Analyzing Problem Solving Using Math in Physics:

Epistemological framing via warrants

Thomas J . Bing
a
and Edward F. Redish
b

a
Department of Physics, Emory University, Atlanta, GA 30322;
b
Department of Physics, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742
Abstract. Developing expertise in physics entails learning to use mathematics effectively and efficiently as applied to
the context of physical situations. Doing so involves coordinating a variety of concepts and skills including mathemati-
cal processing, computation, blending ancillary information with the math, and reading out physical implications from
the math and vice versa. From videotaped observations of intermediate level students solving problems in groups, we
note that students often get stuck using a limited group of skills or reasoning and fail to notice that a different set of
tools (which they possess and know how to use effectively) could quickly and easily solve their problem. We refer to a
students perception/judgment of the kind of knowledge that is appropriate to bring to bear in a particular situation as
epistemological framing. Although epistemological framing is often unstated (and even unconscious), in group problem
solving situations students sometimes get into disagreements about how to progress. During these disagreements, they
bring forth reasons or warrants in support of their point of view. For the context of mathematics use in physics problem
solving, we present a system for classifying physics students warrants and analyze a case study. This warrant analysis
provides a general, widely-applicable technique for identifying students epistemological framings.
Keywords: Enter Keywords here.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
Mathematics is the backbone of physics. It pro-
vides a language for the concise expression and appli-
cation of physical laws and relations. A students de-
velopment as a physicist entails, in no small part, be-
coming increasingly comfortable with mathematics.
As physics teachers, we share a responsibility to help
our students develop fluency with the mathematics of
physics. But what does it mean to become comfort-
able with mathematics in physics, how would we
recognize it happening in a student, and how, as in-
structors, can we facilitate this process? In this article,
we describe how we develop a clearer understanding
of this issue by using videotaped ethnographic obser-
vations of groups of upper-level physics students solv-
ing physics problems.
What we learn is that although mathematics is an
essential component of university level science, math
in science is considerably more complex than the
straightforward application of rules and calculation
taught in math classes. Using math in science criti-
cally involves the blending of ancillary information
with the math in a way that both changes the way that
equations are interpreted and provides metacognitive
support for recovery from errors. There are many dif-
ferent ways to interpret mathematics in physicsand
students often need to blend physical, mathematical,
and computational reasons for constructing and believ-
ing a result.
In order to analyze student behavior along this di-
mension, we have used the analytical tool of epistemo-
logical framing. This refers to the students perception
or judgment (unconscious or conscious) as to what
class of tools and skills are appropriate to bring to bear
in a particular context or situation. Although these
framings are often tacit, in one particular situation they
become much more explicit: when students argue with
each other about what to do next. When there is a dis-
agreement, the discourse tends to include warrants
reasons for drawing a conclusion. We demonstrate
that these warrants fall into clusters, casting a light on
the way the student has framed the situation epistemi-
cally. This leads us to create system of classifying
warrants that should provide a useful lens on the de-
velopment of problem solving skills.
Our observations of students indicate that episte-
mological frames can be sticky; that is, students can
Bing & Redish Epistemological Framing
2
get trapped in them for relatively long periods of time
(many minutes). These observations suggest that an
epistemological framing analysis can be potentially
useful for instruction. First, it can suggest activities
that might facilitate the development of expertise; and
second, it can permit an instructor to recognize the
development of sophisticated problem-solving behav-
ior even when the student makes mathematical errors.
1

B. An example
Many physics students struggle as they try to de-
velop mathematical fluency. Part of their struggle is
undoubtedly due to the sheer conceptual complexity of
the mathematics commonly encountered in physics
classes. As a physics major progresses through the
undergraduate curriculum, she will encounter tech-
niques requiring series expansions, three-dimensional
vector calculus, linear algebra, complex numbers, dif-
ferential equations, probability theory, and more. A
robust understanding of any of these topics involves a
complicated coordination of a large amount of infor-
mation. University math departments commonly de-
vote at least a semester-long class to each of the topics
on that list.
This paper, however, focuses on a different aspect
of the mathematical complexity our physics students
encounter: epistemic complexity. Epistemic is an
adjective referring to what one knows about the nature
of (in this case, mathematical) knowledge. Simply
put, the same piece of mathematics commonly fills
many different roles in a physics class.
To illustrate epistemic complexity, consider the
expression, x
f
= x
i
+ <v>t relating an initial position,
x
i
, a final position, x
f
, an average velocity, <v>and a
time interval, t. First, this expression encodes a cal-
culational scheme. If the object starts at x
i
= 3 m and
maintains an average velocity of <v>=4 m/s for t =
2 s, then the expression x
f
= x
i
+ <v> tells you how to
combine those given values to produce a numerical
result for x
f
: x
f
=3 m +(4 m/s)( 2 s) =11 m.
Second, x
f
= x
i
+ <v>t encodes a physical rela-
tion among measurements. An average velocity tells
how far an object travels per given length of time.
Multiplying by the time of the journey gives <v>t,
unwinding the definition of <v>and representing how
far you move in a given time interval. Tacking that on
to where your object started from, x
i
, must yield the
position at the end of the journey, x
f
.
Third, mathematics provides us with a concise sys-
tem for recalling encoded rules and previously derived
results. No one starts all physics problems from first
principles every time. One can imagine a physicist
simply quoting x
f
= x
i
+ <v>t and simply thinking to
himself, Thats what the final position equation is.
Fourth, our sample expression x
f
= x
i
+ <v>t can
be seen filling yet another role, highlighting another
epistemic feature of mathematics in physics. It fits in
with a large interrelated web of mathematical ideas.
For example, it can be derived from the definition of
average velocity by simple algebraic manipulation. It
also has the conceptual structure of a base-plus-change
symbolic form,
2
just like v
f
= v
i
+ <a>t, and it coor-
dinates with the interpretation of the determination of
distance traveled from a velocity graph by the calcula-
tion of the area under the curve. Stepping even farther
back, x
f
= x
i
+ <v t> can be seen as a solution of a
differential equation of the form
d
2
x
dt
2
= k
.
Mathematics thus fills many different epistemic
roles for a physicist. It reflects physical relations, pro-
vides a calculation framework, forms a web of inter-
connected ideas, and provides a packaging system for
encoding rules and previous results. Even such an
elementary expression as x
f
= x
i
+ <v>t displays this
epistemic complexity.
This paper discusses a detailed case study of a
group of upper level undergraduate physics students at
work on a homework assignment in their physics class.
These students are grappling with the epistemic com-
plexity of the mathematics, often struggling as they
juggle various interpretations of the math at hand. Our
goal is to model their thinking.
In Sec. II we discuss the cognitive framework we
are working in including giving an explanation of the
concept of framing. We also give a brief review of the
relevant elements of argumentation theory that inform
our framing analysis. In Sec. III we discuss our meth-
odology. In Sec. IV we identify the four epistemo-
logical framings we find in our data, and in Sec. V we
present our detailed case study. We present our con-
clusions and the implications for instruction and future
research in Sec. VI.
II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
We begin by situating ourselves within a particular
theoretical way of thinking about student thinking: the
Resource Framework (RF). We give a brief summary
of the assumptions of this approach. We then provide a
simple example (Sarah shifts her reasoning) to illus-
trate how epistemological framing fits within the RF.
We then discuss framing in general and epistemologi-
cal framing in particular.
The Resource Framework:
A brief overview
There are many theoretical lenses that are available
for building models of student behavior. The one we
use is the Resource Framework (RF) that has evolved
Bing & Redish Epistemological Framing
3
out of the Knowledge in Pieces approach developed
by diSessa and his collaborators.
3

