years supervised release; and
KBR $200,504 restitution
Jesse Lane,
30 months in prison and
USAR 223rd Finance Conspiracy and honest services wire fraud 6/5/2007
$323,228 restitution
Detachment
Steven Merkes, DoD Civilian, 12 months and 1 day in prison and
Accepting illegal gratuities 2/16/2007
Operational Support Planner $24,000 restitution
Chief Warrant Officer Peleti,
Jr., USA Army’s Food Service 28 months in prison and $57,500 fine
Bribery and smuggling cash 2/9/2007
Advisor for Kuwait, Iraq, and and forfeiture
Afghanistan
Jennifer Anjakos,
3 years probation; $86,557 restitution;
USAR 223rd Finance Conspiracy to commit wire fraud 11/13/2006
and $100 assessment
Detachment
Sgt. Lomeli Chavez,
3 years probation; $28,107 restitution;
USAR 223rd Finance Conspiracy to commit wire fraud 11/13/2006
and $100 assessment
Detachment
Sgt. Derryl Hollier,
3 years probation; $83,657.47
USAR 223rd Finance Conspiracy to commit wire fraud 11/13/2006
restitution; and $100 assessment
Detachment
Sgt. Luis Lopez,
3 years probation; $66,865 restitution;
USAR 223rd Finance Conspiracy to commit wire fraud 11/13/2006
and $100 assessment
Detachment
Bonnie Murphy, 1 year supervised release and
Accepting unlawful gratuities 11/7/2006
Contracting Officer $1,500 fine
Samir Mahmoud, Employee of 1 day credit for time served;
Making false statements 11/3/2006
U.S. construction firm and 2 years supervised release
Gheevarghese Pappen, 2 years in prison; 1 year supervised
Soliciting and accepting illegal gratuities 10/12/2006
USACE Civilian release; and $28,900 restitution
Lt. Col. Bruce Hopfengardner, 21 months in prison; 3 years
Conspiracy, conspiring to commit wire fraud and money
USAR Special Advisor to CPA- 8/25/2006 supervised release; $200 fine; and
laundering, and smuggling currency
South Central Region $144,500 forfeiture
Continued on the next page

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 167

SIGIR OVERSIGHT

Date of
Name Charges Conviction Sentence
3 years in prison; 2 years supervised
Faheem Mousa Salam, Violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act’s Anti-Bribery
8/4/2006 release; 250 hours community service;
Interpreter, Titan Corp. Provisions
and $100 special assessment
Mohammad Shabbir Khan,
51 months in prison; 2 years supervised
Director of Operations for
Violating the Anti-Kickback Act 6/23/2006 release; $10,000 fine; $133,860
Kuwait and Iraq, Tamimi
restitution; and $1,400 assessment
Global Co. Ltd.
46 months in prison; 2 years supervised
Philip Bloom, Owner: Global
release; $3.6 million forfeiture;
Business Group, GBG Holdings, Conspiracy, bribery, and money laundering 3/10/2006
$3.6 million restitution; and $300
and GBG-Logistics Division
special assessment
12 months and 1 day in prison;
Stephen Seamans,
Wire fraud, money laundering, and conspiracy 3/1/2006 3 years supervised release; $380,130 in
Subcontracts Manager, KBR
restitution; $200 assessment
30 months in prison; 2 years
Christopher Cahill, Regional
supervised release; $10,000 fine; and
Vice President, Middle East and
Major fraud against the United States 2/16/2006 $100 assessment (a civil settlement
India, Eagle Global Logistics,
with EGL arising from the same facts
Inc.
resulted in a settlement of $4 million)
9 years in prison; 3 years of supervised
Robert Stein,
Felon in possession of a firearm, possession of machine guns, release; $3.6 million forfeiture;
CPA-South Central Comptroller 2/2/2006
bribery, money laundering, and conspiracy $3.5 million restitution; and $500
and Funding Officer
special assessment
15 months in prison; 3 years supervised
Glenn Powell,
Major fraud and violating the Anti-Kickback Act 8/1/2005 release; $90,973.99 restitution; and
Subcontracts Manager, KBR
$200 assessment

168 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 SIGIR INVESTIGATIONS

Table 4.5
Debarment List

Name Debarred Name Debarred

Ali N. Jabak 9/30/2009 Al Ghannom and Nair General Trading Company 9/17/2008
Liberty A. Jabak 9/30/2009 Dewa Projects (Private) Ltd. 9/17/2008
Liberty's Construction Company 9/30/2009 Future AIM United 9/17/2008
Tharwat Taresh 9/30/2009 First AIM Trading and Contracting 9/17/2008
Babwat Dourat Al-Arab 9/30/2009 Vasantha Nair 9/17/2008
Dourat Al-Arab 9/30/2009 K. V. Gopal 9/17/2008
Hussein Ali Yehia 9/30/2009 Falah Al-Ajmi 9/17/2008
Amina Ali Issa 9/30/2009 Trans Orient General Trading 9/17/2008
Adel Ali Yehia 9/30/2009 Zenith Enterprises Ltd. 9/17/2008
Mohamed Abdel Latif Zahed 9/10/2009 Peleti “Pete” Peleti, CWO, USA 6/15/2008
Gerald Thomas Krage 9/4/2009 Al Sawari General Trading and Contracting Company 3/13/2008
Andrew John Castro 9/4/2009 John Allen Rivard, MAJ, USAR 1/14/2008
Airafidane, LLC 9/4/2009 Samir Mahmoud 11/29/2007
Kevin Arthis Davis 8/20/2009 Robert Grove 10/30/2007
Jacqueline Fankhauser 8/7/2009 Steven Merkes 9/27/2007
Debra M. Harrison, LTC, USAR 8/7/2009 Bruce D. Hopfengardner, LTC, USAR 9/20/2007
Nazar Abd Alama 7/1/2009 Robert J. Stein, Jr. 8/16/2007
San Juan Company 7/1/2009 Philip H. Bloom 8/8/2007
Mississippi Company for the General Contract 7/1/2009 Global Business Group S.R.L. 8/8/2007
Lee Dynamics International 6/17/2009 Stephen Lowell Seamans 7/27/2007
Lee Defense Services Corporation 6/17/2009 Gheevarghese Pappen 6/28/2007
George H. Lee 6/17/2009 Faheem Mousa Salam 6/28/2007
Justin W. Lee 6/17/2009 QAH Mechanical and Electrical Works 6/27/2007
Oai Lee 6/17/2009 Abdullah Hady Qussay 6/27/2007
Mark J. Anthony 6/17/2009 Al Riyadh Laboratories and Electricity Co. 1/26/2007
Levonda J. Selph 6/17/2009 Thomas Nelson Barnes 1/24/2007
Starcon Ltd. LLC 6/17/2009 Danube Engineering and General Contracting 12/28/2006
Cedar J. Lanmon, CPT, USA 6/3/2009 Alwan Faiq 12/28/2006
D+J Trading Company 5/14/2009 Christopher Joseph Cahill 11/9/2006
Jesse D. Lane Jr. 1/30/2009 Ahmed Hassan Dayekh 09/26/2006
Jennifer Anjakos 1/30/2009 5/14/2009,
Diaa Ahmen Abdul Latif Salem
6/2/2006
Carlos L. Chavez 1/30/2009
5/14/2009,
Darryl Hollier 1/30/2009 Jasmine International Trading and Service Company
6/2/2006
Luis A. Lopez 1/30/2009 Custer Battles 3/17/2006
Mohammed Shabbir Kahn 10/10/2008 Robert Wiesemann, CW2, USA 3/6/2006
Kevin Andre Smoot 9/30/2008 Glenn Allen Powell 2/16/2006
9/17/2008, Amro Al Khadra 1/12/2006
Green Valley Company
5/18/2007
Dan Trading and Contracting 1/12/2006
Triad United Technologies, L.L.C. 9/17/2008
Steven Ludwig 9/29/2005
Dewa Europe 9/17/2008
DXB International 9/29/2005
Dewa Trading Establishment 9/17/2008
Continued next column

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 169

SIGIR OVERSIGHT

SIGIR HOTLINE

The SIGIR Hotline facilitates the reporting of fraud, • 13 were referred to other inspector general
waste, abuse, mismanagement, and reprisal in all agencies.
programs associated with Iraq reconstruction ef- • 3 were closed by SIGIR Audits.
forts funded by the U.S. taxpayer. Cases received by • 2 were dismissed for lack of information.
the SIGIR Hotline that are not related to programs
and operations funded with amounts appropriated Referred Complaints
or otherwise made available for the reconstruction After a thorough review, SIGIR referred 13 com-
of Iraq are transferred to the appropriate entity. The plaints to outside agencies for proper resolution:
SIGIR Hotline receives walk-in, telephone, mail, fax, • 4 were sent to the U.S. Army Office of Inspector
and online contacts from people in Iraq, the United General.
States, and throughout the world. • 4 were sent to the Joint Contracting
Command-Iraq/Afghanistan.
Third Quarter Reporting • 2 were sent to the Department of Defense Office
As of September 30, 2009, the SIGIR Hotline had of Inspector General.
initiated 750 cases. Of these cases, 693 have been • 1 was sent to the Office of Government Ethics.
closed, and 57 remain open. For a summary of • 1 was sent to the Multi-National Force-Iraq Of-
these cases, see Table 4.6. fice of Inspector General.
• 1 was sent to the U.S. Agency for International
New Cases Development Office of Inspector General.
During this reporting period, the SIGIR Hotline
received 21 new complaints, bringing the cumula-
tive total to 750 Hotline cases. The new complaints Table 4.6
were classified in these categories: Summary of SIGIR Hotline Cases, as of 9/30/2009
• 10 involved contract fraud. OPEN CASES
• 5 involved personnel issues. Investigations 50
• 2 involved miscellaneous issues. Audits 6
• 2 involved abuse. Inspections 1
• 1 involved waste. Total Open 57
• 1 involved mismanagement.
CLOSED CASES 1st Qtr 2009 2nd Qtr 2009 3rd Qtr 2009 Cumulative*
FOIA 0 0 0 4
The SIGIR Hotline receives most reports of
OSC Review 0 0 0 2
perceived instances of fraud, waste, abuse, mis-
Assists 0 0 0 46
management, and reprisal through the website
Dismissed 2 1 2 128
and electronic mail. Of SIGIR’s 21 new Hotline
complaints, 11 were received through electronic Referred 11 8 13 302

mail; 10, by the SIGIR website. Inspections 0 0 0 79

Investigations 1 3 37 116

Closed Cases Audits 4 0 3 16

During this quarter, SIGIR closed 55 Hotline cases: Total Closed 18 12 55 693

• 37 were closed by SIGIR Investigations. Cumulative* Open & Closed 750

*Cumulative totals cover the period since the SIGIR Hotline began operations—from 3/24/2004 to 9/30/2009.
170 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION
 SIGIR WEBSITE

SIGIR WEBSITE

During this reporting period, the SIGIR website Figure 4.3

(www.sigir.mil) recorded these activities: Average Number of Visitors per Day
• More than 69,000 users visited the SIGIR web- to SIGIR Website, as of 9/30/2009
site—about 750 users per day.
1,200
• The Arabic language section of the site received
1,025
964 visits. 987 955
• The most frequently downloaded documents
814
were SIGIR’s most recent Quarterly Reports. 800 751

For an overview of daily visits to the SIGIR

website, see Figure 4.3. ◆ 400

0
Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3
2008 2009

Source: DoD, IMCEN, response to SIGIR data call, 10/13/2009.

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 171

SIGIR OVERSIGHT

LEGISLATIVE UPDATE

As of October 22, 2009, the Congress had not yet equip, or otherwise build the capacity of, foreign
concluded its work on fiscal year 2010 appro- military forces,” and the “security assistance
priations for the Department of Defense (DoD) authorities” of DoS and other foreign assis-
or the Department of the State (DoS), Foreign tance agencies. The report should also cover the
Operations, and Related Programs. On Octo- “strengths and weaknesses” of various provisions
ber 22, 2009, the Senate agreed to the confer- of law concerning these activities, the “organiza-
ence report on H.R. 2647, the National Defense tional and procedural changes, if any, that should
Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2010. be made” in DoD and DoS and other foreign
The House had agreed to the conference report assistance agencies to improve their ability to
on October 8, 2009. The NDAA, also referred to “conduct programs to build the capacity of for-
below as “the act,” includes several provisions re- eign military forces, including . . . to participate
lated to the reconstruction of Iraq. The President in or support military and stability operations
is expected to sign it into law. in which the United States Armed Forces are a
participant,” and the forces and funding mecha-
nisms required to ensure adequate funding for
NDAA Title XII—Matters Relating such programs.
to Foreign Nations Section 1209 of the act requires a report by
“the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence
Section 1201 of the NDAA extends the author- of the Secretary of State,” on “the role of Foreign
ity for so-called “Section 1207,” or “security and Military Sales in meeting the requirements of the
stabilization” assistance, through FY 2010 at the military and security forces of Iraq.” The report
current authorization amount of $100 million. shall include a “description of the minimum
The conference report states: requirements of the military and security forces
While…the increased coordination between the of Iraq to achieve and sustain internal security,”
Department of Defense and Department of State
resulting from the joint formulation and implemen- a “description of how Foreign Military Sales
tation of security and stabilization projects under may be leveraged to ensure the timely delivery
the section 1207 authority has value, the conferees
reaffirm that Congress has always intended for this of training, equipment, and supplies beyond the
transfer authority to be temporary and are disap- December 2011 drawdown deadline and any
pointed that the Department of State has not yet
achieved the capacity to fulfill its statutory require- recommendations for improving the Foreign
ments. The conferees urge the administration to Military Sales process with respect to Iraq,” and
work toward this goal as rapidly as possible. They
further recommend that the administration examine an “assessment of the feasibility and desirability
ways to maintain this coordination in the absence of of treating an undertaking by the Government
this authority.
of Iraq… as a dependable undertaking described
Section 1204 of the act requires the President in… the Arms Export Control Act … for the
to report on, among other things, the relation- purpose of entering into contracts for the pro-
ship between the authorities of DoD to “conduct curement of defense articles and defense services
security cooperation programs to train and as provided for in that section.”

