Local

Government
Code
2010
Republic Act 7160 The Local Government Code of 1991
A UP Law
Reviewer
PUYALES, MANNYLYN J.
Law 2
Xavier University-Ateneo de Cagayan
09065436000
UP College of Law
1 | P a g e Municipal Corporation
Part I
Local Governments: Creation, Merger, Abolition and Powers

CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS
Art X, 1987 Constitution
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the
Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as
hereinafter provided.
Section 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy
local autonomy.
Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code
which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable
local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall,
initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local
government units their powers, responsibilities, and
resources, and provide for the qualifications, election,
appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and
functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters
relating to the organization and operation of local units.
Section 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise
general supervision over local governments. Provinces with
respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and
municipalities with respect to component barangays shall
ensure that the acts of their component units are within the
scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
Section 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to
create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees,
and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the
Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of
local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue
exclusively to the local governments.
Chapter 2, RA 7160 (Sec 6 10)
Sec. 6. Authority to Create Local Government Units. A local
government unit may be created, divided, merged, abolished,
or its boundaries substantially altered either by law enacted
by Congress in the case of a province, city, municipality, or
any other political subdivision, or by ordinance passed by the
sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod
concerned in the case of a barangay located within its
territorial jurisdiction, subject to such limitations and
requirements prescribed in this Code.
Comment: Congress has the power to create or abolish a
province, city, municipality, or any other political subdivision.
The sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod
has the power to create and abolish barangays located within
its territorial jurisdiction
Sec. 7. Creation and Conversion. As a general rule, the
creation of a local government unit or its conversion from
one level to another level shall be based on verifiable
indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide
services, to wit:
(a) Income. It must be sufficient, based on acceptable
standards, to provide for all essential government facilities
and services and special functions commensurate with the
size of its population, as expected of the local government
unit concerned;
(b) Population. It shall be determined as the total number of
inhabitants within the territorial jurisdiction of the local
government unit concerned; and
(c) Land Area. It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two
(2) or more islands or is separated by a local government unit
independent of the others; properly identified by metes and
bounds with technical descriptions and sufficient to provide
for such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements
of its populace.
Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to
by the Department of Finance (DOF), the National Statistics
Office (NSO), and the Lands Management Bureau (LMB) of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR).
Mariano v. Comelec (242 SCRA 211)
Facts: Petitioners assail the Constitutionality of RA 7859 on
the ground that it did not properly identify the land area or
territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bound.
Held: The petitioners in the case have not demonstrated that
the delineation of the land area of the proposed area of
Makati (without metes and bounds) will cause confusion as to
its boundaries. Congress has refrained from using metes and
bounds description of land areas of other local government
units.
Municipality of Jimnez v. Baz Jr. (265 SCRA 182)
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Facts: EO 258 creating the Mun. of Sinacaban contained a
technical description of its land area. Based on said EO 258,
Sinacaban claimed portions of several barrios previously
thought to be part of the Mun. of Jimenez. The latter
Municipality asserted jurisdiction in the claimed portion on
the basis of an agreement entered into in 1950 with
Sinacaban, approved by the Provincial Board.
Held: The technical description, containing the metes and
bounds of a municipalitys territory staed in EO 258 creating
the Municipality of Sinacaban, Misamis Oriental is binding.
Sec. 8. Division and Merger. Division and merger of existing
local government units shall comply with the same
requirements herein prescribed for their creation: Provided,
however, That such division shall not reduce the income,
population, or land area of the local government unit or units
concerned to less than the minimum requirements
prescribed in this Code: Provided, further, That the income
classification of the original local government unit or units
shall not fall below its current classification prior to such
division.
The income classification of local government units shall be
updated within six (6) months from the effectivity of this
Code to reflect the changes in their financial position
resulting from the increased revenues as provided herein.
Sec. 9. Abolition of Local Government Units. A local
government unit may be abolished when its income,
population, or land area has been irreversibly reduced to less
than the minimum standards prescribed for its creation under
Book III of this Code, as certified by the national agencies
mentioned in Section 7 hereof to Congress or to the
sangguniang concerned, as the case may be.
The law or ordinance abolishing a local government unit shall
specify the province, city, municipality, or barangay with
which the local government unit sought to be abolished will
be incorporated or merged.
Comment: The Code now lays down three important
indicators of viability in the creation of local government
units namely: income, population and land area.
Sec. 10. Plebiscite Requirement. No creation, division,
merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of
local government units shall take effect unless approved by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the
purpose in the political unit or units directly affected. Said
plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections
(Comelec) within one hundred twenty (120) days from the
date of effectivity of the law or ordinance effecting such
action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date.
Abbas v. COMELEC (179 SCRA 278)
Held: There is no conflict between the power of the President
to merge administrative region with the Constitutional
provision, requiring plebiscite in the merger of local
government units because the requirement of the plebiscite
in a merger expressly applies only to provinces, cities,
municipalities or barangays, not administrative regions.
City of Pasig v. COMELEC 314 SCRA 179
Facts: Karangalan Village petitioned that they be segregated
from Brgy. Manggahan and Dela Paz, Pasig. Plebiscite was
scheduled but the Mun. of Cainta moved to suspend due to a
pending case in RTC-Antipolo, Rizal for settlement of
boundary dispute.
Held: A case involving a boundary dispute between local
government units presents a prejudicial question which must
first be decided before plebiscites for creation of proposed
barangay maybe held.







ARTICLES AND REFERENCES
Public Corporations, Chapters 1-6 (Martin)
CHAPTER ONE: General Principles
A corporation is an artificial being created by operation of
law, having the right of succession and the powers,
attributes, and properties expressly authorized by law or
incident to its existence. It exists only in contemplation of
law.
A corporation is a legal institution devised to confer upon the
individuals of which it is composed powers, privileges, and
immunities which they would not otherwise possess, the
most important of which are continuous legal identity or
unity, and perpetual or indefinite succession under the
corporate name, notwithstanding successive changes by
death or otherwise, in the corporators or members.
Classes of corporations
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1. Public formed or organized for the government of
a portion of a State for the accomplishment of parts
of its own public works. These are created by State
either by special or general act.
2. 2. Privateformed for some private purpose,
benefit, aim or end; organized wholly for the profit
and advantage of their own members and cannot
constitutionally be granted governmental powers.
These are created by the will of the incorporators
with the recognizance of the State.
Public vs Private Consider as criterion the relation of the
corporation to the State. If it is created by the State as its own
agency or instrumentality to help it carry out its
governmental functions, then it is public. Otherwise, it is
private.
3. Quasi-publicprivate corporations that render
public service or supply public wants; while
purposely organized for the gain or benefit of its
members, the law requires them to discharge
functions for the public benefit (i.e. utility
companies).
Private vs Quasi public Consider as criterion the service the
corporation renders to the public. If a corporation performs a
public sovereign power, even though its incorporators intend
to obtain profits from its undertaking, it is quasi-public.
Classes of public corporations
1. Quasi-Corporationspublic corporations created as
agencies of the State for a narrow and limited
purpose. They differ from other public corporations
in that they do not possess the powers and liabilities
of self-governing corporations. Instead, their powers
generally relate to matters of State, and not
municipal concerns. Thus, although they are public
in nature, they cannot be strictly considered
municipal corporations because of their limited
number of corporate powers and low grade of
corporate existence. The main purpose of their
creation is to aid the State in, or to take charge of,
some public or state work other than community
government for the general welfare.
2. 2. Municipal corporations
CHAPTER TWO: Nature, elements, kinds and history of
municipal Corporations
A municipal corporation is a body politic constituted by the
incorporation of the inhabitants of a city or town for the
purpose of its local government. It is established by law partly
as an agency of the State to assist in the civil government of a
country, but chiefly to regulate and administer the local or
internal affairs of the city/town/district which is incorporated.
Courts regard these as subordinate branches of government
of the State exercising delegated powers (municipal
administration as an instrumentality of state administration).
Municipal corporations are granted charters for the better
government of particular areas or districts.
Municipal corporation vs public corporationAll municipal
corporations are public corporations, but not all public
corporations are municipal corporations. Municipal
corporations refer to incorporated villages, towns, and cities
with powers of local administration.
Elements:
1. A legal creation or incorporation;
2. A corporate name by which the legal entity is known
and in which all corporate acts are done;
3. Inhabitants constituting the population invested
with the political and corporate powers which are
exercised through duly constituted officers and
agents;
4. Place or territory within which the local civil
government and corporate functions are exercised.
Kinds:
1. Municipal Corporation Properincorporated
cities/towns/villages invested with the power of
local legislation. These exist and are governed by
their respective charters. Its distinctive purpose and
distinguishing feature is the power of local
government.
2. Quasi-municipal corporationsame as a quasi-
corporation, i.e. it operates directly as an agency of
the State to help in the administration of public
functions.
Municipal corporation proper vs quasi municipal
corporation When invested with the power of local
government, the municipal corporation as an agency of the
state becomes a municipal corporation proper. Consider as
criterion the voluntary or involuntary nature of the
corporation; the existence or non-existence of a charter; and
whether the purpose of the corporation is solely a
governmental agency or one for self-government.
Municipal corporation proper vs quasi corporation Both are
agents of the state for limited and narrow purposes but have
different powers and liabilities. Municipal corporations
proper are created either by the direct solicitation or by the
free consent of the persons composing them while quasi
corporations (also called involuntary corporations) are only
local organizations which, for purposes of civil administration,
are invested with some characteristics of corporate existence.
They are local subdivisions of the state, created by the
sovereign legislative power of its own sovereign will and
without any particular solicitation, consent or concurrent
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action from the inhabitants (West Chicago Park
Commissioners vs Chicago).
Purposes:
1. To serve as an agency or instrumentality of the state
in carrying out the functions of government which
the state cannot conveniently exercise (i.e. tax
collection, assessment of property, enforcement of
police regulations)
2. To act as an agency of the inhabitants in the
regulation and operation of municipal franchises and
public utilities, and the promotion and management
of their local affairs (i.e. maintenance of water
system, ferries, wharves). In this character, they act
as separate entities for their own purposes and not
as subdivisions of the State (Lidasan vs COMELEC).
Dual nature : Two-fold character:
1. PublicMunicipal corporation acts as an agent of
the State for the government of the territory and
inhabitants within the municipal limits. It exercises
by delegation a part of the sovereignty of the State.
2. PrivateMunicipal corporation acts as a business
corporation with functions not strictly governmental
or political. It sees to the administration of local
affairs which are beyond the sphere of the public
purposes for which its governmental powers are
conferred (Villa vs City of Manila, Surigao Electric Co.
Inc. vs Municipality of Surigao).
Origin and history
England Municipal corporations can be traced back to the
farmer commonwealths of the Teutons, and each wick,
ham, stead, or tun took its name form the winsmen
who lived there.
United States Early American municipal corporations were
similar to English municipalities of the 18th century. Prior to
the revolution, local governments in the nature of
municipalities existed in the American colonies by
prescription, sovereign recognition or by virtue of special
charters from the sovereign.
Philippines under the Spanish Regime The basic unit of
local administration was the pueblo, composed of numerous
barrios, and governed by the cabeza de barangay, an
honorific title continued by the Spaniards. Towns were
organized, under the government of a gobernadorcillo, also
called capitan, who represented the provincial governor as
the arbiter of local questions, collected taxes, assisted the
parish priest and entertained visiting officials. He was assisted
by tenientes (deputies), alguaciles (subordinate employees)
and chiefs of police. Elections for these municipal offices
were held annually.
Barangays were administered by cabezas de barangay whose
principal duties were to act as agents for the collection of
taxes. They paid no tribute on their own account and were
members of the principalia, the voting and privileged class.
The position was originally hereditary and breaks were filled
by appointments, but eventually, the position became
elective and service compulsory.
The Maura Law constituted a municipal council of 1 captain
and 4 lieutenants, in charge of the active work of governing
the municipality, such as administration of public works and
the details of taxation. These positions were honorary, and
each of the members was required to have special
qualifications. The Governor General, provincial council and
provincial governor retained disciplinary jurisdiction over the
council and its individual members.
Philippines under the American Regime General Order No.
43, series of 1899 first provided for the government of
municipalities. This was superseded by General Order No. 40,
series of 1900, promulgated by the Military Governor,
supposedly to give the Filipino people the right to elect their
municipal officers, only slightly restricted by certain
conditions. President McKinleys instructions to the 2nd
Philippine Commission also directed the body to devote their
attention to the establishment of municipal governments,
giving the natives of the islands the opportunity to
manage their own local affairs to the fullest extent of which
they are capable, and subject to the least degree of
supervision and control which a careful study of their
capacities and observation of the workings of native controls
show to be consistent with the maintenance of law, order
and loyalty.
The Philippine Commission passed Act No. 82 on January 31,
1901, providing for the organization and government of
municipalities and Act No. 83 on February 5, 1901, for the
organization of provinces. These were later modified in the
Administrative Code.
CHAPTER THREE: Creation of Municipal Corporations
The power to create municipal corporations is essentially
legislative, exclusive and practically unlimited. Aside from the
legislature, the President under his martial law powers can
exercise legislative powers and create municipal
corporations.
In the absence of a Constitutional provision permitting it, this
power cannot be delegated by the legislature to any inferior
or subordinate tribunal or board. However, it can pass a
general law for the incorporation of municipal corporations,
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giving the conditions on which they may be created, and
determining whether such conditions exist.
Certain conditions are needed in order to obtain a municipal
corporations incorporation as a city or a town. Such
conditions may refer to extent of area, nature of the territory,
the character of the land and the uses to which it may be
devoted, the number of inhabitants, and the density and
location of the area to be incorporated.
Creation of municipal corporations
In the Philippines, there is a general municipal law (Chapter
57 of the Administrative Code) under which the
municipalities in regularly organized provinces were
organized and a special municipal law (Chapter 64 of the
Administrative Code) under which municipalities in the
specially organized provinces were organized.
The legislature may, by special act organize chartered cities in
the Philippines.
Under the Local Government Code, a barangay may be
created, named, and its boundaries defined by an ordinance
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or Sangguniang Panlungsod,
subject to the approval of the majority in a plebiscite called
for the purpose by the COMELEC to be held in the units
affected within such a period of time as may be determined
by the ordinance creating the said barangay.
Under Sec 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, the
President may by executive order define the boundaries of
any province, sub province, municipality or any political
subdivision, and increase or decrease the territory comprised
therein, separate any political division other than a province
into such portion as may be required, merge any of such
subdivisions or portions with another, name any new
subdivision so created and change the seat of government
within any subdivision, to such place as the public welfare
may require, provided that the authorization of Congress
shall first be obtained whenever the boundary of any
province or sub-province is to be defined or any province is to
be divided into one or more sub provinces (**Note that this
provision was later declared unconstitutional and repealed by
RA No. 5185).
Municipality of Cardona vs Binangonan (36 Phil. 547) HELD:
Sec 1 of Act No. 1748 which conferred upon the Governor
General the power to enlarge, constrict or otherwise change
the boundary of a province, sub-province, municipality or
township does not constitute an abdication of legislative
functions with regard to this particular subject matter. It is
simply transference of certain details with respect to
provinces, municipalities and townships, many of them newly
created, and all of them subject to rapid change both in
development and population. The proper regulation of this
may require prompt action of such detailed character as not
to permit the legislative body to undertake efficiently.
Pelaez vs Gimenez (December 24, 1965)
HELD: Sec. 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not
meet the requirements for a valid delegation of power to fix
the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate
any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President.
Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise. Although
the last clause of the first sentence of Sec. 68 gives the
President the power to change the seat of the government
within any subdivision to such place as the public welfare may
require, the phrase as the public welfare may require
qualifies not the clauses preceding the one just quoted, but
only the place to which the seat of government may be
transferred.
Calalang vs Williams (70 Phil 726) and People vs Rosenthal (68
Phil 328) upheld public interest and welfare as sufficient
standards for a valid delegation of authority to execute a law.
However, this doctrine must be construed in the relation to
the specific facts and issues involved in these cases, outside
of which they do not constitute precedents and have no
bonding effect.
If the validity of the delegation of power in Sec 68 were
upheld, there would no longer be any legal impediment to
statutory grant of authority to the President to do anything,
which, in his opinion, may be required by public welfare or
interest. Such grant of authority would virtually be an
abdication of power of Congress in favor of the Executive.
The power of control under Sec 10(a) Art X of the
Constitution (at the time) implies the right of the President to
interfere in the exercise of the discretion vested by law in the
officers of the executive departments, bureaus or offices, as
well as to act in lieu of such offices. With respect to local
governments, the fundamental law permits the President to
wield no more authority than of checking whether said local
governments or their officers perform their duties as
provided by statute.
Essential requisites for the incorporation of Municipal
Corporations
1. Territory
In the United States, it is within the power of the legislature,
subject only to constitutional restrictions to determine the
nature and extent of the territory to be incorporated and to
prescribe the minimum or maximum area which may be
incorporated. Aside from whatever restriction the
constitution may impose, the area incorporated must be
contiguous.
2. Population
The Barrio Charter (RA 2370) specifies 500 as the minimum
number of inhabitants required for the creation of a barrio,
and inasmuch as municipalities are composed of barrios,
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there should be at least 500 inhabitants to comply with the
requirement as to population.
3. Charter
The charter usually invests the people of the place with the
power of local government, determines the form of
government of the municipal entity and defines its rights,
powers and obligations. It is conferred for political purposes.
The rule requiring assent of the inhabitants for incorporation
of a municipal corporation to be effective is not applicable in
the Philippines. However, under the new Constitution, the
creation of a political division should be subject to the
approval of majority of the votes cast in the units affected.
Municipal corporations may also exist through prescription.
Its existence will be presumed in where it is shown that the
community has claimed and exercised corporate functions,
with the knowledge and acquiescence of the legislature, and
without interruption or objection for a period long enough to
afford title by prescription.
A corporation may exist in fact although not in point of law
because of certain defects in some essential features of its
organization. It may be considered a de facto municipal
corporation, if the following requisites are complied with: 1) a
valid law authorizing incorporation; 2) an attempt in good
faith to organize under it; 3) a colorable compliance with the
law, and; 4) an assumption of corporate powers.
Municipality of Malabang vs Benito (March 28, 1968)
HELD: In cases where a de facto municipal corporation was
recognized as such despite the fact that the statute creating it
was later invalidated, the decisions could fairly be made to
rest on the consideration that there was some other valid law
giving corporate vitality to the organization. In the present
case, the mere fact that the municipality of Balabagan was
organized at a time when the statute had not been
invalidated cannot make it a de facto corporation, because
independently of Sec 68 of the Administrative Code, there is
no other valid statute to give color of authority to its creation.
An unconstitutional act is not a law; it is, in legal
contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been
passed.
Attack against the validity of incorporation
The validity of incorporation and the corporate existence of a
municipal corporation may not be attacked collaterally. It
may be challenged only by the State in a direct proceeding
such as quo warranto.
But this rule applies only where the municipal corporation is
at least a public corporation. Where it is neither a corporation
de facto or de jure but a nullity, its existence may be
questioned collaterally or directly in any action or proceeding
by anyone whose rights or interests are affected thereby,
including the citizens of territory incorporated unless they are
estopped from doing so (Municipality of Malabang vs Benito).
The principle of estoppel applies to an individual who wants
to attack the validity of incorporation of a municipal
corporation. Where an individual dealt with it and acquiesced
in the exercise of its corporate functions, or where he has
entered into a contract with the said corporation, he may be
estopped to deny its corporate existence.
A person or private corporation may likewise be precluded by
laches from attacking the validity of the incorporation of a
municipality.
Beginning of corporate existence
The legal existence of a municipal corporation is to be
determined by the law creating it. However, where the law is
silent as to the beginning of its corporate existence, the rule
is that this shall commence from the moment the law or
charter creating it becomes effective.
Under the Local Government Code, when a new local
government unit is created, its corporate existence shall
commence upon the qualification of its executive and a
majority of the member s of its legislative body unless some
other time is fixed therefor by law (Sec 6).
A distinction should be made between the creation of the
corporation as a legal entity and the organization of its
government. The first should precede the second. The
organization of the government of a municipal corporation
presupposes necessarily the previous existence of the said
corporation at the time its government is organized (Mejia vs
Balolong, GR No L-1925, 1948).
Carreon vs Carreon (April 30, 1965)
HELD: The existence of the City of Dagupan as a corporate
body is incompatible with the continued existence of the
municipal government of Dapitan. Sec 86 of RA 3811 creating
the City of Dagupan out of the municipality of Dapitan can
only mean that the municipal officials become city officials
upon approval of the city charter. So when petitioners filed
their certificates of candidacy for the positions in the city
government, they filed their certificates to the same positions
that they were holding, and could not be considered resigned
therefrom under the old Election Code.
The existence of a municipal corporation may be proved by
its record of incorporation or charter. In the absence of a
charter, its incorporation may be shown by parol evidence, at
least to prove a de facto existence. Its existence may also be
shown by reputation or by long use of its corporate powers,
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or by legislative grants necessarily implying a town
corporation.
CHAPTER 4: Alteration and dissolution of Municipal
Corporations
A municipal corporation cannot, without legal authorization,
exercise its powers beyond its own corporate limits. It is
therefore necessary that it must have its boundaries fixed,
definite and certain, in order that they may be identified and
that all may know the exact scope or section of territory and
geographical division embraced in the corporate limits and
over which the local corporation has jurisdiction. An
incorporation is void where the boundaries of the municipal
corporation are not described with certainty.
With respect to disputes as to jurisdiction of municipal
governments over areas or barangays, these shall be heard
and decided by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the province
where the municipalities concerned are situated. Where the
areas or barangays in dispute are claimed by municipalities
situated in different provinces, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
involved shall jointly hear and decide the dispute. In case no
settlement is reached within 60 days from the date was
referred to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan concerned, said
dispute shall be elevated to the Regional Trial Court by the
province which first took cognizance of the dispute. The case
shall be decided by the said court within 1 year from the start
of the proceedings and appeal may be taken from the
decision within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules
of Court (Sec 79, Local Government Code).
Boundary disputes within barangays within the same city or
municipality shall be heard and decided by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan concerned for the purpose
of affording the parties an opportunity to reach an amicable
settlement. In case no amicable settlement is reached within
60 days from the date the dispute was referred to the
Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan, the case
shall be heard and decided by the Regional Trial Court by the
of the province or city where the barangays concerned are
located within 1 year from the start of court proceedings.
Appeal may be taken decision within the time and manner
prescribed by the Rules of Court (Sec 80, Local Government
Code).
In the absence of any Constitutional prohibition, the Congress
may alter or dissolve municipal corporations by:
1. fixing, altering, or changing the boundaries of
municipal corporations for the purpose of enlarging
or decreasing its territory;
2. dividing a municipal corporation into 2 or more
separate municipalities;
3. merging or consolidating 2 or more separate
municipalities into 1;
4. annexing one municipality to another;
5. repealing its charter.
Effects of annexation or consolidation
1. On the legal existence of the territory annexed-
Unless otherwise provided, the annexation of one
municipal corporation to another will dissolve the
annexed territory.
2. On the laws and ordinances of the annexed
corporations- In the absence of a provision to the
contrary, the annexed territory shall be become
subject to the laws and ordinances by which the
annexing corporation is governed.
3. On the right of officers or employees of the annexed
corporation to continue to hold their offices- Subject
to what the legislature provides upon annexation,
the officers and employees of the annexed territory
shall terminate their official relation with their
offices.
4. On the title to the property of the annexed territory-
The annexing territory shall acquire title to the
property of the annexed territory at the time of the
annexation unless the annexing statute provides
otherwise. When the annexed territory forms part of
a municipality from which it is taken, the legislature
may provide for the payment of compensation for
the indebtedness incurred on account of the
property taken. Public buildings and improvements
in the annexed territory are not required to be paid
for by the annexing territory, as they have already
been paid for by the annexed territory. However, if
any indebtedness on these exists, the annexing
territory must be required to share in the payment
of said indebtedness.
5. On the debts and obligations of the annexed
territory- Those contracted prior to the annexation
shall be assumed by the annexing territory in the
absence of any provision to the contrary.
Effects of division
1. On the legal existence of the original corporation-
The corporate existence of the original municipality
is extinguished.
2. On the property, powers and rights of the original
corporation- Unless the law provides otherwise,
when a municipal corporation is divided into 2 or
more municipalities, each municipality acquires title
to all the property, powers, rights and obligations
falling within its territorial limits.
Limitations on the power to dissolve municipal corporations
1. by an express provision in the Constitution
prohibiting the legislature to dissolve municipal
corporations;
2. those provisions in the Constitution affording
protection to the rights, property and contracts of
the inhabitants.
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Unless the Constitution has conferred such power, the courts
have no power to dissolve municipal corporations. However,
they can declare the act of the legislature creating a
municipal corporation illegal.
Municipal corporations cannot bring about their own
dissolution by a mere surrender of their charter. A municipal
corporation is not ipso facto dissolved or destroyed by non-
user of its powers in whole or in part, or for its failure for a
number of years to exercise the functions if a municipality. In
such cases, the municipal corporation would be suspended
but not civilly dead, since its dormant functions could be
revived without action on the part of the sovereignty from
which in theory of law, corporate life originally came.
In the absence of a statute, a municipal corporation is not
dissolved by the mere failure to elect or appoint its officers
and agents to conduct its government. The officers do not
constitute a corporation. Rather, the inhabitants of the
designated locality are the corporators.
Vilas vs City of Manila (42 Phil 953)
HELD: The juristic identity of the corporation has in no wise
been affected by the change of sovereignty, and in law, the
present city is in every legal sense the successor of the old. As
such, it is entitled to the property and property rights of the
predecessor corporation and is subject to all of its liabilities.
The mere change of the sovereign authority governing a
country does not necessarily dissolve the municipal
corporation organized under the former sovereign. Only such
governmental functions as are incompatible with the present
sovereignty may be considered suspended.
Dissolution of a municipal corporation through the repeal of
its charter or otherwise, without any provision for
reincorporation, destroys and puts an end to the existence of
the corporation. Its territory and inhabitants are then subject
to such governmental functions as the State may impose
subject to Constitutional limitations.
CHAPTER FIVE: Legislative control and Executive supervision
over Municipal Corporations
Limitations on legislative control
1. Constitutional Limitations
a. Those relating to the protection of private
property
b. Those preventing the impairment of
contractual obligations
c. Those prescribing a uniformity of law and
prohibiting special or local legislation
2. Limitations depending on the nature of the rights
and powers exercised by the municipality
a. a) In matters that relate to private powers
or rights, the corporation is the agent of the
inhabitants, and is assumes the character
and relations of private individuals, and it is
not subject to the absolute control of the
legislature.
In matters that relate to public or governmental powers or
rights, the corporation is the agent of the State and is subject
to its control.
Legislative control over the municipal charter
Unless prohibited by the Constitution, the charter, being a
creation of the State may be modified, amended or repealed
by the legislature when it is deemed necessary or advisable
(US vs Joson, 26 Phil 1)
Provisions of the charter relating to public or governmental
matters do not constitute a contract within the impairment
clause of the Constitution, so the legislature has absolute
power to amend or alter them at will. Provisions of the
charter granting rights, powers or privileges to the
municipality for its own private interest may be considered as
a contract, falling within the protection of the impairment
clause.
Legislative control over the form of government
The legislature can change the form of government of a
municipal corporation since it is a mere incident of their
creation or existence, which the legislature has absolute and
unlimited control over.
The right of local self government is not inherent in
municipalities and the legislature has the absolute power to
deprive them of their rights to govern themselves in local
affairs.
In order to deprive the people of the right of local self
government or any power vested by law in the municipality, it
must be upon express terms of the legislature (City of Manila
vs Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co, 26 Phil 89).
Legislative control over municipal officers
Subject to the Constitution, the legislature has absolute
discretion in providing for the manner of selection and
appointment of the officers to administer the public and
governmental affairs of the municipal corporation (i.e.
justices of the peace, policemen), but the municipality may
not be deprived of the right to select the officers who will
administer the private affairs of the municipality (i.e.
caretakers of municipal parks or streets). The distinction lies
in the nature of their functions.
Legislative control over municipal property
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9 | P a g e Municipal Corporation
Property which the municipality has acquired in its public or
governmental capacity is under the complete control of the
legislature. The State, at its pleasure, may modify or
withdraw the power of the municipality to hold and manage
its property. It may take such property without
compensation, conditionally or unconditionally, despite
protest from the citizens. It may require the municipality to
spend its funds for the acquisition and maintenance of such
property and provide for any regulation for the use and
management thereof which it may deem to be for the public
interest.
Property which the municipality acquired in its private or
proprietary capacity is held by it in the same character as a
private individual. The legislature is subject to the
constitutional restrictions when dealing with such property
and cannot control it, except through a valid exercise of
police power or by taking of private property upon payment
of just compensation.
Clinton vs Rapids, et al (24 Iowa 465)
HELD: Public streets are not the private property of the city; it
cannot alienate or use them for other than legitimate
purposes. And over the use of such property acquired,
dedicated under the statutes to the public use, the
legislature, so far as regards the rights of public corporations,
possesses an unlimited control and therefore can divert the
use of the same for some other public purposes. In this case,
the legislature can authorize the railroad company to lay its
tracks on the streets of the city.
Proprietors of Mt. Hope Cemetery vs City of Boston (153
Mass 509)
HELD: The legislature has no power to require the city to
transfer the cemetery to the corporation without
compensation, because a cemetery is within the class of
property which the city owns in its private or proprietary
character. Ownership of such class of property is protected
under the Constitution in that it cannot be taken without the
payment of just compensation to the city.
Province of Zamboanga del Norte vs City of Zamboanga
(March 28, 1968)
HELD: RA No 3039 which provides that all buildings,
properties and assets belonging to the former Province of
Zamboanga and located within the City of Zamboanaga are
transferred to the city free of charge, is valid insofar as it
affects lots used as the capitol site, school site and its
grounds, hospital and leprosarium sites because they are
truly private in nature. With respect to the 26 lots, the
province of Zamboanga del Norte cannot be deprived of its
share in their value inasmuch as said lots are patrimonial
properties since they are not being utilized for distinctly
governmental purposes.
Legislative control over public utilities
Unless the Constitution provides otherwise, municipal
regulations over the operation of a water, light or gas
company prevail against national or state regulations,
because these involve the exercise of the proprietary or
business functions of the municipality. However, the service
and rates of the public utility may be subject to state
regulation.
Legislative control over municipal contracts
Municipal contracts are regulated or controlled by the
general legislation applicable to either all municipal
corporations created thereafter or existing ones. The
legislature may prescribe the methods of making municipal
contracts or impose restrictions thereon by requiring bonds
from the persons contracting with the municipality. It may
regulate municipal employment, such as by determining the
number of working hours of laborers.
Execution of municipal contracts is subject to the
requirements and restrictions in Secs 606-608 of the Revised
Administrative Code.
Legislative control over municipal funds and revenues
The legislature has absolute control over the public revenues
of a municipality such as those derived from taxation. It may
require the expenditure of these funds for public purposes,
but it has no control over public revenues over which the
municipality or its creditors have already acquired a vested
right. However, no such right arises until after an actual
appropriation is made.
The legislature may not control the private revenues of a
municipal corporation because these posses the character of
trust funds equitably belonging to the inhabitants.
CHAPTER SIX: Executive and Ministerial supervision over
Local Governments
The President shall exercise general supervision over local
governments to ensure that local affairs are administered
according to the law. General supervision includes the power
to order an investigation of the conduct of local government
officials when necessary. This general supervision shall be
exercised primarily through the Ministry of Local Government
(now the DILG).
There is a difference between control and supervision.
Supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an
officer to see that his subordinate officers perform their
duties, and to take such action as prescribed by law if they
should fail to perform those duties. Control means the power
of an officer to alter, modify, nullify or set aside what a
subordinate had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for the latter
(Mondano vs Silvosa, 51 OG 3427).
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This power of general supervision does not authorize the
President to remove or suspend a local official without any
ground or on grounds not authorized by law (Planas vs Gil, 67
Phil 62).
Lacson vs Roque (49 OG 93)
HELD: Suspension of the Mayor of the City of Manila on the
ground of a pending charge against him for libel was illegal
because it was not based on grounds provided for in law. To
be a misconduct in office, the act must be committed in
relation to the performance of his duties.
Jover vs Borra (49 OG 2765)
HELD: The act of the President when, for not valid reasons, he
relieved the Mayor of Iloilo City of his office and designated
an Acting Mayor in his stead, is illegal. Although the office of
the mayor is appointive, Congress fixed the term of office of
the Mayor to 6 years, and this implies that the said officer can
continue in office until the expiration of his term unless
removed for cause as provided by law. The Presidents action
in this case amounted to an assertion of absolute control and
not merely supervision.
Mondano vs Silvosa (supra)
HELD: Suspension of the Mayor of Mainit, Surigao by the
Provincial Governor under an alleged authority of the
President pending the hearing of charges of rape and
concubinage is illegal because the charges preferred against
him were not based on grounds provided for by law. The
alleged act of the Mayor did not involve misconduct in office.
Neither was he convicted yet of a crime involving moral
turpitude.
Compendium on Local Autonomy and Local
Government, Chapters 1-3 (Agra)
CHAPTER ONE: Nature of Local Governments
Local Government Unit is a political subdivision constituted
by law, possessing substantial control over its own affairs.
In a unitary system of government, it is an intra-sovereign
subdivision of one sovereign nation, and is not intended to be
imperium in imperio (empire within an empire). The 1987
Philippine Constitution does not prescribe federalism.
Autonomy does not contemplate the creation of mini-states.
A Chartered City is a political body corporate, endowed with
faculties of municipal corporations exercised through its city
government in conformity with law and its proper corporate
name; may sue and be sued, enter into contracts and be
contracted with.
No plebiscite is necessary when creating a national
government agency such as the Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority (MMDA). Plebiscite is only required
for the creation of local government units.
Dual nature/Two-Fold powers of Local Governments
1. Public, Governmental or Political springs from
sovereignty; exercised in administering the powers
of the State and promoting public welfare; include
legislative, judicial, public and political aspects
Public character as regards the State: agent of the
government
2. Corporate, Private or Proprietary arising from
existence as legal persons, not as public agencies;
exercised for the special benefit and advantage of
the community; include ministerial, private and
corporate aspects
Private character as regards the State: promote local
necessities and convenience for its own community
LGUs as agents and delegates of the National government
Municipal Corporations (MC) derive their powers and rights
from the legislature they can only exercise delegated
legislative powers conferred by Congress as the national
lawmaking body, therefore they cannot defy Congress will,
nor modify or violate it. As agents, they are vested with the
power of subordinate legislation, wherein the delegate
cannot be superior to the principal or exercise higher powers.
MCs have no power to impose tax on natl govt
instrumentalities, or otherwise retard, impede, burden or in
any manner control the operations of constitutional law
enacted by Congress to execute powers vested in the natl
govt. Otherwise, mere creatures of the State can defeat
national policies.
Exercise of governmental functions
As agencies of the State, MCs enjoy sovereign immunity from
suit when engaged in governmental functions. However,
they are subject to suit even in the performance of these
functions if their charter so provides.
Under the Real Property Tax Code, LGUs have no choice but
to collect real property tax this means it is the national
government expressing itself through the legislative branch
that is levying the tax. The LGUs are merely constituted as
agents to fix the rates.
As agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance
of local self-government, MCs are endowed with police
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power in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the
declared objects of their creation.
The National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) exercises
administrative control and supervision over PNP officers and
members while local chief executives exercise operational
supervision and direction. Since the latter are only acting as
representatives of NAPOLCOM, they are answerable to the
former for their actions. However, unless the acts of the local
executives are countermanded by NAPOLCOM, their acts are
considered valid and binding. Although mandatory,
deputization of local executives is not automatic and self-
executory it requires a formal act of the NAPOLCOM.
Delegated powers of local governments (not inherent)
1. Police Power inherent in the State, but not MCs;
valid delegation by Natl Legislature necessary, since
the latter is the repository of the inherent powers of
the State
2. Power to Tax must always yield to a legislative act;
however, may be exercised pursuant to the direct
authority conferred by the 1987 Philippine
Constitution
3. Power of Eminent Domain conferring statues
cannot be broadened or constricted by implication
As agents of the community
Municipal authorities are in a better position to determine
the evils sought to be prevented by the inclusion or
incorporation of particular provisions in enacting a particular
statute and therefore to pass the appropriate ordinance to
attain the object of the law.
Although the general law requires a majority vote in enacting
ordinances, sanggunian may provide for higher requisite vote
in amending specific ordinances.
Corporate existence of LGUs
Municipality [created under E.O. 265 (1949), later declared
unconstitutional] which has performed governmental acts
and been given State recognition and acknowledgment is a
regular de jure municipality. [LGC of 1991 cured defect by
stating that municipal districts organized pursuant to E.O.s
and presidential issuances, which have their respective seats
of office at the the of the Codes effectivity are to be
considered regular de jure municipalities.]
Attack on legal existence of a body politic:
Quo Warranto must be timely filed; quo warranto suit
against corporation for forfeiture of charter must be
commenced within 5 years from time that act complained of
was done or committed.
Any other direct proceeding which must be brought in the
name of the Republic.
To change the name of a local government unit, a plebiscite is
required to be conducted in the unit or units directly
effected. Cannot be effected by mere resolution of
sanggunian.
Since the LGC is silent, sanggunian panlalawigan has no
authority to change the name of its province authority lies
with Congress.
Territorial jurisdiction of political subdivisions
Definition of territorial boundaries of LGU is a standard
provision of the law creating them. Such provision, however,
is not a grant of ownership of National Govt properties
within the boundaries to the LGU. Jurisdiction refers to the
sphere of political authority, not the area of ownership. An
express grant is necessary to effect transfer of ownership.
Council sessions must be conducted within territorial
jurisdiction, except for instances such as lahar having wiped
out the barangay.
Punong barangay cannot alter boundaries on his/her own.
Power of LGUs to issue fishing privileges in the municipal
waters was granted for revenue purposes. Commercial
fishing operation within the 15-km. area of municipal waters
is not prohibited provided: (a) activity is not undertaken in
water areas within7 km. from shoreline; (b) allowed only in
waters 7 or more fathoms deep.
CHAPTER TWO: Local Autonomy and Centralization
Local autonomy is not the same as decentralization. Local
autonomy can only mean a measure of decentralization of
functions of government.
Decentralization devolution of national administration to
the local levels in which local officials remain accountable to
the central govt in the manner law may provide.
LGU is autonomous in the sense that is is given more powers,
authority, responsibilities and resource. Power which used to
be highly centralized is thereby deconcentrated.
Two levels of decentralization:
1. Decentralization of Administration/Administrative
Autonomy central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions to
achieve the ff. purposes:
broaden local power base
make units more responsive and accountable
ensure full development of local governments as
self-reliant communities
break the monopoly of National Government over
managing local affairs
relieve National Government from the burden of
managing local affairs
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Role of the President: general supervision, only to ensure
that local affairs are administered according to law. He/She
has no control over their acts in the sense that he/she can
substitute their judgments with his/her own.
Administrative Autonomy primarily pertains to: power and
responsibility to deliver basic services
2. Decentralization of Power/Political Autonomy
involves abdication of political power in favour of
LGUs; autonomous government is free to chart its
own destiny and shape its future with minimum
intervention from central authorities; amounts to
self-immolation.
Autonomous government becomes accountable to
constituency, not central authorities.
President of the Republic
Omission of phrase as may be provided for by law in
relation to power of general supervision over LGUs in 1987
Constitution merely serves to underscore LGUs autonomy
from Congress and to break the latters control over local
government affairs. Basic law did not intend to deprive
legislature of all authority over municipal corporations,
particularly concerning discipline.
Department Secretaries
Secretary of Justice review and revoke tax ordinances with
regard to constitutionality or legality; cannot substitute own
judgment nor replace the same with another version nor
declare it unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory since
they involve exercise of judgment or discretion as to wisdom
and reasonableness; power is of supervision, not control
Secretary of DILG administrative supervision over local govt
units; need not confirm the decision of a local chief executive
imposing penalty of removal against appointive officials
Congress
Retains control of the LGU, although in significantly reduced
degree under present Constitution. Basic relp between
national legislature and local governments has not been
enfeebled by the new provisions in 1987 constitution
strengthening the policy of local autonomy.
Local autonomy not self-executing
It is subject to the passage of a local government code, local
tax law, income distribution legislation and national
representation law.
Interpretations in favor of decentralization
Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favour
of centralized power in Malacanang and the other beneficial
to local autonomy, scales must be weighed in favour of the
latter. (Should be resolved in favour of the greater economy
of the local government.)
The power to review must be guided by a liberal construction
in favour of the supervised/lower LGU and in consonance
with the principles of local autonomy.
The value of local governments as institutions of democracy
is measured by the degree of autonomy that they enjoy.
Fiscal autonomy
Pursuant to fiscal autonomy granted to LGUs, and although
the LGC is silent as to the placement of idle or excess funds,
the sanggunian may authorize the investment, placement in
time deposit or any judicious utilization of such funds as far
as general funds are concerned.
Incidents of decentralization
Under the principle of local autonomy, even though the
power to abolish an office is not expressly conferred on
provincial governments, it is necessarily implied from the
power to create offices.
R.A. 5185, which gives mayors the power to appoint all
officials entirely paid out of city funds, and B.P. 337,
empowering local executives with the authority to appoint all
officers and employees of the city were not meant to vest the
city mayors per se with comprehensive powers rather, they
underscore the transfer of the power of appointment over
local officials and employees from the President to the local
governments and to highlight local autonomy.
LGUs enjoy full autonomy in the operation and management
of economic enterprises, such as public markets. A
sanggunian may provide for a different scheme of allocating
market stalls.
LGUs may not provide for allowances to judges assigned
within a given locality since this would counter the spirit of
R.A. 6758, which standardizes the salaries of government
personnel.
LGU cannot create its own government owned or controlled
corporation to provide basic services, since only Congress
may create such corporation by special law. Also, it is the
function of the LGu to provide such services.
Department of Agriculture may opt to devolve the function of
regulating the operation of commercial fishing vessels within
municipal waters, in consonance with the spirit of local
autonomy, to LGUs.
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Centralization and national integration
Office of the President
When Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections are not
conducted in certain areas, the President may appoint SK
officials in exercise of his/her residual powers and the power
to appoint other officers of the government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided.
Ordinances enacted by local legislative bodies must not be
repugnant to or in conflict with existing Administrative Orders
or local budget circulars issued by the Dept. of Budget and
Management (DBM) for govt employees and officials.
Classification or reclassification of public forest land is a
prerogative of the President upon recommendation of the
pertinent department head.
Additional compensation outside the purview of R.A. 6758
(ex. medical benefits) only allowable if approved by President
via administrative order.
Sangguniang panlalawigan cannot authorize grant of
representation and transportation allowance to all division
chiefs (divisions only components of departments/offices) of
the provincial gov;t, since it violates Admin. Order 42
(clarifying role of DBM; only allows grant of benefit to
department heads or asst. department heads).
Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
No local elective may be suspended during election period
except upon prior written approval of the COMELEC.
Omnibus Election Code states that LGUs must share in
expenses for the election of barangay officials, therefore
COMELEC may direct compliance therewith.
Commission on Audit (COA)
Approval by COA of disbursements of local funds relates to
administrative aspect of the matter of the officials
accountability, but does not foreclose Ombudsmans
authority to investigate and determine WON there is a crime
to be prosecuted for which he/she is accountable.
Compliance with COA rules and regulations does not
necessarily mean that misappropriation of public funds was
not committed.
COA has power to compromise or release any unsettled claim
or liability whenever government interest requires.
Disposal of unserviceable property through public auction
does not need approval by COA, but those disposed of
through negotiated sale does.
In consonance with its constitutional mandate as guardian of
public funds, disposal of real property owned by LGU shall be
subject to approval of COA regardless of value or cost
involved and mode of divestment, even if Committee on
Awards determines floor price that is disadvantageous to the
LGU.
In exercise of its contract review functions, COA may direct
the adoption of the BIR zonal valuation if it is a more
reasonable selling price as compared to the highest available
bid during the public auction.
COA may employ the services of private appraisers to
determine the value of real property sought to be sold if the
amount involved is substantial and the transaction is the
subject of investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman.
Civil Service Commission (CSC)
Has the power to approve or disapprove appointments set
before it by inquiring into the eligibility of the person, but
does not have the power to make appointments itself or to
direct the appointing authority to change employment status
of an employee, otherwise this will amount to an arrogation
of power belonging to appointing authority.
May accredit an LGU, subject to certain requirements where
appointments of local officials are no longer subject to CSC
approval.
Cannot nullify a board resolution calling for a reorganization
in the local government offices CSC has jurisdiction only
insofar as the implementation of the reorganization is
concerned. Proper forum to assail resolution are the regular
courts (RTCs).
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG)
General supervision is exercised by the President through the
Secretary of Local Government.
Application for authority to travel abroad by all local officials
and employees (other than governors, city mayors or highly
urbanized and independent component cities) shall be
approved by the Secretary. Failure to obtain authority ma
constitute gross negligence and dereliction of duty.
It is the governor that has authority to impose preventive
suspension against a respondent municipal elective official.
DILG has to authority to impose such suspension.
DILG shall be the lead national government agency to
oversee/administer national government assistance to local
government units in the implementation of devolved
infrastructure programs.
[NOTE: a basic element that determines centralization is that
the effects of the concerns of a particular department are not
confined to a particular region rather, they can be felt on a
nationwide scale]
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Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC), Telecommunications Office (TELOF)
Cannot devolve its regional office functions to the LGUs,
considering the interdependence of various telecom systems
on a nationwide scale.
Land Transportation Office (LTO)
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB)
Department of Environment and National Resources
(DENR)
Concerned with enforcement of forestry laws, rules and
regulations, and the protection, development and
management of forest lands.
DENR retains power of control over activities concerning
community-based forestry projects (notwithstanding fact of
devolution), being the national agency authorized by the
Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and preserve the
environment, which is a constitutional mandate. Therefore,
its power cannot be encroached upon by LGU.
Department of Justice (DOJ) (role of Secretary of
Justice discussed above)
Department of Budget and Management (DBM)
Department of Finance (DOF)
Secretary of Finance is the proper appointing authority for
treasurers, and the proper disciplining authority to issue
preventive suspension.
Local legislative councils are bereft of authority to initiate
administrative action against the treasurer.
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)
General supervision over the implementation of the National
Building Code, including appellate jurisdiction over the
decisions and order of the local building officials remains with
the Secretary of Public Works and Highways.
Local chief executive possesses the authority to appoint an
engineer who shall also act as local building official.
Department of Energy (DOE)
Department of Agriculture (DA)
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI)
Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA)
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR)
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO)
Public Estates Authority (PEA)
Cooperative Development Authority (CDA)
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA)
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System
(MWSS)
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC)
Local autonomy and the judicial system
The exercise of an authority or a power by a local
government unit may be judicially inquired into and corrected
only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable,
there having been a denial of due process or a violation of
any other applicable constitutional guarantee.
Internal acts of the Sangguniang Pampook of Region XII,
which enjoyed administrative autonomy are subject to the
jurisdictionof the courts.
Courts have the power to inquire into the legality of the
exercise of the power of eminent domain and to determine
whether there is genuine necessity therefor.
Courts, not the CSC, are the proper forum to assail and seek
nullification of a resolution for reorganization in the local
government offices. CSC has jurisdiction only insofar as the
implementation of the reorganization is concerned.
Provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays
These LGUs enjoy administrative autonomy. The 1987
constitution ensures the autonomy of local governments and
political subdivisions, and limits the Presidents power to
general supervision over local governments.
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
Peculiar to the 1987 Constitution, and contemplates the grant
of political autonomy (according to Cordillera Broad Coalition
vs. COA).
Registration of motor vehicles whose effects are not confined
to a region should not be devolved to the ARMM and should
remain with the LTO.
CAB has no authority to devolve or share any of its general
and specific functions with the ARMM in the regulation of all
entities engaged in air transportation or air commerce.
However, ARMM may assist CAB in the performance of its
functions.
Regional government of ARMM may not enact a Regional
Public Works Act which will absolutely dispense with public
bidding since this would be contrary to public policy in the
prosecution of public undertakings.
May not also enact a Regional Police Force Law.
Employee of Sothern Philippines Development Authority may
refuse to be transferred to the ARMM and may claim and be
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15 | P a g e Municipal Corporation
entitled to separation pay. Cannot be obligated to transfer
because of constitutional prohibition against involuntary
servitude.
Permanent vacancies in the Sangguniang Bayan within a
province situated in ARMM are filled by the provincial
governor, not regional governor.
Cordillera Autonomous Region
Peculiar to the 1987 Constitution, and contemplates the grant
of political autonomy. (according to Cordillera Broad
Coalition vs. COA)
CHAPTER THREE: Devolution
Devolution a mandatory process premised on the
constitutional mandate that all local government units
possess and enjoy local autonomy
E.O. 503 effectively extends the period of devolution from 6
months as provided for in the LGC to 1 year in order to
accommodate the smooth transition and address difficulties
in the devolution process.
Powers devolved to LGUs
Specific grant necessary the enumeration of powers and
services under sec. 17 of the LGC is not exclusive
Power to discipline locally assigned national employees
cannot be subject to the jurisdiction of the municipal council
(ex. fire personnel are under Bureau of Fire Protection of
DILG, fire protection not being a devolved function)
Devolution has a corresponding effect on local budgeting
processes.
Although regulation of cockfighting has been devolved to
local governments, a municipal government cannot issue a
permit to a promoter to hold cockfights in places other than a
licensed cockpit, since this would violate the law.
Ports which are vital to the national interest and security
which are linked to each other are expressly excluded from
the coverage of devolution.
Implementation of locally-funded communal irrigation
projects (CIP) shall be devolved to LGUs. The allocation for
locally funded CIPs will no longer be released to the National
Irrigation Administration (NIA) as a consequence of
devolution. However, foreign-assisted CIPs fall outside the
coverage of devolution.
Licensing and regulation of activities undertaken by travel
agencies, tour operators and professional congress organizers
should be transferred to LGUs.
There is partial devolution in terms of the functions of the
Cooperative Development Authority (CDA). The functions
devolved are the promotion, organization and development
of cooperatives. CDA retains the powers relating to
registration of cooperatives and the issuance of rules and
regulations, policies and guidelines.
General supervision over the implementation of the National
Building Code, including appellate jurisdiction over the
decisions and order of the local building officials remains with
the Secretary of Public Works and Highways.
With regard to the compensation and position classification
system, the Joint Commission on Local Government
Personnel Administration was abolished and transferred to
the appropriate office in the CSC.
Absorption of personnel
Devolution does not only involve the delegation of the
powers to regulate but also the transfer of the necessary
assets and personnel.
Objectives
To ensure the administrative and technical
capabilities of the LGUs to provide the devolved
basic services and facilities at the local level
To ensure that the delivery of basic services is not
duly prejudiced or disrupted.
Incidents of absorption
Re-appointment of an employee to the same position held
prior to the reorganization constitutes a reconsideration of
any previous objection to his/her earlier appointment.
CSC has no power to disapprove appointments made to those
already employed but subsequently devolved. Devolved
personnel do not lose their security of tenure. Even without
appointment, they shall continue to hold the position to
which they were last appointed.
Exceptions
Not administratively viable there is a duplication of
functions when the duties and responsibilities of national
government agency personnel are similar to those of
incumbent local government employees, and their offices
perform the same functions.
However, this does not apply to a national employee who is
responsible for or attached to a devolved asset (ex. drivers of
devolved agencies). The LGU and National Govt may invoke
this provision if both agree as to the duplication, but LGU may
still opt to absorb the employee.
Involuntary servitude employee may refuse to be
transferred and may claim separation pay.
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Appointment not renewed an appointment not renewed by
the DBM prior to the completion of the 6-month process
cannot be re-appointed on the basis alone of the city
government affected
Devolved personnel are considered local government
personnel and should be covered by the existing Position
Classification and Pay Plan. There shall be no diminution in
pay or benefits, therefore they may continue to enjoy higher
rates than their counterparts. Gradual equalization of
salaries of all local government personnel must then be
achieved to eliminate (or at least minimize) the aforesaid
disparity. To achieve this, LGUs lower than special cities and
first class provinces may adopt the salary schedule for higher
LGUs subject to the following conditions:
LGU is financially capable
Salary schedule shall be uniformly applied
Schedule of the highly urbanized cities and first class
provinces shall not be higher than that adopted by
the national government
In implementing a new and higher salary schedule,
the salary grade allocation of positions and salary
steps of personnel shall be retained
Adoption shall be subject to budgetary and general
limitations on Personal Service Expenditures (Secs.
324-325, LGC)
In case of component cities and municipalities,
schedule shall not be higher than that of the
province or city where they belong
Adoption of higher salary schedule shall not alter
existing classification of LGU concerned
LGUs may grant allowances/additional compensation to
national government employees assigned in their localities at
rates authorized by law, rules and regulations, subject to the
following conditions:
Annual income or finances of LGU as certified by the
local treasurer concerned will allow such grant
without exceeding the general limitations for
personal services
Budgetary requirements (Sec. 324 of LGC and R.A.
6758) have been satisfied and provided fully in the
budget as certified by the Budget Officer and COA
representative
LGU has fully implemented the devolution of
personnel/functions in accordance with the LGC
The mandatory absorption does not preclude affected LGUs
from creating equivalent positions nor conferring functions
different from the position previously held by the devolved
employeee provided there is no diminution of pay and
benefits, reduction in rank and impairment of tenure.
Assignment of devolved personnel is an administrative
decision of the LGU.
A local chief executive may appoint one person or a
committee to investigate, hear, make findings and submit
recommendations incidental to administrative complaints
against erring appointive local officials, including devolved
personnel.
Transfer of assets
Assets transferred to LGUs pursuant to devolution cannot be
recovered since the transfer is mandatory. However, a
provincial government may continue funding a general
hospital until the same is officially transferred to the DBM.
Since devolved hospitals have become components of LGUs
like other devolved national government agencies, they shall
be covered by COA Circular No. 92-382.
Memoranda of Agreement to effect devolution
To effect devolution, a MOA must be effected between a
National Government Agency and local governments
concerned. The local chief executive, in order to enter into
an agreement, must have the authority of the local legislative
council. The DILG cannot revoke such agreement, rule on the
alleged diminution of powers, nor pass upon the merits of the
contents and provisions of the agreement.
Oversight Committee
The OC is the body empowered to formulate and issue the
appropriate rules and regulations necessary for the efficient
and effective implementation of all provisions of the LGC.
Opinions rendered by it shall prevail over those of the DOJ.
The DOJ is bereft of authority to review or pass upon the
rulings of the OC, unless the latter itself requests.
The OC, however, cannot expand nor constrict the law. It
must always remain congruent to it. A resolution adopted by
the OC is devoid of legal force and effect unless approved by
the President and subsequently incorporated or embodied in
an executive or administrative order.

Alfiler
See attachments
Tapales
See attachments
CREATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS
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17 | P a g e Municipal Corporation
Tan v. Comelec
BP 885 (an Act creating a new province of Negros del Norte)
was enacted. It provides for the new provinces component
cities, boundaries, and the conduct of a plebiscite for its
creation. A plebiscite was held, pursuant to the requirement
of said BP (shall be conducted in the proposed new province
which are the areas affected), but the plebiscite was
confined only to the inhabitants of the territory of the new
province, to the exclusion of the voters from the rest of the
province. (Negros Occidental some cities and municipalities
of Negross Occidental = Negros del Norte)
WON the petition questioning the constitutionality and
validity of the plebiscite renders the case moot and academic
because the result was in favor of the creation of the new
province and such creation was now fait accompli.

HELD: No
It is the legality of the plebiscite itself which is challenged.

WON the province complied with the plebiscite requirement.

HELD: No
Sec 3, Art XI provides that No province, city, municipality or
barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code, and subject
to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in
the unit or units affected. This means that the rest of Negros
Occidental must be included in the conduct of plebiscite as
the boundaries of the existing province of Negros Occidental
would necessarily substantially altered by the division of its
existing boundaries in order that there can be created the
proposed new province.
WON the new province complied with the requirements of
land area.
HELD: No
Sec 197 of the LGC provides that a province may be created
if it has a territory of at least three thousand five hundred
square kilometers, xxx. The territory need not be contiguous
if it comprises two or more islands. The use of the word
territory clearly, reflects that it has reference only to the
mass of land area and excludes the waters over which the
political unit exercises control. It can be safely concluded that
the word territory in the first paragraph of Section 197 is
meant to be synonymous with "land area" only.
Torralba v. Municipality of Sibagat
BP 56, enacted February 1980, created the Municipality of
Sibagat, Province of Agusan del Sur. Petitioners assail its
validity for being violative of Section 3, Article XI, 1973
Constitution: No province, city, municipality, or barrio may
be created except in accordance with the criteria
established in the Local Government Code; that the LGC
must first be enacted to determine the criteria for the
creation of any province, city, municipality, or barrio and
since no LGC [came into being only on 10 February 1983] had
yet been enacted as of the date BP 56 was passed, the latter
could not have possibly complied with any criteria when the
Municipality was created.
HELD: Section 3, Article XI, 1973 Constitution does not
prohibit the modification of territorial and political
subdivisions before the enactment of the LGC. It does not say
that the LGC is a condition sine qua non for the creation of a
municipality. The constitutional provision simply means that
once said Code is enacted, the creation, modification or
dissolution of LGUs should conform with the criteria thus laid
down. The power to create a municipal corporation is
legislative in nature. In the absence of any constitutional
limitation, a legislative body may create any corporation it
deems essential for the more efficient administration of
government. The creation of the new Municipality was a valid
exercise of legislative power vested by the 1973 Constitution
in the Interim Batasang Pambansa. Pursuant to BP 56, a valid
plebiscite has been conducted among the unit/s affected. The
officials of the new Municipality have taken their oaths and
are performing their functions. A de jure entity has been
created.
Bai Sema v. Comelec
WON RA 9054 delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly
the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays, is constitutional.
WON a province (created by the ARMM Regional Assembly
under MMA Act 201) is entitled to one representative in the
House of Representatives without need of a national law
creating a legislative district for such province
HELD: No
For Congress to delegate validly the power to create a
province or city, it must also validly delegate at the same time
the power to create a legislative district. Congress cannot
delegate to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to
create legislative districts for the House of Representatives.
Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to
create local government units, subject to reasonable
standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision
of the Constitution. However, under the Local Government
Code, "only x x x an Act of Congress" can create provinces,
cities or municipalities.
Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated
to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within the
ARMM. Congress made the delegation under its plenary
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legislative powers because the power to create local
government units is not one of the express legislative powers
granted by the Constitution to regional legislative bodies. In
the present case, the question arises whether the delegation
to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to create
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays conflicts with
any provision of the Constitution.
There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with
the delegation to regional legislative bodies of the power to
create municipalities and barangays, provided Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution is followed. However, the
creation of provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5
(3), Article VI of the Constitution provides, "Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative" in the House
of Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution provides, "Any province that
may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may
hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand
shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at
least one Member x x x."
Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative
district because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended
to the Constitution. For the same reason, a city with a
population of 250,000 or more cannot also be created
without a legislative district. Thus, the power to create a
province, or a city with a population of 250,000 or more,
requires also the power to create a legislative district. Even
the creation of a city with a population of less than 250,000
involves the power to create a legislative district because
once the city's population reaches 250,000, the city
automatically becomes entitled to one representative under
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of
the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, the power
to create a province or city inherently involves the power to
create a legislative district.
Province of North Cotabato v. GRP
On 8/5/08, the government and the MILF were scheduled to
sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain
Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 2001 in
Malaysia.
The Solicitor General, who represents respondents,
summarizes the MOA-AD by stating that the same contained,
among others, the commitment of the parties to pursue
peace negotiations, protect and respect human rights,
negotiate with sincerity in the resolution and pacific
settlement of the conflict, and refrain from the use of threat
or force to attain undue advantage while the peace
negotiations on the substantive agenda are on-going.
WON the creation of the MOA-AD violates the Petitioners
right to information on matters of public concern
HELD:
(a) The MOA-AD is a matter of public concern, involving
as it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
the State, which directly affects the lives of the
people at large
(b) The right to information contemplates inclusion of
negotiations leading to the consummation of the
transaction
(c) The right includes (1) the right of the people to
demand information and (2) the duty of the
officialdom to give information even if nobody
demands.
(d) E.O No 3 contemplates not just the conduct of a
plebiscite to effectuate continuing consultations,
and such establishes petitioners right to be
consulted on the peace agenda, corollary to the
Constitutional right.
(e) Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP)
Esperon committed grave abuse of discretion when
he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation.
At least three pertinent laws animate these constitutional
imperatives and justify the exercise of the peoples right to be
consulted on relevant matters relating to the peace agenda.
1. E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for
continuing consultations on both national and local
levels and for a principal forum for consensus-
building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential
Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct regular
dialogues to seek relevant information, comments,
advice, and recommendations from peace partners
and concerned sectors of society.
2. The Local Government Code of 1991 requires all
national offices to conduct consultations before any
project or program critical to the environment and
human ecology including those that may call for the
eviction of a particular group of people residing in
such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD
is one peculiar program that unequivocally and
unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the
Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and
drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of
a great number of inhabitants from their total
environment.
3. Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples
Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure
for the recognition and delineation of ancestral
domain, which entails, among other things, the
observance of the free and prior informed consent
of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous
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Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the
Executive Department or any government agency
the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral
domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.
The invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege as a
defense to the general right to information or the specific
right to consultation is untenable. The various explicit legal
provisions fly in the face of executive secrecy. In any event,
respondents effectively waived such defense after it
unconditionally disclosed the official copies of the final draft
of the MOA-AD, for judicial compliance and public scrutiny.
Lopez v. Comelec
WON PD 824 (enacted November 1975) creating
Metropolitan Manila is valid.
HELD: Yes
In Paredes v. Executive Secretary the constitutional provision
on the need for a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite
in the unit or units affected would be satisfied even if "those
voters who are not from the barangay to be separated were
excluded in the plebiscite." It cannot be argued therefore
that the plebiscite held in the areas affected to constitute
Metropolitan Manila in the referendum on February 27, 1975
was not a sufficient compliance with the constitutional
provision. With the voters in such four cities and thirteen
municipalities, now composing Metropolitan Manila, having
manifested their will, the constitutional provision relied upon
by petitioners has been satisfied. It is to be noted likewise
that at the time of such plebiscite in February, 1975, there
was no Local Government Code.
Article VIII, Section 2 of the Constitution expressly recognized
the juridical entity known as Metropolitan Manila. Such
express constitutional affirmation of its existence in the
fundamental law calls for the dismissal of these petitions,
there being no legal justification for the declaration of
unconstitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 824. Nor was it
the first time that there has been acknowledgment in law of
the creation of Metropolitan Manila.
Under PD 824: "The Commission, the General Manager and
any official of the Commission shall be under the direct
supervision and control of the President. Notwithstanding
any provision in this Decree, the President shall have the
power to revoke, amend or modify any ordinance, resolution
or act of the Commission, the General and the
Commissioners." It may give rise to doubts as to its validity
insofar as it confers the power of control on the President.
That control he certainly exercises under the present
Constitution over the ministries. His power over local
governments does not go that far. It extends no further than
general supervision. These doubts, however, do not suffice to
nullify such a provision. Succinctly put, that construction that
would save is to be preferred as against one that will destroy.
To show fidelity to this basic principle of construction is to
lend substance to the equally basic doctrine that the
constitution enters into and forms part of every statute.
Accordingly, the presidential power of control over acts of the
Metro Manila Commission is limited to those that may be
considered national in character. Where, however, the acts of
the Metro Manila Commission may be considered as properly
appertaining to local government functions, the power of the
President is confined to general supervision.

PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
Alvarez v. Guingona
RA 7720 converted the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela into
an independent component city. Petitioners claim that the
said municipality has not met the minimum average annual
income required under the LGC. They assert that Internal
Revenue Allotments are not actually income but merely
transfers and/or budgetary aid from the national government
and that they fluctuate, increase or decrease, depending on
factors like population, land and equal sharing.
Another contention of the petitioner is that RA 7330
originated not from Congress but from the Senate.
Apparently, RA 7330 originated from HB 8817 which was filed
on April 18, 1993. After the third reading, the bill was
transmitted to the Senate on January 18, 1994. Meanwhile, a
counterpart bill SB 1243 was filed on May 19, 1993. On
February 23, 1994, HB 8817 was transmitted to the senate.
The committee recommended that HB 8817 be approved
without amendment, taking into consideration that the house
bill was identical to the senate bill.
HELD:RA 7720 is valid.
Internal Revenue Allotments are items of income because
they form part of the gross accretion of funds of the LGU.
They are included in computing the average annual income
required to become a city. The IRAs regularly and
automatically accrues to the local treasury without need of
any further action on the part of the LGU. Thus they
constitute income which the local government can invariably
rely upon as the source of much needed funds.
The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of
its receipt of the bill from the House, does not contravene the
constitutional requirement that a bill of local application
should originate in the House of Representatives, for as long
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as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the
House bill. Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the
Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the
bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body
is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.
Every law, including RA No. 7720,has in its favor the
presumption of constitutionality It is a well-entrenched
jurisprudential rule that on the side of every law lies the
presumption of constitutionality. Consequently, for RA No.
7720 to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear
and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a
doubtful and equivocal one; in other words, the grounds for
nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt.

POWERS AND FUNCTIONS
A. Governmental powers and functions
Municipality of San Fernando v. Firme
A collision occurred involving (1) a passenger jeepney driven
by Bernardo Balagot and owned by the Estate of Macario
Nieveras, (2) a gravel and sand truck driven by Jose
Manandeg and owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and (3) a
dump truck of the petitioner Municipality of San Fernando
and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Several passengers of the
jeepney including Laureano Bania Sr. died as a result of the
injuries they sustained and 4 others suffered physical injuries.
HELD: the municipality cannot be held liable for the torts
committed by its regular employee, who was then engaged in
the discharge of governmental functions.
The test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or
not the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality, is
performing governmental or proprietary functions. The
municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity, and their
functions are twofold. In one they exercise the right springing
from sovereignty, and while in the performance of the duties
pertaining thereto, their acts are political and governmental.
Their officers and agents in such capacity, though elected or
appointed by them, are nevertheless public functionaries
performing a public service, and as such they are officers,
agents, and servants of the state. In the other capacity the
municipalities exercise a private, proprietary or corporate
right, arising from their existence as legal persons and not as
public agencies. Their officers and agents in the performance
of such functions act in behalf of the municipalities in their
corporate or individual capacity, and not for the state or
sovereign power."
It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are
suable because their charters grant them the competence to
sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable
for torts committed by them in the discharge of
governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it
can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity.
The driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that
he was on his way to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand
and gravel for the repair of San Fernando's municipal streets.
In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity
of the performance of official duty is presumed. Hence, the
municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by
its regular employee, who was then engaged in the discharge
of governmental functions. Hence, the death of the
passenger tragic and deplorable though it may be imposed
on the municipality no duty to pay monetary compensation
B. Proprietary powers and functions
City of Manila v. IAC
Vicencio Sto. Domingo, deceased husband of plaintiff Irene
Domingo was buried in a lot of the North Cemetery which lot
was leased by the City of Manila to Irene from 1971 to 2021.
Irene paid the full rental thereof. In January of 1978, the
cemetery authorities exhumed and removed the remains of
Vivencio from the lot which were then placed in a bag and
kept in the bodega of the cementery. When Irene went to the
cemetery for All Souls Day, she was shocked to learn that the
remains of her husband were not anymore in the lot as the
same had been rented out to another lessee.
HELD: The City of Manila is a political body corporate and as
such endowed with the faculties of municipal corporations to
be exercised by and through its city government in
conformity with law, and its proper corporate name. It may
sue and be sued and contract and be contracted with. Its
powers are two fold in character, public, governmental or
political on one hand, and corporate private and proprietary
on the other hand.
The North Cemetery is a patrimonial property of the City of
Manila which was created by resolution of the Municipal
Board. The City of Manila prescribes the procedure and
guidelines for the disposition of burial lots and plots within
the cemetery through Admin. Order No. 5, s.1975. With said
acts of dominion, the cemetery is no doubt within the class of
property which the City of Manila owns in its proprietary or
private character.
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There is no dispute that the burial lot was leased in favor of
the private respondents. Hence, obligation arising from
contracting parties. Thus, a lease contract executed by the
lessor and lessee remains as the law between them.
Therefore a breach of contractual provision entitles the other
party to damages even if no penalty of such breach is
prescribed in the contract.
Hence, the breach of a contractual obligation between the
City of Manila and plaintiff, involving property which is
patrimonial in character entitles the latter to damages.
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Part II
Decentralization; Local Autonomy; Powers of Municipal Corporations

ARTICLES/REFERENCES
Public Corporations, Chapters IV VII
(Martin)
Chapters IV VI, see above
CHAPTER SEVEN: Powers of municipal corprorations
Sources of Powers of Municipal Corporations:
1. Constitution
2. Statutes of the State
3. Charter
4. In some states which adhere to it, the doctrine of
the inherent right of self-government, with respect
to certain municipal matters
Classification of municipal powers
1. Express Powers are those granted in express word
by the special charter or the general law under
which the corporation is organized
2. Implied Powers are those powers which arise by
natural implication from the grant of express powers
or by necessary inference from the purposes or
functions of the corporation
3. Inherent Powers are those which are necessary
and inseparable from every corporation, and which
come into existence as a matter of course as soon as
a municipality is created. They are the common-law
powers of a corporation
4. Legislative Power is the authority to make laws.
This power is generally vested in the common
council.
5. Executive Power is the authority to enforce laws,
or appoint the agents charged with the duty of such
enforcement; generally vested in the mayor and the
heads of the designated departments and other
officers created by law.
Chapter II Book I , LGC (Sec 6 24)
Sec 6 10, see above
Sec. 11. Selection and Transfer of Local Government Site,
Offices and Facilities
The law or ordinance creating or merging local government
units shall specify the seat of government from where
governmental and corporate services shall be delivered.
Factors relevant in selection of seat of government:
geographical centrality, accessibility, availability of
transportation and communication facilities, drainage and
sanitation, development and economic progress, and other
relevant considerations.
Transfer of seat of government:
When conditions and developments in the
LGU concerned have significantly changed
Public hearing and two-thirds vote of all the
members of the Sanggunian
No transfer shall be made outside the
territorial boundaries of the LGU.
The old site and improvements thereon
may be disposed of by sale or lease or
converted to such other use as the
Sanggunian concerned may deem beneficial
to the LGU concerned and its inhabitants.
Transfer, relocation, and conversion to other uses of local
government offices and facilities:
Public hearings conducted for the purpose
i. Concurrence of the majority of all
the members of the Sanggunian
Sec. 12. Government Centers.
Government center - where offices, agencies, or branches of
the National Government, LGUs, or government-owned or
controlled corporations may be located.
LGUs, in designating such a center, shall take into account the
existing facilities of national and local agencies and offices
which may serve as the government center.
The National Government, LGU, or government-owned or
controlled corporation concerned shall bear the expenses for
the construction of its buildings and facilities in the
government center.
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Sec. 13. Naming of Local Government Units and Public
Places, Streets and Structures.
By the Sanggunian
Of LGUs, public places, streets, and structures within
their territorial jurisdiction (see below for detailed
list)
In consultation with PHC
o In changes of name of public schools, upon
recommendation of the local school board
o In changes of names of publc hospitals,
health centers, and other health facilities,
upon recommendation of the local health
board
With notice to the Office of the President, the
representative of the legislative district concerned,
and the Bureau of Posts
Ratified in a plebiscite conducted for the purpose in
the political unit directly affected
Limitations:
Cannot be named after a living person
Justifiable reason
Not oftener than once in ten years
The name of a LGU or a public place, street or
structure with historical, cultural, or ethnic
significance shall not be changed, unless by a
unanimous vote of the Sanggunian concerned and in
consultation with the PHC.
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan may change the names of the
following:
Component cities and municipalities, upon the
recommendation of the Sanggunian concerned (i.e.,
Sanggunian of the component city and municipality
Provincial roads, avenues, boulevards,
thoroughfares, and bridges
Public vocational or technical schools and other
post-secondary and tertiary schools
Provincial hospitals, health centers, and other health
facilities
Any other public place or building owned by the
provincial government.
The Sanggunians of highly urbanized cities and independent
component cities (i.e., component cities whose charters
prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective
officials) may change the names of the following:
City barangays, upon the recommendation of the
sangguniang barangay concerned
City roads, avenues, boulevards, thoroughfares, and
bridges
Public elementary, secondary and vocational or
technical schools, community colleges and non-
chartered colleges
City hospitals, health centers and other health
facilities
Any other public place or building owned by the city
government.
The Sanggunians of component cities and municipalities may
change the names of the following:
City and municipal barangays, upon
recommendation of the sangguniang barangay
concerned
City, municipal and barangay roads, avenues,
boulevards, thoroughfares, and bridges
City and municipal public elementary, secondary and
vocational or technical schools, post-secondary and
other tertiary schools
City and municipal hospitals, health centers and
other health facilities
Any other public place or building owned by the
municipal government.
Sec. 14. Beginning of Corporate Existence.
An LGUs corporate existence commences upon the election
and qualification of its chief executive and a majority of the
members of its Sanggunian, UNLESS some other time is fixed
therefor by the law or ordinance creating it.
Sec. 15. Political and Corporate Nature of Local Government
Units.
Every LGU is a body politic and corporate endowed with
powers to be exercised by it in conformity with law.
As such, LGUs exercise powers
as a political subdivision of the National Government
as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of
its territory
Sec. 16. General Welfare.
Every LGU shall exercise powers
expressly granted
necessarily implied therefrom
necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient
and effective governance
essential to the promotion of the general welfare.
LGUs shall ensure and support, among other things, the
preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and
safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology,
encourage and support the development of appropriate and
self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve
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public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social
justice, promote full employment among their residents,
maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and
convenience of their inhabitants.
Sec. 17. Basic Services and Facilities.
LGUs shall
endeavor to be self-reliant and continue exercising
the powers and discharging the duties and functions
currently vested upon them
discharge the functions and responsibilities of
national agencies and offices devolved to them
pursuant to the LGC
exercise such other powers and discharge such other
functions and responsibilities as are necessary,
appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective
provision of the basic services and facilities
Basic services and facilities (not an exclusive list)
For Barangays
Agricultural support services which include planting
materials distribution system and operation of farm
produce collection and buying stations
Health and social welfare services which include
maintenance of barangay health center and day-care
center
Services and facilities related to general hygiene and
sanitation, beautification, and solid waste collection
Maintenance of katarungang pambarangay
Maintenance of barangay roads and bridges and
water supply systems
Infrastructure facilities such as multi-purpose hall,
multipurpose pavement, plaza, sports center, and
other similar facilities
Information and reading center
Satellite or public market, where viable
For Municipalities
Extension and on-site research services and facilities
related to agriculture and fishery activities which
include dispersal of livestock and poultry, fingerlings,
and other seedling materials for aquaculture; palay,
corn, and vegetable seed farms; medicinal plant
gardens; fruit tree, coconut, and other kinds of
seedling nurseries; demonstration farms; quality
control of copra and improvement and development
of local distribution channels, preferably through
cooperatives inter-barangay irrigation systems;
water and soil resources utilization and conservation
projects; and enforcement of fishery laws in
municipal waters including the conservation of
mangroves
Pursuant to national policies and subject to
supervision, control and review of the DENR,
implementation of community-based forestry
projects which include integrated social forestry
programs and similar projects; management and
control of communal forest with an area not
exceeding fifty (50) square kilometers; establishment
of tree parks, greenbelts, and similar forest
development projects
Subject to the provisions of Title Five, Book I of the
LGC, health services which include the
implementation of programs and projects on
primary health care, maternal and child care, and
communicable and non-communicable disease
control services; access to secondary and tertiary
health services; purchase of medicines, medical
supplies, and equipment needed to carry out the
services herein enumerated
Social welfare services which include programs and
projects on child and youth welfare, family and
community welfare, women's welfare, welfare of the
elderly and disabled persons; community-based
rehabilitation programs for vagrants, beggars, street
children, scavengers, juvenile delinquents, and
victims of drug abuse; livelihood and other pro-poor
projects; nutrition services; and family planning
services
Information services which include investments and
job placement information systems, tax and
marketing information systems, and maintenance of
a public library
Solid waste disposal system or environmental
management system and services or facilities related
to general hygiene and sanitation
Municipal buildings, cultural centers, public parks
including freedom parks, playgrounds, and other
sports facilities and equipment, and other similar
facilities
Infrastructure facilities intended primarily to service
the needs of the residents of the municipality and
which are funded out of municipal funds including,
but not limited to, municipal roads and bridges;
school buildings and other facilities for public
elementary and secondary schools; clinics, health
centers and other health facilities necessary to carry
out health services; communal irrigation, small
water impounding projects and other similar
projects; fish ports; artesian wells, spring
development, rainwater collectors and water supply
systems; seawalls, dikes, drainage and sewerage,
and flood control; traffic signals and road signs and
similar facilities
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Public markets, slaughterhouses and other municipal
enterprises
Public cemetery
Tourism facilities and other tourist attractions,
including the acquisition of equipment, regulation
and supervision of business concessions, and
security services for such facilities
Sites for police and fire stations and substations and
the municipal jail
For Provinces
Agricultural extension and on-site research services
and facilities which include the prevention and
control of plant and animal pests and disease; dairy
farms, livestock markets, animal breeding stations,
and artificial insemination centers; and assistance in
the organization of farmers' and fishermen's
cooperatives, and other collective organizations, as
well as the transfer of appropriate technology
Industrial research and development services, as
well as the transfer of appropriate technology
Pursuant to national policies and subject to
supervision, control and review of the DENR,
enforcement of forestry laws limited to community-
based forestry projects, pollution control law, small-
scale mining law, and other laws on the protection
of the environment; and mini-hydro electric projects
for local purposes
Subject to the provisions of Title Five, Book I of this
Code, health services which include hospitals and
other tertiary health services
Social welfare services which include programs and
projects on rebel returnees and evacuees; relief
operations and, population development services
Provincial buildings, provincial jails, freedom parks
and other public assembly areas, and other similar
facilities
Infrastructure facilities intended to service the needs
of the residents of the province and which are
funded out of provincial funds including, but not
limited to, provincial roads and bridges; inter-
municipal waterworks, drainage and sewerage, flood
control, and irrigation systems; reclamation projects;
and similar facilities
Programs and projects for low-cost housing and
other mass dwellings, except those funded by the
Social Security System (SSS), Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS), and the Home
Development Mutual Fund (HDMF): Provided, That
national funds for these programs and projects shall
be equitably allocated among the regions in
proportion to the ratio of the homeless to the
population
Investment support services, including access to
credit financing
Upgrading and modernization of tax information and
collection services through the use of computer
hardware and software and other means
Inter-municipal telecommunications services,
subject to national policy guidelines
Tourism development and promotion programs
For Cities
All the services and facilities of the municipality and
province
Adequate communication and transportation
facilities
Support for education, police and fire services and
facilities
Public works and infrastructure projects and other
facilities, programs and services funded by the
National Government under the annual General
Appropriations Act, other special laws, pertinent
executive orders, and those wholly or partially
funded from foreign sources, are not covered under
this section, except in those cases where the local
government unit concerned is duly designated as the
implementing agency for such projects, facilities,
programs, and services.
The designs, plans, specifications, testing of materials, and
the procurement of equipment and materials from both
foreign and local sources necessary for the provision of the
foregoing services and facilities shall be undertaken by the
LGU concerned, based on national policies, standards and
guidelines.
Devolution
Act by which the National Government confers
power and authority upon the various local
government units to perform specific functions and
responsibilities
National agencies or offices shall devolve to local
government units the responsibility for the provision
of basic services and facilities within six (6) months
after the effectivity of the LGC.
o Includes the transfer to LGUs of the records,
equipment, and other assets and personnel
of national agencies and offices
corresponding to the devolved powers,
functions, and responsibilities.
o Personnel of said national agencies or
offices shall be absorbed by the LGUs to
which they belong or in whose areas they
are assigned to the extent that it is
administratively viable as determined by
the Oversight Committee
o The rights accorded to personnel pursuant
to civil service law, rules and regulations
shall not be impaired
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Regional directors who are career executive service
officers and other officers of similar rank in the said
regional offices who cannot be absorbed by the LGU
shall be retained by the National Government,
without any diminution of rank, salary or tenure