4
This framework is
documented in detail in a number of published papers.
5

6

7

8
We present a brief overview here but encourage
readers interested in more detail to access the original
papers.
The Resource Framework (RF) is a structure for
creating phenomenological models of high-level think-
ing. It is based on a combination of core results se-
lected from educational research phenomenology,
cognitive/neuroscience, and behavioral science. It is a
framework rather than a theory in that it provides on-
tologies classes of structural elements and the way
they behave and it permits a range of possible struc-
tures and interactions built from these elements. As
such, it provides a framework that permits the creation
of descriptive and phenomenological models that
bridge many existing models such as the alternative
conceptions theory and the knowledge in pieces ap-
proach or cognitive modeling with the socio-cultural
approach. The RF does not (as yet) create mathemati-
cal models in which predictions arise from calcula-
tions.
The RF is an associative network model with con-
trol structure and dynamic binding.
1. Associative Network The basic ontology of the
RF is that of a network, built from the well-established
metaphor of neurons in the brain. The activation of
the neurons corresponding to one resource or cluster of
resources leads to activation of other clusters. Learn-
ing is pictured as the establishment of strong connec-
tions, so that activation of one resource or cluster of
resources leads to the activation of other resources.
Associations can be excitatory (encouraging activa-
tion) or inhibitory (discouraging activation).
2. Control structure The network of resources in
the brain is not simply associative. The brain has
structures (hippocampus, cingulate gyrus, etc., etc.)
that appear to have specific purposes, just as in other
parts of the body (heart, lungs, liver, etc., etc.). In the
pre-frontal cortex perceptual information is mixed
with long-term memory to prime appropriate actions.
The evaluation of a perceived situation affecting action
is a well documented component of behavior in mam-
mals. (See for example Redish, J ensen, and J ohnsons
Fig. 1 and extensive references.)
9
Control structures
rely heavily not only on activating association, but also
on inhibition.
3. Binding Clusters of resources that activate to-
gether frequently become strongly tied so that they
always activate together.
10
This makes possible the
creation of networks of higher level structures con-
cepts, p-prims, or schemas that the user perceives as
unitary. Binding can occur at many levels from being
extremely tight (e.g., it is hard to see the word cat
and not to imagine its referent) to being rather loose
(e.g., one can perceive an orchestral performance as
unitary or listen for individual instruments or motifs).
Both basic associations (concepts) and control struc-
tures (framings) can be tightly or loosely bound.
4. Dynamic A critical element of the entire model
is that it is extremely dynamic. Associations are acti-
vated and inhibit depending on context.
In this paper we are building a component of the
control structure (i.e. how the mind allocates its
power) appropriate for modeling students use of
mathematics in physics: epistemological framing.
A framing story:
Sarah shifts her reasoning
An analysis in terms of epistemological framing
focuses on the moment-to-moment shifts observed in
students reasoning. Their interpretation of the task
and knowledge at hand can change, as in the following
example.
11

Sarah is an upper-division undergraduate physics
major who sat for an interview aimed at her under-
standing of electrical conductors and insulators. Sarah
has just explained how insulators are so dense that
current cannot flow through them. Wanting to explore
this further, the interviewer brings up the case of Sty-
rofoam. When the interviewer asks her whether Styro-
foam is an insulator, Sarah responds that it is. Her re-
sponse to the interviewers question, Why? is that
she memorized it. The conversation continues, and
when the next opportunity arises for Sarah to justify a
claim she makes a blanket statement citing organic
chemistry. So far in the interview, she is relying on
authority in her explanations, quoting rules and facts.
After the interviewer prods her to give any expla-
nation you find, Sarahs reasoning undergoes a shift.
She gives a more detailed, more conceptual account of
conductance. Sarah puts together a little story about
electrons getting torn away from their parent atoms
and then being free to move. She explains how a bat-
tery could perhaps cause this electron-tearing and how
a higher temperature wire might also have more en-
ergy available to tear electrons off the atoms.
The shift we care about in Sarahs reasoning con-
cerns the types of explanations she gives. She began
by quoting facts. Implicit was Sarahs epistemic inter-
pretation of her situation and the interviewers inten-
tions. What is the nature of the knowledge in play
here? Oh, OK, this interviewer wants factual infor-
mation about conductors and insulators. Ill give him
some facts I remember.
The interviewers apparent dissatisfaction with her
quoted facts and subsequent any explanation you
find prompt caused Sarah to reinterpret the activity.
She came to see the interviewers questions as prompts
to tell a story about conduction. Sarah is less sure of
Bing & Redish Epistemological Framing
4
her story about tearing off electrons than she was
about her quoted facts, but she sees this uncertainty as
permissible now. Epistemically, now were construct-
ing stories, not quoting facts.
Briefly, Sarah has a different epistemological fram-
ing of her activity in the two parts of this episode. The
different epistemological framings, different implicit
answers to What kind of knowledge is in play here?
led Sarah to bring different subsets of her knowledge
store to bear on the interviewers questions.
We now turn to a more detailed account of this
epistemological framing process, beginning with an
overview of epistemic resources.
Epistemological resources activate
and deactivate in Sarah's reasoning
In our brief example Sarah treats knowledge as two
different types of things. She begins by viewing
knowledge as fact-based and authority-driven, later
shifting to seeing knowledge as a personally con-
structed thing. We describe this shift by saying that
different epistemological resources have been cued in
Sarahs mind.
An epistemological resource is a cognitive model-
ing element. It represents a tightly bundled packet of
information that, when activated by the mind, leads the
individual to interpret the knowledge at hand in a cer-
tain light. But an epistemological resource is a control
structure, not a concept; epistemological resources
affect how students perceive the nature of the situation
under current consideration and they control what con-
ceptual resources are brought to bear. Do they see
scientific knowledge as fixed and absolute or as being
relative to ones point of view? Do they view scien-
tific knowledge as something they can construct for
themselves or as something that must be handed down
from an authority figure?
12

13

Epistemological resources, like other resources, are
dynamic; they can activate and deactivate during the
moment-to-moment flow of an episode. Broad, decon-
textualized questions such as Do you see science
knowledge as being handed down from authority? at
least by themselves, are unlikely to elicit meaningful
information on students functional epistemologies.
Such a question assumes that students have relatively
stable, context-independent beliefs about the nature of
science. Much like the case with conceptual knowl-
edge,
3

6
authors have argued that students epistemic
stances are manifold and highly sensitive to context.
14

15
Sarah, for example, displayed a shift from knowl-
edge as authority driven to knowledge as con-
structed by oneself in her brief electric conduction
interview. This shift happened in response to an inter-
viewers prod. It was an in-the-moment reaction to the
natural flow of the conversation. One would certainly
not expect that this isolated shift signals a large-scale
change in Sarahs approach towards physics. It is un-
reasonable to think she never saw physics as being
about telling conceptual stories before, nor is it rea-
sonable to think she will never quote authority again.
There are many similar published examples of in-the-
moment shifts in students reasoning.
6

7

16

17

As further evidence of the manifold nature of stu-
dents epistemologies, there also tends to be a discon-
nect between how students view the nature of formal
science and how they proceed to interpret their own
work in science class.
18
Epistemological stances
evolve, in a time averaged sense, in complex ways as
students progress through their education.
19

On more local timescales, many epistemological
resources are available to students. These epistemo-
logical resources are often closely correlated with cer-
tain bits of the wide range of conceptual information
available to students. Sarahs activation of knowl-
edge as authority-driven pointed her towards her store
of organic chemistry facts or perhaps vice-versa.
With a wide range of conceptual and epistemologi-
cal possibilities available, a model of students think-
ing must also include a process by which the set of all
possible epistemological and conceptual options is
pared down to a manageable size for consideration by
the individual. That process is called framing.
Framing:
What kind of activity is going on here?
So far, we have been using the term framing in
what amounts to a common speech mode. We have
not defined it explicitly. But in the behavioral sci-
ences, especially anthropology and sociolinguistics,
framing represents a specific technical term. Fram-
ing is the, usually subconscious, choice the mind
makes answering the question, What kind of activity
is going on here? It narrows down the set of all pos-
sible mental options to a manageable subset. An indi-
viduals framing of a situation tells them what is nec-
essary to pay careful attention to in a situation and
what can be considered irrelevant and ignored. This
selective attention reduces processing load and is the
benefit created by the mental structure that permits
framing.
20
Framing is a common, pervasive cognitive
process.
As a quick example, consider entering a hotel.
Even if you have never been in that particular hotel
before, you will immediately have a general idea how
to proceed. You would expect there to be a front desk
with a check-in clerk, lots of numbered rooms orga-
nized in a particular way, and perhaps a restaurant or
two. You would plan on doing certain things in this
building like sleeping and preparing for the next days
business. You would also have social expectations.
Bing & Redish Epistemological Framing
5
You would not plan on shouting across the lobby,
playing your television at full volume at 11pm, or
throwing furniture off the balcony.
Framing should not be equated to activating a
large, stable instruction list. Its not as if you immedi-
ately run down a checklist upon entering a hotel.
Wheres the elevator? There it is. Where is the conci-
erge desk? There it is. Where is the restaurant? There
it is. Large data structures like this hotel list are like a
set empty slots ready to be filled in with the particulars
of a situation. Several early studies in artificial intelli-
gence (from which modern framing studies partially
evolved) were concerned with identifying (and then
programming) such data structure frames.
21

