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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JONATHAN DANIEL,
Plaintiff,
v.
THE CITY OF PEORIA, JIM ARDIS,
Mayor of Peoria, in his individual
capacity; PATRICK URICH, City
Manager of Peoria, in his individual
capacity; CHRISTOPHER SETTI,
Assistant City Manager of Peoria, in his
individual capacity; SAM RIVERA,
Chief Information Officer for the City of
Peoria, in his individual capacity;
STEVEN SETTINGSGAARD, former
Chief of Police of the Peoria Police
Department, in his individual capacity;
Peoria Police Detectives JAMES
FEEHAN and STEVIE HUGHES, JR., in
their individual capacities,
Defendants.
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COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Plaintiff Jonathan Daniel, by his attorneys, complains of Defendants as follows:
I. INTRODUCTION
1. This is a civil rights lawsuit. Mr. Daniel charges a conspiracy to violate and the
violation of his rights under the First and Fourth Amendments to the United States Constitution
and of Article I, Sections 4 and 6 of the Illinois Constitution and brings his action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. 1983 and 1988, 28 U.S.C. 2201 et seq., and the laws and constitution of the State of
Illinois. Mr. Daniel seeks declaratory and injunctive relief and monetary damages.
E-FILED
Wednesday, 11 June, 2014 04:05:41 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
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2. From March 9 through March 19, 2014, Mr. Daniel tweeted from a Twitter
account, @peoriamayor, which used a picture of Jim Ardis (Ardis), the mayor of Peoria, as the
accounts avatar. Displeased with the content of the tweets, Defendants embarked on a plan to
shut down the account and identify and punish its creator in violation of his constitutional rights.
As part of Defendants plan, Peoria Police Department officers searched Mr. Daniels residence,
seized his personal property, reviewed personal information on Mr. Daniels electronic devices
and in his mail, and arrested, detained, and interrogated Mr. Daniel purportedly for the crime of
false personation of a public official.
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
3. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1331, 1343,
and 1367.
4. Venue is proper in this judicial district pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1391.
III. PARTIES
5. Plaintiff Jonathan Daniel is 29 years old. He is a U.S. Citizen and resident of
Peoria, Illinois.
6. Defendant the City of Peoria (the City) is a municipal corporation under the
laws of the State of Illinois and operates the Peoria Police Department.
7. Defendant Jim Ardis (Ardis) is now and at the time of the events complained of
herein was Mayor of Peoria. He is sued in his individual capacity.
8. Defendant Patrick Urich (Urich) is now and at the time of the events
complained of herein was City Manager of Peoria. The City has delegated to Urich as City
Manager final policy making authority for all municipal departments, including the Peoria Police
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Department. See Peoria Municipal Code 2-281 and 24-35 to -37; 65 ILCS 5/5-3-7. He is sued
in his individual capacity.
9. Defendant Christopher Setti (Setti) is now and at the time of the events
complained of herein was Assistant City Manager of Peoria. He is sued in his individual
capacity.
10. Defendant Sam Rivera (Rivera) is now and at the time of the events complained
of herein was Chief Information Officer for the City of Peoria. He is sued in his individual
capacity.
11. Defendant Steve Settingsgaard (Settingsgaard) was at the time of the events
complained of herein Chief of Police of the Peoria Police Department. He is sued in his
individual capacity.
12. Defendants James Feehan (Feehan) and Stevie Hughes, Jr. (Hughes) are now
and at the time of the events complained of herein were detectives in the Peoria Police
Department. They are sued in their individual capacities.
13. At all times relevant to this complaint, all Defendants were acting under color of
state law and their conduct constituted state action.
IV. FACTS
Illinois FalsePersonationStatute
14. Illinois false personation statute, 720 ILCS 5/17-2, prohibits various types of
false personation, which the statute divides into five categories: false personation for the purpose
of soliciting a material benefit, 720 ILCS 5/17-2 (a), false personation of public officials and
employees, 720 ILCS 5/17-2 (b), fraudulent advertisement of a corporate name, 720 ILCS 5/17-2
(c), producing, selling, and distributing false law enforcement badges, 720 ILCS 5/17-2 (d), and
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falsely representing oneself as having received a government medal, 720 ILCS 5/17-2 (e). The
statute provides that false personation may be accomplished through the internet or electronic
communication under 720 ILCS 5/17-2 (a)(1) through (a)(7) and (e) only. 720 ILCS 5/17-2 (g).
15. False personation of a public official, 720 ILCS 5/17-2 (b)(2), prohibits a person
from knowingly and falsely represent[ing] himself or herself to be . . . [a] public officer or a
public employee or an official or employee of the federal government.