Regional offices of national agencies or offices
whose functions are devolved to LGUs shall be
phased out within one year from the approval of the
LGC.
National agencies and offices may establish such
field units as may be necessary for monitoring
purposes and providing technical assistance to LGUs.
The properties, equipment, and other assets of
these regional offices shall be distributed to the
LGUs in the region in accordance with the rules and
regulations issued by the Oversight Committee.
The National Government or the next higher level of local
government unit may provide or augment the basic services
and facilities assigned to a lower level of local government
unit when:
Services or facilities are not made available
If made available, they are inadequate to meet the
requirements of its inhabitants
Funding of basic services and facilities
From the share of local government units in the
proceeds of national taxes and other local revenues
and funding support from the National Government,
its instrumentalities and government-owned or
controlled corporations which are tasked by law to
establish and maintain such services or facilities
To ensure the active participation of the private
sector in local governance, LGUs may, by ordinance,
sell, lease, encumber, or otherwise dispose of public
economic enterprises owned by them in their
proprietary capacity
Costs may also be charged for the delivery of basic
services or facilities enumerated in this Section.
Any fund or resource available for the use of local
government units shall be first allocated for the
provision of basic services or facilities before
applying the same for other purposes, unless
otherwise provided in the LGC
Sec. 18. Power to Generate and Apply Resources.
LGUs proprietary powers:
to establish an organization that shall be responsible
for the efficient and effective implementation of
their development plans, program objectives and
priorities
to create their own sources of revenue and to levy
taxes, fees, and charges which shall accrue
exclusively for their use and disposition and which
shall be retained by them
to have a just share in national taxes which shall be
automatically and directly released to them without
need of any further action
to have an equitable share in the proceeds from the
utilization and development of the national wealth
and resources within their respective territorial
jurisdictions including sharing the same with the
inhabitants by way of direct benefits
to acquire, develop, lease, encumber, alienate, or
otherwise dispose of real or personal property held
by them in their proprietary capacity and to apply
their resources and assets for productive,
developmental, or welfare purposes, in the exercise
or furtherance of their governmental or proprietary
powers and functions and thereby ensure their
development into self-reliant communities and
active participants in the attainment of national
goals.
Sec. 19. Eminent Domain.
LGUs exercise of power of eminent domain, requisites:
Through the chief executive
Pursuant to an ordinance
For public use, or purpose, or welfare for the
benefits of the poor and the landless
Upon payment of just compensation
Pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and
pertinent laws
Valid and definite offer made to the owner that was
not accepted
LGU may immediately take possession of the property upon
Filing of the expropriation proceedings
Deposit with the proper court of at least 15% of the
FMV of the property based on the current tax
declaration of the property to be expropriated
The amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be
determined by the proper court, based on the fair market
value at the time of the taking of the property.
Sec. 20. Reclassification of Lands.
City or municipality
Through an ordinance passed by the Sanggunian
After public hearing for the purpose
In the following cases:
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o when the land ceases to be economically
feasible and sound for agricultural purposes
as determined by DA
o where the land shall have substantially
greater economic value for residential,
commercial, or industrial purposes, as
determined by the Sanggunian concerned:
Limited to the following percentages of the total
agricultural land area at the time of the passage of
the ordinance
o Highly urbanized and independent
component cities - 15%
o Component cities and first to the third class
municipalities - 10%
o Fourth to sixth class municipalities - 5%
BUT President upon recommendation of NEDA may
authorize a city or municipality to reclassify lands in
excess of the abovementioned limits when public
interest so requires
Agricultural lands distributed to agrarian reform
beneficiaries under R.A. No. 6657 (CARL) shall not be
affected. Conversion of such lands into other
purposes shall be governed by Section 65 of CARL.
Sec. 65, CARL
Conversion of Lands
After the lapse of five (5) years from its award, when the land
ceases to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural
purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land
will have a greater economic value for residential,
commercial or industrial purposes, the DAR, upon application
of the beneficiary or the landowner, with due notice to the
affected parties, and subject to existing laws, may authorize
the reclassification or conversion of the land and its
disposition: Provided, That the beneficiary shall have fully
paid his obligation.
LGUs shall continue to prepare their respective
comprehensive land use plans enacted through zoning
ordinances which shall be the primary and dominant bases
for the future use of land resources. Requirements for food
production, human settlements, and industrial expansion
shall be taken into consideration in the preparation of such
plans.
When approval by a national agency (e.g., DA) is required for
reclassification, such approval shall not be unreasonably
withheld. Failure to act on a proper and complete application
for reclassification within three (3) months from receipt of
the same shall be deemed as approval thereof.
Sec. 21. Closure and Opening of Roads.
Requisites
Pursuant to an ordinance
With provisions for the maintenance of public safety
In cases of permanent closure:
Ordinance must be approved by at least two-thirds
of all the members of the Sanggunian
An adequate substitute for the public facility that is
subject to closure must be provided when necessary
BUT no freedom park shall be closed permanently
without provision for its transfer or relocation to a
new site (adequate substitute always necessary)
o A property permanently withdrawn from
public use may be used or conveyed for any
purpose for which other real property
belonging to the LGU concerned may be
lawfully used or conveyed
Temporary closures
During an actual emergency, or fiesta celebrations,
public rallies, agricultural or industrial fairs, or an
undertaking of public works and highways,
telecommunications, and waterworks projects
Any national or local road, alley, park, or square
Duration shall be specified by the local chief
executive concerned in a written order
No national or local road, alley, park, or square shall
be temporarily closed for athletic, cultural, or civic
activities not officially sponsored, recognized, or
approved by the LGU
For the establishment of shopping malls, Sunday,
flea or night markets, or shopping areas where
goods, merchandise, foodstuffs, commodities, or
articles of commerce may be sold and dispensed to
the general public
Any local street, road, thoroughfare, or any other
public place
By a duly enacted ordinance
Sec. 22. Corporate Powers.
LGUs corporate powers:
To have continuous succession in its corporate name
To sue and be sued
To have and use a corporate seal
To acquire and convey real or personal property
To enter into contracts
To exercise such other powers as are granted to
corporations, subject to the limitations provided in
this Code and other laws
Corporate seals
LGUs may continue using, modify, or change their
existing corporate seals
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Newly established LGUs or those without corporate
seals may create their own corporate seals which
shall be registered with the DILG
Any change of corporate seal shall also be registered
with DILG.
Contracts
Unless otherwise provided in the LGC, no contract
may be entered into by the local chief executive in
behalf of the LGU without prior authorization by the
Sanggunian concerned.
A legible copy of the contract shall be posted at a
conspicuous place in the provincial capitol or the
city, municipal or barangay hall.
Fiscal autonomy
LGUs shall enjoy full autonomy in the exercise of
their proprietary functions and in the management
of their economic enterprises, subject to the
limitations provided in the LGC and other applicable
laws.
Sec. 23. Authority to Negotiate and Secure Grants.
Local chief executives may negotiate and secure financial
grants or donations in kind from local and foreign assistance
agencies
upon authority of the Sanggunian,
in support of the basic services or facilities
enumerated under Sec. 17
without necessity of securing clearance or approval
therefor from any department, agency, or office of
the National Government of from any higher LGU
o BUT projects with national security
implications shall be approved by the
national agency concerned
o When the national agency fails to act on the
request for approval within thirty (30) days
from receipt thereof, the same shall be
deemed approved
report of nature, amount, and terms to both Houses
of Congress and the President within thirty (30) days
upon signing of such grant agreement or deed of
donation
Sec. 24. Liability for Damages.
LGUs and their officials are not exempt from liability for death
or injury to persons or damage to property.
Compendium on Local Government,
Chapters 5 6 (Agra)
CHAPTER FIVE: Police Power, Power of Eminent Domain,
General Powers and Authority
A. Police power, general welfare clause
Police power is inherent in the State, but not in municipal
corporations. There must be a valid delegation of such power
by the National Legislature (which is the repository of
inherent powers of the State) in order for the MC to exercise
such power. MCs exercise such power under the general
welfare clause. The power is broad and is said to be
commensurate with but not exceeding the duty to provide
for the real needs of the people in their health, safety,
comfort and convenience, and consistently as may be with
private rights. Police power is said to be the most essential,
insistent, and illimitable of powers, and in a sense, the
greatest and most powerful attribute of government. To
secure the general welfare of the State and the fundamental
aim of government, the rights of the individual may be
subordinated.
Two Branches of the General Welfare Clause
First: attached to the main trunk of municipal authority;
relates to ordinances and regulations necessary to carry into
effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon
the municipal council by law.
Second: much more independent of the specific functions of
the council which are enumerated by law; authorizes
ordinances that seem to be necessary and proper to provide
for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve
the morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of
the municipality and the inhabitants, and for the protection
of property.
General Rule: Ordinances passed by virtue of the implied
power of the general welfare clause must be:
Reasonable
Consonant with the general powers and purposes of
the corporation
Not inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State
The powers of the municipal corporations are to be
construed strictissimi juris, and any doubt or ambiguity must
be construed against the municipality.
Exercise of police power may be judicially inquired into and
corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or
unreasonable, there having been a denial or due process or a
violation of any other applicable constitutional guarantee.
Zoning
A zoning ordinance or regulation is a valid exercise of police
power and has the effect of nullifying or superseding
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contractual obligations. The rule of non-impairment of
contracts is not absolute it must be reconciled with the
legitimate exercise of police power. Laws and reservation of
essential attributes of sovereign power are read into
contracts agreed upon by parties and they form part of, and
are read into, every contract, unless clearly excluded in cases
where exclusion is allowed.
Police power cannot be surrendered or bargained away
through the medium of a (lease) contract earlier executed.
Police power may be activated anytime.
Financial assistance
LGU may use unappropriated available public funds for
extending financial assistance to qualified (indigent) bereaved
families. Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely
because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons.
(However, may not be applied to heirs of deceased local
government officials as financial assistance.)
Improper exercise of police power
The prohibition of establishment of legitimate enterprises
(such as night clubs and cabarets) is not valid. Under B.P.
337, local governments are only empowered to regulate their
operations.
Confiscation of products
A city mayor has no authority to cause the
seizure/confiscation of meat products in contravention of a
city ordinance, as it is a violation of due process
requirements.
B. Power of eminent domain
As exercised by LGUs, it is only a delegated power. The
statutes conferring such power cannot be broadened or
constricted by implication. As a right, it is founded on
genuine necessity, and the necessity must be of public
character and for the public good. Therefore, LGUs may not
capriciously choose what private property should be taken.
Courts have the power to inquire into the legality of the
exercise of the rights and to determine whether there is
genuine necessity therefore.
Requisites for the Valid Exercise of Eminent Domain:
Ordinance must be passed authorizing the local chief
executive to subject a certain property to
expropriation
Public use, purpose or welfare of poor and landless
Payment of just compensation
Valid and definite offer to pay property, which was
not accepted
A municipal ordinance authorizing the mayor to file
expropriation proceedings must be approved by the
provincial board.
Role of higher/supervising local government
Sangguniang panlalawigan has the power to declare a
municipal ordinance providing for the exercise of eminent
domain invalid on the SOLE GROUND that it is beyond the
power of the sangguniang bayan or the mayor to issue.
Therefore, the SP cannot declare the ordinance invalid for
being unnecessary considering there are other available lots.
Role of national government agencies
The approval of the national government is not required for
local governments to exercise its power of eminent domain.
Stages in actions for expropriation
First: Determination of authority of plaintiff to exercise such
power, and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the
facts involved. Ends with an order (if not dismissal) of
condemnation declaring the lawful right of plaintiff to take
the property. Such order is a final order.
Second: Determination by the court of the just compensation
as of the date of the filing of the complaint, with the
assistance of not more than three commissioners. Such order
fixing the just compensation shall be final as well.
Public purpose or use
Under the new concept, public use means public advantage,
convenience or benefit which tends to contribute to the
general welfare and prosperity of the whole community.
Right to take property
Only after the deposit of just compensation.
Complaint for eminent domain
A complaint which failed to mention the existence of a valid
and definite offer, and that such offer was not accepted but
alleges that repeated negotiations were made but failed is
sufficient to show cause of action.
C. General powers and authority
Restraint of Trade Sangguniang Panlalawigan cannot totally
ban the buying and selling of all kinds of liquor since this is
tantamount to restraint of trade. Granting it may be done, it
must be expressly provided for by the law. However, in order
to promote general welfare the State may interfere with
personal liberty, property, business and occupations. Thus, a
person may be subjected to certain kinds of restraints and
burdens in order to secure the general welfare of the State.
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Compulsory Processes the contempt power of the national
legislature is sui generis, as its exercise is a matter of self-
preservation (it asserts its authority as one of the three
independent and coordinate branches of the govt,
independent of the judicial branch and punishes contempt)
and local legislative bodies cannot correctly claim to possess
it for the same reasons the national legislature does. As the
contempt power and subpoena power partake of a judicial
nature, they cannot be implied in the grant of legislative
power. If there is no express statutory basis, it would run
afoul of the doctrine of the doctrine of separation of powers.
This must be considered an exception to Sec. 4 of B.P. 337,
which provides for liberal rules of interpretation in favour of
local autonomy.
LGUs cannot proclaim religious or local holidays such
power rests within the President
Reclassificaton of Land the authority of the Sanggunian is
limited to the reclassification of agricultural lands. The power
of cities and municipalities to reclassify agricultural land into
commercial, industrial and residential status is only for the
purpose of assessment and real property taxation.
Reclassification power lodged with the LGU; act of
allocating lands to different activities or classes of land uses,
evolved and enacted through local planning and zoning
processes. DAR approval is not necessary.
Land Conversion power lodged with DAR; actual change in
land use and takes into account tenants and farmworkers, if
any, and ascertainment of disturbance compensation.
HOWEVER, such power to issue conversion clearance and/or
approve/disapprove applications can only be exercised on or
after June 15, 1988, the date of the effectivity of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL).
Role of DAR the power of DAR to approve or disapprove
conversions is limited to the applications for reclassification
submitted by land owners or tenant beneficiaries. DARs
authority to convert agricultural land should be exercised in
conjunction with the devolved powers of the LGUs to
reclassify such land. However, once a landholding has been
acquired at redistributed to qualified beneficiaries pursuant
to CARL, it is excluded from the authority to LGUs to
reclassify. Nothing in the LGC shall be construed to repeal,
modify or amend the CARL.
Prescribing penal provisions
Sangguniang barangay cannot provide for the [enalty of
imprisonment for violations of barangay ordinances LGC
only provides for the imposition of a fine. Forfeiture of salary
likewise cannot be validly prescribed.
Sangguniang barangay cannot enact an ordinance identical to
an ordinance of the city of municipality but with a lesser
penalty, since the former is inconsistent with the latter.
Contracting Loans LGU cannot contract external or foreign
loans since LGC only provides for guarantee by the President
of local or domestic loans.
Conduct of Legislative Inquiry municipal mayor cannot
require that all heads of departments and EEs obtain his
clearance and permission before appearing before any
governmental entity.
Scholarship Grants scholarship fund may only be applied to
schools within its jurisdiction.
Legislative Voting Requirement local legislative council
cannot provide for more than majority vote for the passage
of appropriations ordinances, since LGC requires only simple
majority. However, sanggunian may provide for different
vote requirement for other certain ordinances.
Change of Name of Government Center prior consultation
with Philippines Historical Commission required
Requiring Performance Reports may not be reqd by
sangguniang panlalawigan because it may cause work
disruption, and such function is essentially executive, not
legislative.
Regulation of Property public property is outside the
commerce of man, therefore cannot be the subject of lease
or contract, and constructions thereon can be summarily
abated by the LGU. The power to regulate public property is
with the LGU.
Public Plaza
Public Streets road lots in a private subdivision are private
property, hence local governments must first acquire them by
donation, purchase or expropriation if they wish to utilize
them
Land reclaimed by the PEA for and on behalf of the State is no
longer part of the public domain and public use.
An LGU must comply with the legal conditions imposed on a
donation.
Public Markets
Buildings
Disposal of Real Property is Proper When:
Public bidding is conducted
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Price offered by vendee is higher than the appraised
value
Deed of sale is signed by the local chief executive,
with the authority of the sanggunian
Certification is issued that said lot is no longer
needed for public use as duly verified by the auditor
Transfer of Property to Local Governments lots covered by
a Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) issued
pursuant to CARL can only be transferred or acquired through
the DAR in order to be reallocated to another beneficiary.
The term government does not contemplate its political
subdivisions.
Use of Land a municipality may change the use of a piece of
land if there are no such express restrictions in the contract
to sell/contract of sale; it may also enter into a joint venture
agreement with a private entity embodied in a MOA signed
by the local chief executive, a representative of the private
entity and ratified by the sanggunian; HOWEVER, a chapel
may not be constructed on land owned by the govt based on
the separation of church and state
As a LESSOR LGU may file an action for illegal detention and
demand eviction for violation of lease contract and non-
payment of rentals
Abatement of Public Nuisance Local government officials
cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause
authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial
proceedings. This tenet applies to a nuisance per se, which
affects the immediate safety of persons and property, and
may be summarily abated under the undefined law of
necessity. If it be a nuisance per accidens, it may be proven
in a hearing conducted for that purpose. It is not per se a
nuisance warranting its abatement without judicial
intervention. While the Sangguniang Bayan may provide for
the abatement of a nuisance, it cannot declare a particular
thing as a nuisance per se and order its condemnation. It can
only be so adjudged by judicial determination.
Land Use Planning
Logging Activities DENRs powers cannot be encroached
upon by the LGU
Quarrying Activities provincial governors authority to grant
and issue quarry permits extends only to public lands
Fishing, Fishery Privileges
Maintaining Dumpsites must not endanger environment,
health, safety and welfare of residents
Littering fine may be validly imposed
Power to Enter into Contracts
Contracts entered into by local chief executives have the
force of law between parties and should be complied with.
A chief executive acting pursuant to a resolution already
adopted by the council in signing the deed of sale to qualified
buyers determined after public bidding was exercising a
purely ministerial duty incidental to his functions.
Council/Sanggunian authorization is a condition sine qua non
for the validity of a contract entered into by a local chief
executive. Authorization may take the form of a resolution.
Traffic Regulation temporary street closures may be done
through an ordinance
Issuance of Permits the issuance, revocation or cancellation
of permits is a discretionary act subject to strict
implementation as to its scope
Authority to issue business permits are subject to the
regulatory powers of the city mayor
Rejection of application a mayor may refuse the granting of
a permit only if there are valid reasons embodied in an
appropriate ordinance or national law; in the absence of such
law or ordinance, the mayor may not validly refuse to grant
the permit to a legitimate enterprise due to the principle of
free enterprise and competition; also, issuance may not be
withheld based on none-payment of taxes and imposts
Cancellation of permit may not be revoked if operator was
not informed of a specific violation of the LGC, as it will be
violative of due process
Franchises power to issue National Franchises lies with the
National Government, devolution is only with respect to
regulatory powers within the jurisdictions concerned.
However, the grant of franchises for the establishment,
construction, operation and maintenance of public markets
and bus/jeepney terminals are within the concern of the
sanggunians. Although the municipality has the authority to
grant franchises, the authority to collect franchise tax is
under the power of the province and not the municipality.
Coal Corporations power of regulation lies with the DOE
Casinos, Gambling power of LGUs to suppress gambling
refers only to illegal gambling
Demolition
Padlocking of Premises
Local Infrastructure Projects authority of LGUs to
undertake reclamation projects is limited to those funded out
of local funds; projects funded by the National Govt are
lodged with the PEA; regular courts are prohibited from
issuing writs to stop any person, entity, government official or
LGU from proceeding with or continuing the execution or
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implementation of amn infrastructure project approved by
the President through the Executive Secretary (P.D. 3-A).
Creation of LGUs the power to create political subdivisions
is a function of the legislature (ex. conversion of municipal
districts into regular municipalities)
Internal Revenue Allotments (IRA) is included in computation
of average annual income (part of general income of govt
units)
Population requirement of 5,000 for the creation of a
barangay within a highly urbanized city is mandatory (but
does not apply to those already existing)
Registered voters of highly urbanized cities shall be
prohibited from voting in elections at the provincial level,
unless reclassification occurs after ratification of 1987
Constitution, but before effectivity of LGC of 1991.
Plebiscite - to be conducted in the political units directly
affected, (1) meaning residents of the political entity who
would be economically dislocated by the separation have a
right to vote, and (2) referring to the plurality of political units
which would participate; whole unit must participate, not
merely those that form part of the new unit
Applies only to new LGUs created for the first time
under the 1987 Constitution therefore no
plebiscite is necessary in the case of a municipal
corporation which has attained de facto status at the
time the 1987 Constitution took effect.
In case of a negative vote, sub-province shall
continue to be part of the original province, to be
represented by officials of the original province.
There is no law authorizing the holding of special
elections for the first set of barangay officials of
newly-created barangays, therefore, such election
cannot be conducted together with the SK elections.
Abolition of LGUs enactment of an ordinance by
sangguniang panlalawigan or panlungsod concerned and the
conduct of a plebiscite required
Principle of non-user only applies to private corporation
law; does not apply to municipal corporations
Conversion of LGUs bills of local application must originate
from the House of Representatives and initiate the legislative
process which would culminate in the enactment of a Statute.
A technical description similar to those in Torrens titles is not
a condition sine qua non (it would defeat the purpose of the
LGC). What is required is a reasonable ascertainment of the
area.
Reapportionment of Legislative Districts may be made by a
special law, such as the enactment by special law of a charter
of a new city. Congress may increase its own composition
through legislative enactment.
Settling Boundary Disputes
Between barangays referred to sangguniang bayan
or panlungsod concerned; Office of the President
has no jurisdiction
Between adjacent municipalities within a province
elevated to sangguniang panlalawigan
Between independent component city and a
municipality, or highly urbanized cities and
municipalities jointly referred to respective
sanggunians
Barangay Clearances barangays are only authorized to issue
clearances for business and impose reasonable fees, but are
not allowed to issue business permits or licenses. Barangay
clearance cannot be denied on grounds other than those
specified in the appropriate ordinance.
Warrants of Arrest mayors are no longer authorized to issue
such warrants
Election Activities COMELEC has exclusive jurisdiction over
cases involving the enforcement of the Election Code; the
transfer of officers and employees within the election period
is prohibited, except for the purpose of coping with
emergencies and efficiency in the government service
Abolition of an Office express power to create local offices
(absent any contrary provision), impliedly carries with it the
power to abolish said office in GOOD FAITH.
Relocation of Homeless responsibility of both LGU and
National Housing Authority
Inclusion in Special Economic Zones R.A. 7227 provides that
the creation of the Subic Special Economic Zone is subject to
the concurrence of concerned municipalities and cities by
resolution. However, the Subic Authority shall prevail in
conflicts concerning matters affecting the zone.
Assistance to Sectors public purpose is not unconstitutional
merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of
persons
Creation of Fishery Resources Management Council by way of
Ordinance
Appointment to Local Offices punong barangays may
appoint purok leaders, provided the appropriate ordinance
has been enacted and the council thereafter approves the
appointment.
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33 | P a g e Municipal Corporation
Projects, Countrywide Development Fund sanggunian is
authorized to compel a congressman to seek its prior
approval before the implementation of any projects, as the
LGC provides that national projects must be approved by the
sanggunian prior to their implementation. However, an
appropriations ordinance is not required to facilitate the
release of funds from the Countrywide Development Fund of
Representatives of Congress. Legislation, however, must be
enacted specifying the infrastructure and priority projects.
Issuance of Bonds any security issued or guaranteed by the
govt or any of its political subdivisions is exempt from
registration; exempt securities
Ultra Vires Acts of Private Organizations local chief
executives may file a complaint against such organizations
with the appropriate national government unit pursuant to a
resolution adopted by the sanggunians
Additional Insurance Benefits council by way of ordinance
may not increase insurance benefits of municipalities officials
and EEs since this would unreasonable add up to the tax
burden of the inhabitants, resulting in the violation of the
principle forbidding the appropriation of public funds for
private purposes
Imposition of Curfew may be exercised pursuant to police
power, but not by the local chief executive alone. Sanggunian
enact an ordinance determine the necessity,
reasonableness, condition and procedures.
Inter-Local Govt Cooperation local government may group
themselves and procure equipment from domestic and
foreign sources for purposes commonly beneficial to them,
provided national policies, standards and guidelines are
followed.
Incorporation of Stock Corporations only natural persons
can become incorporators of such corporations; prohibition
extends to its local officials being agents of the province
(principal).
CHAPTER SIX: Inter-Local Government Relations
Local Separation of Powers
Doctrine of Separation of Powers and System of Checks-and-
Balance apply to local governments.
It is the duty of public officers to enforce ordinances not
otherwise repealed by the council nor annulled by the courts.
Local chief executive (LCE) may validly enter into a contract
only with council authorization. Prior authorization is not the
same as pre-approval of contracts. Local councils do not
possess the authority to pre-approve contracts after prior
authorization has been given. Prior authorization also does
not mean prior authorization for the payment of obligations.
LCE cannot require that all requests for appropriations be
endorsed by him before they can be enacted.
Designation of members of the Personnel Selection Board as
determined by the sanggunian by resolution must be
approved by the LCE (merely ministerial).
Mayor has no administrative supervision over sanggunian
EEs; authority to approve applications for LOAs of
sanggunian members and appointive EEs rests with the vice
LCE.
Signature of governor required in the resolution adopted by
sangguniang panlalawigan approving or disapproving the
ordinance or resolution enacted by sangguniang
pankungsod/bayan.
While authority to regulate traffic and use of streets rests
with the sanggunian, the execution of an ordinance relating
to it is the responsibility of the LCE.
The authority of the LCE of the higher supervising unit to
impose preventive suspension is purely ministerial, since the
disciplinary authority over erring local legislative officials of
the supervised unite is the sanggunian of the higher unit.
Sanggunian is in the best position to determine rates of
mayors permit fees to be levied are just, reasonable, and not
confiscatory.
Additional functions maybe given the vice mayor only as may
be provided by law or ordinance, otherwise he may validly
refuse.
LCE is mandated by law to represent the LGU, no sanggunian
authorization necessary.
Power of appointment of the vice-mayor is limited to officials
and EEs of the sanggunian, as well as EEs of the office of the
vice mayor.
Authority to discipline municipal sanggunian members and
EEs lies with the vice LCE, since he had administrative
supervision over EEs, being the one with the power to
appoint the same.
Barangay Audit Reports to be transmitted to the vice mayor,
not the LCE, for information and appropriate action.
Mayor is administrator when drawing checks in the
settlement of obligations.
Barangay kagawads perform tasks assigned pursuant to a
valid resolution, and may be required to submit monthly
accomplishment forms.
Province and component city/municipality
Declaration by the sangguniang panlalawigan that a particular
city or municipal ordinance or resolution is invalid for being
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beyond the power conferred upon its respective sanggunians,
is equivalent to a disapproval of the subject ordinance or
resolution.
When a province sells delinquent properties at a public
auction, it was not only acting on its behalf but also on behalf
of the municipalities concerned. Therefore when the
province buys such lot (no other bidder), the municipalities
may be considered co-owners thereof to the extent of their
respective shares in the real property taxes and penalties
thereon.
The exercise of the power to tax by a (component) city also
granted to a province deprives the province from imposing a
similar tax thus exclusive power is granted to the city to
collect and levy the subject tax, fees and charges.
Real property assessments made by city or municipal
assessors are not subject to approval by the provincial
assessor the latter merely exercises technical supervision.
A municipality is entitled to a share in the proceeds from the
real property tax and lease rentals of subject property
collected by the province.
The power to levy tax on sand and gravel exclusively belongs
to the province although a component city or municipality
has a share in the proceeds if the said tax.
If franchise tax is imposed by the province, a component city
of municipality has no share.
City/municipality and barangay
The power to regulate facilities rests upon the unit which
owns the same.
In interpreting ambiguous provisions of the LGC, resolution is
in favour of the lower LGU.
Authority to enter into contracts involving barangay roads
within a municipality rests with the barangay affected, not
the municipality. The municipality only exercises regulatory
powers over municipal roads.
Barangay ordinances are subject to review by the city or
municipal councils and not the other way around.
A municipal mayor does not have authority to control the
disbursement of barangay funds and internal revenue
allotments, nor withhold the share of the barangay from the
internal revenue allotment on the basis of an election
protest. He/She also does not have the authority to control
barangay projects. Such prerogatives belong to the punong
barangay.
A city/municipality possesses the POWER to SUPERVISE over
component barangays. Such power, however, does not
permit infringement upon the legislative powers of the lower
LGU to the extent of dictating changes on the policies or
decisions. The higher sanggunian must be guided by liberality
of construction and fundamental principles of local
autonomy. This power does not include the power to
restrain, nor does it mean that the sangguniang bayan may
invalidate any ordinance enacted by the sangguniang
barangay. It may only point out the defect.
Approval of vouchers is merely ministerial on the part of the
mayor after the mayor after the treasurer (1) has certified the
availability of funds and (2) an appropriate ordinance has
been enacted and was subsequently approved by him/her.
The mayor may not require a punong barangay to personally
present the barangay payroll.
Only a city and a municipality may issue business permits and
licenses. Barangay has no such power.
The new sharing scheme provided for by the LGC does not
take place automatically. An ordinance must be enacted by
the sangguniang bayan or panlungsod concerned in order to
install it.
Appointment of the barangay treasurer only needs the
concurrence of the sangguniang bayan concerned.
Confirmation from the sangguniang bayan is not required.
Services of the municipal engineer may be secured by a
barangay in the implementation of barangay infrastructure
projects after prior representation has been made to the LCE
concerned.
Sangguniang bayan may suspend all barangay officials, which
authorizes the mayor to appoint temporary replacements,
provided such appointees possess all the necessary
qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by
law.
Where there is no law which authorizes the holding of special
elections to fill-in the positions created by the incorporation
of new barangays, the mayor may fill up the vacancies, there
being permanent vacancies. If there are no permanent
vacancies, neither the mayor nor the punong barangay have
the authority to appoint officials.
Past and present administrations
The newly-elected LCE must abide by the contractual
obligations made by the former administration since the
party-in-interest is the LGU. However, an authority to
negotiate loans granted by the local legislative council to the
past LCE does not extend to the newly-elected official.
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35 | P a g e Municipal Corporation
The previous LCE, not the succeeding one, has the authority
to observe and evaluate the performance of the employee
concerned, where the act complained of was done during the
previous administration.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS VIS A VIS NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
A. Power of general Supervision
Drilon v. Lim
Section 187 LGC authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review
the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if
warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds.
Pursuant to this, Secretary of Justice Drilon declared
Ordinance No. 7794 (Manila Revenue Code), null and void for
non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the
enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain
provisions contrary to law and public policy.
HELD: Section 187 of LGC is valid.
Under this provision, when the Secretary of Justice alters or
modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not permitted to
substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local
government that enacted the measure.
The acts of Secretary Drilon in setting aside the Manila
Revenue Code, was of mere supervision, not control:
he did not replace the MRC with his own version.
He did not pronounce the ordinance unwise or
unreasonable as a basis for its annulment.
He did not say that in his judgment it was a bad law.
All he did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the
petitioners were performing their functions in accordance
with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for the
enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the
city government under the LGC.
On the other hand, an officer in control lays down the rules in
the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may, in his
discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his
subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself.
Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or
superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed,
but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he
have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are
not observed, he may order the work done or re-done but
only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe
his own manner for the doing of the act. He has no judgment
on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed.
All he is permitted to do is ascertain the constitutionality or
legality of the tax measure, without the right to declare that,
in his opinion, it is unjust, excessive, oppressive or
confiscatory. He has no discretion on this matter.
Solicitor General v. Metropolitan Manila
Authority
SC ruled that the confiscation of license plates by the MMC
was not among the powers conferred upon it by its charter
(PD 1605). It was also observed by the SC that confiscation
of the drivers licenses was not directly prescribed or allowed
by PD 1605. SC received several letters-complaint that
peoples licenses were confiscated. MMA issued Ordinance
No. 11 authorizing itself "to detach the license plate or tow
and impound attended or unattended or abandoned motor
vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in
Metro Manila."
HELD: Ordinance null and void for being an invalid exercise of
delegated legislative power.
Test for a valid municipal ordinance:
1. must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
2. must not be unfair or oppressive;
3. must not be partial or discriminatory;
4. must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
5. must not be unreasonable; and
6. must be general and consistent with public policy.
PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates
or the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations
committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the
following provisions of the decree authorizing the
Metropolitan Manila Commission to impose such sanctions.
In fact, the provisions prohibit the imposition of such
sanctions in Metropolitan Manila.
That the municipal enactment must not violate existing law
explains itself. Local political subdivisions are able to legislate
only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from
the national legislature (except only that the power to create
their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred
by the Constitution itself). They are mere agents vested with
the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the
Congress, the LGU cannot contravene but must obey at all
times the will of their principal.
The enactments in question, which are merely local in origin,
cannot prevail against the PD 1605, which has the force and
effect of a statute. The measures do not merely add to the
requirement of PD 1605 but, worse, impose sanctions the
decree does not allow and in fact, prohibits. In so doing, the
ordinances disregard and violate and in effect partially repeal
the law. Nowhere is the removal of license plates directly
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imposed by the decree or at least allowed by it to be imposed
by the Commission.
Ganzon v. CA
The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of
administrative complaints, ten in number, filed against him by
various city officials sometime in 1988, on various charges,
among them, abuse of authority, oppression, grave
misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct, intimidation,
culpable violation of the Constitution, and arbitrary
detention. He was placed in preventive suspension for 3
times by the respondent Secretary of Local Government on
different occasions based on different administrative
complaints filed against him.
Mayor Ganzon assailed the power of the respondent to
suspend him alleging that the 1987 Constitution no longer
allows the President, as the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions did,
to exercise the power of suspension and/or removal over
local officials.
HELD: The Sec of Local Government, as the alter ego of the
President, has the power to suspend local officials.
Autonomy does not contemplate making mini-states out of
local government units, as in the federal governments of the
USA. Autonomy, in the constitutional sense, is subject to the
guiding star, though not control, of the legislature, albeit the
legislative responsibility under the Constitution - and as the
"supervision clause" itself suggest - is to wean local
government units from over dependence on the central
government.
It is noteworthy that under the Charter, "local autonomy" is
not instantly self-executing, but subject to, among other
things, the passage of a local government code, a local tax
law, income distribution legislation, and a national
representation law, and measures designed to realize
autonomy at the local level. It is also noteworthy that in spite
of autonomy, the Constitution places the local government
under the general supervision of the Executive. It is
noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows Congress to
include in the local government code provisions for removal
of local officials, which suggest that Congress may exercise
removal powers, and as the existing Local Government Code
has done, delegate its exercise to the President.
Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the relation of
partnership and interdependence between the central
administration and local government units, or otherwise, to
usher in a regime of federalism. The Charter has not taken
such a radical step. Local governments, under the
Constitution, are subject to regulation, however limited, and
for no other purpose than precisely, albeit paradoxically, to
enhance self-government.
However, the Court held that the successive suspensions
were excessive and not proper. What bothers the Court, and
what indeed looms very large, is the fact that since the Mayor
is facing ten administrative charges, the Mayor is in fact
facing the possibility of 600 days of suspension, in the event
that all ten cases yield prima facie findings. The Court is not of
course tolerating misfeasance in public office (assuming that
Ganzon is guilty of misfeasance) but it is certainly another
question to make him serve 600 days of suspension, which is
effectively, to suspend him out of office.
The plain truth is that this Court has been ill at ease with
suspensions, for the above reasons, and so also, because it is
out of the ordinary to have a vacancy in local government.
The sole objective of a suspension, as we have held, is simply
"to prevent the accused from hampering the normal cause of
the investigation with his influence and authority over
possible witnesses" or to keep him off "the records and
other evidence." It is a means, and no more, to assist
prosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against an erring local
official. Under the Local Government Code, it can not exceed
sixty days, which is to say that it need not be exactly sixty
days long if a shorter period is otherwise sufficient, and which
is also to say that it ought to be lifted if prosecutors have
achieved their purpose in a shorter span.
Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority
v. Marcos et al
The Officer of the Treasurer of Cebu City demanded payment
for realty taxes on parcels of land belonging to petitioner
MCIAA. Petitioner objected invoking its tax exemption. It also
asserted that it is an instrumentality of the government
performing governmental functions, citing section 133 of the
LGC which puts limitations on the taxing powers of LGUs. The
city refused insisting that petitioner is a GOCC performing
proprietary functions whose tax exemption was withdrawn
by Sections 193 and 234 of the LGC.
HELD: There can be no question that under Section 14 RA
6958 the petitioner is exempt from the payment of realty
taxes imposed by the National Government or any of its
political subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities.
Nevertheless, since taxation is the rule and exemption is the
exception, the exemption may thus be withdrawn at the
pleasure of the taxing authority. Tax exemptions or incentives
granted to or presently enjoyed by natural or juridical
persons, including government-owned and controlled
corporations, Section 193 of the LGC prescribes the general
rule, viz., they are withdrawn upon the effectivity of the LGC,
except upon the effectivity of the LGC, except those granted
to local water districts, cooperatives duly registered under
R.A. No. 6938, non stock and non-profit hospitals and
educational institutions, and unless otherwise provided in the
LGC.
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37 | P a g e Municipal Corporation
The terms "Republic of the Philippines" and "National
Government" are not interchangeable. The former is boarder
and synonymous with "Government of the Republic of the
Philippines" which the Administrative Code of the 1987
defines as the "corporate governmental entity though which
the functions of the government are exercised through at the
Philippines, including, saves as the contrary appears from the
context, the various arms through which political authority is
made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the
autonomous reason, the provincial, city, municipal or
barangay subdivision or other forms of local government."
These autonomous regions, provincial, city, municipal or
barangay subdivisions" are the political subdivision. On the
other hand, "National Government" refers "to the entire
machinery of the central government, as distinguished from
the different forms of local Governments." The National
Government then is composed of the three great
departments the executive, the legislative and the judicial. An
"agency" of the Government refers to "any of the various
units of the Government, including a department, bureau,
office instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled
corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit therein;"
while an "instrumentality" refers to "any agency of the
National Government, not integrated within the department
framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by
law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers,
administering special funds, and enjoying operational
autonomy; usually through a charter. This term includes
regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government-
owned and controlled corporations".
MCIAA is not an agency or instrumentality of the government
but only a GOCC, thus, LGUs may tax them.
B. Decentralization, local autonomy
Limbona v. Mangelin
Petitioner Speaker Alimbusat Limbona was the speaker of the
regional legislative assembly of central Mindanao. He was
invited to attend a conference and hence he advised acting
secretary Alimbuyao to inform the assemblyman that there
will be no session on such that he will be away.
The Assembly held session in defiance of petitioner's advice.
After declaring the presence of a quorum, all present voted
that the seat of the speaker be declared vacant. The
petitioner then went to court praying that judgment be
rendered declaring the proceedings held by respondents
during the session and his ouster as null and void.
The respondents assails the jurisdiction of the Court to rule
upon the issue.
HELD: Autonomy is either decentralization of administration
or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of
administration when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to
broaden the base of government power and in the process to
make local governments "more responsive and accountable,"
and "ensure their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective partners in the
pursuit of national development and social progress." At the
same time, it relieves the central government of the burden
of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on
national concerns. The President exercises "general
supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs
are administered according to law." He has no control over
their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments
with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an
abdication of political power in the favor of local
governments units declared to be autonomous. In that case,
the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny
and shape its future with minimum intervention from central
authorities. According to a constitutional author,
decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation,"
since in that event, the autonomous government becomes
accountable not to the central authorities but to its
constituency.
But the question of whether or not the grant of autonomy to
Muslim Mindanao under the 1987 Constitution involves,
truly, an effort to decentralize power rather than mere
administration is a question foreign to this petition, since
what is involved herein is a local government unit constituted
prior to the ratification of the present Constitution. Hence,
the Court will not resolve that controversy now, in this case,
since no controversy in fact exists. We will resolve it at the
proper time and in the proper case. Under the 1987
Constitution, local government units enjoy autonomy in these
two senses
An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the
latter category is subject alone to the decree of the organic
act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and
limits of "autonomy." On the other hand, an autonomous
government of the former class is, as we noted, under the
supervision of the national government acting through the
President (and the Department of Local Government). If the
Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous in
the latter sense, its acts are, debatably, beyond the domain of
this Court in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say,
of the Congress of the Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction.
But if it is autonomous in the former category only, it comes
unarguably under our jurisdiction.
An examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the
autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that
they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second
sense, that is, in which the central government commits an
act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the
first place, mandates that "[t]he President shall have the
power of general supervision and control over Autonomous
Regions." 33 the second place, the Sangguniang Pampook,
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their legislative arm, is made to discharge chiefly
administrative services.
Hence, we assume jurisdiction. And if we can make an inquiry
in the validity of the expulsion in question, with more reason
can we review the petitioner's removal as Speaker.
The expulsion of the petitioner has no force and effect. In the
first place, there is no showing that the Sanggunian had
conducted an investigation, and whether or not the
petitioner had been heard in his defense, assuming that there
was an investigation, or otherwise given the opportunity to
do so. In the second place, the resolution appears strongly to
be a bare act of vendetta by the other Assemblymen against
the petitioner arising from what the former perceive to be
abduracy on the part of the latter. While it is within the
discretion of the members of the Sanggunian to punish their
erring colleagues, their acts are nonetheless subject to the
moderating hand of this Court in the event that such
discretion is exercised with grave abuse.
San Juan v. Civil Service Commission
Petitioner governor San Juan recommended Santos to the
position of Provincial Budget Officer for Rizal Province.
However, in defiance to such recommendation, DBM
Regional Officer Galvez appointed Almajosa instead. The
governor protested. The DBM issued a memo ruling that
petitioners protest is not meritorious as the DBM validly
exercised its prerogative in filling-up the contested position
since none of the petitioner's nominees met the prescribed
requirements.
HELD: When the Civil Service Commission interpreted the
recommending power of the Provincial Governor as purely
directory, it went against the letter and spirit of the
constitutional provisions on local autonomy. If the DBM
Secretary jealously hoards the entirety of budgetary powers
and ignores the right of local governments to develop self-
reliance and resoluteness in the handling of their own funds,
the goal of meaningful local autonomy is frustrated and set
back.
Provincial and municipal budgets are prepared at the local
level and after completion are forwarded to the national
officials for review. They are prepared by the local officials
who must work within the constraints of those budgets. They
are not formulated in the inner sanctums of an all-knowing
DBM and unilaterally imposed on local governments whether
or not they are relevant to local needs and resources. It is for
this reason that there should be a genuine interplay, a
balancing of viewpoints, and a harmonization of proposals
from both the local and national officials. It is for this reason
that the nomination and appointment process involves a
sharing of power between the two levels of government.
Ganzon v. CA (supra)
See above
Cordillera Broad Coalition v. COA
EO 220, issued by the President in the exercise of her
legislative powers under Art. XVIII, sec. 6 of the Constitution,
created the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR).
Petitioners argue that the creation of CAR contravened the
constitutional guarantee of local autonomy for provinces and
cities composing it.
HELD: It must be clarified that the constitutional guarantee of
local autonomy in the Constitution refers to the
administrative autonomy of local government units or, cast in
more technical language, the decentralization of government
authority. Local autonomy is not unique to the 1987
Constitution, it being guaranteed also under the 1973
Constitution. And while there was no express guarantee
under the 1935 Constitution, the Congress enacted the Local
Autonomy Act (R.A. No. 2264) and the Decentralization Act
(R.A. No. 5185), which ushered the irreversible march
towards further enlargement of local autonomy in the
country.
On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to
the 1987 Constitution, contemplates the grant of political
autonomy and not just administrative autonomy to these
regions. Thus, the provision in the Constitution for an
autonomous regional government with a basic structure
consisting of an executive department and a legislative
assembly and special courts with personal, family and
property law jurisdiction in each of the autonomous regions.
CAR is a mere transitory coordinating agency that would
prepare the stage for political autonomy for the Cordilleras. It
fills in the resulting gap in the process of transforming a
group of adjacent territorial and political subdivisions already
enjoying local or administrative autonomy into an
autonomous region vested with political autonomy.
Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corporation
In 1992, representatives from PPC made representations with
the Pagcor on the possibility of setting up a casino in Pryce
Plaza Hotel in Cagayan de Oro City. On November 1992, the
parties executed a contract of lease involving the ballroom of
the hotel which would be converted into a casino.
Sangguniang Panglungsod of CDO passed several ordinances
prohibiting the establishment of gambling casinos. PPC and
PAGCOR assail the authority to pass such ordinances.
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39 | P a g e Municipal Corporation
HELD: Ordinances should not contravene a statute. The
rational for this requirement is obvious. Municipal
governments are only agents of the national government.
Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers
conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking
body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or
exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy
to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts
of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the
first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the
statute.
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their
powers and rights wholly from the legislature. It breathes into
them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it
creates, so it may destroy. As it may destroy, it may abridge
and control. Unless there is some constitutional limitation on
the right, the legislature might, by a single act, and if we can
suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great a wrong,
sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations in the
State, and the corporation could not prevent it. We know of
no limitation on the right so far as to the corporation
themselves are concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere
tenants at will of the legislature.
This basic relationship between the national legislature and
the local government units has not been enfeebled by the
new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of
local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy,
we here confirm that Congress retains control of the local
government units although in significantly reduced degree
now than under our previous Constitutions. The power to
create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant
still includes the power to withhold or recall. True, there are
certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct
conferment on the local government units of the power to
tax, which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and
large, however, the national legislature is still the principal of
the local government units, which cannot defy its will or
modify or violate it.
Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has
the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by
a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact
Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the
operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting
the operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives,
these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public
policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and
void.
Taule v. Santos
On June 18,1989, the Federation of Associations of Barangay
Councils (FABC) of Catanduanes, composed of eleven (11)
members convened with six members in attendance for the
purpose of holding the election of its officers. The election
proceeded with petitioner Ruperto Taule declared as
president. The governor protested to the Secretary of DILG
the election of officers on the ground of irregularities. Taule
assailed the power of the Secretary of DILG to decide FABC
election contests.
HELD: The Secretary of Local Government is not vested with
jurisdiction to entertain any protest involving the election of
officers of the FABC. There is no question that he is vested
with the power to promulgate rules and regulations as set
forth in Section 222 of the LGC and the Administrative Code.
There is neither a statutory nor constitutional provision
expressly or even by necessary implication conferring upon
the Secretary of Local Government the power to assume
jurisdiction over an election protect involving officers of the
katipunan ng mga barangay. Presidential power over local
governments is limited by the Constitution to the exercise of
general supervision "to ensure that local affairs are
administered according to law." The general supervision is
exercised by the President through the Secretary of Local
Government.
In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the
power or authority of an officer to see that the subordinate
officers perform their duties. If the latter fails or neglects to
fulfill them the former may take such action or step as
prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to
alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
The fundamental law permits the Chief Executive to wield no
more authority than that of checking whether said local
government or the officers thereof perform their duties as
provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President
cannot interfere with local governments so long as the same
or its officers act within the scope of their authority.
Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the
power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not
include any restraining authority over such body.
Construing the constitutional limitation on the power of
general supervision of the President over local governments,
We hold that Secretary has no authority to pass upon the
validity or regularity of the election of the officers of the
katipunan. To allow the Secretary to do so will give him more
power than the law or the Constitution grants. It will in effect
give him control over local government officials for it will
permit him to interfere in a purely democratic and non-
partisan activity aimed at strengthening the barangay as the
basic component of local governments so that the ultimate
goal of fullest autonomy may be achieved. In fact, his order
that the new elections to be conducted be presided by the
Regional Director is a clear and direct interference by the
Department with the political affairs of the barangays which
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is not permitted by the limitation of presidential power to
general supervision over local governments.
Indeed, it is the policy of the state to ensure the autonomy of
local governments. To deny the Secretary of Local
Government the power to review the regularity of the
elections of officers of the katipunan would be to enhance
the avowed state policy of promoting the autonomy of local
governments. The RTCs have the exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear the protest.
Binay v. Domingo
Petitioner Municipality of Makati, through its Council,
approved Resolution No. 60. This resolution aims to extend
P500 burial assistance to poor, bereaved families, the funds
to be taken out of the unappropriated available funds in the
municipal treasury. The Metro Manila Commission approved
Res. No. 60. Thereafter, the Municipal secretary certified a
disbursement of P400,000 for the implementation of the
program. However, Commission on Audit disapproved said
resolution and disbursement of funds. The reasons it gave
were: 1)the resolution has no connection to alleged public
safety, general welfare, safety, etc. of the inhabitants of
Makati; 2)it will only benefit a few individuals. Public funds
should only be used for public purposes. The issue is WON
Res. No. 60, reenacted as Res. No. 243, is a valid exercise of
the police power under the general welfare clause.
HELD: Yes. Police power is a governmental function, an
inherent attribute of sovereignty inherent in the state but
not in municipal corporations. Before a municipal
corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid
delegation of such power by the legislature. Municipal
corporations exercise police power under the general welfare
clause. Under Sec. 7 of BP 337, every local government unit
shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily
implied therefrom, as well as necessary and proper for
governance such as to promote health and safety, enhance
prosperity, improve morals, and maintain peace and order in
the LGU, and preserve the comfort and convenience of the
inhabitants therein. Police power is the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is
the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers. The
police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has
been said to be commensurate with, but not to exceed, the
duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their
health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as
may be with private rights. It extends to all the great public
needs, and, in a broad sense includes all legislation and
almost every function of the municipal government. Thus, it is
inadvisable to frame any definition which shall absolutely
indicate the limits of police power. Public purpose is not
unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a
limited number of persons. The care for the poor is generally
recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long
been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion
of the common good. There is no violation of the equal
protection clause in classifying paupers as subject of
legislation because the classification is reasonable. Precious
to the hearts of our legislators, down to our local councilors,
is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have been
passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled,
emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil,
housing the urban poor, etc.
Res. No. 60 of Makati is a paragon of the continuing program
of our government towards social justice.
City Government of Quezon City v. Ericta
Sec. 9 0f Ordinance No. 6118 requires that every memorial
park cemetery shall set aside at least 6% of its total area for
charity burial. For several years, this was not enforced.
However, the Q.C. Council passed a resolution instructing the
City Engineer to stop selling the memorial park lots owned by
those who failed to donate the required 6% space for
paupers burial. Respondent Himlayang Pilipino filed with the
CFI a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and
mandamus with preliminary injunction seeking to annul Sec.
9 of the said ordinance, claiming that it is contrary to the
Constitution, the Q.C. Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and
the Revised Admin. Code. The Court declared said section
null and void. Petitioners argue that the taking of the
respondent's property is a valid and reasonable exercise of
police power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is
intended for the burial ground of paupers. They further argue
that the Quezon City Council is authorized under its charter,
in the exercise of local police power. On the other hand,
respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. contends that the taking
or confiscation of property is obvious because the questioned
ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property such
that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and
deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property. Is
Section 9 of the ordinance in question a valid exercise of the
police power?
HELD: NO, it is not a mere police regulation but an outright
confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property
without due process of law, nay, even without compensation.
An examination of the Q.C. Charter does not reveal any
provision that would justify the ordinance in question except
the provision granting police power to the City. The power to
regulate neither includes the power to prohibit nor the power
to confiscate. The ordinance not only confiscates but also
prohibits the operation of a memorial park cemetery. Police
power is usually exercised in the form of mere regulation or
restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion
of the general welfare. It does not involve the taking or
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41 | P a g e Municipal Corporation
confiscation of property with the exception of a few cases not
obtaining here. There is no reasonable relation between the
setting aside of at least 6% of the total area of an private
cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers
and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or
the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a
taking without compensation of a certain area from a private
cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the
municipal corporation. Instead of building a public cemetery
for this purpose, the city passes the burden to private
cemeteries.
The said expropriation without compensation is not covered
by the Q.C. Charter which empowers the city council to
prohibit the burial of the dead within the center of
population of the city and to provide for their burial in a
proper place subject to the provisions of general law
regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local
Government Code, B.P. Blg. 337 states that a Sangguniang
panlungsod may "provide for the burial of the dead in such
place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance"
it simply authorizes the city to provide its own city owned
land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct
public cemeteries. Moreover, the questioned ordinance was
passed after Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. had incorporated,
received necessary permits and commenced operating. The
sequestration of 6% of the cemetery cannot be considered as
having been impliedly acknowledged by the private
respondent when it accepted the permits to commence
operations.
Villanueva v. Castaneda
The Municipal Council of San Fernando adopted Res. No. 218
authorizing 24 members of the Fernandino United Merchants
and Traders Association to construct permanent stalls and
sell in the vicinity of the public market of San Fernando,
Pampanga along Mercado Street. The action was protested
and the CFI held that the land occupied by the
petitioners/stallholders, being public in nature, was beyond
the commerce of man and could not be the subject of private
occupancy. The decision, however, was not enforced for the
petitioners were not evicted from the place and were even
assigned space allotments for which they paid daily fees to
the municipal government. Thereafter, the Association of
Concerned Citizens and Consumers of San Fernando filed a
petition for the immediate implementation of Res. No. 29 to
restore the property to its original and customary use as a
public plaza. Respondent Macalino, as officer-in-charge of
the office of the mayor of San Fernando, issued a resolution
directing the municipal treasurer and engineer to demolish
the stalls. Petitioners, claiming that the area in question was
leased to them by the municipal government, filed a case for
prohibition with the CFI which was denied. Do the
petitioners/stallholders have a right to the said land?
HELD: NO, the place in question is a public plaza which is
beyond the commerce of man and cannot be the subject of
lease or any other contractual undertaking. In Muyot vs. de
la Fuente, it was held that the City of Manila could not lease a
portion of a public sidewalk, being likewise beyond the
commerce of man. In Espiritu vs. Municipal Council of
Pozorrubio, the Supreme Court held: The town plaza cannot
be used for the construction of market stalls or residences,
and such structures constitute a nuisance subject to
abatement according to law. Town plazas are properties of
public dominion, to be devoted to public use and to be made
available to the public in general. They are outside the
commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or even leased
by the municipality to private parties.
The occupation of stallholders (now almost 200) has caused
health, safety and sanitation problems. It has deprived the
stallholders in the public market of much business and has
denied to the people the proper use of the public plaza.
These problems are covered by police power as delegated to
the municipality under the general welfare clause. This
authorizes the municipal council to enact such ordinances,
not repugnant to law, necessary to discharge the powers and
duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem
necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety,
promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good
order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and the
inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property
therein. This authority was validly exercised through the
adoption of a resolution by the municipal council of San
Fernando.
Even assuming a valid lease of the property in dispute, the
resolution should have effectively terminated the agreement
for it is settled that the police power cannot be surrendered
or bargained away through the medium of a contract. In fact,
every contract affecting the public interest suffers a
congenital infirmity in that it contains an implied reservation
of the police power as a postulate of the existing legal order.
This power can be activated at any time to change the
provisions of the contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for
the promotion or protection of the general welfare. Such an
act will not violate the impairment clause, which is subject to
and limited by the paramount police power.
Republic v. Gonzalez
The Republic of the Philippines is the owner of 2 parcels of
land in Taong Malabon, Metro Manila (Lots 1 and 2). The
said property was formerly a deep swamp until the occupants
thereof, among them appellants Gonzales and Josue, started
filling it. Each of the appellants constructed a mixed
residential and commercial building on Lot 2.
Thereafter, then President Magsaysay issued Proclamation
No. 144, entitled "Reserving for Street Widening and Parking
Space Purposes Certain Parcels of the Public Domain Situated
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in the Municipality of Malabon, Province of Rizal, Island of
Luzon." Lots 1 and 2 were specifically withdrawn from sale or
settlement and reserved for the purposes stated in the
Proclamation. The Municipal Council of Malabon then passed
Resolutions authorizing the filing of ejectment cases against
appellants so that Proclamation No, 144 could be
implemented. Separate complaints were also filed against
appellants for the recovery of the portions of Lot 2 they were
occupying.
Appellants disputed the right of the Government to recover
the lots for these reasons: 1) they already filed sales
applications with the Bureau of Lands; 2) they had a
municipal permit to construct a building as well as a business
license duly issued by the Office of the Mayor of Malabon;
and (3) the lot occupied by them was not needed by the
Municipality of Malabon in the widening of F. Sevilla
Boulevard and the setting aside of lots for parking does not
redound to the public benefit. The Trial Court ordered the
appellants to reconvey the lots to the government. Is Proc.
No. 144 lawful and valid?
HELD: Yes! Proc. No. 144 was issued by the President in
response to several resolutions passed by the Municipal
Council of Malabon, Rizal, to address the increasing vehicular
traffic along F. Sevilla Blvd. The Municipal Council had
proposed to widen the road and reserve an area for parking
space to ease up traffic problems. The public has much to
gain from the proposed road widening and from
establishment of a municipal parking area. Traffic congestion
constitutes a threat to the health, welfare, safety and
convenience of the people and it can only be substantially
relieved by widening streets and providing adequate parking
areas. Under the Land Transportation and Traffic Code,
parking in designated areas along public streets or highways
is allowed which clearly indicates that provision for parking
spaces serves a useful purpose.
Appellants, however, allege that the resulting benefits, if any,
will be confined to people who have cars, hence there would
be lacking the essential feature of property reserved for
public use or benefit. This conception is flawed since the
number of users is not the yardstick in determining whether
property is properly reserved for public use or public benefit.
To constitute public use, the public in general should have
equal or common rights to use the land or facility involved on
the same terms, however limited in number the people who
can actually avail themselves of it at a given time. There is
nothing in Proc. No. 144 which excludes non-car-owners from
using a widened street or a parking area should they in fact
happen to be driving cars; the opportunity to avail of the use
thereof remains open to the public.
Prior to the issuance of Proc. No. 144, appellants had applied
for sales applications with the Bureau of Lands over the said
lots. By doing so, they are deemed to have admitted
ownership by the National Government since the said
application can only be filed in respect of public land, not
private land. These applications were either not yet
approved or were already rejected by the Bureau of Lands at
the time the proclamation was issued. Thus, no private rights
had accrued and become vested in appellants. The lots
remained public lands and were subject to the free
disposition and control of the Government. While appellants
had secured municipal permits for the construction of
buildings on the lands in dispute, the Court held that the
disposition and management of lands of the public domain
were directly under the executive control of the Director of
Lands, and not of local government officials. Thus, the
Malabon Municipal Mayor exceeded his authority in allowing
the use of lands of the public domain to appellants.
Patalinhug v. CA
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted
Ordinance No. 363 otherwise known as the "Expanded Zoning
Ordinance of Davao City" which required that funeral parlors
shall be built not less than 50 meters from any residential
structures, churches, and other institutional buildings. A
building permit was issued in favor of petitioner for the
construction of a funeral parlor. Thereafter, petitioner
commenced its construction. Acting on the complaint of
several residents of Brgy. Agdao, Davao City that the
construction of petitioner's funeral parlor violated Ordinance
No. 363, since it was allegedly situated within a 50-meter
radius from the Iglesia ni Kristo Chapel and several residences
(the nearest residential structure, owned by Mr. Tepoot is
only 8 inches to the south). Private respondents filed a case
for the declaration of nullity of the building permit. The court
dismissed the complaint finding that: 1) the residential
building and Iglesia ni Kristo chapel are 63.25 meters and
55.95 m respectively from the funeral parlor; 2) Although the
residential building owned by Mr. Tepoot is adjacent to the
funeral parlor, said residential building is being rented by a
certain Mr. Asiaten who actually devotes it to his laundry
business with machinery thereon.
On appeal, the CA reversed the lower court by annulling the
building permit issued to the petitioner. It disagreed with the
lower court's determination that Tepoot's building was
commercial and ruled that although it was used by Tepoot's
lessee for a laundry business, it was a residential lot as
reflected in the tax declaration, thus paving the way for the
application of Ordinance No. 363.
HELD: Petitioners operation of a funeral home constitutes
permissible use within the district in Davao City. The
testimony of City Councilor Vergara shows that Mr. Tepoot's
building was used for a dual purpose both as a dwelling and
as a place where a laundry business is conducted. But while
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43 | P a g e Municipal Corporation
its commercial aspect has been established by the presence
of laundry paraphernalia, its use as a residence, other than
being declared for taxation purposes as such, was not fully
substantiated.
The reversal by the CA of the TCs decision was based on
Tepoot's building being declared for taxation purposes as
residential. However, a tax declaration is not conclusive of
the nature of the property for zoning purposes. A property
may be declared by its owner as residential for real estate
taxation purposes but it may well be within a commercial
zone. A discrepancy may thus exist in the determination of
the nature of property for real estate taxation purposes vis-a-
vis the determination of a property for zoning purposes. A
tax declaration only enables the assessor to identify the same
for assessment levels. In fact, a tax declaration does not bind
a provincial/city assessor, for under Sec. 22 of the Real Estate
Tax Code, appraisal and assessment are based on the actual
use irrespective of "any previous assessment or taxpayer's
valuation thereon," which is based on a taxpayer's
declaration. In fact, a piece of land declared by a taxpayer as
residential may be assessed by the provincial or city assessor
as commercial because its actual use is commercial.
The finding that Mr. Tepoot's building is commercial is
strengthened by the fact that the Sangguniang Panlungsod
has declared the questioned area as commercial.
Consequently, even if Tepoot's building was declared for
taxation purposes as residential, once a local government has
reclassified an area as commercial, that determination for
zoning purposes must prevail. While the commercial
character of the questioned vicinity has been declared thru
the ordinance, private respondents have failed to present
convincing arguments to substantiate their claim that
Cabaguio Avenue, where the funeral parlor was constructed,
was still a residential zone. Unquestionably, the operation of
a funeral parlor constitutes a "commercial purpose." The
declaration of the said area as a commercial zone thru a
municipal ordinance is an exercise of police power to
promote the good order and general welfare of the people in
the locality. Corollary thereto, the state, in order to promote
the general welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, with
property, and with business and occupations. Thus, persons
may be subjected to certain kinds of restraints and burdens in
order to secure the general welfare of the state and to this
fundamental aim of government, the rights of the individual
may be subordinated. The ordinance which regulates the
location of funeral homes has been adopted as part of
comprehensive zoning plans for the orderly development of
the area covered thereunder.
C. Intergovernmental relations
Book I, Chapters 3 and 4, LGC (sec 25 36)
CHAPTER THREE: Intergovernmental Relations
Article One. National Government and Local Government
Units
Sec. 25. National Supervision over Local Government Units.
(a) Consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy, the
President shall exercise general supervision over local
government units to ensure that their acts are within the
scope of their prescribed powers and functions.
The President shall exercise supervisory authority directly
over provinces, highly urbanized cities, and independent
component cities through the province with respect to
component cities and municipalities; and through the city and
municipality with respect to barangays.
(b) National agencies and offices with project
implementation functions shall coordinate with one another
and with the local government units concerned in the
discharge of these functions. They shall ensure the
participation of local government units both in the planning
and implementation of said national projects.
(c) The President may, upon request of the local government
unit concerned, direct the appropriate national agency to
provide financial, technical, or other forms of assistance to
the local government unit. Such assistance shall be extended
at no extra cost to the local government unit concerned.
(d) National agencies and offices including government-
owned or controlled corporations with field units or branches
in a province, city, or municipality shall furnish the local chief
executive concerned, for his information and guidance,
monthly reports including duly certified budgetary allocations
and expenditures.
Sec. 26. Duty of National Government Agencies in the
Maintenance of Ecological Balance. It shall be the duty of
every national agency or government-owned or controlled
corporation authorizing or involved in the planning and
implementation of any project or program that may cause
pollution, climatic change, depletion of non-renewable
resources, loss of cropland, rangeland, or forest cover, and
extinction of animal or plant species, to consult with the local
government units, non-governmental organizations, and
other sectors concerned and explain the goals and objectives
of the project or program, its impact upon the people and the
community in terms of environmental or ecological balance,
and the measures that will be undertaken to prevent or
minimize the adverse effects thereof.
Sec. 27. Prior Consultations Required. No project or
program shall be implemented by government authorities
unless the consultations mentioned in Sections 2 (c) and 26
hereof are complied with, and prior approval of the
sanggunian concerned is obtained: Provided, That occupants
in areas where such projects are to be implemented shall not
be evicted unless appropriate relocation sites have been
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provided, in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution.
Article Two. Relations with the Philippine National Police
Sec. 28. Powers of Local Chief Executives over the Units of
the Philippine National Police. The extent of operational
supervision and control of local chief executives over the
police force, fire protection unit, and jail management
personnel assigned in their respective jurisdictions shall be
governed by the provisions of Republic Act Numbered Sixty-
nine hundred seventy-five (R.A. No. 6975), otherwise known
as "The Department of the Interior and Local Government Act
of 1990", and the rules and regulations issued pursuant
thereto.
Article Three. Inter-Local Government Relations
Sec. 29. Provincial Relations with Component Cities and
Municipalities. The province, through the governor, shall
ensure that every component city and municipality within its
territorial jurisdiction acts within the scope of its prescribed
powers and functions. Highly urbanized cities and
independent component cities shall be independent of the
province.
Sec. 30. Review of Executive Orders. (a) Except as otherwise
provided under the Constitution and special statutes, the
governor shall review all executive orders promulgated by the
component city or municipal mayor within his jurisdiction.
The city or municipal mayor shall review all executive orders
promulgated by the punong barangay within his jurisdiction.
Copies of such orders shall be forwarded to the governor or
the city or municipal mayor, as the case may be, within three
(3) days from their issuance. In all instances of review, the
local chief executive concerned shall ensure that such
executive orders are within the powers granted by law and in
conformity with provincial, city, or municipal ordinances.
(b) If the governor or the city or municipal mayor fails to act
on said executive orders within thirty (30) days after their
submission, the same shall be deemed consistent with law
and therefore valid.
Sec. 31. Submission of Municipal Questions to the Provincial
Legal Officer or Prosecutor. In the absence of a municipal
legal officer, the municipal government may secure the
opinion of the provincial legal officer, and in the absence of
the latter, that of the provincial prosecutor on any legal
question affecting the municipality.
Sec. 32. City and Municipal Supervision over Their
Respective Barangays. The city or municipality, through the
city or municipal mayor concerned, shall exercise general
supervision over component barangays to ensure that said
barangays act within the scope of their prescribed powers
and functions.
Sec. 33. Cooperative Undertakings Among Local
Government Units. Local government units may, through
appropriate ordinances, group themselves, consolidate, or
coordinate their efforts, services, and resources for purposes
commonly beneficial to them. In support of such
undertakings, the local government units involved may, upon
approval by the sanggunian concerned after a public hearing
conducted for the purpose, contribute funds, real estate,
equipment, and other kinds of property and appoint or assign
personnel under such terms and conditions as may be agreed
upon by the participating local units through Memoranda of
Agreement.
CHAPTER FOUR: Relations with People's and Non-
governmental Organizations
Sec. 34. Role of People's and Non-governmental
Organizations. Local government units shall promote the
establishment and operation of people's and non-
governmental organizations to become active partners in the
pursuit of local autonomy.
Sec. 35. Linkages with People's and Non-governmental
Organizations. Local government units may enter into joint
ventures and such other cooperative arrangements with
people's and non-governmental organizations to engage in
the delivery of certain basic services, capability-building and
livelihood projects, and to develop local enterprises designed
to improve productivity and income, diversity agriculture,
spur rural industrialization, promote ecological balance, and
enhance the economic and social well-being of the people.
Sec. 36. Assistance to People's and Non-governmental
Organizations. A local government unit may through its local
chief executive and with the concurrence of the sanggunian
concerned, provide assistance, financial or otherwise, to such
people's and non-governmental organizations for economic,
socially-oriented, environmental, or cultural projects to be
implemented within its territorial jurisdiction.

POWERS OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS/LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
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45 | P a g e Municipal Corporation
Municipal Corporations, Chapters VIII and IX
(Martin)
CHAPTER EIGHT: Powers of municipal corporations
I. Police Power
Nature of the Power
Is inherent in the State but not in municipal corporations. In
order that a municipal corporation may exercise police
power, there must be a legislative grant which necessarily
also sets the limits for the exercise of the power.
The grant of authority to the sangguniang of the particular
local government unit is what is known as the General
Welfare Clause
In Barangays, the GWC is found in Section 91 (a) of the LGC
In Municipalities, the GWC is found in Section 149 (a) of the
LGC
For Provinces, the GWC is found in Section 208 (a) of the LGC
2 Branches of the General Welfare Clause
General Legislative Power the power to enact ordinances as
may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the
responsibilities conferred upon it by law
Power Power Proper the authority to enact such ordinances
as shall be necessary and proper to promote health and
safety, enhance the prosperity and general welfare, improve
the morals and maintain peace and order in the particular
local government unit and preserve the comfort and
convenience of the inhabitants therein
Requisites for the Exercise of Police Power
First that the interest of the public generally as
distinguished from those of a particular class require such
interference, and
Second that the means is reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals
Liberal Interpretation of the General Welfare Clause
A restrictive view of the general welfare clause is not favored.
The view that the scope of the police power, and therefore of
the general welfare clause, has been fixed by traditional
delineations is not quite accurate. Police power has not
received a full and complete definition; it is elastic and must
be responsive to various social conditions; it is not confined
within the narrow circumscription of precedents resting on
past conditions; it must follow the legal progress of a
democratic way of life
Exercise of Powers Beyond Boundary
Ordinarily, the powers of a municipal corporation can be
exercised only within its own territorial limits which are
contiguous. However, statutes sometimes authorize it to
exercise police powers beyond its territorial boundaries,
especially for the preservation of public health (i.e., City of
Manila which is empowered by statute to extend its
ordinances over the Bay of Manila, three miles beyond the
city limits and over any vessel floating within that distance)
Power of Municipal Corporations to Legislate on the Same
Subject Covered by Law
A municipal corporation, under the authority of its charter,
may adopt ordinances upon subjects already covered by
general law as long as the ordinance is not repugnant to nor
in conflict with the latter.
The reason for the above principle is that municipal
authorities are in a better position to determine the evils
sought to be prevented by the legislature in enacting a
particular statute and, therefore, to pass the appropriate
ordinance to attain the main object of the law
Effect of conviction or acquittal under either Statute or
Ordinance Punishing the Same Act
The Constitution expressly provides, that if an act is punished
by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under
either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the
same act. Hence, where it appears that a person has already
been prosecuted and convicted or acquitted of an act made
punishable by an ordinance he can invoke the defense of
double jeopardy, should the government prosecute him
further under the statute punishing the same act.
II. Power of Eminent Domain
Nature of the Power
A municipal corporation can only exercise the right of
eminent domain when the same has been conferred upon it
by the legislature, expressly or by necessary implication, since
the municipal corporation has no more right than any other
corporation to condemn property.
But although there is no inherent power in a municipal
corporation to acquire property thru condemnation
proceedings, in nearly all jurisdictions the legislature has
conferred the power of eminent domain on cities, towns, and
villages either by express provision or in a general statute or
in the municipal charter.
Who may exercise the right
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The right of eminent domain may be exercised either directly
by the legislature or through the medium of corporate
bodies, or of individual enterprises, by virtue of a delegation
of the power. The legislature, unless limited by constitutional
restriction, is entirely free to use its discretion in the selection
of agents to exercise the power
Purposes of Expropriation
The power may only be exercised for public purposes (for
examples see Section 2106[f] and Section 2245 of the Revised
Administrative Code)
Power of Eminent Domain as exercised by Municipal
Corporation must be strictly construed
Whether the power is directly exercised by the legislature or
immediately thru municipal corporations or other public
agencies, the purpose or use for which the property
authorized to be appropriated must be specified. The power
cannot be enlarged by doubtful construction.
The power of eminent domain, being in derogation of private
property rights, is justified only by a clear public necessity of
an urgent public policy. The power must be strictly construed
against the municipal corporation. The purpose and
procedure prescribed for its exercise must be strictly followed
in all substantial matters. This rule of strict construction is
mandatory and should within reasonable limits, be inflexibly
adhered to and applied.
III. Power of Taxation
Nature of the Power as exercised by Municipal Corporations
The power to tax, although inherent in sovereignty, is not
possessed by municipal corporations by the mere fact that
they are creations of the State. The Power must be expressly
conferred upon them, either in their charters or in a general
law.
Requisites of Municipal Taxation
1. Municipal revenue obtainable by taxation shall
be derived from such sources only as are
expressly authorized by law
2. Taxation shall be just and in each municipality
uniform
3. It shall not be within the power of the municipal
council to impose a tax in any form whatever
upon goods and merchandise carried into the
municipality, or out of the same, and any
attempt of an unreasonable charge for
wharfage, use of bridges or otherwise, shall be
void (case of Laoag Producers vs. Mun. of Laoag,
says this has already been impliedly repealed by
the Local Autonomy Act)
4. In no case shall collection of municipal taxes be
left to any person
5. Except as allowed by law, municipal funds, shall
be devoted exclusively to local public purpose
Power to License
Where only the power to license is given to municipal
corporations, the presumption is that it is regulatory, rather
than for raising of revenue. The terms in which a municipality
is empowered to grant license are expected to indicate with
sufficient precision whether the power could be exercised for
revenue-raising purposes or merely for regulation
Distinction between the Power to License and the Power to
Tax
Power to License is a police measure; the power to Tax is a
revenue measure
Distinction between a license tax and a general tax
A license tax is not a tax upon property, but it is a burden
imposed for the right to exercise a franchise or a privilege
which could be withheld or forbidden altogether. The sum
charged is merely used as the mode of computing the
amount to be paid for the exercise of the privilege.
Kinds of Municipal License
1. Licenses for the regulation of useful occupations or
enterprises
2. Licenses for the regulation or restriction of non-
useful occupations or enterprises
3. Licenses for revenue only
Effectivity of Tax Ordinance
A tax ordinance shall go into effect on the 15th day after its
passage, unless the ordinance shall provide otherwise:
Provided, however, that the Secretary of Finance shall have
the authority to suspend the effectivity of any ordinance
within one hundred and twenty days after its passage, if, in
his opinion, the tax or fee therein levied or imposed is unjust,
excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory, and when the said
secretary exercises this authority the effectivity of such
ordinance shall be suspended.
Condonation of Taxes
Municipal council has no right to condone taxes already
accrued. This power has been withheld from municipal
councils to prevent abuse
Under the law, it is the provincial treasurer who can condone
municipal taxes (Reyes vs. Cornista, 49 OG 931)
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47 | P a g e Municipal Corporation
Special Assessment; Its distinguishing Features
Like general taxes, special assessments are enforced in
proportionate contributions, but instead of being imposed at
regularly recurring periods to provide continuous revenue,
special assessments are levied only occasionally as required.
They are imposed not upon the general body of citizens, but
upon a limited class of persons who are interested in local
government, and also are specially benefited in a local
improvement to the extend of the assessment. They are
imposed and collected as an equivalent, actual or presumed,
of the benefits and are required to pay for the cost of the
improvement.
Distinction between a Tax and Special Assessment
1. SA can be levied only on land
2. SA cannot be made a personal liability of the person
assessed
3. SA is based wholly on benefits
4. SA is exceptional both as to time and locality
CHAPTER NINE: Powers of municipal corporations
I. Power to Appropriate and Spend Money
Nature of the Power
Unless expressly authorized by its charter or statute, a
municipal corporation cannot appropriate or give away the
public money of the municipality as pure donations to any
person, corporation, or private institution, under the control
of the city and having no connection with it
In the Philippines, the power of municipal corporations to
appropriate and spend money is among the many powers
expressly authorized in their charters
Limitation on the Power to Appropriate and Spend
The legislature can neither compel nor authorize a municipal
corporation to spend any of its funds for a private purpose,
and consequently, since practically every undertaking of a
municipality does or may require the expenditures of money,
a municipal corporation cannot, even with the express
legislative sanction, embark in any private enterprise or
assume any functions which are not in a legal sense public.
II. Power to Borrow Money
Nature of the Power
The power to borrow does not belong to a municipal
corporation as an incident of its creation. It exists only when
conferred by express constitutional or legislative grant or by
force of legislative vestment of power, coupled with the
imposition of duties which are incapable of exercise and
performance without the borrowing of money
Limitation on the Power to Borrow
A limit to municipal indebtedness may be fixed either by
statute or Constitution beyond which no obligation could be
incurred by the municipality
The purpose of limiting municipal indebtedness is to protect
persons residing in municipalities from the abuse of their
creditors and the consequent operation of burdensome if not
ruinous taxes
III. Power to Issue Municipal Bonds
Subject to Judicial Examination. There are cases holding that
the power to issue bonds is inherent in the municipal
corporation. Upon examination, however, most of the cases
will be found as sustaining the implied rather than the
inherent power of a municipality to issue bonds
The power to issue negotiable paper will be implied from the
express power to borrow money
IV. Power to Contract
Nature and Extent of Power
The rules that municipal corporations may exercise those
powers which are expressly granted, or those essential to the
carrying out of declared objects and the purposes of the
corporation, is applicable with respect to the power of the
municipality to bind itself by contract
This power, however, is not to be construed as authorizing
the making of contracts of all description, but only such as are
necessary and usually fit and proper, to enable the
corporation to secure or carry into effect the purposes for
which it was created
Nature of the Duty of Municipal Authorities in the Execution
of Contracts
The duty of the officers of the municipal corporation in the
letting of municipal contracts is not merely ministerial but of
a judicial and discretionary nature. In the absence of fraud or
palpable abuse of discretion, courts have no power to control
their action
Requisites Necessary for the Validity of Municipal Contracts
a. First, that the Corporation has the express,
implied, or inherent power to enter into the
particular contract
b. Second, that the contract is entered into by the
proper department, board, committee, officer
or agent

V. Power to Acquire, Hold, and Dispose of Property
Nature of Power
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While the power to acquire property for public purposes is
deemed inherent in municipal corporations or one
necessarily implied from other express powers of municipal
corporations, in the Philippines, this power is expressly
authorized in the corporate charters
Municipal Property, Classified
In the Philippines, properties of provinces, cities, and
municipalities are divided into property for public use and
patrimonial property
Grants of Land in favor of municipal corporations by the
State; Requisites
Two requisites are necessary in order to presume a grant of
land to municipal corporations, namely, that the land is one
which the municipality itself can exclusively own; and that the
land is used to meet public necessity
Municipality may alienate its property
Municipal Corporations possess the incidental or implied
power to alienate or dispose of their real or personal
properties of a private nature. Conversely, they cannot
exercise a like power over their properties of a public nature
in violation of the trust in which such properties are held.
Power to Mortgage
Where property not charged with a trust or public use is held
by the corporation without legislative restriction as to its sale,
it may mortgage it to secure any debt or obligation that it has
the power to create or enter into. The power to mortgage, if
not expressly given or denies, can be considered an incident
of the power to hold and dispose of property, and to make
contracts
VI. Power to Sue and Be Sued
Nature of the Power
The power to sue and be sued is an essential attribute of
Municipal Corporation. A municipality, like any other
complete corporation or person, may appeal to the court for
the vindication of its right; and for any wrong done by it, it
may be sued by the injured party. The power to sue and be
sued by the injured party includes the right to settle or
compromise claims of the municipality.
Municipality may file suit in behalf of the inhabitants
In many instances, a municipal corporation may bring a
representative action in behalf of its inhabitants to protect,
preserve, or establish a common right.
Venue of Action
An action against a municipal corporation is inherently local.
In the absence of any statutory provision to the contrary, it
must be brought in the place or province in which the
municipality is situated.
The reasons for this are: That the municipal corporation
remain statutory in some place, and therefore, must be sued
where they are found; that the welfare of the municipal
bodies and of their citizens require that their officers should
be permitted to remain at home and discharge their public
duties instead of being called elsewhere to attend litigation.
The venue of action in the place of the municipality applies
whether the cause of action arises from the proprietary or
governmental conduct of the municipality.
Compendium on Local Autonomy and Local
Government, Chapter 5 (Agra)
See above
Book I, Chapter 2, LGC (Sec 6 24)
See above
A. Police Power
Binay v. Domingo (supra)
See above
Chua Huat v. CA
Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc. requested del Rosario, the City
Engineer and Building Official of Manila, to condemn the
dilapidated structures located in Paco, Manila, all occupied by
petitioners. The said official issued notices of condemnation
to petitioners. The condemnation orders stated that the
subject buildings were found to be in dangerous condition
and therefore condemned, subject to the confirmation of the
Mayor as required by Section 276 of the Compilation of
Ordinances of the City of Manila. It was stated that the notice
was not an order to demolish as the findings of the City
Engineer are still subject to the approval of the Mayor. The
orders were based on inspection reports made by the Office
of the City Engineer which showed that the buildings suffered
from structural deterioration of as much as 80%. The Mayor
confirmed the condemnation orders.
Petitioners protested against the notices of condemnation.
Later, the City Engineer issued a demolition order to the
petitioners. The petitioners filed a Petition for Prohibition,
with PI or TRO against the City Mayor, City Engineer, Building
Officer and Manuel Uy and Sons Inc.
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49 | P a g e Municipal Corporation
The Court issued the TRO and required respondents to
comment. Respondents prayed that the petition be dismissed
claiming that: (1) the power to condemn buildings and
structures in the City of Manila falls within the exclusive
domain of the City Engineer pursuant to Sections 275 and 276
of its Compilation of Ordinances (also Revised Ordinances
1600); and (2) the power to condemn and remove buildings
and structures is an exercise of the police power granted the
City of Manila to promote public safety.
HELD: The power to condemn buildings and structures in the
City of Manila falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the City
Engineer, who is at the same time the Building Officials. The
Compilation of Ordinances of the City of Manila and the
National Building Code, also provide the authority of the
Building Officials, with respect to dangerous buildings.
Respondent City Engineer and Building Official can, therefore,
validly issue the questioned condemnation and demolition
orders. This is also true with the Mayor who can approve or
deny the condemnation orders as provided in Section 276 of
the Compilation of Ordinances of the City of Manila.There
was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
respondent City Engineer because the orders were made only
after thorough ocular inspections were conducted by the
City's Building Inspectors. The respondent Mayor's act of
approving the condemnation orders was likewise done in
accordance with law. Also, the protest made by petitioners
was submitted 3 months after the notices of condemnation
were issued, and clearly beyond the seven days prescribed
for doing so.
Tatel v. Municipality of Virac
Due to the complaints received from the residents of barrio
Sta. Elena against the disturbance caused by the operation of
the abaca bailing machine inside petitioners warehouse
which emitted obnoxious odor and dust, a committee was
appointed by the municipal council of Virac to investigate the
matter. The committee noted that the warehouse was near
residential houses and that the inflammable materials inside
created danger to the lives and properties of the people.
Resolution 29 was passed by the Municipal Council declaring
the warehouse as a public nuisance within the purview of
Article 694 of the CC. The petitioners MR was denied.
Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary
injunction with the CFI enjoining them from enforcing
Resolution 29 of the Council. The municipal officials contend
that the warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance
No. 13, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a
block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios without
maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said
block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by
accidental fire. Petitioner contends that said ordinance is
unconstitutional, contrary to the due process and equal
protection clause of the Constitution and null and void for not
having been passed in accordance with law. The court ruled
in favor of the municipal council and held that the ordinance
was a legitimate and valid exercise of police power by the
municipal council.
HELD: Ordinance No. 13 was passed by the Municipal Council
of Virac in the exercise of its police power. Municipal
corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and
maintenance of local self-government and as such are
endowed with the police powers in order to effectively
accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their
creation. Its authority emanates from the general welfare
clause under the Administrative Code.
For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the
corporate powers of the municipality to enact but must also
be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, and
must be in consonance with certain well established and
basic principles of a substantive nature. These principles
require that a municipal ordinance (1) must not contravene
the Constitution or any statute (2) must not be unfair or
oppressive (3) must not be partial or discriminatory (4) must
not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be general and
consistent with public policy, and (6) must not be
unreasonable. Ordinance No. 13, meets these criteria. The
purpose of the ordinance is to avoid loss of life and property
in case of accidental fire which is one of the primordial and
basic obligation of any government. Its purpose is well within
the objectives of sound government. No undue restraint is
placed upon the petitioner or for anybody to engage in trade
but merely a prohibition from storing inflammable products
in the warehouse because of the danger of fire to the lives
and properties of the people residing in the vicinity. As to the
contention, that warehouses similarly situated as that of the
petitioner were not prosecuted, the mere fact that the
municipal authorities have not proceeded against other
warehouses in the municipality allegedly violating Ordinance
13 is no reason to claim that the ordinance is discriminatory.
A distinction must be made between the law itself and the
manner in which said law is implemented by the agencies in
charge with its administration/enforcement. There is no valid
reason for the petitioner to complain, in the absence of proof
that the other bodegas mentioned by him are operating in
violation of the ordinance and that the complaints have been
lodged against the bodegas concerned without the municipal
authorities doing anything about it.
Bayan v. Ermita
Petitioners attacked the constitutionality of the Public
Assembly Act (BP 880) and the Calibrated Preemptive
Response (CPR) policy by the Arroyo administrationwhich
enforced a no permit, no rally policy and authorized the
preemptive dispersal of rallies deemed unlawful by the
executive branch. Petitioners based their arguments primarily
on the ground of freedom of expression. The Court upheld
the constitutionality of BP 880. It found out that the
procedure prescribed in the statute does not impose an
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absolute ban on rallies, but merely a time, place and manner
(TPM) regulation that was content-neutral. Since the content
of the speech was not relevant, it held that it does not
impose any prior restraint. The overbreadth argument of
petitioners was also dispensed with by the Court by saying
that BP 880 only regulates the exercise of the right to
peaceful assembly and petition only to the extent needed to
avoid a clear and present danger of the substantive evils
Congress has the right to preventAs to the delegation of
powers to the mayor, the law provides a precise and
sufficient standard the clear and present danger test stated
in Sec. 6(a) *of BP 880+. The reference to imminent and
grave danger of a substantive evil in Sec. 6(c) substantially
means the same thing and is not an inconsistent standard.
However, the CPR serves no valid purpose if it means the
same thing as maximum tolerance and is illegal if it means
something else For this reason, the so-called calibrated
preemptive response policy has no place in our legal
firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that
shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used
by some police agents to justify abuses.
B. Power of Taxation: Local Taxes and Real Property
Tax
Sec 5 -7, Art X, 1987 Constitution
Section 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to
create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees,
and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the
Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of
local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue
exclusively to the local governments.
Section 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as
determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be
automatically released to them.
Section 7. Local governments shall be entitled to an equitable
share in the proceeds of the utilization and development of
the national wealth within their respective areas, in the
manner provided by law, including sharing the same with the
inhabitants by way of direct benefits.
Sec 128 283, LGC
See attachments
i. Local Taxation
Basco v. PAGCOR
PAGCOR, a government owned and controlled corporation, is
exempted by its charter from payment of all kinds of taxes
except for 5% franchise tax. Petitioners assail the grant of
such exemption on the ground that it infringes on the right of
the City of Manila to impose local fees and taxes. The issue is
whether or not PAGCOR which is exempted by its charter
from payment of all kinds of taxes except for the 5% franchise
tax is subject to the local fees and taxes imposed by the City
of Manila. Ruling: yes. The taxing power of local government
units must always yield to an act of Congress. Local
government has no inherent power of tax but merely derives
such power from Congress. In fact, local government units
have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National
Government. Under its charter, PAGCOR is empowered to
operate and regulate gambling casinos. With its regulatory
power, it becomes an instrumentality of the National
Government and hence, entitled to exemption from local
taxes.
Philippine Petroleum Corp v. Municipality of
Pililia Rizal
Philippine Petroleum Corporation is a business enterprise
engaged in the manufacture of lubricated oil basestock which
is a petroleum product, with its refinery plant situated at
Malaya, Pililla, Rizal. The municipality of Pililia enacted a
municipal tax ordinance which covers the business of
petitioner. Petitioner questions the imposition in view of
several provincial circulars directing the municipality officers
to refrain from collecting the said taxes. The validity of the
ordinance is undisputed for it is an exercise of the
constitutional power of LGUs to levy taxes. To allow the
continuous effectivity of the prohibition set forth in the
circulars would be tantamount to restricting their power to
tax by mere administrative issuances. Administrative
regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the
law. It is an ancient rule that exemptions from taxation are
construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and
liberally in favor of the taxing authority.
Floro Cement Corp. v. Gorospe
The municipality of Lugait, province of Misamis Oriental,
seeks to collect from Floro Cement manufacturers and
exporter's taxes. Floro Cement says that it is exempted by
virtue of PD 463 which prevents LGUs from levying taxes on
mineral products. Ruling: the Court has consistently held that
it is not a mineral product but rather a manufactured
product. The exemption mentioned in P.D. No. 463 refers
only to machineries, equipment, tools for production, etc., as
provided in Sec. 53 of the same decree. The manufacture and
the export of cement do not fall under the said provision for
it is not a mineral product. Exemptions are construed strictly
against the taxpayer.
Tuzon and Mapagu v. CA
The issue in this case is the liability of petitioners (Mayor
Tuzon and Mapagu) for damages for refusing to issue to
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51 | P a g e Municipal Corporation
petitioner Jurado a mayor's permit and license to operate his
palay-threshing business for failure to comply with the 1%
donation. The Sangguniang Bayan of Camalaniugan, Cagayan
adopted a resolution soliciting 1% donation from the
thresher operatorsto help finance the continuation of the
construction of the Sports and Nutrition Center Building.
Although the validity of the resolution was not in issue, the SC
observed that: it seems to make the donation obligatory and
a condition precedent to the issuance of the mayor's permit.
This goes against the nature of a donation, which is an act of
liberality and is never obligatoryIf, on the other hand, it is to
be considered a tax ordinance, then it must be shown in view
of the challenge raised by the private respondents to have
been enacted in accordance with the requirements of the
Local Tax Code. Petitioners acted within the scope of their
authority and in consonance with their honest interpretation
of the resolution in question. It was not for them to rule on its
validity. In the absence of a judicial decision declaring it
invalid, its legality would have to be presumed. As executive
officials of the municipality, they had the duty to enforce it as
long as it had not been repealed by the Sangguniang Bayan or
annulled by the courts.
ii. Franchises
PLDT v. City of Davao
PLDT assails the franchise tax being imposed by the City of
Davao. Its argument is based on its franchise in relation to RA
7925 particularly the provision on the equality of treatment
in the telecommunications industry. It argues that because
Smart and Globe are exempt from the franchise tax, it follows
that it must likewise be exempt from the tax being collected
by the City of Davao because the grant of tax exemption to
Smart and Globe ipso facto extended the same exemption to
it. In approving R.A. No. 7925, Congress did not intend it to
operate as a blanket tax exemption to all telecommunications
entities. Applying the rule of strict construction of laws
granting tax exemptions and the rule that doubts should be
resolved in favor of municipal corporations in interpreting
statutory provisions on municipal taxing powers, R.A. 7925
cannot be considered as having amended petitioner's
franchise so as to entitle it to exemption from the imposition
of local franchise taxes.
City Government of QC v. Bayantel
Bayantel claims exemption from real property taxes being
imposed by Quezon City. It anchors its claim on its legislative
franchise. According to the court, the franchise distinguishes
between two (2) sets of properties, be they real or personal,
owned by the franchisee, namely, (a) those actually, directly
and exclusively used in its radio or telecommunications
business, and (b) those properties which are not so used. The
power to impose realty taxes by the LGUs only covers the
second category. Bayantels franchise being national in
character, the "exemption" thus granted in its charter applies
to all its real or personal properties found anywhere within
the Philippine archipelago. Although the enactment of the
LGC withdrew Bayantels exemption, the amendatory law of
Bayantels franchise reenacted the exemption.
FELS Energy v. Province of Batangas
NPC entered into a lease contract with Polar Energy, Inc. over
3x30 MW diesel engine power barges moored at Balayan Bay
in Calaca, Batangas. The contract (Energy Conversion
Agreement) was for a period of 5 years. Article 10 states
that NPC shall be responsible for the payment of taxes; other
than (i) taxes imposed or calculated on the basis of the net
income of POLAR and Personal Income Taxes of its employees
and (ii) construction permit fees, environmental permit fees
and other similar fees and charges. Polar Energy then
assigned its rights under the Agreement to Fels despite NPCs
initial opposition.
FELS received an assessment of real property taxes on the
power barges from the Provincial Assessor of Batangas City.
FELS referred the matter to NPC, reminding it of its obligation
under the Agreement to pay all real estate taxes.
FELS gave NPC the full power and authority to represent it in
any conference regarding the real property assessment of the
Provincial Assessor.
NPC filed a petition with the LBAA. The LBAA ordered Fels to
pay the real estate taxes. The LBAA ruled that the power
plant facilities, while they may be classified as movable or
personal property, are nevertheless considered real property
for taxation purposes because they are installed at a specific
location with a character of permanency. The LBAA also
pointed out that the owner of the bargesFELS, a private
corporationis the one being taxed, not NPC. A mere
agreement making NPC responsible for the payment of all
real estate taxes and assessments will not justify the
exemption of FELS; such a privilege can only be granted to
NPC and cannot be extended to FELS.
Fels appealed to the CBAA. The CBAA reversed and ruled that
the power barges belong to NPC; since they are actually,
directly and exclusively used by it, the power barges are
covered by the exemptions under Section 234(c) of R.A. No.
7160. As to the other jurisdictional issue, the CBAA ruled that
prescription did not preclude the NPC from pursuing its claim
for tax exemption in accordance with Section 206 of R.A. No.
7160. Upon MR, the CBAA reversed itself.
WON the petitioner may be assessed real property taxes
Held: Yes
The CBAA and LBAA maintain that power barges are real
property and are thus subject to real property tax. Tax
assessments by tax examiners are presumed correct and
made in good faith, with the taxpayer having the burden of
proving otherwise. Factual findings of administrative bodies,
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Municipal Corporation P a g e | 52

