STEEL CATENARY RISER INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT

JOINT INDUSTRY PROJECT

Summary of JIP

Prepared for

U.S. Minerals Management
Service (MMS)

Reference No. 4-4-5-010/TN08
Rev. 1
April 2008
16350 Park Ten Place, Suite 202, Houston, Texas 77084, USA
T: 281 646 1071 F: 281 646 1382 E: [email protected]
GALWAY | ABERDEEN | HOUSTON | RIO | PERTH | PARIS | KUALA LUMPUR An ISO 9001 Company
Summary of JIP
Prepared for:

U.S. Minerals Management Service (MMS)

R
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e

N
o

4
-
4
-
5
-
0
1
0
/
T
N
0
8

R
e
v
.

1

A
p
r
i
l

2
0
0
8


REVISION HISTORY
Rev. Date Description Author Checked Project
0 15 April 2008 Issued for Information MH SB MH
1 24 April 2008 Comments Incorporated MH MD MH





Job No:
4-4-5-010
Document No:
4-4-5-010/TN08
No. of Pages
18 26 6
Classification:
Confidential
Distribution:
MCS,
MMS
Disclaimer
Only PDF Generated Versions of this Document are Approved by MCS

16350 Park Ten Place, Suite 202
Houston TX 77084 USA
T: +281-646-1071
F: +281-646-1382
E: [email protected]
W: www.mcs.com
GALWAY | ABERDEEN | HOUSTON | RIO | PERTH | PARIS | KUALA LUMPUR


Copyright 2008

Steel Catenary Riser Integrity Management JIP
39BSummary of JIP


Page ii Doc. No. 4- 4- 5- 010/ TN08, Rev. 1
April 2008


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The SCRIM (Steel Catenary Riser Integrity Management) Joint Industry Project was an industry-sponsored initiative,
managed and delivered by MCS, to develop industry guidelines for the integrity management of offshore
risers. The original scope of the JIP was to develop industry guidelines for the integrity management of steel
catenary risers, but wide industry participation and funding well over the initial target allowed the JIP to
extend its work into the integrity management of hybrid and top-tensioned riser systems.
The JIP was launched in October 2004. The project has been sponsored by 20 participants, comprised of
operators, regulators, contractors, equipment vendors, pipe mills and transportation companies.
This document presents a summary of the JIP as of March 2008. The scope of the JIP consisted of several
subtasks:
(i) Develop a systematic, risk-based approach to the integrity management of SCR field systems;
(ii) Provide a framework for structured record-keeping to allow periodic demonstration of fitness for
purpose and/or to justify extension of service life;
(iii) Survey of SCR and component potential failure modes;
(iv) Identify current best technology, emerging technologies, and technology gaps relating to for SCR
inspection and monitoring;
(v) Develop worked examples of methodology;
(vi) Provide a forum among JIP participants for informally sharing experiences in SCR integrity and
design technology;
(vii) Develop industry guidelines on SCR integrity management.
The methodology produced by the JIP is consistent with the approach and requirements of the of the new
API 2RD / ISO13628-7 (draft) Code of Practice for Dynamic Risers for Floating Production Installations
and the new US CFR 250 Part J (Draft, Oct 2007).
Steel Catenary Riser Integrity Management JIP
39BSummary of JIP


Page iii Doc. No. 4- 4- 5- 010/ TN08, Rev. 1
April 2008


CONTENTS
Section Page
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ....................................................................................................II
CONTENTS........................................................................................................................... III
GLOSSARY.............................................................................................................................. V
1 INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................................................1
1.1 BACKGROUND FOR JIP ..........................................................................................1
1.2 PARTICIPANTS............................................................................................................1
1.3 SCOPE.............................................................................................................................1
1.4 ASSUMPTIONS.............................................................................................................2
1.5 DELIVERABLES ..........................................................................................................2
2 INSPECTION AND MONITORING MEASURES.................................................................... 3
2.1 INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................3
2.2 INSPECTION & MONITORING TECHNOLOGY SURVEY.........................3
2.3 MONITORING METHODS......................................................................................3
2.4 CURRENT TECHNOLOGY .....................................................................................3
2.5 REAL-TIME VERSUS POST-PROCESSED DATA.............................................4
2.6 SUMMARY OF INSPECTION AND MONITORING METHODS................4
3 JIP IM METHODOLOGY............................................................................................................. 6
3.1 OVERVIEW...................................................................................................................6
3.2 SYSTEM SUBDIVISION.............................................................................................6
3.3 FAILURE MODES .......................................................................................................6
3.4 RISK ASSESSMENT ....................................................................................................7
3.4.1 Probability Index (P)..........................................................................................7
3.4.2 Consequence Index (C) .....................................................................................8
3.4.3 Integrity Management Index (IMI) .................................................................9
3.4.4 Mitigation Measures...........................................................................................9
Steel Catenary Riser Integrity Management JIP
39BSummary of JIP


Page iv Doc. No. 4- 4- 5- 010/ TN08, Rev. 1
April 2008


3.5 IM PLAN DEVELOPMENT......................................................................................9
3.5.1 Strategic Inspection Levels ...............................................................................9
3.5.2 Integrtiy Management Measures....................................................................10
3.5.3 Anomaly Limits ................................................................................................10
3.5.4 IM Plan..............................................................................................................11
3.6 INTEGRITY REVIEWS............................................................................................11
3.6.1 Comissioning Assessment...............................................................................11
3.6.2 Periodic Integrity Review................................................................................12
3.6.3 Ad Hoc Engineering Assessment ..................................................................12
3.6.4 Life Extension Assessment.............................................................................13
3.6.5 Deliverables.......................................................................................................13
4 REFERENCES.............................................................................................................................. 18
Steel Catenary Riser Integrity Management JIP
39BSummary of JIP