16. Illinois provision for false personation of a public official criminalizes only
representations made in person. Illinois courts require as an element of the offense that there be
an intent to deceive the public that the impersonator is acting in the official capacity of a public
official. Application of Illinois provision for false personation of a public official to speech
made without such an intent violates the First Amendment and Article I, Section 4 of the Illinois
State Constitution.
Eventsof MarchandApril 2014
17. On or around March 9, 2014, Mr. Daniel began posting tweets to a Twitter
account he created, @peoriamayor (the Twitter account), which used a picture of Ardis as the
accounts avatar. The avatars Twitter biography read I am honored to serve the citizens of our
great city.
18. On or before March 12, 2014, Mr. Daniel added the words parody account to
the end of the Twitter account biography.
19. The Twitter accountwhich juxtaposed the mayors clean-cut image with a series
of tweets conveying in a crude or vulgar manner an exaggerated preoccupation with sex, drugs,
and alcoholwas a satiric form of expression protected by the First Amendment and the Illinois
Constitution. The Twitter account was not reasonably believable as conveying the voice or
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message of the actual mayor. Mr. Daniel had no intention of deceiving people into believing the
account was actually operated by a representative of the mayor or the mayor himself, and no
reasonable person could conclude such an intent from the content of the tweets or the Twitter
accounts profile page.
20. On or around March 11, 2014, Defendants Ardis, Urich, Setti, Rivera,
Settingsgaard, Feehan, and Hughes, communicated about the Twitter account, came to a meeting
of the minds, and agreed to shut it down and punish its creator. In furtherance of this conspiring
agreement, Defendants engaged in the conduct set forth in paragraphs 21 through 49 below.
21. From March 11, 2014 through April 18, 2014, Defendants Ardis, Urich, Setti,
Rivera, Settingsgaard, Brady, Feehan, and Hughes worked jointly and individually to have the
Twitter account shut down and to punish the creator of the account because Ardis and the other
defendants objected to the lawful, protected content of the tweets and because Ardis was
personally offended by the Twitter account.
22. On March 11, 2014, Urich directed Rivera and Feehan to work to shut down the
Twitter account and find out the identity of its creator. Rivera then contacted Twitter and
ordered the account be shut down, or that control of the account be given to the City. In
response, Twitter requested Rivera upload a copy of a government-issued photo identification of
Ardis in order to demonstrate Rivera had authority to act on Ardis behalf. Rivera then asked
Setti to upload Ardis drivers license, which he did.
23. Also on March 11, 2014, Feehan began investigating whether the account violated
any criminal statutes, and concluded that it did not. He communicated his conclusions to
Settingsgaard, who reported Feehans findings to Ardis, Urich, and Rivera.
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24. On March 12, 2014, Ardis directed Urich, Settingsgaard, and Rivera to act with a
sense of urgency with respect to shutting down the Twitter account. Settingsgaard reported to
Urich he thought Rivera was handling the matter. By the evening, Rivera had been unable to get
a response from Twitter, so Setti asked Settingsgaard if the police department could continue
working on shutting down the account and identifying who created it.
25. On March 13, 2014 Settingsgaard asked Feehan if there was anything he could do
to speed up shutting down the account. Feehan then tried to contact Twitter and resumed
investigating whether the account violated a criminal statute. Feehan erroneously claimed that
the Twitter account violated Illinois criminal prohibition of false personation of a public official
under 720 ILCS 5-17-2 (b)(2). Settingsgaard then reported to Ardis and Urich that Feehan had
identified a statute which the Twitter account violated, the false personation statute, and asked
Ardis if he wanted to file a formal complaint and pursue prosecuting the creator of the Twitter
account. Ardis responded that he absolutely wanted to prosecute.
26. On or around March 14, 2014, Feehan, at Settingsgaards direction, applied in the
Circuit Court of Peoria County for a warrant to obtain from Twitter evidence of the offense of
false personation. Feehan did not have probable cause or any other lawful basis to apply for the
warrant. A Peoria County Circuit Court judge issued the warrant and Defendants used the
warrant to obtain the internet protocol address (IP address) used to connect to the Twitter
account.
27. On March 17, 2014, Settingsgaard reported to Ardis and Urich that a warrant had
been issued and sent to Twitter.
28. On March 20, 2014, Ardis and the City, in a letter to Twitter written by the
Interim Corporation Counsel for the City, threatened to file a federal lawsuit seeking an
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injunction against Twitter to terminate the Twitter account. Twitter suspended the Twitter
account that same day.
29. On or around March 29, 2014, Hughes applied in the Circuit Court of Peoria
County for a warrant to obtain from Comcast evidence of the offense of false personation.
Hughes did not have probable cause or any other lawful basis to apply for the warrant. A Peoria
County Circuit Court judge issued the warrant to obtain evidence of false personation.