22

23

This paper does not equate framing with the recall
and activation of organized, rigid data structures.
Rather, we see framing as the cuing of fuzzy, adapt-
able networks of cognitive resources. Not finding a
restaurant in your hotel doesnt necessarily destroy
your interpretation of your surroundings as a hotel. If
the room numbers organization isnt the standard
floor-by-floor numeric order, you would likely still be
able to find your room eventually.
Framing has been studied in a wide array of aca-
demic disciplines including linguistics, sociology, art,
psychology, and anthropology.
24

25

26

27
All of these
studies implicitly agree on the existence of what has
been called Felicitys Condition.
28
Felicitys Condi-
tion is the unspoken premise naturally adopted by an
individual that incoming information, whether it be
spoken, read, observed, etc, comes from a rational
source, and it is thus up to the individual to attempt to
contextualize and hence interpret that incoming infor-
mation. Framing is the process by which the mind at-
tempts this contextualization and interpretation.
Different individuals can certainly frame the same
incoming information in different ways.
26
A quick
example is to note that what may be play to a golfer is
work to the caddy.
29
Miscommunications can arise
when two individuals frame their interaction differ-
ently, each bringing a different subset of their avail-
able resources to bear on the situation. Framing should
not be thought of as something that happens only once
at the start of a new activity. People continually re-
check their framing of a situation and may alter it ac-
cordingly, bringing new resources into conscious con-
sideration while temporarily disregarding other ones.
30

Sarah and her discussion of electrical insulators is one
such example.
Framing can lead people to subconsciously disre-
gard some strands of input information that are not
seen as currently relevant. A latecomer taking his seat
at a theater can be ignored, possibly not even noticed,
by other audience members.
25
The students in this pa-
pers case study display an analogous selective atten-
tion. They can seem temporarily oblivious to a
mathematical course of action that may be obvious to a
classmate, instructor, or researcher. We interpret this
selective attention as a result of their epistemological
framing of their mathematics. They, in that moment,
are interpreting the math at hand in a certain way, fo-
cusing on a particular aspect of the math knowledge in
play.
Argumentation theory
helps us get evidence of framing
Framing is often unconscious, even unnoticed by
the person doing it. How, then, can a researcher gather
evidence of how these upper level physics students are
framing their use of mathematics? How can we iden-
tify what they see as the particular nature of the math
knowledge in play? A possible solution was sug-
gested in our observations of students working on
physics problems in groups. When students disagree
on a procedure or result, they usually become rela-
tively more explicit about why something should be
believed or not. These comments help us identify
what are referred to as warrants in argumentation the-
ory. These warrants show us what epistemic assump-
tions they are making at the moment. We therefore
suggest: look at the warrants they use in their math
arguments. We hence turn to a brief overview of ar-
gumentation theory.
There are several subfields that are sometimes col-
loquially lumped under the rubric, argumentation
theory.
31
On one end of the continuum is what is best
called formal logic. Logic chains like If A then B, if
B then C but not D, etc, lend themselves readily to
computational modeling,
32
although even such appar-
ently straightforward applications of classical logic
rely on fuzzy mental processes that are very difficult to
describe in detail analytically.
33

A second branch of research, the one that is most
often actually called argumentation theory, includes
what is often called rhetoric.
32
This field of research
focuses most on presenting, as opposed to having, an
argument. A central pillar of this field, and an impor-
tant basis for this papers analysis, is the work of Ste-
phen Toulmin. He devised an often-cited system for
parsing an argument into such parts as claims, data,
and warrants.
34
A person will make a statement, the
claim, that requires proof. They will then offer one or
more relevant facts, the data. The warrant is the
bridge, sometimes unspoken, that explains how the
given data relates to the claim at hand. For example, I
might state that Thomas J efferson is the greatest
American founding father (claim) because he largely
wrote the Declaration of Independence (data). The
relevant warrant that would link this data to that claim
would be that the Declaration of Independence is a
Bing & Redish Epistemological Framing
6
cornerstone document of the United States, laying out
the nascent countrys case for autonomy.
Naturally occurring arguments are more nebulous
than a formal logic structure allows. Nor should one
expect a clean Toulmin structure to fit most ordinary
arguments.
35

36
J ustifications that may be logically
unsound can be cognitively sound completely ac-
ceptable and compelling in informal, real-time situa-
tions according to complicated, probabilistic mental
processes.
37
A branch of research, often gathered un-
der the label discourse analysis,
31
concerns itself
primarily with the in-the-moment patterns people em-
ploy in their speech and thought as they construct and
communicate arguments.
This papers work will most closely align with this
discourse analysis research approach. It borrows
Toulmins idea of a warrant to help analyze a vitally
important in-the-moment pattern in physics stu-
dents speech and thought: their epistemological fram-
ing of the math at hand. Students warrants can shift
from moment to moment, and these shifts are closely
tied to what they interpret as the nature of the math
knowledge currently in play.
Practically speaking, this shifting of warrants re-
sults in physics students giving different kinds of proof
at different times during a mathematical argument.
The analysis of the students mathematical warrants
offers a powerful window to describing how they are
currently framing their activity.
The idea of different kinds of proof being accepted
in an argument is not, in general, a new one. On a
grander scale, researchers have noted that what counts
as valid proof does not necessarily remain the same as
one crosses social or cultural boundaries. One needs
look no further than the Creationist/Evolution debate
for an example.
38
On a smaller classroom scale, this
phenomenon of shifting justification has also been
noted with biology students.
39

The idea of different kinds of reasoning counting as
sufficient proof has also been noted in mathematics
education research. Researchers have discussed, for
example, the embodied, proceptual, and formal rea-
sons 13 +24 equals 24 +13.
40