Page v Doc. No. 4- 4- 5- 010/ TN08, Rev. 1
April 2008


GLOSSARY

For the purposes of this report the following
definitions shall apply:
Anomaly
Any unacceptable monitoring or inspection result, or
observation. Anomalies may occur at any phase of
field development, and always require ad-hoc
engineering assessment of their significance to risk.
Consequence
Detrimental effect of a failure in terms of safety,
environmental, and/or economical impact.
Consequence Index (C)
Rating which denotes the consequence of a given
failure mode, accounting for the safety,
environmental and operational consequences of a
failure mode occurring. Typically, the rating is an
integer between 1 and 5. A high rating (5) represents
the most adverse consequences.
Cathodic Protection (CP)
An electrochemical corrosion control method
whereby the metal to be protected against corrosion
is made the cathode for a galvanic corrosion
mechanism. The dissolution reaction is transferred to
an anode which may be a galvanic anode or an
impressed current.
Defect
An anomaly attributable to material, manufacture,
installation or operational conditions outside of
specification or design conditions. A defect does not
necessarily lead to consequences.
Design pressure
The maximum (or minimum) pressure, inclusive of
operating pressure, surge pressure including shut-in
pressure, vacuum conditions and static pressure head.
Failure
Loss of structural fitness for purpose of the pipe
system. In practice failure constitutes a loss of
ability to transport product safely and effectively.
This may be catastrophic (the pipe ruptures or
breaks) or may constitute a minor uncontrolled loss
of pipe integrity or pipe. A failure is an unacceptable
extent of a defect, which always has consequences.
Failure Driver
Convenient classification under which several
possible modes of failure may be grouped together
(e.g. fatigue, installation, accidental damage). Such
groups facilitate the systematic identification of
failure modes that can occur from specific sources.
Failure Initiator (Root Cause)
An event or process associated with the design,
manufacture, installation, operation or maintenance,
which initiates the failure mechanism associated with
a given failure mode.
Failure Mechanism
The sequence of progressive stages from the
initiation of a pipe failure mode (i.e. Failure
Initiator) to the ultimate structural failure of the pipe
(i.e. rupture, collapse, leakage).
Failure Mode
The unique combination of a failure initiator and a
mechanism leading to pipe failure. All SCR failure
modes culminate either in rupture, collapse or
leakage of the riser.
Hazard
Dangerous conditions that can lead to negative
safety, environmental and financial consequences.
Hybrid Riser
A riser is the fluid conduit between static pipeline on
the seabed and hull pipe-work on the floating facility.
The fluid conduit components of a hybrid riser,
typically include the following components; metallic
rigid pipe, goosenecks, flexible jumpers, subsea
jumper/spool.
Hybrid Riser System
A hybrid riser system consists of a free-standing
vertical riser section located below the dynamic wave
zone, with flexible connections (jumpers) near the
surface, between the vertical riser section and the
vessel. The purpose of the flexible jumpers is to
decouple the motion of the vertical riser section from
the motion of the vessel. The vertical free standing
riser section is typically maintained upright as result
of buoyancy along the riser and/or a large buoyancy
tank located at the top of the riser. The hybrid riser
system is the combination of the riser(s) itself, all of
its ancillary components and any other structure or
Steel Catenary Riser Integrity Management JIP
39BSummary of JIP


Page vi Doc. No. 4- 4- 5- 010/ TN08, Rev. 1
April 2008


attached components upon whose integrity, the
integrity of the hybrid riser depends (e.g. buoyancy
tank, core pipe, distributed buoyancy, anchor, riser
bottom connection, flexible joints, metallic tapered
stress joints, chains, CP anodes, coatings, strakes or
fairings, insulation etc.)
Hydrogen Embrittlement
A process resulting in a decrease of the toughness or
ductility of a metal due to the presence of atomic
hydrogen in the metal.
Probability Index (P)
A rating representing the best estimate of the
likelihood of occurrence of a failure mode.
Typically, the rating is an integer between 1 and 5,
with 5 corresponding to the highest likelihood of
occurrence.
Service life
The period of time during which the SCR fulfils all
performance requirements.
Riser (or Dynamic Riser)
Generic term representing production, injection, lift,
or export risers, in dynamic service. A riser is the
fluid conduit between static pipeline on the seabed
and hull pipe-work on the floating facility.
Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC)
Stress corrosion cracking is a cracking process that
requires the simultaneous action of a corrodent and
sustained tensile stress.
SCR
All dynamic and static steel catenary riser (SCR)
sections including the end termination components of
the riser. An SCR is the fluid conduit between static
pipeline on the seabed and hull pipe-work on a
facility.
SCR System
An SCR system is the combination of the SCR itself,
all of its ancillary components and any other
structure or attached components upon whose
integrity the integrity of the SCR depends. The SCR
system includes, in addition to SCR pipe, all
ancillary components (e.g. coatings, porch,
receptacle, dynamically loaded I-tubes, flexible
joints, metallic tapered stress joints, mechanical
couplings, seabed holdback anchors, CP anodes,
holdback tethers, strakes or fairings, distributed or
other buoyancy, insulation)
TTR
All dynamic and static top-tension riser (TTR) pipe
sections from the seabed to hull pipe-work on the
floating facility, typically including the following
components: production tubing, inner casing,
external casing, specialty joints, and surface
equipment.
TTR System
A TTR system consists of a vertical riser section,
with flexible connections (jumpers) between the
vertical riser section and the vessel. The vertical
riser section is typically maintained upright as result
of either a buoyancy or mechanical tensioning
system. The hybrid riser system is the combination
of the riser itself, all of its ancillary components and
any other structure or attached components upon
whose integrity, the integrity of the hybrid riser
depends (e.g. tensioning system, hydraulic tieback
connector, flexible joints, metallic tapered stress
joints, padeyes, CP anodes, coatings, strakes or
fairings, insulation etc.)
Vortex Induced Motions (VIM)
Motions caused by oscillatory forces generated by
vortices formed from surface currents interacting
with a floating facility.
Visual Examination
Examination by eye, of parts and equipment for
visible defects in material and workmanship.
Vortex Induced Vibrations (VIV)
Vibration of a riser caused by oscillatory nature of
vortices released due to the interaction of the current
and riser.

Steel Catenary Riser Integrity Management JIP
39BSummary of JIP


1 Doc. No. 4- 4- 5- 010/ TN08, Rev. 1
April 2008


1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND FOR JIP
The SCRIM JIP was launched by MCS in October
2004 to develop a systematic, risk-based approach to
the integrity management of SCR field systems.
At the launch of the JIP, no widely-accepted
systematic approach had been developed for the
assessment of risk for steel catenary riser (SCR)
systems and the development of appropriate integrity
management strategy based on that risk. Risk-based
integrity management of SCRs has lagged behind
such approaches developed for other safety-critical
assets like pipelines and flexible risers.
The increased use of SCRs, especially for production
risers, together with failures of some SCR
components provided increased incentive for
ensuring that systematic integrity management
programs, combined with effective monitoring and
inspection methods, exist that are capable of
prevention or early detection of integrity problems
with such systems.
With additional participation and funding over the
originally planned JIP scope, the IM methodology
developed by the JIP was extended to include both
hybrid riser and top-tension riser (TTR) systems. A
consistent methodology is presented for addressing
these riser systems.
1.2 PARTICIPANTS
The project has been sponsored by 20 participants as
of September 2007; it has comprised of operators,
regulators, contractors, equipment vendors, pipe
mills and transportation companies.
Operators
Anadarko
BHP Billiton
BP
Chevron
Dominion (ENI)
ExxonMobil
Kerr Mc Gee
Shell
Petrobras
Transportation Companies
Enterprise Products Partners
Williams
Contractors and Manufacturers
Acergy
SBM-Imodco
Manufacturers
Oil States Industries
RTI Energy Systems
Techlam
Tenaris
V&M
Regulators
U.S. Department of Transportation, Pipeline
and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration (PHMSA)
U.S. Department of the Interior, Minerals
Management Service (MMS)
1.3 SCOPE
The original JIP scope consisted of several subtasks:
Develop a systematic, risk-based approach to the
integrity management of SCR field systems;
Provide a framework for structured record-
keeping to allow periodic demonstration of
fitness for purpose and/or to justify extension of
service life;
Survey of SCR and component potential failure
modes;
Identify current best technology, emerging
technologies, and technology gaps relating to for
SCR inspection and monitoring;
Develop worked examples of methodology;
Provide a forum among JIP participants for
informally sharing experiences in SCR integrity
and design technology;
Develop industry guidelines on SCR integrity
management.
Due to the inclusion of more JIP participants, the IM
methodology developed by the JIP was extended to
both hybrid riser and top-tension riser (TTR)
systems. For both of these riser systems, industry
guidelines were developed. These guidelines include
for each riser system:
Application of integrity management
methodology;
Failure modes detailing the most likely
mechanisms culminating in a structural inability
of the riser system to produce fluid;
Example integrity management measures for
each failure mode
This document provides a summary of the inspection
and monitoring measures and the general IM
methodology that was developed by the JIP.
Steel Catenary Riser Integrity Management JIP
39BSummary of JIP