172 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 LEGISLATIVE UPDATE

Section 1221 of the act re-enacts an existing individuals who have renounced violence against
provision that no funds appropriated under an the Afghan government.
authorization of appropriations in the act may Section 1226 of the act requires the Comp-
be used to “establish any military installation or troller General to submit reports on the Iraq
base for the purpose of providing for the perma- campaign plan’s adherence to military doctrine
nent stationing of United States Armed Forces in as established in the DoD publication “Joint
Iraq” or “to exercise United States control of the Operation Planning.”
oil resources of Iraq.” Section 1227 of the act requires a quarterly
Section 1222 of the act contains a one-year report from the Secretary of Defense “concern-
extension of the authorization of appropriations ing the responsible redeployment of United
for the Commander’s Emergency Response States Armed Forces from Iraq in accordance
Program (CERP) through FY 2010. The autho- with the policy announced” by President Obama
rization level is reduced from $1.5 billion for on February 27, 2009, and the United States-Iraq
FY 2009 to $1.3 billion for FY 2010. The act Security Agreement.
requires that the Secretary of Defense, within Section 1228 of the act requires the Secretary
180 days of enactment, conduct a thorough of Defense to submit to Congress “a report on
review of the CERP and submit that review to the feasibility and desirability of establishing
congressional committees. general uniform procedures and guidelines for
According to the conference report: the provision of monetary assistance to civilian
The conferees direct the Secretary of Defense to foreign nationals for losses, injuries, or death …
include as part of this review an assessment of the
following: the process for generating and justifying incident to combat activities of the United States
the CERP budget; the existing management and Armed Forces.”
oversight of CERP funds and contracts; personnel
requirements specifically in support of CERP and Section 1234 of the act provides the Secre-
the number of personnel deployed to meet those re- tary of Defense, with the concurrence of the
quirements in Afghanistan, including with the Joint
Contracting Command and U.S. Forces-Afghan- Secretary of State, the authority to transfer to
istan; the extent and effectiveness of coordination the Government of Iraq, without reimburse-
of projects with other U.S. Government agencies,
international organizations, and Non-Governmental ment, defense articles and associated defense
Organizations carrying out projects in Iraq and services for its military and security forces
Afghanistan; and coordination with the host govern-
ment on CERP projects, including procedures for during FY 2010. Such transfers, combined
ensuring the sustainment of those projects by the
host government over the long run. with similar transfers to the Government of
Afghanistan, are limited to a value of $750 mil-
The same section provides for the use of lion and must have been, at some point, in use
$50 million of the fund by the Secretary of in Iraq. Thirty days prior to making any such
State for the “Afghanistan National Solidar- transfers, the Secretary must provide a plan to
ity Program” and, with the concurrence of the Congress, and in the case of specific transfers
Secretary of State, such funds as are necessary must provide 15 days notice to certain congres-
for the reintegration into Afghan society of sional committees.

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 173

SIGIR OVERSIGHT

NDAA Title VIII—Procurement subcontracts) under contracts for commercial

Matters items. The conferees stated their expectation that
Department of Defense and other affected agencies
to review these procedures to ensure that: (1) federal
Section 811 of the act requires a written justifica- agencies coordinate with other affected federal agen-
tion and approval for contracts in excess of cies on suspension or debarment decisions, as ap-
propriate; and (2) contractors are notified of the basis
$20.0 million that are awarded on a sole-source for suspension or debarment decisions and provided
basis, including certain contracts now exempt an opportunity to respond as early as practicable,
consistent with the fundamental purpose of protect-
from generally applicable justification and ap- ing the Federal Government and the taxpayers from
proval. The conferees noted that sole-source unscrupulous contractors.
contracts may be awarded on a sole-source basis Section 822 of the act extends the life of the
only when those awards have been determined Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq
to be in the best interest of the agency concerned. and Afghanistan for one year (for a total of three
Section 812 of the act requires the Secretary years) and provides for the Commission to be
of Defense to revise the DoD Supplement to the assisted by federal agencies.
Federal Acquisition Regulation to ensure that Section 823 of the act provides that the
regulatory limitations applicable to undefinitized Secretary of Defense shall ensure that certain
contract actions apply to all categories of such con- contracts entered into in the future using award
tract actions, including undefinitized task orders fees shall provide for the consideration of certain
and delivery orders, and undefinitized modifica- “covered incidents” in evaluations of contrac-
tions to contracts, task orders, and delivery orders. tor performance for an award fee period and
Section 813 of the act modifies requirements authorize the Secretary to reduce or deny award
related to contracting actions in Iraq and Af- fees or recover award fees previously paid on the
ghanistan—passed as part of Title VIII and Title basis of the negative impact of certain incidents
XII of the National Defense Authorization Act on contractor performance. “Covered inci-
for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181)—to dents” include those that have been determined
cover grants and cooperative agreements and to through certain criminal, civil, or administrative
lower a reporting threshold related to reports on proceedings to have caused serious bodily injury
the employment of Iraqis. or death to any civilian or military personnel
Section 815 of the act clarifies that a deci- of the government through gross negligence or
sion to suspend or debar a contractor applies to with reckless disregard for the safety of those
subcontracts at any tier, other than (1) subcon- personnel. “Covered incidents” also are incidents
tracts for commercially available off-the-shelf in which a contractor is liable for similar actions
items and (2) subcontracts (other than first-tier of a subcontractor. ◆

174 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 OTHER AGENCY
OVERSIGHT

Introduction 176

Other Agency Audits 177

Other Agency Investigations 184

5
section
OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT

INTRODUCTION

In March 2004, SIGIR formed the Iraq Inspectors In previous quarters, SIGIR has provided
General Council (IIGC) to provide a forum for updates on the U.S. Department of the Treasury
discussion of oversight in Iraq and to enhance and the U.S. Department of Commerce, but these
collaboration and cooperation among the agencies have no current Iraq reconstruction over-
inspectors general (IGs) of the agencies that sight activities ongoing or planned for FY 2009.
oversee Iraq reconstruction funds. Representa- SIGIR will no longer report on these agencies in
tives of member organizations meet quarterly this section.
to exchange details about current and planned Section 842 of the National Defense Authoriza-
audits, identify opportunities for collaboration, tion Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181)
and minimize redundancies. requires that SIGIR, in consultation with other
The most recent meeting was held on August 19, IGs, develop “a comprehensive plan for a series of
2009, at the SIGIR office in Arlington, Virginia, audits” of “federal agency contracts, subcontracts,
with Special Inspector General Bowen chairing and task and delivery orders for the performance
the meeting from Baghdad. These organizations of security and reconstruction functions in Iraq.”
attended the meeting: Following the enactment of Section 842, SIGIR
• CENTCOM Inspector General (CENTCOM IG) has worked closely with the DoD OIG Joint Plan-
• Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) ning Group-Southwest Asia, which has facilitated
• Department of the Army Inspector General the production of the Comprehensive Over-
• Department of Defense Office of Inspector sight Plan for Southwest Asia. That document,
General (DoD OIG) compiled by the relevant IGs (including SIGIR),
• Department of State Office of Inspector General summarizes ongoing and near-term planned
(DoS OIG) oversight for Iraq and the region. In April 2009,
• Government Accountability Office (GAO) several DoD and federal oversight agencies—in-
• SIGIR cluding SIGIR, DoD OIG, DoS OIG, USAID OIG,
• U.S. Agency for International Development USAAA, Naval Audit Service (NAVAUDSVC),
Office of Inspector General (USAID OIG) Air Force Audit Agency (AFAA), and DCAA—
• U.S. Army Audit Agency (USAAA) presented the FY 2009 update to the Compre-
• Commission on Wartime Contracting hensive Oversight Plan for Southwest Asia. The
plan provides a comprehensive accounting of the
Each quarter, SIGIR requests updates from ongoing and planned oversight for Southwest
member organizations on their completed, ongo- Asia, including Iraq, for all IG offices with audit
ing, and planned oversight activities. This section jurisdiction. Participating oversight agencies will
summarizes the audits and investigations reported continue to coordinate oversight plans through
to SIGIR this quarter by DoD OIG, DoS OIG, working groups and councils.
GAO, USAID OIG, and USAAA. For Defense
Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) updates, see
Appendix G.

176 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT

OTHER AGENCY AUDITS

This section updates the audits that IIGC member

agencies reported to SIGIR:
• For recently completed oversight report activity,
see Table 5.1.
• For ongoing oversight report activity of other
U.S. agencies during this reporting period, see
Table 5.2.
• For more information on other agency audits,
including audit summaries, see Appendix G.
• For a complete historical list of audits and
reviews on Iraq reconstruction by all entities, see
Appendix H.

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 177

OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT

Table 5.1
Recently Completed Oversight Reports of Other U.S. Agencies, as of 9/30/2009
Agency Report Number Report Date Report Title
DoD D-2009-113 9/30/2009 Medical Equipment Used to Support Operations in Southwest Asia
Internal Controls Over Naval Special Warfare Command Comptroller Operations in Support of
DoD D-2009-118 9/29/2009
Contingency Operations
Controls Over Air Combat Command and Pacific Air Forces Unliquidated Obligations from
DoD D-2009-117 9/29/2009
Department of the Air Force Contracts Supporting Contingency Operations
DoD D-2009-115 9/29/2009 Summary of Information Operations Contracts in Iraq
DoD D-2009-114 9/25/2009 Transition Planning for the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program IV Contract
DoD D-2009-112 9/25/2009 Deferred Maintenance on the Air Force C-130 Aircraft
DoD D-2009-109 9/25/2009 Contracts Supporting the DoD Counter Narcoterrorism Technology Program Office
DoD D-2009-108 9/23/2009 U.S. Air Forces Central War Reserve Materiel Contract
Investigation of Allegations of the Use of Mind-Altering Drugs to Facilitate Interrogations of
DoD 09-INTEL-13 9/23/2009
Detainees
Price Reasonableness Determinations for Contracts Awarded by the U.S. Special Operations
DoD D-2009-102 9/18/2009
Command
DoD D-2009-091 7/31/2009 Information Operations Contracts in Iraq
DoD D-2009-098 7/30/2009 Status of the Defense Emergency Response Fund in Support of the Global War on Terror
DoD D-2009-095 7/29/2009 Contracting for Transportation Services for U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Division
DoD D-2009-096 7/28/2009 Contracts for the U.S. Army’s Heavy-Lift VI Program in Kuwait
Review of Electrocution Deaths in Iraq: Part II - Seventeen Incidents Apart from Staff Sergeant
DoD IPO-2009-E001 7/27/2009
Ryan D. Maseth, U.S. Army
Review of Electrocution Deaths in Iraq: Part I - Electrocution of Staff Sergeant Ryan D. Maseth,
DoD IE-2009-006 7/24/2009
U.S. Army
DoD D-2009-093 7/15/2009 Ship Utilization in Support of the Global War on Terror
DoS MERO-IQO-09-09 8/25/2009 Review of the Roles, Staffing, and Effectiveness of Regional Embassy Offices in Iraq
Performance Audit of Embassy Baghdad’s Transition Planning for a Reduced United States
DoS MERO-A-09-10 8/25/2009
Military Presence in Iraq
DoS 09-ISP-3020 7/1/2009 Inspection of Embassy Baghdad
GAO GAO-09-1022R 9/25/2009 Overseas Contingency Operations: Reported Obligations for the Department of Defense
Department of State: Additional Steps Needed to Address Continuing Staffing and Experience
GAO GAO-09-874 9/17/2009
Gaps at Hardship Posts
Human Capital: Improved Tracking and Additional Actions Needed to Ensure the Timely and
GAO GAO-09-1019T 9/16/2009
Accurate Delivery of Compensation and Medical Benefits to Deployed Civilians
Contingency Contract Management: DoD Needs to Develop and Finalize Background
GAO GAO-09-351 7/31/2009
Screening and Other Standards for Private Security Contractors
GAO GAO-09-791R 7/10/2009 Overseas Contingency Operations: Reported Obligations for the Department of Defense
Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) Operations in Support of Operation Iraqi
USAAA A-2009-0245-ALL 9/30/2009
Freedom - Power Generators
USAAA A-2009-0244-ALL 9/30/2009 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Contract Functions in Iraq, Gulf Region Division, Baghdad, Iraq
USAAA A-2009-0242-ALR 9/30/2009 Property Book Unit Supply Enhanced, I Corps and Fort Lewis
Retrograde Operations in Southwest Asia - Management of Automatic Return and Critical
USAAA A-2009-0228-ALL 9/30/2009
Items
USAAA A-2009-0132-ALL 9/29/2009 Contracting Operations, U.S. Army Contracting Command Southwest Asia - Kuwait
USAAA A-2009-0235-ALL 9/28/2009 Commander’s Emergency Response Program - Iraq
USAAA A-2009-0233-ALA 9/25/2009 Army Acquisition Objective Process
Continued on next page