which have acquired expertise in their field, are generally
binding and conclusive upon the Court.
Power barges are categorized as immovable property by
destination (Article 415(9) NCC), being in the nature of
machinery and other implements intended by the owner for
an industry or work which may be carried on in a building or
on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs
of said industry or work.
Petitioners maintain that the power barges are exempt from
real estate tax under Section 234 (c) of R.A. No. 7160 because
they are actually, directly and exclusively used by petitioner
NPC, a government- owned and controlled corporation
engaged in the supply, generation, and transmission of
electric power.
SC affirms the findings of the LBAA and CBAA that the owner
of the taxable properties is petitioner FELS, which is the entity
being taxed by the local government.
As stipulated under Section 2.11, Article 2 of the Agreement:
Ownership of power barges. POLAR shall own the Power
Barges and all the fixtures, fittings, machinery and equipment
on the Site used in connection with the Power Barges which
have been supplied by it at its own cost. POLAR shall operate,
manage and maintain the Power Barges for the purpose of
converting Fuel of NAPOCOR into electricity.
FELS cannot escape liability from the payment of realty taxes
by invoking its exemption in Section 234 (c) of R.A. No. 7160.
Indeed, the law states that the machinery must be actually,
directly and exclusively used by the government owned or
controlled corporation; nevertheless, petitioner FELS still
cannot find solace in this provision because Section 5.5,
Article 5 of the Agreement provides:
Operation. POLAR undertakes that until the end of the Lease
Period, subject to the supply of the necessary Fuel pursuant
to Article 6 and to the other provisions hereof, it will operate
the Power Barges to convert such Fuel into electricity in
accordance with Part A of Article 7.
It is a basic rule that obligations arising from a contract have
the force of law between the parties. Not being contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy, the
parties to the contract are bound by its terms and conditions.
Applying the rule of strict construction of laws granting tax
exemptions, and the rule that doubts should be resolved in
favor of provincial corporations, we hold that FELS is
considered a taxable entity.
The mere undertaking of petitioner NPC under Section 10.1
of the Agreement, that it shall be responsible for the
payment of all real estate taxes and assessments, does not
justify the exemption. The privilege granted to petitioner NPC
cannot be extended to FELS. The covenant is between FELS
and NPC and does not bind a third person not privy thereto,
in this case, the Province of Batangas.
It must be pointed out that the protracted and circuitous
litigation has seriously resulted in the local governments
deprivation of revenues. The power to tax is an incident of
sovereignty and is unlimited in its magnitude, acknowledging
in its very nature no perimeter so that security against its
abuse is to be found only in the responsibility of the
legislature which imposes the tax on the constituency who
are to pay for it. The right of local government units to collect
taxes due must always be upheld to avoid severe tax erosion.
This consideration is consistent with the State policy to
guarantee the autonomy of local governments and the
objective of the Local Government Code that they enjoy
genuine and meaningful local autonomy to empower them to
achieve their fullest development as self-reliant communities
and make them effective partners in the attainment of
national goals.
The power to tax is the most potent instrument to raise the
needed revenues to finance and support myriad activities of
the local government units for the delivery of basic services
essential to the promotion of the general welfare and the
enhancement of peace, progress, and prosperity of the
people.
Digitel v. Province of Pangasinan
Section 137 LGC withdrew any exemption from the payment
of franchise tax by authorizing the LGUs to impose a franchise
tax on businesses at a rate not exceeding 50% of 1% of the
gross annual receipts of the business.
Section 232 also authorizes the imposition of an ad valorem
tax on real property by the LGUs within the Metropolitan
Manila Area wherein the land, building, machinery and other
improvement not thereinafter specifically exempted.
Digitel was granted, under Provincial Ordinance No. 18-92, a
provincial franchise to install, maintain and operate a
telecommunications system within Pangasinan.
Under the Sec 6 of the provincial franchise, the grantee is
required to pay franchise and real property taxes.
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan also enacted Provincial Tax
Ordinance 1 (Real Property Tax Ordinance of 1992).
Section 4 expanded the application of Sec. 6 of the provincial
franchise of Digitel to include machineries and other
improvements, not thereinafter exempted,.
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53 | P a g e Municipal Corporation
Provincial Tax Ordinance No 4 was then enacted. Sections 4, 5
and 6 positively imposed a franchise tax on businesses
enjoying a franchise within the province of Pangasinan.
Digitel was granted by RA 7678 a legislative franchise.
Under Section 5 of its legislative franchise, DIGITEL became
liable for the payment of a franchise tax as may be
prescribed by law of all gross receipts of the telephone or
other telecommunications businesses transacted under it by
the grantee, as well as real property tax on its real estate,
and buildings exclusive of this franchise.
Province of Pangasinan found that Digitel had a franchise tax
deficiency for the years of 1992, 1993 and 1994.
In the interregnum, on 16 March 1995, Congress passed RA
7925 (The Public Telecommunications Policy Act of the
Philippines).
Section 23 (Equality of Treatment in the Telecommunications
Industry), provided for the ipso facto application to any
previously granted telecommunications franchises of any
advantage, favor, privilege, exemption or immunity granted
under existing franchises, or those still to be granted, to be
accorded immediately and unconditionally to earlier
grantees.
Digitel opposed Pangasinans claim on the ground that:
prior to the approval of its legislative franchise, its operation
of a telecommunications system was done under a Facilities
Management Agreement it had previously executed with the
DOTC. Thus, all revenues generated from the operation of the
facilities inured to the DOTC and all the fees received by
petitioner DIGITEL were purely for services rendered.
under its legislative franchise, the payment of a franchise tax
to the BIR would be in lieu of all taxes on said franchise or
the earnings therefrom.
The Province of Pangasinan filed a Complaint for Mandamus,
Collection of Sum of Money and Damages before Branch 68
of the RTC of Lingayen, Pangasinan. The trial court decided
the Province.
Digitel maintains that its legislative franchise being an earlier
enactment, by virtue of Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7925,
the ipso facto, immediate and unconditional application to it
of the tax exemption found in the franchises of Globe, Smart
and Bell.
WON Digitel is exempt from the payment of provincial
franchise tax in view of Section 23 of RA 7925 in relation to
the exemptions enjoyed by other telephone companies?
Held: No
Prior to the enactment of its legislative franchise, Digitel did
not enjoy and exemption from the payment of franchise and
real property taxes. In fact the provincial franchise made
Digitel liable for the payment of such taxes.
In the case of PLDT v. City of Davao, SC already clarified the
confusion brought about by the effect of Section 23 of
Republic Act No. 7925 that the word exemption as used in
the statute pertains merely to an exemption from regulatory
or reporting requirements of the DOTC or the NTC and not to
the grantees tax liability. Congress did not intend Section 23
to operate as a blanket tax exemption to all telcos. PLDTs
theory will leave the Government with the burden of having
to keep track of all granted telecommunications franchises,
lest some companies be treated unequally. It is different if
Congress enacts a law specifically granting uniform
advantages, favor, privilege, exemption, or immunity to all
telecommunications entities.
R.A. No. 7925 is a legislative enactment designed to set the
national policy on telecommunications and provide the
structures to implement it to keep up with the technological
advances in the industry and the needs of the public. The
thrust of the law is to promote gradually the deregulation of
the entry, pricing, and operations of all public
telecommunications entities and thus promote a level playing
field in the telecommunications industry. There is nothing in
the language of 23 nor in the proceedings of both the House
of Representatives and the Senate in enacting R.A. No. 7925
which shows that it contemplates the grant of tax exemptions
to all telecommunications entities, including those whose
exemptions had been withdrawn by the LGC.
In view of the passage of RA 7716 abolishing the franchise tax
imposed on telecommunications companies effective 1
January 1996 and in its place is imposed a 10% VAT, the in-
lieu-of-all-taxes clause/provision in the legislative franchises
of Globe, Smart and Bell, among others, has now become
functus officio, made inoperative for lack of a franchise tax.
Therefore, from 1 January 1996, Digitel ceased to be liable for
national franchise tax and in its stead is imposed a 10% VAT in
accordance with Section 108 of the Tax Code.
WON Digitel is exempt from payment of real estate tax under
its legislative franchise.
Held: Yes
SECTION 5. Tax Provisions. The grantee shall be liable to
pay the same taxes on its real estate, buildings, and personal
property exclusive of this franchise as other persons or
corporations are now or hereafter may be required by law to
pay x x x.
SC qualifies that such exemption solely applies to those real
properties actually, directly and exclusively used by the
grantee in its franchise.
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The present issue actually boils down to a dispute between
the inherent taxing power of Congress and the delegated
authority to tax of the local government borne by the 1987
Constitution.
In the PLDT v. City of Davao, SC sustained the power of
Congress to grant exemptions over and above the power of
the local governments delegated taxing authority
notwithstanding the source of such power.
Had Congress intended to tax each and every real property of
Digitel, regardless of whether or not it is used in the business
or operation of its franchise, it would not have incorporated a
qualifying phrase, which such manifestation admittedly is.
The fact that Republic Act No. 7678 was a later piece of
legislation can be taken to mean that Congress, knowing fully
well that the Local Government Code had already withdrawn
exemptions from real property taxes, chose to restore such
immunity even to a limited degree.
Said exemption, however, merely applies from the time of
the effectivity of petitioner DIGITELs legislative franchise and
not a moment sooner.
iii. Real Property Taxation and Special Education
Fund Tax
Sec of Finance v. Ilarde
Cipriano P. Cabaluna, Jr., was the Regional Director of
Regional Office No. VI of the DOF. He co-owns with his wife
certain properties in Jaro, Iloilo City. Private respondent failed
to pay the land taxes for the years 1986 to 1992. A
breakdown of the computation of the delinquent taxes
showed that more than 24% of the delinquent taxes were
charged and collected from private respondent by way of
penalties.
Cabaluna paid his land taxes and the receipts were issued to
him by the City Treasurers Office with the notation paid
under protest. After Cabalunas retirement, he filed a formal
protest with the City Treasurer of Iloilo wherein he contends
that the computation was erroneous since the rate of penalty
exceed 24% in contravention of Section 66 of P.D. No. 464
(Real Property Tax Code).
Section 66 of P.D. No. 464 fixed the maximum penalty for
delinquency in the payment of real estate taxes at 24% of the
delinquent tax. The Assistant City Treasurer Rizalina Tulio
turned down the protest, citing Sec. 4(c) of Joint Assessment
Regulations No. 1-85 and Local Treasury Regulations No. 2-85
of the DOF.
WON the Ministry of Finance could legally promulgate
Regulations prescribing a rate of penalty on delinquent taxes
other than that provided for under PD 464, also known as
the Real Property Tax Code.
Held: No
The subject Regulations must be struck down for being
repugnant to Section 66 of P.D. No. 464 or the Real Property
Tax Code, which is the law prevailing at the time material to
this case.
Under Section 66 of P.D. No. 464, the maximum penalty for
delinquency in the payment of real property tax shall in no
case exceed 24% of the delinquent tax
Section 4(c) of the challenged Joint Assessment Regulations
No. 1-85 and Local Treasury Regulations No. 2-85 issued by
respondent Secretary of Finance provides that the penalty of
two percent (2%) per month of delinquency or twenty-four
percent (24%) per annum as the case may be, shall continue
to be imposed on the unpaid tax from the time the
delinquency was incurred up to the time that the delinquency
is paid for in full.
The penalty imposed under the assailed Regulations has no
limit inasmuch as the 24% penalty per annum shall be
continuously imposed on the unpaid tax until it is paid for in
full unlike that imposed under Section 66 of the Real Property
Tax Code where the total penalty is limited only to twenty-
four percent of the delinquent tax.
The Court harbors doubts on the veracity of petitioners
contention that the Regulations at issue are sanctioned by
E.O. No. 73.
The underlying principle behind E.O. No. 73, is to advance
the date of effectivity of the application of the Real Property
Tax Values of 1984 from 01 January 1988, the original date it
was intended by E.O. No. 1019 to take effect for purposes
stated therein, to 01 January 1987.
E.O. No. 73 did not, in any way, alter the structure of the real
property tax assessments as provided for in P.D. No. 464 or
the Real Property Tax Code.
E.O. No. 73 did not touch at all on the topic of amendment of
rates of delinquent taxes or the amendment of rates of
penalty on delinquent taxes.
E.O. No. 73, particularly in Section 2 thereof, has merely
designated the Minister of Finance to promulgate the rules
and regulations towards the implementation of E.O. No. 73,
particularly on the application of the Real Property Values as
of 31 December 1984, which is the general purpose for
enacting said executive order.
PD 464 in general and Section 66 in particular, remained to be
good law. To accept petitioners premise would be
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55 | P a g e Municipal Corporation
tantamount to saying that EO 73 has repealed or amended
PD 464.
Repeal of laws should be made clear and expressed. Repeals
by implication are not favored for a law cannot be deemed
repealed unless it is clearly manifest that the legislature so
intended it. The failure to add a specific repealing clause
indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law,
unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in
the terms of the new and old laws. SC found no such
inconsistency or repugnancy between EO 73 and Section 66
of PD 464.
A regulation which is in itself invalid for being contrary to law
cannot be validated by any act of endorsement of any official,
much less, by a subordinate of the official who issued such
regulation. Estoppel, certainly, cannot make an invalid
regulation valid.
The penalties imposed by respondents City Treasurer and
Assistant City Treasurer of Iloilo City on the property of
private respondent are valid only up to 24% of the delinquent
taxes. The excess penalties paid should, in view of that, be
refunded by the latter.
However, from 01 January 1992 onwards, the proper basis for
the computation of the real property tax payable, including
penalties or interests, if applicable, must be Rep. Act No.
7160 inasmuch as Section 534 had expressly repealed P.D.
No. 464 or the Real Property Tax Code. Section 5(d) of Rep.
Act No. 7160 provides that rights and obligations existing on
the date of effectivity of the new Code and arising out of
contracts or any source of prestation involving a local
government unit shall be governed by the original terms and
conditions of the said contracts or the law in force at the time
such contracts were vested.
Benguet Corp v. CBAA
Benguet Corporation has bunkhouses used by its rank-and-
file employees for residential purposes. The Provincial
Assessor of Benguet assessed real property tax on these
bunkhouses. According to him, the tax exemption of
bunkhouses under PD 745 was already withdrawn by PD
1955. The main contention if Benguet Corp is that the realty
taxes are local taxes because these taxes are levied by LGUs
per Section 39 of PD 464.
Section 39. Rates Of LevyThe provincial, city or municipal
board or council shall fix a uniform rate of real property tax
applicable to their respective localities.
Benguet Corp contends that LGUs are without any authority
to levy realty taxes on mines per PD 463 and the Local Tax
Code.
WON it is the LGUs and not the National Government which
levy realty taxes
Held: No, it is the national government
While the local government units are changed with fixing the
rate of real property taxes, it does not necessarily follow from
that authority the determination of the imposition of the tax.
LGUs have no alternative but to collect taxes as mandated by
Section 38 ( Incidence of Real Property Tax) of the Real
Property Tax Code. It is clear that is the national government
that levies real property tax. When LGUs are required to fix
the rates, they are merely constituted as agents of the
national government in the enforcement of the Real Property
Tax Code. There is even no delegation of power to speak of
because the national government has already imposed realty
tax in Section 38, leaving only the enforcement to be done by
the local governments.
Realty tax has always been imposed by the law-making body.
It is enforced throughout the Philippines and not merely in a
particular municipality or city but the proceeds of the tax
accrue to the province, city, municipality and barrio where
the municipality is situated. (Section 68 of PD 464) IN
contrast, a local tax is imposed by the municipality or city
council pursuant to the Local Tax Code.
The provisions of the Local Tax Code and PD 463 alleged by
the corporation regarding the absence of power to levy realty
taxes by LGUs on mines are mere limitations on the taxing
power of the LGUs and are not pertinent to the issue in the
case at bar. It cannot affect the imposition of real property
tax by the national government.
National Development Co. v. Cebu City
National Development Company (NDC) is a GOCC authorized
to engage in commercial, industrial, mining, agricultural and
other enterprises necessary or contributory to economic
development or important to public interest. It also operates
subsidiary corporations one of which is National Warehousing
Corporation (NWC).
In 1939, the President issued Proclamation No. 430 reserving
Block no. 4, Reclamation Area No. 4, of Cebu City for
warehousing purposes under the administration of NWC. In
1940, a warehouse with a floor area of 1,940 square meters
more or less, was constructed thereon. In 1947, EO 93
dissolved NWC with NDC taking over its assets and functions.
In 1948, Cebu City assessed and collected from NDC real
estate taxes on the land and the warehouse thereon. By the
first quarter of 1970, a substantial amount of the taxes were
paid under protest. NDC asked for a full refund contending
that the land and the warehouse belonged to the Republic
and therefore exempt from taxation.
WON the NDC is exempt from real estate taxes
Held: Yes
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To come within the ambit of the exemption provided in Art.
3, par. (a), of the Assessment Law, it is important to establish
that the property is owned by the government or its
unincorporated agency, and once government ownership is
determined, the nature of the use of the property, whether
for proprietary or sovereign purposes, becomes immaterial.
What appears to have been ceded to NWC (later transferred
to NDC), in the case before Us, is merely the administration of
the property while the government retains ownership of
what has been declared reserved for warehousing purposes
under Proclamation No. 430.
A reserved land is defined as a public land has been withheld
or kept back from sale or disposition. The government does
not part with its title by reserving them, but gives notice to
the world that it desires them for a certain purpose.Absolute
disposition of land is not implied from reservation; it merely
means a withdrawal of a specified portion of the pubic
domain from disposal under the land laws and the
appropriation for the time being to some particular use or
purpose of the general government.As its title remains with
the Republic, the reserved land is clearly covered by the tax
exemption provision.
However, as regards the warehouse constructed on a public
reservation, a different rule should apply because "[t]he
exemption of public property from taxation does not extend
to improvements on the public lands made by pre-
emptioners, homesteaders and other claimants, or
occupants, at their own expense, and these are taxable by
the state . . ." Consequently, the warehouse constructed on
the reserved land by NWC (now under administration by
NDC), indeed, should properly be assessed real estate tax as
such improvement does not appear to belong to the
Republic.
Province of Tarlac v. Judge Alcantara
Tarlac Enterprises Inc .is the owner of a parcel of land in
Mabini, Tarlac, an ice drop factory in said land, machinery
shed and other machinery. These properties were declared
for purposes of taxation in the Provincial Assessors Office.
The Provincial Treasurer found that real estate taxes for the
years 1974 until 1992 including penalties were not yet paid.
Therefore, the Provincial Treasurer filed a complaint praying
that the company pay the said sum as well as damages. The
court rendered the decision dismissing the complaint. It ruled
that P.D. No. 551 expressly exempts private respondent from
paying the real property taxes demanded, it being a grantee
of a franchise to generate, distribute and sell electric current
for light. The court held that in lieu of said taxes, private
respondent had been required to pay 2% franchise tax in line
with the intent of the law to give assistance to operators such
as the private respondent to enable the consumers to enjoy
cheaper rates.
WON Tarlac Enterprises, Inc. is exempt from the payment of
real property tax under Sec. 40 (g) of P.D. No. 464 in relation
to P.D. No. 551, as amended.
Held: No
The phrase "in lieu of all taxes and assessments of whatever
nature" in the second paragraph of Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 551
does not expressly exempts private respondent from paying
real property taxes. Said proviso is modified and delimited by
the phrase "on earnings, receipts. income and privilege of
generation, distribution and sale" which specifies the kinds of
taxes and assessments which shall not be collected in view of
the imposition of the franchise tax. Said enumerated items
upon which taxes shall not be imposed, have no relation at all
to, and are entirely different from real properties subject to
tax.
If the intention of the law is to exempt electric franchise
grantees from paying real property tax and to make the 2%
franchise tax the only imposable tax, then said enumerated
items would not have been added when PD 852 was enacted
to amend P.D. No. 551. The legislative authority would have
simply stopped after the phrase "national or local authority"
by putting therein a period. On the contrary, it went on to
enumerate what should not be subject to tax thereby
delimiting the extent of the exemption.
It bears emphasis that P.D. No. 551 as amended by P.D. No.
852 deals with franchise tax and tariff on fuel oils and the
"earnings, receipts, income and privilege of generation,
distribution and sale of electric current" are the items
exempted from taxation by the imposition of said tax or tariff
duty. On the other hand, the collection complaint filed by
petitioner specified only taxes due on real properties. While
P.D. No. 551 was intended to give "assistance to the franchise
holders by reducing some of their tax and tariff obligations,"
to construe said decree as having granted such franchise
holders exemption from payment of real property tax would
unduly extend the ambit of exemptions beyond the purview
of the law.
P.D. No. 551 is not as all-encompassing as said provision of
the Local Autonomy Act for it enumerates the items which
are not taxable by virtue of the payment of franchise tax.
It has always been the rule that "exemptions from taxation
are construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and
liberally in favor of the taxing authority" primarily because
"taxes are the lifeblood of government and their prompt and
certain availability is an imperious need." Thus, to be
exempted from payment of taxes, it is the taxpayer's duty to
justify the exemption "by words too plain to be mistaken and
too categorical to be misinterpreted. Private respondent has
utterly failed to discharge this duty.
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57 | P a g e Municipal Corporation
iv. Shares of LGUs in National Taxes
1987 Constitution
Section 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as
determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be
automatically released to them.
Section 7. Local governments shall be entitled to an equitable
share in the proceeds of the utilization and development of
the national wealth within their respective areas, in the
manner provided by law, including sharing the same with the
inhabitants by way of direct benefits.
Sec 284-294, LGC
See attachments
Pimentel v. Aguirre
President Ramos issued Administrative Order 372 (Adoption
of Economic Measures in Government for Fiscal Year 1998).
Section 1 provided that all government departments and
agencies, including state universities and colleges, GOCCs and
LGUs will identify and implement measures in FY 1998 that
will replace total expenditures by at least 25% of authorized
regular appropriations for non-personal services items.
Section 4 also provided that pending assessment by the
Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the
emerging fiscal situation, the amount equivalent to 10% of
the IRA to LGUs shall be withheld. President Estrada issued
AO 43, amending Section 4 by reducing to 5% the IRA to be
withheld.
WON Section 1 of AO 372, insofar as it "directs" LGUs to
reduce their expenditures by 25% is valid
Held: Yes
Section 1 of AO 372, insofar as it directs LGUs to reduce
expenditures by at least 25% is a valid exercise of the
Presidents power of general supervision over LGUs as it is
advisory only. Supervisory power, when contrasted with
control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body;
it does not include any restraining authority over such body.
(Taule vs. Santos) Under existing law, LGU, in addition to
having administrative autonomy, enjoy fiscal autonomy as
well. Fiscal autonomy means that local governments have
the power to create their own sources of revenue in addition
to their equitable share in the national taxes released by the
national government, as well as the power to allocate their
resources in accordance with their own priorities. It extends
to the preparation of their budgets, and local officials in turn
have to work within the constraints thereof.
Local fiscal autonomy does not however rule out any manner
of national government intervention by way of supervision, in
order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are
consistent with national goals. However, under the
Constitution, the formulation and the implementation of such
policies and programs are subject to "consultations with the
appropriate public agencies, various private sectors, and local
government units." The President cannot do so unilaterally.
WON withholding a part of LGUs IRA is valid
Held: No
Section 4 is invalid because it interferes with local autonomy,
particularly local fiscal autonomy. Local autonomy signified
a more responsive and accountable local government
structure instituted through a system of decentralization. A
basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release
of the share of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is
mandated by the Constitution. Section 4 orders the
withholding of 10% of IRA pending he assessment and
evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating
Committee of the emerging fiscal situation. Such
withholding contravenes the Constitution and the law.
Although temporary, it Is equivalent to a holdback, which
means something held back or withheld, often temporarily.
Hence, the temporary nature of the retention does not
matter. Any retention is prohibited.
C. Abatement of Nuisance
Estate of Francisco v. CA
A quonset was constructed by the American Liberation Forces
in 1944. It was purchased in 1946 by Gregoria Francisco. It
stands on a lot owned by the PPA and faces the municipal
wharf. By virtue of Proclamation No. 83 issued by President
Elpidio Quirino, said land was declared for the exclusive use
of port facilities. The PPA issued to Tan Gin San, spouse of
Gregoria Francisco, a permit to occupy the lot where the
building stands for a period of one (1) year, to expire on 31
December 1989. Tan Gin used the quonset for the storage of
copra.
On May 1989, the Mayor notified Tan Gin San to remove or
relocate its Quonset building citing Ordinance No. 147, noting
its antiquated and dilapidated structure; and stressing the
"clean-up campaign on illegal squatters and unsanitary
surroundings along Strong Boulevard." Likewise, according to
the Mayor, the building was outside the warehouse zone;
hence it was a non-confirming structure. The notifications
remained unheeded; thus, the Mayor ordered the demolition
on 24 May 1989. Petitioner sought a Writ of Prohibition with
Injunction and Damages before the RTC of Basilan, which
denied the petition and upheld the power of the Mayor to
order the demolition without judicial authority pursuant to
Ordinance 147.
On 6 September 1989, petitioner's quonset building was
completely demolished. The CA reversed the RTC and ruled
that the mayor was not vested with power to order
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summarily without any judicial proceeding to demolish the
Quonset building which was not a nuisance per se. Upon
reconsideration, however, the CA reversed itself and ruled
that the deficiency was remedied when petitioner filed a
petition for prohibition and injunction and was heard on oral
argument.
WON it was proper for the Mayor to summarily, without
judicial process, order the demolition of the non-conforming
structure.
Held: No (Tan Gin entitled to just compensation but not to
damages)
It is not disputed that the quonset building, which is being
used for the storage of copra, is located outside the zone for
warehouses. It is referred to in Ordinance as a non-
conforming structure, which should be relocated. In the event
that an immediate relocation of the building can not be
accomplished, Sec 16 of the Ordinance provides: A
certificate of non-conformance for all non-conforming uses
shall be applied for by the owner or agent of the property
involved within 12mo from the approval of this Ordinance,
otherwise the non-conforming use may be condemned or
removed at the owner's expense.
Even granting that petitioner failed to apply for a Certificate
of Non-conformance, the provision should not be interpreted
as authorizing the summary removal of a non-conforming
building by the municipal government. For if it does, it must
be struck down for being in contravention of the
requirements of due process, as originally held by the CA. The
enforcement and administration of the provisions of the
Ordinance resides with the Zoning Administrator , who may
call upon the City Fiscal to institute the necessary legal
proceedings to enforce the provisions of the Ordinance.
Violation of a municipal ordinance does not empower
municipal mayor to avail of extra-judicial remedies. . On the
contrary, the Local Government Code imposes upon him the
duty "to cause to be instituted judicial proceedings in
connection with the violation of ordinances".
Respondents can not seek cover under the general welfare
clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without
judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se
or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and
property and may be summarily abated under the undefined
law of necessity.
The storage of copra in the quonset building is a legitimate
business. By its nature, it can not be said to be injurious to
rights of property, of health or of comfort of the community.
If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a
hearing conducted for that purpose. It is not per se a
nuisance warranting its summary abatement without judicial
intervention.
While the Sangguniang Bayan may provide for the abatement
of a nuisance (Local Government Code, Sec. 149 [ee]), it can
not declare a particular thing as a nuisance per se and order
its condemnation. The nuisance can only be so adjudged by
judicial determination.
Petitioner was in lawful possession of the lot and quonset
building by virtue of a permit from the PPA when demolition
was effected. It was not squatting on public land. It was
entitled to an impartial hearing before a tribunal authorized
to decide whether the quonset building did constitute a
nuisance in law. There was no compelling necessity for
precipitate action.
The public officials of Isabela, Basilan, transcended their
authority in abating summarily petitioner's quonset building.
They had deprived petitioner of its property without due
process of law.
Technology Developers Inc. v. CA
Petitioner received a letter from acting mayor Pablo N. Cruz,
ordering the full cessation of the operation of the petitioner's
plant located at Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The letter
requested Plant Manager Armando Manese to bring with him
to the office of the mayor the following: a) Building permit; b)
Mayor's permit; c) Region III-Pollution of Environment and
Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit; and of other
document.
Petitioner undertook to comply with respondent's request for
the production of the required documents. Petitioner
commenced to secure "Region III-DENR Anti-Pollution
Permit," although among the permits previously secured
prior to the operation of petitioner's plant was a "Temporary
Permit to Operate Air Pollution Installation" issued by the
then National Pollution Control Commission. Petitioner's
attention having been called to its lack of mayor's permit, it
sent its representatives to the office of the mayor to secure
the same but were not entertained.
Without previous and reasonable notice upon petitioner,
respondent ordered the Municipality's station commander to
padlock the premises of petitioner's plant, thus effectively
causing the stoppage of its operation. Petitioner instituted an
action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus with preliminary
injunction against private respondent. The judge found that
petitioner is entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction upon posting of a bond worth P50,000. During the
MR, the Provincial Prosecutor presented his evidence
prepared by Marivic Guina, Due to the manufacturing
process and nature of raw materials used, the fumes coming
from the factory may contain particulate matters which are
hazardous to the health of the people. As such, the company
should cease operating until such a time that the proper air
pollution device is installed and operational." The lower court
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then set aside the order which granted a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction and dissolved the writ issued.
WON the Mayor validly issued the closure order?
Held: YES
The following circumstances militate against the maintenance
of the writ of preliminary injunction sought by petitioner:
1. No mayor's permit had been secured. The mayor of a town
has as much responsibility to protect its inhabitants from
pollution, and by virtue of his police power, he may deny the
application for a permit to operate a business or otherwise
close the same unless appropriate measures are taken to
control and/or avoid injury to the health of the residents of
the community from the emissions in the operation of the
business.
2. The Acting Mayor called the attention of petitioner to the
pollution emitted by the fumes of its plant whose offensive
odor "not only pollute the air in the locality but also affect the
health of the residents in the area," so that petitioner was
ordered to stop its operation until further orders.
3. This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the
complaint of the residents of Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria,
Bulacan, directed to the Provincial Governor through
channels.
4. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only
after an investigation was made by Marivic Guina who in her
report observed that the fumes emitted by the plant goes
directly to the surrounding houses and that no proper air
pollution device has been installed.
5. Petitioner failed to produce a building permit from the
municipality of Sta. Maria, but instead presented a building
permit issued by an official of Makati on March 6, 1987.
6. While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit
to operate by the then National Pollution Control Commission
on December 15, 1987, the permit was good only up to May
25, 1988. Petitioner had not exerted any effort to extend or
validate its permit much less to install any device to control
the pollution and prevent any hazard to the health of the
residents of the community.
Court takes note of the plea of petitioner focusing on its huge
investment in this dollar-earning industry. It must be stressed
however, that concomitant with the need to promote
investment and contribute to the growth of the economy is
the equally essential imperative of protecting the health, nay
the very lives of the people, from the deleterious effect of the
pollution of the environment.
Laguna Lake Development Authority v. CA
Issue: Which agency of the Government - the LLDA or the
towns and municipalities comprising the region - should
exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs
insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges is
concerned?
Held: LLDA
Section 4 (k) of RA 4850, the provisions of PD 813, and
Section 2 of EO 927, specifically provide that the LLDA shall
have exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use or all
surface water for any projects or activities in or affecting the
said region, including navigation, construction, and operation
of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like. On the
other hand, RA 7160 has granted to the municipalities the
exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in municipal
waters. The Sangguniang Bayan may grant fishery privileges
to erect fish corrals, oyster, mussels or other aquatic beds or
bangus fry area within a definite zone of the municipal
waters.
The provisions of RA7160 do not necessarily repeal the laws
creating the LLDA and granting the latter water rights
authority over Laguna de Bay and the lake region.
The Local Government Code of 1991 does not contain any
express provision which categorically expressly repeal the
charter of the Authority. It has to be conceded that there was
no intent on the part of the legislature to repeal Republic Act
No. 4850 and its amendments. The repeal of laws should be
made clear and expressed.
Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special
statute, the special statute should prevail since it evinces the
legislative intent more clearly that the general statute. The
special law is to be taken as an exception to the general law
in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary
conclusion.
Considering the reasons behind the establishment of the
Authority, which are enviromental protection, navigational
safety, and sustainable development, there is every indication
that the legislative intent is for the Authority to proceed with
its mission.

There should be no quarrel over permit fees for fishpens,
fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in the Laguna de
Bay area. Section 3 of Executive Order No. 927 provides for
the proper sharing of fees collected.
In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Section 149 of
RA 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
1991, has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the
LLDA, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended. Thus, the
Authority has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for
the enjoyment of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the
exclusion of municipalities situated therein and the authority
to exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it.
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D. Power of Eminent Domain
Rule 67 Expropriation, Rules of Court
Section 1. The complaint. The right of eminent domain shall
be exercised by the filing of a verified complaint which shall
state with certainty the right and purpose of expropriation,
describe the real or personal property sought to be
expropriated, and join as defendants all persons owning or
claiming to own, or occupying, any part thereof or interest
therein, showing, so far as practicable, the separate interest
of each defendant. If the title to any property sought to be
expropriated appears to be in the Republic of the Philippines,
although occupied by private individuals, or if the title is
otherwise obscure or doubtful so that the plaintiff cannot
with accuracy or certainty specify who are the real owners,
averment to that effect shall be made in the complaint. (1a)
Sec. 2. Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value with
authorized government depositary. Upon the filing of the
complaint or at any time thereafter and after due notice to
the defendant, the plaintiff shall have the right to take or
enter upon the possession of the real property involved if he
deposits with the authorized government depositary an
amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for
purposes of taxation to be held by such bank subject to the
orders of the court. Such deposit shall be in money, unless in
lieu thereof the court authorizes the deposit of a certificate of
deposit of a government bank of the Republic of the
Philippines payable on demand to the authorized government
depositary.
If personal property is involved, its value shall be provisionally
ascertained and the amount to be deposited shall be
promptly fixed by the court.
After such deposit is made the court shall order the sheriff or
other proper officer to forthwith place the plaintiff in
possession of the property involved and promptly submit a
report thereof to the court with service of copies to the
parties. (2a)
Sec. 3. Defenses and objections. If a defendant has no
objection or defense to the action or the taking of his
property, he may file and serve a notice of appearance and a
manifestation to that effect, specifically designating or
identifying the property in which he claims to be interested,
within the time stated in the summons. Thereafter, he shall
be entitled to notice of all proceedings affecting the same.
If a defendant has any objection to the filing of or the
allegations in the complaint, or any objection or defense to
the taking of his property, he shall serve his answer within
the time stated in the summons. The answer shall specifically
designate or identify the property in which he claims to have
an interest, state the nature and extent of the interest
claimed, and adduce all his objections and defenses to the
taking of his property. No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-
party complaint shall be alleged or allowed in the answer or
any subsequent pleading.
A defendant waives all defenses and objections not so alleged
but the court, in the interest of justice, may permit
amendments to the answer to be made not later than ten
(10) days from the filing thereof. However, at the trial of the
issue of just compensation, whether or not a defendant has
previously appeared or answered, he may present evidence
as to the amount of the compensation to be paid for his
property, and he may share in the distribution of the award.
(n)
Sec. 4. Order of expropriation. If the objections to and the
defenses against the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the
property are overruled, or when no party appears to defend
as required by this Rule, the court may issue an order of
expropriation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to
take the property sought to be expropriated, for the public
use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment
of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the
taking of the property or the filing of the complaint,
whichever came first.
A final order sustaining the right to expropriate the property
may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. Such
appeal, however, shall not prevent the court from
determining the just compensation to be paid.
After the rendition of such an order, the plaintiff shall not be
permitted to dismiss or discontinue the proceeding except on
such terms as the court deems just and equitable. (4a)
Sec. 5. Ascertainment of compensation. Upon the rendition of
the order of expropriation, the court shall appoint not more
than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as
commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just
compensation for the property sought to be taken. The order
of appointment shall designate the time and place of the first
session of the hearing to be held by the commissioners and
specify the time within which their report shall be submitted
to the court.
Copies of the order shall be served on the parties. Objections
to the appointment of any of the commissioners shall be filed
with the court within ten (10) days from service, and shall be
resolved within thirty (30) days after all the commissioners
shall have received copies of the objections. (5a)
Sec. 6. Proceedings by commissioners. Before entering upon
the performance of their duties, the commissioners shall take
and subscribe an oath that they will faithfully perform their
duties as commissioners, which oath shall be filed in court
with the other proceedings in the case. Evidence may be
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61 | P a g e Municipal Corporation
introduced by either party before the commissioners who are
authorized to administer oaths on hearings before them, and
the commissioners shall, unless the parties consent to the
contrary, after due notice to the parties to attend, view and
examine the property sought to be expropriated and its
surroundings, and may measure the same, after which either
party may, by himself or counsel, argue the case. The
commissioners shall assess the consequential damages to the
property not taken and deduct from such consequential
damages the consequential benefits to be derived by the
owner from the public use or purpose of the property taken,
the operation of its franchise by the corporation or the
carrying on of the business of the corporation or person
taking the property. But in no case shall the consequential
benefits assessed exceed the consequential damages
assessed, or the owner be deprived of the actual value of his
property so taken. (6a)
Sec. 7. Report by commissioners and judgment thereupon.
The court may order the commissioners to report when any
particular portion of the real estate shall have been passed
upon by them, and may render judgment upon such partial
report, and direct the commissioners to proceed with their
work as to subsequent portions of the property sought to be
expropriated, and may from time to time so deal with such
property. The commissioners shall make a full and accurate
report to the court of all their proceedings, and such
proceedings shall not be effectual until the court shall have
accepted their report and rendered judgment in accordance
with their recommendations. Except as otherwise expressly
ordered by the court, such report shall be filed within sixty
(60) days from the date the commissioners were notified of
their appointment, which time may be extended in the
discretion of the court. Upon the filing of such report, the
clerk of the court shall serve copies thereof on all interested
parties, with notice that they are allowed ten (10) days within
which to file objections to the findings of the report, if they so
desire. (7a)
Sec. 8. Action upon commissioners report. Upon the
expiration of the period of ten (10) days referred to in the
preceding section, or even before the expiration of such
period but after all the interested parties have filed their
objections to the report or their statement of agreement
therewith, the court may, after hearing, accept the report
and render judgment in accordance therewith; or, for cause
shown, it may recommit the same to the commissioners for
further report of facts; or it may set aside the report and
appoint new commissioners; or it may accept the report in
part and reject it in part; and it may make such order or
render such judgment as shall secure to the plaintiff the
property essential to the exercise of his right of
expropriation, and to the defendant just compensation for
the property so taken. (8a)
Sec. 9. Uncertain ownership; conflicting claims. If the
ownership of the property taken is uncertain, or there are
conflicting claims to any part thereof, the court may order
any sum or sums awarded as compensation for the property
to be paid to the court for the benefit of the person adjudged
in the same proceeding to be entitled thereto. But the
judgment shall require the payment of the sum or sums
awarded to either the defendant or the court before the
plaintiff can enter upon the property, or retain it for the
public use or purpose if entry has already been made. (9a)
Sec. 10. Rights of plaintiff after judgment and payment. Upon
payment by the plaintiff to the defendant of the
compensation fixed by the judgment, with legal interest
thereon from the taking of the possession of the property, or
after tender to him of the amount so fixed and payment of
the costs, the plaintiff shall have the right to enter upon the
property expropriated and to appropriate it for the public use
or purpose defined in the judgment, or to retain it should he
have taken immediate possession thereof under the
provisions of section 2 hereof. If the defendant and his
counsel absent themselves from the court, or decline to
receive the amount tendered, the same shall be ordered to
be deposited in court and such deposit shall have the same
effect as actual payment thereof to the defendant or the
person ultimately adjudged entitled thereto. (10a)
Sec. 11. Entry not delayed by appeal; effect of reversal. The
right of the plaintiff to enter upon the property of the
defendant and appropriate the same for public use or
purpose shall not be delayed by an appeal from the
judgment. But if the appellate court determines that plaintiff
has no right of expropriation, judgment shall be rendered
ordering the Regional Trial Court to forthwith enforce the
restoration to the defendant of the possession of the
property, and to determine the damages which the
defendant sustained and may recover by reason of the
possession taken by the plaintiff. (11a)
Sec. 12. Costs, by whom paid. The fees of the commissioners
shall be taxed as a part of the costs of the proceedings. All
costs, except those of rival claimants litigating their claims,
shall be paid by the plaintiff, unless an appeal is taken by the
owner of the property and the judgment is affirmed, in which
event the costs of the appeal shall be paid by the owner.
(12a)
Sec. 13. Recording judgment, and its effect. The judgment
entered in expropriation proceedings shall state definitely, by
an adequate description, the particular property or interest
therein expropriated, and the nature of the public use or
purpose for which it is expropriated. When real estate is
expropriated, a certified copy of such judgment shall be
recorded in the registry of deeds of the place in which the
property is situated, and its effect shall be to vest in the
plaintiff the title to the real estate so described for such
public use or purpose. (13a)
Sec. 14. Power of guardian in such proceedings. The guardian
or guardian ad litem of a minor or of a person judicially
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declared to be incompetent may, with the approval of the
court first had, do and perform on behalf of his ward any act,
matter, or thing respecting the expropriation for public use or
purpose of property belonging to such minor or person
judicially declared to be incompetent, which such minor or
person judicially declared to be incompetent could do in such
proceedings if he were of age or competent. (14a)
Sec 19, LGC
Sec. 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may,
through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an
ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public
use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefits of the poor and
the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant
to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws:
Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may
not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been
previously made to the owner, and such offer was not
accepted: Provided, further, That the local government unit
may immediately take possession of the property upon the
filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a
deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%)
of the fair market value of the property based on the current
tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided,
finally, That, the amount to be paid for the expropriated
property shall be determined by the proper court, based on
the fair market value at the time of the taking of the
property.
Moday v. CA
The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan
passed a resolution authorizing its municpal mayor to initiate
expropriation proceedings against he property of Percival
Moday for a farmers center and government sports facilities.
The resolution was approved by the mayor and transmitted
to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for approval. The latter
disapproved it and returned it with comment to the
Municipality stating that expropriation was unnecessary
because there are still available lots in Bunawan for the
purpose.
The municipality filed a motion to take possession of the land
and this was granted by the RTC.
The petitioner attacks the validity of the resolution because it
was not approved by the province.
WON a municipalitys resolution authorizing its mayor to
expropriate was rendered invalid by its disapproval by the
province
Held: No
The law, as expressed in Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337, grants
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan the power to declare a
municipal resolution invalid on the sole ground that it is
beyond the power of the Sangguniang Bayan or the Mayor to
issue.
Thus, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the
authority to disapprove Municipal Resolution for the
Municipality of Bunawan clearly has the power to exercise
the right of eminent domain and its Sangguniang Bayan the
capacity to promulgate said resolution. The resolution is,
therefore, valid and binding and could be used as lawful
authority to petition for the condemnation of petitioners'
property.
Province of Camarines Sur v. CA
The Province of Camarines Sur authorized its governor by
resolution to expropriate a piece of land contiguous to the
provincial capitol site in order to establish a pilot farm for
non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing
project for provincial government employees.
The governor filed expropriation cases in the RTC and then
filed motions for the issuance of writs of possessions.
The owners, San Joaquins, moved to dismiss the complaints
for inadequacy of the price offered for the property.
The RTC granted the writs of possession. The San Joaquins
appealed to the CA which set aside the order allowing
CamSur to take possession. It ordered the RTC to suspend
further proceedings until after CamSur shall have obtained
the requisite approval of the Dept. of Agrarian Reform to
convert the classification of the land from agricultural to non-
agricultural.
WON a local government unit needs the approval of the DAR
to reclassify land before it can expropriate it
Held: No
A reading of previous jurisprudence shows that the power of
eminent domain is superior to the power to distribute lands
under the land reform program.
The local government units power of expropriation is a
delegated power. In delegating the power, the legislature
may retain certain control or impose certain restraints on the
exercise thereof by the local governments. While such
delegated power may be a limited authority, it is complete
within its limits. Moreover, the limitations on the exercise of
the delegated power must be clearly expressed, either in the
law conferring the power or in other legislations.
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63 | P a g e Municipal Corporation
The Local Government Code does not intimate in the least
that local government units must first secure the approval of
the Department of Land Reform for the conversion of lands
from agricultural to non-agricultural use, before they can
institute the necessary expropriation proceedings. Likewise,
there is no provision in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law which expressly subjects the expropriation of agricultural
lands by local government units to the control of the
Department of Agrarian Reform.
Statutes conferring the power of eminent domain to political
subdivisions cannot be broadened or constricted by
implication.
To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local
government units can no longer expropriate agricultural lands
needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools,
hospitals, etc, without first applying for conversion of the use
of the lands with the Department of Agrarian Reform,
because all of these projects would naturally involve a change
in the land use. In effect, it would then be the Department of
Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for
a public purpose or public use.
Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government
unit that shall determine whether the use of the property
sought to be expropriated shall be public, the same being an
expression of legislative policy.
There is also an ancient rule that restrictive statutes, no
matter how broad their terms are, do not embrace the
sovereign unless the sovereign is specially mentioned as
subject thereto.
The orders of the CA nullifying the trial court's order allowing
the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private
respondents' property and requiring the Province of
Camarines Sur to obtain the approval of the Department of
Agrarian Reform to convert or reclassify private respondents'
property from agricultural to non-agricultural use are set
aside.
Barangay San Roque v. Heirs of Pastor
Barangay San Roque filed an expropriation suit with the
Municipal Trial Court against the properties of the
respondents. It was dismissed by the MTC for lack of
jurisdiction. The lower court reasoned that an action for
eminent domain is incapable of pecuniary estimation and
jurisdiction should, therefore, lie with the RTC.
The case was then filed with the RTC but it was again
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The RTC was of the view
that an action for eminent domain involved title to real
property and the value of said property is determinative of
jurisdiction. And the property involved in this case is P1,740
or less than P20,000. Therefore, it ruled, jurisdiction is with
the MTC.
Which court has jurisdiction over actions for eminent
domain?
Held: RTC.
Actions for eminent domain are incapable of pecuniary
estimation and thus jurisdiction properly lies with the RTC.
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of
which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, the criterion is
of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or
remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of
money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary
estimation.
However, where the basic issue is something other than the
right to recover a sum of money, or where the money claim is
purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief
sought, such actions are cases where the subject of the
litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable exclusively by RTC.
The rationale of the rule is plainly that the second class of
cases, besides the determination of damages, demands an
inquiry into other factors which the law has deemed to be
more within the competence of RTC.
Actions for eminent domain involve two phases.
The first is concerned with the determination of
the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of
eminent domain
and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the
facts involved in the suit.
It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, of
condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to
take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use
or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment of
just compensation to be determined as of the date of the
filing of the complaint.
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned
with the determination by the court of the just
compensation for the property sought to be taken.
This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more
than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just
compensation on the basis of the evidence before, and
findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would
finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave
nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue.
It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an
expropriation suit is whether the government or any of its
instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the
taking of private property. Hence, the courts determine:
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the authority of the government entity,
the necessity of the expropriation,
and the observance of due process.
In the main, the subject of an expropriation suit is the
governments exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is
incapable of pecuniary estimation.
True, the value of the property to be expropriated is
estimated in monetary terms, for the court is duty-bound to
determine the just compensation for it. This, however, is
merely incidental to the expropriation suit. Indeed, that
amount is determined only after the court is satisfied with
the propriety of the expropriation.
Municipality of Paranaque v. VM Realty
Corp
The Municipality of Paranaque filed a complaint for
expropriation against V.M. Realty Corporation over two
parcels of land for the purpose of providing socialized
housing. It authorized its mayor to file the complaint by a
resolution.
Later, the Municipality passed an Ordinance for the same
purpose. It is claimed that by res judicata, the municipality is
barred from filing another expropriation proceeding.
WON authorization by a resolution is sufficient for
compliance with the requisites under the LGC
Held: No
The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative
branch of government, which may delegate the exercise
thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities. An
LGU may therefore exercise the power to expropriate private
property only when authorized by Congress and subject to
the latter's control and restraints, imposed "through the law
conferring the power or in other legislations." And Section 19
of the LGC requires authorization by ordinance.
Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an
LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local
legislative council authorizing the local chief
executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise
the power of eminent domain or pursue
expropriation proceedings over a particular
private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised
for public use, purpose or welfare, or for
the benefit of the poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as
required under Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been
previously made to the owner of the
property sought to be expropriated, but
said offer was not accepted.
The terms "resolution" and "ordinance" are not synonymous.
A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An
ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of
the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific
matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent
character, but a resolution is temporary in nature.
Additionally, the two are enacted differently. A third reading
is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless
decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian
members.
WON res judicata may apply
HELD: All the requisites for the application of res judicata are
present in this case. Be that as it may, the principle of res
judicata, which finds application in generally all cases and
proceedings, cannot bar the right of the State or its agent to
expropriate private property. The very nature of eminent
domain, as an inherent power of the State, dictates that the
right to exercise the power be absolute and unfettered even
by a prior judgment or res judicata. The scope of eminent
domain is plenary and, like police power, can "reach every
form of property which the State might need for public use."
"All separate interests of individuals in property are held of
the government under this tacit agreement or implied
reservation. Notwithstanding the grant to individuals, the
eminent domain, the highest and most exact idea of
property, remains in the government, or in the aggregate
body of the people in their sovereign capacity; and they have
the right to resume the possession of the property whenever
the public interest requires it." 47 Thus, the State or its
authorized agent cannot be forever barred from exercising
said right by reason alone of previous non-compliance with
any legal requirement.
Our ruling that petitioner cannot exercise its delegated power
of eminent domain through a mere resolution will not bar it
from reinstituting similar proceedings, once the said legal
requirement and, for that matter, all others are properly
complied with.
However, while the principle of res judicata does not
denigrate the right of the State to exercise eminent domain,
it does apply to specific issues decided in a previous case.
City of Cebu v. CA
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65 | P a g e Municipal Corporation
The City of Cebu authorized its mayor by both resolution and
city ordinance to expropriate the property of Merlita
Cardeno. Cardeno filed a motion to dismiss asseverating that
the allegations in the Citys complaint do no show compliance
with the condition precedent of a valid and definite offer. The
allegation states, that repeated negotiations had been made
with the defendant to have the aforementioned property
purchased by the plaintiff through negotiated sale without
resorting to expropriation, but said negotiations failed.
She argues that, by definition, negotiations run the whole
range of acts preparatory to concluding an agreement, from
the preliminary correspondence; the fixing of the terms of
the agreement; the price; the mode of payment; obligations
of the parties may conceive as necessary to their agreement."
Thus, "negotiations" by itself may pertain to any of the
foregoing and does not automatically mean the making of "a
valid and definite offer."
WON the City has complied with the condition precedent of a
valid and definite offer
Held: Yes
1. The ambiguity in the complaint is not a ground
for a motion to dismiss but rather a bill of
particulars.
2. The RTC and CA should not have strictly applied
the rule that in a motion to dismiss, no
evidence may be allowed and the issue should
only be determined in the light of allegations of
the complaint. Jurisprudence has established
exceptions to this rule. This case should
similarly be treated with liberality. Here an
examination of the Citys Comment and
Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss leave no
room for doubt that petitioner had indeed
made a valid and definite offer.
3. Also, attached to the complaint and made an
integral part of it is the Ordinance authorizing
the Mayor to expropriate the property. The rule
is that a motion to dismiss hypothetically
admits the truth of the facts alleged in the
complaint. And the Ordinance staes that the
city government has made valid and definite
offer.
(The court did not decide whether or not negotiations is
compliance with the requirement.)
Francia v. Municipality of Meycauyan
The Municipality of Meycauayan filed a complaint for
expropriation against the petitioners to obtain property
located at a highway junction to be used as a public terminal.
The Municipality deposited the fifteen percent of the fair
market value of the property based on the current tax
declaration and the RTC granted it the writ of possession.
The petitioner claims that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the writ without first conducting a
hearing to determine the existence of a public purpose.
WON determination of public purpose is a prerequisite to the
issuance of a writ of possession
Held: No
The Local Government Code states that local government
unit may immediately take possession of the property upon
the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a
deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%)
of the fair market value of the property based on the current
tax declaration of the property to be expropriated.
The requisites before a local government unit may enter into
the possession of the property are only that (1) a complaint
for expropriation must have been filed sufficient in form and
substance in the proper court and (2) a deposit of 15% of the
propertys fair market value based on its current tax
declaration must have been made.
The law does not make the determination of a public purpose
a condition precedent to the issuance of a writ of possession.
Heirs of Ardona v. Reyes
The Philippine Tourism Authority filed 4 complaints with the
CFI Cebu City for the expropriation of some 282 hectares of
rolling land situated in barangays Malubog and Babag, Cebu
City for the development into integrated sport complexes of
selected and well-defined geographic areas with potential
tourism value. The defendants (now petitioners) have the
common allegation that the taking is not impressed with
public use under the Constitution, that there is no specific
provision authorizing the taking for tourism purposes. Also,
they are claiming that the lands are under the land reform
program thus it is the Court of Agrarian Relations and not the
CFI that has jurisdiction. The Court issued writs of possession
authorizing the PTA to take immediate possession upon
deposit with the Philippine National Bank an amount
equivalent to 10% of the value of the properties.
HELD: Expropriation is valid
The States power of eminent domain extends to the
expropriation of land for tourism purposes although this
specific objective is not expressed in the Constitution. The
policy objectives of the framers can be expressed only in
general terms. The programs to achieve these objectives vary
from time to time and according to place. The concept of
public use is not limited to traditional purposes; it does not
strictly mean use by the public. Expropriation of several
barangays for provocation of tourism and construction of
sports and hotel complex constitutes expropriation for public
use. Also, the government is authorized to take immediate
possession, control and disposition of the property
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notwithstanding the issues pending in court upon deposit
with the PNB of an amount equivalent to 10% of the value of
the property.
Defendants (now petitioners) failed to show that area being
expropriated is land reform area. In fact, only 8,970 square
meters (less than 1hec.-just 2 property owners) of 283
hectares is part of the Operation Land Transfer. This 8,970
sq. m. is not even within the sports complex proper but forms
part of the 32 hectares resettlement area where the
petitioners would be provided with proper housing, schools,
etc.
Filstream International Inc. v. CA
Filstream is the property owner of parcels of lands located in
Antonio Rivera St., Tondo II Manila. It filed an ejectment suit
against the occupants (private respondents) on the grounds
of termination of lease and non-payment of rentals. The
ejectment suit became final and executory after the CA
affirmed the decision of the RTC.
During the pendency of the ejectment proceedings private
respondents filed a complaint for Annulment of Deed of
Exchange against Filstream. The City of Manila came into the
picture when it approved Ordinance No. 7813 authorizing
Mayor Alfredo Lim to initiate acquisition through legal means
of certain parcels of land. Subsequently, the City of Manila
approved Ordinance No. 7855 declaring the expropriation of
certain parcels of land situated along Antonio River which
formed part of the properties of Filstream. The said
properties were sold and distributed to qualified tenants
pursuant to the Land Use Development Program of the City of
Manila. The City of Manila then filed a complaint for eminent
domain seeking to expropriate lands in Antonio Rivera St. the
Court issued a Writ of Possession. Filstream is claiming that
Ordinance No. 7813 is a void enactment for it was approved
without a public hearing and violative of the constitutional
guarantee against impairment of obligations and contracts,
the price was too low.
HELD: Expropriation is not valid
The City of Manila did not comply with RA 7279, Secs. 9 and
10. The City of Manila has the power to expropriate private
property in the pursuit of its urban land reform and housing
program which must be done pursuant to the provisions of
the Constitution and pertinent laws. There are limitations
with respect to the order of priority in acquiring private lands
and in resorting to expropriation proceedings as a means to
acquire the same. Private lands rank last in the order of
priority for purposes of socialized housing. In the same vein,
expropriation proceedings are to be resorted to only when
the other modes of acquisition have been exhausted.
Also, Petitioner takes exception to the resolutions of
respondent CA which ordered the dismissal of its Petition for
Certiorari for non-compliance with Sec 2(a) of Rule 6 of the
Revised Internal Rules of the CA by failing to attach to its
petition other pertinent documents and papers and for
attaching copies of pleadings which are blurred and
unreadable. Petitioner argues that the respondent court
erred in giving more premium to form rather than substance.
A strict adherence to the technical and procedural rules in
this case would defeat rather than meet the ends of justice as
it would result in the violation of the substantial rights of the
petitioner. At stake in the appeal is the exercise of their
properties rights over the disputed premises which have been
expropriated and have in fact been ordered condemned in
favor of the City of Manila. In effect, the dismissal of their
appeal in the expropriation proceedings based on those
grounds is tantamount to a deprivation of property without
due process of law as it would automatically validate the
expropriation proceedings
Hagonoy Market Vendors Association v.
Mun of Hagonoy Bulacan
On Oct. 1, 1996, the Sanguniang Bayan of Hagonoy, Bulacan
enacted an ordinance, Kautusan Blg. 28 which increased the
stall rentals of market vendors in Hagonoy. Art.3 provided
that it shall take effect upon approval. The subject ordinance
was posted from Nov. 4-25, 1996. In the last week of Nov.
1997, the petitioners members were personally given copies
of the approved Ordinance and were informed that it shall be
enforced in Jan. 1998. On Dec. 8, 1997, the petitioners
President filed an appeal with the Secretary of Justice
assailing the constitutionality of the tax ordinance.
Petitioner claimed it was unaware of the posting of the
ordinance. Respondent opposed the appeal. It contended
that the ordinance took effect on October 6, 1996 and that
the ordinance, as approved, was posted as required by law.
Hence, it was pointed out that petitioners appeal, made over
a year later, was already time-barred.
The Secretary of Justice dismissed the appeal on the ground
that it was filed out of time beyond the 30 days from the
effectivity of the Ordinance on Oct. 1, 1996 as prescribed
under Sec.187 of the 1991 LGC. After its motion for
reconsideration was denied, petitioner appealed to the CA,
claiming the Sec. erred and should have overlooked the
technicality and ruled on its petition on the merits. CA
dismissed its petition for being formally deficient as it was not
accompanied by certified true copies of the assailed
Resolutions of the Sec. of Justice.
HELD: Ordinance is valid & petition should be dismissed for
being time-barred.
The petitioner insists that it had good reasons for its failure to
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comply with the rule and the CA erred in refusing to accept its
explanation. This Court agrees with the petitioner. It is clear
from the records that the petitioner exerted due diligence to
get the copies of its appealed Resolution certified by the
Dept. of Justice but failed to do so on account of typhoon
Loleng. Nonetheless, the Court held that the petition should
be dismissed as the appeal of the petitioner with the Sec. of
Justice was already time-barred. Sec. 187 of the 1991 LGC
states that an appeal of a tax ordinance or revenue measure
should be made to the Sec. of Justice within 30 days from the
effectivity of the assailed ordinance shall not be suspended.
In the case at bar, Mun. Ord, No. 28 took effect in Oct. 1996.
Petitioner filed its appeal only in Dec. 1997. The periods
stated in Sec. 187 LGC are mandatory. Being a revenue
measure, the collection of which is of paramount importance
thus it is essential that the validity of revenue measures is not
left uncertain for a considerable length of time.
Petitioners cannot gripe that there was practically no public
hearing conducted as its objections to the proposed measure
were not considered by the Sanguniang Bayan. Public
hearings are conducted by legislative bodies to allow
interested parties to ventilate their views on a proposed law
or ordinance. However, the views are not binding on the
legislative body and it is not compelled by law to adopt the
same.
Also, even on the substantive points raised, the petition must
fail. Sec. 6c.04 of the 1993 Mun. Rev. Code & Sec 191 of the
LGC limiting the percentage of increase that can be imposed
apply to tax rates, not rentals. Neither can it be said that the
rates were not uniformly imposed. The ordinance covered 3
public markets. However, it excluded Bagong Munisipyo from
the increase since it is only a makeshift, dilapidated place
intended for transient peddlers.
RP v. CA
Notes:
Lot to be expropriated for the broadcast operation and use of
VP. Deposited amount provisionally fixed. 9 years after Court
ordered condemnation and payment of just compensation.
NG failed to pay.
Santos (1) pay current zonal value or (2) return
expropriated property
HELD: no right to recover
On Sept. 19, 1969, petitioner instituted expropriation
proceedings before RTC Bulacan covering a total of 554,980
sq.m. of contiguous land situated along MacArthur Highway
to be utilized for the continued broadcast operation and use
of radio trasnsmitter facilities for the Voice of the Philippines
project. Petitioner made a deposit of P517,558.80, the sum
provisionally fixed as being the reasonable value of the
property. On Feb. 26, 1979 or nine years after the institution
of the expropriation proceedings, the trial courts issued an
order condemning the properties of the defendants and
ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendants just
compensation. It would appear that the National
Government failed to pay the respondents the just
compensation pursuant to the foregoing decision. The
respondents then filed a manifestation with a motion seeking
payment for the expropriated property. In response, the
court issued a writ of execution for the implementation
thereof. Meanwhile, Pres. Estrada issued Proc. No. 22
transferring 20 hec. of the expropriated land to the Bulacan
State University. Despite the courts order, the Santos heirs
remained unpaid and no action was on their case until
petitioner filed its manifestation and motion to permit the
deposit in court of the amount P4,664,000 by way of just
compensation. The Santos heirs submitted a counter-motion
to adjust the compensation from P6/sq.m. as previously fixed
to its current zonal value of P5,000/sq.m. or to cause the
return of the expropriated property. The RTC Bulacan ruled in
favor of the Santos heirs declaring its previous decision to be
unenforceable on the ground of prescription in accordance
with Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the 1964/1997 ROC which states that a
final and executory judgment or order may be executed on
motion within 5 years from the date of its entry.
HELD: Expropriation is valid; private respondents have no
right to recover the property. The right of eminent domain is
the ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate any
property within its territorial sovereignty for a public
purpose. Expropriation proceedings are not adversarial for
the condemning authority is not required to assert any
conflicting interest in the property. Thus, by filing the action,
the condemnor in effect merely serves notice that it is taking
title and possession of the property and the defendant
asserts title/ interest in the property not to prove a right of
possession but to prove a right to compensation for the
taking. Petitioner has occupied and has exercised dominion
over the property pursuant to the judgment. The exercise of
such rights vested to it as the condemnee has amounted to
atleast a partial compliance of the 1979 decision thereby
preempting any claim of bar by prescription on grounds of
non-execution.
In determining the public use, 2 approaches are used actual
use by the public and public benefit/ advantage. Respondents
question the public nature of the utilization since its present
use differs from the original use contemplated in the 1979
decision. This is of no moment, the property has assumed a
public character upon its expropriation. Petitioner is well
within its rights to alter and decide the use of that property.
The constitutional limitation of the just compensation is
considered to be the sum equivalent to the market value of
the property fixed at the time of the actual taking by the
government. However, between the actual taking of the
property and the actual payment, legal interests may accrue
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in order to place the owner in a position as good as but not
better than the position he was in before the taking occurred.
E. Reclassification of Lands
CARP Act
See attachments
Sec 9 and 11, RA 8435
SECTION 9. Delineation of Strategic Agriculture and Fisheries
Development Zones. - The Department, in consultation with
the Department of Agrarian Reform, the Department of Trade
and Industry, the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, Department of Science and Technology, the
concerned LGUs, the organized farmers and fisherfolk groups,
the private sector and communities shall, without prejudice
to the development of identified economic zones and free
ports, establish and delineate, based on sound resource
accounting, the SAFDZ within one (1) year from the effectivity
of this Act.
All irrigated lands, irrigable lands already covered by
irrigation projects with firm funding commitments, and lands
with existing or having the potential for growing high-value
crops so delineated and included within the SAFDZ shall not
be converted for a period of five (5) years from the effectivity
of this Act: Provided, however, That not more than five
percent (5%) of the said lands located within the SAFDZ may
be converted upon compliance with existing laws, rules,
regulations, executive orders and issuances, and
administrative orders relating to land use conversion:
Provided, further, That thereafter: 1) a review of the SAFDZ,
specifically on the productivity of the areas, improvement of
the quality of life of farmers and fisherfolk, and efficiency and
effectiveness of the support services shall be conducted by
the Department and the Department of Agrarian Reform, in
coordination with the Congressional Oversight Committee on
Agricultural and Fisheries Modernization; 2) conversion may
be allowed; if at all, on a case-to-case basis subject to existing
laws, rules, regulations, executive orders and issuances, and
administrative orders governing land use conversion; and, 3)
in case of conversion, the land owner will pay the
Department the amount equivalent to the government's
investment cost including inflation.
SECTION 10. Preparation of Land Use and Zoning Ordinance. -
Within one (1) year from the finalization of the SAFDZ, in
every city and municipality, all cities and municipalities shall
have prepared their respective land use and zoning ordinance
incorporating the SAFDZ, where applicable. Thereafter, all
land use plans and zoning ordinances shall be updated every
four (4) years or as often as may be deemed necessary upon
the recommendation of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board and must be completed within the first year of the
term of the mayor. If the cities/municipalities fail to comply
with the preparation of zoning and land use plans, the DILG
shall impose the penalty as provided for under Republic Act
No. 7160.
SECTION 11. Penalty for Agricultural Inactivity and Premature
Conversion. - Any person or juridical entity who knowingly or
deliberately causes any irrigated agricultural lands seven (7)
hectares or larger, whether contiguous or not, within the
protected areas for agricultural development, as specified
under Section 6 in relation to Section 9 of this Act, to lie idle
and unproductive for a period exceeding one (1) year, unless
due to force majeure, shall be subject to an idle land tax of
Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00) per hectare per year. In
addition, the violator shall be required to put back such lands
to productive agricultural use. Should the continued
agricultural inactivity, unless due to force majeure, exceed a
period of two (2) years, the land shall be subject to escheat
proceedings.
Any person found guilty of premature or illegal conversion
shall be penalized with imprisonment of two (2) to six (6)
years, or a fine equivalent to one hundred percent (100%) of
the government's investment cost, or both, at the discretion
of the court, and an accessory penalty of forfeiture of the
land and any improvement thereon.
In addition, the DAR may impose the following penalties,
after determining, in an administrative proceedings, that
violation of this law has been committed:
a) Cancellation or withdrawal of the authorization for land
use conversion; and
b) Blacklisting, or automatic disapproval of pending and
subsequent conversion applications that they may file with
the DAR.
Fortich v. Corono
This concerns the motion for reconsideration of the courts
resolution dated Nov. 17, 1998 and motion to refer the case
to the Court en banc. In the previous case, the Court voted 2-
2 on the separate MRs, as a result of which the decision was
affirmed. The Court noted in a resolution dated Jan. 27, 1999
that the movants have no legal personality to seek redress
before the Court as their motion to intervene was already
denied and that the motion to refer the case to the Court en
banc is akin to a second MR which is prohibited. In this
motion, both respondents and intervenors prayed the case
be referred to the court en banc inasmuch as their earlier MR
was resolved by a vote of 2-2, the required number to carry a
decision under the Constitution, 3votes, was not met.
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HELD: The issues presented before the Court by the movants
are matters of no extraordinary import to merit the attention
of the Court en banc. Specifically the issue of whether or not
the power of the local government units to reclassify lands is
subject to the approval of DAR is no longer novel, this having
been decided in Province of Camarines Sur v. CA wherein the
Court held that local government units need not obtain
approval of the DAR to convert lands from agricultural to
non-agricultural use.
Intervenors insist that they are the real parties in interest
inasmuch as they have already been issued certificates of
land ownership award and that while they are seasonal
farmers, they have been identified by DAR as qualified
beneficiaries of property. The issuance of CLOA to them does
not grant them the requisite standing in view of the nullity of
the Win-Win Resolution. No legal rights can emanate from a
resolution that is null and void. The same is void and has no
legal effect considering that the March 29, 1996 decision of
the Office of the President had already become final and
executory even prior to the filing of the MR which became
the basis of the said Win-Win Resolution.
Roxas and Co v. IAC
Pres. Cory promulgated Proc. No. 131 instituting CARP and EO
No. 229 providing for mechanisms necessary to implement
CARP. Later when Congress formally convened, it passed RA
6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Petitioner
Roxas is the property owner of Haciendas Palico, Banilad and
Caylaway. Before CARL took effect, petitioner voluntarily
offered to sell Hacienda Caylaway pursuant to EO 229. The
other two were placed under compulsory acquisition by
respondent DAR in accordance with CARL.
Petitioner instituted a case with DAR Adjudication Bd. To
cancel the CLOAs issued alleging that the place where the
haciendas are located was declared a tourist zone and that
the land is not suitable for agricultural production. DARAB
held that the case involved the prejudicial question of
whether the property was subject to agrarian reform and
should be submitted to the Office of the Sec. of Agrarian
Reform. Petitioner then filed a case with the CA questioning
the expropriation of the properties under CARL and the
denial of due process in the acquisition of the land. CA
dismissed the petition on the ground of failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.
HELD: This Court can take cognizance of petitioners petition
despite his failure to exhaust administrative remedies since
his action falls under the exception to the doctrine of
exhaustion of remedies since there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy. The CLOAs to the farmers were issued
without just compensation to the petitioner. The transfer of
possession/ ownership to the government is conditioned
upon the receipt of the landowner of the corresponding
payment/ deposit by the DAR. Until then, the title should
remain with the landowner. The law provides that the deposit
must be made only in cash or LBP bonds. Resp. DARs opening
of a trust account deposit in petitioners name with the Land
Bank of the Phil. does not constitute payment under the law.
The acquisition proceedings over the 3 haciendas are invalid.
(1) There was improper service of Notice of Acquisition Sec.
16 of CARL requires that the said notice be sent to the
landowner by personal delivery or registered mail. The
Revised Rules of Proc. of DARAB states that notices and
pleadings are served on private corporations through its
president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent or any of its
directors or partners. Jaime Pimentel to whom the Notice
was served was neither of those. (2) Parcels of land were not
properly identified before they were taken by DAR under
the law, a landowner may retain not more than 5 hec. the
right to choose the retained land pertains to the landowner.
Upon the receipt of Notice of Acquisition, petitioner
corporation had no idea which portions of its estate were
subject to compulsory acquisition.
Court has no jurisdiction to rule on the reclassification of land
from agricultural to non-agricultural. DARs failure to observe
due process does not ipso facto give the Court the power to
adjudicate over petitioners application for conversion of its
haciendas from agricultural to non. The agency charged with
the mandate of approving applications for conversion is DAR.
F. Closure and Opening of Roads
Sec 21, LGC
Sec. 21. Closure and Opening of Roads. (a) A local
government unit may, pursuant to an ordinance,
permanently or temporarily close or open any local road,
alley, park, or square falling within its jurisdiction: Provided,
however, That in case of permanent closure, such ordinance
must be approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the
members of the sanggunian, and when necessary, an
adequate substitute for the public facility that is subject to
closure is provided.
(b) No such way or place or any part thereof shall be
permanently closed without making provisions for the
maintenance of public safety therein. A property thus
permanently withdrawn from public use may be used or
conveyed for any purpose for which other real property
belonging to the local government unit concerned may be
lawfully used or conveyed: Provided, however, That no
freedom park shall be closed permanently without provision
for its transfer or relocation to a new site.
(c) Any national or local road, alley, park, or square may be
temporarily closed during an actual emergency, or fiesta
celebrations, public rallies, agricultural or industrial fairs, or
an undertaking of public works and highways,
telecommunications, and waterworks projects, the duration
of which shall be specified by the local chief executive
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concerned in a written order: Provided, however, That no
national or local road, alley, park, or square shall be
temporarily closed for athletic, cultural, or civic activities not
officially sponsored, recognized, or approved by the local
government unit concerned.
(d) Any city, municipality, or barangay may, by a duly
enacted ordinance, temporarily close and regulate the use of
any local street, road, thoroughfare, or any other public place
where shopping malls, Sunday, flea or night markets, or
shopping areas may be established and where goods,
merchandise, foodstuffs, commodities, or articles of
commerce may be sold and dispensed to the general public.
Cabrera v. CA
The Provincial Board of Catanduanes adopted Resolution No.
158 which provided for the closure of an old road leading to
the new Capitol Bldng. and giving the owners of the
properties traversed by the new road equal area from the old
road adjacent to the respective remaining portion of their
property. Pursuant thereto, Deeds of Exchange were
executed under which the Province of Catanduanes conveyed
to the private respondents portions of the closed road.
In 1978, part of the northern end of the old road fronting the
petitioners house was planted with vegetables by one of the
private respondents. Another private respondent converted a
part of the old road into a piggery farm. Learning about Res.
158, petitioner filed a complaint for Restoration of Public
Road and/or Abatement of Nuisance, Annulment of
Resolutions and Documents for Damages. Petitioner alleges
that the land fronting his house was a public road owned by
the Province of Catanduanes in its governmental function and
therefore beyond the commerce of man. He contends that
Res. No. 158 and the deeds of exchange were invalid as so
too was the closure of the northern portion of the said road.
HELD: Closure is valid.
The closure of a provincial road is within the powers of the
Provincial Bd. It is the authority competent to determine
whether or not a certain property is still necessary to public
use. Such power to vacate a street is discretionary and such
will not ordinarily be controlled or interfered with by the
courts absent a plain case of abuse or fraud. The Board has
the duty of maintaining such roads for the comfort and
convenience of the inhabitants of the province. This authority
is inferable from the grant by the national legislature of the
funds to the Province for the construction of roads.
Petitioner is not entitled to damages. The general rule is that
one whose property does not abut on the closed section of a
street has no right of compensation for the closing or
vacation of the street. To warrant recovery, the property
owner must show that the situation is such that he has
sustained special damages differing in kind and not merely in
degree from those sustained by the public generally. The
construction of the new road was undertaken under the
general welfare clause. Whatever inconvenience petitioner
suffered pales in significance to the greater convenience the
new road has been giving the public.
MMDA v. Bel Air Village Association Inc.
MMDA is a government agency tasked with the delivery of
basic services in Metro Manila, while BAVA is a non-stock
non-profit corporation whose members are home owners in
Bel-Air Village, a private subdivision in Makati City. BAVA is
the registered owner of Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air
Village. On 26 Dec 1995 BAVA received from MMDA
Chairman Prospero Oreta a notice requesting it to open
Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic starting 2 Jan 1996.
BAVA was also informed that the perimeter wall separating
the subdivision from adjacent Kalayaan Avenue would be
demolished. On 2 Jan 1996, BAVA instituted a petition before
the RTC Makati City Br 136 for the issuance of a TRO and
preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of said street
and the demolition of the wall. The TRO was issued the
following day. But on 23 Jan 1996, after due hearing, it
denied the preliminary injunction. BAVA appealed. CA
conducted an ocular inspection of Neptune Street and on 13
Feb 1996 it issued a writ of preliminary injunction. It later on
granted the petition (making the writ permanent), reasoning
that MMDA had no authority to order the opening of a
private subdivision road nor to demolish the subdivisions
perimeter wall. MR was denied.
WON MMDA has the authority to open Neptune Street to
public traffic without an ordinance enacted by Makati City
HELD: No
MMDA is not a local government which is a political
subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law
and has substantial control of local affairs. MMDAs charter
RA 7924 limited MMDAs function to the delivery of seven
basic services, one of which is transport and traffic
management. It is limited to the following acts: formulation,
coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation,
management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a
system and administration. There is no syllable in RA 7924
that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative
power. All its functions are administrative in nature. MMDA is
not the same entity as its predecessor, the Metro Manila
Commission because the charter of MMC (PD 824) shows that
MMC possessed greater powers which were not bestowed on
MMDA. Unlike MMC, MMDA has no power to enact
ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the LGUs,
acting through their respective legislative councils, that
possess legislative and police power. In this case, the
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Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any
ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune
Street; hence, its proposed opening by MMDA is illegal.
Sangalang v. IAC
Buyers of lots in Bel-Air Village, owned and operated by
Makati Development Corporation (later on merged with
Ayala Corporation) were required to comply with certain
deed restrictions, one of which is that the lots shall be used
only for residential purposes. On 4 Apr 1975 the municipal
council of Makati enacted Ordinance 81 (zonification of
Makati), wherein Bel-Air Village was classified as a Class A
Residential Zone, with its boundary extending to the center
line of Jupiter Street. A subsequent Ordinance 81-01 of the
Metro Manila Commission however showed that Bel-Air
Village was simply bound by Jupiter Street, and the area on
the other side was classified as a High Intensity Commercial
Zone. Due to the reclassification, commercial establishments
appeared along Jupiter Street, in violation of the deed
restrictions. The Office of the Mayor of Makati wrote the Bel-
Air Village Association, Inc. (BAVA), directing that, in the
interest of public welfare, certain streets should be opened to
ease traffic congestion. The Makati municipal officials
allegedly opened, destroyed and removed the gates forcibly,
and opened the entire length of Jupiter Street to public
traffic. Ayala Corporation donated the entire Jupiter Street to
BAVA, but even before 1978 the Makati Police and the
security force of BAVA were already the ones regulating the
traffic along Jupiter Street after the gates were opened in
1977. Residents of Jupiter Street (the Sangalang spouses,
Gaston spouses, and Briones spouses) and the Bel-Air Village
Association, Inc. (BAVA) filed separate actions against Ayala
Corporation and the lot owners who allowed their lots to be
used for commercial purposes. Three of the five trial courts in
the five petitions ruled in favor of the petitioners, while two
were dismissed on procedural and substantive grounds. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed all five petitions, on
the ground that the ordinances, both being valid as a
legitimate exercise of police power, allowed the use of Jupiter
Street for commercial purposes.
WON there was a violation of the deed restrictions
HELD: No
There was no violation of the deed restrictions as Jupiter
Street, which was the common boundary for the commercial
and residential zones, was never exclusively for residential or
commercial purposes only. This is confirmed by the fact that
both ordinances as well as the BAVA Articles of Incorporation
treat Jupiter Street as the boundary line making it clear that
Jupiter Street was intended for use by both commercial and
residential blocks from the very beginning.
WON the MMC Ordinance, raised by Ayala Corporation as an
affirmative defense, was a legitimate exercise of police power
HELD: Yes
The National Government itself, through the MMC, had
reclassified Jupiter Street into a high density commercial zone
pursuant to its Ordinance 81-01. Hence, the petitioners have
no cause of action on the strength alone of the deed
restrictions. This is not to say that restrictive easements are
invalid or ineffective. As far as Bel-Air Village is concerned,
they are valid and enforceable. But they are, like all contracts,
subject to the overriding demands, needs, and interests of
the greater number as the State may determine in the
legitimate exercise of police power. The sanctity of contract
cannot be raised as a deterrent to police power, which is
designed precisely to promote health, safety, peace, and
enhance the common good, at the expense of contractual
rights, whenever necessary. Absent any showing of
capriciousness or arbitrariness on the part of MMC, the
ordinance reclassifying Jupiter Street should be upheld.
Macasiano v. Diokno
On 13 Jun 1990, the Municipality of Paraaque passed
Ordinance 86 (Series of 1990) which authorized the closure of
J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt Garcia Extension and
Opena Streets in Baclaran and the establishment of a flea
market thereon. This ordinance was approved by the
municipal council pursuant to the Metro Manila Commission
Ordinance 2 (Series of 1979) authorizing and regulating the
use of certain city and/or municipal streets, roads and open
spaces within Metro Manila as sites for flea market and/or
vending areas under certain terms and conditions. The
municipal council on 20 Jun 1990 issued a resolution
authorizing Paraaque Mayor Walfrido Ferrer to enter into
contract with any service cooperative for the establishment,
operation, maintenance and management of flea markets
and/or vending areas. On 8 Aug 1990, Palanyag Kilusang
Bayan for Service (Palanyag), a service cooperative was made
a flea market operator subject to municipality dues for such
operation. On 13 Sep 1990, Brig Gen Levy Macasiano (PNP
Superintendent of the Metropolitan Traffic Command)
ordered the destruction and confiscation of stalls along G.G.
Cruz and J Gabriel Streets. B/Gen Macasiano on 16 Oct 1990
gave notice to Palanyag that it had 10 days to discontinue the
flea market; otherwise the market stalls would be
dismantled. The Municipality and Palanyag filed with RTC
Makati Br 62 (Judge Roberto Diokno presiding) a petition for
prohibition and mandamus with damages and a prayer for
preliminary injunction. RTC issued a TRO against Macasiano
pending the hearing, and later on upheld the validity of the
ordinance.
WON an ordinance or resolution issued by the municipal
council of Paraaque authorizing the lease and use of public
streets or thoroughfares as sites for flea markets is valid
HELD: No
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Said streets which were closed off are local roads used for
public service and are therefore considered public properties
of the municipality. Properties of the local government which
are devoted to public service are deemed public and under
the absolute control of Congress. Local governments have no
authority to control or regulate the use of public properties
unless specific authority is vested upon them by Congress.
Sec 10, Loc Gov Code (BP 337, which was the applicable law
at the time)empowers the local governments to close roads,
but this provision should be read and interpreted in
accordance with basic principles already established by law:
1. Art 424, CC: Properties of public dominion devoted to
public use and made available to the public in general are
outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or
leased by the LGU to private persons.
2. To withdraw a property from public use, the requirement
of due process should be complied with, and circumstances
should show that the property is no longer intended or
necessary for public use or public service. (When the property
is withdrawn from public use, it becomes patrimonial
property of the LGU.)
The Municipality has not shown that it has complied with the
conditions precedent set by the Metropolitan Manila
Authority for the latter to approve of such ordinance.
(Conditions are that the streets are not used for vehicular
traffic and that majority of the residents are not opposed to
the establishment of a flea market/vending area, and that
there is a time schedule in during which the flea market
would operate.)
Furthermore, the powers of a LGU should be subservient to
paramount considerations of health and well-being of the
members of the community. It is of public notice that the
streets along Baclaran are congested with people, houses and
traffic brought about by the proliferation of vendors
occupying the streets. Thus, allowing the flea market would
be contrary to the local governments sworn obligation to
enact measures that will enhance the public health and safety
of the municipalitys inhabitants.
G. Corporate Powers
Sec. 22. Corporate Powers. (a) Every local government unit,
as a corporation, shall have the following powers:
(1) To have continuous succession in its corporate name;
(2) To sue and be sued;
(3) To have and use a corporate seal;
(4) To acquire and convey real or personal property;
(5) To enter into contracts; and
(6) To exercise such other powers as are granted to
corporations, subject to the limitations provided in this Code
and other laws.
(b) Local government units may continue using, modify, or
change their existing corporate seals: Provided, That newly
established local government units or those without
corporate seals may create their own corporate seals which
shall be registered with the Department of the Interior and
Local Government: Provided, further, That any change of
corporate seal shall also be registered as provided herein.
(c) Unless otherwise provided in this Code, no contract may
be entered into by the local chief executive in behalf of the
local government unit without prior authorization by the
sanggunian concerned. A legible copy of such contract shall
be posted at a conspicuous place in the provincial capitol or
the city, municipal or barangay hall.
(d) Local government units shall enjoy full autonomy in the
exercise of their proprietary functions and in the
management of their economic enterprises, subject to the
limitations provided in this Code and other applicable laws.
H. Liability for damages
Sec. 24. Liability for Damages. Local government units and
their officials are not exempt from liability for death or injury
to persons or damage to property.
I. Authority to negotiate and secure grants; receive
donations; float bonds; build-operate-transfer
Sec. 23. Authority to Negotiate and Secure Grants. Local
chief executives may, upon authority of the sanggunian,
negotiate and secure financial grants or donations in kind, in
support of the basic services or facilities enumerated under
Section 17 hereof, from local and foreign assistance agencies
without necessity of securing clearance or approval therefor
from any department, agency, or office of the National
Government of from any higher local government unit:
Provided, That projects financed by such grants or assistance
with national security implications shall be approved by the
national agency concerned: Provided, further, That when
such national agency fails to act on the request for approval
within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, the same shall be
deemed approved.
The local chief executive shall, within thirty (30) days upon
signing of such grant agreement or deed of donation, report
the nature, amount, and terms of such assistance to both
Houses of Congress and the President.
J. Mayors power over the police: Operational
control; suspension
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RA 8551
See attachments
Sec 28, LGC
Sec. 28. Powers of Local Chief Executives over the Units of
the Philippine National Police. The extent of operational
supervision and control of local chief executives over the
police force, fire protection unit, and jail management
personnel assigned in their respective jurisdictions shall be
governed by the provisions of Republic Act Numbered Sixty-
nine hundred seventy-five (R.A. No. 6975), otherwise known
as "The Department of the Interior and Local Government Act
of 1990", and the rules and regulations issued pursuant
thereto.
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Part III
Elective Officials, Vacancies, Succession, Disciplinary Actions

ELECTIVE OFFICIALS
Sec 39 75, LGC
Qualifications of elective officials (Sec. 39)
1. citizen of the Philippines
2. registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city,
or province or district (only in the case of a member
of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan) where he
intends to be elected
3. a resident therein for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the election
4. able to read and write Filipino or any other local
language or dialect.
5. Age requirements for candidates, as of election day:
a. governor, vice-governor, or member of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice-
mayor or member of the sangguniang
panlungsod of highly urbanized cities - at
least 23 years old
b. mayor or vice-mayor of independent
component cities, component cities, or
municipalities - at least 21 years old
c. punong barangay , member of the
sangguniang panlungsod, sangguniang
bayan, or sangguniang barangay - at least
18 years old
d. sangguniang kabataan - at least 15 years old
but not more than 21 years old
Certificates of candidacy to be taken at face value
COMELEC may not deny due course or cancel a certificate
without proper proceedings. To receive and acknowledge
receipt of the certificates of candidacy is a ministerial duty of
COMELEC. The COMELEC does not have discretion to give or
not to give due course to the certificate. It may not look into
matters not appearing on their face (Cipriano v. COMELEC
[2004]).
Rationale of residency requirement
The residence requirement is rooted in the desire that
officials of districts or localities be acquainted with the needs,
difficulties, and other matters vital to the common welfare of
the constituents. The actual, physical and personal presence
is substantial enough to show his intention to fulfill the duties
of mayor and for the voters to evaluate his qualifications for
the mayorship. A very legalistic, academic and technical
approach to the residence requirement does not satisfy the
rationale for the said requirement (Torayno v. COMELEC
[2000]).
Disqualifications of elective officials (Sec. 40)
A. Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense
involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment,
within two (2) years after serving sentence
B. Those removed from office as a result of an
administrative case
C. Those convicted by final judgment for violating the
oath of allegiance to the Republic
D. Those with dual citizenship
E. Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political
cases here or abroad
F. Permanent residents in a foreign country or those
who have acquired the right to reside abroad and
continue to avail of the same right after the
effectivity of this Code; and
G. The insane or feeble-minded.
H. Other grounds for disqualification:
a. Vote-buying, upon determination in a
summary administrative proceeding.
(Nolasco v. COMELEC [1997]).
b. Previously-elected official. Any elective
official who has resigned from his office,
which he previously occupied but has
caused to become vacant due to his
resignation (by accepting an appointive
office or for whatever reason), is
disqualified from running in a special
election (from RA 8295, An act providing
for the proclamation of a lone candidate for
any elective office in a special election, and
for other purposes).
c. Politically-motivated acts. Any person who,
directly or indirectly, coerces, bribes,
threatens, harasses, intimidates or actually
causes, inflicts or produces any violence,
injury, punishment, torture, damage, loss or
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disadvantage to any person or persons
aspiring to become a candidate or that of
the immediate member of his family, his
honor or property that is meant to
eliminate all other potential candidate,
where evidence of guilt is strong (also from
RA 8295).
Term of Office (Sec. 43)
1. For all elective officials except barangay officials:
3 years, starting from noon of June 30, 1992 or
such date as may be provided for by law.
a. all local officials first elected during the
local elections immediately following the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution shall
serve until noon of June 30, 1992
2. For barangay officials and members of the
sangguniang kabataan: 3 years, which shall
begin after the regular election of barangay
officials on the second Monday of May 1994.
3. No local elective official shall serve for more
than 3 consecutive terms in the same position.
4. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service
See also Sec. 8, Art. X, 1987 Constitution: The term of office
of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall
be determined by law, shall be three years and no such
official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term for which he was elected.
Elections (Sec. 41, 42)
Unless otherwise provided by law, the elections for local
officials shall be held every 3 years on the second Monday of
May.
Official How elected
Governor, vice-governor,
mayor, vice-mayor, punong
barangay
At large, by all the qualified
voters in their respective
units
Sangguniang kabataan
chairman
By the registered voters of
the katipunan ng kabataan
1

Members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, panlungsod,
bayan
By the qualified voters in
their district
Members of the sangguniang
barangay
At large

1
Sec. 424, LGC: Katipunan ng Kabataan. The katipunan ng kabataan shall
be composed of all citizens of the Philippines actually residing in the
barangay for at least 6 months, who are 15 but not more than 21 years of
age, and who are duly registered in the list of the sangguniang kabataan or in
the official barangay list in the custody of the barangay secretary.

Other members of the various sanggunian
1. The presidents of the leagues of sanggunian
members of component cities and municipalities
shall serve as ex officio members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan concerned.
2. The presidents of the "liga ng mga barangay and the
pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan" elected
by their respective chapters shall serve as ex officio
members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod, and sangguniang bayan
3. There shall be one (1) sectoral representative from
the women, one (1) from the workers, and one (1)
from any of the following sectors: the urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, disabled persons,
or any other sector as may be determined by the
sanggunian concerned within ninety (90) days prior
to the holding of the next local elections as may be
provided for by law.
Vacancies and Succession of Elective OFficials
Permanent Vacancies (Sec. 44)
Arises when an elective local official:
1. fills a higher vacant office
2. refuses to assume office
3. fails to qualify
4. dies
5. is removed from office
6. voluntarily resigns
7. is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge
the functions of his office
Filling of vacancy by automatic succession (Sec. 44)
Permanent Vacancy Successor
1. Office of the governor,
mayor
Vice-governor, vice-mayor
2. Offices of governor & vice-
governor, or mayor & vice-
mayor
- Highest-ranking sanggunian
member, or in case of his
permanent inability,
- The second highest-ranking
sanggunian member
3. Office of the punong
barangay
- Highest-ranking sanggunian
member, or in case of his
permanent inability,
- The second highest-ranking
sanggunian member

For purposes of succession, ranking in the sanggunian shall be
determined on the basis of the proportion of votes obtained
by each winning candidate to the total number of registered
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voters in each district in the immediately preceding local
election.
A tie between or among the highest ranking sanggunian
members shall be resolved by the drawing of lots
The successors as defined herein shall serve only the
unexpired terms of their predecessors.
Filling of vacancy by appointment (Sec. 45)
Resorted to when automatic succession provided in Sec. 44
does not apply
Permanent Vacancy Appointing Power
1. Sangguniang
panlalawigan; sangguniang
panlungsod of highly
urbanized cities and
independent component
cities
President, through the
Executive Secretary
2. Sangguniang panlungsod
of component cities;
sangguniang bayan
Governor
3. Sangguniang barangay City or municipal mayor,
upon recommendation of the
sangguniang barangay
concerned

General Rule: the appointee shall come from the same
political party as that of the sanggunian member who caused
the vacancy and shall serve the unexpired term of the vacant
office. To ensure this, a nomination and a certificate of
membership of the appointee from the highest official of the
political party concerned are conditions sine qua non.
Effects if nomination and certificate are absent:
a. any appointment without such shall be null and void
ab initio
b. ground for administrative action against the official
responsible therefor
Exceptions: In case the permanent vacancy is caused by a
sanggunian member who does not belong to any political
party, the local chief executive shall, upon recommendation
of the sanggunian concerned, appoint any qualified person to
fill the vacancy
In case of vacancy in the representation of the youth and the
barangay in the sanggunian, said vacancy shall be filled
automatically by the official next in rank of the organization
concerned.
Temporary Vacancy in the Office of the Local Chief Executive
(Sec. 46)
Arises when the local chief executive (governor, mayor, or
punong barangay):
1. is on leave of absence
2. is on travel abroad
3. is suspended from office
4. is otherwise temporarily incapacitated to
perform his duties for physical or legal reasons
General rule: the vice-governor, city/municipal vice-mayor, or
the highest ranking sangguniang barangay member shall
automatically exercise the powers, and perform the duties
and functions, of the local chief executive.
Exception: The power to appoint/suspend/dismiss
employees, which can be exercised only if the period of
temporary incapacity exceeds 30 working days.
General rule: The local chief executive cannot authorize any
local official to assume the powers/duties/functions of his
office, other than the vice-governor, city/municipal
vicemayor, or highest ranking sangguniang barangay
member.
Exception: If the local chief executive is traveling within the
country but outside his territorial jurisdiction for a period not
exceeding 3 consecutive days, he may designate in writing
the officer-in-charge. The authorization shall specify the
powers and functions that the officer-in-charge shall exercise,
which does not include the power to
appoint/suspend/dismiss EEs.
Exception to the exception: If the local chief executive
fails/refuses to issue the authorization, the vice-governor,
city/municipal vice-mayor, or highest ranking sangguniang
barangay member has right to assume the
powers/duties/functions of the office on the 4th day of
absence.
The temporary incapacity shall terminate upon submission to
the appropriate sanggunian of a written declaration by the
local chief executive concerned that he has reported back to
office. In cases where the temporary incapacity is due to legal
causes, the local chief executive concerned shall also submit
necessary documents showing that said legal causes no
longer exist.
Acting governor cannot simultaneously act as vice-governor.
A vice-governor who is concurrently an acting governor is
actually a quasi-governor. Being the acting governor, the vice
cannot continue to simultaneously exercise the duties of the
latter office, since the nature of the duties of the governor for
a full-time occupant to discharge them. Hence, there is an
inability on the part of the regular presiding officer (vice-
governor) to preside during the sanggunian sessions, which
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calls for the election of a temporary presiding officer
(Gamboa v. Aguirre [1999]).
The governor has the power to fill vacancy in the Sangguniang
Bayan caused by a member not belonging to any political
party. It is the same manner as where the member belonged
to a political party. Where there is no political party to make
the nomination, the Sanggunian, where the vacancy occurs,
must be considered authority for making the
recommendation. The appointing authority is limited to the
appointment of those recommended to the governor. The
recommendation is a condition sine qua non for the validity
of the appointment (Farias v. Barba [1996]).
Leaves of Absence (Sec. 47)
LOA of To be approved by
1. Governor; mayor of a
highly urbanized city or an
independent component city
The President or his duly
authorized representative
2. Vice-governor; city /
municipal vice-mayor
Local chief executive
concerned
3. Members of the
sanggunian and its
employees
Vice-governor or vice-mayor
concerned
4. Mayor or component city /
municipality
Governor
5. Punong barangay City / municipal mayor
6. Sangguniang barangay
members
Punong barangay

Whenever the application for leave of absence hereinabove
specified is not acted upon within five (5) working days after
receipt thereof, the application for leave of absence shall be
deemed approved.
Local Legislation
Where local legislative power vests (Sec. 48)
1. sangguniang panlalawigan for the province
2. sangguniang panlungsod for the city
3. sangguniang bayan for the municipality
4. sangguniang barangay for the barangay
Presided over by the vice-governor, vice-mayor, or punong
barangay. And because the presider is not a member of the
Sanggunian, he can vote only in case of a tie (Perez v. Dela
Cruz [1969]).
Should the vice-governor, vice-mayor or punong barangay be
unable to preside, the members present and constituting a
quorum shall elect from among themselves a temporary
presiding officer.
The temporary presiding officer shall certify, within 10 days
from the passage of ordinances enacted and resolutions
adopted, such ordinances and resolutions in the session over
which he temporarily
See also Sec. 20, Art. X, 1987 Constitution. Within its
territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this
Constitution and national laws, the organic act of
autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:
1. Administrative organization;
2. Creation of sources of revenues;
3. Ancestral domain and natural resources;
4. Personal, family, and property relations;
5. Regional urban and rural planning development;
6. Economic, social, and tourism development;
7. Educational policies;
8. Preservation and development of the cultural
heritage; and
9. Such other matters as may be authorized by law for
the promotion of the general welfare of the people
of the region.
Internal Rules of Procedure (Sec. 50)
Every sanggunian must adopt or update its existing rules of
procedure, on the first regular session following the election
of its members and within 90 days thereafter
The rules of procedure shall provide for the following:
1. The organization of the sanggunian and the election
of its officers
2. the creation of standing committees (eg.,
committees on appropriations, women and family,
human rights, youth and sports development,
environmental protection, cooperatives, etc.), their
general jurisdiction, their chairpersons, and their
members
3. The order and calendar of business for each session
4. The legislative process
5. The parliamentary procedures which include the
conduct of members during sessions
6. The discipline of members for disorderly behavior
and absences without justifiable cause for four (4)
consecutive sessions,
a. the penalty of suspension or expulsion shall
require the concurrence of at least two-
thirds (2/3) vote of all the sanggunian
members
b. a member convicted by final judgment to
imprisonment of at least one (1) year for
any crime involving moral turpitude shall be
automatically expelled from the
sanggunian; and
7. Such other rules as the sanggunian may adopt
Quorum (Sec. 53)
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A majority of all the members of the sanggunian who have
been elected and qualified shall constitute a quorum to
transact official business
Should a question of quorum be raised during a session, the
presiding officer shall immediately proceed to call the roll of
the members and thereafter announce the results
Where there is no quorum, the presiding officer may declare
a recess until such time as a quorum is constituted, or a
majority of the members present may adjourn from day to
day
Majority of the members present may compel the immediate
attendance of any member absent without justifiable cause
by designating a member of the sanggunian to be assisted by
the police force assigned in the territorial jurisdiction of the
LGU concerned, to arrest the absent member and present
him at the session
If there is still no quorum despite this, no business shall be
transacted. The presiding officer, upon proper motion duly
approved by the members present, shall then declare the
session adjourned for lack of quorum
Sessions (Sec. 52)
Regular Sessions. The sanggunian shall, by resolution, fix the
day, time, and place of its regular sessions on the first session
day immediately after the election of its members.
The minimum numbers of regular sessions shall be:
once a week for the sangguniang panlalawigan,
sangguniang panlungsod, and sangguniang bayan
twice a month for the sangguniang barangay
Special Sessions. Special sessions may be called by the local
chief executive or by a majority of the members of the
sanggunian whenever public interest so demands.
In the case of special sessions, a written notice to the
members shall be served personally at the member's usual
place of residence at least 24 hours before the special session
is held. And unless otherwise concurred in by two-thirds
(2/3) vote of the sanggunian members present, there being a
quorum, no other matters may be considered at a special
session except those stated in the notice.
General rule: all sessions shall be open to the public
Exception: unless a closed-door session is ordered by an
affirmative vote of majority of the members present, there
being a quorum
Reasons for closed-door session: public interest, reasons of
security, decency, or morality.
No two (2) sessions, regular or special, may be held in a single
day.
Each sanggunian shall keep a journal and record of its
proceedings, which may be published upon resolution of the
sanggunian concerned.
Full disclosure of conflict of interest of members (Sec. 51)
Conflict of interest refers in general to one where it may be
reasonably deduced that a member of a sanggunian may not
act in the public interest due to some private, pecuniary, or
other personal considerations that may tend to affect his
judgment to the prejudice of the service or the public.
Every sanggunian member shall, upon assumption to office,
make a full disclosure of:
his business and financial interests
professional relationship, or
any relation by affinity or consanguinity within the
fourth civil degree
with any person, firm, or entity affected by any ordinance or
resolution under consideration by the sanggunian of which he
is a member, which relationship may result in conflict of
interest.
Such relationship shall include:
Ownership of stock or capital, or investment, in the
entity or firm to which the ordinance or resolution
may apply
Contracts or agreements with any person or entity
which the ordinance or resolution under
consideration may affect
The disclosure required under this Act shall be made in
writing and submitted to the secretary of the sanggunian or
the secretary of the committee of which he is a member.
The disclosure shall form part of the record of the
proceedings and shall be made:
before the member participates in the deliberations
on the ordinance or resolution under consideration
before voting on the ordinance or resolution on
second and third readings, if the member did not
participate during the deliberations
when a member takes a position or makes a
privilege speech on a matter that may affect the
business interest, financial connection, or
professional relationship described herein
Approval and Vetoing of Ordinances (Sec. 54, 55)
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1. Ordinances enacted by the sangguniang
panlalawigan, panlungsod, or bayan:
a. Every ordinance enacted by the
sangguniang panlalawigan, panlungsod, or
bayan shall be presented to the local chief
executive (i.e., the governor or mayor).
b. If the local chief executive approves the
same, he shall affix his signature on each
and every page thereof.
c. Otherwise, he shall veto it within 15 days (in
case of a province) or 10 days (in case of a
city or municipality) and return the same
with his written objections to the
sanggunian, which may proceed to
reconsider the same.
i. Grounds for vetoing: the ordinance
is ultra vires, or prejudicial to the
public welfare
ii. Item-vetoing: the local chief
executive shall have the power to
veto any particular item or items of
1. an appropriations
ordinance
2. an ordinance or resolution
adopting a local
development plan and
public investment
program, or
3. an ordinance directing the
payment of money or
creating liability
In such a case, the veto shall not affect the item or items
which are not objected to. The vetoed item or items shall not
take effect unless the sanggunian overrides the veto;
otherwise, any item/s in the appropriations ordinance of the
previous year corresponding to those vetoed shall be deemed
reenacted.
iii. The local chief executive may veto
an ordinance or resolution only
once.
d. The sanggunian concerned may override
the veto of the local chief executive by two-
thirds (2/3) vote of all its members, thereby
making the ordinance or resolution
effective for all legal intents and purposes,
even without the approval of the local chief
executive concerned.
e. If the ordinance is not returned by the local
chief executive within the time prescribed,
the ordinance shall be deemed approved as
if he had signed it.
2. Ordinances enacted by the sangguniang barangay
a. Must be signed by the punong barangay
upon approval by the majority of all the
sanggunian members.
b. The punong barangay has no veto power.