2 Doc. No. 4- 4- 5- 010/ TN08, Rev. 1
April 2008


1.4 ASSUMPTIONS
It is a fundamental assumption in this JIP that all
riser systems have been designed in accordance with
a recognized industry code of practice for riser
design.
Failure modes considered by this approach are
associated with structural failure of a riser system
(e.g. rupture or leakage) rather than flow assurance
failures (i.e. blockage). Additionally, any failure of a
riser component (e.g. buoyancy module) was treated
as an intermediary step leading to the structural
failure of the system.
1.5 DELIVERABLES
To date, the following reports and guidelines
documents have been issued:
SCR Inspection and Monitoring Methods (Rev. 0)
Guidelines for the Integrity Management of SCRs
(Rev. 1)
Appendix A: SCR Pipe
Appendix B: Mechanical Connectors
Appendix C: Ancillary Equipment
SCR Integrity Management Strategy: Worked
Example (Rev. 0)
Guidelines for the Integrity Management of
Hybrid Risers (Rev. 0)
Appendix A: Components
Appendix B: System Failure Modes
Guidelines for the Integrity Management of Top-
Tension Risers (Rev. 0)
Appendix A: Fluid Conduit System
Appendix B: Support Structure
Document management software was also developed
over the course of the JIP and has been made
available to participants.
All deliverables have been made available to
participants via the SCRIM JIP website. The
appendices for the guidelines documents detail riser
system failure modes with example integrity
management measures in a manageable manner.

Steel Catenary Riser Integrity Management JIP
39BSummary of JIP


3 Doc. No. 4- 4- 5- 010/ TN08, Rev. 1
April 2008


2 INSPECTION AND
MONITORING MEASURES
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Several monitoring and inspection technologies are
available to operators to provide the information
necessary to measure riser performance as part of an
integrated IM program.
Information gained from the early monitoring
systems has allowed operators to quantify structural
response of risers and reduce some important design
uncertainties. These initial monitoring systems also
provided several lessons-learned which have
contributed useful input to the development of the
next generation of monitoring capabilities.
2.2 INSPECTION & MONITORING
TECHNOLOGY SURVEY
As part of the scope of the SCRIM JIP, an extensive
list of vendors/manufacturers was identified who
between them offered a variety of monitoring and
inspection technologies.
The survey was based on information received from
these vendors in the form of one or all of the
following formats:
Technical information and/or brochures
Direct face-to-face meetings
Completed (standard form) technical
questionnaires
Answer to detailed technical questions
A total of approximately forty companies were
surveyed in all, representing a combination of both
mature and emerging technologies.
A detailed examination of each technology was
undertaken with the objective of providing the
operators with information on each of the
fundamental inspection and monitoring technologies
offered by vendors, together with the deployment
experience of specific technologies, the experience of
individual companies and some desensitized project
lessons learned.
2.3 MONITORING METHODS
A high-level overview of some of the key parameters
that may be monitored as part of an IM program is
presented in Figure 2-1. Such parameters are
typically some of the key inputs into the riser design
process, and therefore can provide a useful design
validation or integrity check when monitored during
service. A periodic analysis of riser integrity which
had access to such monitored information might
allow designers to calibrate models and validate
design assumptions, thereby allowing an integrity
check during riser operation.
Taking from Figure 2-1 the example of stress/strain
monitoring, a more detailed breakdown of some of
the fundamental technologies is presented in Figure
2-2 to illustrate the typical process by which the
surveyed vendor information has been compiled and
presented. An example is provided of the systems
available for monitoring stress. The various
technologies available are detailed (strain gauges,
fibre optics, LVDTs). Also presented are details of
the various sensors for each technology (e.g. metallic
and silicone strain gauges) and the various
transmission methods currently available to transmit
the data to a central storage unit (copper conductors,
fibre optics, acoustic modems).
A secondary goal of the industry survey was to
survey emerging technologies for future possible
SCR integrity application (e.g. fibre optics, direct
fatigue measurement methods etc.). Some of these
technologies are relatively mature and their
implementation to SCRs may be what is relatively
new. Furthermore, some of the technologies had yet
to be implemented while some had recently been
qualified or deployed.
In keeping with the monitoring goals of the SCRIM
methodology, understanding the limitations and
advantages of the various available monitoring and
inspection methods has made it possible to group
these techniques into the Strategic Inspection Levels
(predictive, detective, basic) required to mitigate a
given level of risk.
2.4 CURRENT TECHNOLOGY
Current sensor technology is capable of measuring
and monitoring riser response precisely and
accurately, using a variety of different sensors and
methods. However the application of this technology
to the offshore environment, where access is limited,
installation is difficult and environmental conditions
such as pressure and temperature may be onerous,
can present challenges to the qualification, long-term
durability, or other limits of such systems.
Therefore, technology gaps have been detailed in
terms of:
Qualification or ability to deploy emerging
technologies;
Remaining uncertainties in design inputs and
riser response.
Steel Catenary Riser Integrity Management JIP
39BSummary of JIP


4 Doc. No. 4- 4- 5- 010/ TN08, Rev. 1
April 2008


2.5 REAL-TIME VERSUS POST-
PROCESSED DATA
In certain situations real time data is necessary and
useful to an operator. Examples of this may be
vessel position and offset, operating temperature and
pressure. In other situations the availability of real
time data may be expensive to acquire or not of
immediate use to an operator. An example of this
might be vortex induced vibration (VIV)
measurements, unless coupled to real-time fatigue
software. Such data, if not practical to acquire and
post-process on-line, may be later post-processed to
determine accumulated fatigue damage and
associated remaining fatigue life.
The requirement for real time data will typically have
a consequential influence other factors in the design
of a monitoring system, by determining the
requirements for data transmission and analysis.
Such a decision may be a cost issue for several of the
monitoring technologies and whether to have an on-
line vs. an off-line system is typically a strong driver
in the design, specifications and ultimately the cost of
any monitoring system.
2.6 SUMMARY OF INSPECTION
AND MONITORING METHODS
A single inspection method is typically not capable
of providing all of the information required from a
riser monitoring program. A combination of
complimentary inspection methods with analytical,
metallurgical, operational history and process
knowledge is necessary to provide a more complete
picture of riser response. An integrated set of
measures typically provides the most effective basis
for the management of a riser. In order to achieve
this goal a clear understanding of the limitations and
advantages of each technique is necessary.
A single project may need to consider the monitoring
of one or a small number of representative risers.
Response may be inferred for other risers based on
useful data from a single monitored riser combined
with calibrated analytical models of others. Short
term monitoring and inspection of a riser and
environmental variables also has the potential to
enable the operator to better understand the structural
response of a riser, offering the potential to eliminate
key uncertainties which increased perceived risk at
the design stage.