41
The embodied ex-
planation is that adding twenty-four objects to a col-
lection of thirteen objects gives you the same total
number as if you started with thirteen objects and
added twenty-four. A proceptual explanation focuses
on how you can manipulate the meaning-laden sym-
bols in the problem in a prescribed manner, i.e. you
can do the column-addition you learned in elementary
school, and get the same result either way. The formal
reason 13 +24 equals 24 +13 is that its assumed true
by axiom. Its the commutative property.
The extended case study demonstrates how the
flow of a physics problem solving conversation can be
parsed by viewing it as two or more individuals trying
to juggle and coordinate various types of mathematical
justifications epistemological framings in their
reasoning.
A summary note on terminology
In summary, we use three terms to describe our
epistemological control structure: epistemological
framing, epistemological resources, and warrants.
Note that by introducing these distinct terms, we are
not proposing that these correspond to three distinct
cognitive structures. Although that may be the case,
we do not at this time have evidence to support that
claim. Rather, we use these three terms to provide a
way of emphasizing different functional aspects of
what may, in the end, turn out to be a reasonably uni-
tary and non-separable process: the process of making
a judgment about what knowledge applies in a particu-
lar situation.
The use of the term framing focuses our attention
on the interaction between the cue and the response. It
stresses that there is an evaluation based on previous
general knowledge and experience that is taking place.
This evaluation is very often a subconscious one. This
papers focus on the warrants observed in physics stu-
dents mathematical arguments is precisely an attempt
to define evidence for the inherently implicit cognitive
process of framing. True, the warrants themselves are
not usually explicitly spelled out in the case study
transcripts later in this paper, but the case study will
demonstrate that the inferential leap is usually a short,
easy one (at least relative to simply telling a researcher
to look for an epistemic resource or a framing).
The use of the term resource focuses our attention
on the fact that the kinds of reasons students cite fall
into broad categories with a common underlying struc-
ture. The use of the term warrant focuses our atten-
tion on the epistemic nature of the specific argument
being made. For example, a student pointing to a five-
line calculation he just performed and a student point-
ing to an electronic calculators output may be using
slightly different specific warrants (i.e. you can trust a
careful manual computation vs. you can trust a ma-
chines algorithmic churning). Both students reason-
ing, however, falls under the same general class of
warrant: algorithmically following a set of established
computational steps should lead to a trustable result.
We would call this general class of warrant an epis-
temic resource. Its a general, repeatedly observable
way students view knowledge. This epistemic re-
source acts as a cognitive control structure. It is one
(of many) regulators of students epistemic framing
(i.e. how they implicitly choose to interpret the knowl-
edge at hand).
In the case study that follows, we are somewhat
loose with our specific uses of class of warrant vs.
Bing & Redish Epistemological Framing
7
speaking of one particular flavor of warrant specific to
the situation at hand. There is simply not always suf-
ficient evidence to carefully distinguish between the
two, nor is it vital to our general argument (that focus-
ing on warrants gives close-to-the-surface evidence of
epistemic framing) to do so.
III. METHODOLOGY
Before turning to our extended case study, we give
a brief description of the video data used in this study
and how our common framings emerged from this data
set.
Approximately 150 hours of raw video data of up-
per-level undergraduate physics students was collected
for this study. These students were enrolled in such
classes as Quantum Mechanics I and II, Intermediate
Mechanics, Intermediate Electricity and Magnetism,
and Intermediate Theoretical Methods. Most were
physics majors. None were in their first university
physics class.
About 80 of these 150 hours (including this papers
case study) come from group homework sessions. Our
students would routinely meet outside of class to work
on their homework together. We simply would ask
their permission at the start of the semester to video
tape these meetings. Another 25 hours of the video
data set came from individual problem-solving inter-
views with students. The rest of the video set was
made of actual classroom recordings. These class-
room videos tended to be less useful for this study
since they contained a much smaller amount of student
speech.
Students' framings are easiest to identify
via contrasts and shifts
Evidence for how students are framing their math
use is easiest to pick out when there is some sort of
contrast or misunderstanding present. Such framing
confusions are common sources of disagreements,
even in non-physics settings.
42
Many mathematical
disagreements physics students have with each other
reduce to the first student essentially saying Look at
this math issue this way while the second student is
claiming No, you should be looking at it this other
way. The students are debating which aspects of
their mathematical knowledge are currently relevant.
Examining the warrants
34
physics students use in their
mathematical arguments offers a good window to how
they are currently framing their math use.
Data selection process
We needed some sort of selection process that
could pare down our 150-hour data set to a collection
appropriate for a close, careful analysis. The first
author was present during 95% of the tapings them-
selves and took detailed notes of the students activity.
These notes allowed the video databank to be quickly
searched for the best debates, arguments, and misun-
derstandings. At this early point in the pare-down
process, best simply meant the debates and argu-
ments that most likely had a lot of material available
for possible analysis. Sometimes best translated to a
simple clock reading. If students spent five minutes
arguing about a certain point, there was a good chance
a closer analysis might find a relatively large amount
of speech that clearly annunciates their ideas. Other
times the best arguments were selected for the nov-
elty of their content. An argument about whether an
expression simplifies to

x
2
+ 2x +1 or to

x
2
2x +1 is
likely to be routine. The students are likely to quickly
agree on a useful way to resolve the argument. They
are likely to share a common framing, which means
there wont be much explicit evidence for that fram-
ing. However, an argument about a novel issue is
much more likely to bring about a variety of ap-
proaches, a variety of framings.
The first pass through the 150-hour data set yielded
about 50 snippets containing the arguments, debates,
and misunderstandings most likely to be explicit and
long enough to offer good evidence (i.e., clearly iden-
tifiable mathematical warrants) for how the students
were framing their math use. Eventually, a framing
analysis was carried out on other episodes that didnt
contain such obvious arguments. Such an extension
helped to assure the generality of our framing analysis.
The reader is invited to look at the dissertation from
which this paper is drawn for such non-argument ex-
amples.
1b

Our 50-snippet subset of arguments was meant to
offer the best evidence for deciding whether a set of
common framings exist and, if they do, what they spe-
cifically are. The next section describes the methodol-
ogy used to help these common framings emerge.
Knowledge analysis: Common framings
emerge from the data set
In order to make sense of our data, we performed a
knowledge analysis.
2

43
The basic idea is to find a
common thread to condense the episodes according to
a common analysis scheme. Knowledge analysis is an
iterative methodology.
A subset of the 50 sample episodes mentioned
above were analyzed individually at first, the goal be-
ing to describe what type of warrants the students were
using in their mathematical arguments.
44

Once a small collection of these individual analy-
ses was collected, it became possible to look for con-
sistencies across episodes. Several clusters incorporat-
ing similar individual math framing examples were
Bing & Redish Epistemological Framing
8
identified. The next step was to do a similar analysis
on a new set drawn from those 50 episodes and see if
these original clusters could incorporate these new
examples of students mathematical thinking as well.
Appropriate changes were made to the clusterings in
light of this new data set, and then a third set of epi-
sodes were considered. After several iterations, the
clustering scheme stopped evolving significantly.
Eventually the whole 50-episode subset was used, with
each individual episode cycled through more than
once.
Four main clusters emerged from this data sets ex-
amples of physics students framing of their math use.
They capture four general types of justification these
students offer for their mathematics: Calculation,
Physical Mapping, Invoking Authority, and Math
Consistency. These clusterings are not meant to be
mutually exclusive or sufficient to span all possibili-
ties. They are merely presented as the most convenient
way found of structuring comparisons across many
different episodes in our data set.
IV. THE FRAMING CLUSTERS THAT
EMERGED FROM OUR DATA SET
Our knowledge analysis led us to classify the stu-
dent interactions into four common framing clusters:
Calculation, Physical Mapping, Invoking Authority,
and Math Consistency. These framings parallel the
discussion of
x
f
= x
i
+ v t
in the introduction. We
begin with a brief overview of each and then present a
more complete discussion and comparison of the four
clusters. Finally, we discuss inter-rater reliability.
Framing 1: Calculation
A calculation framing, like all the other framings
that emerged from the data set, is primarily identified
by the general class of warrant students choose to use.
In this case the epistemological resource (i.e. the gen-
eral class of warrant observed) is: algorithmically
following a set of established computational steps
should lead to a trustable result. The specific war-
rants used, like all the other warrants we identified in
our data set, couples closely to the epistemological
resources currently activated by the student. Episte-
mological resources, recall, are control structures.
They lead the student to frame the knowledge at hand
in a certain way, which focuses the students attention
on a particular subset of his total knowledge.
In a calculation framing, students rely on computa-
tional correctness. The warrant may be implicit, espe-
cially in non-argumentative settings. If an instructor
were deriving y
f
= y
i
+v
i
t -gt
2
from
d
2
y
dt
2
= g
, she
would probably just carefully explain her steps to her
students. They would likely accept the result without
further thought. It is rare to explicitly explain, OK,
because carefully following a set of computational
steps allows one to trust a result, we should trust this
derivation. It would rely on an unspoken epistemo-
logical resource, one thats shared because both in-
structor and student frame the discussion as calcula-
tion.
Framing 2: Physical mapping
When physics students frame their math use as
physical mapping, they support their arguments by
pointing to the quality of fit between their mathematics
and their intuition about the physical or geometrical
situation at hand. This class of warrant can be associ-
ated with the epistemological resource: a mathemati-
cal symbolic representation faithfully characterizes
some feature of the physical or geometric system it is
intended to represent. Again, it is through identifying
these (relatively close-to-the-surface) warrants that a
researcher can get information about the (relatively
implicit) epistemological framing process in the stu-
dents mind.
For example, suppose we wanted to explain why
the expression for the force exerted by a spring,
F = -kx, includes a negative. We might explain how
stretching a spring makes it pull backwards as it tries
to contract back to its natural length. If you compress
the spring, itll push back against the compression as it
tries to expand. In both cases the spring force is oppo-
site the way the spring is deformed. That is, if kx is
positive (say you extend the spring to the right) then
the spring pulls in the negative (i.e. left) direction. If
kx is negative (say you compress the spring leftwards)
the spring exerts a force to the right (positive) direc-
tion. This kind of mechanistic chaining of reasons is a
common characteristic of this framing. Again, we do
not necessarily have to spell out an explicit warrant or
our math-should-model-the-world epistemological
resource. They come along with a physical mapping
framing.
There is a more general point about distinguishing
a calculation framing from a physical mapping fram-
ing. At some level, all mathematics is ultimately
grounded in physical experience. A child learns to
associate 1 with a single object, 2 with a collec-
tion of two objects, and so on. Higher and higher
mathematics are built up by analogy and extension of
what are ultimately physically grounded ideas.
45