178 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT

Recently Completed Oversight Reports of Other U.S. Agencies, as of 9/30/2009

Agency Report Number Report Date Report Title
Effect of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle (MRAP) Upon Tactical Vehicle System
USAAA A-2009-0221-ALA 9/21/2009
Requirements, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7
USAAA A-2009-0219-ALL 9/21/2009 Sensitive Items Accountability and Control, Abu Ghraib Warehouse, Iraq
USAAA A-2009-0212-FFS 9/17/2009 Requirements for Mobilized Soldiers
USAAA A-2009-0188-FFM 9/1/2009 Assessing Future Base Budget Requirements
USAAA A-2009-0164-FFS 9/1/2009 Assessing Future Base Budget Requirements
USAAA A-2009-0202-FFF 8/28/2009 Use of Role-players for Training - Exclusive of Combat Training Centers
USAAA A-2009-0196-ALO 8/27/2009 Assessing Future Base Budget Requirements
USAAA A-2009-0192-FFF 8/25/2009 Assessing Future Base Budget Requirements
USAAA A-2009-0182-ALL 8/18/2009 Commander’s Emergency Response Program - Iraq
USAAA A-2009-0181-ALR 8/18/2009 Property Accountability, 3rd Infantry Division, Rear Detachment, Fort Stewart, Georgia
Controls Over Vender Payments - Kuwait (Phase I - U.S. Army Contracting Command,
USAAA A-2009-0173-ALL 7/29/2009
Southwest Asia, Camp Arifjan, Kuwait)
USAAA A-2009-0169-ALL 7/28/2009 Commander’s Emergency Response Program - Iraq
USAAA A-2009-0159-ALM 7/27/2009 Assessing Future Base Budget Requirements
USAAA A-2009-0144-ZBI 7/23/2009 Army Foreign Language Contracting
USAAA A-2009-0165-ALL 7/16/2009 Follow-up Audit of Management Controls Over Offline Purchases
Field Level Maintenance Operations, U.S. Army Sustainment Command and U.S. Army
USAAA A-2009-0156-ALM 7/9/2009
Garrison, Fort Hood, Texas
USAID E-267-09-005-P 8/16/2009 Audit of USAID/Iraq’s Iraq Rapid Assistance Program

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 179

OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT

Table 5.2
Ongoing Oversight Activities of Other U.S. Agencies, as of 9/30/2009
Agency Project Number Date Initiated Project Title
Ministerial Capacity Development of the Iraqi Ministries of Defense and Interior Inspectors
DoD Not reported Not reported
General
Commercial Vendor Services Compliance With Federal Tax Reporting Requirements for
DoD D2009-D000FH-0292.000 9/23/2009
Contractors Supporting Operations in Southwest Asia
Controls Over the Accountability and Disposition of Government Furnished Property in
DoD D2009-D000JB-0307.000 9/16/2009
Iraq
Review of Inter-Theater Transportation Planning, Capabilities, and Execution for the
DoD D2009-D000LC-240.002 9/10/2009
Drawdown from Iraq
Assessment of Intra-Theater Transportation Planning, Capabilities, and Execution for the
DoD D2009-D00SPO-0310.000 9/10/2009
Drawdown from Iraq
DoD D2009-DIPOAI-0305 9/1/2009 Contract Audit Follow-Up Review on Incurred Cost Audits Related to Iraq Reconstruction
Assessment of U.S. Government Efforts to Develop the Logistics Sustainment Capability of
DoD D2009-D00SPO-0286.000 8/11/2009
the Iraq Security Forces
DoD D2009-D000JB-0280.000 8/10/2009 DoD’s Plans for the Drawdown and Reset of Property in Iraq
DoD D2009-D000AS-0266.000 7/31/2009 Contracts Supporting Base Operation in Kuwait
DoD D2009-D000AS-0264.000 7/20/2009 Air Forces Central War Reserve Materiel Contract
DoD D2009-D000JB-0254.000 7/13/2009 Contracting for Organizational and Direct Support Maintenance at Joint Base Balad, Iraq
DoD D2009-D000AS-0247.000 7/10/2009 Contracts Supporting the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Program
DoD D2009-D000CH-0244.000 7/7/2009 International Oil Trading Company Contracts to Supply Fuel to U.S. Troops in Iraq
DoD D2009-D000LC-0240.001 6/18/2009 Transportation for DoD Personnel and Cargo Relocation from Iraq Drawdown
Air Cargo Transportation Contracts in Support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation
DoD D2009-D000LC-0237.000 6/11/2009
Enduring Freedom
Assessment of the Defense Hotline Allegations Concerning Traumatic Brain Injury
DoD D2009-D00SPO-0242.00 6/11/2009
Research Integrity in Iraq
Review of the Joint Task Force Guantanamo Inclusion of Detainee Mental Health
DoD D2009-DINT01-0203.000 6/10/2009
Information in Intelligence Information Reports
D2009-D000IG-
DoD 5/15/2009 Assessment Research on the Case Management Processes for Combat Amputees
D00SPO.0225.000
D2009-D000IG-
DoD 5/15/2009 Assessment Research on Enlisted Administrative Separations
D00SPO.0226.000
DoD D2009-D000AE-0210.000 4/28/2009 Marine Corps Fulfillment of Urgent Universal Need Statements for Laser Dazzlers
Allowances and Differentials Paid to DoD Civilian Employees Supporting the Global War
DoD D2009-D000FC-0199.000 4/17/2009
on Terror
FY 2008 Marine Corps Global War on Terror-Related Costs Processed Through the
DoD D2009-D000FG-0183.000 4/7/2009
Standard Accounting, Budgeting, and Reporting System
Multi-National Force-Iraq/Multi-National Corps-Iraq Fire Services Inspection and Training
DoD D2009-D000JB-0181.000 4/3/2009
Program
DoD D2009-D000JA-0108.002 4/2/2009 Information Operations in Iraq
Controls Over Unliquidated Obligations for Department of the Army Contracts Supporting
DoD D2009-D000FC-0176.000 3/19/2009
the Global War on Terror
Controls Over Department of the Navy Military Payroll Processed in Support of the Global
DoD D2009-D000FC-0165.000 3/4/2009
War on Terror at San Diego-Area Disbursing Centers
DoD D2009-D000AS-0163.000 3/2/2009 Army and Navy Small Boats Maintenance Contracts
DoD D2009-D000FI-0150.000 2/13/2009 Material Purchases Made Through Partnership Agreements at Corpus Christi Army Depot
DoD D2009-D000JA-0136.000 1/30/2009 Controls Over the Common Access Card in Non-Department of Defense Agencies
DoD D2009-D000LD-0110.000 1/30/2009 Air Force Depot Maintenance Public-Private Partnerships
Continued on next page

180 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT

Ongoing Oversight Activities of Other U.S. Agencies, as of 9/30/2009

Agency Project Number Date Initiated Project Title
Review of Army Decision Not to Withhold Funds on the Logistics Civil Augmentation
DoD D2009-DIPOAI-0141 1/29/2009
Program (LOGCAP) III Contract
DoD D2009-D000JA-0106.000 1/13/2009 Body Armor Acquisition Life Cycle Management
Deployment of the Standard Procurement System in the Joint Contracting Command Iraq/
DoD D2009-D000FB-0112.000 1/5/2009
Afghanistan
DoD D2009-D000AE-0102.000 12/9/2008 DoD Countermine and Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Systems Contracts
DoD D2009-D000CK-0100.000 12/9/2008 Maintenance and Support of the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle
DoD D2009-D000CF-0095.000 12/1/2008 DoD’s Use of Time and Materials Contracts
DoD D2009-D000AS-0092.000 12/1/2008 Counter Radio-Controlled Improvised Explosive Device Electronic Warfare Program
Implementation of Predator/Sky Warrior Acquisition Decision Memorandum Dated May
DoD D2009-D000CD-0071.000 11/12/2008
19, 2008
Reannouncement of the Audit of Funds Appropriated for Afghanistan and Iraq Processed
DoD D2007-D000FD-0198.001 10/10/2008
Through the Foreign Military Sales Trust Fund
DoD D2009-D000AE-0007.000 9/29/2008 Army Acquisition Actions in Response to the Threat to Light Tactical Wheeled Vehicles
DoD D2008-D000AE-0287.000 9/23/2008 Using System Threat Assessments in the Acquisition of Tactical Wheeled Vehicles
DoD D2008-D000AB-0266.000 9/18/2008 Defense Contract Management Agency Acquisition Workforce for Southwest Asia
Medical/Surgical Prime Vendor Contracts Supporting Coalition Forces in Iraq and
DoD D2008-D000LF-0267.000 9/12/2008
Afghanistan
Department of the Army Deferred Maintenance on the Bradley Fighting Vehicle as a
DoD D2008-D000FL-0253.000 9/3/2008
Result of the Global War on Terror
Information Assurance Controls Over the Outside the Continental United States Navy
DoD D2008-D000FN-0230.000 8/28/2008
Enterprise Network as related to the Global War on Terror
DoD D2008-D000LD-0245.000 8/27/2008 Central Issues Facilities
DoD D2008-D000CD-0256.000 8/7/2008 DoD Body Armor Contracts
DoD D2008-D000FP-0252.000 8/1/2008 Department of the Air Force Military Pay in Support of the Global War on Terror
DoD D2008-D000AE-0251.000 7/21/2008 Army’s Use of Award Fees on Contracts That Support the Global War on Terror
DoD D2008-D000AE-0247.000 7/18/2008 Rapid Acquisition and Fielding of Materiel Solutions Within the Navy
Equipment Repair and Maintenance Contracts for Aircraft and Aircraft Components
DoD D2008-D000LH-0249.000 7/14/2008
Supporting Coalition Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan
Contracting for Purchased and Leased Nontactical Vehicles in Support of Operation Iraq
DoD D2008-D000LH-0235.000 6/26/2008
Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom
DoD and DoD Contractor Efforts to Prevent Sexual Assault/Harassment Involving
DoD D2008-D000CE-0221.000 6/9/2008 Contractor Employees Within Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom Areas of
Operation
Department of the Army Deferred Maintenance on the Abrams Tank Fleet as a Result of
DoD D2008-D000FJ-0210.000 5/30/2008
the Global War on Terror
Contracts for Spare Parts for Vehicle-Mounted Small Arms in Support of the Global War
DoD D2008-D000FD-0214.000 5/20/2008
on Terror
Assignment and Training of Contracting Officer’s Representatives at Joint Contracting
DoD D2008-D000JC-0203.000 5/12/2008
Command-Iraq/Afghanistan
DoD D2008-D000CE-0187.000 4/23/2008 Acquisition of Ballistic Glass for the High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle
DoD D2008-D000JC-0186.000 4/23/2008 Class III Fuel Procurement and Distribution in Southwest Asia
Internal Controls Over Army, General Fund, Cash and Other Monetary Assets Held in
DoD D2008-D000FP-0132.000 2/25/2008
Southwest Asia
Evaluation of DoD Sexual Assault Response in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi
DoD 2008C003 2/7/2008
Freedom Areas of Operation
Continued on next page

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 181

OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT

Ongoing Oversight Activities of Other U.S. Agencies, as of 9/30/2009

Agency Project Number Date Initiated Project Title
DoD D2007-D000LA-0199.002 1/24/2008 Controls Over the Contractor Common Access Card Life Cycle in Southwest Asia
DoD D2007-D000FL-0252.000 8/31/2007 Internal Controls and Data Reliability in the Deployable Disbursing System
Operations and Maintenance Funds Used for Global War on Terror Military Construction
DoD D2007-D000CK-0201.000 6/18/2007
Contracts
DoS 10-ISP-3013 9/1/2009 De-mining Programs in Iraq
DoS 09MERO3021 8/1/2009 Baghdad Embassy Security Force (BESF)
DoS 09MERO3017 6/1/2009 Property Inventory and Accountability at Embassy Baghdad
DoS 09MERO3016 6/1/2009 LOGCAP Task Order for Embassy Baghdad
Personal Security Detail (WPPS) Contract—DynCorp (Iraq) (Procurement and Financial
DoS 09MERO3013 4/1/2009
Related)
Personal Security Detail (WPPS) Contract—Triple Canopy (Iraq) (Procurement and
DoS 09MERO3012 4/1/2009
Financial Related)
DoS 08MERO3023 7/1/2008 Audit of Contract Administration, Commissioning, and Accreditation of the NEC Baghdad
GAO 351376 9/1/2009 Readiness of Air Force Combat and Expeditionary Combat Forces
GAO 351385 9/1/2009 Review of Combat Skills Training for Support Forces
GAO 351387 9/1/2009 Review of Army and Marine Corps Training Capacity
GAO 351388 9/1/2009 Review of Availability of Trained and Ready Forces for Iraq and Afghanistan
GAO 351393 8/1/2009 DoD Health Care Requirements for Contingency Operations
GAO 361123 8/1/2009 U.S. Military Burns of Solid Waste in Open Pits in Iraq and Afghanistan
GAO 320691 7/1/2009 U.S. Civilian Agency Planning for the Drawdown of U.S. Troops in Iraq
GAO 320694 7/1/2009 Iraq Refugee and SIV Employment in the United States
U.S., Iraqi, and International Efforts to Address Challenges in Reintegrating Displaced
GAO 320645 3/9/2009
Iraqis
DoD’s Basis for Unmanned Aircraft Systems Program levels and Plans to Support Those
GAO 351271 3/1/2009
Levels
GAO 351321 2/1/2009 DoD’s Planning for the Withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Iraq
GAO 120812 2/1/2009 Iraq/Afghanistan Contractor Oversight
GAO 320638 10/1/2008 Iraq Cost Sharing Arrangements
GAO 351247 9/1/2008 Readiness of the Army Active/Reserve Component Forces
GAO 351239 9/1/2008 Readiness of the Active and Reserve Components of the Navy and Marine Corps
GAO 351242 8/7/2008 Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Processing Capabilities
GAO 351231 6/1/2008 DoD Integration of IED Defeat Capabilities
GAO 351230 6/1/2008 Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) Strategic Management
GAO 351236 6/1/2008 Urgent Wartime Requirements
GAO 351282 8/1/2007 Body Armor Programs and Testing
USAAA A-2009-ALL-0571.000 4Q/FY 2009 Contract for Recycling and Disposing of Waste Material at Camp Steeler, Iraq
USAAA A-2009-ALL-0590.000 4Q/FY 2009 Camp Buehring Fuel Farm Operations - Kuwait
USAAA A-2009-ALL-0531.000 4Q/FY 2009 Commander’s Emergency Response Program - Afghanistan
USAAA A-2009-ALL-0593.000 4Q/FY 2009 Controls over Shipping Container Accountability and Visibility - Iraq
Award Fee Determinations on Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) III
USAAA A-2009-ALC-0535.000 5/21/2009
Contract, Task Order 0139
USAAA A-2009-FFS-0075.000 3/31/2009 Reserve Component Post Mobilization Training
Continued on next page