Steel Catenary Riser Integrity Management JIP
39BSummary of JIP


5 Doc. No. 4- 4- 5- 010/ TN08, Rev. 1
April 2008


Figure 2-1 Breakdown of Monitoring Methods

Figure 2-2 Breakdown of Stress/Strain Monitoring Systems

DAQ
Stress/Strain
Fibre
Optic
Interferometer Distributed FBG
Strain
Gauge
Semi
Conductor
Metallic
Acoustic
Modem
Fibre
Optic
Copper
Conductor
Optical Detector Strain Gauge
Conditioner
PC
Storage
Sensor Technology
Sensor Type
Signal Conditioner
Transmission
Data Storage
Legend:
Measurand
LVDT
Signal
Conditioner
Monitoring
Acceleration
Stress/
Strain
Metal Loss Inclination Metocean Temperature Pressure
Crack
Growth
Steel Catenary Riser Integrity Management JIP
39BSummary of JIP


6 Doc. No. 4- 4- 5- 010/ TN08, Rev. 1
April 2008


3 JIP IM METHODOLOGY
3.1 OVERVIEW
An overview of the approach proposed by JIP for the
development and implementation of an Integrity
Management Program for riser systems is presented
in Figure 3-1. The methodology can be summarized
as follows:
1. Subdivide the system into integrity groups based
on similarity of service and risks to which
groups of risers are exposed.
2. For each group, define the Failure Modes to
which the integrity groups are exposed.
Typically, the most onerous condition of the
grouped items is considered when assessing
Failure Modes.
3. Calculate an Integrity Management Index as the
product of the Probability and Consequence
Indices for each relevant Failure Mode. The
Probability Index is a function of proximity to
design limit and associated uncertainties; the
Consequence Index quantifies the safety,
environmental, and economical cost of a failure.
4. Assess whether any prevention or mitigation
measures are available for the risk. In certain
cases, prevention or mitigation measures may be
more cost-efficient to implement than the in-
service integrity management measures required
to address a higher risk.
5. Develop Integrity Management (IM) Strategy
consistent with the risks associated with relevant
Failure Modes. An IM Strategy consists of a
combination of the following available
measures:
Monitoring Measures
Inspection Measures
Analysis and Testing
Operational Procedures
Preventative Maintenance Measures
Remedial Maintenance Measures
Anomaly limits and implementation frequency
for all measures are crucial components of any
IM strategy.
6. Determine key issues and schedule for Integrity
Reviews. The results of the SCR integrity
management program are periodically reviewed
relative to the anomaly limits, and summarized
in a Fitness Statement. The Fitness Statement
reports any deviations that need immediate
and/or long term action and any updates to the
IM Measures for the future.
The deliverables of the overall IM process are:
Integrity Management Plan, which describes
each of the IM Measures applied as part of the
overall IM program together with their
frequency of application. This document is
updated and maintained throughout field life.
Periodic Fitness Statements, which are the
outputs of periodic reviews of system integrity.
These represent a statement of continued fitness
for purpose based on information gathered from
the IM Plan.
3.2 SYSTEM SUBDIVISION
Where the system is composed of several different
service functions or different designs, then the user
should subdivide the system into component groups
that share characteristics. Shared characteristics
reflect similar applications, and may include:
1. Service function (e.g. production risers, water
injection.);
2. Global configuration (e.g. all SCR through J-
tubes);
3. Riser internal diameter;
4. Design conditions (e.g. pressure, temperature).
Where system components of similar characteristics
are considered together, the most onerous condition
of the group should be considered when assessing
risk and developing integrity monitoring strategy.
By grouping systems in this way, only one risk
assessment from each application need then be
considered.
3.3 FAILURE MODES
Fundamental to the approach developed by the
SCRIM JIP was the need for a comprehensive list of
Failure Modes for riser systems and their
components. The SCRIM JIP put much effort into
developing long-lists of failure modes for SCR,
hybrid riser, and TTR systems through a combination
of design and construction experience combined with
consultation with component vendors and operators.
Well over 200 failure modes were identified for each
type of system, detailing the most likely mechanisms
culminating in a structural inability of the riser
system to produce fluid.
To facilitate risk assessment and the identification of
mitigation and integrity management measures,
Steel Catenary Riser Integrity Management JIP
39BSummary of JIP


7 Doc. No. 4- 4- 5- 010/ TN08, Rev. 1
April 2008


Failure Modes were defined as the combination of
each the following elements:
Failure I nitiator, the event or process that
initiates a failure mode;
Failure Mechanism, the sequence of stages
after initiation which lead to ultimate structural
failure (i.e. either rupture or leakage);
Potential Mitigation Measures, typical options
available to the operator to mitigate and reduce
high risk;
Potential Design Uncertainties, key
unknowns or uncertainties involved in the
design of the riser and/or its components that
may impact this failure mode.
An example of this format is presented in Table 3-1.
A unique identification, or Failure ID, was assigned
to each Failure Mode for easy reference.
Potential Failure Modes were presented in the
appendices of each guidelines document by Failure
Driver. Failure Drivers represent the generalized
source of failure (such as fatigue or accidental
damage) and allow for manageable assessment of
relevant Failure Modes. For a particular integrity
group, the list of Failure Modes can be reduced to
exclude Failure Modes to which the integrity group
is not likely exposed to during the design life.
The Failure Modes lists, though not exhaustive, were
intended to include the most likely sources for riser
system failure. A systematic hazard-identification
(HAZID) process may be necessary to identify any
additional Failure Modes to which the riser system
may be exposed for a specific intended application.
3.4 RISK ASSESSMENT
A series of quantitative risk assessments of all
relevant Failure Modes should be performed. The
initial risk assessment is based on information
available from the design basis. This assessment
should later be updated to consider any anomalies or
refinement of design knowledge.
The SCRIM JIP developed a modified indexing
analysis, applicable to a variety of risk assessment
philosophies and system types. The same method
can be extended to include other subsea systems.
For an indexing analysis, risk is defined as the
product of one score representing the probability of
failure (Probability Index) and another representing
the consequence of failure (Consequence Index).
This relative risk is referred to as an Integrity
Management Index (IMI). The IMI is used to guide
the user towards recommending available IM
strategies.
A high Integrity Management Index indicates that
integrity management measures are required, and
does not necessarily imply high risk of failure. It is
always assumed that any system with a high risk of
failure is not allowed to continue in service.
For the recommended method, the Probability Index
was defined to allow a transparent, systematic
assessment of risk, while being flexible to operator
experience. Methods for mitigating risk typically
modify the Probability Index, instead of the
Consequence Index or directly modifying the IMI.
The Integrity Management Index approach was
developed in order to:
Avoid emotive terms in the classification of
integrity management needs;
Allow easy adaptation between various
operators, where risk may be defined differently;
Avoid possible misinterpretation of high index
as high probability of failure;
Provide clear, easily applied assessment rules;
Ensure methodology gives the right answer in
terms of IM needs for some key Failure Modes;
Provide guidance in selecting integrity strategies.
3.4.1 PROBABILITY INDEX (P)
The Probability Index, P, was defined so that risks
associated with how the system is designed are separated
from risks inherent to uncertainties in design theory or
application.
It is assumed that any system in service is designed
according to code. For example, a riser whose
design pressure is greater than its burst pressure
would not knowingly be put into service. Failure
Modes where the system is designed well within the
relevant code allowable are typically eliminated, save
where significant uncertainties exist.
The inherent uncertainties in the design methodology
were classified in terms of:
Technology Step-Out (TSO)
Design Uncertainties (DU)
Anomalies (A)
Technology Step-Outs account for the uncertainty
associated with new applications or technology step-
outs from existing applications. For example, the use
of mechanical connections between SCR joints is
currently a technology step-out.
Steel Catenary Riser Integrity Management JIP
39BSummary of JIP