Review of Ordinances and Resolutions (Sec. 56-58)
Ordinances and resolutions by the sangguniang
panlungsod / sangguniang bayan
Ordinances by the sangguniang barangay
Reviewed by Sangguniang panlalawigan Sangguniang panlungsod / bayan
What may be
reviewed
1. Approved ordinances
2. Resolutions approving
a. local development plans
b. public investment programs
formulated by local development
councils
All barangay ordinances
Period for submitting
copies by the
secretary of the
sanggunian concerned
Within 3 days after approval Within 10 days after enactment
Period for review
Within 30 days after receipt of copies of ordinances
and resolutions
Within 30 days from receipt of copies of the
ordinances and resolutions
Manner of review
1. By itself, or
2. With the help of the provincial attorney /
provincial prosecutor. The latter must submit
his written comments or recommendations to
the sangguniang panlalawigan within 10 days
from receipt of the documents to be examined
By itself
Ground/s for
invalidating, and
1. If the sangguniang panlalawigan finds that such
an ordinance or resolution is ultra vires, it shall
1. If the sangguniang panlungsod / bayan finds
that such ordinance or resolution is
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action to be taken declare such ordinance or resolution invalid in
whole or in part.
2. The sangguniang panlalawigan shall enter its
action in the minutes and shall advise the
corresponding city or municipal authorities of
the action it has taken.
3. Any attempt to enforce any ordinance or any
resolution approving the local development
plan and public investment program, after the
disapproval thereof, shall be sufficient ground
for the suspension or dismissal of the official or
employee concerned.
inconsistent with law and city/municipal
ordinances, it shall return the same with its
comments and recommendations to the
sangguniang barangay for adjustment,
amendment, or modification
2. In this case, the effectivity of the barangay
ordinance is suspended until such time as the
revision called for is effected.
3. Any attempt to enforce any ordinance after
the disapproval thereof, shall be sufficient
ground for the suspension or dismissal of the
official or employee concerned.
Effect of inaction
If no action has been taken within 30 days after
submission of such an ordinance or resolution, the
same shall be presumed consistent with law and
therefore valid
If no action is taken within thirty (30) days from
receipt of the ordinances, the same shall be
deemed approved


Effectivity of Ordinances or Resolutions (Sec. 59)
1. Ordinance or resolution approving the local
development plan and public investment
program
Unless otherwise stated in the ordinance or resolution
approving the local development plan and public investment
program, the same shall take effect after ten (10) days from
Posting, by the secretary, of a copy thereof in a
bulletin board at the entrance of the provincial
capitol / city, municipal, or barangay hall, which
must be done not later than 5 days after its
approval; and
in at least 2 other conspicuous places in the LGU
concerned
The text of the ordinance or resolution shall be disseminated
and posted in Filipino or English and in the language
understood by the majority of the people in the LGU
concerned
The secretary to the sanggunian shall record such fact in a
book kept for the purpose, stating the dates of approval and
posting
2. Ordinances with penal sanctions
The gist of all ordinances with penal sanctions shall be
published in a newspaper of general circulation within the
province where the local legislative body concerned belongs.
In the absence of any newspaper of general circulation within
the province, posting of such ordinances shall be made in all
municipalities and cities of the province where the
sanggunian of origin is situated.
3. Ordinances enacted by the local legislative
bodies of highly urbanized and independent
component cities

The main features of the ordinance or resolution duly
enacted or adopted shall, in addition to being posted, be
published once in a local newspaper of general circulation
within the city
In the absence of a local newspaper, the ordinance or
resolution shall be published in any newspaper of general
circulation
Disciplinary Actions
Grounds (Sec. 60)
1. Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines;
2. Culpable violation of the Constitution;
3. Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office,
gross negligence, or dereliction of duty;
4. Commission of any offense involving moral
turpitude or an offense punishable by at least
prision mayor;
5. Abuse of authority;
6. Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15)
consecutive working days, except in the case of
members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
Sangguniang Panlungsod, Sangguniang bayan,
and Sangguniang Barangay;
7. Application for, or acquisition of, foreign
citizenship or residence or the status of an
immigrant of another country; and
8. Such other grounds as may be provided in this
Code and other laws.
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81 | P a g e Municipal Corporation
Removal of elective officials based on these grounds may only
be done by ORDER of proper court.
Form and Filing of administrative complaint (sec. 61)
Form of Complaint: It must be VERIFIED
Where to File:
(1) Against an elective official of a province, highly-
urbanized city, independent component city or
component city Office of the President (OP);
(2) Against an elective municipal official Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, appealable to the Office of the
President (OP);
(3) Against an elective barangay official Sangguniang
Panlungsod or Bayan as the case may be, non
appealable.
Notice of hearing (Sec. 62)
The notice of hearing must be sent to the elective official
complained of within seven (7) days from filing of verified
complaint which indicates that:
An administrative complaint is lodged against him;
Requiring him to submit his VERIFIED ANSWER
within fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice
The disciplining authority shall commence the investigation of
the case within ten (10) days after receipt of the respondents
answer.
NOTE:
(1) No investigation shall be held within ninety (90) days
immediately prior to any LOCAL ELECTION, and no preventive
suspension shall be imposed within the same period.
(2) If a preventive suspension has been imposed prior to 90-
day period immediately preceding local election, it shall be
deemed AUTOMATICALLY LIFTED upon start of aforesaid
period.
Preventive suspension of local elective officials (Sec. 63)
Who may impose:
Against an elective official of a PROVINCE, HIGHLY-
URBANIZED CITY, INDEPENDENT COMPONENT CITY
The President thru the DILG Secretary;
Against an elective municipal official or an elective
official of a component city The Provincial
Governor;
Against an elective barangay official The Mayor
When to impose:
At any time after the issues have been joined, when
the evidence of guilt is strong, and given the gravity
of offense, then is great possibility that the
continuance in office of the respondent could
influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the
safety and integrity of the records and other
evidence.
Duration of Preventive Suspension:
Any single preventive suspension of local elective
official SHALL NOT extend beyond sixty (60) days.
In the event that several administrative cases are
filed against an elective official, he cannot be
preventively suspended for more than ninety (90)
days within a single year on the same ground or
grounds existing and known at the time of the first
suspension.
What happens after preventive suspension:
The suspended elective official shall be deemed
REINSTATED IN OFFICE without prejudice to the
continuation of the proceedings against him
Duration of Administrative Proceedings (Rendition of
Judgment):
One hundred twenty (120) days from the time the
respondent was formally notified of the case against
him.
NOTE: If the delay in the proceedings of the case of the case
is due to his FAULT, NEGLECT, or REQUEST, other than the
appeal duly filed, the duration of such delay shall not be
counted in computing the time of termination of the case.
Any abuse of the exercise of the power of preventive
suspension shall be penalized as ABUSE OF
AUTHORITY.
Salary of respondent pending suspension (Sec 64)
The suspended official shall not receive any salary or
compensation during the pendency of the
suspension

If found GUILTY after the
proceeding
If found NOT GUILTY after
the proceeding
No compensation will be
given
The suspended official shall
be paid FULL salary or
compensation including
other emoluments accruing
during the suspension

Rights of respondent official (Sec 65)
1. To appear and defend himself in person or by
counsel;
2. To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against
him;
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3. To require the attendance of witnesses and the
production of documentary evidence in his favor
through the compulsory process of sub poena or sub
poena duces tecum
Form and Notice of decision (Sec 66)
The investigation of the case SHALL be terminated within 90
days from the start thereof.
The disciplining authority shall render its decision within 30
days after the end of the investigation.
Form of decision:
It shall be in writing;
It shall state clearly and distinctly the facts and the
reasons for the decision.
Notice of decision:
The notice together with the copies of the decision
shall IMMEDIATELY be furnished the respondent and
all interested parties.
Imposable penalty:
SUSPENSION
It shall not exceed: (1)
the unexpired term of
the respondent; or (2) a
period of six (6) months
for every administrative
offense

It shall NOT be a bar to
the candidacy of the
respondent so
suspended as long as he
meets the qualifications
required for the office

REMOVAL
Amounts to a bar to the
candidacy of the
respondent for ANY
elective position


Administrative appeals (Sec 67)
Period to appeal:
Within thirty (30) days from receipt of the
decision.
Where to appeal:
Sangguniang Panlalawigan
For the decisions of
Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Component Cities and
Sangguniang Bayan
2


Office of the President

For the decisions of
Sangguniang Panlalawigan
and the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Highly
Urbanized Cities (HUC) and
Independent Component
Cities


Decisions of the Office of the President shall be final and
executory. (see Calingin v. CA, July 12, 2004)
Execution pending appeal
3
(Sec 68)
An appeal shall not prevent a decision from
becoming final and executory.
The respondent official shall be considered as having
been placed under preventive suspension during the
pendency of an appeal in the event he wins such
appeal.
In the event the appeal results in EXONERATION, he
shall be paid his salary and such other emoluments
during the pendency of the appeal.
Recall
By whom exercised (Sec 69)

2
The provision is not explicit whether the decision of Sangguniang Bayan and
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Component Cities after appeal to Sangguniang
Panlalawigan can be further appealed to the Office of the President. But
the author of this reviewer humbly believes that pursuant to the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies in Administrative Law, it can be
further appealed to the Office of the President. This view is also bolstered
by the last sentence of the same provision which states that Decisions of
the Office of the President shall be final and executory. The said
statement begs the question: If the decision of the Office of the President
is final and executory, how about that of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan?

3
This provision is poorly worded. The drafter might be drunk when he/she
wrote this provision. The first and second sentences, as written, do not make
any sense. One might ask regarding the first sentence, Why appeal if the
decision will become final and executory notwithstanding the filing of an
appeal? The author humbly submits that the second and third sentences of
this provision should have been written or was intended to be written this
way: The respondent shall be considered as having been placed under
preventive suspension during the pendency of an appeal[.] in the event he
wins such appeal. In the event the appeal results in an exoneration, he shall
be paid his salary and such emoluments during the pendency of the appeal
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83 | P a g e Municipal Corporation
It shall be exercised by the registered voters of a local
government unit to which the local elective official subject to
such recall belongs.
Ground: Loss of Confidence
Initiation of Recall Process (Sec 70)
Contents of the Petition:
1. The names and addresses of the petitioner written in
legible form and their signatures
2. The barangay, city or municipality, local legislative
district and the province to which the petitioners
belong
3. The name of the official sought to be recalled
4. A brief narration of the reasons and justifications
therefore.
Process:
1. Petition of a registered voter in the LGU concerned,
supported by percentage of registered voters during
the election in which the local official sought to be
recalled is elected filed with the COMELEC thru its
office in the LGU concerned. (Percentage decreases
as population of people in area increases. Also, the
supporting voters MUST sign the petition)
2. Within 15 days after filing, COMELEC must certify the
sufficiency of the required number of signatures.
Failure to obtain required number automatically
nullifies the petition.
3. Within 3 days of certification of sufficiency form and
substance of the petition, the COMELEC shall
provide the official with a copy of the petition and
causes its publication for 3 weeks (once a week) in a
national newspaper and a local newspaper of
general circulation. Petition must also be posted for
10 to 20 days at conspicuous places. Protest should
be filed at this point and shall be ruled with finality
within 15 days from filing of such protest or
challenge.
4. COMELEC then verifies and authenticates the
signatures gathered. Representatives of the
petitioners as well as the official sought to be
recalled shall be duly notified and shall have the
right to participate therein as mere observers.
5. COMELEC shall announce the acceptance of
candidates to the position and thereafter prepare
the list of candidates which shall include the name of
the official sought to be recalled.
Election on recall (Sec 71)
Prescribed date of Recall Election:
For recall of barangay, city,
or municipal officials
Shall not be later than thirty
(30) days upon the
completion of the procedure
for initiation of recall process


For recall of provincial
officials
Shall not be later than forty-
five (45) days upon the
completion of the procedure
for initiation of recall process


The official sought to be recalled shall automatically be
considered as duly registered candidate or candidates to the
pertinent positions and, like other candidates, shall be
entitled to be voted upon.
Effectivity of recall (Sec 72)
The recall of an elective local official shall be effective only
upon the election and proclamation of the candidate
receiving the highest number of votes cast during the recall
election.
Should the official sought to be recalled receive the highest
number of votes, confidence in him is thereby affirmed and
he shall continue in office.
Prohibition from resignation (Sec 73)
The elective local official sought to be recalled shall not be
allowed to resign while the recall process is in progress.
Limitation on recall (sec 74)
Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall
election only once during his term of office
No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of
the officials assumption to office or one (1) year immediately
preceding a regular local election.
Expenses incident to recall election (Sec 75)
All expenses incident to recall elections shall be borne by the
COMELEC.
For this purpose, there shall be included in the annual
General Appropriations Act a contingency fund for the
conduct of recall elections.
A. Qualifications
Sec 39, LGC
See above
Abella v. Comelec
Benjamin Abella was a candidate for Leyte governor for the
1988 elections. Emeterio Larrazabal was also a candidate for
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Leyte governor, but was disqualified for lack of residence. On
the day before the elections, his wife Adelina Larrazabal then
filed her candidacy as his substitute. The following day
Silvestre de la Cruz, a registered voter of Tacloban City, filed a
petition to disqualify her, on the ground that she
misrepresented her residence as Kananga, Leyte when in fact
she was a resident of Ormoc City like her husband. She was
however proclaimed as the winning candidate, and thus
assumed office while the hearings on her disqualification case
continued. She was later on declared by the COMELEC as
disqualified from running as governor. The incumbent vice-
governor Leopoldo Petilla then took his oath as Leyte
Governor and assumed office, which COMELEC resolved by
ordering Petilla to maintain status quo ante and refrain from
assuming the office of governor.
WON Adelina Larrazabal was qualified to run as governor of
Leyte
HELD: No
Adelina Larrazabal lacked the required residence because she
has established her residence at Ormoc City since 1975 and
not at Kananga. Her attempt to purportedly change her
residence one year before the election by registering at
Kananga clearly shows that she considers herself as an Ormoc
City resident. There is no evidence to prove that the
petitioner temporarily left her residence to pursue any
calling, profession or business to satisfy the principle of
animus revertendi. The fact that she occasionally visits
Kananga through the years does not signify an intention to
continue her residence therein. Having thus been established
as an Ormoc City resident, she is disqualified from running as
Leyte governor since Ormoc Citys charter prohibits its voters
from voting for provincial elective officials, since it is treated
like a highly urbanized city which is outside the supervisory
power of the province to which it is geographically attached.
The provision in the charter connotes two prohibitions: one
from running and the other from voting for any provincial
elective official. (Since there was a vacancy in the Office of
the Governor, the vice-governor assumed office.)
Frivaldo v. Comelec (1989)
Juan Frivaldo assumed office as Sorsogon governor in 1988.
On 27 Oct 1988 the League of Municipalities Sorsogon
Chapter, represented by its president Salvador Estuye (also
suing in his personal capacity) filed with the COMELEC a
petition for the annulment of Frivaldos election on the
ground that he was not a FIipino citizen. Frivaldo admitted he
was naturalized in the US, but explained that such was only to
protect himself against President Marcos. He said he could
not have repatriated himself since the Special Committee on
Naturalization (created by LOI 270) had not yet been
organized. He argued that his oath in his certificate of
candidacy that he was a natural-born citizen was a sufficient
act of repatriation, and that his active participation in the
1987 elections had divested him of American citizenship
under US laws, thus restoring his Filipino citizenship.
WON Frivaldo was a Filipino citizen at the time of his election
as Sorsogon governor
HELD: No
The alleged forfeiture of his American citizenship due to his
active participation in Philippine politics does not
automatically restore his Filipino citizenship. If the Committee
tasked to handle the repatriation had not yet been
constituted, it only meant that Frivaldo should have waited
until this was done, or else he should have sought
reacquisition of his Filipino citizenship through other means
(i.e., direct act of Congress or applied for naturalization).
Frivaldo was then not a Filipino citizen, and thus disqualified
to vote and run for office since Filipino citizenship is one of
the qualifications for voting and for being a candidate for
local elective office. (There was then a vacancy in the Office
of the Governor, thus the elected vice-governor assumed
office.)
Labo v. Comelec (1989)
Ramon Labo Jr married an Australian citizen in the
Philippines. As the spouse of an Australian citizen, he was not
required to meet normal requirements for the grant of
citizenship, and was granted Australian citizenship on 28 Jul
1976. His marriage was later declared void for being
bigamous. He returned to the Philippines using an Australian
passport and obtained an Alien Certificate of Registration
(ACR). He applied for a change in status from immigrant to
returning Filipino citizen, but was denied by the Commission
on Immigration and Deportation since he has not applied for
reacquisition of his Filipino citizenship. He later on ran for and
won as Mayor of Baguio City. The second-placer Luis
Lardizabal filed a petition for quo warranto, alleging that Labo
is disqualified from holding public office on the ground that
Labo was an alien, and asking that Labos proclamation as
Mayor be annulled.
WON Labo is a Filipino citizen and hence qualified to be
Mayor
HELD: No
Labo is not a Filipino citizen because he has lost his Filipino
citizenship by all three modes specified in the Constitution:
(1) naturalization in a foreign country, (2) express
renunciation of citizenship, and (3) subscribing to an oath of
allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign
country. Even if it be assumed that his Australian citizenship
was annulled because his marriage was void for being
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85 | P a g e Municipal Corporation
bigamous, that circumstance alone does not automatically
restore his Philippine citizenship. It does not appear that
Labo sought to reacquire his Filipino citizenship through any
of the three modes provided by our laws: direct act of
Congress, naturalization or repatriation. (Also, the earlier
contrary COMELEC decision can also be reversed since res
judicata does not apply to questions of citizenship.) Not
being a Filipino citizen, Labo is disqualified to run for mayor.
(There was then a vacancy in the Office of Mayor, thus the
Vice Mayor assumed office.)
Labo v. Comelec (1992)
Ramon Labo Jr filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of
Baguio City in the 1992 elections. Roberto Ortega also filed
his certificate of candidacy for the same office, and also
subsequently filed for Labos disqualification before the
COMELEC on the ground that Labo was an alien. Labo failed
to Answer and present evidence; COMELEC subsequently
cancelled Labos certificate of candidacy. Labo then moved to
stay the implementation of the COMELEC decision, which was
granted with COMELEC issuing an Order that Labo may still
continue to be voted upon as mayor in the 1992 elections,
but it resolved to suspend Labos proclamation in the event
he wins the elections.
WON Labo is a Filipino citizen and hence qualified to be
Mayor
HELD: No
Labo failed to submit proof that he has reacquired his
Philippine citizenship. He claims that he has reacquired his
Filipino citizenship by citing his application for reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship filed before the OSG, but despite
favorable recommendation by the Solicitor General, the
Special Committee on Naturalization had yet to act upon his
application for repatriation. In the absence of any official
action or approval by the proper authorities, a mere
application for repatriation does not, and cannot, amount to
an automatic reacquisition of the applicants Philippine
citizenship. (Note: Second-placer Ortega is not entitled to be
proclaimed as Mayor because he was not the choice of the
sovereign will. The ineligibility of a candidate receiving
majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate
receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared
elected.)
Frivaldo v. Comelec (1996)
On 20 Mar 1995, Juan Frivaldo filed his certificate of
candidacy for Sorsogon governor in the 1995 elections. Three
days later, another Sorsogon governor candidate, Raul Lee
filed for the cancellation of his Frivaldos certificate of
candidacy on the ground that Frivaldo was not a Filipino
citizen. COMELEC granted the petition. Frivaldo filed a MR,
which was not acted upon until after the elections. His
candidacy then continued and was thus voted upon (he
received the highest number of votes). It was only after the
elections that the COMELEC en banc affirmed the resolution
of its Second Division. By order of COMELEC, Lee was
proclaimed as governor at 830 PM on 30 Jun 1995. On 6 Jul
1995, Frivaldo filed a petition with the COMLEC praying for
the annulment of Lees proclamation, claiming that since he
took his oath of allegiance to the Philippines at 2PM on 30
Jun 1995, there was no more impediment to his being
proclaimed as governor. In the alternative, he averred that it
was the Vice-Governor-elect that should assume the office
and not Lee.
WON Frivaldo was qualified to be elected as Sorsogon
governor
HELD: Yes
The law does not specify any particular date or time when the
candidate must possess citizenship. Sine Frivaldo reassumed
his citizenship on 30 June 1995 the very day the term of
office of governor began he was therefore already qualified
to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the
functions and responsibilities as of said date. Furthermore,
Frivaldos repatriation retroacted to the date of the filing of
his application on 17 Aug 1994, since laws which create new
rights are given retroactive effect. And even if Frivaldo was
previously declared as not a Filipino citizen by the Supreme
Court, such decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of
citizenship cannot govern a persons future status with
finality, because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for
that matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes
recognized by law for the purpose.
SC adds, And let it not be overlooked that Frivaldos
demonstrated tenacity and sheer determination to reassume
his nationality of birth despite several setbacks speak more
loudly, in spirit, in fact and in truth than any legal technicality,
of his consuming intention and burning desire to re-embrace
his native Philippines even now at the ripe old age of 81
years.
Justice Davide DISSENTED, saying that Section 39 of the
Local Government Code of 1991 refers to no other than the
qualifications of candidates for elective local offices and their
election. Hence, in no way may the section be construed to
mean that possession of qualifications should be reckoned
from the commencement of the term of office of the elected
candidate. Also, it is only upon taking the oath of allegiance
that the applicant is deemed ipso jure to have reacquired
Philippine citizenship. If the decree had intended the oath
taking to retroact to the date of the filing of the application,
then it should not have explicitly provided otherwise.
Mercado v. Manzano
In the 1998 elections, 3 candidates for vice-mayor competed
for the post: Eduardo Manzano, Ernesto Mercado and Gabriel
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Daza III. Manzano won the elections but his proclamation was
suspended due to a pending petition for disqualification filed
by Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that Manzano was not a
Filipino citizen but was instead a US citizen. Manzano was
born in San Francisco, California, USA and thus acquired US
citizenship by operation of the US Constitution and laws
under the principle of jus soli. He was also a natural-born
Filipino citizen by virtue of the 1935 Philippine Constitution,
as his father and mother were Filipinos at the time of his
birth. At the age of 6, his parents brought him to the
Philippines using an American passport. His parents
registered his as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of
Immigration and was thus issued an Alien Certificate of
Registration (ACR). When he attained the age of majority, he
registered himself as a voter, and voted in the elections of
1992, 1995 and 1998. On 7 May 1998, COMELEC granted
Mamarils petition and cancelled Manzanos certificate of
candidacy on the ground that he was a dual citizen and thus
disqualified from running for any elective position. On 8 May
1998, Manzano moved for reconsideration of the decision,
and the motion remained pending even until after the
elections. On 31 Aug 1998 the COMELEC en banc declared
that Manzano was qualified to run for vice mayor.
(1) WON Manzano possesses dual citizenship, and (2) WON
he is disqualified from running for and being elected as vice
mayor
HELD: (1) Yes and (2) No
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former
arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the
different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Such
a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his
part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Dual
allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which
a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty
to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary,
dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition. In
including Section 5 in Article IV of the Constitution (Dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and
shall be dealt with by law.), the concern of the Constitutional
Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with
naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their
countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the
phrase dual citizenship in RA 7160 (Local Government Code
of 1991) Sec 40(d) and RA 7854 (Makati City Charter) Sec 20
must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Thus,
persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification.
The oath of allegiance contained in Manzanos certificate of
candidacy is sufficient to constitute renunciation of his
American citizenship, effectively removing any
disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. There is no
merit to the contention that to be effective, such
renunciation should have been made upon Manzanos
reaching the age of majority, since no law requires the
election of Philippine citizenship to be made upon attainment
of the age of majority.
Manzanos oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when
considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and
adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as
an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country,
leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
Coquilla v. Comelec
Coquilla was born of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar.
He resided there until 1965, when he joined the United States
Navy. He was subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen. On
October 15, 1998, petitioner came to the Philippines and took
out a residence certificate but still made several trips to the
US. On November 10, 2000, he was repatriated and he took
his oath as a citizen of the Philippines. On February 27, 2001,
after his application for registration as a voter of Butnga,
Oras, Eastern Samar was approved, he filed his certificate of
candidacy stating therein that he had been a resident of Oras,
Eastern Samar for two (2) years.
Respondent Alvarez (incumbent mayor of Oras and who was
running for reelection) sought the cancellation of petitioners
certificate of candidacy on the ground that the Coquilla had
made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy by stating that he had been a resident of Oras for
two years when in truth he had resided therein for only about
six months since November 10, 2000, when he took his oath
as a citizen of the Philippines.
The COMELEC was unable to render judgment on the case
before the elections on May 14, 2001. Meanwhile, petitioner
was elected by a margin of 379 votes, was proclaimed mayor,
and subsequently took his oath of office.
HELD: Petitioner had NOT been a resident of Oras, Eastern
Samar at least one (1) year before the elections held on May
14, 2001 as he represented in his certificate of candidacy.
An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a
registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or
province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang
bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident
therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the
day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any
other local language or dialect. (Sec. 39(a), LGC)
The term residence is to be understood not in its common
acceptation as referring to dwelling or habitation, but
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rather to domicile or legal residence, that is, the place
where a party actually or constructively has his permanent
home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any
given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus
manendi). A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at
birth. It is usually the place where the childs parents reside
and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of
new domicile (domicile of choice). Petitioner lost his domicile
of origin in Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting in
the U.S. Navy in 1965. From then on and until November 10,
2000, when he reacquired Philippine citizenship, petitioner
was an alien without any right to reside in the Philippines
save as our immigration laws may have allowed him to stay as
a visitor or as a resident alien.
It is not true, as petitioner contends, that he reestablished
residence in this country in 1998 when he came back to
prepare for the mayoralty elections of Oras by securing a
Community Tax Certificate in that year and by constantly
declaring to his townmates of his intention to seek
repatriation and run for mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections.
Evidence shows that when petitioner entered the country in
1998, he did so as a visa-free balikbayan visitor whose stay as
such was valid for one year only. Hence, petitioner can be
held to have waived his status as an alien and as a non-
resident only on November 10, 2000 upon taking his oath as a
citizen of the Philippines under R.A. No. 8171. He lacked the
requisite residency to qualify him for the mayorship of Oras,
Eastern, Samar.
Case of Mayor Jesse Robredo
CA case
B. Disqualifications
Sec 40, LGC
See above
Caasi v. CA
Merito Miguel was elected as the municipal mayor of Bolinao,
Pangasinan in the local elections of January 18, 1988. Caasi
filed a disqualification case against Miguel on the ground that
he is a green card holder - hence, a permanent resident of the
United States of America, not of Bolinao in violation of Sec.
68 of the Omnibus Election Code.
In his "Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration"
in 1984, Miguel's answer to Question No. 21 therein
regarding his "Length of intended stay (if permanently, so
state)," Miguel's answer was, "Permanently." The green card
that was subsequently issued identified him in clear bold
letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN. On the back of the card, the
upper portion, the following information is printed: Person
identified by this card is entitled to reside permanently and
work in the United States.
HELD: Miguel is disqualified under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code on the ground that he is a green card holder.
An immigrant is a person who moves into a country for the
purpose of permanent residence. Miguel's immigration to
the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his
domicile and residence in the Philippines. He entered the
United States with the intention to live there permanently as
evidenced by his application for an immigrant's (not a visitor's
or tourist's) visa. As a resident alien in the U.S., Miguel owes
temporary and local allegiance to the U.S., the country in
which he resides.
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines
provides that any person who is a permanent resident of or
an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run
for any elective office unless said person has waived his
status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign
country in accordance with the residence requirement
provided for in the election laws.
To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines,
the law requires that the candidate who is a green card
holder must have "waived his status as a permanent resident
or immigrant of a foreign country." Miguels act of filing a
certificate of candidacy for elective office in the Philippines
did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a
permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. The
waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act or
acts independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for
elective office in this country. Without such prior waiver, he
was disqualified to run for any elective office. The records of
this case are starkly bare of proof that he had waived his
status as such before he ran for election as municipal mayor
of Bolinao on January 18, 1988.
In addition, residence in the municipality where he intends to
run for elective office for at least one (1) year at the time of
filing his certificate of candidacy, is one of the qualifications
that a candidate for elective public office must possess.
Miguel did not possess that qualification because he was a
permanent resident of the United States and he resided in
Bolinao for a period of only three (3) months (not one year)
after his return to the Philippines in November 1987 and
before he ran for mayor of that municipality on January 18,
1988. The Court therefore holds that he was disqualified to
become a candidate for that office.
Marquez v. Comelec
At the time private respondent Eduardo Rodriguez filed his
certificate of candidacy for Governor of Quezon, a criminal
charge against him for ten (10) counts of insurance fraud or
grand theft of personal property was still pending before the
Municipal Court of Los Angeles Judicial District, County of Los
Angeles, State of California, U.S.A. A warrant issued by said
court for his arrest, it is claimed, has yet to be served on
private respondent on account of his alleged "flight" from
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that country. Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-
elect of Quezon on 29 May 1992.
Petitioner Bienvenido Marquez, the defeated candidate for
the elective position of Governor in the Province of Quezon in
the 11th May 1992 elections, argues that Rodriguez is
disqualified from being a candidate by virtue Section 40(e) of
the Local Government Code which states that a fugitive from
justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad is
disqualified from running for any elective local position.
Rodriguez argues that that term fugitive from justice is
limited to one who has been convicted by final judgment. His
basis is Article 73(b) of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991. It states
that fugitive from justice refers to a person who has been
convicted by final judgment." The issue in this case is the
meaning of fugitive from justice. Note: the issue of WON
Rodriguez is disqualified for being a fugitive from justice was
decided by the Court in the succeeding case of Rodriguez v.
COMELEC.
HELD: The law needs no further interpretation and
construction. Section 40(e) of Republic Act No. 7160 is clear
and it disqualifies "fugitives from justice in criminal or non-
political cases here or abroad" from seeking any elective local
office. The phrase "fugitive from justice" includes not only
those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but
likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid
prosecution. This definition truly finds support from
jurisprudence and it may be so conceded as expressing the
general and ordinary connotation of the term. Article 73 of
the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code of 1991, to the extent that it confines the
term "fugitive from justice" to refer only to a person (the
fugitive) "who has been convicted by final judgment," is an
inordinate and undue circumscription of the law.
Rodriguez v. Comelec
(See Marquez v. COMELEC for background. The
Marquez decision was promulgated for the 1992
elections. This case involves the 1995 elections)
In the May 8, 1995 election, Rodriguez and Marquez renewed
their rivalry for the same position of governor. This time,
Marquez challenged Rodriguez' candidacy via petition for
disqualification before the COMELEC, based principally on the
same allegation that Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice."
The COMELEC, allegedly having kept in mind the Marquez
Decision definition of "fugitive from justice", found Rodriguez
to be one. Such finding was essentially based on Marquez'
documentary evidence consisting of an authenticated copy of
the November 12, 1995 warrant of arrest issued by the Los
Angeles Municipal Court against Rodriguez, and an
authenticated copy of the felony complaint.
Rodriguezs defense is that long before the felony complaint
was allegedly filed, respondent was already in the Philippines
and he did not know of the filing of the same nor was he
aware that he was being proceeded against criminally. In a
sense, thru this defense, respondent implicitly contends that
he cannot be deemed a fugitive from justice, because to be
so, one must be aware of the filing of the criminal complaint,
and his disappearance in the place where the long arm of the
law, thru the warrant of arrest, may reach him is predicated
on a clear desire to avoid and evade the warrant.
HELD: Rodriguez is NOT a fugitive from justice
To reiterate, a "fugitive from justice" includes not only those
who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise
who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution (from
Marquez Decision). The definition thus indicates that the
intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates one's
flight from a particular jurisdiction. And obviously, there can
only be an intent to evade prosecution or punishment when
there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already
instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of
conviction.
Rodriguez' case just cannot fit in this concept. He arrived in
the Philippines from the US on June 25, 1985 while the felony
complaint in the Los Angeles Court was filed and the warrant
of arrest was issued only on November 12, 1985, almost five
(5) months after. It was clearly impossible for Rodriguez to
have known about such felony complaint and arrest warrant
at the time he left the US, as there was in fact no complaint
and arrest warrant much less conviction to speak of yet
at such time. What prosecution or punishment then was
Rodriguez deliberately running away from with his departure
from the US? The very essence of being a "fugitive from
justice" under the MARQUEZ Decision definition, is just
nowhere to be found in the circumstances of Rodriguez. The
evidence of petitioner Rodriguez sufficiently proves that his
compulsion to return to the Philippines was due to his desire
to join and participate vigorously in the political campaigns
against former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and not to
evade any charge against him in the US.
When, in good faith, a person leaves the territory of a state
not his own, homeward bound, and learns subsequently of
charges filed against him while in the relative peace and
service of his own country, the fact that he does not subject
himself to the jurisdiction of the former state does not qualify
him outright as a fugitive from justice.
Dela Torre v. Comelec
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De La Torre was disqualified by COMELEC from running for
the position of Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna in the May 8, 1995
elections citing as the ground therefor, Section 40(a) of the
Local Government Code which provides that those sentenced
by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or
for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment within two (2) years after serving sentence are
disqualified from running for any elective local position. De La
Torre was found guilty (his conviction became final on
January 18, 1991) for violation of P.D. 1612, otherwise known
as the Anti-fencing Law. De La Torre, however, argues that
the crime of fencing does not involve moral turpitude and
that Section 40 (a) of the Local Government Code does not
apply to his case inasmuch as the probation granted him by
the MTC on December 21, 1994 which suspended the
execution of the judgment of conviction and all other legal
consequences flowing therefrom, rendered inapplicable
Section 40 (a) as well.
HELD: The crime of fencing involves moral turpitude. Blacks
Law Dictionary of moral turpitude as an act of baseness,
vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes
his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the
accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man
and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty,
or good morals.
The elements of the crime of fencing, as defined under P.D.
1612, are:
5. A crime of robbery or theft has been
committed;
6. The accused who is not a principal or
accomplice in the crime of robbery or theft,
buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires,
conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells,
or in any manner deals in any article, item,
object or anything of value, which have
been derived from the proceeds of the said
crime;
7. The accused knows or should have known
that the said article, item, object or
anything of value has been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft;
and
8. There is, on the part of the accused, intent
to gain for himself or for another.
Moral turpitude is deducible from the third element. Actual
knowledge by the fence of the fact that property received is
stolen displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of
ones rightful property as that which animated the robbery or
theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral
turpitude. And although the participation of each felon in the
unlawful taking differs in point in time and in degree, both
the fence and the actual perpetrator/s of the robbery or
theft invaded ones peaceful dominion for gain - thus
deliberately reneging in the process private duties they owe
their fellowmen or society in a manner contrary to
accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice,
honesty, or good morals
The same underlying reason holds even if the fence did not
have actual knowledge, but merely should have known the
origin of the property received. The words should know
denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and
intelligence would ascertain the fact in the performance of
his duty to another or would govern his conduct upon
assumption that such fact exists.
As to WON a grant of probation affects Sec. 40(a)s
applicability, the legal effect of probation is only to suspend
the execution of the sentence. Petitioners conviction of
fencing subsists and remains totally unaffected
notwithstanding the grant of probation. In fact, a judgment
of conviction in a criminal case ipso facto attains finality when
the accused applies for probation, although it is not
executory pending resolution of the application for
probation.
Magno v. Comelec
A petition was filed by Montes for the disqualification of
petitioner Nestor Magno as mayoralty candidate (in the 2001
election) on the ground that petitioner was previously
convicted of direct bribery of which he was discharged after
application for parole on March 5, 1998. COMELEC granted
the petition of MONTES and declared MAGNO disqualified
citing Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code.
WON the crime of direct bribery did not involve moral
turpitude and WON that Local Government Code, (citing
Section 40 ) and not the Omnibus Election Code that should
apply in this situation.
HELD: Direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude.
The fact that the offender agrees to accept a promise or gift
and deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains from
performing an official duty in exchange for some favors,
denotes a malicious intent on the part of the offender to
renege on the duties which he owes his fellowmen and
society in general. Also, the fact that the offender takes
advantage of his office and position is a betrayal of the trust
reposed on him by the public. It is a conduct clearly contrary
to the accepted rules of right and duty, justice, honesty and
good morals.
The Local Government Code and not the Omnibus Election
Code that applies in this situation. Article 12 of the Omnibus
Election Code must yield to Article 40 of the Local
Government Code.
The Omnibus Election Code was approved on December 3,
1985 while the Local Government Code took effect on
January 1, 1992. In case of irreconcilable conflict between
two laws, the later enactment must prevail, being the more
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recent expression of legislative will. Legis posteriores priores
contrarias abrogant. In accordance therewith, Section 40 of
RA 7160 is deemed to have repealed Section 12 of BP 881.
Section 40 of RA 7160, insofar as it governs the
disqualifications of candidates for local positions, assumes
the nature of a special law which ought to prevail. The court
Citied David vs. COMELEC: RA 7160 is a codified set of laws
that specifically applies to local government units. Section 40
thereof specially and definitively provides for disqualifications
of candidates for elective local positions. It is applicable to
them only. On the other hand, Section 12 of BP 881 speaks of
disqualifications of candidates for any public office.
The resolution of the COMELEC declaring Magno disqualified
from the 2001 mayoral elections is hereby reversed and set
aside.
Lingating v. Comelec
Lingating filed a petition for disqualification against SULONG
(May 2001 mayoral candidate) alleging that Sulong was
administratively charged, found guilty (by a Sangguniang
Panlalawigan February 4, 1992 decision) and ordered
removed from office. Sulong denied that the decision had
become final and executory since he filed a motion for
reconsideration and/or notice of appeal thereof on February
18, 1992. He also denied having been removed from office.
Because COMELEC was unable to render judgment before the
May 2001 elections, Sulong was voted for and proclaimed
mayor.
COMELEC (First Division) then declared Sulong disqualified
citing Section 40(b) of the LGC THEN the COMELEC en banc
reversed the resolution of its First Division, dismissing the
petition for lack of merit. The COMELEC en banc found that
after having been found guilty by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, Sulong was re-elected mayor of Lapuyan
Zamboanga del Sur in May 1992 & 1995 elections. Applying
Aguinaldo vs. Santos ruling that re-election renders an
administrative case moot and academic the COMELEC en
banc held that the re-election of Sulong in the 1992 and 1995
elections would be tantamount to a condonation of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan decision finding him guilty of
dishonesty, malversation of public funds etc.
Lingating, in this Petition for Certiorari, contends that the
COMELEC en banc erred in applying the ruling in Aguinaldo v.
Commission on Elections. He cites Reyes v. Commission on
Elections which held that an elective local executive officer,
who is removed before the expiration of the term for which
he was elected, is disqualified from being a candidate for a
local elective position under Sec. 40(b) of the LGC.
HELD: Sulong is not disqualified from holding the position of
mayor of Lapuyan.
Reyes vs. Commission on Elections cannot be applied to this
case because the 1992 decision of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan has not until now become final. The filing of his
motion for reconsideration prevented the decision of
Sangguniang Panlalawigan from becoming final. While R.A.
No. 7160 on disciplinary actions is silent on the filing of a
motion for reconsideration, the same cannot be interpreted
as a prohibition against the filing of a motion for
reconsideration. Indeed, considering the failure of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan to resolve respondents motion, it
is unfair to the electorate to be told after they have voted for
respondent Sulong that after all he is disqualified.
There being no prohibition against a motion for
reconsideration there can thus also be no decision finding
respondent guilty to speak of.
Petition for certiorari is DISMISSED; Resolution of the
COMELEC en banc is AFFIRMED
Flores v. Drilon
The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d) , of R.A. 7227,
otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and Development
Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor Richard J.
Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority
(SBMA), is challenged in this petition.
Petitioners, maintain that the proviso in par. (d) of Sec. 13
infringes on Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution,
which states that "no elective official shall be eligible for
appointment or designation in any capacity to any public
officer or position during his tenure, because the City Mayor
of Olongapo City is an elective official and the subject posts
are public offices;
HELD: Gordon is ineligible for appointment as SBMA
Chairman in light of the fact that he is the elective mayor of
Olongapo.
The proviso in Sec. 13 (d) of R.A. 7227 violates the
constitutional proscription against appointment or
designation of elective officials to other government posts.
Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution expresses the policy
against the concentration of several public positions in one
person, so that a public officer or employee may serve full-
time with dedication and thus be efficient in the delivery of
public services. It is an affirmation that a public office is a full-
time job. Since this is precisely what the constitutional
proscription seeks to prevent, it needs no stretching of the
imagination to conclude that the proviso contravenes Sec. 7,
first par., Art. IX-B of the Constitution. The fact that the
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expertise of an elective official may be most beneficial to the
higher interest of the body politic is of no moment.
It is argued that Sec. 94 of the Local Government Code (LGC)
permits the appointment of a local elective official to another
post if so allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
office. But, the contention is fallacious. Section 94 of the LGC
is not determinative of the constitutionality of Sec. 13, par.
(d), of R.A. 7227, for no legislative act can prevail over the
fundamental law of the land.
In any case, the view that an elective official may be
appointed to another post if allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his office ignores the clear-cut difference in the
wording of the two (2) paragraphs of Sec. 7 Art. IX-B of the
Constitution. While the second paragraph authorizes holding
of multiple offices by an appointive official when allowed by
law or by the primary functions of his position, the first
paragraph appears to be more stringent by not providing any
exception to the rule against appointment or designation of
an elective official to the government post, except as are
particularly recognized in the Constitution itself, e.g., the
President as head of the economic and planning agency; the
Vice-President, who may be appointed Member of the
Cabinet; and, a member of Congress who may be designated
ex officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council.
The distinction being clear, the exemption allowed to
appointive officials in the second paragraph cannot be
extended to elective officials who are governed by the first
paragraph. The phrase "shall be appointed" in the proviso
unquestionably shows the intent to make the SBMA posts
appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of
Olongapo City. Had it been the legislative intent to make the
subject positions ex officio, Congress would have, at least,
avoided the word "appointed" and, instead, "ex officio"
would have been used. Therefore, as an incumbent elective
official, respondent Gordon is ineligible for appointment to
the position of Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive of
SBMA.
A. Election cases involving Local Elective Officials
Galido v. Comelec
Petitioner Galido and private respondent Galeon were
candidates during the January 1988 local elections for mayor
of Garcia-Hernandez, Bohol. Petitioner was proclaimed duly-
elected Mayor. Private respondent filed an election protest
before the RTC which upheld the proclamation of petitioner.
Private respondent appealed RTC decision to the COMELEC.
Its First Division reversed the RTC decision and declared
private respondent the duly-elected mayor. After the
COMELEC en banc denied the petitioners motion for
reconsideration and affirmed the decision of its First Division.
The COMELEC held that the 15 ballots in the same precinct
containing the initial C after the name Galido were
marked ballots and, therefore, invalid.
Undaunted, petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari
and injunction before SC and succeeded in getting a
temporary restraining order. In his comment to the petition,
private respondent moved for dismissal, citing Article IX (C),
Section 2(2), paragraph 2 of the 1987 Constitution, that Final
decisions, orders or rulings of the COMELEC in election
contests involving elective municipal offices are final and
executory, and not appealable.
HELD: That decisions, final orders or rulings of the COMELEC
in contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices
are final, executory and not appealable, does not preclude a
recourse to this Court by way of a special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 65. Article IX (A), Section 7, 1987
Constitution: Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution
or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
(Constitutional) Commission may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days
from receipt thereof.
The function of a writ of certiorari is to keep an inferior court
or tribunal (such as the COMELEC in the exercise of its quasi-
judicial powers) within the bounds of its jurisdiction or to
prevent it from committing a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Nevertheless, SC
found no GAD in COMELECs part.
Rivera v. Comelec
Petitioner Juan Garcia Rivera and private respondent Juan
Mitre Garcia II were candidates for the position of Mayor of
Guinobatan, Albay, during the local elections in January 1988.
The Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Rivera as
Mayor by a majority of ten votes. Garcia filed an election
protest with the RTC, Legazpi City which found Garcia to have
obtained 6,376 votes as against Rivera's 6,222. Rivera
appealed to the COMELEC which affirmed the RTC decision.
Garcia commenced to discharge the duties and functions of
Mayor of Guinobatan on 10 October 1990, by virtue of a writ
of execution implementing the COMELEC decision of 6
September 1990. Rivera filed this petition for certiorari.
HELD: The main thrust of the present petition for certiorari is
that the respondent COMELEC en banc committed grave
abuse of discretion when it affirmed the decision of its First
Division, promulgated on 2 May 1990, annulling the
proclamation of the petitioner as the duly elected Mayor of
Guinobatan, Albay and when it did not exclude from the total
votes of Garcia at least ten (10) votes which were allegedly
misappreciated in Garcia's favor. We have closely scrutinized
the challenged COMELEC decision and find that the said
decision was not arrived at capriciously or whimsically by
respondent COMELEC. A painstaking re-evaluation of the
questioned 67 ballots was made by the COMELEC en banc.
Moreover, the appreciation and re-evaluation of ballots are
factual determinations. It is settled that in a petition for
certiorari, findings of fact of administrative bodies are final
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unless grave abuse of discretion has marred such factual
determinations.
B. Term of Office: 3-Term Limit Rule
Sec 8, Art X, Constitution
Section 8, Art. X, Constitution: The term of office of elective
local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official
shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service
for the full term for which he was elected.
Sec 43, LGC
Section 43. Term of Office. -
(a) The term of office of all local elective officials elected after
the effectivity of this Code shall be three (3) years, starting
from noon of June 30, 1992 or such date as may be provided
for by law, except that of elective barangay officials:
Provided, That all local officials first elected during the local
elections immediately following the ratification of the 1987
Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3)
consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for
the full term for which the elective official concerned was
elected.
(c) The term of office of barangay officials and members of
the sangguniang kabataan shall be for three (3) years, which
shall begin after the regular election of barangay officials on
the second Monday of May 1994.
Rivera v. Comelec
In the May 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections,
respondent Marino "Boking" Morales ran as candidate for
mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga for the term commencing
July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007. Petitioners,filed with the
COMELEC a petition to cancel respondent Morales Certificate
of Candidacy on the ground that he was elected and had
served three previous consecutive terms as mayor of
Mabalacat. They alleged that his candidacy violated Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of RA 7160.
respondent Morales admitted that he was elected mayor of
Mabalacat for the term commencing July 1, 1995 to June 30,
1998 (first term) and July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2004 (third
term), but he served the second term from July 1, 1998 to
June 30, 2001 only as a "caretaker of the office" or as a "de
facto officer" since his proclamation as mayor was declared
void by the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
HELD: For the three-term limit for elective local government
officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to
wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three
(3) consecutive terms in the same local government post, and
(2) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms.
Respondent Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to
June 30, 2001. He assumed the position. He served as mayor
until June 30, 2001. He was mayor for the entire period
notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the electoral
protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him (respondent)
as mayor. Respondent Morales is now serving his fourth
term. He has been mayor of Mabalacat continuously without
any break since July 1, 1995. In just over a month, by June 30,
2007, he will have been mayor of Mabalacat for twelve (12)
continuous years. The framers of the Constitution, by
including this exception, wanted to establish some safeguards
against the excessive accumulation of power as a result of
consecutive terms. Therefore, having found respondent
Morales ineligible, his Certificate of Candidacy dated
December 30, 2003 should be cancelled. Not being a
candidate, the votes cast for him SHOULD NOT BE COUNTED
and must be considered stray votes.
Montebon v. Comelec
Petitioners Montebon and Ondy and respondent Potencioso,
Jr. were candidates for municipal councilor of the
Municipality of Tuburan, Cebu for the May 14, 2007
Synchronized National and Local Elections. On April 30, 2007,
petitioners and other candidates for municipal councilor filed
a petition for disqualification against respondent with the
COMELEC alleging that respondent had been elected and
served three consecutive terms as municipal councilor in
1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. Thus, he is
proscribed from running for the same position in the 2007
elections as it would be his fourth consecutive term.
Respondent claimed that the service of his second term in
2001-2004 was interrupted on January 12, 2004 when he
succeeded as vice mayor of Tuburan due to the retirement of
Vice Mayor Petronilo L. Mendoza. Consequently, he is not
disqualified from vying for the position of municipal councilor
in the 2007 elections
HELD: While it is undisputed that respondent was elected
municipal councilor for three consecutive terms, the issue lies
on whether he is deemed to have fully served his second
term in view of his assumption of office as vice-mayor of
Tuburan on January 12, 2004. Succession in local government
offices is by operation of law. Section 44 of Republic Act No.
7160, provides that if a permanent vacancy occurs in the
office of the vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian
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member shall become vice mayor. In this case, a permanent
vacancy occurred in the office of the vice mayor due to the
retirement of Vice Mayor Mendoza. Respondent, being the
highest ranking municipal councilor, succeeded him in
accordance with law. It is clear therefore that his assumption
of office as vice-mayor can in no way be considered a
voluntary renunciation of his office as municipal councilor.
Thus, it is an involuntary severance from his office as
municipal councilor, resulting in an interruption in the service
of his 2001-2004 term.
Borja v. Comelec
Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor
of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30,
1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by
operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar
Borja. On May 11, 1992, he ran and was elected mayor for a
term of three years which ended on June 30, 1995. On May
8, 1995, he was reelected mayor for another term of three
years ending June 30, 1998. Capco filed a certificate of
candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998
elections. Petitioner Borja, Jr., also a candidate for mayor,
sought Capcos disqualification on the theory that the latter
would have already served as mayor for three consecutive
terms by June 30, 1998 and would therefore be ineligible to
serve for another term after that. The COMELEC en banc
declared Capco eligible to run as he was not elected to the
position of Mayor in the 1988 election, but succeeded by
operation of law. Thus, it is not counted as 1 term for the
computation of the 3 term limitation.
HELD: A textual analysis supports the ruling of the COMELEC
that Art. X, 8 contemplates service by local officials for
three consecutive terms as a result of election. The first
sentence speaks of the term of office of elective local
officials and bars such official*s+ from serving for more
than three consecutive terms.
The second sentence, in explaining when an elective local
official may be deemed to have served his full term of office,
states that voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
The term served must therefore be one for which *the
official concerned+ was elected. The purpose of this
provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on
the number of terms an elective official may serve.
Conversely, if he is not serving a term for which he was
elected because he is simply continuing the service of the
official he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to
have fully served the term now withstanding his voluntary
renunciation of office prior to its expiration.
To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must
be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right
to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not
enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms
in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to
the same position for the same number of times before the
disqualification can apply.
Adormeo v. Comelec
Mayor Adormeo was elected in two consecutive elections
and served out the full terms. The third time he ran, he lost.
However during the term of the winning candidate, there was
a recall election, which Adormeo won. He served the
unexpired term. Adormeo wants to run again in the next
immediately succeeding elections.
HELD: The term limit for elective local officials must be taken
to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve
in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough
that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an
elective local office, he must also have been elected to the
same position for the same number of times before the
disqualification can apply. COMELECs ruling that private
respondent was not elected for three (3) consecutive terms
should be upheld. For nearly two years he was a private
citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his
defeat in the 1998 elections. The time between his second
term and the recall election is sufficient interruption. Thus,
there was no three consecutive terms as contemplated in the
disqualifications in the LGC.
Socrates v. Comelec
A recall was initiated for the position of Victorino Dennis M.
Socrates who assumed office as Puerto Princesas mayor on
June 30, 2001. Edward M. Hagedorn (Hagedorn for brevity)
filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor in the recall
election. A petition was filed to disqualify Hagedorn from
running in the recall election and to cancel his certificate of
candidacy on the ground that he is disqualified from running
for a fourth consecutive term, having been elected and
having served as mayor of the city for three (3) consecutive
full terms immediately prior to the instant recall election for
the same post.
HELD: These constitutional and statutory provisions have two
parts. The first part provides that an elective local official
cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. The
clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in
determining the three-term limit rule. The second part states
that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time
does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent
is that involuntary severance from office for any length of
time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service
before and after the interruption from being joined together
to form a continuous service or consecutive terms After
three consecutive terms, an elective official cannot
immediate re-election for a fourth term, The prohibited
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election refers to the next regular election for a fourth term.
The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for
the same office following the same office following the third
consecutive term.
Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer
covered by the prohibition for two reasons:
1. A subsequent election like a recall election, is no
longer an immediate reelection after the three
consecutive terms.
2. The intervening period constitutes an
involuntary interruption in the continuity of
service.
Mendoza v. Comelec
Petitioners Melanio L. Mendoza and Mario E. Ibarra seek to
declare respondent Leonardo B. Romans election as
governor of Bataan on May 14, 2001 as null and void for
allegedly being contrary to Art. X, 8 of the Constitution.
HELD: The Constitution does not prohibit elective local
officials from serving for more than three consecutive terms
because, in fact, it excludes from the three-term limit
interruptions in the continuity of service, so long as such
interruptions are not due to the voluntary renunciation of the
office by an incumbent. Hence, the period from June 28,
1994 to June 30, 1995, during which respondent Leonardo B.
Roman served as governor of Bataan by virtue of a recall
election held in 1993, should not be counted. Since on May
14, 2001 respondent had previously served as governor of
Bataan for only two consecutive terms (1995-1998 and 1998-
2001), his election on that day was actually only his third
term for the same position.
A recall term should not be considered as one full term,
because a contrary interpretation would in effect cut short
the elected officials service to less than nine years and
shortchange his constituents. The desire to prevent
monopoly of political power should be balanced against the
need to uphold the voters obvious preference who, in the
present case, is Roman who received 97 percent of the votes
cast.
C. Tenure of Office
Osmena v. Comelec
Petition assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 7056, which
desynchronized the national and local elections. This, in
effect, shortened the terms of local officials to be elected on
November 1992.
WON R.A. 7056 is unconstitutional.
Held: Yes
R.A. 7056 contravenes Article XVIII, Sections 2 and 5 of the
1987 Constitution which provides for the synchronization of
national and local elections. The said law, on the other hand,
provides for the de-synchronization of election by mandating
that there be two separate elections in 1992. The term
synchronization in the mentioned constitutional provision
was used synonymously as the phrase holding simultaneously
since this is the precise intent in terminating their Office
Tenure on the same day or occasion. This common
termination date will synchronize future elections to once
every three years.
R.A. 7056 also violated Sec. 2, Art. XVIII of the 1987
Constitution which provides that the local official first elected
under the Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30,
1992. But under Sec. 3 of RA 7056, these incumbent local
officials shall hold over beyond June 30, 1992 and shall serve
until their successors shall have been duly elected and
qualified. The Supreme Court, quoting Corpus Juris
Secundum, states that it is not competent for the legislature
to extend the term of officers by providing that they shall
hold over until their successors are elected and qualified
where the constitution has in effect or by clear implication
prescribed the term and when the Constitution fixes the day
on which the official term shall begin, there is no legislative
authority to continue the office beyond that period, even
though the successors fail to qualify within the time.
R.A. 7056 also violated the clear mandate of Sec. 8, Art. X of
1987 Constitution which fixed the term of office of all elective
local officials, except barangay officials, to three (3) years. If
the local election will be held on the second Monday of
November 1992 under RA 7056, those to be elected will be
serving for only two years and seven months, that is, from
November 30, 1992 to June 30, 1995, not three years.
C. Vacancies and Succession
Sec 44 47, LGC
See above
Jainal v. Comelec
Mayor Salip Aloy Jainal and Julhatab J. Talib were candidates
for Mayor of Indanan, Sulu Jainal was proclaimed the
winning candidate. Talib filed a pre-proclamation case with
the COMELEC, praying for the annulment of certain election
returns. Talib claimed that his official watchers were asked to
leave the precincts before the counting and the preparation
of the election returns. Furthermore, the election returns for
these precincts did not bear the signatures of the members of
the Board of Election, and the number of votes cast exceeded
the number of voters. The COMELEC then issued a Resolution
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annulling the proclamation and ordering a recount. The
COMELEC issued an Order directing the Vice-Mayor or any
councilor to cease and desist from assuming the position of
Acting Mayor. Said Order was issued during the pendency of
the present petition and after Ahajan had already taken his
oath and assumed office as Acting Mayor pursuant to
resolutions issued by the COMELEC.
WON the COMELEC Order is valid.
Held: No.
With the nullification of Jainals proclamation, the position of
Municipal Mayor of Indanan, Sulu became vacant. Sec. 44 of
R.A. No. 7160 and Art. 83, Rule XIV of the Implementing Rules
of the LGC then apply the highest ranking sanggunian
member shall become mayor, a tie between or among the
highest ranking sanggunian members shall be resolved by the
drawing of lots, and the successor shall serve only the
unexpired terms of their predecessors.
A permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills
a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to
qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is
otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the
functions of his office.
Ranking in the sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of
the proportion of votes obtained by each winning candidate
to the total number of registered voters in each district in the
immediately preceding local election.
The vacancy created by the nullification of Jainals
proclamation is in the nature of a permanent vacancy and
may be qualified as a "permanent incapacity to discharge the
functions of his office. However, Ahajans assumption of the
office of Mayor should be understood as subject to the result
of the recount to be conducted in accordance with the
issuances of the COMELEC.
Labo v. Comelec (supra)
Ramon Labo, Jr. was disqualified as Mayor of Baguio City for
non-compliance with the citizenship requirement of the
Constitution.
WON the person with the second highest number of votes
cast may assume the position of Mayor.
Held: No
The candidate who obtained the second highest number of
votes cannot occupy the office that was vacant as a result of
the disqualification of the candidate who obtained the
highest number of votes. The simple reason is that, obtaining
the second highest number of votes, he was obviously not
the choice of the people. It would be extremely repugnant to
the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to
suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or
plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as a
representative of the constituency, the majority of which
have positively declared through their ballots that they do
not choose him.
Menzon v. Petilla
As no Governor had been proclaimed in the province of
Leyte, the Secretary of Local Government designated Vice-
Governor Leopoldo Petilla as Acting Governor and Aurelio
Menzon, a senior member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
as Vice-Governor. Menzon took his oath of office before Sen.
Alberto Romulo. However, in Resolution No. 505 of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Menzons appointment was held
to be invalid. In the meantime, Adelina Larrazabal was
proclaimed Governor.
WON (1) there is a vacancy, (2) the Secretary of Local
Government had the authority to designate, and (3) the
designation of Menzon is valid.
Held: Yes
(1) There is a vacancy when there is no person lawfully
authorized to assume and exercise at present the duties of
the office. The office of Vice-Governor was left vacant when
Petilla was appointed as Governor.
(2) Under CA No. 558 and the Revised Administrative Code of
1987, the President is empowered to make temporary
appointments in certain public offices in case of any vacancies
that may occur. Considering the silence of the LGC as regards
the filling up of vacancies in the position of Governor, the
Court rules that, in order to obviate the dilemma resulting
from an interregnum, the President, acting through her alter
ego, the Secretary of Local Government, may remedy the
situation. The Secretary of Government therefore had the
authority to designate Menzon as Acting Vice-Governor.
(3) The mode of succession provided for in permanent
vacancies may likewise be observed in case of a temporary
vacancy. Menzons appointment is in full accord with the
intent of the LGC the contingency of having vacancies in
office cannot be set aside. In a republican form of
government, the majority rules through a chosen few, and if
one of them is incapacitated or absent, the management of
governmental affairs will be hampered.
The right to be paid the salary attached to the Office of the
Vice-Governor is indubitable Menzon is a de facto officer
entitled to compensation.
Docena v. Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Eastern Samar
Luis Capito, elected as a member of the SPES, died in office.
Agustin Docena was appointed by the Secretary of Local
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Government to replace him. Docena took his oath of office
before Speaker Ramon Mitra of the House of Representatives
and thereafter assumed office. Socrates Alar was
subsequently appointed by the Secretary of Local
Government to the position already occupied by Docena. In a
First Indorsement signed by the Department of Local
Government, Alars appointment was recalled on the basis of
the earlier appointment of Docena. The SPES then passed
Resolution No. 1, reiterating the recognition of Alar.
WON Docenas appointment was permanent.
Held: Yes

The appointment, having been issued by the Secretary of
Local Government and accepted by Docena, had already
become complete and enforceable for all legal intents and
purposes at the time it was supposed to have been
superseded by the appointment in favor of Alar. Docenas
appointment was intended to be permanent and as such was
valid for the unexpired portion of the term of the deceased
SPES member. Docena had already acquired security of
tenure in the position and could only be removed therefrom
for the causes and conformably to the procedure prescribed
by the LGC.

APPOINTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS COMMON TO ALL MUNICIPALITIES, CITIES AND PROVINCES
Sec 469 490, LGC
Position Necessity Qualifications Duties
1. Secretary to the
Sanggunian
mandatory position Qualifications
a. Citizen of the Philippines
b. Resident of the LGU concerned
c. Of good moral character
d. A holder of a college degree preferably in
law, commerce or public administration from
a recognized college or university, and
e. A first grade civil service eligible or its
equivalent. (Sec 469[b])
a. Attend meetings of the sanggunian and keep a journal of its
proceedings;
b. Keep the seal of the LGU and affix the same with his signature to
all ordinances, resolutions, and other official acts of the sanggunian
and present the same to the presiding officer for his signature;
c. Forward to the governor or mayor for approval, copies of
ordinances enacted by the sanggunian and duly certified by the
presiding officer;
d. Forward to the sanggunian panlungsod or bayan or the
sangguniang panlungsod of component cities or sangguniang
bayan, copies of duly approved ordinances;
e. Furnish certified copies of records of public character in his
custody;
f. Record in a book kept for the purpose, all ordinances and
resolutions enacted or adopted by the sanggunian, with the dates
of passage and publication thereof;
g. Keep his office and all non-confidential records therein open to
the public during the usual business hours;
h. Translate into the dialect used by the majority of the inhabitants
all ordinances and resolutions immediately after their approval,
and cause the publication of the same;
i. Take custody of the local archives and, where applicable, the
local library and annually account for the same; and
j. Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and
functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance relative to his
position. (Sec. 469[c])
2. Treasurer mandatory position

Appointed by the
Secretary of Finance
from a list of at least
3 ranking, eligible
recommendees of
the governor or
mayor, as the case
may be (Sec 470 [a])
a. Citizen of the Philippines
b. A resident of the LGU concerned
c. Of good moral character
d. A holder of a college degree preferably in
commerce, public administration or law from
a recognized college or university, and
e. A first grade civil service eligible or its
equivalent.
f. Acquired experience in treasury or
accounting service for at least 5 years in the
case of the city or provincial treasurer, and 3
years in the case of the municipal treasurer.
(Sec 470[c])
a. Perform the duties provided for under Book II of the Code
b. Advise the governor or mayor, sanggunian, and other local
government and national officials regarding disposition of local
government funds, and other matters relative to public finance;
c. Take custody of and exercise proper management of the funds
of LGU;
d. Take charge of the disbursement of all local government funds
and such other funds the custody of which may be entrusted to
him;
e. Inspect private commercial and industrial establishments in
relation to the implementation of tax ordinances;
f. Maintain and update the tax information system of the LGU;
g. In the case of the provincial treasurer, exercise technical
supervision over all treasury offices of component cities and
municipalities; and
h. Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and
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97 | P a g e Municipal Corporation
functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance. (Sec 470[d])
3. Assistant
Treasurer
optional position

Appointed by the
Secretary of Finance
from a list of at least
3 ranking, eligible
recommendees of
the governor or
mayor (Sec 471[a])
a. A citizen of the Philippines,
b. Resident of the LGU concerned,
c. Of good moral character,
d. A holder of a college degree preferably in
commerce, public administration, or law from
a recognized college or university,
e. A first grade civil service eligible or its
equivalent,
f. Acquired at least 5 years experience in the
treasury or accounting service in the case of
the city or provincial assistant treasurer, and
3 years in the case of the municipal assistant
treasurer. (Sec 471[b])
a. Assist the treasurer and perform such duties as the latter may
assign to him.
b. Administer oaths concerning notices and notifications to those
delinquent in the payment of the real property tax and concerning
official matters relating to the accounts of the treasurer or arising
in the offices of the treasurer and the assessor. (Sec 471[c])
4. Assessor mandatory position a. Citizen of the Philippines,
b. A resident of the LGU concerned,
c. Of good moral character,
d. A holder of a college degree preferably in
civil or mechanical engineering, commerce, or
any other related course from a recognized
college or university,
e. A first grade civil service eligible or its
equivalent.
f. Acquired experience in real property
assessment work or in any related field for at
least 5years in the case of the city or
provincial assessor, and 3 years in the case of
the municipal assessor. (Sec 472[a])
a. Take charge of the assessor's office,
b. Perform the duties provided for under Book II of the Code,
c. Ensure that all laws and policies governing the appraisal and
assessment of real properties for taxation purposes are properly
executed;
d. Initiate, review, and recommend changes in policies and
objectives, plans and programs, techniques, procedures and
practices in the valuation and assessment of real properties for
taxation purposes;
e. Establish a systematic method of real property assessment;
f. Install and maintain a real property identification and accounting
system,
g. Prepare, install and maintain a system of tax mapping;
h. Conduct frequent physical surveys to verify and determine
whether all real properties within the province are properly listed
in the assessment rolls;
i. Exercise the functions of appraisal and assessment primarily for
taxation purposes of all real properties in the LGU;
j. Prepare a schedule of the fair market value for the different
classes of real properties;
k. Issue certified copies of assessment records of real property and
all other records relative to its assessment;
l. Submit every semester a report of all assessments, cancellations
and modifications of assessments to the local chief executive and
the sanggunian;
m. In the case of the assessor of a component city or municipality
attend sessions of the local board of assessment appeals whenever
his assessment is the subject of the appeal;
n. In the case of the provincial assessor, exercise technical
supervision and visitorial functions over all component city and
municipal assessors, coordinate with component city or municipal
assessors in the conduct of tax mapping operations and all other
assessment activities, and provide all forms of assistance; (Sec
472[b])
o. Exercise such other powers and perform such other
duties and functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance.
(Sec 472[c])
5. Assistant Assessor optional position a. Citizen of the Philippines,
b. Resident of the LGU concerned,
c. Of good moral character,
d. A holder of a college degree preferably in
civil or mechanical engineering, commerce, or
any related course from a recognized college
or university
e. A first grade civil service eligible or its
equivalent.
f. Acquired experience in assessment or in
any related field for at least 3years in the case
of the city or provincial assistant assessor,
and 1 year in the case of the city or provincial
assistant assessor. (Sec 473[a])
a. Assist the assessor and perform such other duties as the latter
may assign to him
b. Administer oaths on all declarations of real property for
purposes of assessment. (Sec 473[b])
6. Accountant mandatory position a. Citizen of the Philippines,
b. A resident of the LGU concerned,
c. Of good moral character,
d. A certified public accountant.
e. Acquired experience in the treasury or
accounting service for at least 5 years in the
a. Take charge of both the accounting and internal audit services of
the LGU;
b. Install and maintain an internal audit system in the local LGU;
c. Prepare and submit financial statements to the governor or
mayor and to the sanggunian;
d. Apprise the sanggunian and other local government officials on
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case of the provincial or city accountant, and
3 years in the case of the municipal
accountant. (Sec 474[a])
f. Incumbent chief accountant in the office of
the treasurer shall be given preference in the
appointment to the position of
accountant.(Sec 474[c])
the financial condition and operations of the LGU;
e. Certify to the availability of budgetary allotment to which
expenditures and obligations may be properly charged;
f. Review supporting documents before preparation of vouchers to
determine completeness of requirements;
g. Prepare statements of cash advances, liquidation, salaries,
allowances, reimbursements and remittances;
h. Prepare statements of journal vouchers and liquidation of the
same and other adjustments;
i. Post individual disbursements to the subsidiary ledger and index
cards;
Maintain individual ledgers for officials and employees pertaining
to payrolls and deductions;
j. Record and post in index cards details of purchased furniture,
fixtures, and equipment, including disposal thereof, if any;
k. Account for all issued requests for obligations and maintain and
keep all records and reports related thereto;
l. Prepare journals and the analysis of obligations and maintain and
keep all records and reports related thereto; and
m. Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and
functions as may be provided by law or ordinance. (Sec 474[b])
7. Budget Officer mandatory position a. Citizen of the Philippines,
b. Resident of the LGU concerned,
c. Of good moral character,
d. A holder of a college degree preferably in
accounting, economics, public administration
or any related course from a recognized
college or university,
e. A first grade civil service eligible or its
equivalent.
f. Acquired experience in government
budgeting or in any related field for at least 5
years in the case of the provincial or city
budget officer, and at least 3 years in the case
of the municipal budget officer. (Sec 475[a])
a. Take charge of the budget office;
b. Prepare forms, orders, and circulars embodying instructions on
budgetary and appropriation matters for the signature of the
governor or mayor,
c. Review and consolidate the budget proposals of different
departments and offices;
d. Assist the governor or mayor in the preparation of the budget
and during budget hearings;
e. Study and evaluate budgetary implications of proposed
legislation and submit comments and recommendations thereon;
f. Submit periodic budgetary reports to the DBM;
g. Coordinate with the treasurer, accountant, and the planning and
development coordinator for the purpose of budgeting;
h. Assist the sanggunian concerned in reviewing the approved
budgets;
i. Coordinate with the planning and development coordinator in
the formulation of the local government unit development plan;
(Sec 475 [b])
j. Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and
functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance. (Sec 475[c])
8. Planning and
Development
Coordinator
mandatory position a. Citizen of the Philippines
b. A resident of the LGU concerned
c. Of good moral character
d. A holder of a college degree preferably in
urban planning, development studies,
economics, public administration, or any
related course from a recognized college or
university
e. A first grade civil service eligible or its
equivalent
f. Acquired experience in development
planning or in any related field for at least 5
years in the case of the provincial or city
planning and development coordinator, and 3
years in the case of the municipal planning
and development coordinator. (Sec 476[a])
a. Take charge of the planning and development office
b. Formulate integrated economic, social, physical, and other
development plans and policies for consideration of the local
government development council;
c. Conduct continuing studies, researches, and training programs
necessary to evolve plans and programs for implementation;
d. Integrate and coordinate all sectoral plans and studies
undertaken by the different functional groups or agencies;
e. Monitor and evaluate the implementation of the different
development programs, projects, and activities in the local
government unit concerned in accordance with the approved
development plan;
f. Prepare comprehensive plans and other development planning
documents for the consideration of the local development council;
g. Analyze the income and expenditure patterns, and formulate
and recommend fiscal plans and policies for consideration of the
finance committee of LGU;
h. Promote people participation in development planning within
the LGU;
i. Exercise supervision and control over the secretariat of the local
development council; and (Sec 476[b])
9. Engineer mandatory position a. Citizen of the Philippines,
b. A resident of the LGU concerned,
c. Of good moral character,
d. A licensed civil engineer
e. Acquired experience in the practice of his
profession for at least 5 years in the case of
a. Act as the local building official (Sec 477[a])
b. Initiate, review and recommend changes in policies and
objectives, plans and programs, techniques, procedures and
practices in infrastructure development and public works in
general;
c. Advise the governor or mayor on infrastructure, public works,
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the provincial or city engineer, and 3 years in
the case of the municipal engineer. (Sec
477[a])
and other engineering matters;
d. Administer, coordinate, supervise, and control the construction,
maintenance, improvement, and repair of roads, bridges, and
other engineering and public works projects;
e. Provide engineering services to the LGU, including investigation
and survey, engineering designs, feasibility studies, and project
management;
f. In the case of the provincial engineer, exercise technical
supervision over all engineering offices of component cities and
municipalities; and (Sec 477[b])
g. Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and
functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance. (Sec477[c])
10. Health Officer mandatory position a. Citizen of the Philippines,
b. A resident of the LGU concerned,
c. Of good moral character, and
d. A licensed medical practitioner.
e. Acquired experience in the practice of his
profession for at least 5 years in the case of
the provincial or city health officer, and 3
years in the case of the municipal health
officer. (Sec478[a])
a. Take charge of the office on health services, supervise the
personnel and staff of said office, formulate program
implementation guidelines and rules and regulations for the
operation of the said
b. Formulate measures for the consideration of the sanggunian
and provide technical assistance and support to the governor or
mayor in carrying out activities to ensure the delivery of basic
services and provision of adequate health facilities;
c. Develop plans and strategies, implement the same, particularly
those which have to do with health programs and projects which
the governor or mayor, is empowered to implement and which the
sanggunian is empowered to provide for;
d. Formulate and implement policies, plans, programs and projects
to promote the health of the people;
e. Advise the governor or mayor and the sanggunian on matters
pertaining to health;
f. Execute and enforce all laws, ordinances and regulations relating
to public health;
g. Recommend to the sanggunian, through the local health board,
the passage of such ordinances as he may deem necessary for the
preservation of public health;
h. Recommend the prosecution of any violation of sanitary laws,
ordinances or regulations;
i. Direct the sanitary inspection of all business establishments
selling food items or providing accommodations such as hotels,
motels, lodging houses, pension houses, and the like, in
accordance with the Sanitation Code;
j. Conduct health information campaigns and render health
intelligence services;
k. Coordinate with other government agencies and non-
governmental organizations involved in the promotion and delivery
of health services;
l. In the case of the provincial health officer, exercise general
supervision over health officers of component cities and
municipalities; and
m. Be in the frontline of health services delivery, particularly during
and in the aftermath of man-made and natural disasters and
calamities; and (Sec478[b])
n. Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and
functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance. (Sec478[c])
11. Civil Registrar mandatory: city and
municipal
a. Citizen of the Philippines,
b. A resident of the LGU concerned,
c. Of good moral character,
d. A holder of a college degree from a
recognized college or university,
e. A first grade civil service eligible or its
equivalent.
f. Acquired experience in civil registry work
for at least 5 years in the case of the city civil
registrar and 3 years in the case of the
municipal civil registrar. (Sec479[a])
a. Responsible for the civil registration program pursuant to the
Civil Registry Law, the Civil Code, and other pertinent laws, rules
and regulations (Sec479[b])
b. Take charge of the office of the civil registry
c. Develop plans and strategies and implement the same,
particularly those which have to do with civil registry programs and
projects which the mayor is empowered to implement and which
the sanggunian is empowered to provide for
d. Accept all registrable documents and judicial decrees affecting
the civil status of persons;
e. File, keep and preserve in a secure place the books required by
law;
f. Transcribe and enter immediately upon receipt all registrable
documents and judicial decrees affecting the civil status of persons
in the civil registry books;
g. Transmit to the Office of the Civil Registrar- General duplicate
copies of registered documents required by law;
h. Issue certified transcripts or copies of any certificate or
registered documents upon payment of the prescribed fees to the
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treasurer;
i. Receive applications for the issuance of a marriage license and
issue the license upon payment of the authorized fee to the
treasurer;
g. Coordinate with the NSO in conducting educational campaigns
for vital registration and assist in the preparation of demographic
and other statistics (Sec479[c])
h. Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and
functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance. (Sec479[d])
12. Administrator mandatory:
provincial and city,
optional: municipal
a. Citizen of the Philippines,
b. A resident of the LGU concerned,
c. Of good moral character,
d. A holder of a college degree preferably in
public administration, law, or any other
related course from a recognized college or
university,
e. A first grade civil service eligible or its
equivalent
f. Acquired experience in management and
administration work for at least 5 years in the
case of the provincial or city administrator,
and 3 years in the case of the municipal
administrator.
g. Term is coterminous with that of his
appointing authority (Sec480[a])
a. Take charge of the office of the administrator
b. Develop plans and strategies and implement the same
particularly those which have to do with the management and
administration-related programs and projects which the governor
or mayor is empowered to implement and which the sanggunian is
empowered to provide for;
c. Assist in the coordination of the work of all the officials of the
LGU, under the supervision, direction, and control of the governor
or mayor, and convene the chiefs of offices and other officials of
the local government unit;
d. Establish and maintain a sound personnel program for the LGU
designed to promote career development and uphold the merit
principle in the local government service;
e. Conduct a continuing organizational development of the LGU
with the end in view of instituting effective administrative reforms;
f. Be in the frontline of the delivery of administrative support
services, particularly those related to the situations during and in
the aftermath of man-made and natural disasters and calamities;
g. Recommend to the sanggunian and advise the governor and
mayor on all other matters relative to the management and
administration of the LGU (Sec480[b])
h. Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and
functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance. (Sec480[c])
13. Legal Officers mandatory:
provincial and city,
optional: municipal
a. Citizen of the Philippines,
b. A resident of the LGU,
c. Of good moral character,
d. A member of the Philippine Bar
e. Practiced his profession for at least 5 years
in the case of the provincial and city legal
officer, and 3years in the case of the
municipal legal officer
f. Term of the legal officer shall be
coterminous with that of his appointing
authority.(Sec481[a])
a. Take charge of the office of legal services
b. Formulate measures for the consideration of the sanggunian and
provide legal assistance and support to the governor or mayor, in
carrying out the delivery of basic services and provisions of
adequate facilities
c. Develop plans and strategies and implement the same,
particularly those which have to do with programs and projects
related to legal services which the governor or mayor is
empowered to implement and which the sanggunian is
empowered to provide
d. Represent the local government unit in all civil actions and
special proceedings wherein the LGU or any official thereof, in his
official capacity, is a party;
e. Draft ordinances, contracts, bonds, leases and other
instruments, involving any interest of the LGU; and provide
comments and recommendations on any instruments already
drawn;
f. Render his opinion in writing on any question of law when
requested to do so by the governor, mayor, or sanggunian;
g. Investigate or cause to be investigated any local official or
employee for administrative neglect or misconduct in office, and
recommend appropriate action;
h. Investigate or cause to be investigated any person, firm or
corporation holding any franchise or exercising any public privilege
for failure to comply with any term or condition in the grant of
such franchise or privilege, and recommending appropriate action
to the governor, mayor or sanggunian, as the case may be;
i. Initiate and prosecute in the interest of the LGU any civil action
on any bond, lease or other contract upon any breach or violation
thereof;
j. Review and submit recommendations on ordinances approved
and executive orders issued by component units;
k. Recommend measures to the sanggunian and advise the
governor or mayor as the case may be on all other matters related
to upholding the rule of law ;
l. Be in the frontline of protecting human rights and prosecuting
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any violations thereof, particularly those which occur during and in
the aftermath of man-made or natural disasters or calamities; and
(Sec481[b])
m. Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and
functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance. (Sec481[c])
14. Agriculturist mandatory:
provincial; optional:
city and municipal
a. Citizen of the Philippines,
b. A resident of the LGU concerned,
c. Of good moral character,
d. A holder of a college degree in agriculture
or any related course from a recognized
college or university,
e. A first grade civil service eligible or its
equivalent.
f. Practiced his profession in agriculture or
acquired experience in a related field for at
least 5 years in the case of the provincial and
city agriculturist, and 3years in the case of the
municipal agriculturist. (Sec482[a])
a. Take charge of the office for agricultural service
b. Formulate measures and provide technical assistance and
support in carrying out said measures to ensure the delivery of
basic services and provision of adequate facilities relative to
agricultural services as provided for under Section 17
c. Develop plans and strategies and implement the same,
particularly those which have to do with agricultural programs and
projects which the governor or mayor is empowered to implement
and which the sanggunian us empowered to provide for
d. Ensure that maximum assistance and access to resources in the
production, processing and marketing of agricultural and aqua-
cultural and marine products are extended to farmers, fishermen
and local entrepreneurs;
e. Conduct or cause to be conducted location-specific agricultural
researches and assist in making available the appropriate
technology arising out of and disseminating information on basic
research on crops, preventive and control of plant diseases and
pests, and other agricultural matters
f. Assist in the establishment and extension services of
demonstration farms or aqua-culture and marine products;
g. Enforce rules and regulations relating to agriculture and
aquaculture;
h. Coordinate with government agencies and NGOs which promote
agricultural productivity through appropriate technology
compatible with environmental integrity;
i. Be in the frontline of delivery of basic agricultural services,
particularly those needed for the survival of the inhabitants during
and in the aftermath of man-made and natural disasters;
j. Recommend and advise on all matters related to agriculture and
aqua-culture which will improve the livelihood and living
conditions of the inhabitants; (Sec482[b])
k. Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and
functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance. (Sec482[c])
15. Social Welfare
and Development
Officer
mandatory:
provincial and city;
optional: municipal
a. Citizen of the Philippines,
b. A resident of the LGU concerned,
c. Of good moral character,
d. A duly licensed social worker or a holder of
a college degree preferably in sociology or
any other related course from a recognized
college or university,
e. A first grade civil service eligible or its
equivalent
f. Acquired experience in the practice of social
work for at least 5 years in the case of the
provincial or city social welfare and
development officer, and 3 years in the case
of the municipal social welfare and
development officer. (Sec483[a])
a. Take charge of the office on social welfare and development
services
b. Formulate measures and provide technical assistance and
support in carrying out measures to ensure the delivery of basic
services and provision of adequate facilities relative to social
welfare and development services as provided for under Section 17
c. Develop plans and strategies and mplement the same
particularly those which have to do with social welfare programs
and projects which the governor or mayor is empowered to
implement and which the sanggunian is empowered to provide for
d. Identify the basic needs of the needy, the disadvantaged and the
impoverished and develop and implement appropriate measures
to alleviate their problems and improve their living conditions;
e. Provide relief and appropriate crisis intervention for victims of
abuse and exploitation and recommend appropriate measures to
deter further abuse and exploitation;
f. Assist the governor or mayor in implementing the barangay level
program for the total development and protection of children up
to six (6) years of age;
g. Facilitate the implementation of welfare programs for the
disabled, elderly, and victims of drug addiction, the rehabilitation
of prisoners and parolees, the prevention of juvenile delinquency
and such other activities which would eliminate or minimize the ill-
effects of poverty;
h. Initiate and support youth welfare programs that will enhance
the role of the youth in nation-building;
i. Coordinate with government agencies and NGOs which have for
their purpose the promotion and the protection of all needy,
disadvantaged, underprivileged or impoverished groups or
individuals, particularly those identified to be vulnerable and high-
risk to exploitation, abuse and neglect;
j. Be in the frontline of service delivery, particularly those which
have to do with immediate relief during and assistance in the
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aftermath of man-made and natural disaster and natural
calamities;
k. Recommend to the sanggunian and advise the governor or
mayor on all other matters related to social welfare and
development services which will improve the livelihood and living
conditions of the inhabitants; (Sec483[b])
l. Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and
functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance. (Sec483[c])
16. Environment and
Natural Resources
Officer
optional position a. A citizen of the Philippines,
b. Resident of the local government unit
concerned,
c. Of good moral character,
d. Holder of a college degree preferably in
environment, forestry, agriculture or any
related course from a recognized college or
university,
e. A first grade civil service eligible or its
equivalent
f. Acquired experience in environmental and
natural resources management, conservation,
and utilization, of at least 5 years in the case
of the provincial or city environment and
natural resources officer, and 3 years in the
case of the municipal environment and
natural resources officer. (Sec484[a])
a. Take charge of the office on environment and natural resources
b. Formulate measures and provide technical assistance and
support in carrying out measures to ensure the delivery of basic
services and provision of adequate facilities relative to
environment and natural resources services as provided for under
Sec 17;
c. Develop plans and strategies and implement the same,
particularly those which have to do with environment and natural
resources programs and projects which the governor or mayor is
empowered to implement and which the sanggunian is
empowered to provide for;
d. Establish, maintain, protect and preserve communal forests,
watersheds, tree parks, mangroves, greenbelts and similar forest
projects and commercial forest;
e. Provide extension services to beneficiaries of forest
development projects and technical, financial and infrastructure
assistance;
f. Manage and maintain seed banks and produce seedlings for
forests and tree parks;
g. Provide extension services to beneficiaries of forest
development projects and render assistance for natural resources-
related conservation and utilization activities consistent with
ecological balance;
h. Promote the small-scale mining and utilization of mineral
resources, particularly mining of gold;
i. Coordinate with government agencies and NGOs in the
implementation of measures to prevent and control land, air and
water pollution with the assistance of the DENR;
j. Be in the frontline of the delivery of services concerning the
environment and natural resources, particularly in the renewal and
rehabilitation of the environment during and in the aftermath of
man-made and natural calamities and disasters;
k. Recommend to the sanggunian and advise the governor or
mayor on all matters relative to the protection, conservation,
maximum utilization, application of appropriate technology and
other matters related to the environment and natural resources;
and (Sec484[b])
l. Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and
functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance. (Sec484[c])
17. Architect optional position a. Citizen of the Philippines,
b. A resident of the LGU concerned,
c. Of good moral character,
d. A duly licensed architect.
e. Practiced his profession for at least 5 years
in the case of the provincial or city architect,
and 3 years in the case of the municipal
architect. (Sec485[a])
a. Take charge of the office on architectural planning and design
b. Formulate measures for the consideration of the sanggunian
and provide technical assistance and support to the governor or
mayor in carrying out measures to ensure the delivery of basic
services and provision of adequate facilities relative to
architectural planning and design as provided for under Section 17;
c. Develop plans and strategies and implement the same,
particularly those which have to do with architectural planning and
design programs and projects which the governor or mayor is
empowered to implement and which the sanggunian is
empowered to provide for under this Code;
d. Prepare and recommend for consideration of the sanggunian
the architectural plan and design for the local government unit or a
part thereof, including the renewal of slums and blighted areas,
land reclamation activities, the greening of land, and appropriate
planning of marine and foreshore areas;
e. Review and recommend for appropriate action of the
sanggunian, governor or mayor the architectural plans and design
submitted by governmental and non-governmental entities or
individuals, particularly those for undeveloped, underdeveloped,
and poorly-designed areas;
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f. Coordinate with government and NGOs and individuals involved
in the aesthetics and the maximum utilization of the land and
water within the jurisdiction of the LGU, compatible with
environmental integrity and ecological balance.
g. Be in the frontline of the delivery of services involving
architectural planning and design, particularly those related to the
redesigning of spatial distribution of basic facilities and physical
structures during and in the aftermath of man-made and natural
calamities and disasters;
h. Recommend to the sanggunian and advise the governor or
mayor on all other matters relative to the architectural planning
and design as it relates to the total socioeconomic development of
the local government unit; and (Sec 485[b])
i. Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and
functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance. (Sec485[c])
18. Information
Officer
optional position a. Citizen of the Philippines,
b. A resident of the LGU concerned,
c. Of good moral character,
d. A holder of a college degree preferably in
journalism, mass communication or any
related course from a recognized college or
university,
e. A first grade civil service eligible or its
equivalent.
f. Have experience in writing articles and
research papers, or in writing for print,
television or broadcast media of at least 3
years in the case of the provincial or city
information officer, and at least 1 year in the
case of municipal information officer.
g. Term of the information officer is co-
terminous with his appointing authority.
(Sec486[a])
a. Take charge of the office on public information
b. Formulate measures and provide technical assistance and
support in providing the information and research data required
for the delivery of basic services and provision of adequate
facilities so that the public becomes aware of said services and may
fully avail of the same;
c. Develop plans and strategies and implement the same,
particularly those which have to do with public information and
research data to support programs and projects which the
governor or mayor is empowered to implement and which the
sanggunian is empowered to provide for;
d. Provide relevant, adequate, and timely information to the LGU
and its residents;
e. Furnish information and data on LGUs to government agencies
or offices as may be required by law or ordinance; and NGOs to be
furnished to said agencies and organizations;
f. Maintain effective liaison with the various sectors of the
community on matters and issues that affect the livelihood and the
quality of life of the inhabitants and encourage support for
programs of the local and national government;
g. Be in the frontline in providing information during and in the
aftermath of manmade and natural calamities and disasters, with
special attention to the victims thereof, to help minimize injuries
and casualties during and after the emergency, and to accelerate
relief and rehabilitation;
h. Recommend and advise on all other matters relative to public
information and research data as it relates to the total
socioeconomic development of the LGU; (Sec486[b])
i. Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and
functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance. (Sec486[c])
19. Cooperative
Officer
optional: provincial
and city
a. Citizen of the Philippines,
b. A resident of the LGU concerned,
c. Of good moral character,
d. Holder of a college degree preferably in
business administration with special training
in cooperatives or any related course from a
recognized college or university,
e. First grade civil service eligible or its
equivalent
f. Have experience in cooperatives
organization and management of at least 5
years in the case of the provincial or city
cooperatives officer, and 3 years in the case
of municipal cooperatives officer. (Sec487[a])
a. Take charge of the office for the development of cooperatives
b. Formulate measures and provide technical assistance and
support in carrying out measures to ensure the delivery of basic
services and provision of facilities through the development of
cooperatives, and in providing access to such services and facilities;
c. Develop plans and strategies and implement the same,
particularly those which have to do with the integration of
cooperatives principles and methods in programs and projects
which the governor or mayor is empowered to implement and
which the sanggunian is empowered to provide for;
d. Assist in the organization of cooperatives;
e. Provide technical and other forms of assistance to existing
cooperatives to enhance their viability as an economic enterprise
and social organization;
f. Assist cooperatives in establishing linkages with government
agencies and NGOs involved in the promotion and integration of
the concept of cooperatives in the livelihood of the people and
other community activities;
g. Be in the frontline of cooperatives organization, rehabilitation or
viability-enhancement, particularly during and in the aftermath of
man-made and natural calamities and disasters, to aid in their
survival and, if necessary subsequent rehabilitation;
h. Recommend and advise on all other matters relative to
cooperatives development and viability- enhancement which will
improve the livelihood and quality of life of the inhabitants;
(Sec487[b])
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i. Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and
functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance. (Sec487[c])
20. Population
Officer
optional position a. Citizen of the Philippines,
b. A resident of the LGU concerned,
c. Of good moral character,
d. A holder of a college degree with
specialized training in population
development from a recognized college or
university,
e. A first grade civil service eligible or its
equivalent.
f. Have experience in the implementation of
programs on population development or
responsible parenthood for at least 5 years in
the case of the provincial or city population
officer and 3 years in the case of the
municipal population officer. (Sec488[a])
a. Take charge of the office on population development
b. Formulate measures and provide technical assistance and
support in carrying out measures to ensure the delivery of basic
services and provision of adequate facilities relative to the
integration of the population development principles and in
providing access to said services and facilities;
c. Develop plans and strategies and implement the same,
particularly those which have to do with the integration of
population development principles and methods in programs and
projects which the governor or mayor is empowered to implement
and which the sanggunian is empowered to provide for;
d. Assist the governor or mayor in the implementation of the
Constitutional provisions relative to population development and
the promotion of responsible parenthood;
e. Establish and maintain an updated data bank for program
operations, development planning and an educational program to
ensure the people's participation in and understanding of
population development;
f. Implement appropriate training programs responsive to the
cultural heritage of the inhabitants; (Sec488[b])
g. Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and
functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance. (Sec488[c])
21. Veterinarian mandatory:
provincial and city
a. Citizen of the Philippines,
b. A resident of the local government
concerned,
c. Of good moral character,
d. A licensed doctor of veterinary medicine,
e. Have practiced his profession for at least 3
years in the case of provincial or city
veterinarian and at least 1 year in the case of
the municipal veterinarian. (Sec489[a])
a. Take charge of the office for veterinary services;
b. Formulate measures and provide technical assistance and
support in carrying out measures to ensure the delivery of basic
services and provision of adequate facilities pursuant to Section 17;
c. Develop plans and strategies and implement the same
particularly those which have to do with the veterinary-related
activities which the governor or mayor is empowered to
implement and which the sanggunian is empowered to provide for
d. Advise the governor or the mayor on all matters pertaining to
the slaughter of animals for human consumption and the
regulation of slaughterhouses;
e. Regulate the keeping of domestic animals;
f. Regulate and inspect poultry, milk and dairy products for public
consumption;
g. Enforce all laws and regulations for the prevention of cruelty to
animals;
h. Take the necessary measures to eradicate, prevent or cure all
forms of animal diseases;
i. Be in the frontline of veterinary related activities, such as in the
outbreak of highly-contagious and deadly diseases, and in
situations resulting in the depletion of animals for work and human
consumption, particularly those arising from and in the aftermath
of man-made and natural calamities and disasters;
j. Recommend and advise on all other matters relative to
veterinary services which will increase the number and improve
the quality of livestock, poultry and other domestic animals used
for work or human consumption; (Sec489[b])
k. Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and
functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance. (Sec489[c])
22. General Services
Officer
mandatory:
provincial and city
a. Citizen of the Philippines,
b. A resident of the local government unit
concerned,
c. Of good moral character,
d. A holder of a college degree on public
administration, business administration and
management from a recognized college or
university,
e. A first grade civil service eligible or its
equivalent.
f. Have acquired experience in general
services, including management of supply,
property, solid waste disposal, and general
sanitation, of at least 5 years in the case of
the provincial or city general services officer,
a. Take charge of the office on general services;
b. Formulate measures and provide technical assistance and
support in carrying out measures to ensure the delivery of basic
services and provision of adequate facilities pursuant to Section 17
and which require general services expertise and technical support
services;
c. Develop plans and strategies and implement the same,
particularly those which have to do with the general services
supportive of the welfare of the inhabitants which the governor or
mayor is empowered to implement and which the sanggunian is
empowered to provide for;
d. Take custody of and be accountable for all properties, real or
personal, owned by the LGU and those granted to it in the form of
donation, reparation, assistance and counterpart of joint projects;
e. Assign building or land space to local officials or other public
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and at least 3 years in the case of the
municipal general services officer. (Sec490[a])
officials, who by law, are entitled to such space;
f. Recommend the reasonable rental rates for local government
properties, whether real or personal, which will be leased to public
or private entities
g. Recommend reasonable rental rates of private properties which
may be leased for the official use of the local government unit;
h. Maintain and supervise janitorial, security, landscaping and
other related services in all local government public buildings and
other real property
i. Collate and disseminate information regarding prices, shipping
and other costs of supplies and other items commonly used by the
LGU;
j. Perform archival and record management with respect to records
of offices and departments of the LGU
k. Perform all other functions pertaining to supply and property
management performed by the local government treasurer; and
enforce policies on records creation, maintenance, and disposal;
l. Be in the frontline of general services related activities, such as
the possible or imminent destruction or damage to records,
supplies, properties, and structures and the orderly and sanitary
clearing up of waste materials or debris, particularly during and in
the aftermath of man-made and natural calamities and disasters;
m. Recommend and advise on all other matters relative to general
services; (Sec490[b])
n. Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and
functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance. (Sec490[c])