182 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT

Ongoing Oversight Activities of Other U.S. Agencies, as of 9/30/2009

Agency Project Number Date Initiated Project Title
USAAA A-2009-ALL-0133.000 3/26/2009 Force Protection – Security Badging (Kuwait)
USAAA A-2009-ALL-0118.000 2/10/2009 Controls Over Vendor Payments – Southwest Asia (Phase II)
Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), Iraqi Security Forces Fund
USAAA A-2009-ALL-0110.000 2/2/2009
(ISFF)
Contracting Operations at the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan – Kabul and
USAAA A-2009-ALL-0106.000 2/2/2009
Jalalabad (Afghanistan)
USAAA A-2009-ALM-0059.000 1/27/2009 Non-Standard Equipment Sustainment
USAAA A-2009-ALL-0354.000 1/20/2009 Forward Operating Base (FOB) Closures
USAAA A-2008-ALA-0588.000 1/20/2009 Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
USAAA A-2009-ALC-0093.000 10/20/2008 Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) III, Contract Close-out
USAAA A-2008-FFF-0081.000 9/10/2008 Unit Training on Defeat Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)
Contracting Operations at the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan – Kandahar
USAAA A-2008-ALL-0401.000 9/1/2008
and Salerno (Afghanistan)
USAAA A-2008-ALL-0398.000 7/21/2008 Controls over Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) – White Property
USAAA A-2008-ALL-0403.000 7/7/2008 Housing Contracts – Area Support Group (ASG) - Kuwait
USAAA A-2008-ALL-0633.000 6/18/2008 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Pilot Defense Base Act (DBA) Insurance Program
Follow-up Audit of Contracting Operations, U.S. Army Contracting Command (USACC),
USAAA A-2008-ALL-0625.000 6/9/2008
SWA-Kuwait (Phase I)
USAAA A-2008-ALM-0313.000 5/19/2008 Automatic Reset Items—Depot
USAAA A-2008-ALL-0204.000 3/4/2008 Audit of Government Property Provided to Contractors – Kuwait Base Operations
USAAA A-2008-ALM-0311.000 2/18/2008 Directorate of Logistics Workload Supporting Reset
USAAA A-2008-FFF-0044.000 2/12/2008 Management of the Prepositioned Fleet at Combat Training Centers
USAAA A-2008-ALL-0319.000 1/29/2008 Contracting Operations at the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (Balad)
USAAA A-2008-ALL-0320.000 1/28/2008 Contracting Operations at the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (Bagram)
USAAA A-2008-ALR-0039.000 12/3/2007 Property Book Unit Supply Enhanced (Audit Control Point)
USAAA A-2007-ALL-0887.002 7/26/2007 Contracting Operations at the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (Victory)
USAAA A-2007-ALL-0887.001 7/24/2007 Contracting Operations at the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (Baghdad)
USAAA A-2007-ALL-0859.000 6/18/2007 Contracting Operations, U.S. Army Contracting Command (USACC), SWA-Kuwait (Phase II)
USAAA A-2007-ALL-0858.000 6/9/2007 Retrograde Operations in Southwest Asia – Kuwait
Audit of the Implementation of USAID/Iraq’s Iraqi Financial Management Information
USAID Not reported 4Q/FY 2009
System
Survey of Incidents Reported by Private Security Contractors of USAID/Iraq’s Contractors
USAID Not reported 4Q/FY 2009
and Grantees
USAID Not reported 1Q/FY 2009 Audit of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance Program in Iraq

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 183

OTHER AGENCY OVERSIGHT

OTHER AGENCY INVESTIGATIONS

SIGIR regularly coordinates with other govern-

ment agencies conducting investigations in Iraq.
For statistics of investigative activities from other
agencies, see Table 5.3

Table 5.3
Status of Investigative Activities of Other U.S. Agencies, as of 9/30/2009
Investigators Investigators in Open/Ongoing
Agency in Iraq Kuwait Cases*
U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command,
7 2 104
Major Procurement Fraud Unit
Defense Criminal Investigative Service 7 2 201
DoS OIG 1 0 20
FBI 4 2 124
Naval Criminal Investigative Service 3 1 21
U.S. Air Force Office of Special Investigations 1 0 3
USAID 2 0 10
Total 25 7 483

* Numbers include pending cases worked with other agencies within the Joint Operations Center.

184 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

ENDNOTES
ENDNOTES

1. P.L. 108-7; P.L. 108-11; P.L. 108-106; P.L. 108-287; P.L. 109- 34. GOI, Ministry of Human Rights, www.khrp.org, accessed
13; P.L. 109-102; P.L. 109-148; P.L. 109-234; P.L. 109-289; 10/13/2009; www.cabinet.iq, accessed 10/13/2009.
P.L. 110-28; P.L. 110-92; P.L. 110-116; P.L. 110-137; P.L. 35. DoS, response to SIGIR data call, 10/15/2009.
110-149; P.L. 110-161; P.L. 110-252; P.L. 111-32. 36. DoL, response to SIGIR data call, 10/16/2009.
2. Commander, MNF-I, testimony before the House Armed 37. Committee to Protect Journalists, “Journalists Killed
Services Committee, “The Status of Ongoing Efforts in in 2009,” http://www.cpj.org/deadly/2009.php, accessed
Iraq,” 9/30/2009. 10/10/2009.
3. Commander, MNF-I, testimony before the House Armed 38. International Organization for Migration, “IDP 2009
Services Committee, “The Status of Ongoing Efforts in IOM Iraq Governorate Profi les,” http://www.iom-iraq.
Iraq,” 9/30/2009. net/library.html#IDP_09_reports, accessed 10/10/2009.
4. Commander, MNF-I, news briefing, http://www.mnf- 39. UNHCR, Statistical Snapshot, http://www.unhcr.org/
iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&i cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e486426, accessed
d=28143&Itemid=131, accessed 10/1/2009. 10/16/2009. UNHCR data is accurate as of January 2009.
5. Commander, MNF-I, testimony before the House Armed 40. DFAS, response to SIGIR data call, 4/10/2009; GOI,
Services Committee, “The Status of Ongoing Efforts in “Republic of Iraq: Budget Revenues and Expenses 2003,
Iraq,” 9/30/2009. July–December,” 2003; GOI, “GOI Budget” (as approved
6. DoD, News Briefing from Iraq, MNC-I Commanding by TNA and written into law December 2005), 2005;
General Charles Jacoby, 9/10/2009. GOI, “Presidency of the Iraqi Interim National Assembly:
7. OSD, response to SIGIR data call, 9/30/2009. The State General Budget for 2005,” 2005; SIGIR,
8. Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Iraq, 8/2009. Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 4/2009,
9. KRG, “Electoral Commission Announces Final Results p. 26; Treasury, responses to SIGIR data call, 1/4/2008;
of Kurdistan Region Elections,” www.krg.org, accessed 4/9/2009, and 10/2/2009; P.L. 108-7; P.L. 108-11; P.L. 108-
8/8/2009. 106; P.L. 108-287; P.L. 109-13; P.L. 109-102; P.L. 109-148;
10. DoS, Iraq Status Report, 10/14/2009, slide 4. P.L. 109-234; P.L. 109-289; P.L. 110-28; P.L. 110-92; P.L.
11. USAID, response to SIGIR data call, 10/14/2009. 110-116; P.L. 110-137; P.L. 110-149; P.L. 110-161; P.L. 110-
12. DoS, Iraq Status Report, 8/19/2009, slide 5. 252; P.L. 111-32.
13. DoS, Iraq Status Report, 7/29/2009, slide 13. 41. DFAS, response to SIGIR data call, 4/10/2009; GOI,
14. DoS, NEA-I, response to SIGIR data call, 10/15/2009. “Republic of Iraq: Budget Revenues and Expenses
15. DoS, NEA-I, response to SIGIR data call, 10/15/2009. 2003, July–December,” 2003; GOI, “GOI Budget” (as
16. DoS, NEA-I, response to SIGIR data call, 10/15/2009. approved by TNA and written into law December
17. DoE, Energy Information Administration, “Weekly Iraq 2005), 2005; GOI, “Presidency of the Iraqi Interim
Kirkuk Netback Price at U.S. Gulf in dollars per barrel,” National Assembly: The State General Budget for
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/hist/wepckirkw.htm, 2005,” 2005; SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United
accessed 10/1/2009. States Congress, 4/2009, p. 26; Treasury, responses to
18. DoS, NEA-I, response to SIGIR data call, 10/15/2009. SIGIR data call, 1/4/2008 and 4/9/2009.
19. Department of the Treasury and MNF-I, “GOI Budget 42. Treasury, response to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2009.
Update,” 8/13/2009, slide 10. 43. SIGIR Audit 10-006, “Development Fund for Iraq: Policy
20. NEA-I, Iraq Status Report, 9/30/2009, slide 13; U.S. Guidance Needed To Enhance Accountability of USACE-
Embassy-Baghdad, Economics Section, response to managed Funds,” 10/2009.
SIGIR data call, 10/15/2009. The third-quarter crude 44. NEA-I, response to SIGIR data call, 10/5/2009.
oil production average for Iraq does not include oil 45. P.L. 108-7; P.L. 108-11; P.L. 108-106; P.L. 108-287; P.L. 109-
production from the Kurdistan Region. 13; P.L. 109-102; P.L. 109-148; P.L. 109-234; P.L. 109-289;
21. DoS, Iraq Status Report, 9/30/2009, slide 13. P.L. 110-28; P.L. 110-92; P.L. 110-116; P.L. 110-137; P.L.
22. U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, Economics Section, response to 110-149; P.L. 110-161; P.L. 110-252; P.L. 111-32.
SIGIR data call, 10/15/2009. 46. NEA-I, response to SIGIR data call, 10/7/2009; DFAS,
23. Remarks by the KRG Minister of Natural Resources, response to SIGIR data call, 4/10/2009; DoS, response to
10/9/2009, http://www.krg.org/articles/detail.asp?lngn SIGIR data call, 4/5/2007; Treasury, response to SIGIR
r=12&smap=02010100&rnr=223&anr=31849, accessed data call, 4/2/2009; USAID, responses to SIGIR data call,
10/15/2009. 4/13/2009 and 10/14/2009; USTDA, response to SIGIR
24. It is unclear whether the CoR needs to approve the CoM’s data call, 4/2/2009; OSD, responses to SIGIR data call,
decision. 10/13/2009 and 10/14/2009; U.S. Embassy-Baghdad,
25. Petroleum Contracts and Licensing Directorate of the responses to SIGIR data call, 7/6/2009, 7/16/2009, and
Ministry of Oil, 9/15/2009. 10/3/2009; USACE, GRD, response to SIGIR data call,
26. UN Security Council Report, #S/2009/430. 10/2/2009; SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Reports to
27. ITAO/ESD, Electric Daily Performance Reports, 7/1/2007– the United States Congress, 4/2003-7/2009. Unexpended
9/30/2009. funds include expired appropriations. ISFF data provided
28. DoS, Iraq Status Report, 9/23/2009, slide 5. by OSD is preliminary for the quarter ending September
29. SIGIR analysis of CoI-generated, compiled, and reported 30, 2009. OSD does not report CERP allocation,
data. SIGIR does not represent that this information obligation, and expenditure data for project categories on
presents a complete picture of all corruption-related legal a quarterly basis for all fiscal year appropriations; CERP
proceedings that occurred in Iraq between 1/1/2009 allocation, obligation, and expenditure data is pulled from
and 8/3/2009. Relevant events could have occurred that IRMS for project category analysis; therefore top-line
are not reflected herein. Moreover, note that some Iraqi totals here may not match values found in the Funding
legal terms do not have a precise U.S. equivalent, so an Uses subsection of this Report. U.S. Embassy-Baghdad
effort was made to convey the CoI data in a manner did not provide updated allocation, obligation, and
comprehensible to U.S. readers. expenditure data for the Democracy and Civil Society,
30. U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, response to SIGIR data call, Iraqi Refugees (Jordan), and Regime Crimes Liaison
10/3/2009. Office sectors; values for these sectors are carried over
31. U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, response to SIGIR data call, from the previous quarter.
10/3/2009. 47. SIGIR Audit 10-004, “Iraq Reconstruction Funds:
32. DoS, Iraq Status Report, 9/23/2009, slide 19. Forensic Audits Identifying Fraud, Waste, and Abuse,
33. DoS, Iraq Status Report, 9/30/2009, slide 15. Interim Report #1,” 10/2009.