8 Doc. No. 4- 4- 5- 010/ TN08, Rev. 1
April 2008


Design Uncertainties reflect uncertainties concerning
design basis input and/or analytical technique. Some
typical design basis concerns include:
Metocean criteria
Well fluid characteristics
Soil stiffness
Operational temperature / pressure
Analytical uncertainties portray the limits of
applicable theories or modeling techniques. One of
the most prominent examples is vortex-induced
vibration response. Other examples include flexible
joint elastomer degradation and SCR touchdown
point response modeling. Many common design
uncertainties are listed with associated Failure
Modes.
Anomalies reflect uncertainty concerning predicted
behavior due to some significant level of defect.
Anomalies can occur at any stage of the system life.
In general, anomaly significance is determined by:
1. Size of anomaly;
2. Effect on code compliance.
Anomalies always require an Ad Hoc Engineering
Assessment to determine their significance.
Examples of anomalies include:
Larger than anticipated wall thicknesses that
were approved by the operator;
Greater than anticipated fatigue damage
accumulation due to hanging on tensioners
during weather down time;
Occurrence of extreme metocean conditions.
Anomaly limits (Section 3.5.3) define when an
anomaly has occurred.
The JIP methodology allows user expertise to
quantify the uncertainty in design input or prediction
of response. However, the effectiveness of the
method relies on the knowledge possessed by the
developer of IM Strategy.
Thorough and well chosen Input Sensitivity Studies
can provide useful assistance in understanding the
effect of a critical design inputs variability on
response (e.g. wall thickness tolerances effect on
stress or fatigue life). For this reason, strong benefit
was attributed to carefully choosing the Design Input
Sensitivity Studies which should be performed during
the design process.
3.4.2 CONSEQUENCE INDEX (C)
The Consequence Index, C, was defined by a scale of
increasing severity, which accounts for all safety,
environmental and operational consequences of
failure. Failure is always defined as the termination
of the integrity groups ability to perform its required
function.
Safety consequences consider potential impact on any
population near the integrity group, typically in terms
of injury and death. For subsea Failure Modes, these
consequences may be broadly defined by proximity
to a population. If a riser leaks in the touchdown
zone, it will not likely cause a direct threat of injury
or death to the personnel topside.
Environmental consequences only consider damage
to the environment. These consequences refer to the
ecological concerns, such as the possible impacts of
failure on marine mammals, birds, fish and shellfish,
and the natural habitats that support these resources.
An Environmental Impact Assessment is a good
resource for determining the environmental
consequence.
Operational consequences consider the significant
monetary costs associated with failure, specifically
loss of operating capability. Typically, these are
assessed in terms of shutdown time or reduction in
overall productivity.
A simple example scale is provided in Table 3-2.
This index was primarily driven by operational and
environmental concerns. Safety consequences were
only broadly defined on the overall consequence. As
such, the Consequence Index assigned to a specific
Failure Mode only varies over the life of the integrity
management cycle if there is some significant change
to the integrity group.
The proposed integrity management approach is
robust enough to allow the consequence index used
for a given application to be adjusted to align with
the consequence categories used by an individual
operator for other safety critical systems.
Steel Catenary Riser Integrity Management JIP
39BSummary of JIP


9 Doc. No. 4- 4- 5- 010/ TN08, Rev. 1
April 2008


3.4.3 INTEGRITY MANAGEMENT
INDEX (IMI)
The integrity management index was defined as:
IMI = P x C
Where
P = Probability index
C = Consequence index
This allowed implementation across the industry and
flexibility for different operators with different risk
assessment approaches.
The value obtained from this calculation is used to
choose from a variety of integrity techniques to
ensure the continued and safe operation of the
system.
3.4.4 MITIGATION MEASURES
Mitigation Measures are any action that will reduce
risk, and help form the preliminary basis for any IM
strategy. Mitigations always reduce the IMI,
typically by modifying the Probability Index. These
measures have been classified as either fabrication or
strategical measures.
Fabrication measures require some sort of
fabrication to implement, such as applying strakes to
an SCR to mitigate VIV. While some of these
measures can be implemented retroactively, most
must be added during the design phase. These
typically modify the Basic Probability Index, P
o
.
Strategical measures emphasize IM measures that
must be included in the IM strategy, such as
requiring the use of fresh water during a hydrotest.
Some of these broad measures might mitigate the
Consequence Index. Most of these measures modify
the Uncertainty Index, U.
Failure Modes which carry an unacceptable risk
should be addressed by applying mitigation
measures. The Failure Modes with high IMIs after
mitigation should be specifically addressed as part of
the detailed integrity management strategy.
3.5 IM PLAN DEVELOPMENT
Following a risk assessment, each failure mode is
assessed to determine the required level of integrity
management. Four Strategic Inspection Levels
(SILs) were identified to denote these integrity
management levels. Combinations of IM Measures
are selected according to SIL. An IM Strategy details
how these measures are implemented for each failure
mode, and form the basis of the IM Plan.
3.5.1 STRATEGIC INSPECTION
LEVELS
Four Strategic Inspection Levels were used to relate
the degree of required integrity management to the
degree of risk identified for a particular failure mode.
These levels, which are related graphically to the risk
matrix in Figure 3-3, were generically defined as:
5. None: Integrity management is not required;
6. Basic: Basic integrity management is required,
typically based in part on regulatory
requirements;
7. Detective: Detection of failure initiation or a
critical stage in the failure mechanism is
required;
8. Predictive: Integrity management measure must
be capable of predicting the remaining life.
Predictive IM measures require either the direct
monitoring of the progress towards failure or the
assignment of a degradation model to failure. A
failure degradation model analytically calculates the
progress and the associated remaining time to failure,
based on the input of measured data.
Realistically, all systems require some IM strategy.
Each failure mode of an integrity group will have an
individual SIL. As such, no system will have a SIL
of None for all Failure Modes. It is also unlikely that
a system will not require at least a SIL of Basic for
all Failure Drivers.
The typical IM Measures presented in the appendices
of the guideline documents included each methods
applicability to the different SILs. However, it is up
to the judgment of the user to:
1. Define the IMIs associated with each SIL;
2. Categorize the SILs available for each
procurable measure;
3. Assess where, when and how to implement the
measures.
Steel Catenary Riser Integrity Management JIP
39BSummary of JIP