De Rama v. CA
Mayor Conrado de Rama sought for the recall of 14 municipal
employees on the ground that they were midnight
appointees of the former mayor, in violation of Art. VII, Sec.
15 of the Constitution. The Civil Service Commission declared
the appointments in accordance with law and valid (approved
by the head of the CSC Field Office of Lucena City).
ISSUE: Whether or not the appointments were
unconstitutional. Held: No.
RULING: Rule VI, Sec. 20 of the Omnibus Implementing Rules
of the Revised Administrative Code provides that
appointments may be recalled on the following grounds: (1)
non-compliance with procedure, (2) failure to pass through
Selection Board, (3) violation of agreement relative to
promotion, (4 violation of other existing civil service laws.
No law prohibits local elective officials from making
appointments during the last days of his or her tenure. The
midnight appointments prohibited by Art. VII, Sec. 15 of the
Constitution applies only to appointments made by the
President. There were no allegations of fraud on the part of
the outgoing mayor or that the appointments were tainted by
irregularities only belatedly, as a supplemental pleading on
appeal, was it alleged that CSC procedures were not followed
(rules on screening, posting of notices, merit and fitness).
Failure to raise these grounds in the original pleading
constitutes a waiver.
Upon the issuance of an appointment and the appointees
assumption of position, he acquires a legal and not only
equitable right to the position, which cannot be taken away
either by revocation or by removal without cause and
previous notice and hearing. There is no showing that any of
the appointees were not qualified. They assumed their
appointive positions this cannot be unilaterally revoked.
Rule V, Sec. 9 of the Omnibus Implementing Rules of the
Revised Administrative Code provides that an appointment
accepted cannot be revoked by the appointing authority and
shall remain in force and effect until disapproved by the CSC.
a. Leagues of Local Barangay Units and Elective
Officials
Sec 491 510, LGC
Article One. Liga ng Mga Barangay
Sec. 491. Purpose of Organization. There shall be an
organization of all barangays, to be known as the Liga ng mga
Barangay, for the primary purpose of determining the
representation of the liga in the sanggunians and for
ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues affecting
barangay government administration and securing, through
proper and legal means, solutions thereto.
Sec. 492. Representation, Chapters, National Liga. Every
barangay shall be represented in said liga by the punong
barangay, or in his absence or incapacity, by a sanggunian
member duly elected for the purpose among its members,
who shall attend all meetings or deliberations called by the
different chapters of the liga.
The liga shall have chapters at the municipal, city, provincial
and metropolitan political subdivision levels.
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The municipal and city chapters of the liga shall be composed
of the barangay representatives of municipal and city
barangays, respectively. The duly elected presidents of
component municipal and city chapters shall constitute the
provincial chapter or the metropolitan political subdivision
chapter. The duly elected presidents of highly-urbanized
cities, provincial chapters, the Metropolitan Manila chapter
and metropolitan political subdivision chapters shall
constitute the National Liga ng mga Barangay.
Sec. 493. Organization. The liga at the municipal, city,
provincial, metropolitan political subdivision, and national
levels directly elect a president, a vice-president, and five (5)
members of the board of directors. The board shall appoint
its secretary and treasurer and create such other positions as
it may deem necessary for the management of the chapter. A
secretary-general shall be elected from among the members
of the national liga and shall be charged with the overall
operation of the liga on the national level. The board shall
coordinate the activities of the chapters of the liga.
Sec. 494. Ex Officio Membership in Sanggunians. The duly
elected presidents of the liga at the municipal, city and
provincial levels, including the component cities and
municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, shall serve as ex-
officio members of the sangguniang bayan, sangguniang
panlungsod, and sangguniang panlalawigan, respectively.
They shall serve as such only during their term of office as
presidents of the liga chapters, which in no case shall be
beyond the term of office of the sanggunian concerned.
Sec. 495. Powers, Functions and Duties of the Liga ng mga
Barangay. The Liga ng mga Barangay shall:
(a) Give priority to programs designed for the total
development of the barangays and in consonance with the
policies, programs and projects of the National Government;
(b) Assist in the education of barangay residents for
people's participation in local government administration in
order to promote united and concerted action to achieve
country wide development goals;
(c) Supplement the efforts of government in creating gainful
employment within the barangay;
(d) Adopt measures to promote the welfare of barangay
officials;
(e) Serve as a forum of the barangays in order to forge
linkages with government and non-governmental
organizations and thereby promote the social, economic and
political well-being of the barangays; and
(f) Exercise such other powers and perform such other
duties and functions which will bring about stronger ties
between barangays and promote the welfare of the barangay
inhabitants.
Article Two. League of Municipalities
Sec. 496. Purpose of Organization. There shall be an
organization of all municipalities, to be known as the League
of Municipalities, for the primary purpose of ventilating,
articulating and crystallizing issues affecting municipal
government administration and securing, through proper and
legal means, solutions thereto.
The league shall form provincial chapters composed of the
league presidents for all component municipalities of the
province.
Sec. 497. Representation. Every municipality shall be
represented in the league by the municipal mayor or, in his
absence, by the vice mayor or a sanggunian member duly
elected for the purpose by the members, who shall attend all
meetings and participate in the deliberations of the league.
Sec. 498. Powers, Functions and Duties of the League of
Municipalities. The League of Municipalities shall:
(a) Assist the National Government in the formulation and
implementation of policies, programs and projects affecting
municipalities as a whole;
(b) Promote local autonomy at the municipal level;
(c) Adopt measures for the promotion of the welfare of all
municipalities and its officials and employees;
(d) Encourage people's participation in local government
administration in order to promote united and concerted
action for the attainment of country wide development goals;
(e) Supplement the efforts of the National Government in
creating opportunities for gainful employment within the
municipalities;
(f) Give priority to programs designed for the total
development of the municipalities in consonance with the
policies, programs and projects of the National Government;
(g) Serve as a forum for crystallizing and expressing ideas,
seeking the necessary assistance of the National Government,
and providing the private sector avenues for cooperation in
the promotion of the welfare of the municipalities; and
(h) Exercise such other powers and perform such other
duties and functions as the league may prescribe for the
welfare of the municipalities.
Article Three. League of Cities
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Sec. 499. Purpose of Organization. There shall be an
organization of all cities, to be known as the League of Cities,
for the primary purpose of ventilating, articulating and
crystallizing issues affecting city government administration
and securing, through proper and legal means, solutions
thereto.
The league may form chapters at the provincial level for the
component cities of a province. Highly-urbanized cities may
also form a chapter of the league. The National League shall
be composed of the presidents of the league of highly-
urbanized cities and the presidents of the provincial chapters
of the league of component cities.
Sec. 500. Representation. Every city shall be represented in
the league by the city mayor or, in his absence, by the city
vice mayor or a sanggunian member duly elected for the
purpose by the members, who shall attend all meetings and
participate in the deliberations of the league.
Sec. 501. Powers, Functions and Duties of the League of
Cities. The League of Cities shall:
(a) Assist the National Government in the formulation and
implementation of the policies, programs and projects
affecting cities as a whole;
(b) Promote local autonomy at the city level;
(c) Adopt measures for the promotion of the welfare of all
cities and its officials and employees;
(d) Encourage people's participation in local government
administration in order to promote united and concerted
action for the attainment of country wide development goals;
(e) Supplement the efforts of the National Government in
creating opportunities for gainful employment within the
cities;
(f) Give priority to programs designed for the total
development of cities in consonance with the policies,
programs and projects of the National Government;
(g) Serve as a forum for crystallizing and expressing ideas,
seeking the necessary assistance of the National Government
and providing the private sector avenues for cooperation in
the promotion of the welfare of the cities; and
(h) Exercise such other powers and perform such other
duties and functions as the league may prescribe for the
welfare of the cities.
Article Four. League of Provinces
Sec. 502. Purpose of Organization. There shall be an
organization of all provinces, to be known as the League of
Provinces, for the primary purpose of ventilating, articulating
and crystallizing issues affecting provincial and metropolitan
political subdivision government administration and securing,
through proper and legal means, solutions thereto. For this
purpose, the Metropolitan Manila Area and any metropolitan
political subdivision shall be considered as separate provincial
units of the league.
Sec. 503. Representation. Every province shall be
represented in the league by the provincial governor, or in his
absence, by the provincial vice mayor or a sanggunian
member duly elected for the purpose by the members, who
shall attend all meetings and participate in the deliberations
of the league.
Sec. 504. Powers, Functions and Duties of the League of
Provinces. The league of Provinces shall:
(a) Assist the National Government in the formulation and
implementation of the policies, programs and projects
affecting provinces as a whole;
(b) Promote local autonomy at the provincial level;
(c) Adopt measures for the promotion of the welfare of all
provinces and its officials and employees;
(d) Encourage people's participation in local government
administration in order to promote united and concerted
action for the attainment of countrywide development goals;
(e) Supplement the efforts of the National Government in
creating opportunities for gainful employment within the
province;
(f) Give priority to programs designed for the total
development of the provinces in consonance with the
policies, programs and projects of the National Government;
(g) Serve as a forum for crystallizing and expressing ideas,
seeking the necessary assistance of the national government
and providing the private sector avenues for cooperation in
the promotion of the welfare of the provinces; and
(h) Exercise such other powers and perform such other
duties and functions as the league may prescribe for the
welfare of the provinces and metropolitan political
subdivisions.
Article Five. Provisions Common to all Leagues
Sec. 505. Funding. (a) All leagues shall derive its funds from
contributions of member local government units and from
fund-raising projects and activities without the necessity of
securing permits therefor: Provided, That the proceeds from
said fund-raising projects and activities shall be used primarily
to fund the projects for which the said proceeds have been
raised, subject to the pertinent provisions of this Code and
the Omnibus Election Code.
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(b) All funds of leagues shall be deposited as trust funds
with its treasurer and shall be disbursed in accordance with
the board of director's resolutions, subject to pertinent
accounting and auditing rules and regulations: Provided, That
the treasurer shall be bonded in an amount to be determined
by the board of directors. The funds of a chapter shall be
deposited as chapter funds and funds of the national league
shall be deposited as national funds.
Sec. 506. Organizational Structure. To ensure the effective
and efficient administration, the leagues for municipalities,
cities and provinces shall elect chapter-level and national-
level boards of directors and a set of officers headed by the
president. A secretary-general shall be chosen from among
the national league members to manage the day to day
operation and activities of the national league. The board of
directors on the chapter or national level may create such
other positions as may be deemed necessary for the
management of the chapters and of the national league. The
national board directors of the leagues for municipalities,
cities or provinces shall coordinate programs, projects and
activities of the chapter and the national-level league.
Sec. 507. Constitution and By-laws of the Liga and the
Leagues. All other matters not herein otherwise provided for
affecting the internal organization of the leagues of local
government units shall be governed by their respective
constitution and by-laws which are hereby made suppletory
to the provision of this Chapter: Provided, That said
constitution and by-laws shall always conform to the
provisions of the Constitution and existing laws.
CHAPTER 2. Leagues and Federations of Local Elective
Officials
Sec. 508. Organization. (a) Vice governors, vice mayors,
sanggunian members of barangays, municipalities,
component cities, highly-urbanized cities and provinces, and
other elective local officials of local government units,
including those of the Metropolitan Manila area and any
metropolitan political subdivisions, may form their respective
leagues or federations, subject to applicable provisions of this
Title and pertinent provisions of this Code;
(b) Sanggunian members of component cities and
municipalities shall form a provincial federation and elect a
board of directors and a set of officers headed by the
president. The duly elected president of the provincial
federation of sanggunian members of component cities and
municipalities shall be an ex officio member of the
sangguniang panlalawigan concerned and shall serve as such
only during his term of office as president of the provincial
federation of sanggunian members of component cities and
municipalities, which in no case shall be beyond the term of
office of the sanggunian panlalawigan concerned.
Sec. 509. Constitution and By-laws. The leagues or
federations shall adopt a constitution and by-laws which shall
govern their internal organization and operation: Provided,
That said constitution and by-laws shall always conform to
the provision of the Constitution and existing laws.
Sec. 510. Funding. The leagues and federations may derive
funds from contributions of individual league or federation
members or from fund-raising projects or activities. The local
government unit concerned may appropriate funds to
support the leagues or federation organized pursuant to this
Section, subject to the availability of funds.
David v. Comelec
Petitioners seek to declare as unconstitutional Sec. 43(c) of
R.A. 7160, which limited the term of office of Barangay
officials to three years. Petitioners contend that under Sec. 2
of RA 6653 the term of office of barangay officials shall be for
five years. This is reiterated in R.A. 6679. Petitioners further
aver that although Sec. 43 of RA 7160 reduced the term of
office of all local elective officials to three years, such
reduction does not apply to barangay officials because (1) RA
6679 is a special law applicable only to barangays while RA
7160 is a general law which applies to all other local
government units; (2) RA 7160 does not expressly or
impliedly repeal RA 6679 insofar as the term of barangay
officials is concerned; (3) while Sec. 8 of Article X of the 1987
constitution fixes the term of elective local officials at three
years, the same provision states that the term of barangay
officials "shall be determined by law"; and (4) thus, it follows
that the constitutional intention is to grant barangay officials
any term, except three years.
The COMELEC maintains that RA 7160 repealed all other
special laws relied upon by the Petitioner.
WON the term of the barangay officials should be limited only
to three years.
Held: Yes
R.A. 7160 was enacted later than RA 6679. In case of an
irreconciliable conflict between two laws of different
vintages, the later enactment prevails. Also, R.A. 7160 is a
codified set of laws that specifically applies to local
government units. It specifically provides that the term of
office of barangay officials shall be for three years. With such
particularity, the provision cannot be deemed a general law.
Petitioners posit that by excepting barangay officials whose
"term shall be determined by law" from the general provision
fixing the term of "elective local officials" at three years, the
Constitution thereby impliedly prohibits Congress from
legislating a three year term for such officers. This is legally
flawed. The Constitution did not expressly prohibit Congress
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109 | P a g e Municipal Corporation
from fixing any term of office for barangay officials. It merely
left the determination of such term to the lawmaking body,
without any specific limitation or prohibition, thereby leaving
to the lawmakers full discretion to fix such term in
accordance with the exigencies of public service.
b. Private counsel/lawyers for elective local officials
Alinsug v. RTC-Negros Occidental
Zonsayda Alinsug was a regular employee of the Office of the
Mayor of Escalante Negros Occidental. Mayor Ponsica issued
Office Order No. 31, suspending Zonsayda for one month and
one day for simple misconduct categorized as an act of
insubordination.
Zonsayda filed with the RTC a petition for injunction with
damages. Mayor Ponsica, through private practitioner Samuel
SM Lezama, claimed that Zonsayda had not yet exhausted
administrative remedies and that her suspension was in
accordance with law. Alinsug moved that the respondents be
all declared in default on the ground that, since the
respondents were sued in their official capacities, they should
have been represented by either the municipal legal officer or
the provincial legal officer or prosecutor as provided for by
Sec. 481 (b) [i] and [3] of the Local Government Code. The
respondents opposed the motion manifesting that the
municipality of Escalante has no legal officer.
WON private counsel may represent municipal officials sued
in their official capacities.
Held: Yes
It appears that the law allows a private counsel to be hired by
a municipality only when the municipality is an adverse party
in a case involving the provincial government or another
municipality or city within the province. This has its apparent
origin in De Guia v. The Auditor General where the Court held
that the municipality's authority to employ a private attorney
is expressly limited only to situations where the provincial
fiscal would be disqualified to serve and represent it.
But would these proscriptions include public officials? Not
necessarily. It can happen that a government official,
ostensibly acting in his official capacity and sued in that
capacity, is later held to have exceeded his authority. On the
one hand, his defense would have then been underwritten by
the people's money which ordinarily should have been his
personal expense. On the other hand, personal liability can
attach to him without, however, his having had the benefit of
assistance of a counsel of his own choice.
In the discharge of governmental functions, municipal
corporations are responsible for the acts of its officers, except
if and when, the only to the extent that, they have acted by
authority of the law, and in conformity with the requirements
thereof. Also, a government official sued in his official
capacity may engage the services of private counsel when the
complaint contains other allegations and a prayer for moral
damages, which, if due from the defendants, must be
satisfied by them in their private capacity.
The key then to resolving the issue of whether a local
government official may secure the services of private
counsel, in an action filed against him in his official capacity,
lies on the nature of the action and the relief that is sought.
While the petition below was filed against respondents as
public officials, its allegations were also aimed at questioning
certain acts that can well bring the case beyond the mere
confines of official functions; thus
The petition then went on to claim moral and exemplary
damages, as well as litigation expenses, as shown by its
prayer. Moral damages cannot generally be awarded unless
they are the proximate result of a wrongful act or omission.
Exemplary damages, on the other hand, are not awarded if
the defendant had not acted in a wanton, oppressive or
malevolent manner nor in the absence of gross or reckless
negligence. A public official, who in the performance of his
duty acts in such fashion, does so in excess of authority, and
his actions would be ultra vires that can thereby result in an
incurrence of personal liability.
Municipality of Pililia v. CA
RTC rendered judgment in favor of the Municipality of Pililla,
Rizal, against the Philippine Petroleum Corporation, ordering
the latter defendant to pay the amount of P5,301,385.00
representing the tax on business due from the defendant
under Section 9(A) of Municipal Tax Ordinance No. 1 of said
municipality.
When Atty. Mendiola ffiled a petition for certiorari with the
SC, the PPC filed a motion questioning his authority to
represent petitioner municipality. The CA dismissed the
petition for having been filed by a private counsel in violation
of law and jurisprudence but without prejudice to the filing of
a similar petition by the Municipality of Pililla through the
proper provincial or municipal legal officer.
WON Atty. Mendiola has the authority to file the petition in
behalf of the municipality.
Held: No
Private attorneys cannot represent a province or municipality
in lawsuits; only the provincial fiscal and the municipal
attorney can represent a province or municipality in their
lawsuits. The provision is mandatory. The municipality's
authority to employ a private lawyer is expressly limited only
to situations where the provincial fiscal is disqualified to
represent it. The fact that the provincial fiscal was
disqualified to handle the case must appear on record. In the
instant case, there is nothing in the record to show that the
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provincial fiscal is disqualified; the appearance of herein
private counsel is without authority of law.
Also, the fiscal's refusal to represent the municipality is not a
legal justification for employing the services of private
counsel. A fiscal cannot refuse to perform his functions on
grounds not provided for by law without violating his oath of
office. Instead of engaging the services of a special attorney,
the municipal council should request the Secretary of Justice
to appoint an acting provincial fiscal in place of the provincial
fiscal who has declined, (Sec. 1679, Administrative Code).
Furthermore, even assuming that the representation of the
municipality by Atty. Mendiola was duly authorized, said
authority is deemed to have been revoked by the
municipality when the latter, through the municipal mayor
and without said counsel's participation, entered into a
compromise agreement with the respondent. A client, by
appearing personally and presenting a motion by himself, is
considered to have impliedly dismissed his lawyer.
Ramos v. CA
A petition was filed for the Declaration of Nullity of Municipal
Ordinances and the contract of lease over a commercial
arcade to be constructed in the municipality of Baliuag,
Bulacan. Atty. Romanillos manifested that he was counsel for
the municipality filing a motion to dismiss and an amended
answer. The provincial attorney, Atty. Regalado, who first
filed the answer, appeared as collaborating counsel.
However, the Provincial Fiscal (Regalado) did not appear. It
was Atty. Romanillos who worked the case for the
municipality.
The petitioners questioned the personality of Atty.
Romanillos to appear as counsel of the municipality. In a
joint statement, Atty. Romanillos withdrew as counsel for the
municipality and Atty. Regalado, as collaborating counsel
adopted the entire proceedings participated in/undertaken
by Atty. Romanillos. The judge denied the petitioners motion
to disqualify.
WON private lawyer is authorized to represent the
Municipality in its Lawsuits?
Held: NO
General Rule: Private counsel may not represent municipality
or province in lawsuits.
Section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code provides
that it is the duty of fiscal to represent provinces and
provincial subdivisions in litigation EXCEPT in cases where:
1. Original jurisdiction is vested in the SC
2. The municipality or municipal district in question is a
party adverse to the provincial government or to
some other municipality or municipal district in the
same province.
3. He, or his wife, or child, is pecuniarily involved, as
heir legatee, creditor or otherwise.
The above provision is complemented by Section 3, RA 2264,
the Local Autonomy Law. The provision is mandatory. The
municipality's authority to employ a private lawyer is
expressly limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal
is disqualified to represent it. This strict coherence to the
letter of the law appears to have been dictated by the fact
that the municipality should not be burdened with expenses
of hiring a private lawyer and that the interests of the
municipality would be best protected if a government lawyer
handles its litigations.
None of the exemptions are present in this case. In addition,
for the exceptions to apply, the fact that the provincial fiscal
was disqualified to handle the municipality's case must
appear on record. There is nothing in the records to show
that the provincial fiscal is disqualified to act as counsel for
the Municipality. There is also no estoppel on the part of the
plaintiffs because the legality of the representation of an
unauthorized counsel may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings.
WON Collaboration with private counsel is allowed?
Held: NO
General rule: Private counsel may not represent the
municipality/province even if only in collaboration with
authorized government lawyers.
EXCEPT that in interest of substantial justice, the municipality
may adopt the work already performed in good faith by such
private lawyer, which work is beneficial to it, provided:
1. No injustice it thereby heaped on the adverse party;
2. No compensation in any guise is paid therefor by
said municipality to the private lawyer.
Unless so expressly adopted, the private lawyers work cannot
bind the municipality. The proceedings already done are
declared null and void for being participated in by
unauthorized counsel.
The Court believes that conferring legitimacy to the
appearance of Atty. Romanillos would not cause substantial
prejudice on petitioners. Requiring a new trial on the mere
legal technicality that the municipality was not represented
by a legally authorized counsel would not serve the interest
of justice.
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111 | P a g e Municipal Corporation
Salalima v. Guingona
An administrative complaint was filed against Albay Governor
Salalima, Vice-Governor Azafla, and several members of the
Albay Sangguniang Panlalawigan because of the retainer
contract for legal services entered into between the Province
of Albay and Atty. Cornago and the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm
(private lawyers), and the disbursement of public funds in
payment thereof.
WON respondents have incurred administrative liability in
entering into the retainer agreement and making payments
pursuant thereto. (The retainer was for a case filed by NPC
against the province).
Held: Yes
Sec. 481 of the Local Government Code which is based on
Section 1681 of the Revised Administrative Code requires the
appointment of a legal officer to represent the local
government unit in all civil actions and special proceedings
wherein the local government unit or any official thereof, in
his official capacity is a party; EXCEPT that in actions or
proceeding where a component city or municipality is a party
adverse to the provincial government or to another
component city or municipality, a special legal officer may be
employed to represent the adverse party.
Local government units cannot be represented by private
lawyers and it is solely the Provincial Fiscal who can rightfully
represent them. Moreover, the entire transaction was
attended by irregularities (i.e. No prior written approval of
Solicitor General and COA before the disbursements were
made, the resolution passed only authorized the governor to
sign a retainer contract with the Cortes & Reyna Loaw Firm
yet he also signed with Atty. Cornago which is a different
entity, the province disbursed money to the Cortes & Reyna
Law Firm although the latter did not appear as counsel for the
Province in the SC case, the attorneys fees were
unreasonable = P38.5 Million).
DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS
A. Sec 60 68, LGC
See above
Ganzon v. CA and Artieda v. Santos (joint
case)
A series of administrative complaints (10) were filed against
Mayor Ganzon (Mayor of Iloilo City) by city officials on various
charges: abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct
and others. Secretary of Local Government, Hon. Santos,
issued a preventive suspension order for 60 days. A second
60 day suspension was ordered but Mayor Ganzon was able
to obtain a restraining order and a writ of preliminary
injunction in the RTC. The second preventive suspension was
not enforced.
Amidst the two successive suspensions, Mayor Ganzon
instituted an action for prohibition against the respondent in
the RTC. Meanwhile, the respondent issued a third order for
another 60 day preventive suspension (3rd time in 20
months), designating Vice-Mayor Malabor as acting mayor.
Undaunted, Mayor Ganzon commenced before the CA, a
petition for prohibition. The CA rendered judgment
dismissing the cases.
WON the several suspensions imposed upon Mayon Ganzon
are proper.
Held: No
The plain truth is that this Court has been uncomfortable with
suspensions because it is out of the ordinary to have a
vacancy in local government. The sole objective of a
suspension is simply "to prevent the accused from hampering
the normal cause of the investigation with his influence and
authority over possible witnesses" or to keep him off "the
records and other evidence." It is a means, and no more, to
assist prosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against an
erring local official. Under the LGC (section 63), a suspension
cannot exceed sixty days. It need not be exactly sixty days
long if a shorter period is sufficient and it ought to be lifted if
prosecutors have achieved their purpose in a shorter span.
Suspension is temporary. It may be imposed for no more than
sixty days, a longer suspension is unjust and unreasonable,
and nothing less than tyranny. Since the Mayor is facing ten
administrative charges, the Mayor is in fact facing the
possibility of 600 days of suspension, in the event that all ten
cases yield prima facie findings. The Court is not of course
tolerating misfeasance in public office but it is certainly
another question to make him serve 600 days of suspension,
which is effectively, to suspend him out of office. The Court is
aware that only the third suspension is under questions, and
that any talk of future suspensions is in fact premature. The
fact remains, however, that Mayor Ganzon has been made to
serve a total of 120 days of suspension and the possibility of
sixty days more is arguably around the corner which amounts
to a violation of the Local Government Code which brings to
light a pattern of suspensions intended to suspend the Mayor
the rest of his natural tenure. The Court is simply foreclosing
what appears to us as a concerted effort of the State to
perpetuate an arbitrary act.
Espiritu v. Melgar
Garing filed a sworn letter-complaint to the Secretary Santos
of DILG, the Provincial Governor of Oriental Mindoro Espiritu
and to the Presidential Action Center, charging Mayor Melgar
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of Naujan. Oriental Mindoro, with grave misconduct,
oppression, abuse of authority, culpable violation of the
Constitution and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the public service. Melgar allegedly assaulted Garing and
ordered his arrest and detention without filing any charges
until his release the following day.
Mayor Melgar submitted his answer wherein he said that
while he was delivering a speech during a graduation
ceremony, Garing suddenly clapped causing disturbance on
the part of the audience. When the Mayor ended his speech,
he instructed a policeman to investigate Garing. It appeared
that Garing was drunk. The mayor informed Garing to go
home but he refused to go and only did so the following
morning.
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro passed
Resolution No 55, recommending to the Provincial Governor
that the Mayor be preventively suspended for 45 days
pending the investigation of the administrative complaint.
When the mayor received the order of suspension, he filed a
Petition for Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction with prayer
for Restraining Order in the RTC. The RTC judge issued a writ
of preliminary injunction enjoining Governor Espiritu from
implementing the Order of suspension against Mayor Melgar.
On appeal, Governor Espiritu contends that the trial judge
erred in granting the preliminary injunction since the
Governor is empowered to place an elective municipal official
under preventive suspension pending decision of an
administrative case against the elective municipal official.
WON the governor has the power to suspend the mayor
Held: Yes
Under Section 63 LGC, the provincial governor is authorized
by law to preventively suspend the municipal mayor anytime
after the issues had been joined and any of the following
grounds were shown to exist:
1. When there is reasonable ground to believe that the
respondent has committed the act or acts
complained of.
2. When the evidence of culpability is strong.
3. When the gravity of the offense so warrants.
4. When the continuance in office of the respondent
could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the
safety and integrity of the records and other
evidence.
There is nothing improper in suspending an officer before the
charges against him are heard and before he is given an
opportunity to prove his innocence. Preventive suspension is
allowed so that the respondent may not hamper the normal
course of the investigation through the use of his influence
and authority over possible witnesses.Since the mayor
believed that his preventive suspension was unjustified and
politically motivated, he should have sought relief first from
the Secretary of DILG, not from the courts. Mayor Melgar's
direct recourse to the courts without exhausting
administrative remedies was premature. The RTC had no
jurisdiction over Special Civil Action No. R-5003 and gravely
abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss the case. As a
general rule, the office or body that is invested with the
power of removal or suspension should be the sole judge of
the necessity and sufficiency of the cause. However, in this
case, since the 60-day preventive suspension of Mayor
Melgar was maintained by the TRO and therefore has already
been served, he is deemed reinstated in office without
prejudice to the continuation of the administrative
investigation of the charges against him.
Aguinaldo v. Santos
Aguinaldo was the duly elected Governor of the province of
Cagayan. After the December 1989 coup d'etat was crushed,
the DILG Secretary Santos sent a telegram & letter to
Governor Aguinaldo requiring him to show cause why he
should not be suspended or removed from office for
disloyalty to the Republic. A sworn complaint was also filed
by Mayors of several municipalities in Cagayan against
Aguinaldo for acts committed during the coup. Aguinaldo
denied being privy to the planning of the coup or actively
participating in its execution, though he admitted that he was
sympathetic to the cause of the rebel soldiers.
The Secretary suspended petitioner from office for 60 days
from notice, pending the outcome of the formal
investigation. Later, the Secretary rendered a decision finding
petition guilty as charged and ordering his removal from
office. The Vice Governor Vargas was installed as Governor.
Aguinaldo appealed. While the case was pending before the
SC, Aguinaldo filed his certificate of candidacy for the position
of Governor of Cagayan. Three petitions for disqualification
were filed against him on the ground that he had been
removed from office. The Comelec granted the petition.
Later, this was reversed on the ground that the decision of
the Secretary has not yet attained finality and is still pending
review with the Court. As Aguinaldo won by a landslide
margin in the elections, the resolution paved the way for his
eventual proclamation as Governor of Cagayan.
WON the Secretary has the power to suspend or remove local
government officials as alter ego of the President
Held: Yes
The power of the Secretary to remove local government
officials is anchored on both the Constitution and a statutory
grant from the legislative branch. The constitutional basis is
provided by Articles VII (17) and X (4) of the 1987
Constitution which vest in the President the power of control
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113 | P a g e Municipal Corporation
over all executive departments, bureaus and offices and the
power of general supervision over local governments. It is a
constitutional doctrine that the acts of the department head
are presumptively the acts of the President unless expressly
rejected by him. Furthermore, it cannot be said that BP337
was repealed by the effectivity of the present Constitution as
both the 1973 and 1987 Constitution grants to the legislature
the power and authority to enact a local government code,
which provides for the manner of removal of local
government officials. The power of the DILG secretary to
remove local elective government officials is found in Secs. 60
and 61 of BP 337. As to Aguinaldos argument of the want of
authority of the Secretary to appoint Vargas as Governor,
Section 48 (1) of B.P. Blg. 337 shows otherwise. Equally
without merit is petitioner's claim that before he could be
suspended or removed from office, proof beyond reasonable
doubt is required because he is charged with a penal offense
of disloyalty to the Republic which is defined and penalized
under Article 137 of the RPC. Petitioner is not being
prosecuted criminally, but administratively where the
quantum of proof required is only substantial evidence.
Aguinaldos re-election to the position of Governor of
Cagayan has rendered the administrative case pending before
Us moot and academic. It appears that after the canvassing of
votes, petitioner garnered the most number of votes among
the candidates for governor of Cagayan province. The rule is
that a public official cannot be removed for administrative
misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-
election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's
previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to
remove him therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no
application to criminal cases pending against petitioner for
acts he may have committed during the failed coup.
Reyes v. Comelec
Reyes was the incumbent mayor of the municipality of
Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro. An administrative complaint
was filed against him with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan by
Dr. Manalo. It was alleged that Reyes exacted and collected
P50,000,00 from each market stall holder in the Bongabong
Public Market. Also, that certain checks issued to him by the
National Reconciliation and Development Program of the
DILG were never received by the Municipal Treasurer nor
reflected in the books of accounts of the same officer; and
that he took 27 heads of cattle from beneficiaries of a cattle
dispersal program. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan found
petitioner guilty of the charges and ordered his removal from
office.
Reyes filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction
with the RTC of Oriental Mindoro. Later, the Presiding Officer
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan issued an order for Reyes to
vacate the position of mayor and to turn over the office to
the incumbent vice mayor but he refused to accept the
service of the order. Thereafter, Reyes filed a certificate of
candidacy with the Comelec but a petition for disqualification
was filed against him. Thus, the Comelec canceled Reyess
certificate of candidacy. However, the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Bongabong unaware of the disqualification of
Reyes by the Comelec, proclaimed him the duly-elected
mayor. The Comelec en banc affirmed. Reyes argues that his
election on May 8, 1995 is a bar to his disqualification.
Garcia, who obtained the highest number of votes next to
Reyes intervened, contending that because Reyes was
disqualified, he was entitled to be proclaimed mayor. The
Comelec en banc denied Garcias prayer.
WON the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is not yet
final because he has not been served a copy thereof.
Held: No
The failure of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to deliver a copy
of its decision was due to the refusal of petitioner and his
counsel to receive the decision. Repeated attempts had been
made to serve the decision on Reyes personally and by
registered mail, but Reyes refused to receive the decision. If a
judgment or decision is not delivered to a party for reasons
attributable to him, service is deemed completed and the
judgment or decision will be considered validly served as long
as it can be shown that the attempt to deliver it to him would
be valid were it not for his or his counsel's refusal to receive
it. Reyess refusal to receive the decision may, therefore, be
construed as a waiver on his part to have a copy of the
decision.
Petitioner was given sufficient notice of the decision. Rather
than resist the service, he should have received the decision
and taken an appeal to the Office of the President in
accordance with R.A. No. 7160 Section 67. But petitioner did
not do so. Accordingly, the decision became final 30 days
after the first service upon petitioner. Thus, when the
elections were held the decision of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan had already become final and executory. The
filing of a petition for certiorari with the RTC did not prevent
the administrative decision from attaining finality. An original
action of certiorari is an independent action and does not
interrupt the course of the principal action nor the running of
the reglementary period involved in the proceeding.
Consequently, to arrest the course of the principal action
during the pendency of the certiorari proceedings, there must
be a restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction from
the appellate court directed to the lower court. In the case at
bar, although a temporary restraining order was issued by the
Regional Trial Court, no preliminary injunction was
subsequently issued. The temporary restraining order issued
expired after 20 days. From that moment on, there was no
more legal barrier to the service of the decision upon
petitioner.
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WON petitioners reelection rendered the administrative
charges against him moot and academic
Held: No
This case is different from Aguinaldo v. Santos. Here,
although Reyes brought an action to question the decision in
the administrative case, the TRO issued in the action he
brought lapsed with the result that the decision was served
on petitioner and became final. Thus, because petitioner
failed to appeal to the Office of the President, he was validly
removed from office and, pursuant to Section 40(b) of the
LGC, he was disqualified from running for reelection.
It is noteworthy that at the time the Aguinaldo cases were
decided there was no provision similar to Section 40(b) which
disqualifies any person from running for any elective position
on the ground that he has been removed as a result of an
administrative case. R.A. No. 7160 could not be given
retroactive effect. Furthermore, the Aguinaldo decision has
not yet attained finality. As indicated earlier, the decision of
the then Secretary of Local Government was questioned by
the petitioner in this Court and that to date, the petition
remains unresolved.
Garcia's plea that the votes cast for Reyes be invalidated is
without merit. The candidate who obtains the second highest
number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the
winning candidate is disqualified. To simplistically assume
that the second placer would have received the other votes
would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the
voter. The votes cast for Reyes are presumed to have been
cast in the belief that Reyes was qualified and for that reason
cannot be treated as stray, void, or meaningless. The
subsequent finding that he is disqualified cannot retroact to
the date of the elections so as to invalidate the votes cast for
him.
Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole
Criminal and administrative complaints were filed in the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman against Mayor Ouano, Vice-
Mayor Caete and Sangguniang Panlungsod Member Mayol
of Mandaue City, by Mandaue City Councilors. The
respondents were charged with having violated R.A No. 3019,
as amended; Articles 170 and 171 RPC; and R.A. No. 6713.
Councilors Dionson and Bercede averred that respondent
officials, acting in conspiracy, had caused the alteration
and/or falsification of Ordinance No. 018/92 by increasing the
allocated appropriation therein without authority from the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaue City.
Aside from opposing the motion for preventive suspension,
respondent officials prayed for the dismissal of the complaint
on the ground that the Ombudsman Hagad supposedly was
bereft of jurisdiction to try, hear and decide the
administrative case filed against them since, under Section 63
LGC, the power to investigate and impose administrative
sanctions against said local officials, as well as to effect their
preventive suspension, had now been vested with the Office
of the President. The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
denied the motion to dismiss and recommended the
preventive suspension of respondent officials, except City
Budget Officer Guido, until the administrative case would
have been finally resolved by the Ombudsman.
A petition for prohibition, with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order was
filed by respondent officials with the RTC. The RTC issued a
restraining order directed at the Ombudsman, enjoining him
from enforcing the preventive suspension.
WON the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over the present case
Held: Yes
The general investigatory power of the Ombudsman is
decreed by Section 13(1,) Article X1, of the 1987 Constitution,
while his statutory mandate to act on administrative
complaints is contained in Section 19 of R.A. No. 6770.
Section 21 of the same statute names the officials who could
be subject to the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman.
Taken in conjunction with Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, the
Office of the Ombudsman correspondingly has the authority
to decree preventive suspension on any public officer or
employee under investigation by it.
The argument of the respondents that the disciplinary
authority of the Ombudsman over local officials has been
removed by the subsequent enactment of the Local
Government Code of 1991 is without merit. Although Section
63 of the Local Government Code provides that preventive
suspension can only be imposed by: ". . . the President if the
respondent is an elective official of a province, a highly
urbanized or an independent component city; . . ." There is
nothing in the LGC to indicate that it has repealed, whether
expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the
Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific matter in
question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as
to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other.
Well settled is the rule that repeals of laws by implication are
not favored, and that courts must generally assume their
congruent application. The two laws must be absolutely
incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before
the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is
expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare leqibus
esf optimus interpretendi: every statute must be so
interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to
form a uniform system of jurisprudence. All doubts must be
resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts should be
exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on
the subject.
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115 | P a g e Municipal Corporation
The authority to conduct administrative investigation and to
impose preventive suspension over elective provincial or city
officials was at that time entrusted to the Minister of Local
Government until it became concurrent with the
Ombudsman upon the enactment of R.A No. 6770 (Sec. 21 &
24), to the extent of the common grant, the LGC did not
effect a change from what already prevailed, the modification
being only in the substitution of the Secretary of Local
Government by the Office of the President.
Respondent local officials contend that the 6-month
preventive suspension without pay under Section 24 of the
Ombudsman Act is much too repugnant to the 60-day
preventive suspension provided by Section 63 LGC to even
now maintain its application. This contention is without
merit. The two provisions govern differently and there is
justification for the imposition of the 6 month preventive
suspension.
Ombudsman RA 7160
6 month preventive suspension 60 day preventive suspension, at
any time after the issues have
been joined
All public officials (Elective or
appointive) under investigation.
Elective officials only after the
issues are joined.
Grounds for preventive suspension: (S.
24, RA 9770)
1. The evidence of guilt should
be strong, AND
a. The charge against the
officer or employee
should involve
dishonestly,
oppression or grave
misconduct or neglect
in the performance of
duty, or
b. The charges should
warrant removal from
the service, or
c. The respondents
continued stay in
office would prejudice
the case filed against
him
Grounds for preventive
suspension:
1. There is a reasonable
ground to believe that
the respondent has
committed the act or
acts complained of
2. The evidence of guilt is
strong
3. The gravity of the
offense so warrants
4. The continuance in
office of the
respondent could
influence the
witnesses or pose a
threat to the safety
and integrity of the
records and other
evidence

Salalima v. Guingona (supra)
Administratrive Order No. 153 was signed by the President
and respondent Teofisto Guingona, which approved the
findings of an Ad Hoc Committee holding Salalima et al liable
in four (4) consolidated administrative cases. Petitioners
were elective officials of the Province of Albay, and were
handed out penalties in the following manner: 1) 5 months
suspension for Albay Governor Salalima and 4 months
suspension for the other respondents for abuse of authority,
due to the passage of an illegal ordinance which deprived the
barangays of Tiwi and Daraga of their share in delinquency
payments made by Napocor to the government; 2) 6 months
suspension for Salalima and Azana, 4 months for all the other
respondents for abuse of authority under Section 60 of the
LGC, when they hired private lawyers (Cortes & Reyna Law
Firm) to represent them in their case in the Supreme Court
and disbursed public money to do so; 3) 4 months suspension
each for oppression and abuse of authority, when they
assumed jurisdiction and hastily and arbitrarily meted out
suspensions to Tiwi Mayor Corral pending the administrative
cases she had filed against the respondents; and 4) 5 months
suspension to Governor Salalima for abuse of authority and
gross negligence for failing to impose and collect damages
from RYU Construction Corp when the latter incurred in
delay. Petitioners challenge AO 153 on the grounds that: 1)
the AO effectively suspends petitioners for periods ranging
from twelve to twenty months; 2) the Office of the President
committed grave abuse of discretion in suspending
petitioners for administrative offenses allegedly committed
during prior terms.
Held: 1) Petitioners contend that the challenged
administrative order deprived them of their respective offices
without procedural and substantive due process. Their
suspensions ranging from twelve months to twenty months
or for the entire duration of their unexpired term, which was
then only seven months, constituted permanent
disenfranchisement or removal from office in clear violation
of Section 60 of R.A. No. 7160 which mandates that an
elective local official may be removed from office by order of
the court. However, Section 66(b) of R. A. No. 7160 expressly
provides that the penalty of suspension shall not exceed the
unexpired term of the respondent or a period of six (6)
months for every administrative offense, nor shall said
penalty be a bar to the candidacy of the respondent so
suspended as long as he meets the qualifications for the
office. Administrative Offense means every act or conduct or
omission which amounts to, or constitutes any of the grounds
for disciplinary action. The Office of the President committed
no grave abuse of discretion in imposing the penalty of
suspension, although the aggregate thereof exceeded six
months and the unexpired portion of the petitioners' term of
office. The fact remains that the suspension imposed for each
administrative offense did not exceed six months and there
was an express provision that the successive service of the
suspension should not exceed the unexpired portion of the
term of office of the petitioners. 2) Governor Salalima could
no longer be held liable in connection with the negotiated
contract RYU Construction, nor could the petitioners be held
administratively liable for the execution in November 1989 of
the retainer contract with Atty. Jesus Cornago and the Cortes
and Reyna Law Firm. This is so because public officials cannot
be subject to disciplinary action for administrative
misconduct committed during a prior term. His reelection to
office operates a condonation of the officer's previous
misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove
him therefor. This doctrine of forgiveness or condonation
cannot, however, apply to criminal acts which the reelected
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official may have committed during his previous term. 3) The
grant of the power to remove elective local officials by the
Oversight Committee to the disciplining authority in
drafting the Implementing Rules for the LGC is ultra vires;
such power is vested only with the court.
Grego v. Comelec
October 31, 1981 (before the effectivity of the LGC), Basco
was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff (with
prejudice to reinstatement to any position in the national or
local government and its agencies and instrumentalities or
GOCCs, in the words of the Court) upon a finding of serious
misconduct in an administrative complaint lodged by Nena
Tordesillas. Basco then ran as a candidate for Councilor on
two consecutive occasions and won, with subsequent
challenges to his election having been dismissed. On the third
instance when Basco was again elected Councilor, petitioner
Grego filed with the COMELEC a petition praying for Basco's
disqualification, for the suspension of his proclamation, and
for the declaration of seventh placer Romualdo S. Maranan as
the sixth duly elected Councilor of Manila's Second District.
While the case was ongoing, the Manila City Board of
Canvassers proclaimed Basco as a duly elected councilor for
the Second District of Manila, placing sixth among several
candidates who vied for the seats. Basco immediately took
his oath of office before the Honorable Ma. Ruby Bithao-
Camarista, Presiding Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch
I, Manila.
HELD: Section 40 (b) of the LGC disqualifies those removed
from office as a result of an administrative case from running
for any elective position. However, it does NOT apply
retroactively to those removed from office before it took
effect on January 1, 1992. Well-settled is the principle that
while the Legislature has the power to pass retroactive laws
which do not impair the obligation of contracts, or affect
injuriously vested rights, it is equally true that statutes are
not to be construed as intended to have a retroactive effect
so as to affect pending proceedings, unless such intent is
expressly declared or clearly and necessarily implied from the
language of the enactment. There is no provision in the
statute which would clearly indicate that the same operates
retroactively. Lex prospicit, non respicit. As such, the issue of
whether or not Bascos election to office in the 1988, 1992
and 1995 elections wipe away and condone the
administrative penalty against him is beside the point since
he is deemed NOT subject to disqualification under Sec 40 (b)
of the LGC. Also, Basco is deemed NOT to have circumvented
the prohibition in the Tordesillas decision since under the
former Civil Service Decree, (the law applicable at the time of
the decision) reinstatement referred only to an appointive
position. Moreover, there is no reason why the Manila City
BOC should not have proclaimed Basco as the sixth winning
City Councilor. Absent any determination of irregularity in the
election returns, as well as an order enjoining the canvassing
and proclamation of the winner, it is a mandatory and
ministerial duty of the Board of Canvassers concerned to
count the votes based on such returns and declare the result.
Lastly, Romualdo S. Maranan, the seventh placer, may NOT
be legally declared a winning candidate since Basco was not
disqualified.
Joson v. Executive Secretary Torres
Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Nueva Ecija
filed a letter-complaint with the Office of the President
charging petitioner Governor Joson with grave misconduct
and abuse of authority, praying for his suspension and
removal from office. Governor Joson had allegedly barged
into the Hall during a scheduled session of the SP and angrily
kicked the door and chairs in the Hall and uttered threatening
words at respondents while men with firearms encircled the
area. Acting on the complaint, President Ramos ordered
Secretary of Internal and Local Government Robert Barbers
take appropriate preemptive and investigative actions, but
to break not the peace. Upon recommendation of Secretary
Barbers, Executive Secretary Ruben Torres issued an order, by
authority of the President, placing petitioner under
preventive suspension for sixty (60) days pending
investigation of the charges against him. Joson filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals
challenging the order of preventive suspension and the order
of default, which was dismissed. Petitioner alleges that
subsequent to the institution of this petition, the SILG
rendered a resolution on the case finding him guilty of the
offenses charged, whose finding was based on the position
papers and affidavits of witnesses submitted by the parties.
The Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, then
adopted the findings and recommendation of the DILG
Secretary and imposed a six-month suspension. Joson now
questions the CA decision affirming his preventive suspension
and the implementation of the SILG Resoultion without
formal investigation.
HELD: An administrative complaint against an elective official
must be verified and filed with the proper government office.
A complaint against an elective provincial or city official must
be filed with the Office of the President, one against an
elective municipal official must be filed with the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, while that of a barangay official must be filed
before the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan.
Joson is an elective provincial official, thus the complaint
against him was properly filed with the Office of the
President. According to petitioner, the complaint was not
verified by private respondents. However, the defect was not
fatal. The requirement was deemed waived by the President
himself when he acted on the complaint. Petitioner also
claims undue delegation of the disciplining authority to the
DILG. Jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary actions
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117 | P a g e Municipal Corporation
against elective local officials is lodged in two authorities: the
Disciplining Authority (the President or the Executive
Secretary) and the Investigating Authority (the DILG, as per A.
O. No. 23). What is delegated is the power to investigate, not
the power to discipline. The DILG did not err when it
recommended preventive suspension, which may be imposed
by the Disciplining Authority at any time (a) after the issues
are joined; (b) when the evidence of guilt is strong; and (c)
given the gravity of the offense, there is great probability that
the respondent, who continues to hold office, could influence
the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of
the records and other evidence. However, the rejection of
petitioner's right to a formal investigation denied him
procedural due process. The records show that petitioner
filed a motion for formal investigation. An erring elective
local official has rights akin to the constitutional rights of an
accused. These rights are essentially part of procedural due
process. The local elective official has the (1) right to appear
and defend himself in person or by counsel; (2) the right to
confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him; and
(3) the right to compulsory attendance of witness and the
production of documentary evidence. Petitioner's right to a
formal investigation was not satisfied when the complaint
against him was decided on the basis of position papers. The
procedure of requiring position papers in lieu of a hearing in
administrative cases is expressly allowed with respect to
appointive officials but not to those elected. An elective
official, elected by popular vote, is directly responsible to the
community that elected him. Suspension and removal are
thus imposed only after the elective official is accorded his
rights and the evidence against him strongly dictates their
imposition.
Conducto v. Monzon
Judge Iluminado Monzon was charged with ignorance of the
law for deliberately refusing to suspend a barangay chairman
who was charged with unlawful appointment before his sala.
Barangay chairman Benjamin Maghirang was charged with
violation of Section 394 of the Local Government Code and
Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code for appointing his
sister-in-law as barangay secretary. The Office of the City
Prosecutor dismissed the complaint, stating that the
appointment was made before the effectivity of the Local
Government Code of 1991. Complainant was later able to
secure an Opinion from the DILG Director Jacob Montesa,
which declared that the appointment issued by Maghirang to
his sister-in-law violated the Local Government Code in effect
prior to that of 1991. This prompted the Office of the City
Prosecutor to file an information with the Municipal Trial
Court of San Pablo. Respondent judge issued a warrant for
Maghirangs arrest. A motion for suspension was filed
pursuant to Sec. 13 of RA 3019 or the Anti Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (which provides that any incumbent public
officer or official under criminal prosecution under Title 7,
Book II of the RPC shall be suspended). Respondent judge
denied the motion on the ground that offenses committed
during a prior term shall not be cause for suspension during
the present term. In denying a motion for reconsideration of
the same, Monzon stated that preventive suspension only
applies if there is an administrative case against the official
filed at the same time as the criminal charge.
HELD: There is misplaced reliance by the judge upon the case
of Pascual vs Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija. The doctrine of
forgiveness or condonation finds no application in criminal
liability. It was subsequently held in Ingco vs. Sanchez that
the reelection of a public officer does not wipe away any
criminal liability incurred by him in a previous term. Section
13 of RA 3019 makes it mandatory upon the Court to suspend
any public officer against whom a valid information is filed for
a violation of Title 7, Book II of the RPC or any offense
involving fraud upon government or public funds or property.
Respondent judge is fined P5,000 for ignorance of the law
and given a warning against committing similar acts in the
future.
Pablico v. Villapando
An administrative complaint was filed with the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Palawan against then Mayor of San Vicente,
Palawan Alejandro Villapando for abuse of authority and
culpable violation of the Constitution because he entered into
a consultancy agreement with Orlando Tiape, a defeated
mayoralty candidate. Complainants argue that this
amounted to appointment to a government position within
the prohibited one-year period under Article IX-B, Sec. 6 of
the 1987 Constitution. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan found
respondent guilty and imposed on him the penalty of
dismissal from service, and was affirmed by the Office of the
President. Vice-mayor Pablico took his oath as municipal
mayor in place of Villapando. The Court of Appeals declared
the decisions of the SP and OP void, and ordered Pablico to
vacate the Office of the Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan.
HELD: The last paragraph of Sec. 60 of the Local Government
Code clearly provides that the dismissal from service of an
erring elective local official may only be decreed by a court of
law. Although Article 124(b), Rule XIX of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code adds
that such removal may be had by the disciplining authority
(pertaining to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan), no rule or
regulation may alter, amend, or contravene a provision of law
such as the LGC. Such power to remove elective local officials
from service is lodged exclusively with the courts.
Sangguniang Barangay of Don Mariano v.
Punong Barangay Martines
Severino Martinez was administratively charged with
Dishonesty and Graft and Corruption by petitioner through
the filing of a verified complaint before the Sangguniang
Bayan as the disciplining authority over elective barangay
officials pursuant to Section 64 of RA 7160. The complaint
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was later amended for Dishonesty, Misconduct in Office and
Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The Sangguniang Bayan rendered its Decision which imposed
upon Martinez the penalty of removal from office. The
decision was conveyed to the mayor of Bayombong, Nueva
Ecija. The mayor, however, issued a Memo wherein he stated
that the Sangguniang Bayan has no power to order Martinez
removal from office. However, the decision remains valid
until reversed.
WON the Sanggunian may remove Martinez, an elective local
official, from office.
Held: No
Section 60 of the Local Government Code conferred upon the
courts the power to remove elective local officials from
office. During the deliberations of the Senate on the Local
Government Code,[16] the legislative intent to confine to the
courts, i.e., RTCs, the Sandiganbayan and the appellate
courts, jurisdiction over cases involving the removal of
elective local officials was evident.
In Salalima v. Guingona, Jr., the Court en banc categorically
ruled that the Office of the President is without any power to
remove elected officials, since the power is exclusively vested
in the proper courts as expressly provided for in the last
paragraph of Section 60 of the LGC. It further invalidated
Article 125, Rule XIX of IRR. The Court nullified the rule since
the Oversight Committee that prepared the Rules and
Regulations of the Local Government Code exceeded its
authority when it granted to the disciplining authority the
power to remove elective officials, a power which the law
itself granted only to the proper courts. Thus, it is clear that
under the law, the Sangguniang Bayan is not vested with the
power to remove Martinez.
Petitioner contends that administrative cases involving
elective barangay officials may be filed with, heard and
decided by the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang
Bayan concerned, which can, thereafter, impose a penalty of
removal from office. It further claims that the courts are
merely tasked with issuing the order of removal, after the
Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan finds that a
penalty of removal is warranted.
The aforementioned position put forward by the petitioner
would run counter to the rationale for making the removal of
elective officials an exclusive judicial prerogative. In Pablico v.
Villapando, the court declared that:The law on suspension or
removal of elective public officials must be strictly construed
and applied, and the authority in whom such power of
suspension or removal is vested must exercise it with utmost
good faith, for what is involved is not just an ordinary public
official but one chosen by the people through the exercise of
their constitutional right of suffrage. Their will must not be
put to naught by the caprice or partisanship of the
disciplining authority. Where the disciplining authority is
given only the power to suspend and not the power to
remove, it should not be permitted to manipulate the law by
usurping the power to remove. (Emphasis supplied.)
The rule which confers to the proper courts the power to
remove an elective local official from office is intended as a
check against any capriciousness or partisan activity by the
disciplining authority.
As the law stands, Section 61 of the Local Government Code
provides for the procedure for the filing of an administrative
case against an erring elective barangay official before the
Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan. However,
the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan cannot
order the removal of an erring elective barangay official from
office, as the courts are exclusively vested with this power
under Section 60 of the Local Government Code. Thus, if the
acts allegedly committed by the barangay official are of a
grave nature and, if found guilty, would merit the penalty of
removal from office, the case should be filed with the
regional trial court. Once the court assumes jurisdiction, it
retains jurisdiction over the case even if it would be
subsequently apparent during the trial that a penalty less
than removal from office is appropriate. On the other hand,
the most extreme penalty that the Sangguniang Panlungsod
or Sangguniang Bayan may impose on the erring elective
barangay official is suspension; if it deems that the removal of
the official from service is warranted, then it can resolve that
the proper charges be filed in court.
The doctrine of separation of powers is not absolute in its
application; rather, it should be applied in accordance with
the principle of checks and balances. The removal from office
of elective officials must not be tainted with partisan politics
and used to defeat the will of the voting public. The local
government units are not deprived of the right to discipline
local elective officials; rather, they are prevented from
imposing the extreme penalty of dismissal.
Cases of Sexual Harassment versus elective local
government officials and local government employees,
heads of departments
Civil Service Administrative Rule on Sexual
Harassment and RA No 7877
See attachments
Book I, Title 2, Chapter 4, LGC (Sec 60 68)
See above
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119 | P a g e Municipal Corporation
B. Disciplinary Actions over Local Appointive Officials
Sec 84 89, LGC
Administrative discipline (Sec 84)
Investigation and adjudication of administrative complaints
against appointive local officials and employees as well as
their suspension and removal shall be in accordance with the
civil service law and rules and other pertinent laws.
The results of such administrative investigations shall be
reported to the Civil Service Commission.
Preventive suspension of appointive local officials and
employees (Sec 85)
Who may impose:
The local chief executive
When to impose:
Pending investigation after filing of administrative
charges against the subordinate official or employee
which involves:
o Dishonesty
o Oppression
o Grave misconduct
o Neglect in the performance of duty
o If there is reason to believe that the
respondent is guilty of the charges which
would warrant his removal from the service
Duration of Preventive Suspension:
Not exceeding sixty (60) days
What happens after preventive suspension:
The suspended official shall be automatically reinstated in
office without prejudice to the continuation of the
administrative proceedings against him until its termination.
NOTE: If the delay in the proceedings of the case of the case
is due to the fault, neglect, or request of the respondent, the
time of the delay shall not be counted in computing the
period of suspension herein provided.
Administrative investigation (Sec 86)
Who may perform:
Any person or committee duly authorized by the
local chief executive
How performed:
The person or committee duly authorized shall conduct
hearings on the cases brought against appointive local
officials and employees.
The investigating body shall submit their findings and
recommendations to the local chief executive concerned
within fifteen (15) days from conclusion of the hearings.
Duration of Administrative Proceedings (Rendition of
Judgment):
90 days from the time the respondent is formally
notified of the charges.
Disciplinary jurisdiction (Sec 87)
Imposable penalties:
1. Removal from service
2. Demotion in rank
3. Suspension for not more than one (1) year
without pay
4. Fine in an amount not exceeding six (6) months
salary
5. Reprimand
6. Other disciplinary actions
Appeal
4

APPEALABLE NOT APPEALABLE
If the penalty imposed is
heavier than suspension of
thirty (30) days
If the penalty imposed is
suspension without pay for
not more than thirty (30) days

Where to appeal:
Civil Service Commission (judgment must be rendered within
30 days from receipt of appeal)
Execution pending appeal (Sec 88)
An appeal shall not prevent the execution of a decision of
removal or suspension of a respondent-appellant.
In case the respondent-appellant is EXONERATED, he shall be
reinstated to his position with all the rights and privileges
appurtenant thereto from the time he had been deprived
thereof.
Prohibited business and pecuniary interest (Sec 89)
1. Engage in any business transaction with the local
government unit in which he is:
a. an official, or

4
The provision is unclear whether the imposition of demotion, reprimands
etc. are also final and not appealable. The provision speaks only of
suspension without pay for not more than thirty days which is not appeable.

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Municipal Corporation P a g e | 120

b. employee, o
c. over which he has the power of supervision,
or with any of its
d. authorized boards,
e. officials,
f. agents, or
g. attorney,
whereby money is to be paid, or property or anything of
value is to be transferred, directly or indirectly, out of the
resources of the LGU to such person or firm;
2. Hold such interests in any cockpit or other games
licensed by an LGU;
3. Purchase any real estate or other property forfeited
in favor of such LGU
a. for unpaid taxes or assessment, or
b. by virtue of a legal process at the instance
of the said local official;
4. Be a surety for any person contracting or doing
business with the LGU for which a surety is required;
and
5. Possess or use any public property of the LGU for
private purposes.
Other prohibited businesses and interests as provided under
R.A. 6713 shall also be applicable.
Mendez v. CSC
Then Acting Register of Deeds of Quezon City Vicente N.
Coloyan filed an administrative complaint against the
petitioner, a legal research assistant in the Quezon City Office
of the City Attorney, for Gross Misconduct and Dishonesty,
allegedly for having torn off a portion of Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 209287 from the registry book of Quezon City and
for having pocketed it. After three months of investigation,
then Quezon City Mayor Adelina Rodriguez dismissed the said
complaint against the petitioner for insufficiency of evidence.
Coloyan appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board
(MSPB) reversed the decision of the Mayor and dismissed
Mendez from the service. The CSC affirmed the MSPB
decision. Mendez filed a motion for reconsideration, assailing
the reversal of the city mayor's decision by the MSPB and the
CSC on the ground that Coloyan is not an aggrieved party or
"party adversely affected by the decision" allowed by law to
file an appeal. Moreover, the petitioner claimed that his
exoneration by the city mayor is unappealable pursuant to
Section 37, paragraph (b) of P.D. 807.
HELD: P.D. 807, otherwise known as The Philippine Civil
Service Law, does not contemplate a review of decisions
exonerating officers or employees from administrative
charges. Section 37 paragraph (a) thereof, provides: "The
Commission shall decide upon appeal all administrative
disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of
suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount
exceeding thirty days' salary, demotion in rank or salary or
transfer, removal or dismissal from office " Said provision
must be read together with Section 39 paragraph (a) of P.D.
805 which contemplates: "Appeals, where allowable, shall be
made by the party adversely affected by the decision . . ."
The phrase "party adversely affected by the decision" refers
to the government employee against whom the
administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary
action which may take the form of suspension, demotion in
rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office. In
the instant case, Coloyan, who filed the appeal, cannot be
considered an aggrieved party because he is not the
respondent in the administrative case below. Moreover, The
remedy of appeal may be availed of only in a case where the
respondent is found guilty of the charges filed against him.
But when the respondent is exonerated of said charges, as in
this case, there is no occasion for appeal. The CSC decision is
set aside and the decision of the Quezon City Mayor is
reinstated (Complaint against Mendez dismissed).
Macalingag and Carlos v. Chang
Pursuant to an administrative charge against him for
dishonesty, neglect of duty, and act prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, an Order of Preventive suspension was
issued against Roberto Chang, then the acting municipal
treasurer of Makati. Said Order was signed by Lorinda Carlos,
the Executive director of the Bureau of Local Government,
and Victor Macalincag, Undersecretary of Finance, who was
then the acting Secretary. Chang filed a complaint for
prohibition with preliminary injunction with the lower court.
The trial court found in that in order for preventive
suspension to take effect, there are two steps involved: 1)
service of the copy the order on the respondent, and 2)
designation of his replacement. The order of preventive
suspension was held to have been incomplete and without
effect since an acting municipal treasurer had yet to be
appointed to replace Chang.
HELD: Preventive suspension is governed by Sec. 41 of P.D.
807 or the Civil Service Law, which does not require a
replacement to be designated for the Order to take effect.
BP 337 (the LGC in effect at the time) provides for the
automatic assumption of the assistant municipal treasurer or
next in rank officer in case of suspension of the municipal
treasurer. There can be no question that the Order of
Preventive Suspension became effective upon respondent
Changs receipt thereof. Chang argues that EO 392, which
gave rise to the creation of the Metropolitan Manila
Authority, vested in the President of the Philippines the
power to appoint the municipal treasurer, and thus only the
President may suspend or remove him. However, Section 8
of EO 392 provides that the appointments made by the
President of the Philippines shall be subject to the Civil
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121 | P a g e Municipal Corporation
Service Law, rules and regulations. Moreover, the Office of
the Municipal Treasurer unquestionably falls under the
Department of Finance. Hence, the Secretary of Finance is
the proper disciplining authority to issue the preventive
suspension order. Even assuming that the power to appoint
includes the power to discipline (as argued by Chang), Acting
Secretary Macalingag, as Secretary of Finance, is the alter ego
of the President. It is therefore within his authority to
preventively suspend Chang.
Garcia v. Pajaro and the City of Dagupan
Sebastian Garcia is an employee at the City Treasurers Office,
Dagupan City. He was ordered suspended by City Treasurer
Juanito Pajaro and directed the withholding of his salary
because of the Formal Charge filed against him. However,
Pajaro continued reporting for work because he did not
honor the suspension order as the City Treasurer acted as the
complainant and that there was no complaint against him
from the Office of the City Mayor.
Juanito Pajaro, the City Treasurer of Dagupan City, claimed
that Garcia has been rating unsatisfactory in his performance
for several semesters, which is the reason why he was
formally charged. Garcia was preventively suspended for
ninety days since the charge is a major offense. An
investigation was scheduled but Garcia failed to appear and
testify. Garcia also did not answer the subpoena. So, Pajaro
proceeded with an ex parte investigation. The Bureau of Local
Government Finance favorably approved the suspension. This
was affirmed by the Regional Director. Affirming the RTC
Decision, the CA held that private respondent was vested
with legal power and authority to institute disciplinary action
against subordinate officers and employees. The appellate
court further held that the requisites of administrative due
process had been fully observed by Pajaro while investigating
petitioner. But despite being informed of the charges against
him and being given the opportunity to be heard in a formal
investigation, petitioner chose not to answer those charges.
HELD: Under the old and the present Local Government
Codes, appointive officers and employees of local
government units are covered by the Civil Service Law; and
such rules, regulations and other issuances duly promulgated
pursuant thereto, unless otherwise specified. Moreover, the
investigation and the adjudication of administrative
complaints against appointive local officials and employees,
as well as their suspension and removal, shall be in
accordance with the Civil Service Law and rules and other
pertinent laws.
The Administrative Code of 1987, -- specifically Book V on the
civil service -- is the primary law governing appointive officials
and employees in the government. They may be removed or
dismissed summarily (1) *w+hen the charge is serious and the
evidence of guilt is strong; (2) [w]hen the respondent is a
recidivist x x x; and (3) [w]hen the respondent is notoriously
undesirable. Technical rules of procedure and evidence are
not strictly applied; due process in the administrative context
cannot be fully equated with that in the strict judicial sense.
The power to discipline is specifically granted by Section 47 of
the Administrative Code of 1987 to heads of departments,
agencies and instrumentalities, provinces and cities. On the
other hand, the power to commence administrative
proceedings against a subordinate officer or employee is
granted by Section 34 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
Book V of the said Administrative Code to the secretary of a
department, the head of office of equivalent rank, the head
of a local government unit, the chief of an agency, the
regional director or a person with a sworn written complaint.
Further, the city treasurer may institute, motu propio,
disciplinary proceedings against a subordinate officer or
employee. Local Administrative Regulations (LAR) No. 2-85,
which was issued by the Ministry of Finance on March 27,
1985, authorized the minister (now secretary) of finance, the
regional director, and head of a local treasury or an
assessment office to start administrative disciplinary action
against officers or employees subordinate to them. In the
case at bar, the city treasurer is the proper disciplining
authority referred to in Section 47 of the Administrative Code
of 1987. The term agency refers to any of the various units
of the government including a department, a bureau, an
office, an instrumentality, a government-owned or controlled
corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit therein.
Respondent Pajaro, as the city treasurer, was the head of the
Office of the Treasurer; while petitioner, a senior revenue
collector, was an officer under him. Thus, the city treasurer is
the proper disciplining authority who could investigate
petitioner and issue a preventive suspension order against
him.
Likewise, the old Local Government Code does not vest in city
mayors the sole power to discipline and to institute criminal
or administrative actions against any officers or employees
under their jurisdiction. In fact, there is no provision under
the present Local Government Code expressly rescinding the
authority of the Department of Finance to exercise
disciplinary authority over its employees. By the same token,
there is nothing that prohibits the city treasurer from filing a
complaint against petitioner.
Due process has not been violated. In an administrative
proceeding, the essence of due process is simply the
opportunity to explain ones side. Such process requires
notice and an opportunity to be heard before judgment is
rendered. One may be heard, not solely by verbal
presentation in an oral argument, but also -- and perhaps
even many times more creditably and practicably -- through
pleadings. So long as the parties are given the opportunity to
explain their side, the requirements of due process are
satisfactorily complied with. This constitutional mandate is
deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of an action or a ruling.
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Municipal Corporation P a g e | 122

In the case at bar, the administrative proceedings were
conducted in accordance with the procedure set out in the
1987 Administrative Code and other pertinent laws. First,
petitioner was furnished a copy of the May 30, 1990 formal
charge against him. Second, Pajaro requested the approval of
the Order of Preventive Suspension in his June 1, 1990 letter
addressed to the Bureau of Local Government Finance
regional director, who approved the Order in the First
Indorsement dated June 4, 1990. Third, a subpoena dated
July 31, 1990 was issued to petitioner ordering him to testify
during an investigation on August 15, 1990. However, he
admittedly refused to attend the investigation; thus, it was
conducted ex parte. Fourth, the Department of Finance
affirmed Respondent Pajaros findings in its August 1, 1991
Decision.
UP College of Law
123 | P a g e Municipal Corporation

Recall

Sec 69-75, LGC
See above
RA 9244
See attachments
This amends Sec 70 71 of the LGC
Rivera v. Comelec
In the May 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections,
Marino Morales ran as candidate for mayor of Mabalacat. On
January 5, 2004, he filed his Certificate of Candidacy. On
January 10, petitioners filed before the COMELEC a petition
to cancel Morales certificate of candidacy on the ground that
the was elected and had served three previous consecutive
terms as mayor of Mabalacat contrary to RA 43(b) of RA
7160.Morales admitted that he was elected mayor of
Mabalacat for the term commencing July 1, 1995 to June 30,
1998 (first term) and July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2004 (third
term), but he served the second term from July 1, 1998 to
June 30, 2001 only as a caretaker of the office or as a de
facto officer because he was not validly elected as his
proclamation as mayor was declared void by the RTC and
thereafter, he was preventively suspended by the
ombudsman. The COMELEC ruled that Morales was
disqualified to run for public office. Morales MR was
however granted. The COMELEC ruled that his proclamation
before was void and that the discharge of the duties is that of
a de facto mayor.
In the other case filed by Anthony Dee: After Morales was
proclaimed as the duly elected mayor, Anthony Dee filed a
petition for quo warranto before the RTC. Dee reiterated the
previous arguments of petitioners. The RTC dismissed Dees
petition for quo warranto on the ground that Morales did not
serve the three-term limit since he was not the duly elected
mayor of Mabalacat, but Dee in the May 1998 elections for
the term 1998 to 2001. Comelec affirmed.
HELD: Morales is disqualified from running as mayor. In Ong
v. Alegre the Court held, thus:
For the three-term limit for elective local government officials
to apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1)
that the official concerned has been elected for three (3)
consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2)
that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms.
Here, Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June
30, 2001. He assumed the position. He served as mayor until
June 30, 2001. He was mayor for the entire period
notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the electoral
protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him (respondent)
as mayor. To reiterate, as held in Ong v. Alegre, such
circumstance does not constitute an interruption in serving
the full term. Section 8, Article X of the Constitution can not
be more clear and explicit. Respondent Morales is now
serving his fourth term. He has been mayor of Mabalacat
continuously without any break since July 1, 1995. In just
over a month, by June 30, 2007, he will have been mayor of
Mabalacat for twelve (12) continuous years.
This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitution
specifically included an exception to the peoples freedom to
choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil
of a single person accumulating excessive power over a
particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged
stay in the same office.
Morales maintains that he served his second term (1998 to
2001) only as a caretaker of the office or as a de facto
officer. Section 8, Article X of the Constitution is violated
and its purpose defeated when an official serves in the same
position for three consecutive terms. Whether as caretaker
or de facto officer, he exercises the powers and enjoys the
prerequisites of the office which enables him to stay on
indefinitely. Morales should be promptly ousted from the
position of mayor of Mabalacat. Having found respondent
Morales ineligible, his Certificate of Candidacy dated
December 30, 2003 should be cancelled. In the light of the
foregoing, Morales cannot be considered a candidate in the
May 2004 elections. Not being a candidate, the votes cast for
him SHOULD NOT BE COUNTED and must be considered stray
votes. Since respondent Morales is DISQUALIFIED from
continuing to serve as mayor of Mabalacat, the instant
petition for quo warranto has become moot.
In Labo v. Comelec, this Court has ruled that a second place
candidate cannot be proclaimed as a substitute winner. As a
consequence of petitioners ineligibility, a permanent vacancy
in the contested office has occurred. This should now be
filled by the vice-mayor in accordance with Section 44 of the
Local Government Code.
Evardone v. Comelec
Felipe Evardone the mayor of Sulat, Eastern Samar, having
been elected to the position during the 1988 local elections.
He assumed office immediately after proclamation. In 1990,
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Alexander R. Apelado, Victozino E. Aclan and Noel A. Nival
filed a petition for the recall of Evardone with the Office of
the Local Election Registrar, Municipality of Sulat. The
Comelec issued a Resolution approving the the
recommendation of Election Registrar Vedasto Sumbilla to
hold the signing of petition for recall against Evardone.
Evardone filed a petition for prohibition with urgent prayer of
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Later,
in an en banc resolution, the Comelec nullified the signing
process for being violative of the TRO of the court. Hence,
this present petition.
HELD: Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution express
provides that all existing laws not inconsistent with the 1987
Constitution shall remain operative, until amended, repealed
or revoked. Republic Act No. 7160 providing for the Local
Government Code of 1991, approved by the President on 10
October 1991, specifically repeals B.P. Blg. 337 as provided in
Sec. 534, Title Four of said Act. But the Local Government
Code of 1991 will take effect only on 1 January 1992 and
therefore the old Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) is
still the law applicable to the present case. Prior to the
enactment of the new Local Government Code, the
effectiveness of B.P. Blg. 337 was expressly recognized in the
proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. We
therefore rule that Resolution No. 2272 promulgated by the
COMELEC is valid and constitutional. Consequently, the the
COMELEC had the authority to approve the petition for recall
and set the date for the signing of said petition.
In the present case, the records show that Evardone knew of
the Notice of Recall filed by Apelado, on or about 21 February
1990 as evidenced by the Registry Return Receipt; yet, he was
not vigilant in following up and determining the outcome of
such notice. Despite his urgent prayer for the issuance of a
TRO, Evardone filed the petition for prohibition only on 10
July 1990. The Court issued a TRO on 12 July 1990 but the
signing of the petition for recall took place just the same on
the scheduled date through no fault of the COMELEC and
Apelado. The signing process was undertaken by the
constituents of the Municipality of Sulat and its Election
Registrar in good faith and without knowledge of the TRO
earlier issued by this Court. As attested by Election Registrar
Sumbilla, about 2,050 of the 6,090 registered voters of Sulat,
Eastern Samar or about 34% signed the petition for recall.
The right to recall is complementary to the right to elect or
appoint. It is included in the right of suffrage. It is based on
the theory that the electorate must maintain a direct and
elastic control over public functionaries. It is also predicated
upon the idea that a public office is "burdened" with public
interests and that the representatives of the people holding
public offices are simply agents or servants of the people with
definite powers and specific duties to perform and to follow if
they wish to remain in their respective offices. Whether or
not the electorate of Sulat has lost confidence in the
incumbent mayor is a political question. It belongs to the
realm of politics where only the people are the judge. Loss of
confidence is the formal withdrawal by an electorate of their
trust in a person's ability to discharge his office previously
bestowed on him by the same electorate. The constituents
have made a judgment and their will to recall Evardone has
already been ascertained and must be afforded the highest
respect. Thus, the signing process held last 14 July 1990 for
the recall of Mayor Felipe P. Evardone of said municipality is
valid and has legal effect.
However, recall at this time is no longer possible because of
the limitation provided in Sec. 55 (2) of B.P. Blg, 337. The
Constitution has mandated a synchronized national and local
election prior to 30 June 1992, or more specifically, as
provided for in Article XVIII, Sec. 5 on the second Monday of
May, 1992. Thus, to hold an election on recall approximately
seven (7) months before the regular local election will be
violative of the above provisions of the applicable Local
Government Code
Garcia v. Comelec
Enrique Garcia was elected governor of the province of
Bataan. Some mayors, vice-mayors and members of the
Sangguniang Bayan of the twelve (12) municipalities of the
province constituted themselves into a Preparatory Recall
Assembly to initiate the recall election of Garcia. The mayor
of Mariveles, Honorable Oscar, de los Reyes, and the mayor
of Dinalupihan, the Honorable Lucila Payumo, were chosen as
Presiding Officer and Secretary of the Assembly, respectively.
Thereafter, the Vice-Mayor of Limay, the Honorable Ruben
Roque, was recognized and he moved that a resolution be
passed for the recall of the petitioner on the ground of "loss
of confidence." The motion was "unanimously seconded."
Petitioners filed with the COMELEC a petition to deny due
course to the Resolution for failure to comply with the
requirements under the LGC, which dismissed the petition
and scheduled the recall election. Petitioners filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with the SC on the ground that
section 70 of R.A. 7160 allowing recall through the initiative
of the PRAC is unconstitutional because: (1) the people have
the sole and exclusive right to decide whether or not to
initiate proceedings, and (2) that the initiation of a recall
through the PRA had de facto recalled Garcia from office and
it effectively shortens and ends the term of the incumbent
local officials and (3 )it violated the right of elected local
public officials belonging to the political minority to equal
protection of law. They also argued that the proceedings
followed by the PRAC in passing Resolution No. I suffered
from numerous defects, the most fatal of which was the
deliberate failure to send notices of the meeting to sixty-five
(65) members of the assembly. The Court granted petition on
the narrow ground that sending of selective notices to
members of the PRAC violated the due process protection of
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125 | P a g e Municipal Corporation
the Constitution and fatally flawed the enactment of
Resolution No. 1. Requirement of notice is mandatory and its
non-observance is fatal to the validity of the resolution to
recall Garcia as Governor. Petitioners then filed again Urgent
Petition reiterating their contention that section 70 of RA
7160 is unconstitutional.
HELD: Section 70 of R.A. 7160 allowing recall through the
initiative of the PRAC is constitutional. As to the first
contention, the Court stated that the legislative records
reveal there were two (2) principal reasons why this
alternative mode of initiating the recall process thru an
assembly was adopted, viz: (a) to diminish the difficulty of
initiating recall thru the direct action of the people; and (b) to
cut down on its expenses. Our lawmakers took note of the
undesirable fact that the mechanism initiating recall by direct
action of the electorate was utilized only once in the City of
Angeles, Pampanga, but even this lone attempt to recall the
city mayor failed. This initiatory process by direct action of
the people was too cumbersome, too expensive and almost
impossible to implement. Consequently, our legislators
added in the a second mode of initiating the recall of local
officials thru a preparatory recall assembly. To be sure, there
is nothing in the Constitution that will remotely suggest that
the people have the "sole and exclusive right to decide on
whether to initiate a recall proceeding." The Constitution did
not provide for any mode, let alone a single mode, of
initiating recall elections. Neither did it prohibit the adoption
of multiple modes of initiating recall elections. The mandate
given by section 3 of Article X of the Constitution is for
Congress to "enact a local government code which shall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local
government structure through a system of decentralization
with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and
referendum . . ." By this constitutional mandate, Congress
was clearly given the power to choose the effective
mechanisms of recall as its discernment dictates. Using its
constitutionally granted discretion, Congress deemed it wise
to enact an alternative mode of initiating recall elections to
supplement the former mode of initiation by direct action of
the people. Congress has made its choice as called for by the
Constitution and it is not the prerogative of this Court to
supplant this judgment. The choice may be erroneous but
even then, the remedy against a bad law is to seek its
amendment or repeal by the legislative. By the principle of
separation of powers, it is the legislative that determines the
necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law.
As to the second contention, the Court held that Petitioners
have misconstrued the nature of the initiatory process of
recall by the PRAC. They have embraced the view that
initiation by the PRAC is not initiation by the people. This is a
misimpression for initiation by the PRAC is also initiation by
the people, albeit done indirectly through their
representatives. It is not constitutionally impermissible for
the people to act through their elected representatives.
Nothing less than the paramount task of drafting our
Constitution is delegated by the people to their
representatives, elected either to act as a constitutional
convention or as a congressional constituent assembly. More
far out is petitioners' stance that a PRA resolution of recall is
the recall itself. It cannot be seriously doubted that a PRA
resolution of recall merely, starts the process. It is part of the
process but is not the whole process. This ought to be self
evident for a PRA resolution of recall that is not submitted to
the COMELEC for validation will not recall its subject official.
Likewise, a PRA resolution of recall that is rejected by the
people in the election called for the purpose bears no effect
whatsoever. The initiatory resolution merely sets the stage
for the official concerned to appear before the tribunal of the
people so he can justify why he should be allowed to
continue in office. Before the people render their sovereign
judgment, the official concerned remains in office but his
right to continue in office is subject to question. This is clear
in section 72 of the Local Government Code which states that
"the recall of an elective local official shall be effective only
upon the election and proclamation of a successor in the
person of the candidate receiving the highest number of
votes cast during the election on recall."
As to the third contention, the fear is expressed that the
members of the PRAC may inject political color in their
decision as they may initiate recall proceedings only against
their political opponents especially those belonging to the
minority. A careful reading of the law, however, will
ineluctably show that it does not give an asymmetrical
treatment to locally elected officials belonging to the political
minority. First to be considered is the politically neutral
composition of the preparatory recall assembly, all mayors,
vice-mayors and sangguniang members of the municipalities
and component cities are made members of the preparatory
recall assembly at the provincial level. Its membership is not
apportioned to political parties. No significance is given to the
political affiliation of its members. Secondly, the preparatory
recall assembly, at the provincial level includes all the elected
officials in the province concerned. Considering their number,
the greater probability is that no one political party can
control its majority. Thirdly, sec. 69 of the Code provides that
the only ground to recall a locally elected public official is loss
of confidence of the people. The members of the PRAC are in
the PRAC not in representation of their political parties but as
representatives of the people. By necessary implication, loss
of confidence cannot be premised on mere differences in
political party affiliation. There is only one ground for the
recall of local government officials: loss of confidence. This
means that the people may petition or the Preparatory Recall
Assembly may resolve to recall any local elective officials
without specifying any particular ground except loss of
confidence. There is no need for them to bring up any charge
of abuse or corruption against the local elective officials who
are the subject of any recall petition.
Paras v. Comelec
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Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula,
Cabanatuan City. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay
was filed by the registered voters of the barangay. The
COMELEC scheduled the petition signing on October 14,
1995, and set the recall election on November 13,1995. At
least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition,
above the 25% requirement provided by law. To prevent the
holding of the recall election, petitioner filed before the RTC
petition for injunction. After conducting a summary hearing,
the trial court lifted the restraining order, dismissed the
petition and required petitioner and his counsel to explain
why they should not be cited for contempt for
misrepresenting that the barangay recall election was
without COMELEC approval.
The Comelec again re-scheduled the recall election, hence
the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for
injunction the issue being WON the recall election to be held
on January 13, 1996 is barred by the SK election to be held on
May 1996.
HELD: The issue on recall has become moot and academic.
But the Court held that it would be more in keeping with the
intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular
local election as one referring to an election where the office
held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be
contested and be filled by the electorate.
Petitioner's argument is simple and to the point. Citing
Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as
the Local Government Code, which states that "no recall shall
take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's
assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a
regular local election", petitioner insists that the scheduled
January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred as the
Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set by Republic Act
No. 7808 on the first Monday of May 1996, and every three
years thereafter. The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject
an elective local official to recall election once during his term
of office. Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a)
merely designates the period when such elective local official
may be subject of a recall election, that is, during the second
year of his term of office. Thus, subscribing to petitioner's
interpretation of the phrase regular local election to include
the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of
the Local Government Code on recall, a mode of removal of
public officers by initiation of the people before the end of his
term. And if the SK election which is set by R.A No. 7808 to be
held every three years from May 1996 were to be deemed
within the purview of the phrase "regular local election", as
erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no recall election can
be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the
LGC. In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start
with the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an
effective law, and the legislature is not presumed to have
done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. An
interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a
statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as
otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated,
repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant,
meaningless, inoperative or nugatory. It is likewise a basic
precept in statutory construction that a statute should be
interpreted in harmony with the Constitution. Thus, the
interpretation of Section 74 of the Local Government Code,
specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should not be in conflict
with the Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X of
the Constitution to "enact a local government code which
shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanism of recall, initiative,
and referendum . . . ." Finally, recall election is potentially
disruptive of the normal working of the local government unit
necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition
against the conduct of recall election one year immediately
preceding the regular local election. The proscription is due
to the proximity of the next regular election for the office of
the local elective official concerned. The electorate could
choose the official's replacement in the said election who
certainly has a longer tenure in office than a successor
elected through a recall election. It would, therefore, be more
in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code
to construe regular local election as one referring to an
election where the office held by the local elective official
sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the
electorate. Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer
possible because of the limitation stated under Section 74 (b)
of the Code considering that the next regular election
involving the barangay office concerned is barely seven (7)
months away, the same having been scheduled on May 1997.
Malonzo v. Comelec
Petitioner was duly elected as Mayor, winning over former
Mayor Macario Asistio, Jr. Barely one year into his term,
1,057 Punong Barangays and Sangguniang Barangay
members and SK chairmen, constituting a majority of the
members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly of the City of
Caloocan, met, and upon deliberation and election, voted for
the approval of Preparatory Recall Assembly Resolution No.
01-96, expressing loss of confidence in Mayor Malonzo, and
calling for the initiation of recall proceedings against him. The
Comelec declared the recall proceedings to be in order.
Mayor Malonzo filed a petition for certiorari with a prayer for
TRO assailing the Comelecs resolution. The Petition, in the
main, raises the issue of the validity of the institution and
proceedings of the recall, putting to fore the propriety of the
service of notices to the members of the Preparatory Recall
Assembly, and the proceedings held, resulting in the issuance
of the questioned Resolution.
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127 | P a g e Municipal Corporation
HELD: The Court ruled that notices were properly sent to the
members of the PRA and that the proceedings held by the
PRA are valid. The Commission regards the sending of notice
one thing, and the completion of service thereof another, for
indeed, the requirement of notice can only be fully satisfied,
if there was not only service, but also completion of service
thereof. Personal services were acknowledged by receipts
signed, if not by the addressee himself, then, as indicated
thereon, by his or her spouse, nearest relative or a person of
sufficient discretion in the member 's residence or office.
Service by registered mail was evinced by the return card duly
signed by the addressee or by persons acting for him. There
were instances when notices were served but were refused,
this fact noted in the acknowledgment receipt by the server
and his witnesses. The circumstances being thus, it was held
that there was complete service of the notices as
contemplated in Section 8, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. That
it was Alex David, President of the LIGA ng mga Barangay who
sent the notices is of no moment. As member of the PRA, he
can legally exercise the prerogatives attached to his
membership in the Preparatory Recall Assembly, sending
notices to the other members of its scheduled convening. It is
evident from the foregoing and, therefore, the Commission
so holds that the requirements of notice had been fully
complied with. Needless to state, the issue of propriety of the
notices sent to the PRA members is factual in nature, and the
determination of the same is therefore a function of the
COMELEC. In the absence of patent error, or serious
inconsistencies in the findings, the Court should not disturb
the same.
Petitioner's insistence, that the initiation of the recall
proceedings was infirm since it was convened by the Liga ng
mga Barangays, is misplaced. Petitioner observes that
"respondent Liga is an organization of all barangays. It is not
an organization of barangay captains and kagawads. The
barangays are represented in the Liga by the barangay
captains as provided under Section 492 LGC. It also provides
that the Kagawad may represent the barangay in the absence
of the barangay chairman." The Liga ng mga Barangay is
undoubtedly an entity distinct from the Preparatory Recall
Assembly. It just so happens that the personalities
representing the barangays in the Liga are the very members
of the Preparatory Recall Assembly, the majority of whom
met on July 7, 1996, and voted in favor of the resolution
calling for the recall of Mayor Malonzo, after deliberation
reported in the record, in accordance with the existing law.
Thus, the Punong Barangays and Sangguniang Barangay
members convened and voted as members of the
Preparatory Recall Assembly of Caloocan, and not as
members of the Liga ng mga Barangay. The recall
proceedings, therefore, cannot be denied merit on this
ground. Any doubt as to the propriety of the proceedings
held during the recall assembly should be laid to rest. As the
COMELEC pertinently observes: The Minutes of the session
of the Preparatory Assembly indicated that there was a
session held. Attendees constitute the majority of all the
members of the Preparatory Assembly, as we shall later on
establish. Rules of procedure, simple they may be were
formulated. Deliberations were conducted on the main issue,
which was that of petitioner's recall. The members were
given the opportunity to articulate on their resolve about the
matter. More importantly, their sentiments were expressed
through their votes signified by their signatures and
thumbmarks affixed to the Resolution. No proof was adduced
by Petitioner to substantiate his claim that the signatures
appearing thereon represented a cause other than that of
adopting the resolution.
The charges of graft and corruption, violence and
irregularities, before and during the session of the
preparatory recall assembly are largely uncorroborated, and
cannot override the substantiated findings of the respondent
COMELEC.
Claudio v. Comelec
Jovito Claudio was the duly elected mayor of Pasay City in the
May 11, 1998 elections. On May 19, 1999, several barangay
chairs formed an ad hoc committee for the purpose of
convening the PRA. Richard Advincula was designated chair.
The members of the PRA adopted Resolution No. 01, S-1999,
initiating Claudios recall. The petition for recall was filed in
the Office of the City Mayor. The COMELEC also posted the
petition on the bulletin boards of certain public places.
Oppositions to the petition were filed by Jovito Claudio, Rev.
Ronald Langub, and Roberto L. Angeles, alleging procedural
and substantive defects in the petition, to wit: (1) the
signatures affixed to the resolution were actually meant to
show attendance at the PRA meeting; (2) most of the
signatories were only representatives of the parties
concerned who were sent there merely to observe the
proceedings; (3) the convening of the PRA took place within
the one-year prohibited period; (4) the election case, filed by
Wenceslao Trinidad in this Court, seeking the annulment of
the proclamation of petitioner Claudio as mayor of Pasay City,
should first be decided before recall proceedings against
petitioner could be filed; and (5) the recall resolution failed to
obtain the majority of all the members of the PRA,
considering that 10 were actually double entries, were not
duly accredited members of the barangays, 40 Sangguniang
Kabataan officials had withdrawn their support, and 60
barangay chairs executed affidavits of retraction.
The COMELEC granted the petition and dismissed the
opposition. It ruled that the 1,073 members who attended
the May 29, 1999 meeting were more than necessary to
constitute the PRA, considering that its records showed the
total membership of the PRA was 1,790, while the statistics of
the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG)
showed that the total membership of the PRA was 1,876. In
either case, since only a majority is required to constitute the
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PRA, clearly, a majority had been obtained in support of the
recall resolution. Hence, this petition.
WON the word "Recall" in Paragraph (b) of 74 of the Local
Government Code Includes the Convening of the Preparatory
Recall Assembly and the Filing by it of a Recall Resolution
Held: Yes
Recall is a process which begins with the convening of the
preparatory, recall assembly or the gathering of the
signatures at least 25% of the registered voters of a local
government unit, and then proceeds to the filing of a recall
resolution or petition with the COMELEC, the verification of
such resolution or petition, the fixing of the date of the recall
election, and the holding of the election on the scheduled
date. However, as used in paragraph (b) of 74, "recall"
refers to the election itself by means of which voters decide
whether they should retain their local official or elect his
replacement. Several reasons can be cited in support of this
conclusion.
First, 74 deals with restrictions on the power of recall. It is
in fact entitled "Limitations on Recall." On the other hand,
69 provides that "the power of recall ...shall be exercised by
the registered voters of a local government unit to which the
local elective official belongs." Since the power vested on the
electorate is not the power to initiate recall proceedings but
the power to elect an official into office, the limitations in 74
cannot be deemed to apply to the entire recall proceedings.
In other words, the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers only
to the recall election, excluding the convening of the PRA and
the filing of a petition for recall with the COMELEC, or the
gathering of the signatures of at least 25 % of the voters for a
petition for recall.
Thus, there may be several PRAs held or petitions for recall
filed with the COMELEC - there is no legal limit on the number
of times such processes may be resorted to. These are merely
preliminary steps for the purpose of initiating a recall. The
limitations in 74 apply only to the exercise of the power of
recall which is vested in the registered voters. It is this - and
not merely, the preliminary steps required to be taken to
initiate a recall - which paragraph (b) of 74 seeks to limit by
providing that no recall shall take place within one year from
the date of assumption of office of an elective local official.
The second reason why the term "recall" in paragraph (b)
refers to recall election is to be found in the purpose of the
limitation itself. There are two limitations in paragraph (b) on
the holding of recalls: (1) that no recall shall take place within
one year from the date of assumption of office of the official
concerned, and (2) that no recall shall take place within one
year immediately preceding a regular local election.
The purpose of the first limitation is to provide a reasonable
basis for judging the performance of an "The only logical
reason which we can ascribe for requiring the electors to wait
one year before petitioning for a recall election is to prevent
premature action on their part in voting to remove a newly
elected official before having had sufficient time to evaluate
the soundness of his policies and decisions." The one-year
limitation was reckoned as of the filing of a petition for recall
because the Municipal Code involved in that case expressly
provided that "no removal petition shall be filed against any
officer or until he has actually held office for at least twelve
months." But however the period of prohibition is
determined, the principle announced is that the purpose of
the limitation is to provide a reasonable basis for evaluating
the performance of an elective local official. Hence, in this
case, as long as the election is held outside the one-year
period, the preliminary proceedings to initiate a recall can be
held even before the end of the first year in office of a local
official.
Third, to construe the term "recall" in paragraph (b) as
including the convening of the PRA for the purpose of
discussing the performance in office of elective local officials
would be to unduly restrict the constitutional right of speech
and of assembly of its members. The people cannot just be
asked on the day of the election to decide on the
performance of their officials. The crystallization and
formation of an informed public opinion takes time. To hold,
therefore, that the first limitation in paragraph (b) includes
the holding of assemblies for the exchange of ideas and
opinions among citizens is to unduly curtail one of the most
cherished rights in a free society. Indeed, it is wrong to
assume that such assemblies will always eventuate in a recall
election. To the contrary, they may result in the expression of
confidence in the incumbent.
To sum up, the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers to the
recall election and not to the preliminary proceedings to
initiate recall -
1. 1. Because 74 speaks of limitations on "recall" which,
according to 69, is a power which shall be exercised by the
registered voters of a local government unit. Since the voters
do not exercise such right except in an election, it is clear that
the initiation of recall proceedings is not prohibited within
the one-year period provided in paragraph (b);
2. Because the purpose of the first limitation in paragraph (b)
is to provide voters a sufficient basis for judging an elective
local official, and final judging is not done until the day of the
election; and
3. Because to construe the limitation in paragraph (b) as
including the initiation of recall proceedings would unduly
curtail freedom of speech and of assembly guaranteed in the
Constitution.
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129 | P a g e Municipal Corporation
As the recall election in Pasay City is set on April 15, 2000,
more than one year after petitioner assumed office as mayor
of that city, we hold that there is no bar to its holding on that
date.
WON the Phrase "Regular Local Election" in the Same
Paragraph (b) of 74 of the LGC includes the election period
or campaign period?
Held: No
The law is unambiguous in providing that "[n]o recall shall
take place within . . . one (1) year immediately preceding a
regular local election." Had Congress intended this limitation
to refer to the campaign period, which period is defined in
the Omnibus Election Code, it could have expressly said so.
Petitioner's interpretation would severely limit the period
during which a recall election may be held. Actually, because
no recall election may be held until one year after the
assumption of office of an elective local official, presumably
on June 30 following his election, the free period is only the
period from July 1 of the following year to about the middle
of May of the succeeding year. This is a period of only nine
months and 15 days, more or less. To construe the second
limitation in paragraph (b) as including the campaign period
would reduce this period to eight months. Such an
interpretation must be rejected, because it would devitalize
the right of recall which is designed to make local
government units" more responsive and accountable."
Indeed, there is a distinction between election period and
campaign period. Under the Omnibus Election Code, unless
otherwise fixed by the COMELEC, the election period
commences ninety (90) days before the day of the election
and ends thirty (30) days thereafter. Thus, to follow
petitioner's interpretation that the second limitation in
paragraph (b) includes the "election period" would
emasculate even more a vital right of the people.
WON the Recall RESOLUTION was Signed by a Majority of the
PRA and Duly Verified
Held: Yes
Petitioner contends that a majority of the signatures of the
members of the PRA was not obtained because 74 members
did not really sign the recall resolution. According to
petitioner, the 74 merely signed their names on pages 94-104
of the resolution to signify their attendance and not their
concurrence. Petitioner claims that this is shown by the word
"Attendance" written by hand at the top of the page on
which the signatures of the 74 begin.
This contention has no basis. To be sure, this claim is being
raised for the first time in this case. It was not raised before
the COMELEC. Although the word "Attendance" appears at
the top of the page, it is apparent that it was written by
mistake because it was crossed out by two parallel lines
drawn across it. Apparently, it was mistaken for the
attendance sheet which is a separate document. It is absurd
to believe that the 74 members of the PRA who signed the
recall resolution signified their attendance at the meeting
twice. It is more probable to believe that they signed pages
94-104 to signify their concurrence in the recall resolution of
which the pages in question are part. The other point raised
by petitioner is that the recall petition filed in the COMELEC
was not duly verified, because Atty. Nelson Ng, who notarized
it, is not commissioned as notary public for Pasay City but for
Makati City. As in the case of the first claim, this issue was not
raised before the COMELEC itself. It cannot, therefore, be
raised now.
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Human Resources and Development