186 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 ENDNOTES

48. P.L. 108-106; P.L. 108-287. This figure accounts for later 71. Curt Tarnoff, CRS Report RL31833, “Iraq: Reconstruction
rescissions of the IRRF. Assistance,” 8/7/2009, p. 2.
49. P.L. 111-32, “Supplemental Appropriations Act, 72. MNSTC-I, “ITAM Defense Forces ISFF Program Review:
2009,” 6/24/2009; Senate Report 111-20, “Making Investing in Regional Stability,” 8/2009, p. 3.
Supplemental Appropriations for the Fiscal year 73. P.L. 108-7; P.L. 109-102; P.L. 109-234; P.L. 110-28; P.L.
Ending September 20, 2009, and for Other Purposes,” 110-92; P.L. 110-116; P.L. 110-137; P.L. 110-149; P.L. 110-
5/14/2009. See Table 2.1 [U.S. Appropriated Funds] for 161; P.L. 110-252; P.L. 111-32.
details of appropriations by fiscal year. $453 million was 74. U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, responses to SIGIR data call,
appropriated to the CERP by P.L. 111-32, but it has not 7/6/2009, 7/16/2009, and 10/3/2009; USACE, GRD,
yet been allocated between Afghanistan and Iraq. When response to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2009; USAID, response
it is allocated, total FY 2009 appropriations for Iraq to SIGIR data call, 10/14/2009. U.S. Embassy-Baghdad
reconstruction will increase. did not provide updated allocation, obligation, and
50. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Reports to the United expenditure data for the Democracy and Civil Society,
States Congress, 3/2004–7/2009. Iraqi Refugees (Jordan), and Regime Crimes Liaison
51. DoS, “Foreign Operations Congressional Budget Office sectors. Values for these sectors are carried over
Justification, Fiscal Year 2010,” 5/2009, Summary Tables, from the previous quarter. Unexpended funds include
pp. 1, 20. expired appropriations.
52. DoD, “Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Request: Summary 75. U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, responses to SIGIR data call,
Justification,” 5/2009, pp. 5-17, 5-19. 7/6/2009, 7/16/2009, and 10/3/2009; USACE, GRD,
53. Projections include CERP, ESF, IRRF, and ISFF. response to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2009; USAID, response
Projections assume that all appropriated funds not yet to SIGIR data call, 10/14/2009.
expired will be obligated and that all obligated funds 76. U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, responses to SIGIR data call,
will be expended. Projected rates of obligation and 7/6/2009, 7/16/2009, and 10/3/2009; USACE, GRD,
expenditure by quarter are based on historical obligation response to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2009; USAID, response
and expenditure rates in that respective quarter. The to SIGIR data call, 10/14/2009; SIGIR, Quarterly and
projected rate of obligation per quarter is equal to Semiannual Reports to the United States Congress, 7/2009.
quarterly obligations divided by available appropriations 77. Letter from Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Chairman,
(appropriations less obligations) as of the beginning Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate,
of the respective quarter, averaged over the previous 9/14/2009.
four years. The projected rate of expenditure is equal to 78. DoD, “Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Request: Summary
quarterly expenditures divided by available obligations Justification,” 5/2009, p. 5-19; DoS, “Congressional
(obligations less expenditures) as of the beginning of the Budget Justification for Fiscal Year 2010,” 5/2009,
respective quarter, averaged over the previous four years. Summary Tables, p. 20.
54. P.L. 108-11; P.L. 108-106. 79. Senate Appropriations Committee Report 111-74,
55. NEA-I, response to SIGIR data call, 10/7/2009; DFAS, “Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2010,”
response to SIGIR data call, 4/10/2009; DoS, response to 9/10/2009, p. 244; Senate Appropriations Committee
SIGIR data call, 4/5/2007; Treasury, response to SIGIR Report 111-44, “Department of State, Foreign Operations,
data call, 4/2/2009; USAID, response to SIGIR data call, and Related Programs Appropriations Bill, 2010,”
4/13/2009; USTDA, response to SIGIR data call, 4/2/2009. 7/9/2009, p. 48.
56. DoS, Iraq Status Report, 10/1/2008. 80. OSD, response to SIGIR data call, 10/14/2009.
57. P.L. 109-13; P.L. 109-234; P.L. 109-289; P.L. 110-28; P.L. 81. OSD, responses to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2009 and 10/14/2009.
110-161; P.L. 110-252; P.L. 111-32. 82. OSD, response to SIGIR data call, 10/14/2009.
58. OSD, response to SIGIR data call, 9/30/2009. 83. DoD, “DoD Financial Management Regulation,” Vol. 12,
59. OSD, response to SIGIR data call, 10/13/2009. Ch. 27, Annex A.
Unexpended funds include expired appropriations. 84. IRMS, MNC-I Quarterly Report, 10/12/2009.
60. OSD, responses to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2009 and 10/13/2009. IRMS does not have data for the “Hero Payments”
61. OSD, response to SIGIR data call, 10/13/2009; CEFMS, or “Temporary Contract Guards for Critical
ISFF Execution Report, 10/2/2009. Infrastructure” project categories.
62. OSD, response to SIGIR data call, 10/13/2009. 85. OSD, response to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2009.
63. DoD, Fiscal Year 2010 Budget, “Military Personnel (M-1) 86. DoD OIG, response to SIGIR data call, 1/12/2009.
Operation and Maintenance Programs (O-1),” 7/2009, Obligation and expenditure data from IRMS does
p. 85; DoD, “National Defense Budget Estimates for FY not match the OSD quarterly expenditure report.
2010,” 6/2009, p. 19. House Appropriations Committee IRMS has been identified by DoD OIG and SIGIR
Report 111-230, “Department of Defense Appropriations as unreliable, but it is the only source available for
Bill, 2010,” 7/24/2009; Senate Appropriations Committee historical obligation and expenditure data by project
Report 111-74, “Department of Defense Appropriations category. OSD, response to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2009.
Bill, 2010,” 9/10/2009. OSD is only able to provide data from the current fiscal
64. OSD, response to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2009. year appropriation.
65. OSD, response to SIGIR data call, 10/13/2009. 87. House Appropriations Committee Report 111-230,
66. OSD, response to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2009. “Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2010,”
67. Senate Appropriations Committee Report 111-44, 7/24/2009, pp. 6-7, 349-350. The “thorough review of
“Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related CERP, its purpose, use and scope,” should include “a
Programs Appropriations Bill, 2010,” 7/9/2009, pp. review and explanation of the process by which CERP
9–10, 59. The Senate appropriations committee also budget requests are generated and justified; a review of
made allowances for Jordan and other countries in the the practice of obligating a significant amount of CERP
Middle East to receive more Foreign Military Financing funding in the last quarter of the fiscal year; a review
assistance for border security, “should the situation in of existing management and oversight of CERP funds
Iraq deteriorate significantly.” by the Department of the Army and CENTCOM that
68. MNSTC-I, “ITAM Defense Forces ISFF Program Review: includes an assessment of whether there are sufficient,
Investing in Regional Stability,” 8/2009. appropriately trained personnel to oversee this
69. OSD, response to SIGIR data call, 10/19/2009. program at both the department level and in the area of
70. DoS, response to SIGIR data call, 9/17/2009. operations,” as well as other requirements.

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 187

ENDNOTES

88. House Appropriations Committee Report 111-105, 105. Management comments provided by U.S. Embassy-
“Making Supplemental Appropriations for the Fiscal Year Baghdad on DoS OIG Audit MERO-A-09-10, “Embassy
Ending September 30, 2009, and for Other Purposes,” Baghdad’s Transition Planning for Reduced U.S. Military
5/12/2009. in Iraq,” 8/2009, p. 11.
89. Letter from Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Chairman, 106. Inspector General Stuart Bowen, letter to Ambassador
Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Hill and General Odierno, 8/18/2009.
9/14/2009. 107. DoS OIG Audit MERO-A-09-10, “Embassy Baghdad’s
90. DoD, “Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Request: Summary Transition Planning for Reduced U.S. Military in Iraq,”
Justification,” 5/2009, p. 5-19. 8/2009, p. 11.
91. In addition to the $354 million in unexpended CERP, 108. Christopher Hill, House Committee on Foreign Affairs
as of September 30, 2009, a portion of the $453 million Holds a Hearing on Iraq and U.S. Policy, 9/10/2009.
appropriated to the CERP by P.L. 111-32 will be allocated 109. DoS OIG ISP-I-09-30A, “Report of Inspection, Embassy
to Iraq. Baghdad, Iraq,” 8/2009, p. 6.
92. OSD, response to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2009. 110. OSD, response to SIGIR data call, 9/30/2009.
93. USAAA Audit Report A-2009-0119-ALL, 6/8/2009; 111. DoS OIG Audit MERO-A-09-10, “Embassy Baghdad’s
USAAA Audit Report A-2009-0169-ALL, 7/28/2009; Transition Planning for Reduced U.S. Military in Iraq,
USAAA Audit Report A-2009-0182-ALL, 8/18/2009; 8/2009, p. 1.
USAAA Audit Report A-2009-0235-ALL, 9/28/ 2009. 112. DoD, ASA (FM&C), Memorandum for the Deputy
USAAA performed work at four locations throughout Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction.
Iraq and issued separate reports (one in the third quarter 113. U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, response to SIGIR data call,
and the other three in the fourth quarter of FY 2009) on 10/4/2009.
the results of each site review. USAAA will incorporate 114. DoS OIG Audit MERO-A-09-10, “Embassy Baghdad’s
its overall audit results in a summary report that will Transition Planning for Reduced U.S. Military in Iraq,
be issued in FY 2010. The summary report will include 8/2009, p. 12.
the Army’s official position on the overall audit results, 115. DoD, “News Briefing with Robert Hale (Under
conclusions, and recommendations. None of the four Secretary of Defense Comptroller and Director, Force
site reports USAAA issued included an official Army Structure and Resources) and VADM Steve Stanley
position. (Joint Staff ),” 5/7/2009.
94. USAAA, response to SIGIR data call, 10/6/2009. 116. U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, OPA, response to SIGIR data
95. USAAA Audit A-2009-0169-ALL, “Audit of call, 10/2/2009.
Commander’s Emergency Response Program Multi- 117. DoS OIG Audit MERO-A-09-10, “Embassy Baghdad’s
National Division-North, 7/28/2009. Transition Planning for Reduced U.S. Military in Iraq,
96. USAAA, response to SIGIR data call, 10/6/2009; USAAA 8/2009, p. 6.
Audit A-2009-0169-ALL, “Audit of Commander’s 118. OSD, response to SIGIR data call, 9/30/2009.
Emergency Response Program Multi-National Division- 119. OSD, response to SIGIR data call, 9/30/2009.
North,” 7/28/2009. 120. OSD, response to SIGIR data call, 9/30/2009.
97. USAAA, response to SIGIR data call, 10/6/2009. 121. OSD, response to SIGIR data call, 9/30/2009.
98. USAAA Audit A-2009-0169-ALL, “Audit of 122. “Agreement Between the United States of America and the
Commander’s Emergency Response Program Multi- Republic of Iraq On the Withdrawal of U.S. Forces from
National Division-North,” 7/28/2009. Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities during Their
99. OSD, response to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2009. Temporary Presence in Iraq,” 11/17/2008, Section 4, par. 2.
100. MNC-I, response to SIGIR data call, 10/12/2009. 123. INL, response to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2009.
101. NEA-I, response to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2009. 124. OSD, response to SIGIR data call, 9/30/2009.
102. DoS OIG Audit MERO-A-09-10, “Embassy Baghdad’s 125. DoD, Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
Transition Planning for Reduced U.S. Military in Iraq,” for Program Support, “Contractor Support of U.S.
8/2009, pp. 31-32. Operations in USCENTCOM AOR, Iraq, and
103. DoS OIG Audit MERO-A-09-10, “Embassy Baghdad’s Afghanistan,” 8/2009.
Transition Planning for Reduced U.S. Military in Iraq,” 126. GAO Audit GAO-09-351, “Contingency Contract
8/2009, pp. 31-32. Management: DoD Needs to Develop and Finalize
104. NEA, response to SIGIR data call, 10/7/2009; DFAS, Background Screening and Other Standards for Private
response to SIGIR data call, 4/10/2009; DoS, response to Security Contractors,” 7/2009, p. 6.
SIGIR data call, 4/5/2007; Treasury, response to SIGIR 127. CRS, “Defense Logistical Support Contracts in Iraq and
data call, 4/2/2009; USAID, responses to SIGIR data Afghanistan: Issues for Congress,” 6/24/2009, p. 5.
calls, 4/13/2009 and 10/14/2009; USTDA, response to 128. JCC-I/A, response to SIGIR data call, 10/15/2009.
SIGIR data call, 4/2/2009; OSD, responses to SIGIR data 129. DoD, “Contractor Support of U.S. Operations in
call, 10/13/2009 and 10/14/2009; U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, USCENTCOM AOR, Iraq, and Afghanistan,” 8/2009.
responses to SIGIR data call, 7/6/2009, 7/16/2009, and 130. GAO Audit GAO-10-1, “DoD, State, and USAID Continue
10/3/2009; USACE, GRD, response to SIGIR data call, to Face Challenges in Tracking Contractor Personnel and
10/2/2009. ISFF data provided by OSD is preliminary Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan,” 10/2009, p. 1.
for the quarter ending September 30, 2009. OSD does 131. OSD-ADUSD, response to SIGIR data call, 10/13/2009.
not report CERP allocation, obligation, and expenditure 132. GAO Audit GAO-10-1, “DoD, State, and USAID
data for project categories on a quarterly basis for all Continue to Face Challenges in Tracking Contractor
fiscal year appropriations; CERP allocation, obligation, Personnel and Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan,”
and expenditure data is pulled from IRMS for project 10/2009, pp. 4, 6.
category analysis, and therefore top-line totals here may 133. GAO Audit GAO-10-1, “DoD, State, and USAID
not match values found in the Funding Uses subsection Continue to Face Challenges in Tracking Contractor
of this Report. U.S. Embassy-Baghdad did not provide Personnel and Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan,”
updated allocation, obligation, and expenditure data 10/2009, p. 11.
for the Democracy and Civil Society, Iraqi Refugees 134. GAO Audit GAO-10-1, “DoD, State, and USAID Continue
(Jordan), and Regime Crimes Liaison Office sectors; to Face Challenges in Tracking Contractor Personnel and
values for these sectors are carried over from the Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan,” 10/2009, p. 13.
previous quarter. 135. DoL, response to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2009.