10 Doc. No. 4- 4- 5- 010/ TN08, Rev. 1
April 2008


3.5.2 INTEGRTIY MANAGEMENT
MEASURES
Several measures are available to maintain the
integrity of a field system. Based on the required
Strategic Inspection Level for the IMI, an integrity
management strategy is selected from any
combination of measures. For simplicity, these
measures were identified under the following
categories:
Inspection Measures
Monitoring Measures
Analysis & Testing
Operational Procedures
Preventative Maintenance Measures
Remedial Maintenance Measures
Broadly, inspection and monitoring measures refer to
obtaining information about the system. Analysis &
testing measures refer to how the information is
assessed. Operational procedures, preventative
maintenance measures and remedial maintenance
measures refer to actions designed to prevent failure.
Inspection Measures serve as periodic critical
appraisals. Increasing frequency usually denotes
increased IMI levels. For subsea systems, inspection
options may require innovation. In particular, SCRs
subsea inspections are currently restricted to visual
ROV / AUV limits.
Monitoring Measures provide approximately
continuous measurements of either environmental or
structural conditions. Current sensor technology is
capable of measuring and monitoring response
extremely precisely and accurately, using a variety of
different sensors and methods.
Analysis & Testing Measures are designed to verify
design assumptions and assess the impact of any
variations. These measures include evaluation of
monitoring and inspection equipment. Reanalysis of
fatigue under monitored metocean conditions to
determine the actual remaining life is a typical A&T
Measure.
Operational Procedures establish specific guidelines
to avoid the most common risk-critical situations
during any planned operation. Some examples
include abandonment & recovery procedures, lifting
& handling procedures, and vessel exclusion zones.
Common ad-hoc events are also addressed in these
procedures, such as dropped object protocols.
Preventative Maintenance Measures are
modifications to system components prior to an
expected failure initiation or critical stage of failure
mechanism. They are scheduled to prevent
premature failure by servicing or replacing
equipment to reduce wear and maintain optimal
performance. Scouring marine growth, replacement
of anodes, and recalibration of instrumentation are
some examples. Manufacturer recommendations are
a primary source for these measures.
Remedial Maintenance Measures are modifications
to system components to address an unlikely failure
initiation or critical stage of failure mechanism. For
example, flexjoint degradation due to anomalously
high temperature may require the flexjoint to be
replaced. These measures are always initiated by an
Ad-Hoc Engineering Assessment after some Anomaly
Limit has been exceeded.
The IM Measures feed into each other. Dropped
object protocols should be included in Operational
Procedures. Following implementation of this
procedure, additional monitoring or remedial
maintenance measures may be required.
Table 3-3 provides further examples of available
integrity management options.
3.5.3 ANOMALY LIMITS
The bounds of acceptable behavior, or anomaly
limits, for a system must be defined for each non-
maintenance IM Measure implemented. Anomaly
limits are set within the most rigorous design,
operating, and qualification limits of the integrity
group. These anomaly limits establish when, prior to
design exceedance, further action is required.
Where practical, quantitative anomaly limits should
be defined. All subsequent IM actions are compared
to the predefined anomaly limits.
Some typical anomaly limits may include:
Acceptable H
2
S percent content in production
fluid;
Minimum detection limits for crack width,
length, and depth.
Steel Catenary Riser Integrity Management JIP
39BSummary of JIP


11 Doc. No. 4- 4- 5- 010/ TN08, Rev. 1
April 2008


Anomaly limits are not necessarily the same as
design limits. They are used to determine whether an
observed variation qualifies as an anomaly.
Anomalies can occur at any point during the service
life, such as:
Manufacture
Installation
Operation
All anomalies require an Ad-Hoc Engineering
Assessment to examine the significance of the
anomaly. Significance is judged at the very least on:
How badly the anomaly limit is exceeded;
If the anomaly affects code compliance.
Any significant anomalies require an updated risk
assessment, and the Ad-Hoc Engineering Assessment
should include any updates to the IM plan.
These assessments are discussed in Section 3.6.3.
3.5.4 IM PLAN
An IM Plan is developed from the IM Strategies,
expressly detailing all IM Measures with frequency
of implementation and anomaly limits. A detailed
description and schedule for at least one future
integrity review should be included, although a
schedule for several such reviews is not precluded.
Common IM Plan components include:
Identification of critical failure modes;
All Anomaly Limits;
Provisions for remediation of common
conditions found during integrity assessments,
listed by specific problem;
Recordkeeping provisions;
Detailed inspection checklists;
Personnel requirements to implement IM Plan;
Procedures for satisfying any regulatory
requirements regarding integrity management
programs;
Schedule and guidelines for Integrity Reviews,
which provide for continual evaluation and
assessment of the system.
A first-pass IM Plan typically is developed during
the design phase of a project, so that any IM
Measures requiring hardware can be incorporated
into the design. Any significant alteration to the
system or its operational conditions may require a
reassessment of the risk assessment and IM Plan.
Additionally, periodic reviews are required to:
Determine if the system behavior has been
adequately assessed;
Validate any uncertainties associated with high
risk failures;
Verify the IM Plan is implemented as specified;
Evaluate the effectiveness of the IM Plan.
A preliminary schedule and detailed procedure for at
least the first Integrity Review are critical
components of the IM Plan.
3.6 INTEGRITY REVIEWS
Integrity Reviews evaluate the performance, service
conditions, and IM Measures of the system and
determine if any modifications are required. Several
types of reviews are necessary over the life of the
system:
1. Commissioning Assessment
2. Periodic Integrity Review
3. Ad Hoc Engineering Assessment
4. Life Extension Assessments
A Commissioning Assessment is conducted to
determine if the IM Plan should be updated due to
any anomalies or non-conformances during
fabrication and installation. Periodic Integrity
Reviews assess the systems in-service condition over
prescribed intervals, while Ad Hoc Engineering
Assessments evaluate the significance of any
anomalies. Life Extension Assessments are
conducted towards the end of expected service life,
to determine if any extension is allowable.
After an Integrity Review, a Fitness Statement is
issued. Details for the next Integrity Review and any
changes to the IM Plan are specified in a Forward
Action Plan. The next Integrity Review will use the
Fitness Statement as a basis for comparison.
3.6.1 COMISSIONING ASSESSMENT
A Commissioning Assessment is conducted to assess
the accumulated effect any modifications during
fabrication and installation may have on the system
performance. Any anomalies should be identified in
manufacturing Non-Conformance Reports (NCRs)
and installation record books. These anomalies may
contribute additional Failure Modes which require an
update of the risk assessment and IM Plan, as
described by the process flow chart of Figure 3-1.
Steel Catenary Riser Integrity Management JIP
39BSummary of JIP