Book I, Title 3, LGC (Sec 76 97)
For Sec 84 89, see above
Title III Human Resources and Development
Organization structure and staffing pattern (Sec 76)
In designing and implementing the organizational structure
and staffing pattern by the LGU the following factors shall be
considered:
1. Service Requirements of the LGU;
2. Financial Capability of the LGU
Subject to the guidelines prescribed by the
Civil Service Commission
Responsibility for human resources and development (Sec 77)
The local chief executive of every LGU shall be responsible for
human resources and development of the said LGU.
The local chief executive shall take all personnel actions in
accordance with the Constitution, pertinent laws, rules and
regulations including such policies, guidelines and standards
as may be established by the Civil Service Commission.
The local chief executive may employ emergency or casual
employees or laborers paid on a daily wage, piecework, or
per job order basis for local projects authorized by the
Sangguniang concerned, without the need for approval or
attestation by the Civil Service Commission BUT the period of
employment of these workers SHALL NOT exceed six (6)
months.
Civil Service Law, rules and regulations, and other related
issuances (Sec 78)
General rule: All matters pertaining to human resources and
development in LGUs shall be governed by the Civil Service
Law and such rules and regulations and other issuances
promulgated pursuant thereto.
Exception: When specified otherwise by the Local
Government Code.
Limitation on appointment (Sec 79)
No person shall be appointed in the career service of the local
government if he is related within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity to the appointing or recommending
authority.
Public notice of vacancy; Personnel Selection Board (Sec 80)
Requirement in filling up a vacant career position:
Posting of notice of the vacancy in at least three (3)
conspicuous public places in the LGU concerned for a period
of not less than fifteen (15) days.
Personnel Selection Board
Functions:
1. To assist the local chief executive in the judicious
and objective selection of personnel for employment
and for promotion;
2. To assist the local chief executive in the formulation
of policies that would contribute to employee
welfare.
Composition:
Headed by the Local Chief Executive;
Members shall be determined by resolution of the
sanggunian concerned;
A representative of the Civil Service Commission as
an ex-officio member;
The personnel officer of the LGU also as an ex-officio
member.
Compensation of local officials and employees (Sec 81)
General rule: It shall be determined by the sanggunian of
their respective LGU.
Limitations of the rule:
1. The increase in compensation of elective local
officials shall take effect only after the terms of
office of those approving such increase shall have
expired;
2. The increase in the compensation of the appointive
officials and employees shall take effect as provided
in the ordinance authorizing the such increase;
3. The increases as provided shall not exceed the
limitations on budgetary allocations for personal
services provided under Title 5, Book 2 of LGC;
4. The compensation as provided may be based upon
the pertinent provisions of R.A. 6758.
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Exception: The punong barangay, the sangguniang barangay
members, the SK chairman, the barangay treasurer, and the
barangay secretary shall be entitled to such compensation,
allowances, emoluments, and such other privileges as
provided under Title 1, Book 3 of LGC. (see Sec. 393, LGC)
Elective local officials shall be entitled to the same leave
privileges as those enjoyed by appointive local officials,
including the cumulation and commutation thereof.
Resignation of elective local officials (Sec 82)
Resignation by elective local officials shall be deemed
effective only upon acceptance of the proper authorities as
shown below:
Officials tendering
resignation
Proper Authority to accept
the resignation
Governors, vice-governors,
and mayors and vice-mayors
of highly urbanized cities and
independent component
cities
President of the Philippines


Municipal mayors, municipal
vice-mayors, city mayors and
city vice-mayors of
component cities
Governor
Sanggunian member
Sanggunian to which he/she
belongs
Barangay officials City or municipal mayor

Copies of the resignation letters of elective local officials,
together with the action taken by the proper authorities
accepting the resignation shall be furnished the DILG.
The resignation shall be deemed accepted if not acted upon
by the authority concerned within fifteen (15) working days
from receipt thereof.
Irrevocable resignations by sanggunian members shall be
deemed accepted upon presentation before an open session
of the sanggunian concerned and duly entered in its records.
Exceptions:
1. The above rule does not apply to sanggunian
members subject to recall election;
2. The same does not apply in cases where existing
laws prescribe the manner of acting upon such
resignations.
Grievance procedure (Sec 83)
The local chief executive, of every LGU shall establish a
procedure to inquire into, act upon, resolve or settle
complaints and grievances presented by local government
employees.
Practice of profession (Sec 90)
Governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from
practicing their profession or engaging in any business other
than the exercise of their function as local chief executives.
Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage
in any occupation, or teach in schools.
Exception: During session hours.
Exception to the exception: Doctors of medicine may practice
their profession even during official hours of work ONLY on
occasion of emergency PROVIDED; they do not derive any
monetary compensation therefrom.
Special rules for Sanggunian members who are also lawyers:
1. They shall not appear as counsel before any court in
any civil case wherein an LGU or any office, agency,
or instrumentality of the government is the adverse
party;
2. They shall not appear as counsel in any criminal case
wherein an officer or employee of the national or
local government is accused of an offense
committed in relation to his office;
3. They shall not collect any fee for their appearance in
administrative proceedings involving the local
government unit of which he is an official;
4. They shall not use property and personnel of the
Government except when they are defending the
interest of the Government.
Statement of assets and liabilities (Sec 91)
Officials and employees of LGUs shall file their:
1. Sworn statements of assets, liabilities and net worth
2. Lists of relatives within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity in government service;
3. Financial and business interests;
4. Personal data sheets as required by law.
Oath of office (Sec 92)
All elective and appointive local officials and employees shall,
upon assumption to office, subscribe to an oath or
affirmation of office in the prescribed form.
The oath or affirmation shall be filed with the office of the
local chief executive concerned.
A copy of the oath or affirmation of office of all elective and
appointive local officials and employees shall be preserved in
the individual personal records file under the custody of the
personnel office, division, or section of the LGU concerned.
Partisan political activity (Sec 93)
No local official or career civil service employee shall:
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1. Engage directly or indirectly in any partisan political
activity or take part in any election, initiative,
referendum, plebiscite, or recall EXCEPT to vote;
2. Use his official authority or influence to cause the
performance of any political activity by any person
or body.
Local officials or career civil service employees MAY express
his views on current issues, or mention the names of certain
candidates for public office whom he supports.
Elective local officials may take part in partisan political and
electoral activities BUT it shall be unlawful for them to solicit
contributions from their subordinates or subject these
subordinates to any of the prohibited acts under the Omnibus
Election Code.
Appointment of elective and appointive local officials;
candidates who lost in an election (Sec 94)
No elective of appointive local official shall be eligible for
appointment or designation in any capacity to any public
office or position during his tenure.
No elective or appointive local official shall hold any other
office or employment in the Government or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality including government owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
Exception: When otherwise allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position (Ex officio positions)
No candidate who lost in any election shall, within one (1)
year after such election, be appointed to any office in the
Government or any government owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.
Exception: Losers in the barangay elections.
Additional or double compensation (Sec 95)
No elective or appointive local official or employee shall
receive additional, double, or indirect compensation.
Exception: When specifically allowed by law.
No elective or appointive local official or employee shall
accept any present, emoluments, office, or title of any kind
from any foreign government.
Exception: When Congress gives consent.
Pension and gratuities shall not be considered as additional,
double, or indirect compensation.
Permission to leave station (sec 96)
Provincial, city, municipal, and barangay appointive officials
going on OFFICIAL TRAVEL shall apply and secure written
permission from their respective local chief executives before
departure.
The application (for permission to leave station) shall specify
the reason for the travel.
The permission shall be given or withheld based on:
1. considerations of pubic interest;
2. financial capability of the local government unit
concerned; and
3. urgency of the travel.
Should the local chief executive concerned fail to act upon
the application within four (4) working days from receipt
thereof, it shall be deemed APPROVED.
Mayors of component cities and municipalities shall secure
the permission of the governor concerned for any travel
outside the province.
Local government officials TRAVELING ABROAD shall notify
their respective sanggunian PROVIDED that when the period
of travel extends to MORE THAN THREE (3) MONTHS, during
periods of emergency or crisis or when the travel involves the
use of public funds, permission from the Office of the
President shall be secured.
Field officers of national agencies or offices assigned in
provinces, cities, municipalities shall not leave their official
stations without giving PRIOR WRITTEN NOTICE to the local
chief executive concerned.
The written notice shall state the duration of the travel and
the name of the officer whom he shall designate to act for
and in his behalf during his absence.
Annual report (Sec 97)
On or before March 31 of every year, every local chief
executive shall submit an annual report to the sanggunian
concerned on the socio-economic, political and peace and
order conditions, and other matters concerning the local
government unit, which shall cover the immediately
preceding calendar year.
A copy of the report shall be forwarded to the DILG.
Component cities and municipalities shall likewise provide
the sangguniang panlalawigan copies of their respective
annual reports.
I. Practice of Profession by Mayors, Governors
and other elective officials
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133 | P a g e Municipal Corporation
Sec 90, LGC
See above
Javellana v. DILG
Attorney Erwin B. Javellana was an elected City Council or of
Bago City, Negros Occidental. City Engineer Ernesto C.
Divinagracia filed Administrative Case against Javellana.
Divinagracia's complaint alleged that Javellana has
continuously engaged in the practice of law without securing
authority for that purpose from the Regional Director,
Department of Local Government, as required by DLG
Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 in relation to DLG
Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 of the same department:
that on July 8, 1989, Javellana, as counsel for Antonio Javiero
and Rolando Catapang, filed a case against City Engineer
Ernesto C. Divinagracia of Bago City for "Illegal Dismissal and
Reinstatement with Damages" putting him in public ridicule:
that Javellana also appeared as counsel in several criminal
and civil cases in the city, without prior authority of the DLG
Regional Director, in violation of DLG Memorandum Circular
No. 80-38. Javellana filed a Motion to Dismiss the
administrative case against him on the ground mainly that
DLG Memorandum Circular Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 are
unconstitutional because the Supreme Court has the sole and
exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law. The
motion to dismiss was denied.
A few months later, the LGC was enacted which provides:
"SEC. 90. Practice of Profession.
"(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions,
engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during
session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are
also members of the Bar shall not:
"(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case
wherein a local
government unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of
the government is the adverse party;
"(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer
or employee of the national or local government is accused of
an offense committed in relation to his office:
"(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative
proceedings involving the local government unit of which he
is an official; and
"(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except
when the sanggunian member concerned is defending the
interest of the Government.
Javellana thereupon filed this petition for certiorari praying
that DLG Memorandum Circulars Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 and
Section 90 of RA 7160 be declared unconstitutional and null
and void.
HELD: The Memorandum Circulars and Section 90 of RA 7160
are constitutional. In the first place, complaints against public
officers and employees relating or incidental to the
performance of their duties are necessarily impressed with
public interest for by express constitutional mandate, a public
office is a public trust. The complaint for illegal dismissal filed
by Javiero and Catapang against City Engineer Divinagracia is
in effect a complaint against the City Government of Bago
City, their real employer, of which petitioner Javellana is a
councilman. Hence, judgment against City Engineer
Divinagracia, would actually be a judgment against the City
Government. By serving as counsel for the complaining
employees and assisting them to prosecute their claims
against City Engineer Divinagracia, the petitioner violated
Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 (in relation to Section 7[b-2]
of RA 6713) prohibiting a government official from engaging
in the private practice of his profession, if such practice would
represent interests adverse to the government. Petitioner's
contention that Section 90 of the Local Government Code of
1991 and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 violate Article
VIII. Section 5 of the Constitution is completely off tangent.
Neither the statute nor the circular trenches upon the
Supreme Court's power and authority to prescribe rules on
the practice of law. The Local Government Code and DLG
Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply prescribe rules of
conduct for public officials to avoid conflicts of interest
between the discharge of their public duties and the private
practice of their profession, in those instances where the law
allows it. Section 90 of the Local Government Code does not
discriminate against lawyers and doctors. It applies to all
provincial and municipal officials in the professions or
engaged in any occupation. Section 90 explicitly provides that
Sanggunian Members "may practice their professions, engage
in any occupation, or teach in schools except during session
hours." If there are some prohibitions that apply particularly
to lawyers, it is because of all the professions, the practice of
law is more likely than others to relate to, or affect, the area
of public service.
II. Civil Service Law, Rules and Regulations;
Limitations on Appointments; Resignation of
Elective Local Officials; Preventive Suspension
of Local Officials and Employees;
Administrative Investigation; Disciplinary
Jurisdiction; Additional or Double
Compensation
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Local Boards and Councils

Book I, Titles 4-7 (Sec 98 116)
Title IV Local School Boards
There shall be established in every province, city, or
municipality a provincial, city or municipal school board
respectively.
Composition
i. Provincial School Board
Co - Chairmen 1. Provincial Governor
2. Provincial Division
Schools Superintendent
Members 1. Chairman of Education
Committee in the
Sangguniang
Panlalawigan
2. Provincial Treasurer
3. SK Federation
Representative in the
Sangguniang
Panlalawigan
4. President of the
Provincial Federation of
PTA
5. Representative of the
teachers organization in
the province
6. Representative of the
non-academic personnel
of public schools in the
province

ii. City School Board
Co Chairmen 1. City Mayor
2. City Division Schools
Superintendent

Members 1. Chairman of Education
Committee in the
Sangguniang Panlungsod
2. City Treasurer
3. SK Federation
Representative in the
Sangguniang Panlungsod
4. President of the City
Federation of PTA
5. Representative of the
teachers organization in
the city
Representative of the
non-academic personnel
of public schools in the
city

iii. Municipal School Board
Co Chairmen 1. Municipal Mayor
2. District Supervisor
Members 1. Chairman of Education
Committee in the Sangguniang
Bayan
2. Municipal Treasurer
3. SK Federation Representative in
the Sangguniang Bayan
4. President of the Municipal
Federation of PTA
5. Representative of the teachers
organization in the municipality
Representative of the non-
academic personnel of public
schools in the municipality

In the event that a province or a city has two (2) or more
school superintendents, and in the event that a municipality
has two (2) or more district supervisors, the co-chairmen of
the local school board shall be determined as follows:
1. The DepEd shall designate the co-chairman for the
provincial or city schools board; and
2. The Schools Division Superintendent shall designate
the district supervisor who shall serve as co-
chairman as in the municipal school board
The performance of the duties and responsibilities of the
abovementioned officials in their respective school boards
shall no be delegated.
Functions of a local school board
1. To determine in accordance with the criteria set by
the DepEd, the annual supplementary budgetary
needs for the operation and maintenance of public
schools within the province, city, or municipality, as
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the case may be, and the supplementary local costs
of meeting such needs, which shall be reflected in
the form of an annual school board budget
corresponding to its share of the proceeds of the
special levy on real property constituting the Special
Education Fund and such other sources of revenue
as this Code and other laws or ordinances may
provide;
2. To authorize the provincial, city or municipal
treasurer, as the case may be, to disburse funds
from the Special Education Fund pursuant to the
budget prepared and in accordance with existing
rules and regulations;
3. To serve as an advisory committee to the sanggunian
concerned on educational matters such as, but not
limited to, the necessity for and the uses of local
appropriations for educational purposes; and
4. To recommend changes in the names of public
schools within the territorial jurisdiction of the local
government unit for enactment by the sanggunian
concerned.
The DepEd shall consult the local school board on the
appointment of division superintendents, district supervisors,
school principals, and other officials.
Meetings and quorum
The local school board shall meet at least once a month or as
often as may be necessary.
Any of the co-chairmen may call a meeting.
A majority of all its members shall constitute a quorum.
However, when both co-chairmen are present in a meeting,
the local chief executive concerned, as a matter of protocol,
shall be given preference to preside over the meeting.
The division schools superintendent, city schools
superintendent or district supervisor, as the case may be,
shall prepare the budget of the school board concerned. Such
budget shall be supported by programs, projects, and
activities of the school board for the ensuing fiscal year.
The affirmative vote of the majority of all the members shall
be necessary to approve the budget.
Priorities in the school board budget
1. Construction, repair, and maintenance of school
buildings and other facilities of public elementary
and secondary schools;
2. Establishment and maintenance of extension classes
where necessary; and
3. Sports activities at the division, district, municipal,
and barangay levels.
Title V Local Health Boards
There shall be established a local health boards in every
province, city, or municipality.
Composition:
i. Provincial Health Board
Chairman Provincial Governor
Vice Chairman Provincial health officer
Members
1. Chairman of the committee
on health of the
sangguniang panlalawigan
2. Representative from Private
sector or NGO involved in
health services
3. Representative from the
DOH in the province

ii. City Health Board
Chairman City Mayor
Vice Chairman City Health Officer
Members
1. Chairman of the committee
on health of the
Sangguniang panlalawigan
2. Representative from Private
sector or NGO involved in
health services
3. Representative from DOH
in the province

iii. Municipal Health Board
Chairman Municipal Mayor
Vice chairman Municipal health officer
Members
1. Chairman of the committee
on health of the
sangguniang panlalawigan
2. Representative from Private
sector or NGO involved in
health services
3. Representative from the
DOH in the province


Functions of a local health board
1. To propose to the sanggunian concerned, in
accordance with standards and criteria set by the
DOH, annual budgetary allocations for the operation
and maintenance of health facilities and services
within the municipality, city, or province, as the case
may be;
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2. To serve as an advisory committee to the sanggunian
concerned on health matters such as, but not limited
to, the necessity for, and application of, local
appropriations for public health purposes; and
3. To create committees, consistent with the technical
standards and administrative standards of the DOH,
which shall advise local health agencies on matters
such as but not limited to:
a. personnel selection and promotion
b. bids and awards
c. grievance and complaints
d. personnel discipline
e. budget review
f. operations review
g. other similar functions.
Meetings and quorum
The board shall meet at least once a month or as may be
necessary.
A majority of the members of the board shall constitute a
quorum but the chairman or the vice-chairman must be
present during meetings where budgetary proposals are
being prepared or considered.
The affirmative vote of all the majority of the members shall
be necessary to approve such in proposals.
Compensation and remuneration
General Rule: The chairman, vice-chairman and members of
the local health board shall perform their duties without
compensation or remuneration.
Exception: Members of the local health board who are not
government officials or employees shall be entitled to
necessary traveling expenses and allowances chargeable
against the funds of the local health board concerned, subject
to the existing accounting and auditing rules and regulations.
Direct national supervision and control by the Secretary of
Health (Sec 105)
General Rule: The local health matters in a particular LGU
shall be directly controlled and supervised by the local health
board.
Exception: In cases of epidemics, pestilence, and other
widespread public health dangers, the Secretary of Health
may, upon the direction of the President and in consultation
with the LGU concerned, temporarily assume direct
supervision and control over health operations in any LGU for
the duration of the emergency, but in no case exceeding six
(6) months. With the concurrence of the LGU concerned, the
period for such direct supervision and control may be further
extended.
Title VI Local Development Councils
Section 106. Local Development Councils. Each local
government unit shall have a comprehensive multisectoral
development plan to be initiated by its development council
and approved by its sanggunian. For this purpose, the
development council at the provincial, city, municipal or
barangay level, shall assist the corresponding sanggunian in
setting the direction of economic and social development,
and coordinating development efforts within its territorial
jurisdiction.
Comments: The Code has established a local development
council for every province, city, municipality and barangay. Its
primary duty is to initiate a comprehensive multisectoral
development plan for the LGU concerned, which is submitted
to the proper sanggunian for its approval.
By initiating the development plan for the LGU concerned,
the local development council sets the direction of economic
and social development and coordinates development efforts
within the said local government unit. It is not specifically
directed by the Code that development planning should start
from below, the local people, and not imposed from the top,
the central government.
Section 107. Composition of Local Development Councils. The
composition of the local development council shall be as
follows:
(a)The barangay development council shall be headed by the
punong barangay and shall be composed of the following
members:
1. Members of the Sangguniang Barangay;
2. Representatives of nongovernmental organizations
operating in the barangay, who shall constitute not
less than one fourth (1/4) of the members of the
fully organized council;
3. A representative of the congressman.
(b)The City or Municipal Development Council shall be
headed by the mayor and shall be composed of the following
members:
1. All punong barangays in the city or municipality;
2. The chairman of the committee on appropriations of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan
concerned;
3. The congressman or his representative; and
4. Representatives of nongovernmental organizations
operating in the city or municipality, as the case may
be, who shall constitute not less than one-fourth
(1/4) of the members of the fully organized council.
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137 | P a g e Municipal Corporation
(c) The Provincial Development Council shall be headed by
the governor and shall be composed of the following
members:
1. All mayors of component cities and municipalities;
2. The chairman of the committee on appropriations of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan;
3. The congressman or his representative; and
4. Representatives of nongovernmental organizations
operating in the province, who shall constitute not
less than one-fourth (1/4) of the members of the
fully organized council.
(d) The local development councils may call upon any local
official concerned or any official of national agencies or
offices in the local government unit to assist in the
formulation of their respective development plans and public
investment programs.
Comments: The local chief executives chair the local
development councils: (a) the governor for the Provincial
Development Council, (b) the mayor for the City or Municipal
Development Council and (c) the punong barangay for the
Barangay Development Council.
NGO Members
The Code gives the NGOs a sizable number of representatives
(not less than of the total number of council members) in
the LDCs in recognition of the vital role that the private sector
plays in the development of the different provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays. As members of the LDCs, NGOs
can play a substantial role in defining the thrusts of local
development.
Power to Summon Assistance
The local development councils have the power to summon
any official of an LGU concerned or of the national
government agency or office in the said LGU to assist them in
the formulation of their respective development plans and
public investment programs.
Section 108. Representation of Nongovernmental
Organizations. Within a period of sixty (6) days from the start
of organization of local development councils, the
nongovernmental organizations shall choose from among
themselves their representatives to said councils. The local
sanggunian concerned shall accredit nongovernmental
organizations subject to such criteria as may be provided by
law.
Comments:
Period to Choose NGO Representatives
This section directs that within 60 days from the organization
of the LDC, the NGOs shall choose their representatives to
the council from among themselves.
It bears repeating that NGO representatives are chosen by
them. They are not to be appointed by the mayor, the
governor nor any other politician.
Accreditation of NGOs
This section deals with the accreditation of the NGOs by the
local sanggunian concerned according to such criteria as may
be provided by law. Till this date, there is no such law yet.
The IRR, however, indicate some criteria for the accreditation
of NGOs. The criteria laid down by the IRR are helpful guides
for accreditation.
Section 109. Functions of Local Development Councils.
(a)The Provincial, City and Municipal Development Councils
shall exercise the following functions:
1. Formulate long-term, medium-term, and annual
socioeconomic development plans and policies;
2. Formulate the medium-term and annual public
investment programs;
3. Appraise and prioritize socioeconomic development
programs and projects;
4. Formulate local investment incentives to promote
the inflow and direction of private investment
capital;
5. Coordinate, monitor and evaluate the
implementation of development programs and
projects; and
6. Perform such other functions as may be provided by
law or competent authority.
(b) The barangay development council shall exercise the
following functions:
1. Mobilize peoples participation in local development
efforts;
2. Prepare barangay development plans based on local
requirements;
3. Monitor and evaluate the implementation of
national or local programs and projects; and
4. Perform such other functions as may be provided by
law or competent authority.
Comments: The Barangay Development Council does
essentially the same things for the barangay, although there
is one thing that it is explicitly empowered to do which the
other development councils have not been expressly
authorized to do to mobilize peoples participation in local
development efforts. It does not mean, however, that other
LDCs cannot mobilize popular participation in local
development. In fact, they should do so because without
popular involvement and support, there will be no substantial
development in their community.
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Section 110. Meetings and Quorum. The local development
council shall meet at least once every six (6) months or as
often as may be necessary.
Section 111. Executive Committee.
(a) Each local development council shall create an executive
committee to represent it and act in its behalf when it is not
in session. The composition of the executive committee shall
be as follows:
1. The executive committee of the Provincial
Development Council shall be composed of the
governor as chairman, the representative of
component city and municipal mayors to be chosen
from among themselves, the chairman of the
committee on appropriations of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, the president of the provincial league
of barangays, and a representative of non-
governmental organizations that are represented in
the council, as members;
2. The executive committee of the City or Municipal
Development Council shall be composed of the
mayor as chairman, the chairman of the committee
on appropriations of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
the president of the city or municipal league of
barangays, and a representative of nongovernmental
organizations that are represented in the council, as
members; and
3. The executive committee of the barangay
development council shall be composed of the
punong barangay as chairman, a representative of
the Sangguniang Barangay to be chosen from among
its members, and a representative of
nongovernmental organizations that are
represented in the council, as members.
(b) The executive committee shall exercise the following
powers and functions:
1. Ensure that the decision of the council are faithfully
carried out and implemented;
2. Act on matters requiring immediate attention or
action by the council;
3. Formulate policies, plans and programs based on the
general principles laid down by the council; and
4. Act on other matters that may be authorized by the
council.
Comments:
Excom Functions
The main function of the executive committee of a local
development council is to represent it and act in its behalf
when the council is not meeting.
Section 112. Sectoral or Functional Committee. The local
development councils may form sectoral or functional
committees to assist them in the performance of their
functions.
Comments: Sectoral/Functional Committees. The Code allows
the LDCs to create sectoral or functional committees to assist
them. A sectoral committee may be composed of members
who come from a particular sector of society, for example, an
urban poor committee or a committee of fisherfolk.
Functional committees may encompass definite duties like a
committee on ways and means or a committee on
beautification.
Section 113. Secretariat. There is hereby constituted for each
local development council a secretariat which shall be
responsible for providing technical support, documentation
of proceedings, preparation of reports and such other
assistance as may be required in the discharge of its
functions. The local development council may avail of the
services of any nongovernmental organization or educational
or research institution for this purpose.
The secretariats of the Provincial, City and Municipal
Development Councils shall be headed by their respective
planning and development coordinators. The secretariat of
the barangay development council shall be headed by the
barangay secretary who shall be assisted by the city or
municipal planning and development coordinator concerned.
Comments: LDC Secretariat. The Code does not define the
membership of the secretariat of the LDCs but it must be
headed by the provincial, city or municipal Development
Coordinators in the case of a province, city or municipality
and by the barangay secretary in the case of a barangay. The
barangay secretary as head of the Barangay Secretariat shall
be assisted by the city or municipal planning and
development coordinator concerned. The reason is that very
few, if any, barangay secretaries would have the expertise to
discharge the duties of the head of the barangay secretariat
on socioeconomic planning.
Section 114. Relation of Local Development Councils to the
Sanggunian and the Regional Development Council.
(a) The policies, programs and projects proposed by local
development councils shall be submitted to the sanggunian
concerned for appropriate action. The local development
plans approved by their respective sanggunian may be
integrated with the development plans of the next higher
level of local development council.
(b) The approved development plans of provinces, highly
urbanized cities and independent component cities shall be
submitted to the Regional Development Council, which shall
be integrated into the regional development plan for
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submission to the National Economic and Development
authority, in accordance with existing laws.
Comments:
Sanggunian Approval Needed. Plans, programs and projects
prepared by LDCs do not automatically acquire the force of
law. They must be submitted to the sanggunian concerned,
which enacts the corresponding ordinance to make them
enforceable within the territory of the LGU concerned. The
Sanggunian may or may not adopt the said plans, programs
and projects.
Integration with Higher Level LDC Plans. If adopted by the
Sanggunian, the said plans, programs and projects may be
integrated with the development plans of the next higher
LDC. For example, if the development plans of a Municipal
Development Council is adopted by the municipal
Sanggunian, the plans may be made a part of the provincial
development plan by the Provincial Development Council.
Submission to Regional Development Council. Development
plans approved by the Sanggunian of a province, a highly
urbanized city or an independent component city shall be
submitted to the Regional Development Council which shall
integrate them into the regional development plan for
submission to the NEDA in accordance with existing laws.
The regional development Council has no authority to
disapprove a provincial, city or municipal development plan
but it may make its implementation difficult by
recommending its disapproval for funding.
Section 115. Budget Information. The Department of Budget
and Management shall furnish the various local development
councils information on financial resources and budgetary
allocations applicable to their respective jurisdictions to guide
them in their planning functions.
Comments:
It is not a requirement for the Department of Budget and
Management to furnish LDCs with information on financial
resources of and budgetary allocations to the LGUs to guide
them in the discharge of their functions.
Title VII Local Peace and Order Council
Section 116. Organization. There is hereby established in
every province, city, and municipality a local peace and order
council, pursuant to Executive Order Numbered Three
hundred nine (EO No. 309), as amended, Series of 1988. The
local peace and order councils shall have the same
composition and functions as those prescribed by the said
executive board.
Comments:
Composition of Peace and Order Council
Executive Order No. 309 as amended, Series of 1988, defines
the membership of the local peace and order council.
Provincial Peace and Order Council Composition
The peace and order council of the province is composed of
the following: (a) the governor as chair; (b) the representative
of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, chosen by its members; (c)
the Social Welfare and Development Officer; (d) the
Information Officer; (e) the Health Officer; and (f) the
representatives of the central government office or agency in
the province who are appointed by their respective heads,
such as (i) the PNP director of the province; (ii) the
Commission on Human Rights in the province, (iii) the
commanding general or officer of the armed forces, if any, in
the province; (iv) the NBI provincial office; (v) the National
Security Council, if any, in the province; (vi) the provincial
prosecutors office; (vii) the DILK, if any, in the province; (viii)
the executive director of the Dangerous Drugs Board; and (ix)
3 representatives of the NGOs and Pos in the province,
representing the academic, civic and religious organizations,
who are appointed by the governor.
City/Municipal Peace and Order Council Composition
The peace and order council of the city or municipality is
composed of the following: (a) the mayor as chair; (b) the
Sangguniang Panglungsod or Sangguniang Bayan
representative, chosen by the sanggunian from among its
members; (c) the SWDO; (d) the Information Officer; (e) the
Health Officer; and (f) the representatives of the central
government office or agency in the city or municipality who
are appointed by their respective heads, such as (i) the chief
of police; (ii) the Commission on Human Rights, if any, in the
city or municipality; (iii) the commanding general or officer of
the armed forces, if any, in the city or municipality; (iv) the
NBI city or provincial office; (v) the National Security Council;
(vi) the city or municipal prosecutors office or in their
absence, the city or municipal attorney; (vii) the DILG, if any;
(viii) the executive director of the Dangerous Drugs Board;
and (ix) 3 representatives of the NGOs and Pos, representing
the academic, civic and religious organizations in the city or
municipality, who are appointed by the mayor upon
consultation with the members of the Council.
Local Peace and Order Council Functions
The provincial, city and municipal peace and order councils
have the following duties and functions:
(a) Formulate plans and recommend such measures to
improve or enhance peace and order and public safety in
their respective areas;
(b) Monitor the implementation of peace and order
programs and projects at the provincial, city or municipal
levels, and the operation of Civilian Volunteer Self-Defense
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Organizations and such other counter-insurgency programs
and activities;
(c) Make periodic assessments of the prevailing peace
and order situation in their respective areas and submit a
report thereon with recommendations to the chair of the
national peace and order council; and
(d) Perform all other functions assigned by law to the
peace and order council.
Regional Peace and Order Council
In between the national and the local peace and order
councils, there is another council called the Regional Peace
and Order Council, which is composed of their counterpart
members of the local peace and order councils. The Regional
Peace and Order Council performs essentially the same
functions as those of the local peace and order councils.
Osea v. Malaya
Petitioner filed a protest case with the Civil Service
Commission alleging that she was appointed as Officer-in-
Charge, Assistant Schools Division Superintendent of
Camarines Sur, by the then Secretary of DECS, upon the
endorsement of the Provincial School Board of Camarines
Sur. However, despite this, President Fidel Ramos, appointed
respondent to the position of Schools Division
Superintendent of Camarines Sur.
Petitioner claims that the appointment of respondent was
made without prior consultation with the Provincial School
Board, in violation of Section 99 of the Local Government
Code as well as her vested right as the Schools Division
Superintendent of Camarines Sur.
HELD: Section 99 of the LGC applies to appointments made by
the DECS because at the time of the enactment of the LGC,
schools division superintendents were appointed by the DECS
to specific division or location. However, in 1994, the Career
Executive Service Board issued a Memorandum Circular
placing the positions of schools division superintendent and
assistant schools division superintendent within the career
executive service. Consequently, the power to appoint
persons to career executive service positions was transferred
from the DECS to the President.
In addition, under the circumstances, the designation of
respondent as Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines
Sur was not a case of appointment but rather in the nature of
reassignment. Therefore, Section 99 of the LGC, which
requires prior consultation with the local school board does
not apply.
Appointment should be distinguished from reassignment. An
appointment may be defined as the selection, by the
authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to
exercise the functions of a given office. When completed,
usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in
security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is
replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office.
On the other hand, a reassignment is merely a movement of
an employee from one organizational unit to another in the
same department or agency which does not involve a
reduction in rank, status or salary and does not require the
issuance of an appointment. In the same vein, a designation
connotes merely the imposition of additional duties on an
incumbent official
Petitioner's designation as Officer-in-Charge, Assistant
Schools Division Superintendent, was expressly made subject
to further advice from the DECS. Thus, her designation was
temporary. In fact, there was a need to recommend her to
the President for appointment in a permanent capacity.
Inasmuch as she occupied her position only temporarily,
petitioner can be transferred or reassigned to other positions
without violating her right to security of tenure. Indeed,
petitioner has no vested right to the position of Schools
Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur.

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Local Taxation and Fiscal Matters

Book II Title 3, LGC
See above
Shares of LGUs in national taxes
Pimentel v. Aguirre (supra)
See above

Local Government Units


THE BARANGAY
Sec 384-439
CHAPTER I - Role and creation of the Barangay
Section 384. Role of the Barangay. As the basic political unit,
the barangay serves as the primary planning and
implementing unit of government policies, plans, programs,
projects and activities in the community, and as a forum
wherein the collective views of the people may be expressed,
crystallized and considered, and where disputes may be
amicably settled.
Comments:
The barangay discharges three seminal functions:
(a) as a basic political unit the barangay is the smallest
political entity used for governance in the country.
(b) as a primary planning and implementing unit the
barangay is mandated to plan development projects in its
territory and to deliver some basic services of the
government to its people.
(c) as a forum the barangay gets soundings of the views of
the people on various topics. It also provides a venue for the
settlement of disputes amicably.
Section 385. Manner of Creation. - A barangay may be
created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, by law or by an ordinance of the
sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod,
subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite to be conducted by the Comelec in the local
government unit or units directly affected within such period
of time as may be determined by the law or ordinance
creating said barangay. In the case of the creation of
barangays by the sangguniang panlalawigan, the
recommendation of the sangguniang bayan concerned shall
be necessary.
Section 386. Requisites for Creation.
(a) A barangay maybe created out of a contiguous territory
which has apopulation of at least two thousand (2,000)
inhabitants ascertified by the National Statistics Office except
in cities and municipalities within Metro Manila and other
metropolitan political subdivisions or in highly urbanized
cities where such territory shall have a certified population of
at least five thousand (5,000) inhabitants: Provided, That the
creation thereof shall not reduce the population of the
original barangay or barangays to less than the minimum
requirement prescribed herein.
To enhance the delivery of basic services in the indigenous
cultural communities, barangays may be created in such
communities by an Act of Congress, notwithstanding the
above requirement.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of the new barangay shall be
properly identified by metes and bounds or by more or less
permanent natural boundaries. The territory need not be
contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c) The governor or city mayor may prepare a consolidation
plan for barangays, based on the criteria prescribed in this
Section, within his territorial jurisdiction. The plan shall be
submitted to the sangguniang panlalawigan or sangguniang
panlungsod concerned for appropriate action. In the case of
municipalities within the Metropolitan Manila area and other
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metropolitan political subdivisions, the barangay
consolidation plan shall be prepared and approved by the
sangguniang bayan concerned.
Comments:
Unlike provinces, cities or municipalities which need a
definite territorial size to be created, all that the Code
requires in terms of area for newly created barangays is that
it be contiguous. The Code takes into account the fact that
when barangays were created during the Marcos years, their
territories were not defined by specific metes and bounds
and therefore came in different sizes, some comprising only a
block or two in the city and others covering areas larger than
some municipalities. Now, the Code directs that the territory
of the new barangay shall be identified by metes and bounds
or by more or less permanent boundaries.
The requirement of contiguity of barangay areas is not
mandatory when the barangay comprises two or more
islands.
Population Requirement
In general, at least 2,000 inhabitants are needed to qualify a
barangay for creation. But when the barangay being created
is within highly urbanized cities or in cities and municipalities
in the Metropolitan Manila Area or other metropolitan
political subdivisions, the population requirement is 5,000.
The population required must be certified by the NSO.
It is also required that the population of the new barangay
does not reduce the population of the original barangay from
which it is being created to levels below the numbers now
required by the Code. Nonetheless, barangays may be
created by law within areas occupied by indigenous cultural
communities even if their population may be below the
required numbers stipulated in the Code. The reason for this
exemption is to enhance the delivery of basic services.
Consolidation of Barangays
With an appropriate plan for consolidation of barangays
prepared by the governor or city mayor, the local sanggunian
may consolidate barangays within its territory based upon the
criteria set forth in this section. Consolidation may be the
only way to solve the problem of hundreds of barangays
throughout the country whose territorial jurisdictions are ill-
defined and which in the urban centers may comprise only a
block or two.
In the Metropolitan Manila Area, the consolidation plan for
barangays shall be approved by the Sangguniang Bayan of the
municipalities and Sangguniang Panlungsod of the cities.
CHAPTER II - Barangay officials and offices
Section 387. Chief Officials and Offices.
(a) There shall be in each barangay a punong barangay, seven
(7) sangguniang barangay members, the sangguniang
kabataan chairman, a barangay secretary, and a barangay
treasurer.
(b) There shall also be in every barangay a lupong
tagapamayapa. The sangguniang barangay may form
community brigades and create such other positions or
offices as may be deemed necessary to carry out the
purposes of the barangay government in accordance with the
needs of public service, subject to the budgetary limitations
on personal services prescribed under Title Five, Book II of
this Code.
Comments:
Aside from the principal officials for the barangay, namely the
punong barangay and the seven Sangguniang Barangay
members, the Sangguniang Kabataan chair, the barangay
secretary and the barangay treasurer, there are other
important officials in the barangay, namely the members of
the Lupong Tagapamayapa and the Community Brigades such
as the Tanod Brigade and the Disaster Brigade.
Section 388. Persons in Authority. - For purposes of the
Revised Penal Code, the punong barangay, sangguniang
barangay members, and members of the lupong
tagapamayapa in each barangay shall be deemed as persons
in authority in their jurisdictions, while other barangay
officials and members who may be designated by law or
ordinance and charged with the maintenance of public order,
protection and security of life and property, or the
maintenance of a desirable and balanced environment, and
any barangay member who comes to the aid of persons in
authority, shall be deemed agents of persons in authority.
Comments:
Punong barangays, members of Sangguniang Barangays and
Lupong Tagapamayapa are considered persons in authority
under this section. For purposes of the Code, the definition of
a person in authority in the Revised Penal Code is relevant.
Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code states that any person
directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or
as a member of some court or governmental corporation,
board or commission, shall be deemed a person in authority.
A barangay captain and a barangay chairman shall also be
deemed a person in authority.
The article also defines an agent of a person in authority as:
Any person who, by direct provision of law or by election or
by appointment by competent authority, is charged with the
maintenance of public order and the protection and security
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of life and property, such as a barrio councilman, barrio
policeman and barangay leader and any person who comes
to the aid of persons in authority
Definition Modified
That definition is now modified. In addition to the punong
barangay, the members of the Sangguniang Barangay and the
Lupong Tagapamayapa are now considered not merely as
agents of but as persons in authority in the Code. But other
barangay officials and members who may be designated by
law or ordinance and charged with the maintenance of public
order, protection and security of life and property, or the
maintenance of a desirable and balanced environment, and
any barangay member who comes to the aid of persons in
authority continue to be deemed agents of persons in
authority.
Section 388 of the Code provides that for purposes of the
Revised Penal Code, the punong barangay, the Sangguniang
Barangay members and the members of the Lupong
Tagapamayapa in each barangay shall be deemed as persons
in authority in their jurisdictions This law expands the
definition of a person in authority under the Revised Penal
Code, wherein among the barangay officials, only the
barangay captain or chairman, now called the punong
barangay, is expressly considered a person in authority, as
provided in Article 152 thereof. Thus, in addition to the
punong barangay, the members of the Sangguniang Barangay
or kagawads and members of the Lupong Tagapamayapa are
now considered not merely agents of, but as persons, in
authority.
Protecting Environment as Agents of Persons in Authority
Barangay officials and members designated by law or
ordinance to maintain a desirable and balanced environment
or who come to the aid of persons in authority who protect
the environment are considered agents of persons in
authority.
Consequences of Being Persons in Authority/Agents of
Persons in Authority
As persons in authority, they are entitled to respect and may
request assistance from barangay residents in the
performance of their duties. Also, because they are
considered persons in authority, if they are physically
harmed, the person responsible may be charged for higher
degree felonies than would otherwise be the case. For
example, if a barangay resident is attacked physically but
without any intent to kill and he suffers some injuries, the
attacker may be charged for physical injuries. But if the victim
is a barangay official, the charge may be for the more serious
offense of assault upon a person in authority or upon an
agent of a person in authority for which a higher penalty is
imposable.
Power to Arrest and Detain
A barangay captain (now called punong barangay) is a peace
officer in the barrio (barangay) and is considered under the
law as a person in authority. As such, he may make arrests
and detain persons within legal limits but if the detention is
without legal grounds, the punong barangay may be charged
for arbitrary detention as defined in Article 124 of the
Revised Penal Code.
CHAPTER III - The Punong Barangay
Section 389. Chief Executive: Powers, Duties and Functions.
(a)The punong barangay, as the chief executive of the
barangay government, shall exercise such powers and
perform such duties and functions, as provided by this Code
and other laws.
(b)For efficient, effective and economical governance, the
purpose of which is the general welfare of the barangay and
its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the
punong barangay shall:
1. Enforce all laws and ordinances which are applicable
within the barangay;
2. Negotiate, enter into, and sign contracts for and in
behalf of the barangay, upon authorization of the
sangguniang barangay;
3. Maintain public order in the barangay and, in
pursuance thereof, assist the city or municipal mayor
and the sanggunian members in the performance of
their duties and functions;
4. Call and preside over the sessions of the
sangguniang barangay and the barangay assembly,
and vote only to break a tie;
5. Upon approval by a majority of all the members of
the sangguniang barangay, appoint or replace the
barangay treasurer, the barangay secretary, and
other appointive barangay officials;
6. Organize and lead an emergency group whenever
the same may be necessary for the maintenance of
peace and order or on occasions of emergency or
calamity within the barangay;
7. In coordination with the barangay development
council, prepare the annual executive and
supplemental budgets of the barangay;
8. Approve vouchers relating to the disbursement of
barangay funds;
9. Enforce laws and regulations relating to pollution
control and protection of the environment;
10. Administer the operation of the Katarungang
Pambarangay in accordance with the provisions of
this Code;
11. Exercise general supervision over the activities of the
sangguniang kabataan;
12. Ensure the delivery of basic services as mandated
under Section 17 of this Code;
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13. Conduct an annual palarong barangay which shall
feature traditional sports and disciplines included in
national and international games, in coordination
with the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports;
14. Promote the general welfare of the barangay; and
15. Exercise such other powers and perform such other
duties and functions as may be prescribed by law or
ordinance.
(c) In the performance of his peace and order functions, the
punong barangay shall be entitled to possess and carry the
necessary firearm within his territorial jurisdiction, subject to
appropriate rules and regulations.
Comments:
Barangay Chief Executive
To a lesser extent, the punong barangay is the equivalent of
the governor of a province or the mayor of a city or
municipality as chief executive for his barangay.
Power of Appointment
The appointment of barangay officials by the punong
barangay is subject to confirmation by the majority of all the
members of the Sangguniang Barangay.
Some Powers of Punong Barangay
Among the more important powers
attached to his office by the Code are the
(a) enforcement of laws relative to pollution
control and protection of the environment;
(b) administration of barangay justice or
Katarungang Pambarangay; and (c) holding
of annual palarong barangay in
coordination with the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports.
Enforcement of Anti-Pollution Laws. The
punong barangay has the power to protect
the environment and to enforce laws
against pollution
Palarong Barangay. The punong barangay
has the power to conduct the annual
Palarong Barangay. The idea is to encourage
the youth of the land, including those living
in the remotest areas, to participate in
sports activities. It is hoped that through
the palarong barangay, they may develop
into national, if not international, class
athletes.
Right to Carry Firearms. The punong
barangay is entitled to possess and carry a
firearm within his barangay while
discharging his duties.
CHAPTER IV - The Sangguniang Barangay
Section 390. Composition. The Sangguniang Barangay, the
legislative body of the barangay, shall be composed of the
punong barangay as presiding officer, and the seven (7)
regular Sangguniang Barangay members elected at large and
Sangguniang Kabataan chairman, as members.
Comments:
The punong barangay is a part of the Sangguniang Barangay
of which he is the presiding officer.
The Supreme Court has stressed that *a+ petition or protest
contesting the election of barangay officer should be decided
by the municipal or metropolitan trial court within 15 days
from filing thereof. xxx Election cases, unlike ordinary actions,
involve public interest. Time is of the essence in its
disposition since the uncertainty as to who is the real choice
of the people for the position must soonest be dispelled. It is
neither fair nor just that one of whose right to the office is in
doubt should remain in that office for an uncertain period.
Section 391. Powers, Duties and Functions.
(a) The sangguniang barangay, as the legislative body of the
barangay, shall:
1. Enact ordinances as may be necessary to discharge
the responsibilities conferred upon it by law or
ordinance and to promote the general welfare of the
inhabitants therein;
2. Enact tax and revenue ordinances, subject to the
limitations imposed in this Code;
3. Enact annual and supplemental budgets in
accordance with the provisions of this Code;
4. Provide for the construction and maintenance of
barangay facilities and other public works projects
chargeable to the general fund of the barangay or
such other funds actually available for the purpose;
5. Submit to the sangguniang panlungsod or
sangguniang bayan such suggestions or
recommendations as it may see fit for the
improvement of the barangay or for the welfare of
the inhabitants thereof;
6. Assist in the establishment, organization, and
promotion of cooperative enterprises that will
improve the economic condition and well-being of
the residents;
7. Regulate the use of multi-purpose halls, multi-
purpose pavements, grain or copra dryers, patios
and other post-harvest facilities, barangay
waterworks, barangay markets, parking areas or
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other similar facilities constructed with government
funds within the jurisdiction of the barangay and
charge reasonable fees for the use thereof;
8. Solicit or accept monies, materials and voluntary
labor for specific public works and cooperative
enterprises of the barangay from residents, land
owners, producers and merchants in the barangay;
monies from grants-in-aid, subsidies, contributions,
and revenues made available to the barangays from
national, provincial, city or municipal funds; and
monies from other private agencies and individuals:
Provided, however, That monies or properties
donated by private agencies and individuals for
specific purposes shall accrue to the barangay as
trust fund;
9. Solicit or accept, in any or all the foregoing public
works and cooperative enterprises, such cooperation
as is made available by national, provincial, city, or
municipal agencies established by law to render
financial, technical, and advisory assistance to
barangays and to barangay residents: Provided,
however, That in soliciting or accepting such
cooperation, the sangguniang barangay need not
pledge any sum of money for expenditure in excess
of amounts currently in the barangay treasury or
encumbered for other purposes;
10. Provide compensation, reasonable allowances or per
diems as well as travel expenses for sangguniang
barangay members and other barangay officials,
subject to the budgetary limitations prescribed
under Title Five, Book II of this Code: Provided,
however, That no increase in the com- pensation or
honoraria of the sangguniang barangay members
shall take effect until after the expiration of the full
term of all members of the sangguniang barangay
approving such increase;
11. Hold fund-raising activities for barangay projects
without the need of securing permits from any
national or local office or agency. The proceeds from
such activities shall be tax-exempt and shall accrue
to the general fund of the barangay: Provided, That
in the appropriation thereof, the specific purpose for
which such fund-raising activity has been held shall
be first satisfied: Provided, further, That no fund-
raising activities shall be held within a period of sixty
(60) days immediately preceding and after a national
or local election, recall, referendum, or plebiscite:
Provided, finally, That said fund-raising activities
shall comply with national policy standards and
regulations on morals, health, and safety of the
persons participating therein. The sangguniang
barangay, through the punong barangay, shall
render a public accounting of the funds raised at the
completion of the project for which the fund-raising
activity was under- taken;
12. Authorize the punong barangay to enter into
contracts in behalf of the barangay, subject to the
provisions of this Code;
13. Authorize the barangay treasurer to make direct
purchases in an amount not exceeding One
thousand pesos (P1,000.00) at any one time for the
ordinary and essential administrative needs of the
barangay;
14. Prescribe fines in amounts not exceeding One
thousand pesos (P1,000.00) for violation of barangay
ordinances;
15. Provide for the administrative needs of the lupong
tagapamayapa and the pangkat ng tagapagkasundo;
16. Provide for the organization of community brigades,
barangay tanod, or community service units as may
be necessary;
17. Organize regular lectures, programs, or fora on
community problems such as sanitation, nutrition,
literacy, and drug abuse, and convene assemblies to
encourage citizen participation in government;
18. Adopt measures to prevent and control the
proliferation of squatters and mendicants in the
barangay;
19. Provide for the proper development and welfare of
children in the barangay by promoting and
supporting activities for the protection and total
development of children, particularly those below
seven (7) years of age;
20. Adopt measures towards the prevention and
eradication of drug abuse, child abuse, and juvenile
delinquency;
21. Initiate the establishment of a barangay high school,
whenever feasible, in accordance with law;
22. Provide for the establishment of a non-formal
education center in the barangay whenever feasible,
in coordination with the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports, ;
23. Provide for the delivery of basic services; and
24. Exercise such other powers and perform such other
duties and functions as may be prescribed by law or
ordinance.
Comments:
Wider powers are now enjoyed by the Sangguniang Barangay
than was previously the case.
Among the more noteworthy of its powers are: (a) to enact
tax and other revenue measures authorized by the Code; (b)
to regulate and charge fees for the use of barangay facilities,
including parking areas, markets, copra dryers, multipurpose
halls and the like; (c) to assist in the establishment of
cooperatives to improve the economic well-being of the
barangay residents; (d) to provide compensation, allowances,
per diems and travel expenses for barangay officials subject
to the limitations provided for in this Code; (e) to authorize
direct purchases by the barangay treasurer of not more than
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P1,000 worth of items at any one time that are ordinarily and
essentially needed by the barangay; (f) to prescribe fines of
not more than P1,000 for violations of barangay ordinances;
(g) to adopt measures to combat drug abuse, child abuse and
juvenile delinquency; (h) to provide for the establishment of
non-formal education centers; and (i) to provide for the
delivery of basic services.
Section 392. Other Duties of Sangguniang Barangay
Members. In addition to their duties as members of the
Sangguniang Barangay, Sangguniang Barangay members may:
(a) Assist the punong barangay in the discharge of his duties
and functions;
(b) Act as peace officers in the maintenance of public order
and safety; and
(c) Perform such other duties and functions as the punong
barangay may delegate.
Section 393. Benefits of Barangay Officials.
(a) Barangay officials, including barangay tanods and
members of the lupong tagapamayapa, shall receive
honoraria, allowances, and such other emoluments as may be
authorized by law or barangay, municipal or city ordinance in
accordance with the provisions of this Code, but in no case
shall it be less than One thousand pesos (P=1,000.00) per
month for the punong barangay and Six hundred pesos
(P=600.00) per month for the sangguniang barangay
members, barangay treasurer, and barangay secretary:
Provided, however, That the annual appropriations for
personal services shall be subject to the budgetary limitations
prescribed under Title Five, Book II of this Code;
(b) The punong barangay, the sangguniang barangay
members, the barangay treasurer, and the barangay
secretary shall also:
1. Be entitled to Christmas bonus of at least One
thousand pesos (P=1,000.00) each, the funds for
which shall be taken from the general fund of
the barangay or from such other funds
appropriated by the national government for
the purpose;
2. Be entitled, during their incumbency, to
insurance coverage which shall include, but shall
not be limited to temporary and permanent
disability, double indemnity, accident insurance,
death and burial benefits, in accordance with
Republic Act Numbered Sixty-nine hundred
forty-two (R.A. No. 6942), entitled "An Act
Increasing the Insurance Benefits of Local
Government Officials and Providing Funds
Therefor";
3. Be entitled to free medical care including
subsistence, medicines, and medical attendance
in any government hospital or institution:
Provided, That such hospital care shall include
surgery or surgical expenses, medicines, X-rays,
laboratory fees, and other hospital expenses; In
case of extreme urgency where there is no
available government hospital or institution, the
barangay official concerned may submit himself
for immediate medical attendance to the
nearest private clinic, hospital or institution and
the expenses not exceeding Five thousand pesos
(P=5,000.00) that may be incurred therein shall
be chargeable against the funds of the barangay
concerned;
4. Be exempted during their incumbency from
paying tuition and matriculation fees for their
legitimate dependent children attending state
colleges or universities. He may likewise avail of
such educational benefits in a state college or
university located within the province or city to
which the barangay belongs; and
5. Be entitled to appropriate civil service eligibility
on the basis of the number of years of service to
the barangay, pursuant to the rules and
regulations issued by the Civil Service
Commission.
(c) Elective barangay officials shall have preference in
appointments to any government position or in any
government-owned or -controlled corporations, including
their subsidiaries, after their tenure of office, subject to the
requisite qualifications and the provisions of the immediately
preceding paragraph.
(d) All duly appointed members of the barangay tanod
brigades, or their equivalent, which shall number not more
than twenty (20) in each barangay, shall be granted insurance
or other benefits during their incumbency, chargeable to the
barangay or the city or municipal government to which the
barangay belongs.
Comments:
Barangays may now grant honoraria, allowances and other
emoluments to their barangay officials, barangay tanods and
members of the Lupong Tagapamayapa.
The minimum is P1,000 per month for the punong barangay
and P600 for the Sangguniang Barangay members, Barangay
Treasurers and Barangay Secretaries subject, however, to the
requirement that not more than 55% of the total annual
income actually realized by the barangay from local sources
during the next preceding fiscal year shall be set aside for
personal services. Increase of honoraria or compensation
awarded by the Sangguniang Barangay for their elective
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members cannot take effect until after their term is over as
provided for under Section 391(10).
Among the more noteworthy benefits to which barangay
officials are entitled are the following: (a) a Christmas bonus
of at least P1,000 each; (b) insurance coverage; (c) free
medical care in government hospitals, (d) free education for
their legitimate dependent children in state colleges or
universities and for themselves in state colleges or
universities located in the province or city where their
barangays belong; (e) appropriate civil service eligibility on
the basis of their length of service to their barangays; and (f)
after their tenure of office, preference in appointments to
government-owned or controlled corporations.
The insurance for barangay officials includes disability
benefits, double indemnity, accident coverage, death and
burial benefits pursuant to the law that increases the
insurance benefits of local government officials (R.A. 6942).
The free medical care to which these officials are entitled
includes surgery or surgical expenses, medicines, x-rays,
laboratory fees and other hospital expenses in government
hospitals.
There is no limit as to the number of legitimate dependent
children of barangay officials who are entitled to free tertiary
education in state colleges or universities.
Barangay tanods are also entitled to insurance coverage and
other benefits chargeable to the barangay concerned or to
the city or municipality to which the barangay belongs.
CHAPTER V - Appointive barangay officials
Section 394. Barangay Secretary: Appointment,
Qualifications, Powers and Duties.
(a)The barangay secretary shall be appointed by the punong
barangay with the concurrence of the majority of all the
sangguniang barangay members. The appointment of the
barangay secretary shall not be subject to attestation by the
Civil Service Commission.
(b) The barangay secretary shall be of legal age, a qualified
voter and an actual resident of the barangay concerned.
(c) No person shall be appointed barangay secretary if he is a
sangguniang barangay member, a government employee, or
a relative of the punong barangay within the fourth civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity.
(d) The barangay secretary shall:
1. Keep custody of all records of the sangguniang
barangay and the barangay assembly meetings;
2. Prepare and keep the minutes of all meetings of
the sangguniang barangay and the barangay
assembly;
3. Prepare a list of members of the barangay
assembly, and have the same posted in
conspicuous places within the barangay;
4. Assist in the preparation of all necessary forms
for the conduct of barangay elections, initiatives,
referenda or plebiscites, in coordination with
the Comelec;
5. Assist the municipal civil registrar in the
registration of births, deaths, and marriages;
6. Keep an updated record of all inhabitants of the
barangay containing the following items of
information: name, address, place and date of
birth, sex, civil status, citizenship, occupation,
and such other items of information as may be
prescribed by law or ordinances;
7. Submit a report on the actual number of
barangay residents as often as may be required
by the sangguniang barangay; and
8. Exercise such other powers and perform such
other duties and functions as may be prescribed
by law or ordinance.
Comments:
Mandatory Barangay Appointive Officials
The barangay secretary and the barangay treasurer are
mandatory officers who are to be appointed by the Punong
Barangay subject to the approval of the majority of all the
members of the Sangguniang Barangay concerned. There are
other mandatory barangay officials like the Lupong
Tagapamayapa and the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo who are
mentioned specifically by the Code.
The barangay may create other positions which may be filled
by appointment by the punong barangay subject to approval
of a majority of the members of the Sangguniang Barangay.
Civil Registrar Duties of Barangay Secretary
One of the more important duties of the barangay secretary
is to assist the municipal civil registrar in the registration of
births, deaths and marriages. Another is to keep an updated
record of all inhabitants of the barangay containing their
names, addresses, places of birth, sexes, civil statuses,
citizenships, occupations and other items of information as
may be prescribed by law or ordinance.
Section 395. Barangay Treasurer: Appointment,
Qualifications, Powers and Duties.
(a) The barangay treasurer shall be appointed by the punong
barangay with the concurrence of the majority of all the
sangguniang barangay members. The appointment of the
barangay treasurer shall not be subject to attestation by the
Civil Service Commission.
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(b) The barangay treasurer shall be of legal age, a qualified
voter, and an actual resident of the barangay concerned.
(c) No person shall be appointed barangay treasurer if he is a
sangguniang barangay member, a government employee, or
a relative of the punong barangay within the fourth civil
degree of consanguinity or affinity.
(d) The barangay treasurer shall be bonded in accordance
with existing laws in an amount to be determined by the
sangguniang barangay but not exceeding Ten thousand pesos
(P=10,000.00), premiums for which shall be paid by the
barangay.
(e) The barangay treasurer shall:
1. Keep custody of barangay funds and properties;
2. Collect and issue official receipts for taxes, fees,
contributions, monies, materials, and all other
resources accruing to the barangay treasury and
deposit the same in the account of the barangay as
provided under Title Five, Book II of this Code;
3. Disburse funds in accordance with the financial
procedures provided in this Code;
4. Submit to the punong barangay a statement
covering the actual and estimates of income and
expenditures for the preceding and ensuing calendar
years, respectively, subject to the provisions of Title
Five, Book II of this Code;
5. Render a written accounting report of all barangay
funds and property under his custody at the end of
each calendar year, and ensure that such report shall
be made available to the members of the barangay
assembly and other government agencies
concerned;
6. Certify as to the availability of funds whenever
necessary;
7. Plan and attend to the rural postal circuit within his
jurisdiction; and
8. Exercise such other powers and perform such other
duties and functions as may be prescribed by law or
ordinance.
Comments:
Barangay treasurers are appointed by the punong barangay
subject to the approval of the majority of the members of the
Sangguniang Barangay.
The Code prohibits the appointment of a person as barangay
treasurer if he is a member of the Sangguniang Barangay, a
government employee or a relative of the punong barangay
within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity.
It is absolute only in the case of a relative of the punong
barangay within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or
affinity. It is not absolute in the case of a member of the
Sangguniang Barangay or a government employee who can
resign as such and then accept appointment as barangay
treasurer.
The barangay treasurer shall be bonded in an amount not
exceeding P10,000.
Section 396. Other Appointive Officials. The qualifications,
duties and functions of all other barangay officials appointed
by the punong barangay shall be governed by the provisions
of this Code and other laws or by barangay ordinances.
CHAPTER VI - Barangay Assembly
Section 397. Composition; Meetings.
(a) There shall be a barangay assembly composed of all
persons who are actual residents of the barangay for at least
six (6) months, fifteen (15) years of age or over, citizens of the
Philippines, and duly registered in the list of barangay
assembly members.
(b) The barangay assembly shall meet at least twice a year to
hear and discuss the semestral report of the sangguniang
barangay concerning its activities and finances as well as
problems affecting the barangay. Its meetings shall be held
upon call of the punong barangay or of at least four (4)
members of the sangguniang barangay, or upon written
petition of at least five percent (5%) of the assembly
members.
(c) No meeting of the barangay assembly shall take place
unless a written notice is given one (1) week prior to the
meeting except on matters involving public safety or security,
in which case notice within a reasonable time shall be
sufficient. The punong barangay, or in his absence, the
sangguniang barangay member acting as punong barangay,
or any assembly member selected during the meeting, shall
act as presiding officer in all the meetings of the assembly.
The barangay secretary, or in his absence, any member
designated by the presiding officer to act as secretary, shall
discharge the duties of secretary of the barangay assembly.
Comments:
Barangay Assembly Composition
Actual residents of a barangay for at least 6 months who are
citizens of the Republic, at least 15 years of age and are
registered in the list of barangay assembly members compose
the Barangay Assembly.
Barangay Assembly Meetings
Mandatory meetings of the Barangay Assembly are at least
twice a year.
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Meetings may be called by the punong barangay or by at
least four members of the Sangguniang Barangay or upon
petition of at least 5% of the assembly members.
Written notice is required to be sent at least one week before
the meeting is held except when matters involving public
safety or security are the main agenda of the meeting, in
which case, notice for a shorter period is allowed.
The punong barangay presides at the Barangay Assembly
meetings. If he is absent, the acting punong barangay takes
over or any assembly member selected during the meeting
may act as president officer.
Section 398. Powers of the Barangay Assembly. The barangay
assembly shall:
(a) Initiate legislative processes by recommending to the
sangguniang barangay the adoption of measures for the
welfare of the barangay and the city or municipality
concerned;
(b) Decide on the adoption of initiative as a legal process
whereby the registered voters of the barangay may directly
propose, enact, or amend any ordinance; and
(c) Hear and pass upon the semestral report of the
sangguniang barangay concerning its activities and finances.
Comments:
Assemblies as Forums. Barangay Assemblies provide the
forum for the discussion of barangay development plans or
petitions for the adoption of initiative to enact or amend a
barangay ordinance.
CHAPTER VII Katarungang Pambarangay
Section 399. Lupong Tagapamayapa
What
(a) There is hereby created in each barangay a lupong
tagapamayapa, composed of
the Punong Barangay, as chairman
ten (10) to twenty (20) members.
The lupon shall be constituted every three
(3) years in the manner provided herein.
Who
(b) Any person
actually residing or working
in the barangay
not otherwise expressly disqualified by law
and possessing integrity, impartiality,
independence of mind, sense of fairness,
and reputation for probity, may be
appointed a member of the lupon.
How
(c) A notice to constitute the lupon
which shall include the names of proposed
members
who have expressed their willingness to
serve
shall be prepared by the punong barangay
within the first fifteen (15) days from the
start of his term of office
Notice shall be posted in three (3)
conspicuous places in the barangay
continuously for a period of not less than
three (3) weeks
Appointment, when discretionary
(d) Taking into consideration any opposition to the proposed
appointment or any recommendations for appointment as
may have been made within the period of posting, the
Punong Barangay
shall within ten (10) days thereafter
appoint as members those whom he
determines to be suitable therefor
Appointments shall be in writing, signed by
the punong barangay, and attested to by
the barangay secretary.
(e) The list of appointed members shall be posted in three (3)
conspicuous places in the barangay for the entire duration of
their term of office; and
(f) In barangays where majority of the inhabitants are
members of indigenous cultural communities, local systems
of settling disputes through their councils of datus or elders
shall be recognized without prejudice to the applicable
provisions of this Code.
Section 400. Oath and Term of Office.
1. Upon appointment, each lupon member shall take
an oath of office before the punong barangay.
2. He shall hold office until a new lupon is constituted
on the third year following his appointment unless
sooner terminated by resignation, transfer of
residence or place of work, or withdrawal of
appointment by the punong barangay with the
concurrence of the majority of all the members of
the lupon.
Section 401. Vacancies.
Punong barangay shall immediately appoint a qualified
person who shall hold office only for the unexpired portion of
the term.
Section 402. Functions of the Lupon.
(a) Exercise administrative supervision over the conciliation
panels provided herein;
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(b) Meet regularly once a month to
provide a forum for exchange of ideas
among its members and the public on
matters relevant to the amicable
settlement of disputes,
to enable various conciliation panel
members to share with one another their
observations and experiences in effecting
speedy resolution of disputes; and
(c) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties
and functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance.
Section 403. Secretary of the Lupon.
The barangay secretary concurrently serves
as the secretary of the lupon.
Records the results of mediation
proceedings before the punong barangay
Submits a report thereon to the proper city
or municipal courts.
Receives and keeps the records of
proceedings submitted to him by the
various conciliation panels.
Section 404. Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo. (Conciliation
Panel)
(a) Constituted for each dispute brought before the lupon
consisting of three (3) members
chosen by the parties to the dispute from
the list of members of the lupon.
Should the parties fail to agree on the
pangkat membership, the same shall be
determined by lots drawn by the lupon
chairman.
(b) The three (3) members constituting the pangkat shall elect
from among themselves the chairman and the secretary.
Pangkat Secretary Functions
prepares minutes of the pangkat
proceedings
submits a copy duly attested to by the
chairman to the lupon secretary and to the
proper city or municipal court
issue and cause to be served notices to the
parties concerned.
The lupon secretary shall issue certified true copies of any
public record in his custody that is not by law otherwise
declared confidential.
Section 405. Vacancies in the Pangkat.
Chosen by the parties to the dispute from among the other
lupon members.
Should the parties fail to agree on a common choice, the
vacancy shall be filled by lot to be drawn by the lupon
chairman.
Section 406. Character of Office and Service of Lupon
Members.
(a) The lupon members deemd as persons in authority (as
defined in the RPC) while in the performance of their official
duties or on the occasion thereof.
(b) Lupon and pangkat members serve without compensation
without prejudice to incentives.. The DILG shall provide for a
system of granting economic or other incentives to the lupon
or pangkat members who adequately demonstrate the ability
to judiciously and expeditiously resolve cases referred to
them.
While in the performance of their duties, the lupon or
pangkat members, whether in public or private employment,
shall be deemed to be on official time, and shall not suffer
from any diminution in compensation or allowance from said
employment by reason thereof.
Section 407. Legal Advice on Matters Involving Questions of
Law.
The provincial, city legal officer or prosecutor or the
municipal legal officer shall render legal advice on matters
involving questions of law to the punong barangay or any
lupon or pangkat member
whenever necessary
in the exercise of his functions in the
administration of the katarungang
pambarangay.
Section 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement;
Exception Thereto.
The lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring
together the parties actually residing in the same city or
municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except:
(a) Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or
instrumentality thereof;
(b) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the
dispute relates to the performance of his official functions;
(c) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1)
year or a fine exceeding Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00);
(d) Offenses where there is no private offended party;
(e) Where the dispute involves real properties located in
different cities or municipalities unless the parties thereto
agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by
an appropriate lupon;
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(f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays
of different cities or municipalities, except where such
barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto
agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by
an appropriate lupon;
(g) Such other classes of disputes which the President may
determine in the interest of Justice or upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.
The court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the
authority of the lupon under this Code are filed may, at any
time before trial motu propio refer the case to the lupon
concerned for amicable settlement.
Section 409. Venue.
(a) Disputes between persons actually residing in the same
barangay shall be brought for amicable settlement before the
lupon of said barangay.
(b) Those involving actual residents of different barangays
within the same city or municipality shall be brought in the
barangay where the respondent or any of the respondents
actually resides, at the election of the complaint.
(c) All disputes involving real property or any interest therein
shall be brought in the barangay where the real property or
the larger portion thereof is situated.
(d) Those arising at the workplace where the contending
parties are employed or at the institution where such parties
are enrolled for study, shall be brought in the barangay
where such workplace or institution is located.
OBJECTIONS to venue shall be raised in the
mediation proceedings before the punong
barangay; otherwise, the same shall be
deemed WAIVED.
Any legal question which may confront the
punong barangay in resolving objections to
venue may be submitted to the Secretary of
Justice, or his duly designated
representative, whose ruling thereon shall
be binding.
Section 410. Procedure for Amicable Settlement.
(a) Who may initiate proceeding
Upon payment of the appropriate filing fee
any individual who has a cause of action
against another individual
involving any matter within the authority of
the lupon
may complain, orally or in writing, to the
lupon chairman of the barangay.
(b) Mediation by lupon chairman
Upon receipt of the complaint, the lupon
chairman shall within the next working day
summon the respondent(s), with notice to
the complainant(s) for them and their
witnesses
to appear before him for a mediation of
their conflicting interests.
If he fails in his mediation effort within
fifteen (15) days from the first meeting of
the parties before him
he shall forthwith set a date for the
constitution of the pangkat.
(c) Suspension of prescriptive period of offenses
While dispute is under mediation,
conciliation, or arbitration, the prescriptive
periods for offenses and cause of action
INTERRUPTED upon filing the complaint
with the punong barangay. Period RESUMES
upon receipt by the complainant of the
complainant or the certificate of
repudiation or of the certification to file
action issued by the lupon or pangkat
secretary:
Interruption shall not exceed sixty (60) days
from the filing of the complaint with the
punong barangay.
(d) Issuance of summons; hearing; grounds for
disqualification
The pangkat shall convene not later than
three (3) days from its constitution
on the day and hour set by the lupon
chairman
to hear both parties and their witnesses,
simplify issues, and explore all possibilities
for amicable settlement.
For this purpose, the pangkat may issue
summons for the personal appearance of
parties and witnesses before it.
If party moves to disqualify any member of
the pangkat by reason of relationship, bias,
interest, or any other similar grounds
discovered AFTER the constitution of the
pangkat, the matter shall be resolved by the
affirmative vote of the majority of the
pangkat whose decision shall be final.
Should disqualification be decided upon,
the resulting vacancy shall be filled as
herein provided for.
(e) Period to arrive at a settlement -
Within fifteen (15) days from the day the pangkat convenes in
accordance with this section. This period is extendible at the
discretion of the pangkat, which shall not exceed fifteen (15)
days, except in clearly meritorious cases.
Section 411. Form of settlement.
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All amicable settlements shall be in writing
in a language or dialect known to the
parties
signed by them
and attested to by the lupon chairman or
the pangkat chairman, as the case may be.
When the parties to the dispute do not use
the same language or dialect, the
settlement shall be written in the language
known to them.
Section 412. Conciliation.
(a) Pre-condition to Filing of Complaint in Court.
No complaint, petition, action, or
proceeding involving any matter within the
authority of the lupon shall be filed or
instituted directly in court or any other
government office for adjudication
unless there has been a confrontation
between the parties before the lupon
chairman or the pangkat
and that no conciliation or settlement has
been reached as certified by the lupon
secretary or pangkat secretary as attested
to by the lupon or pangkat chairman
or unless the settlement has been
repudiated by the parties thereto.
(b) Where Parties May Go Directly to Court.
The parties may go directly to court in the following
instances:
1. Where the accused is under detention;
2. Where a person has otherwise been deprived of
personal liberty calling for habeas corpus
proceedings;
3. Where actions are coupled with provisional
remedies such as preliminary injunction,
attachment, delivery of personal property and
support pendente lite; and
4. Where the action may otherwise be barred by the
statute of limitations.
(c) Conciliation among members of indigenous cultural
communities.
Customs and traditions of indigenous cultural communities
SHALL be applied in settling disputes between members of
the cultural communities.
Section 413. Arbitration.
(a) The parties may, at any stage of the proceedings, agree in
writing that they shall abide by the arbitration award of the
lupon chairman or the pangkat.
Such agreement to arbitrate may be
repudiated within five (5) days from the
date thereof for the same grounds and in
accordance with the procedure hereinafter
prescribed.
Arbitration award shall be made after the
lapse of the period for repudiation and
within ten (10) days thereafter.
(b) The arbitration award shall be in writing in a language or
dialect known to the parties. When the parties to the dispute
do not use the same language or dialect, the award shall be
written in the language or dialect known to them.
Section 414. Proceedings Open to the Public; Exception.
All proceedings for settlement shall be public and informal.
Provided, however, That the lupon chairman or the pangkat
chairman, as the case may be, may motu proprio or upon
request of a party, exclude the public from the proceedings in
the interest of privacy, decency, or public morals.
Section 415. Appearance of Parties in Person.
Parties must appear in person without the assistance of
counsel or representative, except for minors and
incompetents who may be assisted by their next-of-kin who
are not lawyers.
Section 416. Effect of Amicable Settlement and Arbitration
Award.
The amicable settlement and arbitration award shall have the
force and effect of a final judgment of a court upon the
expiration of ten (10) days from the date thereof
unless repudiation of the settlement has
been made or a petition to nullify the award
has been filed before the proper city or
municipal court.
This provision shall not apply to court cases
settled by the lupon, in which case the
compromise or the pangkat chairman shall
be submitted to the court and upon
approval thereof, have the force and effect
of a judgment of said court.
Section 417. Execution.
The amicable settlement or arbitration award may be
enforced by execution by the lupon within six (6) months
from the date of the settlement.
After the lapse of such time, the settlement may be enforced
by action in the appropriate city or municipal court.
Section 418. Repudiation.
Any party to the dispute may, within ten (10) days from the
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date of the settlement, repudiate the same
by filing with the lupon chairman
a statement to that effect sworn to before
him
where the consent is vitiated by fraud,
violence, or intimidation.
Such repudiation shall be sufficient basis for
the issuance of the certification for filing a
complaint.
Section 419. Transmittal of Settlement and Arbitration.
Award to the Court. - The secretary of the lupon shall
transmit the settlement or the arbitration award to the
appropriate city or municipal court
within five (5) days from the date of the
award
or from the lapse of the ten-day period
repudiating the settlement
and shall furnish copies thereof to each of
the parties to the settlement and the lupon
chairman.
Section 420. Power to Administer Oaths.
The punong barangay, as chairman of the lupong
tagapamayapa, and the members of the pangkat are hereby
authorized to administer oaths in connection with any matter
relating to all proceedings in the implementation of the
katarungang pambarangay.
Section 421. Administration; Rules and Regulations.
The city or municipal mayor, as the case may be, shall see to
the efficient and effective implementation and administration
of the katarungang pambarangay.
The Secretary of Justice shall promulgate the rules and
regulations necessary to implement this Chapter.
Section 422. Appropriations.
Such amount as may be necessary for the effective
implementation of the katarungang pambarangay shall be
provided for in the annual budget of the city or municipality
concerned.
CHAPTER VIII - Sangguniang Kabataan
Section 423. Creation and Election. -
(a) There shall be in every barangay a sangguniang kabataan
to be composed of
a chairman
seven (7) members
a secretary
a treasurer
(b) A sangguniang kabataan official who, during his term of
office, shall have passed the age of twenty-one (21) years
shall be allowed to serve the remaining portion of the term
for which he was elected.
Section 424. Katipunan ng Kabataan.
Composed of
all citizens of the Philippines actually
residing in the barangay for at least six (6)
months
who are fifteen (15) but not more than
twenty-one (21) years of age
duly registered in the list of the
sangguniang kabataan or in the official
barangay list in the custody of the barangay
secretary.
Section 425. Meetings of the Katipunan ng Kabataan.
At least once every three (3) months
or at the call of the chairman of the
sangguniang kabataan
or upon written petition of at least one-
twentieth (1/20) of its member
to decide on important issues affecting the
youth of the barangay.
Section 426. Powers and Functions of the Sangguniang
Kabataan.
The sangguniang kabataan shall:
(a) Promulgate resolutions necessary to carry out the
objectives of the youth in the barangay in accordance with
the applicable provisions of this Code;
(b) Initiate programs designed to enhance the social, political,
economic, cultural, intellectual, moral, spiritual, and physical
development of the members;
(c) Hold fund-raising activities, the proceeds of which shall be
tax-exempt and shall accrue to the general fund of the
sangguniang kabataan: Provided, however, That in the
appropriation thereof, the specific purpose for which such
activity has been held shall be first satisfied;
(d) Create such bodies or committees as it may deem
necessary to effectively carry out its programs and activities;
(e) Submit annual and end-of-term reports to the
sangguniang barangay on their projects and activities for the
survival and development of the youth in the barangay;
(f) Consult and coordinate with all youth organizations in the
barangay for policy formulation and program
implementation;
(g) Coordinate with the appropriate national agency for the
implementation of youth development projects and
programs at the national level;
(h) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties
and functions as the sangguniang barangay may determine or
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delegate; and
(i) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties
and functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance.
Section 427. Meetings of the Sangguniang Kabataan.
Meet regularly once a month on the date, time, and place to
be fixed by the said sanggunian.
Special meetings may be called by the sangguniang kabataan
chairman or any three (3) of its members
by giving written notice to all members of
the date, time, place and agenda of the
meeting at least one (1) day in advance.
Notices of regular or special meetings shall
be furnished the punong barangay and the
sangguniang barangay.
A majority of the members of the sangguniang kabataan shall
constitute a quorum.
Section 428. Qualifications.
An elective official of the sangguniang kabataan must be
a citizen of the Philippines
a qualified voter of the katipunan ng
kabataan
a resident of the barangay for at least one
(1) year immediately prior to election
at least fifteen (15) years but not more than
twenty- one (21) years of age on the day of
his election
able to read and write Filipino, English, or
the local dialect
must not have been convicted of any crime
involving moral turpitude.
Section 429. Term of Office.
Three (3) years, unless sooner removed for cause as provided
by law, permanently incapacitated, die or resign from office.
Section 430. Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman.
The registered voters of the katipunan ng kabataan shall elect
the chairman of the sangguniang kabataan who shall
automatically serve as an ex officio member of the
sangguniang barangay upon his assumption to office.
As such, he shall exercise the same powers, discharge the
same duties and functions, and enjoy the same privileges as
the regular sangguniang barangay members, and shall be the
chairman of the committee on youth and sports development
in the said sanggunian.
Section 431. Powers and Duties of the Sangguniang Kabataan
Chairman.
(a) Call and preside over all meetings of the katipunan ng
kabataan and the sangguniang kabataan;
(b) Implement policies, programs, and projects within his
jurisdiction in coordination with the sangguniang barangay;
(c) Exercise general supervision over the affairs and activities
of the sangguniang kabataan and the official conduct of its
members, and such other officers of the sangguniang
kabataan within his jurisdiction;
(d) With the concurrence of the sangguniang kabataan,
appoint from among the members of the sangguniang
kabataan, the secretary and treasurer and such other officers
as may be deemed necessary; and
(e) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties
and functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance.
Section 432. Sangguniang Kabataan Secretary.
(a) Keep all records of the katipunan ng kabataan and
sangguniang kabataan;
(b) Prepare and keep the minutes of all meetings of the
katipunan ng kabataan and sangguniang kabataan;
(c) Prepare all forms necessary for the conduct of
registrations, elections, initiatives, referenda, or plebiscites,
in coordination with the barangay secretary and the
COMELEC; and
(d) Perform such other duties and discharge such other
functions as the chairman of the sangguniang kabataan may
prescribe or direct.
Section 433. Sangguniang Kabataan Treasurer.
(a) Take custody of all sangguniang kabataan property and
funds not otherwise deposited with the city or municipal
treasurer;
(b) Collect and receive contributions, monies, materials, and
all other sources intended for the sangguniang kabataan and
katipunan ng kabataan;
(c) Disburse funds in accordance with an approved budget of
the sangguniang kabataan;
(d) Certify to the availability of funds whenever necessary;
(e) Submit to the sangguniang kabataan and to the
sangguniang barangay certified and detailed statements of
actual income and expenditures at the end of every month;
and
(f) Perform such other duties and discharge such other
functions as the chairman of the sangguniang kabataan may
direct.
Section 434. Privileges of Sangguniang Kabataan Officials.
Same privileges enjoyed by other
sangguniang barangay officials under this
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155 | P a g e Municipal Corporation
Code subject to such requirements and
limitations provided herein.
During their incumbency, sangguniang
kabataan officials exempt from payment of
tuition and matriculation fees while
enrolled in public tertiary schools, including
state colleges and universities.
The national government shall reimburse
said college or university the amount of the
tuition and matriculation fees: Provided,
That, to qualify for the privilege, the said
officials shall enroll in a state college or
university within or nearest their area of
jurisdiction.
Section 435. Succession and Filling of Vacancies.
(a) In case a sangguniang kabataan chairman
refuses to assume office
fails to qualify
is convicted of a felony
voluntarily resigns
dies
is permanently incapacitated
is removed from office
or has been absent without leave for more
than three (3) consecutive months
the sangguniang kabataan member who obtained the next
highest number of votes in the election immediately
preceding shall assume the office of the chairman
for the unexpired portion of the term
discharge the powers and duties
enjoy the rights and privileges appurtenant
to the office.
In case the said member refuses to assume the position or
fails to qualify, the sangguniang member obtaining the next
highest number of votes shall assume the position of the
chairman for the unexpired portion of the term.
(b) Where two (2) or more sangguniang kabataan members
obtained the same next highest number of votes, the other
sangguniang kabataan members shall conduct an election to
choose the successor to the chairman from among the said
members.
(c) After the vacancy shall have been filled, the sangguniang
kabataan chairman shall call a special election to complete
the membership of said sanggunian. Such sangguniang
kabataan member shall hold office for the unexpired portion
of the term of the vacant seat.
(d) In case of suspension of the sangguniang kabataan
chairman, the successor, as determined in subsections (a) and
(b) of this Section shall assume the position during the period
of such suspension.
CHAPTER IX - Pederasyon ng mga Sangguniang Kabataan
Section 436. Pederasyon ng mga Kabataan.
(a) There shall be an organization of all the pederasyon ng
mga sangguniang kabataan to be known as follows:
1. in municipalities pambayang pederasyon ng mga
sangguniang kabataan;
2. in cities, panlungsod na pederasyon ng mga
sangguniang kabataan;
3. in provinces, panlalawigang pederasyon ng mga
kabataan;
4. in special metropolitan political subdivisions,
pangmetropolitan pederasyon ng mga sangguniang
kabataan; and
5. on the national level pambansang pederasyon ng
mga sangguniang kabataan.
(b) The pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan shall, at all
levels, elect from among themselves the president, vice-
president and such other officers as may be necessary and
shall be organized in the following manner:
1. The panlungsod and pambayang pederasyon shall be
composed of the sangguniang kabataan chairmen of
barangays in the city or municipality, respectively;
2. The panlalawigang pederasyon shall be composed of
presidents of the panlungsod and pambayang
pederasyon;
3. The pangmetropolitang pederasyon shall be
composed of presidents of the panlungsod and
pambayan pederasyon;
(c) The elected presidents of the pederasyon at the provincial,
highly urbanized city, and metropolitan political subdivision
levels shall constitute the pambansang katipunan ng mga
sangguniang kabataan.
Section 437. Constitution and By-Laws.
The term of office, manner of election, removal and
suspension of the officers of the pederasyon ng mga
sangguniang kabataan at all levels shall be governed by the
constitution and by-laws of the pederasyon in conformity
with the provisions of this Code and national policies on
youth.
Section 438. Membership in the Sanggunian.
(a) A sangguniang kabataan chairman shall, upon certification
of his election by the COMELEC and during his tenure of office
is elected as pederasyon president, serve as an ex-officio
member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod, and sangguniang bayan, as the case may be,
without need of further appointment.
(b) The vice-president of the pederasyon whose president has
been elected as president of a higher pederasyon shall serve
as ex-officio member of the sanggunian concerned without
need of further appointment.
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(c) The pederasyon president or vice-president, as the case
may be, shall be the chairman of the committee on youth and
sports development of the sanggunian concerned.
CHAPTER X - Linggo ng Kabataan
Section 439. Observance of Linggo ng Kabataan. -
(a) Every barangay, municipality, city and province shall, in
coordination with the pederasyon ng mga sangguniang
kabataan at all levels, conduct an annual activity to be known
as the Linggo ng Kabataan on such date as shall be
determined by the Office of the President.
(b) The observance of the Linggo ng Kabataan shall include
the election of the counterparts of all local elective and
appointive officials, as well as heads of national offices or
agencies stationed or assigned in the territorial jurisdiction of
the local government unit, among in-school and community
youth residing in the local government unit concerned from
ages thirteen (13) to seventeen (17). During said week, they
shall hold office as boy and girl officials and shall perform
such duties and conduct such activities as may be provided in
the ordinance enacted pursuant to this Chapter.