188 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 ENDNOTES

136. GAO Audit GAO-10-1, “DoD, State, and USAID 163. OSD, response to SIGIR data call, 10/13/2009.
Continue to Face Challenges in Tracking Contractor 164. OSD, response to SIGIR data call, 9/30/2009.
Personnel and Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan,” 165. DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, 7/2009, p. 43.
10/2009, p. 17. 166. DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, 7/2009, p. 42.
137. OSD-ADUSD, response to SIGIR data call, 10/13/2009. 167. OSD, response to SIGIR data call, 9/30/2009.
138. DoD, FY 2010 Budget Request Summary Justification, 168. SIGIR PA-09-182, “Al Kasik Location Command, Al
“Overseas Contingency Operations,” 9/2009, p. 4. Kasik, Iraq,” 10/2009.
139. MNF-I, “As U.S. Meets Withdrawal Deadline, Baghdad 169. SIGIR PA-09-182, “Al Kasik Location Command, Al
Declares Holiday,” The Advisor, 8/2009, p. 3. Kasik, Iraq,” 10/2009.
140. United Nations Security Council, S/2009/393, “Report 170. MNF-I, “Brigades represent new Iraq mission,”
of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 6 of 9/11/2009; MNF-I, “Joint Headquarters Army Advisory
resolution 1830(2008),” 7/30/2009, p. 10. Training Team,” 8/2009.
141. DoS, Iraq Status Report, 8/19/2009, p. 18. 171. OSD, response to SIGIR data call, 9/30/2009.
142. Commander, MNF-I, testimony before the House Armed 172. U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, INL, response to SIGIR data call,
Services Committee, “The Status of Ongoing Efforts in 10/13/2009.
Iraq,” 9/30/2009, p. 6. 173. U.S. Justice Attaché, response to SIGIR data call,
143. Commander, MNF-I, testimony before the House Armed 10/3/2009.
Services Committee, “The Status of Ongoing Efforts in 174. SIGIR PA-09-177, “Renovate and Expand Chamchamal
Iraq,” 9/30/2009, p. 4. Correctional Facility, Chamchamal, Iraq,” 10/2009.
144. GOI, www.cabinet.iq, accessed 10/5/2009. 175. The Rusafa court was originally called CCC-I Rusafa.
145. DoD, “Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Request: Summary However, because of a slowdown in strictly CCC-I cases,
Justification,” 5/2009, p. 5–19. the Rusafa court is now designated as an investigative
146. OSD, response to SIGIR data call, 10/13/2009. ISFF data court (IC). Even so, the Rusafa court continues to handle
provided by OSD is preliminary for the quarter ending very serious terrorism cases.
September 30, 2009. Unexpended funds include expired 176. U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, INL, response to SIGIR data call,
appropriations. 10/15/2009.
147. CRS, “Iraq: Reconstruction Assistance,” 8/7/2009, p. 13. 177. U.S. Justice Attaché, response to SIGIR data call, 10/3/2009.
148. DFAS, response to SIGIR data call, 4/10/2009; DoS, 178. DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, 7/2009, p. 7.
responses to SIGIR data call, 4/5/2007 and 9/17/2009; 179. U.S. Justice Attaché, response to SIGIR data call, 10/3/2009.
IRMS, MNC-I Quarterly Report, 10/12/2009; NEA-I, 180. U.S. Justice Attaché, response to SIGIR data call, 10/3/2009.
response to SIGIR data call, 10/7/2009; OSD, response 181. U.S. Justice Attaché, response to SIGIR data call, 10/3/2009.
to SIGIR data call, 10/13/2009; U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, 182. SIGIR PA-08-166, “Secure Document Storage Facility,
response to SIGIR data call, 7/16/2009. ISFF data Baghdad, Iraq,” 10/2009.
provided by OSD is preliminary for the quarter 183. U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, INL, response to SIGIR data call,
ending September 30, 2009. OSD does not report 10/2/2009.
CERP allocation, obligation, and expenditure data 184. DoD press release, “Camp Bucca Detention Center
for project categories on a quarterly basis for all fiscal Closes in Iraq,” 9/17/2009.
year appropriations; CERP allocation, obligation, and 185. U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, INL, response to SIGIR data call,
expenditure data is pulled from IRMS; therefore, totals 10/2/2009.
may not match top-line values found in the Funding 186. DoS, Iraq Status Report, 9/2/2009, p. 20.
Sources subsection of this Report. U.S. Embassy-Baghdad 187. DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, 7/2009, p. 7.
did not provide updated allocation, obligation, and 188. DFAS, response to SIGIR data call, 4/10/2009; IRMS,
expenditure data for the Regime Crimes Liaison Office; MNC-I Quarterly Report, 10/12/2009; NEA-I, response
values are carried over from the previous quarter. to SIGIR data call, 10/7/2009; USACE, GRD, response to
149. Commander, MNF-I, testimony before the House Armed SIGIR data call, 10/2/2009; USAID, response to SIGIR
Services Committee, “The Status of Ongoing Efforts in data call, 4/13/2009. Data not audited. Numbers affected
Iraq,” 9/30/2009, p. 7, and MNF-I, response to SIGIR data by rounding. OSD does not report CERP allocation,
call, 9/30/2009. obligation, and expenditure data for project categories on
150. MNF-I, “MNC-I details latest drawdown plans,” a quarterly basis for all fiscal year appropriations; CERP
8/30/2009. allocation, obligation, and expenditure data is pulled from
151. DoS, Iraq Status Report, 9/2/2009, p. 19. IRMS; therefore, totals may not match top-line values
152. MNF-I, “Guidelines for Achieving Sustainable Stability,” found in the Funding Sources subsection of this Report.
5/3/2009. 189. DFAS, response to SIGIR data call, 4/10/2009; NEA,
153. DoS OIG, Performance Audit of Embassy Baghdad’s response to SIGIR data call, 10/7/2009; USACE GRD,
Transition Planning for a Reduced United States Military response to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2009. Data not audited.
Presence in Iraq, 8/2009, p. 17. Numbers affected by rounding.
154. GAO-09-351, “Contingency Contract Management: DoD 190. U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, Economics Section, response to
Needs to Develop and Finalize Background Screening and SIGIR data call, 10/15/2009.
Other Standards for Private Security Contractors,” 7/2009. 191. GOI, Council of Representatives, www.parliament.iq,
155. MNF-I, response to SIGIR data call, 10/15/2009. accessed on 10/1/2009.
156. MNF-I, response to SIGIR data call, 10/13/2009. 192. DoS, Iraq Status Report, 8/12/2009, slide 9.
157. Commander, MNF-I, testimony before the House Armed 193. Remarks by the KRG Minister of Natural Resources,
Services Committee, “The Status of Ongoing Efforts in October 9, 2009, http://www.krg.org/articles/detail.as
Iraq,” 9/30/2009, p. 5. p?lngnr=12&smap=02010100&rnr=223&anr=31849,
158. DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, 7/2009, p. 40. accessed 10/15/2009.
159. Commander, MNF-I, testimony before the House Armed 194. DoS, Iraq Status Report, 10/14/2009, slide 13. U.S.
Services Committee, “The Status of Ongoing Efforts in Embassy-Baghdad, Economics Section, response to
Iraq,” 9/30/2009, p. 3. SIGIR data call 10/15/2009. The third-quarter crude
160. OSD, response to SIGIR data call, 9/30/2009. oil production average for Iraq does not include oil
161. DoD, News Briefing from Iraq, MNC-I Commanding production from the Kurdistan Region.
General Charles Jacoby, 9/10/2009. 195. 3% calculation based on data provided by NEA-I
162. DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, 7/2009, p. v. responses to SIGIR data call, 7/2/2009 and 10/14/2009.

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 189

ENDNOTES

196. DoS, NEA-I, response to SIGIR data call, 9/14/2009. 222. DoS, Iraq Status Report, 8/26/2009, slide 10.
197. ITAO, Monthly Import, Production and Export Spreadsheet, 223. U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, Economics Section, response to
1/2008. U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, response to SIGIR data SIGIR data call, 10/15/2009.
call, 10/2/2008. NEA-I, Iraq Status Report, 5/27/2009. 224. MEES, Weekly Report, Vol. LII, No. 36, 9/7/2009, p. 1;
198. DoS, Iraq Status Report, 10/14/2009, slide 13. U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, Economics Section, response to
199. DoS, NEA-I, response to SIGIR data call, 9/14/2009. SIGIR data call, 10/15/2009.
Crude oil export numbers do not include crude oil 225. Remarks by the KRG Minister of Natural Resources,
exports from the Kurdistan Region. 10/9/2009, http://www.krg.org/articles/detail.asp?lngn
200. ITAO, Monthly Import, Production and Export Spreadsheet, r=12&smap=02010100&rnr=223&anr=31849, accessed
1/2008. U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, response to SIGIR data 10/15/2009.
call, 10/2/2008. DoS, Iraq Status Report, 5/27/2009. 226. Speech of the KRG Prime Minister at the opening of the
201. DoS, Iraq Status Report, 7/1/2009, p. 11. IEA characterizes Khurmala Dome oil project, 7/19/2009; KAR Group,
Iraq’s target of 6 MBPD by 2017 as overly optimistic and http://www.kargroup.net/refinery.html, accessed
forecasts that Iraq’s oil production could drop to 2.23 MBPD 10/20/2009.
by 2010–2011, before increasing to 2.7 MBPD by 2014. 227. Speech of the KRG Prime Minister at the opening of
202. DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, 6/2009, the Khurmala Dome oil project, 7/19/2009. Although
page 16. reports vary, the KAR Group states that its Erbil refinery
203. DoS, Iraq Status Report, 6/10, 2009, slide #9. is the first privately owned refinery in Iraq, http://www.
204. MEES, Weekly Report, Vol. LII, No. 33, 8/17/2009. kargroup.net/refinery.html, accessed 10/16/2009.
205. MEES, Weekly Report, Vol. LII, No. 33, 8/17/2009. 228. DoS, NEA-I, response to SIGIR data call, 10/15/2009.
206. U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, Economics Section, response to 229. Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani, speech, 7/18/2009,
SIGIR data call, 10/15/2009. MEES, Weekly Report, Vol. www.krg.org/articles, accessed 10/2/2009; U.S. Embassy-
LII, No. 40, 10/5/2009, p. 3. SOMO has the remaining Baghdad, Economics Section, response to SIGIR data
25% stake in the Rumaila deal. call, 10/15/2009.
207. U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, Economics Section, response to 230. U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, Economics Section, response to
SIGIR data call, 10/15/2009. MEES, Weekly Report, Vol. SIGIR data call, 10/15/2009.
LII, No. 40, 10/5/2009, p. 3. SOMO has the remaining 231. MNSTC-I/ITAM, response to SIGIR data call, 9/30/2009.
25% stake in the Rumaila deal. 232. MNC-I, response to SIGIR data call, 9/30/2009.
208. DoS, Iraq Status Report, 9/2/2009, p. 9. U.S. Embassy- 233. ITAO/ESD, response to SIGIR data call, 9/30/2009.
Baghdad, Economics Section, response to SIGIR data 234. U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, response to SIGIR data call,
call, 10/15/2009. 4/2/2009; NEA-I, response to SIGIR data call, 4/14/2009;
209. U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, Economics Section, response to U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, response to SIGIR data call,
SIGIR data call, 10/15/2009. MEES, Weekly Review, Vol. 7/6/2009.
LII, No. 35, 9/31/2009, p. 2. 235. SIGIR PA-08-137, 7/24/2008.
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211. Eni SpA., press release, “Eni awarded the license for the 238. DoS, Iraq Status Report, 7/29/2009, slide 13.
Zubair giant field in Iraq,” 10/13/2009, http://www.eni.it/ 239. DoS, NEA-I, response to SIGIR data call, 10/15/2009.
en_IT/media/press-releases/2009/10/2009-10-13-zubair- 240. U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, Economic Section, response
field.shtml, accessed 10/15/2009. to SIGIR data call, 10/15/2009. “Heads of Agreement”
212. Eni SpA., press release, “Eni awarded the license for the is the term given to a non-binding document outlining
Zubair giant field in Iraq,” 10/13/2009, http://www.eni.it/ the main issues relevant to a tentative partnership
en_IT/media/press-releases/2009/10/2009-10-13-zubair- agreement.
field.shtml, accessed 10/15/2009. 241. U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, Economics Section, response to
213. U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, response to SIGIR data call, SIGIR data call, 10/15/2009.
10/3/2009. 242. DoS, Iraq Status Report, 8/26/2009, slide 11; U.S.
214. Letter from the KRG Minister of Natural Resources Embassy-Baghdad, Economics Section, response to
to the Directors, DNO Iraq, 10/5/2009, http://hugin. SIGIR data call, 10/15/2009; MEES, Weekly Report, Vol.
info/36/R/1345858/323142.pdf on 10/6/2009. “Over the LII, No. 38, 9/21/2009
last few months, the Region has demonstrated (with 243. GOI, Ministry of Oil Spokesman, 9/24/2009, www.
DNO’s help) that the Region can easily export 100,000 parliament.iq, accessed 10/16/2009. The spokesman said
barrels of oil per day and that this can be doubled in a that Iraq could miss the one-year deadline, which “can be
very short period of time.” extended.”
215. DoS, NEA-I, response to SIGIR data call, 10/15/2009. 244. DoS, Iraq Status Report, 9/9/2009, slide 10.
216. MEES, Research Special Report, 8/31/2009, page 8. 245. DFAS, response to SIGIR data call, 4/10/2009; IRMS,
217. U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, Economics Section, response to MNC-I Quarterly Report, 10/12/2009; NEA-I, response
SIGIR data call, 10/15/2009. to SIGIR data call, 10/7/2009; USACE, GRD, response
218. Remarks by the KRG Minister of Natural Resources, to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2009. Data not audited.
10/9/2009, http://www.krg.org/articles/detail.asp?lngn Numbers affected by rounding. OSD does not report
r=12&smap=02010100&rnr=223&anr=31849, accessed CERP allocation, obligation, and expenditure data
10/15/2009. for project categories on a quarterly basis for all fiscal
219. GOI, Council of Representatives, statement of the year appropriations; CERP allocation, obligation, and
chairman of the parliamentary oil and gas committee, expenditure data is pulled from IRMS; therefore, totals
10/1/2009, www.parliament.iq, accessed 10/16/2009. may not match top-line values found in the Funding
220. Business Intelligence Middle East, 9/9/2009, http:// Sources subsection of this Report.
www.bi-me.com/main.php?id=40114&t=1&c=17&cg= 246. ITAO/ESD, Electric Daily Performance Reports, 7/1/2007–
2&mset=, accessed 9/9/2009; DoS, Iraq Status Report, 9/30/2009.
8/26/2009, p. 12. 247. ITAO/ESD, Electric Daily Performance Reports, 7/1/2007–
221. Addax Petroleum press release, “Sinopec International 9/30/2009.
Acquires 100% of Addax Petroleum Corporation Shares,” 248. ITAO/ESD, Electric Daily Performance Reports, 7/1/2007–
10/5/2009, www.addaxpetroleum.com/press_room/162, 9/30/2009.
accessed on 10/6/2009. 249. IRMS, Global Benchmark, 10/9/2009.