46

The distinction between a calculation framing and a
physical mapping framing largely concerns a persons
in-the-moment awareness of the physical referents of
her math.
Bing & Redish Epistemological Framing
9
We note that for this work, we do not distinguish
between the use of physical statements from the use of
abstract geometrical statements as warrants. This is
because in the examples we observed, the geometry
arose out of the location of the physical situation in 3-
space. We expect that if a wider class of situations
were considered, it might be appropriate to separate
physical and geometrical framings.
. Framing 3: Invoking authority
Suppose we were trying to convince you what the
rotational inertia of a solid sphere was. We might sim-
ply pick up an introductory physics book, thumb
through the index until we found rotational inertia,
turn to page 253, and point at an entry in a table that
says solid sphere, I = MR
2
. Perhaps you would
accept our argument, also accepting the implicit class
of warrants (i.e. epistemological resource) that under-
lies our reasoning: information that comes from an
authoritative source can be trusted.
An invoking authority framing is often closely tied
to finding the right level of detail to go into during a
problem. It is unreasonable to take every single prob-
lem down to absolute first principles every time. Some
results will always simply be taken for granted. Per-
haps you would be more likely to accept our earlier
argument for the rotational inertia of a solid sphere if
we were engaged with a larger problem like finding
the time it would take such a sphere to roll down a
given ramp. You might judge the specific value of the
spheres rotational inertia to be sufficiently irrelevant
to the problems main purpose to permit us to quote
from the textbook.
Another common trait of the invoking authority
framing is the absence of extended chains of reason-
ing. Chaining has been closely tied to students
mechanistic reasoning.
47

48
When a student links to-
gether a series of implications, she is chaining. An
example would be adding another resistor in series
puts another obstacle in the currents way, so the total
resistance goes up, but the batterys push remains the
same, so the current flowing decreases. Students en-
gage in mathematical chaining arguments as well. The
calculation framing often cues reasoning like A = BC,
but we dont know C, but we can use C = EF to get C,
then we can use C to get A. The electric current ex-
ample just above could be a nice example of chaining
while in a physical mapping framing if the student was
simultaneously thinking about the formula V = IR.
Chaining is usually absent or severely limited if the
student is framing his math use solely as invoking
authority, but is often present in both the calculational
and physical mapping framings.
Framing 4: Mathematical consistency
Suppose you were trying to explain Coulombs
Law for the electric force,

F
e

=
1
4
o
q
1
q
2
r
2
r

, to a stu-
dent. You might remind him of the expression for the
gravitational force,

F
g

=
Gm
1
m
2
r
2
r

, and demonstrate
how ideas from this more familiar bit of math map to
Coulombs Law. Both forces depend on the relative
strengths (mass or charge) of the two objects in ques-
tion. Both forces fall off with respect to distance in the
same way, and both include a proportionality constant
(G or

1
4
o
) that must be experimentally measured.
Even dis-analogous observations can be illuminating.
Gravity is always attractive, hence the negative sign is
explicitly included in front of the always positive
masses. An electric force can be attractive or repul-
sive, so the implicit signs on the positive or negative
charges, q
1
and q
2
, will determine the direction of the
Coulomb force.
Implicit in your discussion with the student would
be the class of warrants indicative of a Math Consis-
tency framing: mathematics and mathematical ma-
nipulations have a regularity and reliability and are
consistent across different situations. Establishing a
common underlying mathematical structure allows one
to trust the relevant set of relations and inferences.
Correlates of the four framing clusters
Our four common framings are primarily identified
via the warrants physics students use in their mathe-
matical reasoning. Other indicators, however, have
been observed to cluster preferentially around certain
framings. The table below summarizes these primary
(i.e. warrants) and secondary framing indicators we
have observed in our data set.
Framing is a dynamic cognitive process. A per-
sons mind makes an initial judgment regarding the
nature of the situation at hand, but that judgment is
continually updated and reevaluated. New information
comes to the student all the time, whether in the form
of a classmates comment, an interviewers interjec-
tion, simply turning to a different page in a textbook,
or even spontaneous random associations within her
own brain. This new information can lead a student to
reframe her activity. As a result, the epistemological
framings observed in these students work can extend
over a range of time periods. We have found examples
in our data set ranging from ten seconds to ten min-
utes.



Table 1: Four common framings and their primary (i.e. warrants) and secondary indicators.
Calculation Physical Mapping Invoking Authority Math Consistency
Class of
Warrant
Used
Correctly follow-
ing algorithmic
steps gives trust-
able result
Goodness-of-fit between
math and physical ob-
servations or expecta-
tions attests to a result.
Authoritatively as-
serting a result or a
rule gives it cre-
dence.
Similarity or logical
connection to another
math idea offers vali-
dation.
Other
Common
Indicators
-focus on techni-
cal correctness
-math chaining:
need this to get
that
-often aided by a dia-
gram
-demonstrative gesturing
mechanistic chaining
-quoting a rule
-absence of mecha-
nistic chaining
-little acknowledg-
ment of substructure
-analogy with another
math idea
-categorization

Statement of this study's purpose
We now have laid a sufficient foundation upon which
to state this papers main premise in its full detail:
framing and epistemic resources are, by definition,
cognitive modeling elements. They aim to capture an
important aspect of students thinking (i.e. its tendency
to selective attention), but one can never directly ob-
serve, say, an epistemic resource. We suggest that
analyzing the warrants students rely on provides a way
to pin down evidence of their framing and the epistemic
resources activated in their minds.
Why have we put Class of Warrant Used on a ped-
estal in Table 1 while relegating various student actions
to Other Common Indicators? Isnt an action like
quoting a rule also excellent evidence of an Invoking
Authority framing? It certainly is, but the phase space of
possible student actions is immense. Consider one stu-
dent who confidently states and restates some canned
phrase (maybe work is path independent) and another
student who combs through fifty pages of his textbook
looking for the formula I = (2/5)MR
2
. Their actions are
different, but the class of warrant that underlies their
action tends to be the same: authoritatively asserting a
rule or result gives it credence. Both students are fram-
ing their work as Invoking Authority. The dimensional-
ity of the warrant phase space is much lower (on the or-
der of four) as the upcoming case study demonstrates.
Inter-rater reliability of
epistemological framing analysis
The value of this studys epistemological framing
analysis depends in part on how readily other researchers
can apply it consistently. An inter-rater reliability study
was carried out by giving this papers methodology dis-
cussion to another researcher and that researcher was
then asked to parse a new transcript for epistemological
framing (i.e. identify the class of warrants underlying the
students arguments). Details of this inter-rater reliabil-
ity test are given in Chapter Four of the first authors
dissertation.
1b
Different researchers agreed on their war-
rant codes (and hence their framing codes) 70% of the
time for a novel transcript before any consultation or
discussion. This figure improved to 80% after discus-
sion. As our case study demonstrates, this warrant
analysis does indeed parse students thought into frames
in a natural, reasonable way.
We do not expect our warrant coding scheme to yield
a 100% consistent coding of a random transcript. Stu-
dents thinking is simply not that cleanly compartmental-
ized. Indeed, we argue (see ref. 1b, Chapter 7) that one
characteristic of expertise in physics problem solving is
the ability to effectively blend these four framings dy-
namically.
Two issues are relevant here. First, there is the ques-
tion of how often students are observed to spend an ap-
preciable time, say a minute or more, uniquely in one of
this papers four common framings. Of all the data ana-
lyzed for this study, perhaps less than 50% can be
cleanly coded in minute-or-longer chunks under one of
these general framings.
The second notion of clean coding of framing that
is relevant concerns not these minute-long pure state
framings but rather our ability to identify smaller chunks
in hybrid framings. Calculation, physical mapping, in-
voking authority, and math consistency do a reasonable
job of spanning the space of these students mathemati-
cal arguments. We observed that about 90% of a random
episode or more can be seen as made up of behavior in-
dicative of those four landmark framings. But at this
stage of student development (upper division physics
majors) hybrids are common. Perhaps a student quotes a
few computational rules as he performs a long calcula-
tion. Maybe a student makes an analogy to both a similar
physical situation and a similar math structure. As the
inter-rater reliability test shows, researchers can still use
this studys analysis scheme to identify evidence of these
elemental framings in a piece of transcript that is, in gen-
eral, a more complicated hybrid framing.