12 Doc. No. 4- 4- 5- 010/ TN08, Rev. 1
April 2008


3.6.2 PERIODIC INTEGRITY REVIEW
A Periodic Integrity Review assesses the in-service
performance, service condition, and IM Measures of
the system. Numerous reviews are completed during
the life of the system, based on the Strategic
Inspection Level and the intent of the review.
Periodic Integrity Reviews were classified as:
1. System Performance Assessments
2. Design Basis Validations
3. Plan Implementation Assessments
4. Plan Effectiveness Assessments
System Performance Assessments determine if the
systems behavior has been consistently within the
prescribed Anomaly Limits since the previous
Integrity Review. The results of all IM Measures and
Ad Hoc Engineering Assessments from this cycle are
reviewed, comparing performance measures to pre-
defined Anomaly Limits. The frequency for these
assessments is determined by the implementation
frequency associated with the relevant IM Strategies.
A System Performance Assessment serves two
distinct purposes. It ensures that anomalies are not
overlooked, and provides a convenient benchmark of
the system performance. All inspection data,
monitoring data, analysis & testing results, and
maintenance records should be reviewed, and any
non-working equipment identified.
A Design Basis Validation examines key design
inputs and any inherent uncertainties in the design
methodology. As part of this process, the
appropriateness of the original Design Basis should
be checked against actual operating conditions and
up to date design practices.
The frequency of review is typically driven by the
most critical failure modes for an Integrity Group,
and emphasis is placed on the design uncertainties
associated with these failure modes. A Design Basis
Validation might typically occur once every 5 years.
A Plan I mplementation Assessment reviews all IM
Measures to ensure that they have been enacted as
specified in the IM Plan. Some items verified are:
IM Plan measures are all in place;
Monitoring devices have been calibrated
properly;
Analyses comply with approved methods;
Dropped Object Protocols have been followed
for any incidents;
Preventative maintenance schedule has been
observed.
A Plan Implementation Assessment is typically
justified after any change to the IM Plan.
Additionally, this review might be conducted every 5
years to ensure validity of IM Measure results.
A Plan Effectiveness Assessment examines if the IM
Plan has successfully maintained the integrity of the
system. Regulatory and company requirements
typically drive review frequency and define
successful. In general, the following items should
be assessed:
Does the IM Plan meet regulatory and company
standards?
Have any failures occurred or any Failure
Mechanisms progressed past their critical stage
unnoticed?
Are more effective measures available?
Any deficiencies at minimum require a change in
frequency of IM Measures. New IM Strategies may
be selected for Failure Modes insufficiently
managed. New, more effective IM Measures are
implemented if they are significant benefit to the IM
Plan.
3.6.3 AD HOC ENGINEERING
ASSESSMENT
Whenever an anomaly occurs, an Ad Hoc
Engineering Assessment is required to examine the
significance of the anomaly. This assessment should
be carried out as soon as possible after an anomaly
has been detected, and should not wait for the next
periodic review. Significance is judged at the very
least on:
The extent by which the anomaly limit is
exceeded;
If the anomaly affects code compliance or safety.
Any significant anomalies require an updated risk
assessment and IM Plan. Some typical anomalies
include:
Metocean conditions beyond anomaly limits (i.e.
post-extreme event)
Occurrence of defects or cracks;
Re-qualification after occurrence of accidental
loads;
Altered service conditions.
All Ad Hoc Engineering Assessments must include
an anomaly specific investigation and an assessment
of anomalys impact on the system. If possible,
factors that affect the anomalys significance are
identified. If the anomaly is assessed to be
Steel Catenary Riser Integrity Management JIP
39BSummary of JIP


13 Doc. No. 4- 4- 5- 010/ TN08, Rev. 1
April 2008


significant, some further action is required. This may
include:
Validation of uncertainties or design inputs;
Reassessment of Anomaly Limits;
Preventative maintenance;
Additional IM Measures;
Increased frequency of existing IM Measures.
Actions should be implemented based on a revised
risk assessment for the riser, with an increased
Anomaly rating for the Uncertainty Index.
Typical additional IM Measures include:
Retrofit temporary or permanent monitoring
equipment;
Removal of component for testing or repair;
Reduced service life;
Replacement schedule for component.
Remedial Maintenance Measures are always initiated
by a failure or an Ad Hoc Engineering Assessment
after some Anomaly Limit has been exceeded.
3.6.4 LIFE EXTENSION ASSESSMENT
The service life of the system should be reevaluated
if any of evaluations in the Periodic Review show
that the service life does not meet the design
requirements. An example of this may be that an
anomaly occurs which reduces the remaining service
life of the riser.
If an operator wishes to extend the life of an SCR
past its original design, a reevaluation of the design
life is required. This assessment should include a
new Design Basis, based on any updated
information. It should consider fatigue life, extreme
response, and other factors which may affect the
response or service life of the system.
3.6.5 DELIVERABLES
The deliverables of the Integrity Review process are
typically a Fitness Statement and a Forward Action
Plan.
3.6.5.1 FITNESS STATEMENT
A Fitness Statement reports the current condition of
the Integrity Group and highlights any critical issues
pertaining to it from the Integrity Review. The
function of a Fitness Statement is to report ongoing
fitness for purpose to the operator.
The Fitness Statement must include:
Scope of the fitness assessment;
Details of monitoring or inspection results
assessed as part of the review;
Comparison with predefined anomaly criteria;
Deviations that need immediate and long term
corrective action or maintenance;
Recommendations for when to conduct and what
should be reviewed during the next evaluation;
Exceptions that are not addressed within this
fitness evaluation.
Guidelines for the Fitness Statements should be
specified in the IM Plan. It was recommended that
the Fitness Statements are structured to meet
regulatory compliance reporting requirements.
3.6.5.2 FORWARD ACTION PLAN
The Forward Action Plan specifies any necessary
modifications to the IM Plan. Corrective action or
maintenance is required only if anomalies come to
light from the Integrity Review. Frequencies for IM
Measures and Integrity Reviews may also be altered
on the basis of Integrity Review, with possible
revision as new techniques, methods or data become
available. The Forward Action Plan should address
all actions for at minimum the next Integrity Review
cycle.
The Forward Action Plan must include:
Forward plan for IM Strategies;
Information gained through preceding reviews;
New knowledge regarding the application of IM
Measures;
Updated system uncertainties;
New analysis techniques and methods.