A. Katarungang Pambarangay
Sec 399 422, LGC
See above
The Laws on VAW in the Philippines (expert
paper of Mam Guanzon)
See attachments
Sec 14, Sec 5, RA 9262
SECTION 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May
Issue and How. - Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to
the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering
the perpetrator to desist from committing acts under Section
5 (a) and (b) of this Act. A Punong Barangay who receives
applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the
applicant on the date of filing after ex parte determination of
the basis of the application. If the Punong Barangay is
unavailable to act on the application for a BPO, the
application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay
Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad the
order must be accompanied by an attestation by the
Barangay Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was unavailable
at the time for the issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be
effective for fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the issuance
of an ex parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or Barangay
Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of the same on the
respondent, or direct any barangay official to effect is
personal service.
The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in
any proceeding before the Punong Barangay.
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their
Children.- The crime of violence against women and their
children is committed through any of the following acts:
a. Causing physical harm to the woman or her child;
b. Threatening to cause the woman or her child
physical harm;
c. Attempting to cause the woman or her child
physical harm;
d. Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent
physical harm;
e. Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or
her child to engage in conduct which the woman or
her child has the right to desist from or desist from
conduct which the woman or her child has the
right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or
restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of
movement or conduct by force or threat of force,
physical or other harm or threat of physical or
other harm, or intimidation directed against the
woman or child. This shall include, but not limited
to, the following acts committed with the purpose
or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's
or her child's movement or conduct:
i. Threatening to deprive or actually
depriving the woman or her child
of custody to her/his family;
ii. Depriving or threatening to deprive
the woman or her children of
financial support legally due her or
her family, or deliberately
providing the woman's children
insufficient financial support;
iii. Depriving or threatening to deprive
the woman or her child of a legal
right;
iv. Preventing the woman in engaging
in any legitimate profession,
occupation, business or activity or
controlling the victim's own
mon4ey or properties, or solely
controlling the conjugal or
common money, or properties;
f. Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical
harm on oneself for the purpose of
controlling her actions or decisions;
g. Causing or attempting to cause the woman
or her child to engage in any sexual activity
which does not constitute rape, by force or
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157 | P a g e Municipal Corporation
threat of force, physical harm, or through
intimidation directed against the woman or
her child or her/his immediate family;
h. Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or
reckless conduct, personally or through
another, that alarms or causes substantial
emotional or psychological distress to the
woman or her child. This shall include, but
not be limited to, the following acts:
i. Stalking or following the woman or
her child in public or private
places;
ii. Peering in the window or lingering
outside the residence of the
woman or her child;
iii. Entering or remaining in the
dwelling or on the property of the
woman or her child against her/his
will;
iv. Destroying the property and
personal belongings or inflicting
harm to animals or pets of the
woman or her child; and
v. Engaging in any form of
harassment or violence;
i. Causing mental or emotional anguish,
public ridicule or humiliation to the woman
or her child, including, but not limited to,
repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and
denial of financial support or custody of
minor children of access to the woman's
child/children.
Aquino v. Aure
Aure and E.S. Aure Lending Investors, Inc. (Aure Lending) filed
a Complaint for ejectment against Aquino before the MeTC,
alleging that they acquired the subject property from the
spouses Aquino by virtue of a Deed of Sale. However, after
the spouses Aquino received substantial consideration for the
sale of the subject property, they refused to vacate the same.
In her Answer, Aquino countered that Aure Lending do not
have any legal right over the property, as per their
Memorandum of Agreement, Aure shall secure a loan from a
bank or financial institution in his own name using the subject
property as collateral and turn over the proceeds thereof to
the spouses Aquino. However, even after Aure successfully
secured a loan, the spouses Aquino did not receive the
proceeds thereon or benefited therefrom.
MeTC decided in favor of Aquino on the ground of non-
compliance with the barangay conciliation process. RTC
Affirmed this decision. However, the Court of Appeals
REVERSED and reasoned that the failure of Aure to undergo
barangay conciliation is not a jurisdictional flaw and it will not
affect the sufficiency of Aures Complaint since Aquino failed
to seasonably raise such issue in her Answer.
HELD: The primordial objective of barangay conciliations is to
reduce the number of court litigations and prevent the
deterioration of the quality of justice which has been brought
by the indiscriminate filing of cases in the courts. To ensure
this, the law requires the parties to undergo a conciliation
process as a precondition to filing a complaint in court subject
to certain exceptions which are inapplicable to this case. This
has been declared compulsory in nature.
However, the conciliation process is not a jurisdictional
requirement, so that non-compliance therewith cannot affect
the jurisdiction which the court has otherwise acquired over
the subject matter or over the person of the defendant; in
other words, the same would not prevent a court of
competent jurisdiction from exercising its power of
adjudication over the case before it, where the defendants,
as in this case, failed to object to such exercise of jurisdiction
in their answer and even during the entire proceedings a quo.
In the case at bar, Aquino cannot be allowed to attack the
jurisdiction of the MeTC after having submitted herself
voluntarily thereto. An examination of Aquinos Answer
before the MeTC shows that there is utter lack of any
objection on her part to any deficiency in the complaint
which could oust the MeTC of its jurisdcition. The fact that
Aquino raised such objection during the pre-trial and in her
Position Paper is of no moment, for the issue of non-recourse
to barangay mediation proceedings should be impleaded in
her Answer. Thus, although Aquinos defense is meritorious,
procedurally, such defense is no longer available for failure to
plead the same in the Answer as required by the omnibus
motion rule.
Neither could the MeTC dismiss the case motu proprio. The
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide only three instances
when the court may motu proprio dismiss the claim. It is clear
that a court may not motu proprio dismiss a case on the
ground of failure to comply with the requirement for
barangay conciliation, this ground not being among those
mentioned for the dismissal by the trial court of a case on its
own initiative.
Morata v. Go
Respondents Victor Go and Flora D. Go filed in the CFI of
Cebu a complaint against petitioners Morata for recovery of a
sum of money plus damages. On the basis of the allegation in
the complaint that the parties-litigants are all residents of
Cebu City, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss, citing as
ground the failure of the complaint to allege prior availment
by the plaintiffs of the barangay conciliation process required
by P.D. 1508, as well as the absence of a certification by the
Lupon or Pangkat Secretary that no conciliation or settlement
had been reached by the parties.
HELD: Except in the instances enumerated in sections 2 and 6
of the law, the Lupon has the authority to settle amicably all
types of disputes involving parties who actually reside in the
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same city or municipality. The law makes no distinction
whatsoever with respect to the classes of civil disputes that
should be compromised at the barangay level. In fact, in
defining the Lupon's authority, Section 2 of said law
employed the universal and comprehensive term "all", to
which usage the court should neither add nor subtract in
consonance with the rudimentary precept in statutory
construction that "where the law does not distinguish, the
court should not distinguish.
The conciliation process at the barangay level is designed to
discourage indiscriminate filing of cases in court in order to
decongest its clogged dockets and, in the process, enhance
the quality of justice dispensed by it. Thus, to say that the
authority of the Lupon is limited to cases exclusively
cognizable by the inferior courts is to lose sight of this
objective.
Moreover, if it is the intention of the law to restrict its
coverage only to cases cognizable by the inferior courts, then
it would not have provided in Section 3 thereof the rule on
Venue, which looks to the location of the real property in the
determination of venue, for it should be noted that,
traditionally and historically, jurisdiction over cases involving
real property or any interest therein, except forcible entry
and detainer cases, has always been vested in the courts of
first instance [now regional trial court].
Sections 11, 12 and 14, relied upon by respondent judge, deal
with the nullification or execution of the settlement or
arbitration awards obtained at the barangay level. These
sections conferred upon the city and municipal courts the
jurisdiction to pass upon and resolve petitions or actions for
nullification or enforcement of settlement/arbitration awards
issued by the Lupon, regardless of the amount involved or the
nature of the original dispute. But there is nothing in the
context of said sections to justify the thesis that the
mandated conciliation process in other types of cases applies
exclusively to said inferior courts.
Lastly, the circular issued by then Chief Justice embodying the
directive "to desist from receiving complaints, petitions,
actions and proceedings in cases falling within the authority
of said Lupons," has been addressed not only to judges of city
and municipal courts, but also to all the judges of the courts
of first instance, circuit criminal courts, juvenile and domestic
courts and courts of agrarian relations, now known as
regional trial courts. This clearly shows that conciliation
process at the barangay level, prescribed by P.D. 1508 as a
pre-condition for filing a complaint in court, is compulsory
not only for cases falling under the exclusive competence of
the metropolitan and municipal trial courts, but for actions
cognizable by the regional trial courts as well.
Uy v. Contreras
An argument arose between the petitioner and respondent
when the former sought to withdraw from premises of the
latter certain movable properties that the petitioner failed to
remove despite the expiry of their sublease agreement. This
led to a scuffle between the parties respective employees,
which allegedly resulted in injuries inflicted on the private
respondents. The private respondents then filed a complaint
with the barangay captain of Valenzuela, Makati, however,
during their scheduled confrontation before the barangay
captain, only the petitioner appeared. The prosecutor then
filed two informations for slight physical injuries against the
petitioner with the MTC of Makati.
Petitioner alleged in a motion to dismiss the prematurity of
the filing of the criminal cases for failure to undergo
conciliation proceedings. On the other hand, private
respondents contend that a denial of motion to dismiss is
proper because prior referral of the dispute to the lupon is
not applicable since she and petitioner are not residents of
barangays in the same city or municipality or of adjoining
barangays in different cities or municipalities and that referral
to the lupon is not likewise required if the case may
otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations. Moreover,
even assuming arguendo that prior referral to the lupon
applies to the case of private respondent, the latter had,
nevertheless, substantially complied with the requirement
with the subsequent certification of the barangay to file the
action.
HELD: While P.D. No. 1508 has been repealed by the L GC of
1991, the jurisprudence built thereon regarding prior referral
to the lupon as a pre-condition to the filing of an action in
court remains applicable because its provisions on prior
referral were substantially reproduced in the Code. In view of
the respondents' failure to appear at the scheduled
mediation, no complaint for slight physical injuries could be
validly filed with the MTC of Makati at any time before such
date. The filing then of criminal cases was premature.
In addition, Section 6 of P.D. No. 1508 (more properly,
Section 412(b)(4) of the LGC) which states that the parties
may go directly to court where the action is about to
prescribe, cannot justify the dismissal of the case. This is
because pursuant to paragraph (c), Section 410 of the Code,
the prescriptive period was automatically suspended for a
maximum period of sixty days.
Moreover, having brought the dispute before the lupon of
barangay Valenzuela, Makati, the private respondents are
estopped from disavowing the authority of the body which
they themselves had sought. Their act of trifling with the
authority of the lupon by unjustifiably failing to attend the
scheduled mediation hearings and instead filing the
complaint right away with the trial court cannot be
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159 | P a g e Municipal Corporation
countenanced for to do so would wreak havoc on the
barangay conciliation system.
Neither is the argument that petitioner "had already waived
the right to a reconciliation proceedings before the barangay,
persuasive. The petitioner did not waive the reconciliation
proceedings before the lupon of Valenzuela, Makati; she
submitted to it and attended the scheduled conciliation and
invoked the pre-condition of referral to the lupon in her
counter-affidavit.
Lastly, nor could the Court accept the contention of the
respondent that the parties could not agree on a compromise
and that they had to request the barangay captain to issue a
certification to file action. The request was nearly one and a
half months after criminal cases were filed with the court a
quo. Evidently, this was done to support their contention
that, in any event, there was substantial compliance with the
requirement of referral to the lupon. It must be stressed that
the private respondents, after failing to appear at the initial
confrontation and long after the criminal cases were filed,
had no right to demand the issuance of a certification to file
action.
Wingarts v. Mejia
These administrative complaints were an offshoot of criminal
cases decided by the respondent judge. The respondent
judge is charged with incompetence, ignorance of the law
and abuse of authority for taking cognizance of a criminal
case for grave threats and issuing a warrant of arrest against
the accused despite the lack of prior barangay conciliation.
The respondent judge explained that he took cognizance of
the criminal case in the belief that there had been substantial
compliance of the requirements of the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law since a certification of the barangay
captain regarding a confrontation of the partiesd, the fact
that no amicable settlement was reached by them, and that
he was endorsing the filing of the case in court, had been duly
submitted to respondent judge.
HELD: Under the LGC of 1991, offenses punishable by
imprisonment not exceeding 1 year or a fine not exceeding
Php5,000 require prior barangay conciliation. The crime of
grave threats punishable under Art. 282 of the Revised Penal
Code fall within the purview of this section. Furthermore, Sec.
412 (a) also requires the same mandate. Therefore,
respondent judge should have remanded the case to the
lupon instead of taking cognizance thereof and prematurely
issuing a warrant of arrest against the accused.
The respondent judge is liable for incompetence and
ignorance of the law for taking cognizance of this case
especially since judges are directed from improvidently
receiving and acting on complaints in cases falling within the
authority of the Lupon. It is a well-settled rule that
proceedings before the lupon are a precondition to the filing
of any action or proceeding in court or other government
office. Such an initiatory pleading, if filed without compliance
with the precondition, may be dismissed on the motion of
any interested party on the ground that it fails to state a
cause of action.
Although there is no clear proof of malice or bad faith,
respondent judge should have exercised the requisite
prudence, which he owes to the public and his profession,
especially in a case where personal liberty of the accused is
involved.
Corpuz v. CA
Carlito Corpuz filed an action for unlawful detainer against
private respondent Juanito Alvarado with the MTC of Manila,
for recovery of possession of the room being occupied by the
latter, which Corpuz children allegedly needed for their own
use. Finding the defenses of Alvarado to be without merit,
the MTC ordered Alvarado to vacate the room.
Alvarado raises the issue in the instant petition that the
ejectment suit was not referred to the Lupon Tagapayapa as
required by P.D. No. 1508
HELD: Alvarados defense was only stated in a single short
sentence in his answer. In Dui vs. CA, the Court held that
failure of a party to specifically allege the fact that there was
no compliance with the barangay conciliation procedure
constitutes waiver of that defense. A perusal of Alvarados
answer reveals that no reason or explanation was given to
support his allegation, which is deemed a mere general
averment.
In any event, the proceeding outlined in P.D. 1508 is not a
jurisdictional requirement and non-compliance therewith
cannot affect the jurisdiction which the lower court has
already acquired over the subject matter and the parties
therein.
Bonifacio Law Office v. Judge Bellosillo
In a letter-complaint, Atty. Salomon, Jr. charged Judge
Bellosillo with ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion
and obvious partiality and assailed the order of the said
judge, which referred an ejectment case back to the barangay
for conciliation proceedings despite the fact that it was
alleged in the verified complaint, that the matter had already
been referred to the barangay and that a copy of the
Certification to File Motion was attached.
In its Answer, the judge denied the charges and averred that
there was premature issuance of the Certificate to File Action
considering that there is no proof to show that the Pangkat
was duly constituted before the said certificate was issued.
Moreover, the belated submission by complainant of the
Minutes of Proceedings before the Barangay Chairman, which
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was inaccurate and difficult to decipher reveals the non-
compliance of complainant with the requirement of the law.
HELD: The records reveal that the Certification to File Action
was improperly and prematurely issued as it clearly shows
that no personal confrontation before a duly constituted
Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo took place. This supports the
respondents position that the Pangkat was not constituted,
and that no face to face conciliation of the parties had taken
place before it is substantiated by the Minutes submitted by
complainant. Evidently, complainant failed to complete the
barangay conciliation proceedings.
In addition, the Complaint before the barangay was dated
February 16, 1996. Records show that the hearing was
scheduled for February 26, 1996 and was reset for February
29, 1996. And yet, the Certification to File Action was issued
on March 1, 1996, less than fifteen days after the first
scheduled hearing before the barangay chairman in
contravention of Section 410 (b) of the LGC, requiring a
mediation effort within 15 days from the first meeting.
Evidently, the barangay failed to exert enough effort required
by law to conciliate between the parties and to settle the
case before it. Hence, respondent judge was correct in
remanding the case to it for completion of the mandated
proceedings. We cannot fault him for seeking to promote the
objectives of barangay conciliation and for taking to heart the
provisions of Supreme Court Circular No. 14-93. His referral
of the case back to the barangay cannot be equated with
gross ignorance of the law. Neither does it constitute grave
abuse of discretion or obvious partiality.
Despite this, however, respondent judge failed to comply
with the requirements of the Rules on Summary Procedure
when, acting on the complainants motion to consider the
proceedings already held before the barangay as substantial
compliance with the requirements of law, he chose to
continue with the proceedings of the case, and failed to
render a judgment within 30 days from the failure of the
respondents to answer. This undue delay constitutes a less
serious charge of gross inefficiency and warrants the
imposition of administrative sanction.
Mendoza v. Judge Afable
Mendoza alleged that on February 18, 1998, he filed with the
Office of the Barangay Chairman a complaint for slight
physical injuries against Palada, however, despite the
hearings conducted thereon, the parties failed to reach an
amicable settlement. Therefore, on May 4, 1998 complainant
Mendova filed a complaint for slight physical injuries before
the MTC. However, the case was dismissed by Judge Afable
on the ground of prescription (the complaint alleging a light
offense, which prescribes in two months).
In this administrative case, the complainant alleged that, in
dismissing the case, Judge Afable showed his ignorance of the
law when he did not apply the provisions of Section 410(c) of
the LGC, which suspends the prescriptive period of offences
upon the filing of the complaint with the Punong Barangay. In
his Answer, Judge Afable merely admitted his error and
claimed a mere mental lapse on his part.
HELD: It is axiomatic that an administrative complaint is not
the appropriate remedy for every irregular or erroneous
order or decision issued by a judge where a judicial remedy is
available, such as a motion for reconsideration, or an appeal.
For, obviously, if subsequent developments prove the judges
challenged act to be correct, there would be no occasion to
proceed against him at all. Besides, to hold a judge
administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or
decision he renders, assuming he has erred, would be nothing
short of harassment and would make his position doubly
unbearable. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial
office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or
interpret the law in the process of administering justice can
be infallible in his judgment. It is only where the error is so
gross, deliberate and malicious, or incurred with evident bad
faith that administrative sanctions may be imposed against
the erring judge.
In the present case, the complainant did not bother at all to
file a motion for reconsideration of respondent judges
decision dismissing the criminal case. No reason was
advanced by complainant why he failed to do so. Thus,
following our settled pronouncements cited above, his
instant administrative complaint is premature.
In addition, records fail to show when complainant received
the Barangay Certification to File Action. The undated
certification he submitted merely states that the case was set
for hearing before the barangay on March 16, 22 and 29,
1998, but the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement.
When he filed on May 4, 1998 the criminal case for slight
physical injuries with respondent's court, until the dismissal
of the case on November 3, 1998, he still failed to present
proof of his receipt of the Barangay Certification to File
Action. Clearly, he cannot now fault respondent judge for
dismissing the case on the ground of prescription.
While respondent admitted his mistake, the same may not be
considered ignorance of the law. If at all, it can only be an
error of judgment.
Finally, we noted that the complaint does not allege any bad
faith or malice on the part of respondent judge when he
dismissed the criminal case.
B. Sangguniang Kabataan
Sec 423 439, LGC
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161 | P a g e Municipal Corporation
See above
Monteclaros v. Comelec
SK, previously known as the Kabataang Barangay is a youth
organization established by PD 684. The KB was composed of
residents less than 18 years old, with no minimum age
specified. The LGC renamed the KB to SK and limited
membership to those aged 15-21 years. It is tasked to initiate
programs to enhance the social, political, economic cultural,
intellectual, moral, spiritual, and physical development of the
youth. It is composed of a chairperson and 7 members to be
elected by the Katipunan ng Kabataan, in turn composed of
citizens actually residing in the barangay for at least 6 months
who meet the age requirement. RA 7808 scheduled the SK
elections on the 1st Monday of 1996 and every 3 years
thereafter. The next elections are supposed to be held on
May 6, 2002. A bill by the Bicameral Committee however
reset the SK and barangay elections to July 15, 2002. The said
bill also lowered the membership age to at least 15 but not
more than 18 years old. Montesclaros et al. filed a petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for TRO
or preliminary injunction to: 1) prevent the postponement of
the SK elections originally scheduled for May 6, 2002, 2) to
prevent respondents from passing laws that reduce the age
requirement membership in the SK, and 3) to compel
respondents to allow those who have turned 21 on May 2002
to participate in any rescheduled SK elections. They allege
that those aged 18-21 will be unduly dismembered, unfairly
discriminated, unnecessarily disenfranchised, unjustly
associated and obnoxiously disqualified from the SK. They
also allege grave abuse of discretion on the COMELECs part.
The bill was approved by Congress and signed into law as RA
9164 on March 19, 2002.
HELD: The petition is bereft of merit. There is no actual
controversy as to the date of the elections that requires
judicial intervention. Neither was there grave abuse of
discretion in the postponement of the elections. The prayer
to prevent Congress from enacting laws that lower the age
requirement cannot be granted because a proposed bill is not
subject to judicial review. The court can only exercise judicial
review after and not before a law is enacted, lest it resort to
rendering advisory opinions. Absent a clear violation of
constitutional rights, Courts cannot exercise review over the
internal processes of Congress. The Court has no power to
dictate the object or subject of bills that Congress should
enact into law.
Public office is a public trust. It is not a property right. No one
has a vested right to any public office, much less the
expectancy of holding a public office. While the state
encourages the youths involvement in public affairs, the
policy refers to those who belong to the class of people
defined as the youth. Congress has the power to define who
are the youth qualified to join the SK. Every law is subject to
amendment or repeal and those who no longer qualify for
the SK because they are past the age limit cannot insist on
being part of the youth. Under PD 9164, Congress merely
restored the maximum age requirement of 18 years in PD684,
SKs original charter. RA 9164 enjoys the presumption of
constitutionality.









THE MUNICIPALITY, CITY AND PROVINCE

MUNICIPALITY CITY PROVINCE
a. Composition
Group of barangays [440] Group of more urbanized and developed
barangays [448]
Cluster of municipalities, or municipalities and component cities
[459]
b. Role
As a general-purpose government for the
coordination and delivery of basic, regular
and direct services and effective
governance of the inhabitants within its
territorial jurisdiction [440]
Same as the municipality[448] As a political and corporate of government serves as a dynamic
mechanism for developmental processes and effective governance of
LGUs within its territorial jurisdiction [459]
c. How created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered
Only by an Act of Congress and subject to
the approval by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite conducted by the COMELEC
in the LGU/s directly affected
Same as the municipality [449]

Same as the municipality [460]
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The plebiscite shall be held 120 days from
the date of its effectivity except as may
otherwise be provided in the Act.
[441]
d. Requisites for creation
Ave. annual income of at least
P2,500,000.00 for the last 2 consecutive
years based on the 1991 constant prices, as
certified by the DOF
- includes the income accruing to the
gen. fund
- excludes special funds, transfers and
non-recurring income
Population of at least 25,000 inhabitants
as certified by the NSO
A contiguous territory of at least 50 sq.
kms. as certified by the LMB
- should be properly identified by
metes and bounds
- does not apply if there is 1 or more
islands
- need not be contiguous if thereare
2 or more islands

Municipalities existing as of the date of the
effectivity of the LGC shall continue to exist
and operate as such. Existing municipal
districts organized prusuant to presidential
issuances or EOs and which have their
respective set of elective municipal officials
holding office at the time of the effectivity
of the LGC shall be considered as regular
municipalities. [442]
Ave. annual income of at least
P20,000,000.00 for the last 2 consecutive
years based on the 1991 constant prices, as
certified by the DOF
- includes the income accruing to the
gen. fund
- excludes special funds, transfers and
non-recurring income
Either of:
Population of at least 150,000 inhabitants
as certified by the NSO
A contiguous territory of at least 100 sq.
kms. as certified by the LMB
- should be properly identified by
metes and bounds
- does not apply if there is 1 or more
islands
- need not be contiguous if there are 2
or more islands
Provided, that, the creation thereof shall
not reduce the land area, population, and
income of the original unit/s at the time of
said creation to less than the min. reqts.
prescribed. [450]

For HIGHLY URBANIZED CITIES:
Ave. annual income of at least
P50,000,000.00 for the last 2 consecutive
years based on the 1991 constant prices, as
certified by the DOF
Population of at least 200,000 inhabitants
as certified by the NSO
[452]

* It shall be the duty of the President to
declare a city as highly urbanized within 30
days after it shall have met the min. reqts.
upon properapplication therefor and
ratification in a plebiscite by qualified voters
therein. [453]
Ave. annual income of at least P20,000,000.00 for the last 2
consecutive years based on the 1991 constant prices, as certified by
the DOF
- includes the income accruing to the gen. fund
- excludes special funds, transfers and non-recurring income
Either of:
Population of at least 250,000 inhabitants as certified by the NSO
A contiguous territory of at least 2,000 sq. kms. as certified by the
LMB
- should be properly identified by metes and bounds
- does not apply if there is 1 or more islands
- need not be contiguous if there are 2 or more islands
Provided, that, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area,
population, and income of the original unit/s at the time of said
creation to less than the min. reqts. prescribed. [461]

Existing sub-provinces are converted into regular provinces upon
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to be held in
the said sub-provinces and the original provinces directly affected.
The plebiscite shall be conducted by the COMELEC simultaneously
with the national elections following the effectivity of the LGC. [462]
e. Officials
mayor
vice-mayor
sangguniang bayan members
secretary to the sangguniang bayan
treasurer
assessor
accountant
budget officer
planning and devt. coordinator
engineer/building official
health officer
civil registrar

Optional:
administrator
legal officer
agriculturist
environment and natural resources
officer
social welfare and devt. officer
architect
information officer
mayor
vice-mayor
sangguniang panlungsod members
secretary to the sangguniang panlungsod
treasurer
assessor
accountant
budget officer
planning and devt. coordinator
engineer
health officer
civil registrar
administrator
legal officer
social welfare and devt. officer
gen. services officer
veterinarian

Optional:
architect
information officer
agriculturist
governor
vice-governor
sangguniang panlalawigan members
secretary to the sangguniang panlalawigan
treasurer
assessor
accountant
budget officer
planning and devt. coordinator
engineer
health officer
administrator
legal officer
social welfare and devt. officer
gen. services officer
agriculturist
veterinarian

Optional:
population officer
- cities which have existing population offices shall continue to
maintain such ofices for 5 years from the date of effectivity of the
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163 | P a g e Municipal Corporation

The sangguniang bayan may:
1. maintain existing offices not mentioned
above
2. create such other offices as may be
necessary to carry out the purposes of the
provincial government
3. consolidate the functions of any office
with those of another in the interest of
efficiency and economy

Unless, otherwise provided herein, heads of
departments and offices shall be appointed
by the municipal mayor with the
concurrence of the majority of all the
sangguniang bayan members, subject to
civil service law, rules and regulations. The
sangguniang bayan shall act on the
appointment within 15 days from the date
of its submission; otherwise, the same shall
be confirmed. [443]
population officer
- cities which have existing population
offices shall continue to maintain such
ofices for 5 years from the date of
effectivity of the LGC, after which said
office shall become optional
environment and natural resources officer
cooperatives officer
population officer

The sangguniang panlungsod may:
1. maintain existing offices not mentioned
above
2. create such other offices as may be
necessary to carry out the purposes of the
provincial government
3. consolidate the functions of any office
with those of another in the interest of
efficiency and economy

Unless, otherwise provided herein, heads of
departments and offices shall be appointed
by the city mayor with the concurrence of
the majority of all the sangguniang
panlungsod members, subject to civil service
law, rules and regulations. The sangguniang
panlungsod shall act on the appointment
within 15 days from the date of its
submission; otherwise, the same shall be
confirmed. [454]
LGC, after which said office shall become optional
natural resources and envrionment officer
cooperative officer
architect
information officer

The sangguniang panlalawigan may:
1. maintain existing offices not mentioned above
2. create such other offices as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes of the provincial government
3. consolidate the functions of any office with those of another in the
interest of efficiency and economy

Unless, otherwise provided herein, heads of departments and offices
shall be appointed by the governor with the concurrence of the
majority of all the sangguniang panlalawigan members, subject to
civil service law, rules and regulations. The sangguniang panlalawigan
shall act on the appointment within 15 days from the date of its
submission; otherwise, the same shall be confirmed. [463]
f. Composition of the sanggunian
Presiding officer: municipal vice-mayor
Members:
the regular sanggunian members
the president of the municipal chapter of
the liga ng mga barangay
the president of the pambayang
pederasyon ng mga SK
sectoral representatives
1. 1 from the women
2. 1 from the agricultural or industrial
workers
3. 1 from other sectors, including the
urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, or disabled persons
[446]
Presiding officer: city vice-mayor
Members:
the regular sanggunian members,the
president fothe city chapter of the liga ng
mga barangay
the president of the panlungsod na
pederasyon ng mga SK
the sectoral representatives
1. 1 from the women
2. 1 from the agricultural or industrial
workers
3. 1 from other sectors, including the
urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, or disabled persons
[457]
Presiding officer: provincial vice-governor
Members:
the regular sanggunian members
the president of the provincial chapter of the liga ng mga barangay
the president of the panlalawigang pederasyon ng mga SK
the president of the provincial federation of sangguniang members
of municipalities and component cities
sectoral representatives
1. 1 from the women
2. 1 from the agricultural or industrial workers
3. 1 from other sectors, including the urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, or disabled persons [467]

g. Salary grades as prescribed under RA 6758
Municipal mayor: Salary Grade 27 [444(d)]

Muncipal vice-mayor: Salary Grade 25
[445(b)]

Members of the sangguniang bayan: Salary
Grade 24

Members of the sanggunian of
municipalities in Metropolitan Manila Area
and other metropolitan political
subdivisions: Salary Grade 25 [447(b)]
City mayor: Salary Grade 30 [455(d)]

City vice-mayor of a highly urbanized city:
Salary Grade 28

City vice-mayor of a component city: Salary
Grade 26 [456(b)]

Members of the sangguniang panlungsod:
Salary Grade 25

Members of the sanggunian of highly-
urbanized cities: Salary Grade 27 [458(b)]
Provincial governor: Salary Grade 30 [465(c)]

Vice-governor:Salary Grade 28 [466(b)]

Members of the sangguniang panlalawigan: Salary Grade 27 [468(b)]

Classes of cities:
a. Component
1. Dependent component cities
2. Independent component cities - those
component cities whose charters prohibit their
voters from voting for provincial elective
officials. Independent component cities shall be
independent of the province
b. Highly-urbanized
- Voters of highly urbanized cities shall remain
excluded from voting for elective provincial officials.

Duties and Functions of the Municipal Mayor, City Mayor,
Governor (Sec 444, 455, 465)

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a. Such duties and functions as provided by the LGC
and other laws
b. Efficient, effective and economical governance for
the general welfare (see Sec.16) of the
(municipality/city/province) and its inhabitants
c. Hold office in the (municipal/city/provincial) hall
during his incumbency

Under the efficient, effective and economical governance:
A. Exercise general supervision and control over all programs,
projects, services, and activities of the
(municipal/city/provincial) government, and in this
connection shall:
1. Determine the guidelines of
(municipal/city/provincial) policies and be
responsible to the sanggunian for the program of the
government;
2.1. Direct the formulation of the
(municipal/city/provincial) development plan, with
the assistance of the (municipal/city/provincial)
development council
2.2. Implement the (municipal/city/provincial)
development plan upon approval thereof by the
sanggunian
3. At the opening of the regular session of the
sanggunian for every calendar year, and as may be
deemed necessary, present the program of
government and propose policies and projects for
the consideration of the sangguian as the general
welfare of the inhabitants and the needs of the
(municipal/city/provincial) government may require;
4.1. Initiate and propose legislative measures to the
sanggunian
4.2. Provide such information and data needed or
requested by said sanggunian in the performance of
its legislative functions, from time to time as the
situation may require
5. Appoint all officials and employees whose salaries
and wages are wholly or mainly paid out of
(municipal/city/provincial) funds and whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for in the
LGC, as well as those he may be authorized by law to
appoint;
6.1. Represent the (municipality/city/province) in all its
business transactions upon authorization by the
sanggunian
6.2. Sign on behalf of the (municipality/city/province) all
bonds, contracts, and obligations, and such other
documents made pursuant to law or ordinance upon
authorization by the sanggunian
7. Carry out such emergency measures as may be
necessary during and in the aftermath of man-made
and natural disasters and calamities;
8. Determine, according to law or ordinance, the time,
manner and place of payment of salaries or wages of
the officials and employees of the
(municipality/city/province)
9. Allocate and assign office space to
(municipal/city/provincial) and other officials and
employees who, by law or ordinance, are entitled to
such space in the municipal hall and other buildings
owned or leased by the (municipal/city/provincial)
government;
10.1. Ensure that all executive officials and employees of
the municipality faithfully discharge their duties and
functions as provided by law and the LGC;
10.2. Cause to be instituted administrative or judicial
proceedings against any official or employee of the
(municipality/city/province) who may have
committed an offense in the performance of his
official duties;
11.1. Examine the books, records and other documents of
all offices, officials, agents or employees of the
(municipality/city/province)
11.2. Require all national officials and employees
stationed in or assigned to the
(municipality/city/province) to make available to him
such books, records, and other documents in their
custody, in aid of his executive powers and
authority, except those classified by law as
confidential
12. Furnish copies of EOs issued by him within 72 hours
after their issuance
a. if municipal mayor, to the provincial governor
b. if mayor of a municipality of Metropolitan
Manila Area and that of any metropolitan
political subdivision, to the metropolitan
authority council chairman and to the Office of
the President
c. if component city mayor, to the provincial
governor
d. if highly-urbanized city mayor, to the Office of
the President
e. if mayor of a city in the Metropolitan Manila
Area and other metropolitan political
subdivision, to the metropolitan authority
council chairman
f. if governor, to the Office of the President
13. Visit component (barangays/barangays/cities and
municipalities) of the (municipality/city/province) at
least once in every 6 months to deepen his
understanding of problems and conditions therein,
listen and give appropriate counsel to local officials
and inhabitants, inform the officials and inhabitants
of the component (barangays/barangays/cities and
municipalities) general laws and ordinances which
especially concern them, and otherwise conduct
visits and inspections to the end that the governance
of the (municipality/city/province) will improve the
quality of life of the inhabitants;
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165 | P a g e Municipal Corporation
14. Act on leave applications of officials and employees
appointed by him and the commutation of the
monetary value of leave credits according to law;
15. Authorize official trips outside of the
(municipality/city/province) of
(municipal/city/provincial) officials and employees
for a period not exceeding 30 days;
16.1. Call upon any national office or employee stationed
in or assigned to the (municipality/city/province) to
advise him on matters affecting the
(municipality/city/province) and to make
recommendations thereon, or to coordinate in the
formulation and implementation of plans, programs,
projects,
16.2. Initiate an administrative or judicial action against a
national government official or employee who may
have committed an offense in the performance of
his official duties while stationed in or assigned to
the LGU concerned, when appropriate
17. Authorize payment of medical care, necessary
transportation, subsistence, hospital or medical fees
of (municipal/city/provincial) officials and employees
who are injured while in the performance of their
official duties and functions, subject to the
availability of funds;
18. Solemnize marriages, any provision of law to the
contrary notwithstanding;
19. Conduct a palarong
(bayan/panlungsod/panlalawigan) in coordination
with the DECS, as an annual activity which shall
feature traditional sports and disciplines included in
national and international games; and
20. Submit the following reports: (same receivers as in
NO. 12)
an annual report containing a summary of all
matters pertaining to the management,
administration and development of the
(municipality/city/province) and all information
and data relative to its political, social and
economic conditions;
and supplemental reports when unexpected
events and situations arise at any time during
the year, particularly when man-made or
natural disasters or calamities affect the general
welfare of the municipality, province, region or
country.

B. Enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance
of the (municipality/city/province) and the exercise of its
corporate powers (See Sec. 22), implement all approved
policies, programs, projects, services and activities of the
(municipality/city/province) and, in addition shall:
1. Ensure that the acts of the component
(barangays/barangays/cities and municipalities) of
the (muncipality/city/province) and of its officials
and employees are within the scope of their
prescribed powers, functions, duties and
responsibilites;
2. Call conventions, conferences, seminars or meetings
of any elective and appointive officials of the
(municipality/city/province), including provincial
officials and national officials and employees
stationed in or assigned to the
(municipality/city/province) at such time and place
and on such subject as he may deem important for
the promotion of the general welfare of the LGU and
its inhabitants;
3. Issue such EOs as are necessary for the proper
enforcement and execution of laws and ordinances;
4. Be entitled to carry the necessary firearm within his
territorial jurisdiction;
5. Act as the deputized representative of the National
Police Commission, formulate the peace and order
plan of the (municipality/city/province) and upon its
approval, implement the same and exercise general
and operational control and supervision over the
local police forces in the (municipality/city/province)
in accordance with RA 6975 (DILG Act of 1990)
6. Call upon the appropriate law enforcement agencies
to suppress disorder, riot, lawless violence, rebellion
or sedition or to apprehend violators of the law
when public interest so requires and the
(municipal/city/provincial) police forces are
inadequate to cope with the situation or the
violators;

C. Initiate and maximize the generation of resources and
revenues, and apply the same to the implementation of
development plans, programs objectives and priorities (see
Sec. 18), particularly those resources and revenues
programmed for agro-industrial development and country-
wide growth and progress, and relative thereto shall:
1. Require each head of an office or department to
prepare and submit an estimate of appropriations
for the ensuing calendar year, in accordance with
the budget preparation process
2. Prepare and submit to the sanggunian for approval
the executive and supplemental budgets of the
(municipality/city/province) for the ensuing calendar
year
3. Ensure that all taxes and other revenues of the
(municipality/city/province) are collected, and that
(municipal/city/provincial) funds are applied to the
payment of expenses and settlement of obligations
of the (municipality/city/province), in accordance
with law or ordinance;
4. Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke
the same for any violation of the conditions upon
which said licenses or permits had been issued,
pursuant to law or ordinance;
5. Issue permits, without need of approval therefor
from any national agency, for the holding of
activities for any charitable or welfare purpose,
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excluding prohibited games of chance or shows
contrary to law, public policy and public owners;
(does not apply to governors)
6. Require owners of illegally constructed houses,
buildings or other structures to obtain the necessary
permit, subect to such fines and penalties as may be
imposed by law or ordinance, to make necessary
changes in the construction of the same when said
construction violates any law or ordinance, or to
order the demolition or removal of said house,
building or structure within the period prescribed by
law or ordinance;
(does not apply to governors)
7.1. Adopt adequate measures to safeguard and
conserve land, mineral, marine, forest, and other
resources for the (municipality/city/province in
coordination with the mayors of component cities
and municipalities);
7.2. Provide efficient and effective property and supply
management in the (municipality/city/province);
7.3. Protect funds, credits, rights, and other properties of
the (municipality/city/province);
8.1. Institute or cause to be instituted administrative or
judicial proceedings for the violation of ordinances in
the collection of taxes, fees or charges, and for the
recovery of funds and property;
8.2. Cause the (municipality/city/province) to be
defended against all suits to ensure that its interests,
resources and rights shall be adequately protected;

D. Ensure the delivery of basic services and the provision of
adequate facilities (see Sec. 17 (B) (2)), and in addition
thereto, shall:
1. Ensure that the construction and repair of roads and
highways funded by the National Government shall
be, as far as practicable, carried out in a spatially
contiguous manner and in coordination with the
construction and repair of the roads and bridges of
the (municipality/city and the province/province and
its component cities and municipalities);
2. Coordinate the implementation of technical services,
including public works and infrastructure programs
in the municipality
a. rendered by national and provincial offices in
the case of municipalities
b. rendered by national offices in the case of highly
urbanized and independent component cities
c. rendered by national and provincial offices in
the case of component cities
d. rendered by national offices for the province
and its component cities and municipalities

Power, duties of the Municipal Vice-Mayor, City Vice-Mayor,
Vice Governor (Sec 445, 456, 466)
1. Be the presiding officer of the sanggunian and sign
all warrants drawn on the (municipal/city/provincial)
treasury for all expenditures appropriated for the
operation of the sanggunian
2. Subject to civil service law, rules and regulations,
appoint all officials and employees of the
sanggunian, except those whose manner of
appointment is specifically provided in the LGC
3. Assume the office of the (municipal mayor/city
mayor/governor) for the unexpired term of the
latter in the event of permanent vacancy
4. Exercise the powers and perform the duties and
functions of the (municipal mayor/city
mayor/governor) in cases of temporary vacancy
5. Exercise such powers and perform such other duties
and functions as may be prescribed by law or
ordinance

Powers, duties and functions of the Sangguniang (Bayan,
Panglungsod, Panlalawigan) (Sec 444, 455, 465)

A. Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an
efficient and effective (municipal/city/provincial)
government, and in this connection:
1. Review all ordinances approved by the (sangguniang
barangay/sangguniang barangay/sanggunians of
component cities and municipalities) and EOs issued
by the (punong barangay/punong barangay/mayors
of said component units) to determine whether
these are within the scope of the prescribed powers
of the sanggunian and of the (punong
barangay/punong barangay/mayor)
2. Maintain peace and order by enacting measures to
prevent and suppress lawlessness, disorder, riot,
violence, rebellion, or sedition and impose penalties
for the violation of said ordinances
3. Appprove ordinances imposing a fine not exceeding
(P2,500/P5,000/P5,000) or an imprisonment for a
period not exceeding (6 months/1 year/1 year), or
both, in the discretion of the court, for the violation
of a (municipal/city/provincial) ordinance
4. Adopt measures to protect the inhabitants of the
(municipality/city/province) from the harmful effects
of man-made or natural disasters and calamities and
to provide relief services and assistance for victims
during and in the aftermath of said disasters or
calamities and their return to productive livelihood
following said events
5. Enact ordinances intended to prevent, suppress and
impose appropriate penalties for habitual
drunkenness in public places, vagrancy, mendicancy,
prostitution, establishment and maintenance of
houses of ill repute, gambling and other prohibited
games of chance, fraudulent devices and ways to
obtain money or property, drug addiction,
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maintenance of drug dens, drug pushing, juvenile
delinquency, the printing, distribution or exhibition
of obscene or pornographic materials or
publications, and such other activities inimical to the
welfare and morals of the inhabitants of the
(municipality/city/province)
6. Protect the environment and impose appropriate
penalties for acts which endanger the environment,
such as dynamite fishing and other forms of
destructive fishing, illegal logging and smuggling of
logs, smuggling of natural resources products and of
endangered species of flora and fauna, slash and
burn farming, and such other activities which result
in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers
and laks, or of ecological imbalance
7. Subject to the provisions of the LGC and pertinent
laws, determine the powers and duties of officials
and employees of the (municipality/city/province)
8. Determine the positions and salaries, wages,
allowances and other emoluments and benefits of
officials and employees paid wholly or mainly from
(municipal/city/provincial) funds and provide for
expenditures necessary for the proper conduct of
programs, projects, services, and activities of the
(municipal/city/provincial) government
9. Authorize the payment of compensation to a
qualified person not in the government service who
fills up to a temporary vacancy or grant honorarium
to any qualified official or employee designated to
fill a temporary vacancy in a concurrent capacity at
the rate authorized by law
10. Provide a mechanism and the appropriate funds
therefor, to ensure the safety and protection of all
(municipal/city/provincial) government property,
public documents, or records such as those relating
to property inventory, land ownership, records of
births, marriages, deaths, assessments, taxation,
accounts, business permits, and such other records
and documents of public interest in the offices and
departments of the (municipal/city/provincial)
government
11. When the finances of the (municipal/city/provincial)
government allow, provide for additional allowances
and other benefits to judges, prosecutors, public
elementary and high school teachers, and other
national government officials stationed in or
assigned to the (municipality/city/province)
12. Provide for legal assistance to barangay officials
who, in the performance of their official duties or on
the occasion thereof, have to initiate judicial
proceedings or defend themselves against legal
action
(does not apply to the sangguniang
panlalawigan)
13. Provide for group insurance or additional insurance
coverage for barangay officials, including members
of barangay tanod brigades and other service units,
with public or private insurance companies, when
the finances of the (municipal/city) government
allow said coverage
(does not apply to the sangguniang
panlalawigan)

B. Generate and maximize the use of resources and revenues
for the development plans, program objectives and priorities
of the (municipality/city (see Sec. 18) with particular
attention to agro-industrial development and countryside
growth and progress, and relative thereto, shall:
1. Approve the annual and supplemental budgets of
the (municipal/city/provincial) government and
appropriate funds for specific programs, projects,
services and activities of the
(municipality/city/province), or for other purposes
not contrary to law, in order to promote the general
welfare of the (municipality/city/province) and its
inhabitants
2. Subject to the provisions of Book II of the LGC and
applicable laws and upon the majority vote of all the
members of the sanggunian, enact ordinances
levying taxes, fees and charges, prescribing the rates
thereof for general and specific purposes, and
granting tax exemptions, incentives or reliefs
3. Subject to the provisions of Book II of the LGC and
upon the majority vote of all the members of the
sanggunian, authorize the (municipal mayor/city
mayor/provincial governor) to negotiate and
contract loans and other forms of indebtedness
4. Subject to the provisions of Book II of the LGC and
applicable laws and upon the majority vote of all the
members of the sanggunian, enact ordinances
authorizing the floating of bonds or other
instruments of indebtedness, for the purpose of
raising funds to finance development projects
5. Appropriate funds for the construction and
maintenance of the rental of buildings for the use of
the (municipality/city/province); and, upon the
majority vote of all the members of the sanggunian,
authorize the (municipal mayor/city
mayor/provincial governor) to lease to private
parties such public buildings held in a proprietary
capacity, subject to existing laws, rules and
regulations
6. Prescribe reasonable limits and restraints on the use
of property within the jurisdiction of the
(municipality/city/province)
7.
a. For the sangguniang bayan and sangguniang
panlungsod: adopt a comprehensive land use plan
for the (municipality/city), provided, that the
formulation, adoption, or modification of said plan
shall be in coordination with the approved provincial
comprehensive land use plan
b. For the sangguniang panlalawigan: review the
comprehensive land use plans and zoning ordinances
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of component cities and municipalities and adopt a
comprehensive provincial land use plan, subject to
existing laws
8. Reclassify land within the jurisdiction of the
(municipality/city), subject to the pertinent
provisions of the LGC
(does not apply to the sangguniang
panlalawigan)
9. Enact integrated zoning ordinances in consonance
with the approved comprehensive land use plan,
subject to existing laws, rules and regulations;
establish fire limits or zones, particularly in populous
centers; and regulate the construction, repair or
modification of buildings within said fire limits or
zones in accordance with the provisions of the Fire
Code
(does not apply to the sangguniang
panlalawigan)
10. Subject to national law, process and approve
subdivision plans for residential, commercial, or
industrial purposes, and other development
purposes, and collect processing fees and other
charges, the proceeds of which shall accrue entirely
to the (municipality/city): Provided, however, that
where approval by a national agency or office is
required, said approval shall not be withheld for
more than 30 days from receipt of the application.
Failure to act on the application within the period
stated above shall be deemed as approval
(does not apply to the sangguniang
panlalawigan)
11. Subject to the provisions of Book II of the LGC, grant
the exclusive privilege of constructing fish corrals or
fish pens, or the taking or catching of bangus fry,
prawn fry or kawag-kawag, or fry of any species or
fish within the municipal waters
(does not apply to the sangguniang
panlalawigan)
12. With the concurrence of at least 2/3 of all the
members of the SANGGUNIAN, grant tax
exemptions, incentives or reliefs to entities engaged
in community growth-inducing industries
(does not apply to the sangguniang
panlalawigan)
* Under 192, LGC, LGUs may, through
ordinances duly approved, grant tax
exemptions, incentives or reliefs under such
terms and conditions as they may deem
necessary.
13. Grant loans or provide grants to other LGUs or to
national, provincial and municipal charitable,
benevolent or educational institutions: Provided,
that said institutions are operated and maintained
within the (municipality/city)
(does not apply to the sangguniang
panlalawigan)
14. Regulate the numbering of residential, commercial
and other buildings
(does not apply to the sangguniang
panlalawigan)
15. Regulate the inspection, weighing and measuring of
articles of commerce
(does not apply to the sangguniang
panlalawigan)
16. For the sangguniang panlalawigan: adopt measures
to enhance the full implementation of the national
agrarian reform program in coordination with the
DAR

C. Subject to the provisions of Book II of the LGC, grant
franchises, enact ordinances authorizing the issuance of
permits or licenses, or enact ordinances levying taxes, fees
and charges upon such conditions and for such purposes
intended to promote the general welfare of the inhabitants of
the (municipality/city, and pursuant to his legislative
authority shall:
1. Fix and impose reasonable fees and charges for all
services rendered by the (municipal/city/provincial)
government to private persons or entities
2.
a. For the Sangguniang Bayan: regulate any
business, occupation, or practice of profession or
calling which does not require government
examination within the municipality and the
conditions under which the license for said business
or practice of profession may be issued or revoked
b. For the Sangguniang Panlungsod: regulate or fix
license fees for any business or practice of
profession within the city and the conditions under
which the license for said business or practice of
profession may be revoked and enact ordinances
levying taxes thereon
c. For the Sangguniang Panlalawigan: regulate or fix
the license fees for such activities as provided under
the LGC
3. Prescribe the terms and conditions under which
public utilities owned by the (municipality/city) shall
be operated by the municipal/city government or
leased to private persons or entities, preferably
cooperatives
4. Regulate the display of and fix the license fees for
signs, signboards, or billboards at the place/s where
the profession or business advertised thereby is, in
whole or in part, conducted
5. Any law to the contrary notwithstanding, authorize
and license the establishment, operation, and
maintenance of cockpits, and regulate cockfighting
and commercial breeding of gamecocks: Provided,
that existing rights should not be prejudiced
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6. Subject to the guidelines prescribed by the DOTC,
regulate the operation of tricycles and grant
franchises for the operation thereof within the
territorial jurisdiction of the (municipality/city)
7. Upon approval by a majority vote of all the members
of the sanggunian, grant a franchise to any person,
partnership, corporation, or cooperative to establish,
construct, operate and maintain ferries, wharves,
markets or slaughterhouses, or such other similar
activities within the (municipality/city) as may be
allowed by applicable laws: Provided, that,
cooperatives shall be given preference in the grant
of such a franchise
(Nos. 3-7 do not apply to the sangguniang
panlalawigan)

D. Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings
and structures within the (municipality/city) in order to
promote the general welfare and for said purpose shall:
1. Declare, prevent ora abate any nuisance
2. Require that buildings and the premises thereof and
any land within the (municipality/city be kept and
maintained in a sanitary condition; impose penalties
for any violation thereof, or upon failure to comply
with said requirements, have the work done and
require the owner, administrator or tenant
concerned to pay the expenses of the same; or
require the filling up of any land or premises to a
grade necessary for proper sanitation
3. Regulate the disposal of clinical and other wastes
from hospitals, clinics and other similar
establishments
4. Regulate the establishment, operation and
maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses,
hotels, motels, inns, penison houses, lodging houses,
and other similar establishments, inlcuding tourist
guides and transports
5. Regulate the sale, giving away or dispensing of any
intoxicating malt, vino, mixed or fermented liquors
at any retail outlet
6. Regulate the establishment and provide for the
inspection of steam boilers or any heating device in
buildings and the storage of inflammable and highly
combustible materials within the municipality
7. Regulate the establishment, operation, and
maintenance of entertainment or amusement
facilities, including theatrical performances, circuses,
billiard pools, public dancing schools, public dance
halls, sauna baths, massage parlors, and other places
of entertainment or amusement; regulate such other
events or activities for amusement or
entertainment, particularly those which tend to
disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants, or
require the suspension or suppression of the same;
or prohibit certain forms of amusement or
entertainment in order to protect the social and
moral welfare of the community
8. Provide for the impounding of stray animals;
regulate the keeping of animals in homes or as part
of a business, and the slaughter, sale or disposition
of the same; and adopt measures to prevent and
penalize cruelty to animals
9. Regulate the establishment, operation and
maintenance of funeral parlors, and the burial or
cremation of the dead, subject to existing laws, rules
and regulations

E. Approve ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and
effective delivery of the basic services and facilities (see Sec.
17), and in addition:
For the sangguniang bayan and sangguniang panlungsod:
1. Provide for the establishment, maintenance,
protection, and conservation of communal forests
and watersheds, tree parks, greenbelts, mangroves,
and other similar forest development projects
2. Establish markets, slaughterhouses or animal corrals
and authorize the operation thereof, and regulate
the construction and operation of private markets,
talipapas or other similar buildings and structures
3. Authorize the establishment, maintenance and
operation of ferries, wharves, and other structures,
and marine seashore or offshore activities intended
to accelerate productivity
4. Regulate the preparation and sale of meat, poultry,
fish, vegetables, fruits, fresh dairy products, and
other foodstuffs for public consumption
5. Regulate the use of streets, avenues, alleys,
sidewalks, bridges, parks and other public places and
approve the construction, improvement, repair and
maintenance of the same; establish bus and vehicle
stops and terminals or regulate the use of the same
by privately-owned vehicles which serve the public;
regulate garages and the operation of conveyances
for hire; designate stands to be occupied b public
vehicles when not in use; regulate the putting up of
signs, signposts, awnings and awning posts on the
streets; and provide for the lighting, cleaning and
sprinkling of streets and public places
6. Regulate traffic on all streets and bridges, prohibit
the putting up of encroachments or obstacles
thereon, and, when necessary in the interest of
public welfare authorize the removal of
encroachments and illegal constructions in public
places
7. Subject to existing laws, provide for the
establishment, operation, maintenance, and repair
of an efficient waterworks system to supply water
for the inhabitants; regulate the construction,
maintenance, repair and use of hydrants, pumps,
cisterns and reservoirs; protect the purity and
quantity of the water supply of the (municipality/city
and, for this purpose, extend the coverage of
appropriate ordinances over all territory within the
drainage area of said water supply and within 100
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meters of the reservoir, conduit, canal, aqueduct,
pumping station, or watershed used in connection
with the water service; and regulate the
consumption, use or wastage of water
8. Regulate the drilling and excavation of the ground
for laying of water, gas, sewer, and other pipes and
the construction, repair and maintenance of public
drains, sewers, cesspools, tunels and similar
structures; regulate the placing of poles and the use
of crosswalks, curbs, and gutters; adopt measures to
ensure public safety agaisnt open canals, manholes,
live wires and other similar hazards to life and
property; and regulate the construction and use of
private water closets, privies and other similar
structures in buildings and homes
9. Regulate the placing, stringing, attaching, installing,
repair and construction of all gas mains, electric,
telegraph and telephone wires, conduits, meters and
other apparatus; and, provide for the correction,
condemnation or removal of the same when found
to be dangerous, defective or otherwise hazardous
to the welfare of the inhabitants
10. Subject to the availability of funds and to existing
laws, rules and regulations, establish and provide for
the operation of vocational and technical schools
and similar post-secondary institutions and, with the
approval of the DECS, fix and collect reasonable fees
and other school charges on said institutions, subject
to existing laws on tuition fees
11. Establish a scholarship fund for poor but deserving
students residing within the muncipality in schools
located within its jurisdiction
12. Approve measures and adopt quarantine regulations
to prevent the introduction and spread of diseases
13. Provide for an efficient and effective system of solid
waste and garbage collection disposal and prohibit
littering and the placing or throwing of garbage,
refuse and other filth and wastes
14. Provide for the care of paupers, the aged, the sick,
persons of unsound mind, disabled persons,
abandoned minors, juvenile delinquents, drug
dependents, abused children and other needy and
disadvantaged persons, partcularly children and
youth below 18 years of age and, subject to the
availability of funds, establish and provide for the
operation of centers and facilities for said needy and
disadvantaged persons
15. Establish and provide for the maintenance and
improvement of jails and detention centers, institute
sound jail management programs, and appropriate
funds for the subsistence of detainees and convicted
prisoners in the municipality/city
16. Establish a municipal/city council whose purpose is
the promotion of culture and the arts, coordinate
with government agencies and NGOs and subject to
the availability of funds, appropriate funds for the
support and development of the same
17. Establish a municipal/city council for the elderly
which shall formulate policies and adopt measures
mutually beneficial to the elderly and to the
community; provide incentives for nongovernmental
agencies and entities and, subject to the availability
of funds, appropriate funds to support programs and
projects for the benefits of the elderly

For the sangguniang panlalawigan:
1. Adopt measures and safeguards against pollution
and for the preservation of the natural ecosystem in
the province, in consonance with approved
standards on human settlements and environmental
sanitation
2. Subject to applicable laws, facilitate or provide for
the establishment and maintenance of waterworkds
system or district waterworks for supplying water to
inhabitants of component cities and municipalities
3. Subject to the availability offunds and to existing
laws, rules and regulations, provide for the
establishment and operation of vocational and
technical schools and similar post-secondary
institutions; and, with the approval of the DECS and
subject to existing laws on tuition fees, fix
reasonable tuition fees and other school charges in
educational institutions supported by the provincial
government;
4. Establish a scholarship fund or the poor but
deserving students in schools located within its
jurisdiction or for students residing within the
province;
5. Approve measures and adopt quarantine regulations
to prevent the introduction and spread of diseases
within its territorial jurisdiction;
6. Provide for the care of paupers, the aged, the sick,
persons of unsound mind, abandoned minors,
abused children, disabled persons, juvenile
delinquents, drug dependents, and other needy and
disadvantaged persons, particularly children and
youth below 18 years of age; subject to availability
of funds, establish and support the operation of
centers and facilities for said needy and
disadvantaged persons, and facilitate efforts to
promote the welfare of families below the poverty
threshold, the disadvantaged, and the exploited;
7. Establish and provide for the maintenance and
improvement of jails and detention centers, institute
a sound jail management program, and appropriate
funds for the subsistence of detainees and convicted
prisoners in the province
8. Establish a provincial council whose purpose is the
promotion of culture and the arts, coordinate with
government agencies and nongovernmental
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organizations and, subject to the availability of
funds, appropriate funds for the support and
development of the same;
9. Establish a provincial council for the elderly which
shall formulate policies and adopt measures
mutually beneficial to the elderly and to the
province; and subject to the availability of funds,
appropriate funds to support programs and projects
for the elderly; and provide incentives for
nongovernmental agencies and entities to support
the programs and projects of the elderly;

F. Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties
and functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance

A. The Municipality
Scope of power to tax municipalities; share
of provinces in municipal taxes (Sec 440
447)
See above
Munez v. Arlino
Mayor Asuero Irisari of Loreto, Agusan del Sur summoned
Apolinario S. Munez for a conference on a land dispute with
one Tirso Amado. Munez failed to appear and Mayor Irisari
issued a warrant of arrest against him. It was served on the
former although no investigation later ensued. Munez filed a
criminal complaint against Mayor Irisari for grave misconduct
and usurpation of judicial function with the Office of the
Ombudsman and an administrative complaint for misconduct
in office and abuse of authority with the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur. The investigating officer of
the Office of the Ombudsman filed a case for usurpation of
judicial function against Irisari which the latter moved to
quash, alleging that Sec 143 of the former LGC authorized
mayors to issue warrants of arrest. Judge Arino denied the
MTQ on the ground that the power of Mayors to issue
warrants ceased to exist with the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan (SP) on the other
hand adjudged Irisari to be guilty of the administrative
complaint and suspended him for 8 months without pay. The
DILG reversed the SP and said that while the warrant issued
by the Mayor was one of arrest, it was actually just a
summons or an invitation. Judge Arino dismissed the case
based on the decision by the DILG saying that decisions by
administrative agencies, when not tainted by unfairness and
arbitrariness should be respected. Acting on the said decision,
Munez sent two letters to the Presidential Anti-Crime
Commission charging Judge Arino with knowingly rendering
an unjust judgment.
HELD: The Court agrees with the Ombudsman that the Judge
may have acted in good faith but must be administratively
liable. It is not true that what was issued wasnt a warrant of
arrest. The mayor even justified his order by citing Sec. 143 of
the former LGC, which provided that in cases where the
mayor may conduct preliminary investigation, the mayor
shall, upon probable cause after examination of the
witnesses, have the authority to order the arrest of the
accused. The said provision was however repealed by Art II,
Sec 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which expressly provides that
only a judge can personally issue warrants. It was also held in
Ponsica vs. Ognalaga that the grant of the said power on the
Mayor had been abrogated, rendered functus officio by the
Constitution. That there was no pending criminal case did not
make the order any less an order of arrest. There was only a
land dispute and no criminal case against Munez. The Mayor
thus performed a judicial function that even a judge couldnt
have done. Judge Arino reversed himself citing the DILG
decision when the case wasnt before him on review from the
decision of the administrative agency. There was no reason to
apply substantiality of evidence. Before him was a criminal
case and he shouldve considered solely the facts alleged in
the information. The acts alleged in the information
constitute the crime of usurpation of judicial authority,
satisfying the elements of the same. At the very least, he
showed poor judgment and gross ignorance of basic legal
principles. What the judge did was to rely on the opinion of
the DILG, disregarding his own previous ruling, and showing a
lack of capacity for independent judgment in the process.
Greater Balanga Devt Corp v. Municipality
of Balanga, Bataan
The case involves Lot 261 B-6-A-3 with a land area of 8,467 sq
meters located behind the public market in Balanga, Bataan,
It is registered in the name of Greater Balanga Devt. Corp,
owned and controlled by the Camacho family. The lot in
question was part of Lot 261-B, formerly registered in the
name of Aurora Camacho. It was subdivided into certain lots-
some were sold, other donated. Five buyers of the lot filed
Civil Case 3803 against Camacho for partition and delivery of
titles.
Petitioner applied for and was granted a business permit by
the Office of the Mayor of Balanga but failed to mention the
existence of Civil Case 3803. The permit granted the privilege
of a real estate dealer/privately-owned market operator.
The Sangguniang Bayan (SB) however passed Resolution
No.12, s-88 annulling the Mayors permit issued to petitioner,
mentioning that the civil dispute as to the ownership of the
lot caused anxiety, uncertainty and restiveness among the
stallholders and traders in the lot, and advising the Mayor to
revoke the permit to operate a public market. The Mayor
took the advice and revoked the permit by way of EO No.1, s-
88. Petitioner filed instant petition with prayer for
preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction or
restraining order aimed at the reinstatement of the Mayors
permit and the curtailment of the municipalitys collection of
market and entrance fees from the occupants of the lot.
Petitioner corporation alleges that: 1) it didnt violate any
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law, thus theres no reason for revocation of permit 2) the
respondents failed to observe due process in the revocation
3) the collection of market fees is illegal. The Municipality
asserts on the other hand that the Mayor as local chief
executive has the power to issue, deny or revoke permits.
They claim that the revocation was due to the violation by
the corporation of Section 3A-o6(b) of the Balanga Revenue
Code when it: 1) made a false statement in the application
form, failing to disclose that the lot was subject of adverse
claims for which Civil Case 3803 was filed, 2) failed to apply
for two separate permits for the 2 lines of business (real
estate and public market).
HELD: The authority of the Mayor to revoke permits is
premised on a violation by the grantee of any of the
conditions for its grant. The application for the Mayors
permit at bench requires the applicant to state the type of
business, profession, occupation, privileges applied for.
Revocation cannot be justified under the mentioned
provision for there must be 1) proof of willful
misrepresentation and 2) deliberate intent to make a false
statement. Good faith is always presumed. Neither was the
petitioners applying for two businesses in one permit a
ground for revocation. Section 3A-06(b) does not expressly
require two permits for two businesses but only that separate
fees be paid for each.
The Resolution by the SB stated that the land was earmarked
for the expansion of the Balanga Public Market. The SB
doesnt actually maintain a public market on the area. Until
expropriation proceedings are instituted in court, the owner
cannot be deprived of its land. The SB has the duty to
regulate any business subject to municipal license fees and
provide conditions for revocation but anxiety, uncertainty,
restiveness among stallholders who are doing business on
property not owned by the Municipal government is not
among those conditions. Also, the manner by which
revocation was done violated the petitioners right to due
process the alleged violation of the Revenue Code was not
mentioned in the revocation order, neither was the petitioner
informed of his specific violation. Moreover, the respondent
Municipality isnt the owner of Lot 261 B-6-A-3 and thus
cannot collect market fees and market entrance fees, which
only an owner can do.
B. The City
Scope of Power to tax of cities (Sec 448
458)
See above
Lim v. CA
Bistro Pigalle Inc. is the owner of the New Bangkok Club and
Exotic Garden Restaurant in Malate Manila. Bistro filed a case
against Mayor Lim after the policemen, under the Mayors
instructions, inspected and investigated Bistros license, along
with the work permits and health certificates of its staff,
causing stoppage of work in Bistros business operations. Lim
also refused to accept Bistros application for a business
permit and its staffs applications for work permits. Bistro
says that Lims refusal to issue permits is against the doctrine
laid down in Dela Cruz vs. Paras that Municipal corporations
cannot prohibit the operation of nightclubs. They may be
regulated but not prevented from carrying on their business.
The trial court issued a TRO against Lim and after receiving
evidence from the parties, issued a prohibitory mandatory
injunction against the same, ordering him to cease and desist
from impeding the business operations of Bistro while the
case awaits resolution on the merits. Both orders were
ignored by Lim, insisting that the power of a mayor to inspect
commercial establishments is implicit in the statutory power
to issue, suspend or revoke business licenses, provided in Sec
11 (1), Art II of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila and
in Sec 455 of the LGC. Lim permanently closed down the
operations of Bistro pursuant to newly-enacted Manila City
Ordinance No7783. Lim argues that the passage of the
ordinance has made the case filed by Bistro moot and
academic.
HELD: The authority of mayors to issue business licenses and
permits is beyond question as the law, specifically the
Revised Charter of Manila expressly provides for such
authority. The power to issue includes the corollary power to
suspend and revoke licenses premised on violation of the
conditions upon which they were granted. True, the mayor
has the power to investigate whether the conditions are
complied with but he has no power to order a police raid on
such establishments. In doing so, Lim acted beyond his
authority and in patent violation of Ordinance 7716, which
prohibits police raid inspections of business establishments.
In refusing to issue a business permit, Lim didnt specify any
violation committed by Bistro. Neither was Bistro given the
proper notice and the opportunity to be heard, infringing its
right to due process of law. There is no provision in any law
authorizing the mayor to close down establishments without
notice and hearing and if there is, such will be void.
While Lims campaign against prostitution is commendable,
his acts were arbitrary and the trial court was correct in
restraining him. The regulatory powers of municipal
corporations must be exercised in accordance with the rights
of people to due process and equal protection of the law.

C. The Province
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173 | P a g e Municipal Corporation
Sec 459 490, LGC
For Sec 459 468, see above

Appointive Local Officials Common to Municipalities, Cities and Province (Sections 469-490)

Position Necessity Qualifications Duties
1. Secretary to the
Sanggunian
mandatory position Qualifications
a. Citizen of the Philippines
b. Resident of the LGU concerned
c. Of good moral character
d. A holder of a college degree
preferably in law, commerce or
public administration from a
recognized college or university,
and
e. A first grade civil service eligible
or its equivalent. (Sec 469[b])
a. Attend meetings of the sanggunian and keep a journal of its
proceedings;
b. Keep the seal of the LGU and affix the same with his signature to all
ordinances, resolutions, and other official acts of the sanggunian and
present the same to the presiding officer for his signature;
c. Forward to the governor or mayor for approval, copies of ordinances
enacted by the sanggunian and duly certified by the presiding officer;
d. Forward to the sanggunian panlungsod or bayan or the sangguniang
panlungsod of component cities or sangguniang bayan, copies of duly
approved ordinances;
e. Furnish certified copies of records of public character in his custody;
f. Record in a book kept for the purpose, all ordinances and resolutions
enacted or adopted by the sanggunian, with the dates of passage and
publication thereof;
g. Keep his office and all non-confidential records therein open to the
public during the usual business hours;
h. Translate into the dialect used by the majority of the inhabitants all
ordinances and resolutions immediately after their approval, and cause
the publication of the same;
i. Take custody of the local archives and, where applicable, the local
library and annually account for the same; and
j. Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and
functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance relative to his
position. (Sec. 469[c])
2. Treasurer mandatory position

Appointed by the
Secretary of Finance
from a list of at least 3
ranking, eligible
recommendees of the
governor or mayor, as
the case may be (Sec
470 [a])
a. Citizen of the Philippines
b. A resident of the LGU concerned
c. Of good moral character
d. A holder of a college degree
preferably in commerce, public
administration or law from a
recognized college or university,
and
e. A first grade civil service eligible
or its equivalent.
f. Acquired experience in treasury
or accounting service for at least 5
years in the case of the city or
provincial treasurer, and 3 years in
the case of the municipal treasurer.
(Sec 470[c])
a. Perform the duties provided for under Book II of the Code
b. Advise the governor or mayor, sanggunian, and other local
government and national officials regarding disposition of local
government funds, and other matters relative to public finance;
c. Take custody of and exercise proper management of the funds of
LGU;
d. Take charge of the disbursement of all local government funds and
such other funds the custody of which may be entrusted to him;
e. Inspect private commercial and industrial establishments in relation
to the implementation of tax ordinances;
f. Maintain and update the tax information system of the LGU;
g. In the case of the provincial treasurer, exercise technical supervision
over all treasury offices of component cities and municipalities; and
h. Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and
functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance. (Sec 470[d])
3. Assistant Treasurer optional position