Bing & Redish Epistemological Framing
11
V. CASE STUDY
We now turn to our case study. This detailed exam-
ple illustrates how this papers warrant-based framing
analysis can be applied to parse an authentic conversa-
tion among physics students.
The students framing of their math use plays a sig-
nificant role in the episode. The principal dynamic con-
cerns how to interpret the math at hand. A significant
amount of these students energy goes into trying to es-
tablish the epistemological framing they see as appropri-
ate.
Their thinking is dynamic. Different bits of their
mathematical knowledge are activated and deactivated as
they frame and reframe their activity. Sometimes fram-
ing differences have marked effects. The students some-
times talk past each other, neither one seeming to hear
what the other is saying, because they are framing their
work differently. Sometimes a students framing can
exhibit considerable resistance to change. As students
become more sophisticated and expert-like, we conjec-
ture, students become more flexible in their framing and
increasingly create hybrid frames.
49

Our case study comes from a group of three students
enrolled in the class Intermediate Theoretical Methods
(PHYS 374). One is a junior (S2) and the other two are
sophomores (S1 and S3). These three students met regu-
larly outside of class to work on their homework to-
gether, and this episode was taped during one such
homework session.
The question
Our episode starts in the middle of their work on one
of that weeks homework problems. The problem they
were considering reads:

A rocket (mass m) is taken from a point A near
an asteroid (mass M) to another point B. We
will consider two (unrealistic) paths as shown
in figure 1.

Calculate the work done by the asteroid on the
rocket along each path. Use the full form of
Newtons Universal Law of Gravitation (not the
flat earth approximation mg). Calculate the
work done by using the fundamental definition
of work:

W
AB
= F

dr

A
B

.
The reader familiar with the physics of this example
will recognize an attempt to get the student to see how
the theorem that says potential energy is path independ-
ent arises out of explicit calculation. Not all of the stu-
dents in this discussion recognized the point of the prob-
lem from the beginning.


Figure 1: Case Study problem.

The first framing clash
During this episode, the students are trying to decide
if the work done should be the same along the two paths
from A to B. They had previously suppressed the G, m,
and M constants and written the (incorrect)
50
equation

1
r
2
dr =
1
y
2
+ 9
dy
1
3

2
3 2

+
1
x
2
+1
1
3

dx

on the blackboard to express the work done along the
direct and two-part paths, respectively. They have also
copied the diagram of the situation from the problem
statement.
The students are standing at the blackboard where all
the relevant equations and diagrams appear. We focus on
the type of justification each student offers for his math
arguments:

1. S1: whats the problem?
2. You should get a different answer
3. from here for this. [Points to each path on two-path
diagram. ]
4. S2: No no no
5. S1: They should be equal?
6. S2: They should be equal
7. S1: Why should they be equal?
8. This path is longer if you think about it. [Points to
two-part path again]
9. S2: Because force, err, because
10. work is path independent.
11. S1: This path is longer, so it should have, [Points to
two-part path again]
12. this number should be bigger than
13. S2: Work is path independent. If you
14. go from point A to point B,
15. doesnt matter how you get there,
16. it should take the same amount of work.

Lines 1 to 6 contain the main issue of this episode.
While S1 thinks there should be different amounts of
work done on the small mass along the two different
paths, S2 believes the work done should be the same.
Bing & Redish Epistemological Framing
12
In the language of formal argumentation theory,
34
S1
makes the claim that more work is done along the two-
part path, and he offers the data that the two-part path is
longer. An unspoken warrant exists that connects his
data to his claim: the particular mathematics being used
should align with the physical systems under study. The
goodness-of-fit between the math at hand and the physi-
cal system attests to the validity of ones conclusions.
The work formula,
,
seems to say force times distance to S1. The two-part
path has more distance, and S1 thus draws justification
for his answer.
S1s warrant thus suggests he is framing his activity
as physical mapping. His use of a diagram in lines 1 to 3
and 7 to 8 supports this characterization. He gestures to
the different paths as he points out that the two-part path
is physically longer. Use of a diagram as intermediary
between the physical situation and the mathematics is a
commonly observed indicator of a physical mapping
framing. A diagram can often help a student entwine
physical and mathematical ideas as he examines how the
two fit together.
S2 not only has a different answer than S1, but he is
also framing his use of mathematics in a different way.
S2 claims that the work done on the small mass should
be the same along the two paths because work is path
independent (lines 9 and 10). His data is a familiar
mantra (though he omits mentioning how this statement
is only valid for conservative forces like gravity). The
unspoken warrant that S2 is relying on concerns the
common use of rules and definitions in math and phys-
ics: sometimes previous results are simply taken as giv-
ens for speed and convenience. S2 is framing his math
use as invoking authority.
After hearing S2s counterargument, S1 repeats him-
self. In lines 11 and 12, he restates his longer-path justi-
fication and again points to the relevant features of the
diagram they had previously drawn on the board. S2
responds by restating work is path independent in line
13 and again, slightly differently, in lines 14 to 16.
The most important observation in this first clip is
that S1 and S2 are disagreeing over much more than
merely the answer itself. Explicitly, they are debating
whether or not more work is done along the longer path.
Implicitly, they are arguing over the most useful way to
frame their present use of mathematics. S1 never explic-
itly says Please respond to my claim in a way that maps
our math to some detail of the physical situation I may
have overlooked. His phrasing and gesturing in his ini-
tial argument (lines 7 and 8) and beyond (lines 11 and
12) implies this framing request, though.
When S2 responds with his rule citation, he is not
merely arguing for a different answer. He is pushing for
a different type of warrant for judging the validity of a
given answer. S2s invoking an authority framing may
have even prevented him from really hearing what S1
was saying. S1s framing request may have passed by S2
unnoticed because he was too caught up in the subset of
all his math resources that his invoking authority framing
had activated within his mind. At any rate, S2 responds
in lines 9 and 10 with a different type of justification
than what S1 was expecting.
When S1 repeats himself in lines 11 and 12, he is im-
plicitly repeating his bid for a physical mapping framing.
One can imagine a situation when S2s invoking author-
ity justification would simply be accepted without inci-
dent, but here it did not align with S1s present framing.
S2 does not respond to this reframing request and repeats
his answer as he remains in invoking authority.
There is thus an intense framing argument going on
under the surface of this debate. Sensing that he is not
making any headway in the framing battle, S1 now
moves to shift both himself and S2 into a third framing.
A temporary agreement on a third framing
S1 now makes a move toward a third way of address-
ing the mathematics at hand. He suggests they churn
away and calculate what numeric answers their expres-
sions actually give (which happens during the lines 31 to
41). S2 accepts for a time.

17. S1: OK, thats assuming Pythagorean
18. Theorem and everything else add[s].
19. Well, OK, well is this what was the
20. answer to this right here? [Points to
.]
21. What was that answer?
22. S2: Yeah, solve each integral numerically.
23. S1: Yeah, what was that answer?
24. S3: Each individual one?
25. S1: Yeah, what was
26. S3: OK, let me, uhh [S3 starts typing into Mathe-
matica]
27. S1: Cause path two is longer than path one, so
28. S2: May I, for a minute? [S2 writes on a small cor-
ner of the blackboard, but never speaks about what
he writes.]
29. S1: and path one was this.
30. S2: Gimme this, I wanna think about something.
31. S1: J ust add those up, tell me the number for this
[Points to integrals again]
32. and Ill compare it to the number of
33. S3: OK, the y-one is point one five.
34. S1: I, just give me the, just sum those up.
35. I just want the whole total.
36. I just want this total quantity there,
37. just the total answer. [Points to integrals again]
Bing & Redish Epistemological Framing
13
38. S2: Oh, it was point four-
39. S3: No, thats the other one [direct path].
40. S1: you gave it to me before, I just didnt write it
down.
41. S3: Oh I see, point, what, point six one eight
42. S1: See, point six one eight, which is what I said,
43. the work done here should be larger
44. than the work done here cause the path [Points to
two-path diagram]
45. S2: No, no no, no no no
46. S3: the path where the x is changing
47. S2: Work is path independent.
48. S1: How is it path independent?
49. S2: by definition
50. S3: Somebody apparently proved this before we did.