Steel Catenary Riser Integrity Management JIP
39BSummary of JIP


14 Doc. No. 4- 4- 5- 010/ TN08, Rev. 1
April 2008


Figure 3-1 Flowchart of Riser Integrity Management Process



SYSTEM
SUBDIVISION
HAZID
FAILURE
MODES
FITNESS
STATEMENT
&
CHANGES TO
IM PLAN
MONITORING
&
INSPECTION
METHODS
PROBABILITY
CONSEQUENCE
GENERIC
FAILURE
MODES
BARRIERS &
MITIGATION
MEASURES
DEVELOP
INTEGRITY
MANAGEMENT
STRATEGY
Process Output Input
REMEDIAL OR
CORRECTIVE
MAINTENANCE
ACTIONS
INTEGRITY
REVIEW
OPERATIONAL
PROCEDURES
ANALYSIS AND
TESTING
PREVENTATIVE
MAINTENANCE
INSPECTION MONITORING
ANOMALY LIMITS ANOMALY LIMITS ANOMALY LIMITS ANOMALY LIMITS
RISK
ASSESSMENT
INTEGRITY
MANAGEMENT
PLAN
Steel Catenary Riser Integrity Management JIP
39BSummary of JIP


15 Doc. No. 4- 4- 5- 010/ TN08, Rev. 1
April 2008


Table 3-1 Example Failure Modes
Failure Mode
ID Mode Initiator Mechanism
Potential Uncertainties
Potential Mitigation
Measures
SL1 Pipe rupture due to
excessive facility
offset
(Inadequate
mooring)
Mooring line
failure due to
inadequate
design, leading
to excessive
facility offset
1. Mooring line failure
and excessive
excursions
2. Excessive wall
tension
3. Rupture
Vessel Motions
Mooring line response
Metocean conditions
S/N data
Increased mooring design
conservatism
Move vessel/ change out
strategy
Better specifications for
metocean and motion inputs
to riser design
Riser design review when
out of specification
Two line failure survival
mooring line design
SL2 Pipe rupture due to
excessive facility
motions
(Facility VIM)
Excessive
surface
currents
inducing
facility VIM
1. Vortex induced
motions
2. Excessive stress
cycling
3. Rupture
Vessel Motions
VIM modeling
Mooring line response
Metocean conditions
S/N data
Winch to increase mooring
stiffness
Move vessel
Better specifications for
metocean and motion inputs
to riser design

Figure 3-2 Sample Risk Matrix

Steel Catenary Riser Integrity Management JIP
39BSummary of JIP


16 Doc. No. 4- 4- 5- 010/ TN08, Rev. 1
April 2008


Table 3-2 Example Consequence Index
Rating Description
1 Non-hydrocarbon, low-pressure riser.
2
Non-hydrocarbon high pressure riser greater than 1000ft from a populated facility, whose failure
has a low impact on total field productivity.
3
Non-hydrocarbon high pressure riser greater than 1000ft from a populated facility, whose failure
has critical impact on total field productivity.
4
Hydrocarbon riser more than 1000ft from a populated facility OR non-hydrocarbon, high pressure
riser within 1000ft of a populated facility.
5 Hydrocarbon riser any part of which is located within 1000ft of a populated facility.

Figure 3-3 Example Strategic Inspection Levels as a function of Probability and Consequence


Steel Catenary Riser Integrity Management JIP
39BSummary of JIP


17 Doc. No. 4- 4- 5- 010/ TN08, Rev. 1
April 2008


Table 3-3 Example Integrity Management Measures
Failure Driver IM Method Typical Integrity Management Measure
Inspection
ROV visual inspection for evidence of temperature degradation of materials
(e.g. flex-joint elastomer or steel riser coating)
Monitoring
Temperature at subsea tree, downhole, on flexible joints, production
facility
Analysis & Testing
Reanalysis of pipe corrosion
Flexible pipe polymer degradation under measured temperature conditions
Operational
Procedures
Regulation of product temperature in export risers with process coolers
Preventative
Maintenance
Review and adjustment of chemical dosage (e.g. chemical inhibitor)
Temperature
Remedial
Maintenance
Retrieval and repair of flexjoint
Inspection
ROV inspection
Monitoring
Pressure at subsea tree, downhole, and production facility
Analysis & Testing
Reanalysis of pipe corrosion, flexible pipe polymer degradation under
measured pressure conditions
Operational
Procedures
Controlled shut-down to prevent rapid decompression in pipe bore
Preventative
Maintenance
Scheduled maintenance of valves and actuators
Pressure
Remedial
Maintenance
Retrieval and repair of flexjoint, due to pressure pulsation damage
Inspection
Inspection of corrosion coupons
Monitoring
Corrosion probe monitoring produced fluid H
2
S, CO
2
content
Analysis & Testing
Reanalysis of corrosion models
Reanalysis of sour service fatigue
Material testing
Operational
Procedures
Fresh water required for hydrotest
Fresh water / biocide in flooded SCR wet-parked
Preventative
Maintenance
Chemical injection strategy
Fluid
Composition
Remedial
Maintenance
Wax remediation pigging
Hot-oil flushing


Steel Catenary Riser Integrity Management JIP
39BSummary of JIP


18 Doc. No. 4- 4- 5- 010/ TN08, Rev. 1
April 2008


4 REFERENCES
1. MCS, Guidelines for Integrity
Management of Unbonded Flexible Pipe.
MCS Doc. No. 2-1-4-036/TR02, Rev.04;
1998.
2. API RP 2RD Design of Risers for Floating
Production Systems and Tension Leg
Platforms. 1
st
Edition; 1998.
3. API 1111 Design, Construction, Operation
and Maintenance of Offshore Hydrocarbon
Pipelines (Limit State Design). 3
rd
Edition;
1999.
4. ISO 14224:1999 Petroleum and natural gas
industries Collection and exchange of
reliability and maintenance data for
equipment. 2
nd
Edition; 2004.
5. ASME B31.8S Managing system integrity
of gas pipelines. 2004.
6. W. K. Muhlbauer Pipeline risk
management man
7. MCS, SCRIM JIP; Inspection and
Monitoring Methods. MCS Doc. No. 4-4-
5-010/TN02, Rev.0; 2005.
8. MCS, SCRIM JIP; Guidelines for the
Integrity Management of SCRs. MCS
Doc. No. 4-4-5-010/TN03, Rev.02; 2008.
9. MCS, SCRIM JIP; SCR Integrity
Management Strategy: Worked Example.
MCS Doc. No. 4-4-5-010/TN04, Rev.0;
2007.
10. MCS, SCRIM JIP; MCS Document
Management Software. MCS Doc. No. 4-
4-5-010/TN05, Rev.0; 2006.
11. MCS, SCRIM JIP; Guidelines for the
Integrity Management of Hybrid Risers.
MCS Doc. No. 4-4-5-010/TN06, Rev.0;
2007.
12. MCS, SCRIM JIP; Guidelines for the
Integrity Management of Top Tensioned
Risers. MCS Doc. No. 4-4-5-010/TN07,
Rev.0; 2008.