Defendants used the warrant to obtain the name and address of the subscriber associated with the
IP address used to connect to the Twitter account.
30. On April 8, 2014, Ardis was informed that Comcast had returned information to
the police department in response to the warrant.
31. On April 14, 2014, Ardis requested information from the police department on the
status of the investigation of the Twitter account.
32. On or around April 15, 2014, Hughes applied in the Circuit Court of Peoria
County for a warrant to search the premises identified by Comcast as the residence of the IP
subscriber, 1220 N. University Street in Peoria (the premises), and seize evidence pertaining to
the offense of false personation, including any electronic device which can store digital media,
books, papers, records, photographs, recordings, [and] documents, and any cocaine, heroin,
[and] drug paraphernalia.
33. On April 15, 2014, Defendants Hughes executed the search warrant for the
premises. Two of Mr. Daniels roommates and two guests were at the premises when the police
officers arrived to execute the search warrant. A number of pieces of mail, as well as computers,
telephones, and other electronic devices were seized, including Mr. Daniels laptop, computer
processor, and mail.
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34. At the time the search warrant was executed, Mr. Daniel was at his place of
employment.
35. Shortly after his work shift had ended, Mr. Daniel received a telephone call from
Hughes, who told Mr. Daniel that he needed to come to the station. Mr. Daniel informed Hughes
of his whereabouts and Hughes then directed two police officers to bring Mr. Daniel to the police
station. Hughes did not have an arrest warrant, probable cause, or any other lawful basis to
direct the arrest Mr. Daniel.
36. When the police officers arrived at Mr. Daniels place of employment, they
ordered Mr. Daniel to get in the police car, performed a pat-down search of Mr. Daniel, placed
him into the car, and brought him to the police station. During this period, Mr. Daniel reasonably
believed he was not free to leave the officers presence.
37. At the police station, Mr. Daniel was told he had to take everything out of his
pockets before entering an interrogation room. Mr. Daniel emptied the contents of his pockets,
which included his cellular telephone, and placed the items on a chair in the station. He was then
taken into an interrogation room. Mr. Daniel reasonably believed he was not free to leave the
interrogation room or the police station.
38. In the interrogation room, Hughes told Mr. Daniel that he wanted to talk to Mr.
Daniel about impersonating a public official on social media. Hughes then orally informed
Daniel of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona. Mr. Daniel invoked his right to an attorney and
Hughes then left the room.
39. Shortly thereafter Hughes returned to the room with Mr. Daniels cellular
telephone and ordered Mr. Daniel to power off the phone because it was being confiscated. Mr.
Daniel objected to the confiscation of his only phone, particularly because he used it to
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coordinate visits with his three and five year old sons and with his sick grandmother, who often
called him when she needed help. Hughes told Mr. Daniel he could not have his phone back, but
that he was now free to leave.
40. In the evening of April 15, 2014, and again on April 16, 2014, Ardis
communicated with Settingsgaard and affirmed his desire to prosecute whoever created the
Twitter account.
41. On April 17, 2014 Hughes applied in the Circuit Court of Peoria County for a
warrant to search the contents of Mr. Daniels cellular telephone for evidence of false
personation and for a warrant to obtain from Google evidence of false personation in the email
account associated with the Twitter account. Hughes did not have probable cause or any other
lawful basis to apply for either warrant. A Peoria County Circuit Court judge issued both
warrants.
42. On information and belief, Hughes and Feehan thereafter searched Mr. Daniels
electronic devices for records of communications and other data.
43. After being released from police custody, Mr. Daniel believed he would be
charged and prosecuted for a crime for which he could serve up to a year in prison. His
relationships with his roommates were strained because of the search of the premises and the
seizure of his roommates property. He worried police officers would view highly personal
digital photographs, written electronic documents, and texts on his laptop, computer, and
telephone.
44. Mr. Daniel was forced to not visit with his children on April 18 and 19 because he
feared his children would witness his arrest. He believed he might have to leave Peoria because
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Defendants had shown they would take illegal actions against him and he feared they would
continue to do so in retaliation for the Twitter account.
45. Mr. Daniel learned he would not be charged with a crime when it was reported in
the Peoria Journal Star on April 23, 2014. The Peoria Journal Star article stated that the States
Attorney of Peoria County decided not to prosecute Mr. Daniel for false personation of a public
official. The States Attorney stated that Mr. Daniels conduct did not violate the statute because
false personation of a public official under 720 ILCS 5/17-2(b)(2) had to be done in person and
the statute could not be violated over the Internet or through electronic communication.
46. After learning he would not be charged with a crime, Mr. Daniel twice went to the
police station to request the return of his property. His requests were denied. On April 24, 2014
Mr. Daniels counsel made a demand by email to Ardis and Settingsgaard for the immediate
return of Mr. Daniels property. Mr. Daniels personal property was returned to him on or
around May 2, 2014.