S1 attempts to reframe the discussion in lines 19 to
21. He points to the integrals theyve written and asks,
Well, OKwhat was the answer to this right here?
What was that answer? He is calling for someone to
evaluate each of their expressions for the work so that he
can compare the numeric results. This argument relies on
another kind of warrant. Mathematics provides one with
a standardized, self-consistent set of manipulations and
transformations. Performing a calculation or having a
computer do it for you according to these rules will give
a valid, trustable result. S1 is moving to reframe their
math use as calculation.
Even though S1 doesnt explicitly detail the new war-
rant he is proposing, S2 quickly zeroes in on it. He im-
mediately responds, yeah, solve each integral numeri-
cally (line 22). Compare this successful, fluid epistemic
frame negotiation with the struggle of the previous snip-
pet. Lines 1 to 16 had S1 pushing for physical mapping
while S2 lobbied for invoking authority. Both stuck to
their positions, resulting in an inefficient conversation.
Neither was accepting what the other was trying to say.
Lines 19 to 22 have S1 and S2 agreeing, for the moment,
on what type of mathematical justification should count.
The calculation framing negotiated, lines 23 to 41 are
mostly about S1 directing S3 to input the proper expres-
sions into Mathematica, a common software calculator
package. They finish with Mathematica in line 41. It
turns out that the radial path integral,
1
r
2
2
3 2

dr
, is equal to
0.47 while the two-part path integrals,

1
y
2
+ 9
dy
1
3

+
1
x
2
+1
dx
1
3

, evaluate to 0.618. S2 was cor-

rect back in lines 1 to 16. The same amount of work
should be done along the two paths. While the radial
integral is correct as written (within a negative sign),
they have neglected the cosine term from the dot product
F

dr

in the two-part path integrals.

S1 takes the result of their calculation argument to
support his earlier physical mapping framing. See, point
six one eight, which is what I said, the work done here
should be larger than the work done here cause the
path (lines 42 to 44). This move is quite impressive.
Here, S1 is using his calculation framing as a subroutine
of sorts. He is nesting his computation within a larger
scheme of supporting his physical mapping argument of
longer-path-means-more-work.
S1 gives another hint that the physical mapping fram-
ing has not completely decayed while they are calculat-
ing. In the midst of the Mathematica work, he tosses in
cause path two is longer than path one (line 27). This
example illustrates the hybrid point made in the inter-
rater reliability section of this paper. Physics students
thinking is simply not always compartmentalized. The
four framings only represent general clusters of reason-
ing. That S1 tosses in a still-active piece from his previ-
ous physical mapping into the calculation is neither an
anomaly of thought nor a failure of this papers frame-
work. A likely mark of expertise in physics is a more
expansive framing that allows students to access and
interact the resources in the framings described here.
51

Indeed, this problem was set up and assigned for the
very purpose of encouraging students to look for coher-
ency among various framings like S1 is doing here.
Earlier, we claimed that less than 50% of a random
episode of student thinking could be cleanly coded as an
elemental form of calculation, physical mapping, invok-
ing authority, or math consistency. Still, we claimed that
about 90% of a transcript could be seen as a molecular
combination of overlapping bits of them. Lines 19 to 41
are an example that is mostly calculation but is fuzzed
somewhat by physical mapping.
S2 responds in a familiar way to S1s recall of physi-
cal mapping in lines 42 to 44: See, point six one eight,
which is what I said, the work done here should be larger
than the work done here cause the path. S2 returns to
invoking authority to justify his equal-work assertion in
lines 45 and 47. No, no no, no no nowork is path
independent. When S1 presses him for more detail,
how is it path independent? (line 48), S2 and S3 re-
spond by definition (line 49) and somebody appar-
ently proved this before we did (line 50).
An even stronger bid for physical mapping
The replies of S2 and S3 in lines 49 and 50 do not
contain the type of justification S1 seeks. The next block
of transcript begins with S1 making another strong bid
for physical mapping.

51. S1: OK, I dont understand the concept then,
52. because youre saying its path independent.
53. S2: Im saying, if youre at the bottom of a hill
54. S1: all right
Bing & Redish Epistemological Framing
14
55. S2: and you want to drive to the top of the hill
56. S1: right
57. S2: and theres a road that goes like this,
58. a road that goes like this, and a road thats like this,
[Draws ]
59. it takes the same amount of energy to get
60. from the bottom to the top.
61. It doesnt matter which one you take.
62. S1: OK, then you tell me this then;
63. work is force times distance, right?
64. S2: Its the integral of f-drf-dr, yeah.
65. S1: So if youre going this r, and [Draws
]
66. youre going this R, which one has more work?
67. S2: If theres constant force?
68. S1: Constant force on each on
69. S2: This one if its the same force. [Points to long
R path]
70. S1: OK, now the same force is acting on that
71. S2: No. No no. Because this one [radial] has
72. direct force the whole time.
73. See, theres lesser force. [Gestures at two-path dia-
gram]
74. S1: OK
75. S2: in each one of these [two part path]
76. S1: OK. All right
77. S2: your forces are
78. S1: I see what you mean. I see what you mean.
79. Here were taking
80. S2: Here were supposed
81. to be compensating for that
82. S1: Were just taking the x component [Gestures at
two-path diagram]
83. of the force here, and the y component
84. of the force there. Youre probably right.
85. Youve probably been right the whole time
86. Are we thinking about that correctly then?
87. I agree with what youre saying.

S1 begins this last transcript chunk with another bid
to frame their math use as physical mapping. I dont
understand the concept then, because youre saying its
path independent (lines 51 and 52).
S2 responds to this newest bid with an interesting hy-
brid of his own. He is still quoting work is path inde-
pendent but he now couches that rule in terms of a
physical situation. He draws a picture of various paths up
a hill and asserts it takes the same amount of energy to
get from the bottom to the top. It doesnt matter which
one you take (lines 53 to 61).
S2s latest response still partly reflects an invoking
authority framing because it offers no physical mecha-
nism for why the work done by gravity should be the
same along any of the paths up the hill. Technically,
your car would burn more gasoline along the curviest
path, but S2 doesnt acknowledge this point and may not
have even considered it in light of the inertia invoking
authority is exhibiting in his thought. Perhaps S2 has a
more detailed physical mechanism in his mind, but he
doesnt articulate it here.
Nonetheless, S1 recognizes a glimmer of the type of
justification he seeks in S2s latest argument. S1 presses
further on the longer-path issue. OK, then you tell me
this then; work is force times distance, right? So if
youre going this r, and youre going this R, which one
has more work? (lines 62 to 66) This question is S1s
most explicit call yet for a physical mapping framing. He
closely juxtaposes a mathematical point (work is force
times distance) and a diagram-aided observation of a
longer path (his r and R picture).
This reframing bid tips S2. His hint of a physical
mapping framing in lines 57 to 61 asserts itself, putting
him in a much better position to understand S1s argu-
ment. For the first time in this conversation, S2 explicitly
addresses a physical detail relevant to the physical map-
ping S1 is attempting: if theres constant force? (line
67) S1 quickly affirms that assumption and S2 correctly
concludes that more work would be done on the long
R path. When S1 quickly moves from this hypothetical
r and R case back to the homework problem (line 70), S2
immediately points out the inconsistency. No. No no.
Because this one [radial] has a direct force the whole
time. See, theres lesser force in each one of these
[two-part path]here were supposed to be compensat-
ing for that (lines 71 to 75 and 80 to 81). S2 gestures to
the problems diagram during this physical mapping.
The gravitational force vector and the displacement vec-
tor are (anti-) parallel for the radial path, hence you need
to consider the full magnitude of the gravitational force
in calculating the work done along that path. These two
vectors do not align perfectly along the two-part path,
hence you only consider a component of the force there.
S1 quickly accepts and confirms this argument (lines
78 to 87), which is the first fully articulated physical
mapping argument S2 had offered during this conversa-
tion. His quick comprehension and acceptance occur
because S2 has now framed their problem solving in the
way S1 has. S1 was mentally ready to accept such an
argument.
S2s reluctance to adopt a physical mapping framing
implies an activation failure, not lack of sophistication or
naivety. His reluctance was certainly not due to simple
inability. He was, after all, the one who actually wrote
the integrals (which do not contain the necessary cosine
factors but, according to S2, were meant to reflect the
lesser force idea) in the minutes leading up to the pre-
sented transcript. S2 quickly generated a physical map-
ping argument once he framed the discussion as physical
Bing & Redish Epistemological Framing
15
mapping, i.e. once he activated the relevant subset of his
mental resources.
Summary of the case study
This case study illustrates how epistemological fram-
ing negotiation and communication can be a powerful
dynamic in physics students work. S1 and S2 disagreed
over much more than whether the gravitational work
done was independent of path. Their disagreement over
what type of justification was appropriate drove this
conversation. Much of this debate was implicit. S1
never came out and said, for example, please respond to
me in a way that points out some detail of the physical
situation that I have not mapped correctly to the mathe-
matics were using. The epistemological framing
analysis presented in this paper offers a way of making
this implicit conversation-dynamic explicit to teachers
and physics education researchers.
In this case study these epistemological framings had
considerable inertia. S2 remained in invoking authority
despite several prods. S1s commitment to physical
mapping allowed those prods to keep happening. Other
case studies show students shifting frames much more
readily.
1b