190 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 ENDNOTES

250. ITAO/ESD, Electric Daily Performance Reports, 7/1/2007– 274. U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, response to SIGIR data call,
9/30/2009. 10/4/2009.
251. KRG Ministry of Electricity, “Review on Power Generation 275. ITAO/ESD, Electric Daily Performance Reports,
in Iraq Kurdistan Region,” 2/26/2009, pp. 18, 24–25; 7/1/2009–9/30/2009.
International Crisis Group, “Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble 276. ITAO, Essential Indicators Report, 9/26/2009, slide 4; U.S.
Along The Trigger Line,” Middle East Report N°88, Embassy-Baghdad, response to SIGIR data call, 10/4/2009.
7/8/2009, p. 22; RTI International, "Kurdistan Region 277. ITAO/ESD, Electric Daily Performance Reports, 7/1/2007–
Economic Development Assessment,” produced for USAID 9/30/2009.
under Local Governance Project, 12/2008, p. 53. Note: 278. DoS, Iraq Status Report, 7/8/2009, slide 14.
The Erbil Gas plant is also known as Pir Daud, and the 279. MNSTC-I, news release, “Alternative Energy Powers
Sulaymaniyah plant is also known as Chamchamal. Remote Iraq Border Checkpoints,” 10/10/2009, http://
252. ITAO/ESD, Electric Daily Performance Reports, www.cjtf7.army.mil/index.php?option=com_content&
7/1/2009–9/30/2009. task=view&id=27523&Itemid=225, accessed 8/12/2009;
253. IRMS, Global Benchmark, 9/16/2009. GRD, Weekly SITREP, 8/7/2009.
254. ITAO/ESD, Electric Daily Performance Reports, 280. MNF-I, “Solar energy powers Baghdad clinic,” 9/20/2009,
7/1/2009–9/30/2009. http://www.mnf-iraq.com/index.php?option=com_content
255. Hassan Hafidh, Dow Jones Newswires, “Pvt Kurdish &task=view&id=27983&Itemid=128, accessed 10/10/2009.
Grp Gets $480M Pwr Plant Contract In Iraq,” 7/28/2009, 281. USACE GRD, response to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2009.
http://www.zawya.com/printstory.cfm?storyid=ZW2009 282. USACE GRD, response to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2009.
0728000006&l=041302090728, accessed 8/22/2009. 283. UNESCO, “Water shortage fueling displacement of people
256. U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, response to SIGIR data call, in northern Iraq, UNESCO study finds,” 10/2009, portal.
10/4/2009. unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=46631&URL_DO=DO_
257. ITAO/ESD, Electric Daily Performance Reports, TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html, accessed 10/16/2009.
7/1/2009–9/30/2009. 284. IRMS, MNC-I Quarterly Report, 10/12/2009; NEA-I,
258. ITAO/ESD, Electric Daily Performance Reports, response to SIGIR data call, 10/7/2009; USACE GRD,
7/1/2009–9/30/2009. response to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2009. Data not audited.
259. SIGIR analysis based on data reported in ITAO/ESD, Numbers affected by rounding. OSD does not report
Electric Daily Performance Reports, 7/1/2007–9/30/2009. CERP allocation, obligation, and expenditure data
260. DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, 6/2009, p. 18. for project categories on a quarterly basis for all fiscal
261. DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, 6/2009, p. 60. year appropriations; CERP allocation, obligation, and
262. OPA, PRT Weekly Summary, 020809–080809, pp. 11–12. expenditure data is pulled from IRMS; therefore, totals
263. Parsons Brinckerhoff, Private Generation Integration may not match top-line values found in the Funding
Study: Final Report on the Survey of Private Generation in Sources subsection of this Report.
the Baghdad Governorate, 7/2009. 285. GRD, Cumulative Reconstruction Fact Sheet, 10/1/2009.
264. Calculation assumes an average of 6.4 people per 286. U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, ITAO, response to SIGIR data
household, which is reported in The New England Journal call, 10/12/2009.
of Medicine, “Violence-Related Mortality in Iraq from 287. GOI, Ministry of Water Resources, www.mowr.gov.iq/
2002 to 2006,” 1/31/2008, http://content.nejm.org/cgi/ english, accessed 9/15/2009.
content/full/358/5/484, accessed 10/10/2009. 288. DoS, Iraq Status Report, 9/9/2009, slide 18.
265. Parsons Brinckerhoff, Private Generation Integration 289. GOI, Ministry of Water Resources, www.mowr.gov.iq/
Study: Final Report on the Survey of Private Generation in english, accessed 9/15/2009.
the Baghdad Governorate, 7/2009. 290. GRD, Cumulative Reconstruction Fact Sheet, 10/1/2009.
266. MOI, General Directorate for Gas Power Plants 291. GRD, response to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2009.
Projects, http://www.gppproject.com, accessed 292. GRD, “GRD brings clean water to Wassit province,”
9/15/2009; GE press release, “Government of Iraq 9/3/2009, www.grd.usace.army.mil/news/releases/NR09-
Signs Power Generation Agreement with GE Energy 09-03.pdf, accessed 10/15/2009; GRD, response to SIGIR
Valued at Approximately $3 Billion,” 12/16/2008, data call, 10/15/2009.
http://www.gepower.com/about/press/en/2008_ 293. GRD, “GRD builds new facilities for Iraqi Army,”
press/121608.htm, accessed 9/15/2009; Siemens press 9/13/2009, www.grd.usace.army.mil/news/releases/
release, “Power for Iraq—Siemens Supplies Key NR09-09-13.pdf, accessed 10/15/2009; GRD, response to
Components for Gas Power Plants—Order Volume SIGIR data call, 10/15/2009.
Approximately EUR1.5Billion,” 12/22/2009, http:// 294. MNF-I, “Sun purifies water in remote region,” 9/7/2009.
w1.siemens.com/press/en/pressrelease/index.php?bus 295. MNF-I, “Soldiers Work with Iraqi Army Partners to
iness%2Cfi nance=0&business%2Cfi nance=1&trade= Purify Baghdad Water,” 8/16/2009.
0&trade=1&public=0&public=1&date-1-dd=01&date- 296. GRD, response to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2009.
1-mm=11&date-1=2008&date-2-dd=10&date-2- 297. GRD, response to SIGIR data call, 10/15/2009.
mm=09&date-2=2009&division=&search=Iraq, 298. IRMS, MNC-I Quarterly Report, 10/12/2009; NEA-I,
accessed 9/10/2009. response to SIGIR data call, 10/7/2009; USACE, GRD,
267. DoS, Iraq Status Reports, 8/5/2009, slide 13; 8/12/2009, response to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2009. Data not audited.
slide 11. Numbers affected by rounding. OSD does not report
268. U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, response to SIGIR data call, CERP allocation, obligation, and expenditure data
10/4/2009. for project categories on a quarterly basis for all fiscal
269. MOI, General Directorate for Gas Power Plants Projects, year appropriations; CERP allocation, obligation, and
http://www.gppproject.com, accessed 10/10/2009. expenditure data is pulled from IRMS, and therefore
270. U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, response to SIGIR data call, totals may not match top-line values found in the
10/4/2009. Funding Sources subsection of this Report.
271. MOI, General Directorate for Gas Power Plants Projects, 299. GRD, Cumulative Reconstruction Fact Sheet, 10/1/2009.
http://www.gppproject.com, accessed 10/10/2009. 300. MNF-I, “Basrah Oil Terminal Key to Iraqi Economy,”
272. ITAO/ESD, Electric Daily Performance Reports, 7/1/2007– 9/10/2009.
9/30/2009. 301. GOI, Ministry of Transportation, http://www.motrans.
273. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Reports to the United gov.iq/english/index.php?name=News&file=article&s
States Congress, 7/30/2009. id=19, 10/05/2009, accessed 10/05/2009.

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 191

ENDNOTES

302. GRD, Cumulative Reconstruction Fact Sheet, 10/1/2009. 331. UNAMI, “Preparations for 2010 CoR Elections Intensify
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307. GRD, Cumulative Reconstruction Fact Sheet, 10/1/2009. 10/11/2009, www.uniraq.org/newsroom/getarticle.
308. MNF-I, “Iraqi Aviation Authority ready to handle asp?ArticleID=1146, accessed, 10/14/2009.
Baghdad commercial air traffic,” 8/24/2009. 333. USAID, response to SIGIR data call, 10/14/2009.
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call, 10/4/2009; MNF-I, response to SIGIR data call, 335. U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, response to SIGIR data call,
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“Remarks by the Vice President at a Joint Statement 343. MNF-I, “New face of Iraqi justice: Iraqi leaders
to the Press with President of the Kurdistan Regional committed to human rights, fair treatment,” 10/7/2009,
Government Massoud Barzani,” 9/17/2009, www. www.cjtf7.army.mil/index.php?option=com_content&ta
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MNC-I Quarterly Report, 10/12/2009; NEA-I, response SIGIR data call, 10/3/2009.
to SIGIR data call, 10/7/2009; U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, 346. World Health Organization, www.emro.who.int/
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data call, 10/2/2009; USAID, response to SIGIR data emrinfo/index.asp?Ctry=saa, accessed 10/13/2009.
call, 4/13/2009. Data not audited. Numbers affected 348. World Health Organization, www.emro.who.int/
by rounding. OSD does not report CERP allocation, emrinfo/index.asp?Ctry=jor, accessed 10/13/2009.
obligation, and expenditure data for project categories 349. GRD, Cumulative Reconstruction Fact Sheet, 10/1/2009.
on a quarterly basis for all fiscal year appropriations; 350. Deputy Chief of Mission for Transition, meeting with
CERP allocation, obligation, and expenditure data is SIGIR staff, 8/13/2009.
pulled from IRMS, and therefore totals may not match 351. SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Report to the United
top-line values found in the Funding Sources subsection States Congress, 7/30/2009, pp. 99-100.
of this Report. U.S. Embassy-Baghdad did not provide 352. U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, Health Attaché, response to
updated allocation, obligation, and expenditure data SIGIR data call, 10/15/2009.
for the Democracy and Civil Society and Iraqi Refugees 353. GRD, Weekly Situation Report, 8/21/2009, slide 13.
(Jordan) sectors; values for these sectors are carried over 354. GRD, Weekly Situation Report, 8/21/2009, slide 16.
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192 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 ENDNOTES

367. UNHCR, “Iraq humanitarian effort needs ongoing 392. U.S. Treasury, response to SIGIR data call, 4/2/2009.
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194 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 ENDNOTES

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642. OCHA, Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit, PRT Weekly Summary, 020809–080809, p. 21.
Qadissiya Governorate Profile, 7/2009. 699. OPA, PRT response to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2009.
643. OPA, PRT response to SIGIR data call, 10/3/2009. 700. OPA, PRT Weekly Summary, 260709–010809, p. 21.
644. OPA, PRT response to SIGIR data call, 10/3/2009. 701. OPA, PRT response to SIGIR data call, 10/3/2009.
645. OPA, PRT response to SIGIR data call, 10/3/2009. 702. OPA, PRT Weekly Summary, 260709–010809, p. 19.
646. OSD, Brigade Commander response to SIGIR data call, 703. USAID, response to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2009.
9/30/2009. 704. OPA, PRT response to SIGIR data call, 10/3/2009.