47. Each of the Defendants personally participated in the unlawful conduct described
herein which deprived Mr. Daniel of his constitutional rights, acted jointly and in concert with
the other Defendants who participated in or acquiesced to the unlawful conduct, failed to
intervene or stop other Defendants from engaging in the unlawful conduct though possessing the
power to do so, or knew of and condoned or approved of the unlawful conduct.
48. Each Defendant acted knowingly and intentionally, willfully and wantonly, or
with reckless or callous disregard for, or with deliberate indifference to Mr. Daniels rights.
49. Defendants unlawful conduct described herein directly and proximately caused
Mr. Daniels mental and emotional distress, loss of appetite, insomnia, anxiety, discomfort,
damage to reputation, and deprivation of his constitutional rights.
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50. Defendants unlawful conduct described herein directly and proximately caused
Mr. Daniel the loss of opportunity to engage in expression during the period when his cell phone
and other electronic devices were confiscated.
51. Because Defendants Ardis, Urich, and Settingsgaard continue to maintain
publicly that the actions taken against Mr. Daniel were lawful and proper, Mr. Daniel remains in
danger of being punished for exercising his right to free expression if he engages in the future in
speech that is derogatory towards the mayor.
52. Mr. Daniel has no adequate remedy at law and is irreparably harmed in that he
wishes to be able to parody, satirize, and otherwise engage in humorous expression about the
mayor and the City of Peoria in the futureincluding through the use of risqu languagebut is
chilled from doing so because he reasonably fears retaliation from Defendants if he engages in
such protected expression.
VI. CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
COUNT ONE:
53. The allegations of paragraphs 1 through 52 are realleged and incorporated by
reference as if fully set forth herein.
54. The actions of the Defendants described herein violate the rights of Mr. Daniel to
freedom of expression as guaranteed by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.
COUNT TWO:
55. The allegations of paragraphs 1 through 54 are realleged and incorporated by
reference as if fully set forth herein.
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56. The actions of the Defendants described herein violate the rights of Mr. Daniel to
be free from unreasonable searches, seizures, and invasions of privacy guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.
COUNT THREE:
57. The allegations of paragraphs 1 through 56 are realleged and incorporated by
reference as if fully set forth herein.
58. The actions of the Defendants described herein violate the rights of Mr. Daniel to
speak, write, and publish freely as guaranteed by Article I, Section 4 of the Illinois Constitution.
COUNT FOUR:
59. The allegations of paragraphs 1 through 58 are realleged and incorporated by
reference as if fully set forth herein.
60. The actions of the Defendants described herein violate the rights of Mr. Daniel to
be free from unreasonable searches, seizures, and invasions of privacy as guaranteed by Article I,
Section 6 of the Illinois Constitution.
COUNT FIVE:
61. The allegations of paragraphs 1 through 60 are realleged and incorporated by
reference as if fully set forth herein.
62. The actions of the Defendants described herein constitute a conspiracy that caused
the violation of Mr. Daniels right to freedom of expression and freedom from unreasonable
searches, seizures, and invasions of privacy as guaranteed by the First and Fourth Amendments
of the United States Constitution.
VII. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Mr. Daniel respectfully requests the following relief:
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A. A declaratory judgment that Defendants conspired to and violated Mr. Daniels
right to freedom of expression and his right to be free from unreasonable searches, seizures, and
invasions of privacy guaranteed by the First and Fourth Amendments of the United States
Constitution and Article I, Sections 4 and 6 of the Illinois Constitution.
B. Permanent injunctive relief prohibiting the City of Peoria from engaging in future
efforts to suppress constitutionally protected speech that is derogatory towards the mayor.
C. Compensatory damages, in an amount to be ascertained at trial, for the unlawful
suppression of Mr. Daniels freedom of expression and the unlawful detention, arrest, searches
and seizures complained of herein.
D. Punitive damages from individual defendants, in an amount to be ascertained at
trial, for Defendants reckless and callous disregard of Mr. Daniels constitutional rights
E. Attorneys fees, costs, and expenses, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988 and the Illinois
Civil Rights Act of 2003, 740 ILCS 23/1 et seq.
F. Such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and proper.
DATED: June 11, 2014 Respectfully submitted:
/s/ Harvey Grossman
Lead counsel for plaintiff
HARVEY GROSSMAN
KAREN SHELEY
ROSHNI SHIKARI
Roger Baldwin Foundation of ACLU, Inc.
180 N. Michigan Ave. Suite 2300
Chicago, IL 60601
(312) 201-9740
MARC O. BEEM
Miller Shakman & Beem
180 N. LaSalle St. Suite 3600
Chicago, IL 60601
(312) 263-3700
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