Other examples
While we believe that our case study presents a com-
pelling case for the value of our epistemological framing
via warrants analysis, we also note that there are exam-
ples in the published literature that demonstrate the
stickiness of epistemological framing and would lend
themselves well to an analysis of the type described here.
In a previous paper by the authors
52
we discuss a case
study in which a group of students solving a problem in
quantum mechanics are stuck for nearly 15 minutes in
a computational/mathematical-consistency frame unable
to detect an error in the setup of their equations. Only
when the group shifts to a physical reasoning frame does
the error become clear.
In a paper describing students functional epistemol-
ogy in introductory algebra-based physics, Redish and
Tuminaro cite an example of a student so stuck in a
mathematical consistency frame that she fails to notice
that her statement that her dormitory room has a volume
of 1 cubic meter is absurd.
53

VI. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
Summary
In this paper we have argued that analyzing student
problem solving from the point of view of the kind of
warrants (or epistemological resources) they choose to
use gives insight into the way the student is framing the
mathematical task at hand. From a large number of eth-
nographic observations of students in upper division
physics classes we selected situations in which students
were taking contrasting views on the approach to be
used. From this salient data we created a classification
of warrants that we believe indicate the students episte-
mological framing of the task.
The students in our case study disagree over much
more than an answer. They each frame their activity
differently and hence try to apply a different type of war-
rant to judge the validity of their claims. The students
exert various pushes and pulls on each other as they try
to negotiate a common epistemological framing. Vary
rarely are these reframing bids explicit. Nonetheless,
these framing debates underlie the speech in both of our
case studies. When a common framing is established,
the conversation tends to be richer and more efficient.
The warrant analysis presented here is meant as a useful
tool for finding evidence of what is, at its root, an im-
plicit cognitive process.
Implications for instruction
Our analysis has important implications for teachers
as well as for researchers. First, being aware of framing
can help an instructor be aware of when he and his stu-
dents are not communicating when they are not on the
same page. Second, being aware of framing can lead an
instructor to understand the value of hybrid and flexible
framing and lead to her evaluating student progress in a
fashion that is both subtler and more productive. We
elaborate briefly on each of these points and speculate on
how an instructor might respond to these issues effec-
tively.
1. Being aware of framing
can reveal failures in communication
Framing differences like those in the case study here,
and the miscommunications that accompany them, could
certainly occur between instructor and student as well as
between students. Both the instructor and students will
naturally frame what occurs during a lesson, but there is
no guarantee they will frame each part of the lesson in
the same way. A teacher may calculate for a while and
then want to make a point about how an equation
matches a physical expectation. The teacher may even
offer a signal that hes switching approaches, but per-
haps that signal isnt sufficient to tip the students. They
may merely try to interpret his physical mapping com-
ments through a calculation lens, or even reject the
physical mapping reframing as irrelevant and stop pay-
ing attention. Perhaps a professor gives an extended
math consistency discussion, carefully explaining how
the math at hand is analogous to a more familiar math
idea. Maybe his students are framing the discussion as
invoking authority and instead hear a series of math facts
to be accepted on faith.
Bing & Redish Epistemological Framing
16
We conjecture that there are (at least) two ways to
combat such teacher/student framing misunderstandings.
The first is for a teacher to simply exaggerate her fram-
ing cues. If the situation calls for conveniently quoting a
rule, spend a little extra time explaining your reasons for
doing so. If its obvious to you, as a teacher, that a
physical mapping discussion is in order, make that (and
your reasons for believing so) more explicit to your
class. More explicit framing cues might lessen the prob-
ability of miscommunication due to a framing mismatch.
A second antidote to teacher/student framing mis-
matches is for the teacher to gather more evidence, in
real time, of her students framing. In a traditional lec-
ture, information tends to only flow from the professor to
the students. Such a lecturer will have scant evidence
available for how her students are framing the lesson.
Asking questions that have simple phrase-like answers
may give a teacher evidence of the simple correctness or
incorrectness of the classs answers, but is only of mar-
ginal help for inferring the students epistemological
framing. Engaging ones students in extended discus-
sions during class is the best way to get valuable framing
evidence. Asking open-ended questions that give stu-
dents a wide range of possible responses will require
them to explain their reasoning to a much greater depth.
As they explain their justifications for their claims, their
framing will become much more apparent to the teacher.
Framing mismatches will become much easier to diag-
nose in real time.
2. Being aware of framing can help an instructor
better diagnose the cause of students difficulties
As instructors, we all have experience of students
who appear oblivious to a course of action or a solution
method that seems utterly obvious to us. The simplest
explanation for such a phenomenon can sometimes be
that those students just dont have the requisite knowl-
edge or experience that the problem demands.
However, if an instructor is aware of the fact that stu-
dents may get stuck in a framing that limits their ac-
cess to tools and knowledge they may not only possess
but be good at, the instructor will have an alternate ex-
planation of the difficulty the students may be experienc-
ing. That instructor may be less likely to write off his
students as incompetent and more likely to try prodding
them into a different framing. Developing homework
questions comes to be seen as creating tasks of sufficient
richness and complexity to help students develop these
frame-juggling skills on their own. This issue is dis-
cussed in more detail in reference 1b, Chapter 7.
Implications for future research
This analysis opens possibilities for significant re-
search efforts by illuminating a dimension of student
performance that is rarely considered as a component of
student difficulties but that potentially plays a critical
and controlling role for many students. Much more
work is needed, both in improving the methodology of
identifying student framing and in explicating the role
framing difficulties play in the typical classroom. An-
other interesting question is how (if at all) physics exper-
tise differs from novice problem solving behavior when
viewed through a framing analysis lens. We conjecture
that experts are more likely to both create broader fram-
ings that blend more knowledge and skills and to explic-
itly search for coherence between different framings, but
this remains an open research question.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We gratefully acknowledge the support and sugges-
tions of many members of the University of Maryland
Physics Education Research Group and of visitors to the
group including David Hammer, Andrew Elby, Rachel
Scherr, Rosemary Russ, Ayush Gupta, Brian Frank,
Saalih Allie, and Steve Kanim. This material is based
upon work supported by the US National Science Foun-
dation under Awards No. REC 04-4 0113, DUE 05-
24987, and a Graduate Research Fellowship. Any opin-
ions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations ex-
pressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and
do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Sci-
ence Foundation.
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See ref. 1b, Chapter 7.
50
The integrals with x and y omit factors that correspond
to the cosine of the angle between the force and the dis-
placement.
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See ref. 1b, Chapter 7.
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