196 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 ENDNOTES

705. OPA, PRT Weekly Summary, 300809–050909, pp. 15-16. 742. A fastener system for securing a reinforcing beam or the
706. OPA, PRT Weekly Summary, 160809–220809, p. 16. like to a poured concrete structural member includes
707. OPA, PRT Weekly Summary, 090809–150809, p. 18. an anchor to be set in poured concrete with an exposed
708. OPA, PRT Weekly Summary, 090809–150809, p. 18. handle portion free of said concrete and also includes a
709. OPA, PRT response to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2009. shaft with a slotted end for receiving the handle portion.
710. OPA, PRT Weekly Summary, 160809–220809, p. 16. 743. Formerly known as the Abu Ghraib Prison.
711. OPA, PRT Weekly Summary, 160809–220809, p. 16. 744. A parapet is a wall-like barrier at the edge of a roof,
712. OPA, PRT Weekly Summary, 190709–250709, p. 15. terrace, balcony, or other structure.
713. OPA, PRT Weekly Summary, 190709–250709, p. 15. 745. Pallet racking is a material-handling storage system
714. OPA, PRT response to SIGIR data call, 10/3/2009. designed to store materials on pallets.
715. OPA, PRT response to SIGIR data call, 10/3/2009. 746. A raft foundation is a foundation consisting of an
716. OPA, PRT Weekly Summary, 190709–250709, p. 21. extended layer of reinforced concrete.
717. OPA, PRT Weekly Summary, 300809–050909, p. 20.
718. OPA, PRT response to SIGIR data call, 10/3/2009,
719. USAID, response to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2009.
720. OPA, PRT response to SIGIR data call, 10/3/2009.
721.
722.
OPA, PRT response to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2009.
SIGIR, meeting with DCM for Assistance Transition,
Sources for Provincial
8/13/2009; SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Report to the
United States Congress, 7/30/2009; U.S. Embassy-Baghdad,
Health Attaché, response to SIGIR data call, 10/15/2009;
Portrait Graphics
OPA, PRT response to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2009. Security Maps: The security maps were creating using SIGIR’s
723. OPA, PRT response to SIGIR data call, 10/15/2009. analysis of open sources as well as official English and Arabic
724. OPA, PRT response to SIGIR data call, 10/3/2009. documents, studies, maps, and satellite imagery.
725. OPA, PRT Weekly Summary, 230809–290809, pp. 19–20.
726. OCHA, Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit Infrastructure Tables: Information used for infrastructure
Missan Governorate Profile, 7/2009. spending tables is based on IRMS data, which is not fully
727. PIC, “Investment Opportunities Proposed by the PIC,” accurate, complete, or audited. Project totals therefore do not
www.nic.gov.iq, accessed 9/17/2009. reconcile with top-line obligations and expenditures provided
728. OPA, PRT Weekly Summary, 260709–010809, p. 23. by the agencies. Individual sector totals may not reconcile with
729. OPA, PRT response to SIGIR data call, 10/3/2009. totals due to rounding errors.
730. OPA, PRT response to SIGIR data call, 10/3/2009.
731. OPA, PRT Weekly Summary, 280609–040709, p. 15.
732. OPA, PRT response to SIGIR data call, 10/2/2009.
733. OPA, PRT response to SIGIR data call, 10/3/2009.
734.
735.
736.
OPA, PRT response to SIGIR data call, 10/3/2009.
OPA, PRT response to SIGIR data call, 10/3/2009.
GRD, response to data call, 10/3/2009.
Sources for
737. OCHA, Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit,
Basrah Governorate Profile, 7/2009; OPA, PRT Weekly
Information Provided
738.
Summary, 050709–110709, p. 14.
The IHT, initially referred to as the “Iraqi Special Tribunal,”
on the Insert to This
was established by order of the Coalition Provisional
Authority in December 2003. Because the tribunal’s
creation involved the introduction of international crimes
Report
into Iraqi law, many legal experts questioned the validity
of the tribunal’s establishment. The tribunal was re- Note: Details of all events scheduled to occur after October 2009
established under Iraqi law and renamed in October 2005. are subject to change. Fund allocations for the FY 2010 appropria-
The tribunal has jurisdiction over Iraqis and Iraqi residents tion are taken from House and Senate conference reports.
alleged to have committed genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and violations of certain Iraqi laws Sources for Timeline of U.S. Reconstruction Management
between July 17, 1968, and May 1, 2003. in the Transition: House Appropriations Committee Report
739. The word “moment” in the term “moment frame” 111-230, “Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2010,”
refers to the moment of inertia placed on a building by 7/24/2009, pp. 6–7, 349–350; DoD, Measuring Stability and
wind or earthquake conditions. A building faces two Security in Iraq, 12/31/2008; OSD, responses to SIGIR data
primary types of inertia. One is outer inertia caused by calls, 4/2/2009, 7/1/2009, and 9/30/2009; Commander, MNF-I,
wind pressure—the same pressure applied to a person testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, “The
standing in a strong wind. Inner inertia, like that from an Status of Ongoing Efforts in Iraq,” 9/30/2009; GRD, “Cu-
earthquake, comes from the ground up. A person would mulative Reconstruction Fact Sheet,” www.grd.usace.army.
feel similar inertia when standing on a train that takes mil, data as of 9/1/2009; GRD, response to SIGIR data call,
off quickly—shaken from the feet up. And, importantly 10/15/2009; U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, cable 2694, 10/7/2009;
in Iraq, moment would also occur in a lateral explosion U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, responses to SIGIR data call,
against a structure. 10/3/2009, 10/4/2009, 10/6/2009, and 10/14/2009; DoS OIG
740. A moment frame is a box-shaped frame with special Audit MERO-A-09-10, “Embassy Baghdad’s Transition Plan-
moment connections or joints that help in the resistance of ning for Reduced Military in Iraq,” 8/2009, pp. 1–22; Inspector
wind and earthquake damage. The frame helps a building General Stuart Bowen, letter to U.S. Chief of Mission, U.S.
to flex as necessary to remain the building’s integrity. Embassy-Iraq, and Commanding General, MNF-I, 8/18/2009;
741. The weight of everything superimposed on, or SIGIR, Quarterly and Semiannual Reports to the United States
temporarily attached to, a structure (people, machinery Congress, 1/2009–7/2009.
and equipment, furniture, appliances, etc.) but not that
of the material utilized in its construction or of anything Sources for Timeline of U.S. Budget Process: DoD, “Fis-
permanently attached to it. cal Year 2010 Budget Request: Summary Justification,”

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 197

ENDNOTES

5/2009, p. 5–19; DoS, “Congressional Budget Justifica- Sources for Information on the Government of Iraq: U.S.
tion for Fiscal Year 2010,” 5/2009, Summary Tables, p. 20; Treasury, responses to SIGIR data call, 4/9/2009, 10/3/2009,
H.R. 3081, “Department of State, Foreign Operations, and and 10/14/2009; GOI, Cabinet of Ministers, www.cabinet.
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2010,” 7/9/2009; iq, accessed 10/14/2009; NEA-I, response to SIGIR data call,
H.R. 3326, “Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 4/2/2009; IRFFI, “Donor Commitments to the World Bank
2010,” 10/6/2009; House Appropriations Committee Report Iraq Trust Fund and United Nations Development Group
111-230, “Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2010,” Iraq Trust Fund,” 8/31/2009; IRFFI, “Final Statement of IRFFI
7/24/2009, pp. 6, 349; House Appropriations Committee Donor Committee Meeting,” Naples, Italy, 2/18/2009; MOI,
Report 111-105, “Making Supplemental Appropriations for General Directorate for Gas Power Plants Projects, http://www.
the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2009, and for Other gppproject.com, accessed 9/15/2009; GE press release, “Gov-
Purposes,” 5/12/2009; House Appropriations Committee ernment of Iraq Signs Power Generation Agreement with GE
Report 111-187, “State, Foreign Operations, and Related Energy Valued at Approximately $3 Billion,” 12/16/2008, http://
Programs Appropriations Bill, 2010,” 6/26/2009, pp. 59, 75, www.gepower.com/about/press/en/2008_press/121608.htm,
94; S. 1434, “Department of State, Foreign Operations, and accessed 9/15/2009; Siemens press release, “Power for Iraq—
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2010,” 7/9/2009; Sen- Siemens Supplies Key Components for Gas Power Plants—
ate Appropriations Committee Report 111-44, “Department Order Volume Approximately EUR1.5Billion,” 12/22/2009,
of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Ap- http://w1.siemens.com/press/en/pressrelease/index.
propriations Bill, 2010,” 7/9/2009, pp. 9–10, 48, 57, 59; Senate php?business%2Cfinance=0&business%2Cfinance=1&trade-
Appropriations Committee Report 111-74, “Department of =0&trade=1&public=0&public=1&date-1-dd=01&date-1-
Defense Appropriations Bill, 2010,” 9/10/2009, p. 244; Letter mm=11&date-1=2008&date-2-dd=10&date-2-mm=09&date-
from Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Chairman, Com- 2=2009&division=&search=Iraq, accessed 9/10/2009; MOI,
mittee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 9/14/2009; General Directorate for Gas Power Plants Projects, http://www.
MNSTC-I, “ITAM Defense Forces ISFF Program Review: gppproject.com, accessed 10/10/2009; U.S. Embassy-Baghdad,
Investing in Regional Stability,” 8/2009; OSD, responses to response to SIGIR data call, 10/4/2009; SIGIR analysis of open
SIGIR data call, 10/2/2009 and 10/19/2009. source and official documents.

198 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS

ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS

This section contains all of the abbreviations and acronyms found in this Report.

Acronym Definition
AAB Advise and Assist Brigade
AAO Adder Area Office
ABOT Al Basrah Oil Terminal
ACCO Anti-Corruption Coordination Office
ACOB Armed Contractor Oversight Branch
AFCEE Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment
AIG Association of Inspectors General (also Assistant Inspector General)
BAO Basrah Area Office
BCH Basrah Children’s Hospital
BCT Brigade Combat Team
BDOP Business Development and Outreach Program
BPA Blanket Purchase Agreement
CCC-I Central Criminal Court of Iraq
CEFMS Corps of Engineers Financial Management System
CENTCOM U.S. Central Command
CERP Commander’s Emergency Response Program
CID Criminal Investigation Division
CID-MPFU U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command-Major Procurement Fraud Unit
CMC Communications Media Commission
CMM Capability Maturity Model
COFE Committee of Financial Experts
COI Commission on Integrity (previously known as Commission on Public Integrity)
CoM Council of Ministers
CoMSec Council of Ministers Secretariat
CONOC Contractor Operations Cells
CoR Council of Representatives
COSIT Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology
CPA Coalition Provisional Authority
CPA-SC CPA South Central Region
CPJ Committee to Protect Journalists
DCAA Defense Contract Audit Agency
DCIS Defense Criminal Investigative Service
DCM Deputy Chief of Mission
DCMA Defense Contract Management Agency

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 199

ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS

Acronym Definition
DFAS Defense Finance and Accounting Service
DFI Development Fund for Iraq
DoD Department of Defense
DoD OIG Department of Defense Office of Inspector General
DOI Daughters of Iraq
DoS Department of State
DoS OIG Department of State Office of Inspector General
DRL Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor
EDMS Electronic Document Management System
EG II Economic Governance II
EGP EGP Business Solutions Inc.
ePRT Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team
ESF Economic Support Fund
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCC Freedom Consulting and Catering Co.
FMS Foreign Military Sales
FPS Facilities Protection Service
FY Fiscal Year
GAO Government Accountability Office
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GEO Governorate Electoral Office
GMASS Global Maintenance and Supply Services
GOI Government of Iraq
GRC Gulf Region Division-Central District
GRD Gulf Region Division
GRN Gulf Region-North District
GRS Gulf Region South
HHS U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
HJC Higher Judicial Council
IA Iraqi Army
IAMB International Advisory and Monitoring Board
IBC International Building Code
ICAA Iraqi Civil Aviation Authority
ICBG Iraq Company for Bank Guarantees
ICCM Iraq Community-Based Conflict Mitigation
ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement
I-CERP Iraq-Commander’s Emergency Response Program
ICF-SME Iraqi Company for SME Finance Ltd.
ICI International Compact with Iraq
ICITAP International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program
ICS Iraqi Correctional Service
Continued on next page

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 ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS

Acronym Definition
IDP Internally Displaced Person
IEAT International Electoral Assistance Team
IED Improvised Explosive Device
IFES International Foundation for Electoral Systems
IFMIS Iraq Financial Management Information System
IG Inspector General
IHEC Independent High Electoral Commission
IIGC Iraq Inspectors General Council
IJ Investigative Judge
IJU Iraqi Jurist Union
IMF International Monetary Fund
INCLE International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement Fund
INL Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (DoS)
IOM International Organization for Migration
IRAP Iraq Rapid Assistance Program
IRFFI International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq
IRI International Republican Institute
IRMS Iraq Reconstruction Management System
IRRF Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund
IRRF 1 Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund
IRRF 2 Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund
IRS Internal Revenue Service
ISAM Iraq Security Assistance Mission
ISCI Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq
ISF Iraqi Security Forces
ISFF Iraq Security Forces Fund
IT Information Technology
ITAM Iraq Training and Advisory Mission
ITAO Iraq Transition Assistance Office
ITPC Iraqi Telecommunications and Postal Company
IWPR Institute for War and Peace Reporting
JCC-I/A Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan
JCCS Joint Contingency Contracting System
JEDI Judicial Education and Development Institute
JIC Joint Investigative Committee
KDP Kurdistan Democratic Party
km Kilometer
KRG Kurdistan Regional Government
LAOTF Law and Order Task Force
LC Location Command
LCCP Legislative Coordination Committee Program

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 201

ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS

Acronym Definition
LGP Local Governance Program
LNO Line of Operation
LOGCAP Logistics Civil Augmentation Program
LPG Liquefied Petroleum Gas
MBPD Million Barrels Per Day
MCD Ministerial Capacity Development
MCTF Major Crimes Task Force
MNC-I Multi-National Corps-Iraq
MNF-I Multi-National Force-Iraq
MNSTC-I Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq
MOC Ministry of Communications
MOD Ministry of Defense
MODM Ministry of Displacement and Migration
MOE Ministry of Electricity
MOF Ministry of Finance
MOH Ministry of Health
MOI Ministry of Interior
MOJ Ministry of Justice
MOT Ministry of Transportation
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
MoWR Ministry of Water Resources
MSH Missan Surgical Hospital
MW Megawatt
MWh Megawatt-hour
NACB National Anticorruption Board
NCD National Capacity Development
NEA-I Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs-Iraq (DoS)
NGO Non-governmental Organization
OCO Overseas Contingency Operations
OPA Office of Provincial Affairs
P.L. Public Law
PC Provincial Council
PDS Public Distribution System
PEZ Pipeline Exclusion Zone
PFB Procurement Fraud Branch
PHC Primary Healthcare Center
PRDC Provincial Reconstruction Development Council
PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSC Private Security Contractor
PSD Personal Security Detail
PUK Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
Continued on next page

202 I SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

 ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS

Acronym Definition
QA Quality Assurance
QC Quality Control
QRF Quick Response Fund
R&S Reconstruction and Stabilization
RoL Rule of Law
RoLC Rule of Law Coordinator
RoLSAP Rule of Law Strategic Action Plan
RORO Roll-On/Roll-Off
RRT Regional Reconstruction Team
RTI Research Triangle Institute International
SET Security Escort Team
SIGAR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
SIGIR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
SIV Special Immigrant Visa
SME Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprise
SOI Sons of Iraq
SOW Statement of Work
SPOT Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker
SRSG Specific Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Iraq
TGA Total Government Allegiance
TNMD Taji National Maintenance Depot
Treasury U.S. Department of Treasury
UCMJ Uniform Code of Military Justice
UN United Nations
UNAMI UN Assistance Mission for Iraq
UNCAC United Nations Convention Against Corruption
UNCC United Nations Compensation Commission
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
USAAA U.S. Army Audit Agency
USACE U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
USAID U.S. Agency for International Development
USAID OIG U.S. Agency for International Development Office of Inspector General
USF-I U.S. Forces-Iraq
WOB Women-Owned Businesses

OCTOBER 30, 2009 I REPORT TO CONGRESS I 203