Appointed by the
Secretary of Finance
from a list of at least 3
ranking, eligible
recommendees of the
governor or mayor (Sec
471[a])
a. A citizen of the Philippines,
b. Resident of the LGU concerned,
c. Of good moral character,
d. A holder of a college degree
preferably in commerce, public
administration, or law from a
recognized college or university,
e. A first grade civil service eligible
or its equivalent,
f. Acquired at least 5 years
experience in the treasury or
accounting service in the case of
the city or provincial assistant
treasurer, and 3 years in the case of
the municipal assistant treasurer.
(Sec 471[b])
a. Assist the treasurer and perform such duties as the latter may assign
to him.
b. Administer oaths concerning notices and notifications to those
delinquent in the payment of the real property tax and concerning
official matters relating to the accounts of the treasurer or arising in
the offices of the treasurer and the assessor. (Sec 471[c])
4. Assessor mandatory position a. Citizen of the Philippines,
b. A resident of the LGU concerned,
c. Of good moral character,
d. A holder of a college degree
preferably in civil or mechanical
engineering, commerce, or any
a. Take charge of the assessor's office,
b. Perform the duties provided for under Book II of the Code,
c. Ensure that all laws and policies governing the appraisal and
assessment of real properties for taxation purposes are properly
executed;
d. Initiate, review, and recommend changes in policies and objectives,
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other related course from a
recognized college or university,
e. A first grade civil service eligible
or its equivalent.
f. Acquired experience in real
property assessment work or in any
related field for at least 5years in
the case of the city or provincial
assessor, and 3 years in the case of
the municipal assessor. (Sec
472[a])
plans and programs, techniques, procedures and practices in the
valuation and assessment of real properties for taxation purposes;
e. Establish a systematic method of real property assessment;
f. Install and maintain a real property identification and accounting
system,
g. Prepare, install and maintain a system of tax mapping;
h. Conduct frequent physical surveys to verify and determine whether
all real properties within the province are properly listed in the
assessment rolls;
i. Exercise the functions of appraisal and assessment primarily for
taxation purposes of all real properties in the LGU;
j. Prepare a schedule of the fair market value for the different classes of
real properties;
k. Issue certified copies of assessment records of real property and all
other records relative to its assessment;
l. Submit every semester a report of all assessments, cancellations and
modifications of assessments to the local chief executive and the
sanggunian;
m. In the case of the assessor of a component city or municipality
attend sessions of the local board of assessment appeals whenever his
assessment is the subject of the appeal;
n. In the case of the provincial assessor, exercise technical supervision
and visitorial functions over all component city and municipal
assessors, coordinate with component city or municipal assessors in
the conduct of tax mapping operations and all other assessment
activities, and provide all forms of assistance; (Sec 472[b])
o. Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties
and functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance. (Sec 472[c])
5. Assistant Assessor optional position a. Citizen of the Philippines,
b. Resident of the LGU concerned,
c. Of good moral character,
d. A holder of a college degree
preferably in civil or mechanical
engineering, commerce, or any
related course from a recognized
college or university
e. A first grade civil service eligible
or its equivalent.
f. Acquired experience in
assessment or in any related field
for at least 3years in the case of the
city or provincial assistant assessor,
and 1 year in the case of the city or
provincial assistant assessor. (Sec
473[a])
a. Assist the assessor and perform such other duties as the latter may
assign to him
b. Administer oaths on all declarations of real property for purposes of
assessment. (Sec 473[b])
6. Accountant mandatory position a. Citizen of the Philippines,
b. A resident of the LGU concerned,
c. Of good moral character,
d. A certified public accountant.
e. Acquired experience in the
treasury or accounting service for
at least 5 years in the case of the
provincial or city accountant, and 3
years in the case of the municipal
accountant. (Sec 474[a])
f. Incumbent chief accountant in
the office of the treasurer shall be
given preference in the
appointment to the position of
accountant.(Sec 474[c])
a. Take charge of both the accounting and internal audit services of the
LGU;
b. Install and maintain an internal audit system in the local LGU;
c. Prepare and submit financial statements to the governor or mayor
and to the sanggunian;
d. Apprise the sanggunian and other local government officials on the
financial condition and operations of the LGU;
e. Certify to the availability of budgetary allotment to which
expenditures and obligations may be properly charged;
f. Review supporting documents before preparation of vouchers to
determine completeness of requirements;
g. Prepare statements of cash advances, liquidation, salaries,
allowances, reimbursements and remittances;
h. Prepare statements of journal vouchers and liquidation of the same
and other adjustments;
i. Post individual disbursements to the subsidiary ledger and index
cards;
Maintain individual ledgers for officials and employees pertaining to
payrolls and deductions;
j. Record and post in index cards details of purchased furniture,
fixtures, and equipment, including disposal thereof, if any;
k. Account for all issued requests for obligations and maintain and keep
all records and reports related thereto;
UP College of Law
175 | P a g e Municipal Corporation
l. Prepare journals and the analysis of obligations and maintain and
keep all records and reports related thereto; and
m. Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and
functions as may be provided by law or ordinance. (Sec 474[b])
7. Budget Officer mandatory position a. Citizen of the Philippines,
b. Resident of the LGU concerned,
c. Of good moral character,
d. A holder of a college degree
preferably in accounting,
economics, public administration or
any related course from a
recognized college or university,
e. A first grade civil service eligible
or its equivalent.
f. Acquired experience in
government budgeting or in any
related field for at least 5 years in
the case of the provincial or city
budget officer, and at least 3 years
in the case of the municipal budget
officer. (Sec 475[a])
a. Take charge of the budget office;
b. Prepare forms, orders, and circulars embodying instructions on
budgetary and appropriation matters for the signature of the governor
or mayor,
c. Review and consolidate the budget proposals of different
departments and offices;
d. Assist the governor or mayor in the preparation of the budget and
during budget hearings;
e. Study and evaluate budgetary implications of proposed legislation
and submit comments and recommendations thereon;
f. Submit periodic budgetary reports to the DBM;
g. Coordinate with the treasurer, accountant, and the planning and
development coordinator for the purpose of budgeting;
h. Assist the sanggunian concerned in reviewing the approved budgets;
i. Coordinate with the planning and development coordinator in the
formulation of the local government unit development plan; (Sec 475
[b])
j. Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and
functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance. (Sec 475[c])
8. Planning and
Development
Coordinator
mandatory position a. Citizen of the Philippines
b. A resident of the LGU concerned
c. Of good moral character
d. A holder of a college degree
preferably in urban planning,
development studies, economics,
public administration, or any
related course from a recognized
college or university
e. A first grade civil service eligible
or its equivalent
f. Acquired experience in
development planning or in any
related field for at least 5 years in
the case of the provincial or city
planning and development
coordinator, and 3 years in the case
of the municipal planning and
development coordinator. (Sec
476[a])
a. Take charge of the planning and development office
b. Formulate integrated economic, social, physical, and other
development plans and policies for consideration of the local
government development council;
c. Conduct continuing studies, researches, and training programs
necessary to evolve plans and programs for implementation;
d. Integrate and coordinate all sectoral plans and studies undertaken
by the different functional groups or agencies;
e. Monitor and evaluate the implementation of the different
development programs, projects, and activities in the local government
unit concerned in accordance with the approved development plan;
f. Prepare comprehensive plans and other development planning
documents for the consideration of the local development council;
g. Analyze the income and expenditure patterns, and formulate and
recommend fiscal plans and policies for consideration of the finance
committee of LGU;
h. Promote people participation in development planning within the
LGU;
i. Exercise supervision and control over the secretariat of the local
development council; and (Sec 476[b])
9. Engineer mandatory position a. Citizen of the Philippines,
b. A resident of the LGU concerned,
c. Of good moral character,
d. A licensed civil engineer
e. Acquired experience in the
practice of his profession for at
least 5 years in the case of the
provincial or city engineer, and 3
years in the case of the municipal
engineer. (Sec 477[a])
a. Act as the local building official (Sec 477[a])
b. Initiate, review and recommend changes in policies and objectives,
plans and programs, techniques, procedures and practices in
infrastructure development and public works in general;
c. Advise the governor or mayor on infrastructure, public works, and
other engineering matters;
d. Administer, coordinate, supervise, and control the construction,
maintenance, improvement, and repair of roads, bridges, and other
engineering and public works projects;
e. Provide engineering services to the LGU, including investigation and
survey, engineering designs, feasibility studies, and project
management;
f. In the case of the provincial engineer, exercise technical supervision
over all engineering offices of component cities and municipalities; and
(Sec 477[b])
g. Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and
functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance. (Sec477[c])
10. Health Officer mandatory position a. Citizen of the Philippines,
b. A resident of the LGU concerned,
c. Of good moral character, and
d. A licensed medical practitioner.
e. Acquired experience in the
practice of his profession for at
least 5 years in the case of the
provincial or city health officer, and
3 years in the case of the municipal
health officer. (Sec478[a])
a. Take charge of the office on health services, supervise the personnel
and staff of said office, formulate program implementation guidelines
and rules and regulations for the operation of the said
b. Formulate measures for the consideration of the sanggunian and
provide technical assistance and support to the governor or mayor in
carrying out activities to ensure the delivery of basic services and
provision of adequate health facilities;
c. Develop plans and strategies, implement the same, particularly those
which have to do with health programs and projects which the
governor or mayor, is empowered to implement and which the
sanggunian is empowered to provide for;
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d. Formulate and implement policies, plans, programs and projects to
promote the health of the people;
e. Advise the governor or mayor and the sanggunian on matters
pertaining to health;
f. Execute and enforce all laws, ordinances and regulations relating to
public health;
g. Recommend to the sanggunian, through the local health board, the
passage of such ordinances as he may deem necessary for the
preservation of public health;
h. Recommend the prosecution of any violation of sanitary laws,
ordinances or regulations;
i. Direct the sanitary inspection of all business establishments selling
food items or providing accommodations such as hotels, motels,
lodging houses, pension houses, and the like, in accordance with the
Sanitation Code;
j. Conduct health information campaigns and render health intelligence
services;
k. Coordinate with other government agencies and non-governmental
organizations involved in the promotion and delivery of health services;
l. In the case of the provincial health officer, exercise general
supervision over health officers of component cities and municipalities;
and
m. Be in the frontline of health services delivery, particularly during and
in the aftermath of man-made and natural disasters and calamities;
and (Sec478[b])
n. Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and
functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance. (Sec478[c])
11. Civil Registrar mandatory: city and
municipal
a. Citizen of the Philippines,
b. A resident of the LGU concerned,
c. Of good moral character,
d. A holder of a college degree from
a recognized college or university,
e. A first grade civil service eligible
or its equivalent.
f. Acquired experience in civil
registry work for at least 5 years in
the case of the city civil registrar
and 3 years in the case of the
municipal civil registrar. (Sec479[a])
a. Responsible for the civil registration program pursuant to the Civil
Registry Law, the Civil Code, and other pertinent laws, rules and
regulations (Sec479[b])
b. Take charge of the office of the civil registry
c. Develop plans and strategies and implement the same, particularly
those which have to do with civil registry programs and projects which
the mayor is empowered to implement and which the sanggunian is
empowered to provide for
d. Accept all registrable documents and judicial decrees affecting the
civil status of persons;
e. File, keep and preserve in a secure place the books required by law;
f. Transcribe and enter immediately upon receipt all registrable
documents and judicial decrees affecting the civil status of persons in
the civil registry books;
g. Transmit to the Office of the Civil Registrar- General duplicate copies
of registered documents required by law;
h. Issue certified transcripts or copies of any certificate or registered
documents upon payment of the prescribed fees to the treasurer;
i. Receive applications for the issuance of a marriage license and issue
the license upon payment of the authorized fee to the treasurer;
g. Coordinate with the NSO in conducting educational campaigns for
vital registration and assist in the preparation of demographic and
other statistics (Sec479[c])
h. Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and
functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance. (Sec479[d])
12. Administrator mandatory: provincial
and city, optional:
municipal
a. Citizen of the Philippines,
b. A resident of the LGU concerned,
c. Of good moral character,
d. A holder of a college degree
preferably in public administration,
law, or any other related course
from a recognized college or
university,
e. A first grade civil service eligible
or its equivalent
f. Acquired experience in
management and administration
work for at least 5 years in the case
of the provincial or city
administrator, and 3 years in the
case of the municipal
a. Take charge of the office of the administrator
b. Develop plans and strategies and implement the same particularly
those which have to do with the management and administration-
related programs and projects which the governor or mayor is
empowered to implement and which the sanggunian is empowered to
provide for;
c. Assist in the coordination of the work of all the officials of the LGU,
under the supervision, direction, and control of the governor or mayor,
and convene the chiefs of offices and other officials of the local
government unit;
d. Establish and maintain a sound personnel program for the LGU
designed to promote career development and uphold the merit
principle in the local government service;
e. Conduct a continuing organizational development of the LGU with
the end in view of instituting effective administrative reforms;
f. Be in the frontline of the delivery of administrative support services,
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177 | P a g e Municipal Corporation
administrator.
g. Term is coterminous with that of
his appointing authority (Sec480[a])
particularly those related to the situations during and in the aftermath
of man-made and natural disasters and calamities;
g. Recommend to the sanggunian and advise the governor and mayor
on all other matters relative to the management and administration of
the LGU (Sec480[b])
h. Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and
functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance. (Sec480[c])
13. Legal Officers mandatory: provincial
and city, optional:
municipal
a. Citizen of the Philippines,
b. A resident of the LGU,
c. Of good moral character,
d. A member of the Philippine Bar
e. Practiced his profession for at
least 5 years in the case of the
provincial and city legal officer, and
3years in the case of the municipal
legal officer
f. Term of the legal officer shall be
coterminous with that of his
appointing authority.(Sec481[a])
a. Take charge of the office of legal services
b. Formulate measures for the consideration of the sanggunian and
provide legal assistance and support to the governor or mayor, in
carrying out the delivery of basic services and provisions of adequate
facilities
c. Develop plans and strategies and implement the same, particularly
those which have to do with programs and projects related to legal
services which the governor or mayor is empowered to implement and
which the sanggunian is empowered to provide
d. Represent the local government unit in all civil actions and special
proceedings wherein the LGU or any official thereof, in his official
capacity, is a party;
e. Draft ordinances, contracts, bonds, leases and other instruments,
involving any interest of the LGU; and provide comments and
recommendations on any instruments already drawn;
f. Render his opinion in writing on any question of law when requested
to do so by the governor, mayor, or sanggunian;
g. Investigate or cause to be investigated any local official or employee
for administrative neglect or misconduct in office, and recommend
appropriate action;
h. Investigate or cause to be investigated any person, firm or
corporation holding any franchise or exercising any public privilege for
failure to comply with any term or condition in the grant of such
franchise or privilege, and recommending appropriate action to the
governor, mayor or sanggunian, as the case may be;
i. Initiate and prosecute in the interest of the LGU any civil action on
any bond, lease or other contract upon any breach or violation thereof;
j. Review and submit recommendations on ordinances approved and
executive orders issued by component units;
k. Recommend measures to the sanggunian and advise the governor or
mayor as the case may be on all other matters related to upholding the
rule of law ;
l. Be in the frontline of protecting human rights and prosecuting any
violations thereof, particularly those which occur during and in the
aftermath of man-made or natural disasters or calamities; and
(Sec481[b])
m. Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and
functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance. (Sec481[c])
14. Agriculturist mandatory: provincial;
optional: city and
municipal
a. Citizen of the Philippines,
b. A resident of the LGU concerned,
c. Of good moral character,
d. A holder of a college degree in
agriculture or any related course
from a recognized college or
university,
e. A first grade civil service eligible
or its equivalent.
f. Practiced his profession in
agriculture or acquired experience
in a related field for at least 5 years
in the case of the provincial and city
agriculturist, and 3years in the case
of the municipal agriculturist.
(Sec482[a])
a. Take charge of the office for agricultural service
b. Formulate measures and provide technical assistance and support in
carrying out said measures to ensure the delivery of basic services and
provision of adequate facilities relative to agricultural services as
provided for under Section 17
c. Develop plans and strategies and implement the same, particularly
those which have to do with agricultural programs and projects which
the governor or mayor is empowered to implement and which the
sanggunian us empowered to provide for
d. Ensure that maximum assistance and access to resources in the
production, processing and marketing of agricultural and aqua-cultural
and marine products are extended to farmers, fishermen and local
entrepreneurs;
e. Conduct or cause to be conducted location-specific agricultural
researches and assist in making available the appropriate technology
arising out of and disseminating information on basic research on
crops, preventive and control of plant diseases and pests, and other
agricultural matters
f. Assist in the establishment and extension services of demonstration
farms or aqua-culture and marine products;
g. Enforce rules and regulations relating to agriculture and aquaculture;
h. Coordinate with government agencies and NGOs which promote
agricultural productivity through appropriate technology compatible
with environmental integrity;
i. Be in the frontline of delivery of basic agricultural services,
particularly those needed for the survival of the inhabitants during and
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in the aftermath of man-made and natural disasters;
j. Recommend and advise on all matters related to agriculture and
aqua-culture which will improve the livelihood and living conditions of
the inhabitants; (Sec482[b])
k. Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and
functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance. (Sec482[c])
15. Social Welfare and
Development Officer
mandatory: provincial
and city; optional:
municipal
a. Citizen of the Philippines,
b. A resident of the LGU concerned,
c. Of good moral character,
d. A duly licensed social worker or a
holder of a college degree
preferably in sociology or any other
related course from a recognized
college or university,
e. A first grade civil service eligible
or its equivalent
f. Acquired experience in the
practice of social work for at least 5
years in the case of the provincial
or city social welfare and
development officer, and 3 years in
the case of the municipal social
welfare and development officer.
(Sec483[a])
a. Take charge of the office on social welfare and development services
b. Formulate measures and provide technical assistance and support in
carrying out measures to ensure the delivery of basic services and
provision of adequate facilities relative to social welfare and
development services as provided for under Section 17
c. Develop plans and strategies and mplement the same particularly
those which have to do with social welfare programs and projects
which the governor or mayor is empowered to implement and which
the sanggunian is empowered to provide for
d. Identify the basic needs of the needy, the disadvantaged and the
impoverished and develop and implement appropriate measures to
alleviate their problems and improve their living conditions;
e. Provide relief and appropriate crisis intervention for victims of abuse
and exploitation and recommend appropriate measures to deter
further abuse and exploitation;
f. Assist the governor or mayor in implementing the barangay level
program for the total development and protection of children up to six
(6) years of age;
g. Facilitate the implementation of welfare programs for the disabled,
elderly, and victims of drug addiction, the rehabilitation of prisoners
and parolees, the prevention of juvenile delinquency and such other
activities which would eliminate or minimize the ill-effects of poverty;
h. Initiate and support youth welfare programs that will enhance the
role of the youth in nation-building;
i. Coordinate with government agencies and NGOs which have for their
purpose the promotion and the protection of all needy, disadvantaged,
underprivileged or impoverished groups or individuals, particularly
those identified to be vulnerable and high-risk to exploitation, abuse
and neglect;
j. Be in the frontline of service delivery, particularly those which have
to do with immediate relief during and assistance in the aftermath of
man-made and natural disaster and natural calamities;
k. Recommend to the sanggunian and advise the governor or mayor on
all other matters related to social welfare and development services
which will improve the livelihood and living conditions of the
inhabitants; (Sec483[b])
l. Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and
functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance. (Sec483[c])
16. Environment and
Natural Resources
Officer
optional position a. A citizen of the Philippines,
b. Resident of the local government
unit concerned,
c. Of good moral character,
d. Holder of a college degree
preferably in environment, forestry,
agriculture or any related course
from a recognized college or
university,
e. A first grade civil service eligible
or its equivalent
f. Acquired experience in
environmental and natural
resources management,
conservation, and utilization, of at
least 5 years in the case of the
provincial or city environment and
natural resources officer, and 3
years in the case of the municipal
environment and natural resources
officer. (Sec484[a])
a. Take charge of the office on environment and natural resources
b. Formulate measures and provide technical assistance and support in
carrying out measures to ensure the delivery of basic services and
provision of adequate facilities relative to environment and natural
resources services as provided for under Sec 17;
c. Develop plans and strategies and implement the same, particularly
those which have to do with environment and natural resources
programs and projects which the governor or mayor is empowered to
implement and which the sanggunian is empowered to provide for;
d. Establish, maintain, protect and preserve communal forests,
watersheds, tree parks, mangroves, greenbelts and similar forest
projects and commercial forest;
e. Provide extension services to beneficiaries of forest development
projects and technical, financial and infrastructure assistance;
f. Manage and maintain seed banks and produce seedlings for forests
and tree parks;
g. Provide extension services to beneficiaries of forest development
projects and render assistance for natural resources-related
conservation and utilization activities consistent with ecological
balance;
h. Promote the small-scale mining and utilization of mineral resources,
particularly mining of gold;
i. Coordinate with government agencies and NGOs in the
implementation of measures to prevent and control land, air and water
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pollution with the assistance of the DENR;
j. Be in the frontline of the delivery of services concerning the
environment and natural resources, particularly in the renewal and
rehabilitation of the environment during and in the aftermath of man-
made and natural calamities and disasters;
k. Recommend to the sanggunian and advise the governor or mayor on
all matters relative to the protection, conservation, maximum
utilization, application of appropriate technology and other matters
related to the environment and natural resources; and (Sec484[b])
l. Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and
functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance. (Sec484[c])
17. Architect optional position a. Citizen of the Philippines,
b. A resident of the LGU concerned,
c. Of good moral character,
d. A duly licensed architect.
e. Practiced his profession for at
least 5 years in the case of the
provincial or city architect, and 3
years in the case of the municipal
architect. (Sec485[a])
a. Take charge of the office on architectural planning and design
b. Formulate measures for the consideration of the sanggunian and
provide technical assistance and support to the governor or mayor in
carrying out measures to ensure the delivery of basic services and
provision of adequate facilities relative to architectural planning and
design as provided for under Section 17;
c. Develop plans and strategies and implement the same, particularly
those which have to do with architectural planning and design
programs and projects which the governor or mayor is empowered to
implement and which the sanggunian is empowered to provide for
under this Code;
d. Prepare and recommend for consideration of the sanggunian the
architectural plan and design for the local government unit or a part
thereof, including the renewal of slums and blighted areas, land
reclamation activities, the greening of land, and appropriate planning
of marine and foreshore areas;
e. Review and recommend for appropriate action of the sanggunian,
governor or mayor the architectural plans and design submitted by
governmental and non-governmental entities or individuals,
particularly those for undeveloped, underdeveloped, and poorly-
designed areas;
f. Coordinate with government and NGOs and individuals involved in
the aesthetics and the maximum utilization of the land and water
within the jurisdiction of the LGU, compatible with environmental
integrity and ecological balance.
g. Be in the frontline of the delivery of services involving architectural
planning and design, particularly those related to the redesigning of
spatial distribution of basic facilities and physical structures during and
in the aftermath of man-made and natural calamities and disasters;
h. Recommend to the sanggunian and advise the governor or mayor on
all other matters relative to the architectural planning and design as it
relates to the total socioeconomic development of the local
government unit; and (Sec 485[b])
i. Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and
functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance. (Sec485[c])
18. Information Officer optional position a. Citizen of the Philippines,
b. A resident of the LGU concerned,
c. Of good moral character,
d. A holder of a college degree
preferably in journalism, mass
communication or any related
course from a recognized college or
university,
e. A first grade civil service eligible
or its equivalent.
f. Have experience in writing
articles and research papers, or in
writing for print, television or
broadcast media of at least 3 years
in the case of the provincial or city
information officer, and at least 1
year in the case of municipal
information officer.
g. Term of the information officer is
co-terminous with his appointing
authority. (Sec486[a])
a. Take charge of the office on public information
b. Formulate measures and provide technical assistance and support in
providing the information and research data required for the delivery
of basic services and provision of adequate facilities so that the public
becomes aware of said services and may fully avail of the same;
c. Develop plans and strategies and implement the same, particularly
those which have to do with public information and research data to
support programs and projects which the governor or mayor is
empowered to implement and which the sanggunian is empowered to
provide for;
d. Provide relevant, adequate, and timely information to the LGU and
its residents;
e. Furnish information and data on LGUs to government agencies or
offices as may be required by law or ordinance; and NGOs to be
furnished to said agencies and organizations;
f. Maintain effective liaison with the various sectors of the community
on matters and issues that affect the livelihood and the quality of life of
the inhabitants and encourage support for programs of the local and
national government;
g. Be in the frontline in providing information during and in the
aftermath of manmade and natural calamities and disasters, with
special attention to the victims thereof, to help minimize injuries and
casualties during and after the emergency, and to accelerate relief and
rehabilitation;
h. Recommend and advise on all other matters relative to public
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information and research data as it relates to the total socioeconomic
development of the LGU; (Sec486[b])
i. Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and
functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance. (Sec486[c])
19. Cooperative Officer optional: provincial
and city
a. Citizen of the Philippines,
b. A resident of the LGU concerned,
c. Of good moral character,
d. Holder of a college degree
preferably in business
administration with special training
in cooperatives or any related
course from a recognized college or
university,
e. First grade civil service eligible or
its equivalent
f. Have experience in cooperatives
organization and management of at
least 5 years in the case of the
provincial or city cooperatives
officer, and 3 years in the case of
municipal cooperatives officer.
(Sec487[a])
a. Take charge of the office for the development of cooperatives
b. Formulate measures and provide technical assistance and support in
carrying out measures to ensure the delivery of basic services and
provision of facilities through the development of cooperatives, and in
providing access to such services and facilities;
c. Develop plans and strategies and implement the same, particularly
those which have to do with the integration of cooperatives principles
and methods in programs and projects which the governor or mayor is
empowered to implement and which the sanggunian is empowered to
provide for;
d. Assist in the organization of cooperatives;
e. Provide technical and other forms of assistance to existing
cooperatives to enhance their viability as an economic enterprise and
social organization;
f. Assist cooperatives in establishing linkages with government agencies
and NGOs involved in the promotion and integration of the concept of
cooperatives in the livelihood of the people and other community
activities;
g. Be in the frontline of cooperatives organization, rehabilitation or
viability-enhancement, particularly during and in the aftermath of man-
made and natural calamities and disasters, to aid in their survival and, if
necessary subsequent rehabilitation;
h. Recommend and advise on all other matters relative to cooperatives
development and viability- enhancement which will improve the
livelihood and quality of life of the inhabitants; (Sec487[b])
i. Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and
functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance. (Sec487[c])
20. Population Officer optional position a. Citizen of the Philippines,
b. A resident of the LGU concerned,
c. Of good moral character,
d. A holder of a college degree with
specialized training in population
development from a recognized
college or university,
e. A first grade civil service eligible
or its equivalent.
f. Have experience in the
implementation of programs on
population development or
responsible parenthood for at least
5 years in the case of the provincial
or city population officer and 3
years in the case of the municipal
population officer. (Sec488[a])
a. Take charge of the office on population development
b. Formulate measures and provide technical assistance and support in
carrying out measures to ensure the delivery of basic services and
provision of adequate facilities relative to the integration of the
population development principles and in providing access to said
services and facilities;
c. Develop plans and strategies and implement the same, particularly
those which have to do with the integration of population
development principles and methods in programs and projects which
the governor or mayor is empowered to implement and which the
sanggunian is empowered to provide for;
d. Assist the governor or mayor in the implementation of the
Constitutional provisions relative to population development and the
promotion of responsible parenthood;
e. Establish and maintain an updated data bank for program
operations, development planning and an educational program to
ensure the people's participation in and understanding of population
development;
f. Implement appropriate training programs responsive to the cultural
heritage of the inhabitants; (Sec488[b])
g. Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and
functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance. (Sec488[c])
21. Veterinarian mandatory: provincial
and city
a. Citizen of the Philippines,
b. A resident of the local
government concerned,
c. Of good moral character,
d. A licensed doctor of veterinary
medicine,
e. Have practiced his profession for
at least 3 years in the case of
provincial or city veterinarian and
at least 1 year in the case of the
municipal veterinarian. (Sec489[a])
a. Take charge of the office for veterinary services;
b. Formulate measures and provide technical assistance and support in
carrying out measures to ensure the delivery of basic services and
provision of adequate facilities pursuant to Section 17;
c. Develop plans and strategies and implement the same particularly
those which have to do with the veterinary-related activities which the
governor or mayor is empowered to implement and which the
sanggunian is empowered to provide for
d. Advise the governor or the mayor on all matters pertaining to the
slaughter of animals for human consumption and the regulation of
slaughterhouses;
e. Regulate the keeping of domestic animals;
f. Regulate and inspect poultry, milk and dairy products for public
consumption;
g. Enforce all laws and regulations for the prevention of cruelty to
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animals;
h. Take the necessary measures to eradicate, prevent or cure all forms
of animal diseases;
i. Be in the frontline of veterinary related activities, such as in the
outbreak of highly-contagious and deadly diseases, and in situations
resulting in the depletion of animals for work and human consumption,
particularly those arising from and in the aftermath of man-made and
natural calamities and disasters;
j. Recommend and advise on all other matters relative to veterinary
services which will increase the number and improve the quality of
livestock, poultry and other domestic animals used for work or human
consumption; (Sec489[b])
k. Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and
functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance. (Sec489[c])
22. General Services
Officer
mandatory: provincial
and city
a. Citizen of the Philippines,
b. A resident of the local
government unit concerned,
c. Of good moral character,
d. A holder of a college degree on
public administration, business
administration and management
from a recognized college or
university,
e. A first grade civil service eligible
or its equivalent.
f. Have acquired experience in
general services, including
management of supply, property,
solid waste disposal, and general
sanitation, of at least 5 years in the
case of the provincial or city
general services officer, and at least
3 years in the case of the municipal
general services officer. (Sec490[a])
a. Take charge of the office on general services;
b. Formulate measures and provide technical assistance and support in
carrying out measures to ensure the delivery of basic services and
provision of adequate facilities pursuant to Section 17 and which
require general services expertise and technical support services;
c. Develop plans and strategies and implement the same, particularly
those which have to do with the general services supportive of the
welfare of the inhabitants which the governor or mayor is empowered
to implement and which the sanggunian is empowered to provide for;
d. Take custody of and be accountable for all properties, real or
personal, owned by the LGU and those granted to it in the form of
donation, reparation, assistance and counterpart of joint projects;
e. Assign building or land space to local officials or other public officials,
who by law, are entitled to such space;
f. Recommend the reasonable rental rates for local government
properties, whether real or personal, which will be leased to public or
private entities
g. Recommend reasonable rental rates of private properties which
may be leased for the official use of the local government unit;
h. Maintain and supervise janitorial, security, landscaping and other
related services in all local government public buildings and other real
property
i. Collate and disseminate information regarding prices, shipping and
other costs of supplies and other items commonly used by the LGU;
j. Perform archival and record management with respect to records of
offices and departments of the LGU
k. Perform all other functions pertaining to supply and property
management performed by the local government treasurer; and
enforce policies on records creation, maintenance, and disposal;
l. Be in the frontline of general services related activities, such as the
possible or imminent destruction or damage to records, supplies,
properties, and structures and the orderly and sanitary clearing up of
waste materials or debris, particularly during and in the aftermath of
man-made and natural calamities and disasters;
m. Recommend and advise on all other matters relative to general
services; (Sec490[b])
n. Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and
functions as may be prescribed by law or ordinance. (Sec490[c])



LOCAL FISCAL ADMINISTRATION
Sec 303 306, LGC
SEC. 303. Remedies and Sanctions. - Local government units
shall appropriate in their respective annual budgets such
amounts as are sufficient to pay the loans and other
indebtedness incurred or redeem or retire bonds,
debentures, securities, notes and other obligations issued
under this Title: Provided, That failure to provide the
appropriations herein required shall render their annual
budgets inoperative.
SEC. 304. Scope. - This Title shall govern the conduct and
management of financial affairs, transactions, and operations
of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays.
SEC. 305. Fundamental Principles. - The financial affairs,
transactions, and operations of local government units shall
be governed by the following fundamental principles:
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a. No money shall be paid out of the local treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriations ordinance
or law;
b. Local government funds and monies shall be spent
solely for public purposes;
c. Local revenue is generated only from sources
expressly authorized by law or ordinance, and
collection thereof shall at all times be acknowledged
properly;
d. All monies officially received by a local government
officer in any capacity or on any occasion shall be
accounted for as local funds, unless otherwise
provided by law;
e. Trust funds in the local treasury shall not be paid out
except in fulfillment of the purpose for which the
trust was created or the funds received;
f. Every officer of the local government unit whose
duties permit or require the possession or custody of
local funds shall be properly bonded, and such
officer shall be accountable and responsible for said
funds and for the safekeeping thereof in conformity
with the provisions of law;
g. Local governments shall formulate sound financial
plans, and the local budgets shall be based on
functions, activities, and projects, in terms of
expected results; development plans, goals, and
strategies in order to optimize the utilization of
resources and to avoid duplication in the use of fiscal
and physical resources;
h. Local budget plans and goals shall, as far as
practicable, be harmonized with national
development plans, goals, and strategies in order to
optimize the utilization of resources and to avoid
duplication in the use of fiscal and physical
resources;
i. Local budgets shall operationalize approved local
development plans;
j. Local government units shall ensure that their
respective budgets incorporate the requirements of
their component units and provide for equitable
allocation of resources among these component
units;
k. National planning shall be based on local planning to
ensure that the needs and aspirations of the people
as articulated by the local government units in their
respective local development plans are considered in
the formulation of budgets of national line agencies
or offices;
l. Fiscal responsibility shall be shared by all those
exercising authority over the financial affairs,
transactions, and operations of the local government
units; and
m. The local government unit shall endeavor to have a
balanced budget in each fiscal year of operation.
SEC. 306. Definitions. - When used in this Title, the term
a. "Annual Budget" refers to a financial plan
embodying the estimates of income and
expenditures for one (1) fiscal year;
b. "Appropriation" refers to an authorization made by
ordinance, directing the payment of goods and
services from local government funds under
specified conditions or for specific purposes;
c. "Budget Document" refers to the instrument used by
the local chief executive to present a comprehensive
financial plan to the sanggunian concerned;
d. "Capital Outlays" refers to appropriations for the
purchase of goods and services, the benefits of
which extend beyond the fiscal year and which add
to the assets of the local government unit
concerned, including investments in public utilities
such as public markets and slaughterhouses;
e. "Continuing Appropriation" refers to an
appropriation available to support obligations for a
specified purpose or projects, such as those for the
construction of physical structures or for the
acquisition of real property or equipment, even
when these obligations are incurred beyond the
budget year;
f. "Current Operating Expenditures" refers to
appropriations for the purchase of goods and
services for the conduct of normal local government
operations within the fiscal year, including goods
and services that will be used or consumed during
the budget year;
g. "Expected Results" refers to the services, products,
or benefits that will accrue to the public, estimated
in terms of performance measures or physical
targets;
h. "Fund" refers to a sum of money, or other assets
convertible to cash, set aside for the purpose of
carrying out specific activities or attaining certain
objectives in accordance with special regulations,
restrictions, or limitations, and constitutes an
independent fiscal and accounting entity;
i. "Income" refers to all revenues and receipts
collected or received forming the gross accretions of
funds of the local government unit;
j. "Obligations" refers to an amount committed to be
paid by the local government unit for any lawful act
made by an accountable officer for and in behalf of
the local unit concerned;
k. "Personal Services" refers to appropriations for the
payment of salaries, wages and other compensation
of permanent, temporary, contractual, and casual
employees of the local government unit;
l. "Receipts" refers to income realized from operations
and activities of the local government or are
received by it in the exercise of its corporate
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functions, consisting of charges for services
rendered, conveniences furnished, or the price of a
commodity sold, as well as loans, contributions or
aids from other entities, except provisional advances
for budgetary purposes; and
m. "Revenue" refers to income derived from the regular
system of taxation enforced under authority of law
or ordinance, and, as such, accrue more or less
regularly every year.
Rivera v. Malolos
Petitioner Rivera won the bidding for supply of road
construction materials in the Municipality of Malolos,
Bulacan. A contract was signed between the municipal mayor
and the petitioner, with a stipulation that the latter will
supply 2700 cubic meters of crushed adobe stones and 1400
cu. m. of gravel in consideration of P19,235.oo. A year after
the contract was entered into, the petitioner still hasnt been
paid. He requested that the balance be included in the
municipalitys appropriations for the next fiscal year. The
petitioner sued for the payment of the unpaid amount but
the Auditor General denied the claim on the ff. grounds: 1)
that no appropriation was made before the execution of the
contract, as mandated by Revised Administrative Code
Section 607 and 2) that the deliveries could no longer be
verified by the Provincial Auditor of Bulacan or his
representative. Petitioner Rivera argues that: 1) the annual
allotment from the Motor Vehicle Law could be used to pay
the indebtedness, 2) according to the Revised Administrative
Code, municipalities are endowed with the faculties of a
municipal corporation, therefore competent to contract and
be contracted with.
HELD: The Revised Administrative Code imposes the ff.
requirements before a contract involving P2000 or more may
be authorized: a) There must be an appropriation b) The
Municipal Treasurer must certify to the officer entering into
the contract that the funds have been duly appropriated for
the purpose and that the proposed amount is available for
expenditure. The Motor Vehicle Law invoked by petitioner
merely allocates 10% of the money collected and deposited in
a special trust account of the National treasury to the road
and bridge funds of the different municipalities in proportion
to their population. This alone does not satisfy the requisite
appropriation and authority to disburse part of the proceeds
from the Motor Vehicle Law to pay the petitioner. The
Auditor General had no alternative but to comply with the
law and as the contract entered into by the Malolos Mayor
was contrary to it, the Auditor General was correct in denying
the petitioners claim.

APPLICATION OF THE LGC TO LGUS IN THE AUTONOMOUS REGION
Sec 526, LGC
SEC. 526. Application of this Code to Local Government Units
in the Autonomous Regions. This Code shall apply to all
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays in the
autonomous regions until such time as the regional
government concerned shall have enacted its own local
government code.

THE ARMM
Sec 1, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, Art X, 1987
Constitution
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the
Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as
hereinafter provided.
Section 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of
provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas
sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant
characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and
the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines.
Section 16. The President shall exercise general supervision
over autonomous regions to ensure that the laws are
faithfully executed.
Section 17. All powers, functions, and responsibilities not
granted by this Constitution or by law to the autonomous
regions shall be vested in the National Government.
Section 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each
autonomous region with the assistance and participation of
the regional consultative commission composed of
representatives appointed by the President from a list of
nominees from multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall
define the basic structure of government from the region
consisting of the executive department and legislative
assembly, both of which shall be reflective and representative
of the constituent political units. The organic acts shall
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likewise provide for special courts with personal, family, and
property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of this
Constitution and national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective
when approved by majority of the votes cast by the
constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose,
provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas
voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the
autonomous region.
Section 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the
provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic
act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative
powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and development of the cultural
heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law
for the promotion of the general welfare of the
people of the region.
Section 21. The preservation of peace and order within the
regions shall be the responsibility of the local police agencies
which shall be organized, maintained, supervised, and utilized
in accordance with applicable laws. The defense and security
of the regions shall be the responsibility of the National
Government.
RA 6734
See attachments
Disomancop v. Datumanong
Pursuant to Article 10, Sec 15 of the 1987 Constitution, RA
6734 entitled An Act Providing for An Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao was enacted. In a
plebiscite, the provinces of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu
and Tawi-Tawi voted to become part of the ARMM. To
implement RA 6734, then President Cory Aquino issued E.O
426, placing the control and supervision of the Offices of the
DPWH within the ARMM under the jurisdiction of the
Autonomous Regional Government (ARG). Nine years later,
them DPWH Secretary issued D.O 119 creating a DPWH
Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office, which shall have
jurisdiction over all national infrastructure projects and over
all facilities under the DPWH within Marawi City and Lanao
del Sur. R.A. 9054 was later passed, detailing and expanding
the specific powers of the ARG. In 2001 however, RA 8999
was enacted, establishing an Engineering District in the First
District of Lanao del Sur- in effect reestablishing the National
Governments jurisdiction over infrastructure programs in the
area. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of R.A. 8999 and
D.O. 119, saying that the two run counter to the
constitutional autonomy of the ARMM.
HELD: R.A 8999 is antagonistic and cannot be reconciled with
the ARMM Organic Acts 6734 and 9054. The idea behind the
Constitutional provisions for the autonomous regions is to
allow separate development of peoples with distinct cultures
and traditions. It strives to free Philippine society of the strain
caused by the assimilationist approach. Decentralization is a
prerequisite to autonomy. It comes in two forms-
deconcentration and devolution. The former is a
decentralization of administration, the latter the
decentralization of power. The framers of the Constitution
intended for the autonomy of the ARMM to be in the nature
of the latter- a meaningful and authentic regional
autonomy. Ratified through a plebiscite, the ARMM Organic
Act cannot be amended without a plebiscite, which R.A. 8999
clearly lacked. It is the intention of the ARMM Organic Acts to
cede some, if not most of the powers of the national
government to the autonomous government. The
enforcement of RA 8999 runs afoul of these organic acts. It
bears stressing that national laws are subject to the
Constitution, one of the policies of which is to ensure
autonomy of autonomous regions, subject only to general
supervision by the President.
Meanwhile, the office created under D.O. 119 is a duplication
of the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del
Sur formed under the auspices of E.O. 426. The Department
order in effect takes back powers, which had already been
devolved to the ARG. The DPWH order, cannot rise higher
than its source the Executive. It is also worthy to note that
E.O 124 on which D.O. 119 is based is merely a general law
organizing the DPWH while E.O. 426 is a special law
transferring control and supervision of DPWH offices within
the ARMM to the ARG. The latter should prevail. Even
without applying the principle of lex specialis derogat
generali, the enactment of R.A. 9054 in 2001 which repealed
laws, orders and issuances inconstent with it rendered D.O.
119 functus officio.
Abbas v. Comelec
Petitioners argue that R.A. 6734 or the Act Providing for an
Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao is unconstitutional. According to them, R.A. 6734
unconditionally creates an autonomous region in Mindanao,
regardless of how many provinces vote for autonomy,
contrary to Article X, Section 5 of the Constitution, which
makes the creation of such a region dependent on the
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outcome of the plebiscite. One of the petitioners also insist
that the RA is unconstitutional because it includes non-
Muslim areas, which do not share the same characteristics
with the other provinces. Seemingly contradicting himself,
the petitioner also claims that since some non-Muslim areas
have been included, other non-Muslim areas in Mindanao
must also be covered in order for them to similarly enjoy the
benefits of autonomy. The RAs failure to include all such
areas is allegedly a violation of the equal protection clause of
the Constitution. Petitioners likewise assert that Article XIX,
Section 13 of RA 6734 grants the President power to merge
regions a power not conferred by the Constitution. Lastly,
they contend that the creation of an Oversight Committee is
unconstitutional in that it delays the creation of an
autonomous region.
HELD: R.A. 6734 substantially incorporates the requirements
for the creation of an autonomous region embodied in the
Constitution. Creation of an autonomous region takes effect
only when approved by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite, and only those provinces and cities voting
favorably shall be included. Majority means a simple majority
of votes approving the Organic Act in individual constituent
units and not a double majority of the votes in all constituent
units put together, as well as the constituent units taken
individually. Contrary to the petitioners claims, creation of
autonomous region is not rendered absolute. It may be that
even if an autonomous region is created, not all of the 13
provinces and 9 municipalities shall be included. This is
because the plebiscite will be determinative of two points: 1)
whether there will be an autonomous region in Muslim
Mindanao, and 2) which provinces and cities shall comprise it.
With respect to the inclusion of non-Muslim areas, the
contention is not tenable. Ascertainment of the areas that
share common attributes is within the legislatures discretion.
It is beyond the review powers of the judiciary. The same
explanation supports the rejection of the claim that other
non-Muslim areas should be included in the autonomous
region, lest the equal protection clause be violated. Equal
protection permits of reasonable classification. Since the
Congress based its classification on real and substantial
distinctions, no violation was made.
The power of the President to merge administrative regions
was upheld, it pertaining merely to groupings of contiguous
provinces for administrative purposes. Administrative regions
are not territorial and political subdivisions like provinces,
municipalities and barangays that require a plebiscite to be
merged. The power to merge administrative regions although
not expressly provided for in the Constitution is traditionally
lodged with the President.
The questioned provisions requiring an Oversight Committee
to supervise the transfer of national offices to the regional
government is precisely aimed to effect a smooth transition
and cannot be considered an impediment or a cause of delay.
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality
and the petitioners failed to overcome that presumption.
Pandi v. CA
Take note of the dates because they are significant
in determining the validity of appointments
On August 9, 1993, Dr. Jamila R. Macacaua, in her capacity as
Regional Director and DOH-ARMM Secretary issued a
Memorandum appointing Dr. Pandi as Officer-in-Charge of
the Integrated Provincial Health Office-Amai Pakpak General
Hospital in Lanao del Sur (IPHO-APGH) and transferring the
incumbent OIC, Dr. Sani to the DOH-ARMM Regional Office in
Cotabato City. On September 15, 1993, Lanao del Sur
Governor Mahid Mutilan appointed Dr. Saber also to the
position of OIC of the IPHO-APGH. In other words, Saber and
Pandi were appointed to the same position by different
appointing officers. Sani on the other hand, contests her
being moved to Cotabato and claims to be the holder of a
permanent appointment as provincial health officer (PHO) of
IPHO-PGH, the same post that Saber and Pandi were
appointed to. On October 5, 1993 President Ramos issued EO
133, transferring powers and functions of the DOH in the
region to the ARMM Regional Government (ARG), pursuant
to which Macacaua reiterated her appointments. The parties
are in dispute as to which appointments are valid. The case
traces the enactment of various legislation, divided into five
periods, to wit: 1) the time prior to effectivity of Organic Act
of 1989, 2) the time after Organic Act 1989 but before the
LGC of 1991, 3) after the LGC of 1991 but before the ARMM
Code, 4) after the ARMM Code but before Organic Act of
2001, 5) after Organic Act of 2001. During the first period, the
governing law was the DOH Charter (EO 119), in which the
power to appoint was granted to the Minister of Health. Then
LGC of 1984 classified the Provincial Health Officer as a
national government official whose salary is paid out of
national funds. The ARMM was created after the enactment
of the Organic Act of 1989. The latter transferred certain
agencies and offices of the national government to the
Regional Government but the DOH was not among them.
PHOs were still part of the national government until the
Regional Government adopts its own Local Government
Code. During the third period, the LGC of 1991 took effect,
naming the provincial health officer as an official of the
Provincial Government to be appointed by the Governor if his
salary is paid out of provincial funds. One must however note
that although LGC 1991 is a later law than OA 1989, the latter
is not affected by the formers enactment because an organic
act requires an approval through plebiscite to be amended.
Thus, even with LGC 1991s passage, the appointment of the
PHO is still with the Secretary of Health. It was only upon the
effectivity of EO 133 in October 1993 that the power to
appoint provincial health officers to any province was
assigned to the ARMM Secretary of Health (Regional
Secretary). In the fourth period, the ARMM Local Code came
into being, stating that if the salary of a PHO comes from
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Municipal Corporation P a g e | 186

provincial funds, appointing power is with the Provincial
Governor and if it comes from regional funds, then it is with
the Regional Governor, upon recommendation from the
Provincial Governor. In case of doubt, the ARMM Local Code
is interpreted in favor of devolution- in favor of the provincial
governors powers. The fifth period covers the passage of the
Organic Act of 2001, through which the powers and functions
of any other provincial governor under the LGC of 1991,
including the power to appoint PHOs, are now enjoyed as a
minimum by the Provincial Governor of the ARMM.
HELD: When Governor Mahid Mutilan appointed Saber as OIC
on September 1993, the provincial health officer was still a
national government official paid out of national funds. The
provincial health officer became a provincial government
official only on March 3, 1994 after the effectivity of the
ARMM Local Code. The governor had no power to make such
designation at the time, hence the appointment of Saber as
OIC is void. Reliance on the LGC is misplaced since it did not
amend the Organic Act of 1989. The provision in the LGC
which states that The appointment of a health officer shall
be mandatory for provincial, city and municipal governments
is merely a directive that those empowered to appoint local
health officers are mandated to do so. With respect to the
initial transfer of Sani by Macacaua from Lanao del Sur to
Cotabato on August 1993, the Court holds that the act is void,
since the power to appoint was still with the Secretary of
Health at the time, not with the Regional Secretary. However,
when Macacaua issued a second memorandum on November
6, 1993, reiterating the transfer of Sani, the prior error was
cured and the transfer became valid since it was made after
the issuance of EO 133 which expressly transferred
supervision and control over all functions and activities of
the Regional Department of Health to the Head of the
Regional Department of Health. The same is true for the
appointment of Pandi, which was similarly made by
Macacaua on the same dates. The appointments made by
Macacaua are valid while that made by Governor Mutilan is
void. The Court reminds us however, that after the effectivity
of the ARMM Local Code, the Regional Secretary had been
stripped of authority to make such a designation. The said
power is now with the Provincial Governor.
Bai Sema v. Comelec (supra)
Maguindanao forms part of the ARMM, created under
Organic Act (RA 9054). The Ordinance appended to the
Constitution apportioned two legislative districts to the
Province of Maguindanao, the first consisting of Cotabato City
and eight other municipalities. The ARMMs legislature,
exercising its power to create provinces under Section 19 of
R.A 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201
(MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan
composed of the said eight municipalities in Maguindanaos
first district. The Act however provided that despite the
creation of the new province, the existing legislative district
(8 municipalities + Cotabato) shall still remain. The voters of
Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuans creation in a
plebiscite. Cotabatos Sangguniang Panlunsod asked the
COMELEC to clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the
creation of Shariff Kabunsuan. To this, COMELEC answered
with a Resolution maintaining the status quo- with Cotabato
and Shariff Kabunsuan constituting part of the first legislative
district in Maguindanao. COMELEC later promulgated
Resolution No. 7902 renaming Maguindanaos first district as
Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City. Bai Sema, a
candidate for Congresswoman of Shariff Kabunsuan with
Cotabato City, asserts that according to Article VI, Section
5(3) of the Constitution, and Ordinance 3 appended to the
latter, Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one representative,
and Cotabato with a population of only 163, 849 to another.
She cites Felwa vs. Salas, which held that when a province is
created by statute, the corresponding legislative district
comes into existence neither by authority of that statute nor
by apportionment but by operation of the Constitution,
without reapportionment. In other words, she wants
Cotabato and Shariff Kabunsuan to have separate
representatives, since according to her, the creation of a new
province necessitates the creation of a corresponding
legislative district.
HELD: Although the Congress is not given by the Constitution
express powers to delegate the creation of local government
units, such power may be gleaned from its plenary powers.
While there is no conflict between the Constitution and
Congress delegation of the power to create municipalities
and barangays, it is an altogether different matter when it
comes to the creation of cities and provinces. This is because
of the situation created by Article VI, Section 5(3) of the
Constitution which says, "Each city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have
at least one representative" in the House of Representatives.
A province cannot be created without a legislative district
because it will violate the aforequoted provision of the
Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended
to the former. For Congress to delegate validly the power to
create a province or city, it must also validly delegate the
power to create a legislative district. The latter is however
disallowed by the Section 5(1) Article VI of the Constitution,
giving Congress the exclusive power to create or reapportion
legislative districts. It would be anomalous for regional or
local legislative bodies to create or reapportion legislative
districts for a national legislature like Congress. The office of a
legislative district representative to Congress is a national
office, and its occupant, a Member of the House of
Representatives, is a national official. It would be incongruous
for a regional legislative body like the ARMM Regional
Assembly to create a national office when its legislative
powers extend only to its regional territory. The office of a
district representative is maintained by national funds and
UP College of Law
187 | P a g e Municipal Corporation
the salary of its occupant is paid out of national funds. To
allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national
office is to allow its legislative powers to operate outside the
ARMM's territorial jurisdiction. This violates Section 20,
Article X of the Constitution which expressly limits the
coverage of the Regional Assembly's legislative powers
"within its territorial jurisdiction." Since a province cannot be
legally created without a legislative district, the creation of
the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan is unconstitutional. The
reliance by Sema on the Felwa case is misplaced. A district is
created in two ways: a) indirectly, through the creation of a
province, and b) directly, by creation of legislative districts.
The court sustained the constitutionality of the creation of a
new district in that case because it was made indirectly
through a special law enacted by the Congress creating a
province and also because the creation of legislative districts
will not exceed the maximum number of representatives
allowed by the Constitution.
Semas theory will lead to the following disastrous
consequences: (1) An inferior legislative body like the ARMM
Regional Assembly can create 100 or more provinces and
thus increase the membership of a superior legislative body,
the House of Representatives, beyond the maximum limit of
250 fixed in the Constitution (unless a national law provides
otherwise);
(2) The proportional representation in the House of
Representatives based on 1 rep/at least 250,000 residents
will be negated because the ARMM Regional Assembly need
not comply with the requirement in Section 461(a)(ii) of RA
7160 that a province or city must have a minimum population
of 250,ooo; and (3) Representatives from the ARMM
provinces can become the majority in the House of
Representatives through the ARMM Regional Assembly's
continuous creation of provinces or cities within the ARMM.
The Congress and the framers of the Constitution did not
intend such consequences.
Organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the
Constitution, Sec 20 of which provides that legislative powers
of regional assemblies are limited within its territorial
jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of the Constitution.
Section 19, Article VI of R.A. 9054 is unconstitutional insofar
as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to
create provinces and cities. MMA 201 is thus void and of no
effect.
Separate Opinion by Tinga: The only constitutional provision
that concerns with the creation of provinces is Section 10,
Article X, which reads: No province, city, municipality or
barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code and subject
to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in
the political units directly affected. Nothing in this provision
specifically limits the power to create provinces, cities,
municipalities or barangays to Congress alone. The provision
does embody a significant limitation - that the creation of
these political subdivisions must be in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code, a law which
is enacted by Congress. It would thus be proper to say that
the Constitution limits the ability to set forth the standards
for the creation of a province exclusively to Congress. But to
say that the Constitution confines to Congress alone the
power to establish the criteria for creating provinces is vastly
different from saying that the Constitution confines to
Congress alone the power to create provinces. There is
nothing in the Constitution that supports the latter
proposition.


CAR
Admin Order 220
See attachments
Ordillo v. Comelec
The people of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra,
Kalinga-Apayao and Baguio City cast their votes in a plebiscite
pursuant to R.A. 6766 entitled An Act Providing for an
Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. A total of
5,889 people voted for the creation of the region while an
overwhelming majority of 148,676 votes rejected it.
Consequently, COMELEC issued resolution No.2259 stating
that since the Organic Act for the region has been approved
by a majority of votes in Ifugao Province only, the latter alone
will constitute the autonomous region. The President also
issued Administrative Order No. 160 abolishing the Cordillera
Executive Board and the Cordillera Regional Assembly in view
of the Organic Acts ratification. Petitioner assails the
Comelec Resolution 2259 and AO No. 160, saying that the
province of Ifugao cannot solely constitute the Cordillera
Autonomous Region.
HELD: The petition is meritorious. Article X, Sec 15 of the
Constitution is explicit in providing that provinces, cities,
municipalities and geographical areas shall constitute the
autonomous region- meaning more than one constituent
unit. The term region used in its ordinary sense means two
or more provinces. This is supported by the fact that the 13
regions we have in the country are groupings of contiguous
provinces. Ifugao is a province in itself, one of the smallest in
the country to boot making up only 11% of the total
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population of the areas mentioned in RA 6766. The law
reiterates the provision in the Constitution by providing that
The Regional Government shall exercise powers...for the
proper governance of all provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays. It can be gleaned that Congress never intended a
single province to constitute an autonomous region.
Otherwise, we would be faced with an absurd situation of
having two sets of officials- a set of provincial officials and a
set of regional officials exercising executive and legislative
powers over exactly the same small area. Since Ifugao is very
small province, it would have too many government officials
for so few people. The law also creates a Regional Planning
and Development Board consisting of several members, with
functions similar to that of a Provincial Coordinators. If it
takes only one person in the provincial level to perform those
functions while it takes an entire Board to perform
substantially the same tasks in the regional level, it only
means that a larger area is contemplated by the law to make
up the autonomous region. Also, the huge allotment of P10M
to the Regional Government for its initial organizational
requirements is too much to fund a lone and small province.
Cordillera Broad Coalition v. COA
Executive Order No. 220, issued by the President in the
exercise of her legislative powers under Art. XVIII, sec. 6 of
the 1987 Constitution, created the Cordillera Administrative
Region (CAR), which covers the provinces of Abra, Benguet,
Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province and the City
of Baguio [secs. 1 and 2]. It was created to accelerate
economic and social growth in the region and to prepare for
the establishment of the autonomous region in the
Cordilleras [sec. 3]. Its main function is to coordinate the
planning and implementation of programs and services in the
region, particularly, to coordinate with the local government
units as well as with the executive departments of the
National Government in the supervision of field offices and in
identifying, planning, monitoring, and accepting projects and
activities in the region [sec. 5]. It shall also monitor the
implementation of all ongoing national and local government
projects in the region [sec. 20]. The CAR shall have a
Cordillera Regional Assembly as a policy-formulating body
and a Cordillera Executive Board as an implementing arm
[secs. 7, 8 and 10]. The CAR and the Assembly and Executive
Board shall exist until such time as the autonomous regional
government is established and organized [sec. 17].
In these cases, petitioners principally argue that by issuing
E.O. No. 220 the President, in the exercise of her legislative
powers prior to the convening of the first Congress under the
1987 Constitution, has virtually pre-empted Congress from its
mandated task of enacting an organic act and created an
autonomous region in the Cordilleras.
During the pendency of this case, R.A. 6766 entitled "An Act
Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous
Region," was enacted and signed into law. The Act recognizes
the CAR and the offices and agencies created under E.O. No.
220 and its transitory nature is reinforced in Art. XXI of R.A.
No. 6766, to wit:
SEC. 3. The Cordillera Executive Board, the Cordillera Region
Assembly as well as all offices and agencies created under
Execute Order No. 220 shall cease to exist immediately upon
the ratification of this Organic Act.
All funds, properties and assets of the Cordillera Executive
Board and the Cordillera Regional Assembly shall
automatically be transferred to the Cordillera Autonomous
Government.
WON E.O.220 is unconstitutional because it pre-empts the
Congress from enacting an organic act for the autonomous
region in Cordillera.
Held: No
A reading of E.O. No. 220 will easily reveal that what it
actually envisions is the consolidation and coordination of the
delivery of services of line departments and agencies of the
National Government in the areas covered by the
administrative region as a step preparatory to the grant of
autonomy to the Cordilleras. It does not create the
autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. It
merely provides for transitory measures in anticipation of the
enactment of an organic act and the creation of an
autonomous region. In short, it prepares the ground for
autonomy. This does not necessarily conflict with the
provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions.
The transitory nature of the CAR does not necessarily mean
that it is, as petitioner Cordillera Broad Coalition asserts, "the
interim autonomous region in the Cordilleras. The
Constitution provides for a basic structure of government in
the autonomous region composed of an elective executive
and legislature and special courts with personal, family and
property law jurisdiction [Art. X, sec. 18]. Using this as a
guide, we find that E.O. No. 220 did not establish an
autonomous regional government. It merely created a region,
covering a specified area, for administrative purposes with
the main objective of coordinating the planning and
implementation of programs and services [secs. 2 and 5]. The
bodies created by E.O. No. 220 do not supplant the existing
local governmental structure, nor are they autonomous
government agencies. They merely constitute the mechanism
for an "umbrella" that brings together the existing local
governments, the agencies of the National Government, the
ethno-linguistic groups or tribes, and non-governmental
organizations in a concerted effort to spur development in
the Cordilleras.
UP College of Law
189 | P a g e Municipal Corporation
WON the CAR is a territorial and political subdivision.
Held: No
E.O. 220 did not create a new territorial and political
subdivision or merge existing ones into a larger subdivision.
Firstly, the CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and
political subdivision. It does not have a separate juridical
personality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalities.
Neither is it vested with the powers that are normally granted
to public corporations, e.g. the power to sue and be sued, the
power to own and dispose of property, the power to create
its own sources of revenue, etc. As stated earlier, the CAR
was created primarily to coordinate the planning and
implementation of programs and services in the covered
areas.
The CAR may be considered more than anything else as a
regional coordinating agency of the National Government,
similar to the regional development councils which the
President may create under the Art. X, Sec. 14 of the
Constitution.
As we have said earlier, the CAR is a mere transitory
coordinating agency that would prepare the stage for political
autonomy for the Cordilleras. It fills in the resulting gap in the
process of transforming a group of adjacent territorial and
political subdivisions already enjoying local or administrative
autonomy into an autonomous region vested with political
autonomy.
MMDA AND LGUS
Sec 11, Art X, 1987 Constitution
Section 11. The Congress may, by law, create special
metropolitan political subdivisions, subject to a plebiscite as
set forth in Section 10 hereof. The component cities and
municipalities shall retain their basic autonomy and shall be
entitled to their own local executives and legislative
assemblies. The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority
that will hereby be created shall be limited to basic services
requiring coordination.
RA 7924
See attachments
MMDA v. Bel Air Village Association Inc
(supra)
MMDA attempted to demolish the wall separating Kalayan
Avenue from the subdivision owned by the respondent. Thus,
respondents filed a case for injunction against the MMDA.
The CA ruled for the respondent and issued a permanent writ
of injunction. Hence, this petition.
MMDAs argument: that it has the authority to open the
Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent of the
state endowed with police power in the delivery of basic
services in Metro Manila (in this case, traffic management).
From the premise that it has police power, it is now urged
that there is no need for the City of Makati to enact an
ordinance opening Neptune street to the public. Moreover, it
is alleged that the police power of MMDA was affirmed by
this Court in the consolidated cases of Sangalang v.
Intermediate Appellate Court.
WON MMDA has police power and WON there is no need for
the City of Makati to enact an ordinance opening the
disputed street to the public.
Held: No to both
MMDA has no police power and an ordinance enacted by the
City of Makati is necessary for the opening of Neptune Street
to the public.
It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to
the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation,
implementation, preparation, management, monitoring,
setting of policies, installation of a system and administration.
There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA
police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro
Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power.
Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units,
there is no provision in R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the
MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances, approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare" of
the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in
the charter itself, a "development authority." It is an agency
created for the purpose of laying down policies and
coordinating with the various national government agencies,
peoples organizations, non-governmental organizations, and
the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of
basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions
are administrative in nature and these are actually summed
up in the charter itself, viz:
"Sec. 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority. -- x x x.
The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and
coordinative functions, and in the process exercise regulatory
and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide
services within Metro Manila, without diminution of the
autonomy of the local government units concerning purely
local matters."
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Municipal Corporation P a g e | 190

Having no legislative power, the MMDA cannot enact
ordinances. Thus, it becomes necessary for the City of Makati
to enact an ordinance declaring the Neptune Street open to
the public before the MMDA can implement such activity.
WON the consolidated cases of Sangalang vs. IAC (as regards
the SCs upholding of MMDAs alleged police power) are
applicable in this case.
Held: No
Firstly, the Sangalang cases involved zoning ordinances
passed by the municipal council of Makati and the Metro
Manila Commission (MMC the forerunner of MMDA). In the
instant case, the basis for the proposed opening of Neptune
Street is a mere notice sent by MMDA to the respondent, the
former relying on its authority under its charter to
rationalize the use of roads and/or thoroughfares for the safe
and convenient movement of persons.
Secondly, the MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC in
Sangalang. Although the MMC is the forerunner of the
present MMDA, an examination of P. D. No. 824, the
charter of the MMC, shows that the latter possessed greater
powers which were not bestowed on the present MMDA.
Metropolitan Manila was first created in 1975 by P.D. 824. Its
administration was placed under the Metro Manila
Commission (MMC), which was specifically vested with
legislative powers. The MMC was the central government
of Metro Manila and fully possessed legislative and police
powers. Whatever legislative powers the component cities
and municipalities had were all subject to review and
approval by the MMC.
In 1990, President Aquino issued E.O. No. 392 and
constituted the Metropolitan Manila Authority (MMA). The
powers and functions of the MMC were devolved to the
MMA. It ought to be stressed, however, that not all powers
and functions of the MMC were passed to the MMA. The
MMAs power was limited to the "delivery of basic urban
services requiring coordination in Metropolitan Manila." The
MMAs governing body, the Metropolitan Manila Council,
although composed of the mayors of the component cities
and municipalities, was merely given the power of: (1)
formulation of policies on the delivery of basic services
requiring coordination and consolidation; and (2)
promulgation of resolutions and other issuances, approval of
a code of basic services and the exercise of its rule-making
power.
Under the 1987 Constitution, the local government units
became primarily responsible for the governance of their
respective political subdivisions. The MMAs jurisdiction was
limited to addressing common problems involving basic
services that transcended local boundaries. It did not have
legislative power. Its power was merely to provide the local
government units technical assistance in the preparation of
local development plans. Any semblance of legislative power
it had was confined to a "review [of] legislation proposed by
the local legislative assemblies to ensure consistency among
local governments and with the comprehensive development
plan of Metro Manila," and to "advise the local governments
accordingly."
When R.A. No. 7924 took effect, Metropolitan Manila
became a "special development and administrative region"
and the MMDA a "special development authority" whose
functions were "without prejudice to the autonomy of the
affected local government units." The MMDA is not a political
unit of government. The power delegated to the MMDA is
that given to the Metro Manila Council to promulgate
administrative rules and regulations in the implementation of
the MMDAs functions. There is no grant of authority to enact
ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the
inhabitants of the metropolis. It is good to note that the
explanatory note to the bill which created MMDA stated that
the proposed MMDA is a development authority which is a
national agency, not a political government unit.
It is beyond doubt that the MMDA is not a local government
unit or a public corporation endowed with legislative power.
It is not even a "special metropolitan political subdivision" as
contemplated in Section 11, Article X of the Constitution. The
creation of a "special metropolitan political subdivision"
requires the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected. R. A. No.
7924 was not submitted to the inhabitants of Metro Manila in
a plebiscite. The Chairman of the MMDA is not an official
elected by the people, but appointed by the President with
the rank and privileges of a cabinet member. In fact, part of
his function is to perform such other duties as may be
assigned to him by the President, whereas in local
government units, the President merely exercises supervisory
authority. This emphasizes the administrative character of
the MMDA.
Clearly then, the MMC under P. D. No. 824 is not the same
entity as the MMDA under R. A. No. 7924. Unlike the MMC,
the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare
of the community. It is the local government units, acting
through their respective legislative councils, that possess
legislative power and police power. In the case at bar, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any
ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune
Street, hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is
illegal and the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in so
ruling.
MMDA v. Garin
UP College of Law
191 | P a g e Municipal Corporation
Dante O. Garin, a lawyer, was issued a traffic violation receipt
(TVR) and his drivers license was confiscated for parking
illegally along Gandara Street, Binondo, Manila, on 08/05/95.
Due to the then MMDA Chairmans failure to heed Garins
request that his drivers license be returned and that instead
he be subjected to a case for traffic violation in court, Garin
filed a cased for injunction in the RTC.
Garins argument: In the absence of any implementing rules
and regulations, Sec. 5(f) of R.A. No. 7924 grants the MMDA
unbridled discretion to deprive erring motorists of their
licenses, thereby violating the due process clause of the
Constitution. Garin further contends that the provision
violates the constitutional prohibition against undue
delegation of legislative authority, allowing as it does the
MMDA to fix and impose unspecified and therefore
unlimited - fines and other penalties on erring motorists.
MMDAs argument: The powers granted to it by Sec. 5(f) of
Rep. Act No. 7924 are limited to the fixing, collection and
imposition of fines and penalties for traffic violations, which
powers are legislative and executive in nature; the judiciary
retains the right to determine the validity of the penalty
imposed. It further argues that the doctrine of separation of
powers does not preclude admixture of the three powers of
government in administrative agencies. Moreover, MMDA
has already formulated its implementing rules for Sec. 5(f),
which is Memorandum Circular No. YY-95-001 dated
04/15/95.
The RTC ruled in favor of Garin. Thus, MMDA filed this
petition in the SC. MMDA reiterates and reinforces its
argument that a license to operate a motor vehicle is neither
a contract nor a property right, but is a privilege subject to
reasonable regulation under the police power in the interest
of the public safety and welfare. It further argues that
revocation or suspension of this privilege does not constitute
a taking without due process as long as the licensee is given
the right to appeal the revocation.
Meanwhile, on 12 August 2004, the MMDA, through its
Chairman Bayani Fernando, implemented Memorandum
Circular No. 04, Series of 2004, outlining the procedures for
the use of the Metropolitan Traffic Ticket (MTT) scheme.
Under the circular, erring motorists are issued an MTT, which
can be paid at any Metrobank branch. Traffic enforcers may
no longer confiscate drivers licenses as a matter of course in
cases of traffic violations. All motorists with unredeemed
TVRs were given seven days from the date of implementation
of the new system to pay their fines and redeem their license
or vehicle plates.
It would seem, therefore, that insofar as the absence of a
prima facie case to enjoin the petitioner from confiscating
drivers licenses is concerned, recent events have overtaken
the Courts need to decide this case, which has been
rendered moot and academic by the implementation of
Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 2004. The petitioner,
however, is not precluded from re-implementing
Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001, or any other scheme,
for that matter, that would entail confiscating drivers
licenses. For the proper implementation, therefore, of the
petitioners future programs, the Supreme Court deemed it
appropriate to make the following observations: 1) A license
to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege that the state may
withhold in the exercise of its police power; 2) The MMDA is
not vested with police power; and 3) Sec. 5(f) grants the
MMDA with the duty to enforce existing traffic rules and
regulations (which means that MMDA may enforce, but
cannot enact, ordinances).
WON MMDA has police power and WON it has the authority
to confiscate traffic violators drivers license without an
enabling law enacted by Congress.
Held: No
Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the
power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make,
ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and
reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with
penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as
they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. Having
been lodged primarily in the National Legislature, it cannot be
exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing
legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may
delegate this power to the president and administrative
boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal
corporations or local government units (LGUs). Once
delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative
powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking
body.
In Metro Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village
Association, Inc., the SC categorically stated that Rep. Act No.
7924 does not grant the MMDA with police power, let alone
legislative power, and that all its functions are administrative
in nature. The MMDA is not a political unit of government.
The power delegated to the MMDA is that given to the Metro
Manila Council to promulgate administrative rules and
regulations in the implementation of the MMDAs functions.
There is no grant of authority to enact ordinances and
regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the
metropolis. Therefore, insofar as Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No.
7924 is understood by the lower court and by the petitioner
to grant the MMDA the power to confiscate and suspend or
revoke drivers licenses without need of any other legislative
enactment, such is an unauthorized exercise of police power.
Sec. 5(f) grants the MMDA with the duty to enforce existing
traffic rules and regulations. Thus, where there is a traffic law
or regulation validly enacted by the legislature or those
agencies to whom legislative powers have been delegated
(the City of Manila in this case), the petitioner is not
precluded and in fact is duty-bound to confiscate and
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suspend or revoke drivers licenses in the exercise of its
mandate of transport and traffic management, as well as the
administration and implementation of all traffic enforcement
operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education
programs. This is consistent with the ruling in Bel-Air that the
MMDA is a development authority created for the purpose of
laying down policies and coordinating with the various
national government agencies, peoples organizations, non-
governmental organizations and the private sector, which
may enforce, but not enact, ordinances.
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193 | P a g e Municipal Corporation

Municipal Contracts

CORPORATE POWERS
Sec 22, LGC
See above
Feliciano v. COA
This is a petition for certiorari to annul the Commission on
Audits (COA) Resolution dated 01/03/00 and the Decision
dated 01/30/01 denying the Motion for Reconsideration. The
COA denied petitioner Ranulfo C. Felicianos request for COA
to cease all audit services, and to stop charging auditing fees,
to Leyte Metropolitan Water District (LMWD). The COA also
denied petitioners request for COA to refund all auditing fees
previously paid by LMWD.
Background: A Special Audit Team from COA Regional Office
No. VIII audited the accounts of LMWD. Subsequently,
LMWD received a letter from COA dated 19 July 1999
requesting payment of auditing fees. As General Manager of
LMWD, petitioner sent a reply dated 12 October 1999
informing COAs Regional Director that the water district
could not pay the auditing fees. Petitioner cited as basis for
his action Sections 6 and 20 of Presidential Decree 198 (PD
198), as well as Section 18 of Republic Act No. 6758 (RA
6758). The Regional Director referred petitioners reply to
the COA Chairman on 18 October 1999.
On 19 October 1999, petitioner wrote COA through the
Regional Director asking for refund of all auditing fees LMWD
previously paid to COA. On 16 March 2000, petitioner
received COA Chairman Celso D. Gangans Resolution dated 3
January 2000 denying his requests. Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration on 31 March 2000, which COA denied on
30 January 2001. On 13 March 2001, petitioner filed this
instant petition.
WON a Local Water District (LWD) created under PD 198, as
amended, is a government-owned or controlled corporation
subject to the audit jurisdiction of COA.
Held: Yes
The Constitution and existing laws mandate COA to audit all
government agencies, including government-owned and
controlled corporations (GOCCs) with original charters. An
LWD is a GOCC with an original charter. Section 2(1), Article
IX-D of the Constitution provides for COAs audit jurisdiction,
as follows:
SECTION 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the
power, authority and duty to examine, audit, and settle all
accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and
expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in
trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its
subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including
government-owned and controlled corporations with original
charters, x x x
The Constitution authorizes Congress to create government-
owned or controlled corporations through special charters.
Since private corporations cannot have special charters, it
follows that Congress can create corporations with special
charters only if such corporations are government-owned or
controlled.
Obviously, LWDs are not private corporations because they
are not created under the Corporation Code. LWDs are not
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Section 14 of the Corporation Code states that *A+ll
corporations organized under this code shall file with the
Securities and Exchange Commission articles of incorporation
x x x. LWDs have no articles of incorporation, no
incorporators and no stockholders or members. There are no
stockholders or members to elect the board directors of
LWDs as in the case of all corporations registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission. The local mayor or the
provincial governor appoints the directors of LWDs for a fixed
term of office. This Court has ruled that LWDs are not
created under the Corporation Code.
LWDs exist by virtue of PD 198, which constitutes their
special charter. Since under the Constitution only
government-owned or controlled corporations may have
special charters, LWDs can validly exist only if they are
government-owned or controlled. To claim that LWDs are
private corporations with a special charter is to admit that
their existence is constitutionally infirm.
Unlike private corporations, which derive their legal existence
and power from the Corporation Code, LWDs derive their
legal existence and power from PD 198. Sections 6 and 25 of
PD 198 provide:
Section 6. Formation of District. This Act is the
source of authorization and power to form and maintain a
district. For purposes of this Act, a district shall be considered
as a quasi-public corporation performing public service and
supplying public wants. As such, a district shall exercise the
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powers, rights and privileges given to private corporations
under existing laws, in addition to the powers granted in, and
subject to such restrictions imposed, under this Act. x x x
Sec. 25. Authorization. The district may exercise all the
powers which are expressly granted by this Title or which are
necessarily implied from or incidental to the powers and
purposes herein stated. For the purpose of carrying out the
objectives of this Act, a district is hereby granted the power
of eminent domain, the exercise thereof shall, however, be
subject to review by the Administration.
Clearly, LWDs exist as corporations only by virtue of PD 198,
which expressly confers on LWDs corporate powers. Section
6 of PD 198 provides that LWDs shall exercise the powers,
rights and privileges given to private corporations under
existing laws. Without PD 198, LWDs would have no
corporate powers. Thus, PD 198 constitutes the special
enabling charter of LWDs. The ineluctable conclusion is that
LWDs are government-owned and controlled corporations
with a special charter.
The phrase government-owned and controlled corporations
with original charters means GOCCs created under special
laws and not under the general incorporation law. There is
no difference between the term original charters and
special charters.
Petitioners contention that the Sangguniang Bayan
resolution creates the LWDs assumes that the Sangguniang
Bayan has the power to create corporations. This is a
patently baseless assumption. The Local Government Code
does not vest in the Sangguniang Bayan the power to create
corporations. What the Local Government Code empowers
the Sangguniang Bayan to do is to provide for the
establishment of a waterworks system subject to existing
laws. Thus, Section 447(5)(vii) of the Local Government
Code provides:
SECTION 447. Powers, Duties, Functions and
Compensation. (a) The sangguniang bayan, as the
legislative body of the municipality, shall enact ordinances,
approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general
welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to
Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the
corporate powers of the municipality as provided for under
Section 22 of this Code, and shall:
(vii) Subject to existing laws, provide for the
establishment, operation, maintenance, and repair of an
efficient waterworks system to supply water for the
inhabitants; regulate the construction, maintenance, repair
and use of hydrants, pumps, cisterns and reservoirs; protect
the purity and quantity of the water supply of the
municipality and, for this purpose, extend the coverage of
appropriate ordinances over all territory within the drainage
area of said water supply and within one hundred (100)
meters of the reservoir, conduit, canal, aqueduct, pumping
station, or watershed used in connection with the water
service; and regulate the consumption, use or wastage of
water;
The Sangguniang Bayan may establish a waterworks system
only in accordance with the provisions of PD 198. The
Sangguniang Bayan has no power to create a corporate entity
that will operate its waterworks system. However, the
Sangguniang Bayan may avail of existing enabling laws, like
PD 198, to form and incorporate a water district. Besides,
even assuming for the sake of argument that the Sangguniang
Bayan has the power to create corporations, the LWDs would
remain government-owned or controlled corporations
subject to COAs audit jurisdiction. The resolution of the
Sangguniang Bayan would constitute an LWDs special
charter, making the LWD a government-owned and
controlled corporation with an original charter. In any event,
the Court has already ruled in Baguio Water District v. Trajano
that the Sangguniang Bayan resolution is not the special
charter of LWDs, thus:
While it is true that a resolution of a local sanggunian is still
necessary for the final creation of a district, this Court is of
the opinion that said resolution cannot be considered as its
charter, the same being intended only to implement the
provisions of said decree.

AUTHORITY TO NEGOTIATE OR SECURE GRANTS AND INCUR INDEBTEDNESS
Sec 23, LGC
See above
BUILD-OPERATE-TRANSFER
Sec 302, LGC
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195 | P a g e Municipal Corporation
Sec. 302. Financing, Construction, Maintenance, Operation,
and Management of Infrastructure Projects by the Private
Sector.
(a) Local government units may enter into contracts
with any duly pre-qualified individual contractor,
for the financing, construction, operation, and
maintenance of any financially viable infrastructure
facilities, under the build-operate-and-transfer
agreement, subject to the applicable provisions of
Republic Act Numbered Sixty-nine hundred fifty-
seven (R.A. No. 6957) authorizing the financing,
construction, operation and maintenance of
infrastructure projects by the private sector and
the rules and regulations issued thereunder and
such terms and conditions provided in this Section.
(b) Local government units shall include in their
respective local development plans and public
investment programs priority projects that may be
financed, constructed, operated and maintained by
the private sector under this Section. It shall be the
duty of the local government unit concerned to
disclose to the public all projects eligible for
financing under this Section, including official
notification of duly registered contractors and
publication in newspapers of general or local
circulation and in conspicuous and accessible
public places. Local projects under the build-
operate-and-transfer agreement shall be
confirmed by the local development councils.
(c) Projects implemented under this Section shall be
subject to the following terms and conditions:
(1) The provincial, city, or municipal engineer, as the
case may be, upon formal request in writing by the
local chief executive, shall prepare the plans and
specifications for the proposed projects, which shall
be submitted to the sanggunian for approval.
(2) Upon approval by the sanggunian of the project
plans and specifications, the provincial, city or
municipal engineer shall, as the case may be cause
to be published once every week for two (2)
consecutive weeks in at least one (1) local
newspaper which is circulated in the region,
province, city or municipality in which the project is
to be implemented, a notice inviting all duly
qualified contractors to participate in a public
bidding for the projects so approved. The conduct of
public bidding and award of contracts for local
government projects under this Section shall be in
accordance with this Code and other applicable laws,
rules and regulations.
In the case of a build-operate-and-transfer
agreement, the contract shall be awarded to the
lowest complying bidder whose offer is deemed
most advantageous to the local government and
based on the present value of its proposed tolls,
fees, rentals, and charges over a fixed term for the
facility to be constructed, operated, and maintained
according to the prescribed minimum design and
performance standards, plans, and specifications.
For this purpose the winning contractor shall be
automatically granted by the local government unit
concerned the franchise to operate and maintain the
facility, including the collection of tolls, fees, rentals,
and charges in accordance with subsection (c-1)
hereof.
In the case of a build-operate-and-transfer
agreement, the contract shall be awarded to the
lowest complying bidder based on the present value
of its proposed schedule of amortization payments
for the facility to be constructed according to the
prescribed minimum design and performance
standards, plans, and specifications.
(3) Any contractor who shall undertake the prosecution
of any project under this Section shall post the
required bonds to protect the interest of the
province, city, or municipality, in such amounts as
may be fixed by the sanggunian concerned and the
provincial, city or municipal engineer shall, as the
case may be, not allow any contractor to initiate the
prosecution of projects under this Section unless
such contractor presents proof or evidence that he
has posted the required bond.
(4) The contractor shall be entitled to a reasonable
return of its investment in accordance with its bid
proposal as accepted by the local government unit
concerned.
In the case of a build-operate-and-transfer
agreement, the repayment shall be made by
authorizing the contractor to charge and collect
reasonable tolls, fees, rentals, and charges for the
use of the project facility not exceeding those
proposed in the bid and incorporated in the
contract: Provided, That the local government unit
concerned shall, based on reasonableness and
equity, approve the tolls, fees, rentals and charges:
Provided, further, That the imposition and collection
of tolls, fees, rentals and charges shall be for a fixed
period as proposed in the bid and incorporated in
the contract which shall in no case exceed fifty (50)
years: Provided, finally, That during the lifetime of
the contract, the contractor shall undertake the
necessary maintenance and repair of the facility in
accordance with standards prescribed in the bidding
documents and in the contract.
In the case of a build-operate-and-transfer
agreement, the repayment shall be made through
amortization payments in accordance with the
schedule proposed in the bid and incorporated in
the contract.
In case of land reclamation or construction of
industrial estates, the repayment plan may consist of
the grant of a portion or percentage of the reclaimed
land or the industrial estate constructed.
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(5) Every infrastructure project undertaken under this
Section shall be constructed, operated, and
maintained by the contractor under the technical
supervision of the local government unit and in
accordance with the plans, specifications, standards,
and costs approved by it.
(d) The provincial, city or municipal legal officer
shall, as the case may be, review the
contracts executed pursuant to this Section
to determine their legality, validity,
enforceability and correctness of form.
UP College of Law
197 | P a g e Municipal Corporation


Liability

LIABILITY ON CONTRACTS ULTRA VIRES ACT
San Diego v. Municipality of Naujan,
Oriental Mindoro
Following a public bidding for the lease of the municipal
waters of Respondent, Petitioner, being the highest bidder,
was awarded a contract which granted to the lessee the
exclusive privilege of erecting fish corrals along the Butas
river up to the Nuajan Lake for a period of 5 years. About a
year into the lease period, the council reduced the annual
rental by 20% upon the petition of the lessee.
Petitioner later asked for an extension because a typhoon
destroyed most of his fish corrals. The municipal council
adopted Resolution 222 which extended the lease for
another five years on the condition that Plaintiff would waive
the privilege to seek for the reduction of the annual rent. This
resolution was approved by the Provincial Board and a new
contract was drawn and approved through Resolution 229 by
the municipal council whose term was then about to expire.
The new municipal council, this time with a new set of
members, adopted Resolutions 3 and 11 which revoked
Resolutions 222 and 229 respectively. Petitioner argues that
these resolutions violated his constitutional right against
deprivation of property without due process. The respondent
argues that Resolutions 222 and 229 are void.
Held: Resolution 222, and hence also Resolution 229, are
void. Sec. 2323 of the Revised Administrative Code requires
public bidding for the exclusive privilege of fishery or the right
to conduct a fish-breeding ground. There is no doubt that the
original lease contract in this case was awarded to the highest
bidder, but the reduction of the rental and the extension of
the term of the lease appear to have been granted without
previous public bidding. Statutes requiring public bidding
apply to amendments of any contract already executed in
compliance with the law where such amendments alter the
original contract in some vital and essential particular.
Resolution 3 is not an impairment of the obligation of
contract, because the constitutional provision on impairment
refers only to contract legally executed.
Public biddings are held for the best protection of the public
and to give the public the best possible advantages by means
of open competition between the bidders." Contracts
requiring public bidding affect public interest, and to change
them without complying with that requirement would indeed
be against public policy.
Rivera v. Municipality of Malolos
Petitioners bid the lowest in the public bidding for the supply
of construction materials for road repair operations of the
municipality. The acting municipal treasurer informed them
that the contract was awarded to them and the Mayor signed
it in behalf of the municipality. The contracted stipulated that
petitioners were to deliver crushed adobe stones and gravel
which they did in 1949 at the place designated by the Mayor.
In 1950, petitioners wrote the municipal treasurer because
the amount of P19, 339.56 that was due them was not yet
paid. The municipal treasurer informed them that Municipal
Council had agreed to put said amount as standing obligation
of the municipality authorizing payment and authorizing the
Municipal Treasurer to pay as soon as funds are available.
Resolution No. 68 was later passed which ratified the public
bidding held for the construction supplies.
In 1951, petitioners filed an action with the CFI which was
dismissed. They filed a case with the Presidential Complaints
and Action Committee which forwarded it to the General
Auditing Office. This office denied the claim for payment on
grounds which the Petitioners argue are mere technicalities.
Held: The law requires that before a contract involving the
expenditure of P2,000 or more may be entered into or
authorized, the municipal treasurer must certify to the officer
entering into such contracts that funds have been duly
appropriated for such purpose and that the amount
necessary to cover the proposed contract-is available for
expenditure on account thereof. The contracted entered into
by the Petitioners is contrary to this provision and is wholly
void.
Moreover, the law provides that the provincial auditor or his
representative must check up the deliveries made by a
contractor pursuant to a contract lawfully and validly entered
into. In the case at bar, there was no such check up and the
Auditor General is not in duty bound to pass and allow in
audit the sum claimed by the petitioner if he or his authorized
representative did not check up the delivery of the crushed
adobe stone and gravel. To say that the purpose and aim of
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Municipal Corporation P a g e | 198

this checking requirement is to forestall fraud and collusion is
to state what is obvious.
Petitioners claim that the Motor Vehicle Law constitutes
sufficient appropriation is untenable. This law merely
allocates 10 per cent of the money collected under its
provisions to the road and bridge funds of the different
municipalities in proportion to population as shown in the
latest available census, for the repair, maintenance and
construction of municipal roads. This alone is not sufficient
appropriation and authority to disburse part of the 10 per
cent collected under the Motor Vehicle Law for the purpose
of paying the claim of the petitioner.
Petitioners remedy can be found in Sec. 608 of the Revised
Administrative Code.
Rivera v. Maclang
this is a continuation of the above case)
Petitioner filed a case against respondent Maclang (the
Mayor) which the CFI dismissed because the Supreme Court
has already declared that the contract is void and therefore
cant produce any legal effects.
Held: The present action is against defendant-appellee in his
personal capacity on the strength of section 608 of the
Revised Administrative Code, which provides as follows:
SEC. 608. Void contract, Liability of officer. A purported
contract entered into contrary to the requirements of the
next preceding section hereof shall be wholly void, and the
officer assuming to make such contract shall be liable to the
Government or other contracting party for any consequent
damage to the same extent as if the transaction had been
wholly between private parties.
The position of defendant-appellee, as the officer who signed
the contract with appellant in violation of section 607, comes
squarely under the provision just quoted. His liability is
personal, as it the transaction had been entered into by him
as a private party. We take it that the intention of the law in
this respect is to ensure that public officers entering into
transactions with private individuals calling for the
expenditure of public funds observe a high degree of caution
so that the government may not be the victim of ill-advised or
improvident action by those assuming to represent it.

LIABILITY ON TORTS (QUASI-DELICT)
Sec 24, LGC
See above
Art 2180, 2189, 34, Civil Code
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but
also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother,
are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children
who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or
incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live
in their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise
are likewise responsible for damages caused by their
employees in the service of the branches in which the latter
are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged
in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a
special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by
the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which
case what is provided in article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades
shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and
students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their
custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when
the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all
the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
(1903a)
Art. 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable
for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any
person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets,
bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their
control or supervision. (n)
Thurman v. City of Torrington
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199 | P a g e Municipal Corporation
Tracey Thurman repeatedly reported to the police that she
and her son were being physically and emotionally abused by
her husband Charles Thurman but the police continuously
ignored her. There were instances that members of the police
actually saw the abuse happening but did not intervene.
Charles Thurman lived in Torrington and worked as a
counterman and short order cook at Skies Diner. There he
served many members of the Torrington Police Department,
including some of the officers in this case. While at work,
Charles Thurman boasted to the officers that he intended to
get his wife and that he intended to kill her.
The situation escalated to the point that after being issued a
restraining order, Charles Thurman nevertheless went to
Traceys home and demanded to be let in. Tracey called the
police and went outside to plead with Charles not to hurt
their son. Charles suddenly stabbed Tracey repeatedly in the
chest, neck, and throat. 25 minutes later, a single police
officer arrived and saw Charles still holding the bloody knife.
In the presence of the police officer, Charles kicked Tracey in
the head then went inside the house and came back holding
their son whom he dropped on top of Tracey. Charles kicked
Tracey in the head a second time.
Soon, more police arrived but they permitted Charles to
wander about the crowd and continue to threaten Tracey.
Finally, upon approaching Tracey once again, this time while
she was lying on a stretcher, Charles Thurman was arrested
and taken into custody.

Held: Tracey Thurman sued the city for the violations of her
rights under the U.S. Constitution. The City brought a motion
to dismiss her claims arguing that the equal protection clause
[no state shall deny any person the equal protection of the
laws+ only prohibits intentional discrimination that is racially
motivated. The Citys argument is clearly a misstatement of
the law. The application of the equal protection clause is not
limited to racial classifications or racially motivated
discrimination. Classifications on the basis of gender will be
held invalid under the equal protection clause unless they are
substantially related to strike down classifications which are
not rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.
City officials and police officers are under an affirmative duty
to preserve law and order, and to protect the personal safety
of persons in the community. This duty applies equally to
women whose personal safety is threatened by individuals
with whom they have or have had a domestic relationship as
well as to all other persons whose personal safety is
threatened, including women not involved in domestic
relationships. If officials have notice of the possibility of
attacks on women in domestic relationships or other persons,
they are under an affirmative duty to take reasonable
measures to protect the personal safety of such persons in
the community. Failure to perform this duty would constitute
a denial of equal protection of the laws. The Citys motion to
dismiss is denied
Palafox v. Province of Ilocos Norte
Sabas Torralba was employed as a driver of the Provincial
Government of Ilocos Norte and was detailed to the Office of
the District Engineer. While driving his truck in the
performance of his duties, he ran over and killed Proceto
Palafox. Torralba was convicted of homicide through reckless
imprudence. The heirs of Palafox instituted an action for
damages against the provincial government.
Issue: WON the Provincial Government of Ilocos Norte is
liable.
Held: No
To attach liability to the state, a declaration must be made
that Torralba was a special agent within the scope of Article
1903 paragraph 5 of the Civil Code. But this principle applies
only to the Insular Government of the Philippines as
distinguished from provincial or municipal governments.
The heirs of Palafox invoked the doctrine of respondeat
superior which provides that the master shall answer for the
negligent acts of its employees.
In the Mendoza case, it was held that if the negligent
employee was engaged in the performance of governmental
duties as distinguished from proprietary or business
functions, the government is not liable. In the present case,
the construction or maintenance of roads in which the driver
Torralba was engaged in at the time of the accident is
admittedly governmental activities.
Mendoza v. De Leon
This is an action for damages against the individual members
of the municipal council of the municipality of Villasis,
Pangasinan, for the revocation of the lease of an exclusive
ferry privilege awarded to the plaintiff under the provisions of
Act. No. 1634 of the Philippine Commission. After user of a
little more than one year, the plaintiff was forcibly ejected
under and in pursuance of a resolution adopted by the herein
defendants, awarding a franchise for the same ferry to
another person.
Issue: WON the defendants are liable to the plaintiff for
damages.
Held: Yes
Municipalities of the Philippine Islands organized under the
Municipal Code have both governmental and corporate or
business functions. Of the first class are the adoption of
regulation against fire and disease, preservation of the public
peace, maintenance of municipal prisons, establishment of
primary schools and post-offices, etc. Of the latter class are
the establishment of municipal waterworks for the use of the
inhabitants, the construction and maintenance of municipal
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slaughterhouses, markets, stables, bathing establishments,
wharves, ferries, and fisheries. Act No. 1643 provides that the
use of each fishery, fish-breeding ground, ferry, stable,
market, and slaughterhouse belonging to any municipality or
township shall be let to the highest bidder annually or for
such longer period not exceeding five years as may have been
previously approved by the provincial board of the province
in which the municipality or township is located.
The twofold character of the powers of a municipality, under
our Municipal Code (Act No. 82) is so apparent and its private
or corporate powers so numerous and important that we find
no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the general
principles governing the liability of such entities to private
individuals as enunciated in the United States are applicable
to it.
The distinction is also recognized by Dillon in his work on
Municipal Corporations (5th ed.) sections 38 and 39.
As is indicated in some of the above quoted cases, the
municipality is not liable for the acts of its officers or agents
in the performance of its governmental functions.
Governmental affairs do not lose their governmental
character by being delegated to the municipal government.
Nor does the fact that such duties are performed by such
officers of the municipality which, for convenience, the state
allows the municipality to select, change their character. To
preserve the peace, protect the morals and health of the
community and so on is to administer government, whether
it be done by the central government itself or is shifted to a
local organization. And the state being immune for injuries
suffered by private individuals in the administration of strictly
governmental functions, like immunity is enjoyed by the
municipality in the performance of the same duties, unless it
is expressly made liable by statute.
It should be clear that a municipality is not exempt from
liability for the negligent performance of its corporate or
proprietary or business functions. In the administration of its
patrimonial property, it is to be regarded as a private
corporation or individual 153113-13 so far as its liability to
third persons on contract or in tort is concerned. Its
contracts, valid entered into, may be enforced and damages
may be collected from it for the torts of its officers or agents
within the scope of their employment in precisely the same
manner and to the same extent as those of private
corporations or individuals. As to such matters the principle
of respondeat superior applies. It is for these purposes that
the municipality is made liable to suits in the courts.
Here it is clear that the leasing of a municipal ferry to the
highest bidder for a specified period of time is not a
governmental but corporate function. Such a lease, when
validly entered into, constitutes a contract with the lessee
which the municipality is bound to respect. The matter is thus
summed up by Dillon on Municipal Corporations (5th ed., sec.
1306):
"Ordinances made by municipalities under charter or
legislative authority, containing grants to water and light
companies and other public service corporations of the right
to use the street pipes, mains, etc., upon the condition of the
performance of service by the grantee, are, after acceptance
and performance by the grantee, contracts protected by the
prohibition of the Federal Constitution against the enactment
of any State Law impairing the obligation of contracts."
It seems clear, therefore, that under the provisions of the
Municipal Code and Act No. 1634, above referred to, the
plaintiff had a vested right to the exclusive operation of the
ferry in question for the period of his lease. Were the
municipality a party to this action, it would be patent that a
judgment for damages against it for the rescission of the
contract would be proper. This, be it said, is the usual method
of exacting damages, either ex contractu or ex delicto arising
from the exercise of corporate powers of municipalities.
There is not a scintilla of evidence that there was any
justifiable reason for forcibly evicting the plaintiff from the
ferry which he had leased. On the contrary, the defendant
councilors attempted to justify their action on the ground
that the ferry which he was operating was not the one leased
to him; this in spite of the fact the vice-president had
personally placed him in possession of it more than a year
before, and the fact that he had operated this ferry for over a
year, evidently with the knowledge of the defendants. The
evidence is so clear that the ferry of which the plaintiff was
dispossessed was the one which he had leased that no
reasonable man would entertain any doubt whatever upon
the question. Hence, we cannot say that in rescinding the
contract with the plaintiff, thereby making the municipality
liable to an action for damages for no valid reason at all, the
defendant councilors were honestly acting for the interests of
the municipality. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the
defendants are liable jointly and severally for the damages
sustained by the plaintiff from the rescission of his contract of
lease of the ferry privilege in question.
Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v.
Firme
Petitioner Municipality of San Fernando, La Union is a
municipal corporation existing under and in accordance with
the laws of the Republic of the Philippines. At about 7 o'clock
in the morning of December 16, 1965, a collision occurred
involving a passenger jeepney driven by Bernardo Balagot
and owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras, a gravel and
sand truck driven by Jose Manandeg and owned by
Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump truck of the Municipality of
San Fernando, La Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Several
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passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Bania Sr. died
as a result of the injuries they sustained and four (4) others
suffered varying degrees of physical injuries.
Private respondents (heirs of the deceased Laureano Bania
Sr.) instituted a compliant for damages against the Estate of
Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot in the CFI of La
Union. The aforesaid defendants filed a Third Party Complaint
against the petitioner and the driver of a dump truck of
petitioner. Thereafter, the private respondents amended the
complaint wherein the petitioner and its regular employee,
Alfredo Bislig were impleaded for the first time as
defendants.
The trial court rendered a decision for the plaintiffs, and
defendants Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and
Alfredo Bislig are ordered to pay them jointly and severally.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and for a new
trial without prejudice to another motion which was then
pending but the MR was denied.
WON respondent Judge Firme exceeded his jurisdiction when
he ruled on the issue of liability of the Municipality of San
Fernando, La Union.
Held: Yes
The doctrine of non-suability of the State is expressly
provided for in Article XVI, Section 3 of the Constitution, to
wit: "the State may not be sued without its consent."
Stated in simple parlance, the general rule is that the State
may not be sued except when it gives consent to be sued.
Consent takes the form of express or implied consent.
Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a
special law. The standing consent of the State to be sued in
case of money claims involving liability arising from contracts
is found in Act No. 3083. A special law may be passed to
enable a person to sue the government for an alleged quasi-
delict. Consent is implied when the government enters into
business contracts, thereby descending to the level of the
other contracting party, and also when the State files a
complaint, thus opening itself to a counterclaim.
Municipal corporations, for example, like provinces and cities,
are agencies of the State when they are engaged in
governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the
sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject
to suit even in the performance of such functions because
their charter provided that they can sue and be sued.
It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are
suable because their charters grant them the competence to
sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable
for torts committed by them in the discharge of
governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it
can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity.
In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives
the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not
acting in its governmental capacity when the injury was
committed or that the case comes under the exceptions
recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.
In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the
municipality insists that "he was on his way to the Naguilian
river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San
Fernando's municipal streets.
In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity
of the performance of official duty is presumed pursuant to
Section 3(m) of Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Hence, We rule that the driver of the dump truck was
performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office.
After a careful examination of existing laws and
jurisprudence, We arrive at the conclusion that the
municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by
its regular employee, who was then engaged in the discharge
of governmental functions. Hence, the death of the
passenger tragic and deplorable though it may be imposed
on the municipality no duty to pay monetary compensation.
Fernando v. CA and City of Davao
On November 7, 1975, Bibiano Morta, market master of the
Agdao Public Market filed a requisition request with the Chief
of Property of the City Treasurer's Office for the re-emptying
of the septic tank in Agdao. An invitation to bid was issued to
Aurelio Bertulano, Lito Catarsa, Feliciano Bascon, Federico
Bolo and Antonio Suer, Jr. Bascon won the bid. On
November 26, 1975 Bascon was notified and he signed the
purchase order. However, before such date, specifically on
November 22, 1975, bidder Bertulano with four other
companions were found dead inside the septic tank. The
bodies were removed by a fireman. The City Engineer's office
investigated the case and learned that the five victims
entered the septic tank without clearance from it nor with
the knowledge and consent of the market master. In fact, the
septic tank was found to be almost empty and the victims
were presumed to be the ones who did the re-emptying. Dr.
Juan Abear of the City Health Office autopsied the bodies and
in his reports, put the cause of death of all five victims as
`asphyxia' caused by the diminution of oxygen supply in the
body working below normal conditions. The lungs of the five
victims burst, swelled in hemmorrhagic areas and this was
due to their intake of toxic gas, which, in this case, was sulfide
gas produced from the waste matter inside the septic tank.
The trial court rendered a decision dismissing the case.
Petitioners appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate
Court (now Court of Appeals). The IAC reversed the appealed
judgment and ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiffs.
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Both parties filed their separate motions for reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals rendered an Amended Decision
dismissing the case against the City of Davao.
WON the City of Davao is guilty of negligence.
Held: No
Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe for the
protection of the interests of another person that degree of
care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. Under the
law, a person who by his omission causes damage to another,
there being negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done
(Article 2176, New Civil Code). As to what would constitute a
negligent act in a given situation, the case of Picart v. Smith
(37 Phil. 809, 813) provides Us the answer, to wit:
"The test by which to determine the existence or negligence
in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the
defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that
reasonable care and caution which an ordinary person would
have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence.
"The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a
prudent man in a given situation must of course be always
determined in the light of human experience and in view of
the facts involved in the particular case. The proper criterion
for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is
this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in
the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an
effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to
warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding against its
consequences.
To be entitled to damages for an injury resulting from the
negligence of another, a claimant must establish the relation
between the omission and the damage. He must drove under
Article 2179 of the New Civil Code that the defendant's
negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his
injury. The test is simple. Distinction must be made between
the accident and the injury, between the event itself, without
which there could have been no accident, and those acts of
the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but
contributing to his own proper hurt. Where he contributes to
the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he
can not recover. Where, in conjunction with the occurrence,
he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the
amount that the defendant responsible for the event should
pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent
for his own imprudence.
While it may be true that the public respondent has been
remiss in its duty to re-empty the septic tank annually, such
negligence was not a continuing one. Upon learning from the
report of the market master about the need to clean the
septic tank of the public toilet in Agdao Public Market, the
public respondent immediately responded by issuing
invitations to bid for such service. Thereafter, it awarded the
bid to the lowest bidder, Mr. Feliciano Bascon. The public
respondent, therefore, lost no time in taking up remedial
measures to meet the situation. It is likewise an undisputed
fact that despite the public respondent's failure to re-empty
the septic tank since 1956, people in the market have been
using the public toilet for their personal necessities but have
remained unscathed.
The absence of any accident was due to the public
respondent's compliance with the sanitary and plumbing
specifications in constructing the toilet and the septic tank.
Hence, the toxic gas from the waste matter could not have
leaked out because the septic tank was air-tight.
Toilets and septic tanks are not nuisances per se as defined in
Article 694 of the New Civil Code which would necessitate
warning signs for the protection of the public. While the
construction of these public facilities demands utmost
compliance with safety and sanitary requirements, the
putting up of warning signs is not one of those requirements.
It would appear that an accident such as toxic gas leakage
from the septic tank is unlikely to happen unless one removes
its covers. The accident in the case at bar occurred because
the victims on their own and without authority from the
public respondent opened the septic tank. Considering the
nature of the task of emptying a septic tank especially one
which has not been cleaned for years, an ordinarily prudent
person should undoubtedly be aware of the attendant risks.
The victims are no exception; more so with Mr. Bertulano, an
old hand in this kind of service, who is presumed to know the
hazards of the job. His failure, therefore, and that of his men
to take precautionary measures for their safety was the
proximate cause of the accident.
The market master knew that work on the septic tank was
still forthcoming. It must be remembered that the bidding
had just been conducted. Although the winning bidder was
already known, the award to him was still to be made by the
Committee on Awards. Upon the other hand, the accident
which befell the victims who are not in any way connected
with the winning bidder happened before the award could be
given. Considering that there was yet no award and order to
commence work on the septic tank, the duty of the market
master or his security guards to supervise the work could not
have started. The surreptitious way in which the victims did
their job without clearance from the market master or any of
the security guards goes against their good faith. Even their
relatives or family members did not know of their plan to
clean the septic tank.
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There is a total absence of contractual relations between the
victims and the City Government of Davao City that could give
rise to any contractual obligation, much less, any liability on
the part of Davao City.
Tuzon and Mapagu v. CA and Jurado
The petitioners are questioning the decision of the
respondent court holding them liable in damages to the
private respondent for refusing to issue to him a mayor's
permit and license to operate his palay-threshing business.
The case goes back to March 14, 1977, when the Sangguniang
Bayan of Camalaniugan, Cagayan, unanimously adopted
Resolution No. 9 which authorizes the municipal treasurer to
enter into an agreement to all thresher operators, that will
come to apply for a permit to thresh palay within the
jurisdiction of the municipality to donate 1% of all the palay
threshed by them to help finance the continuation of the
construction of the Sports and Nutrition Center Building.
To implement the above resolution, petitioner Lope C.
Mapagu, then incumbent municipal treasurer, prepared a
document for signature of all thresher/owner/operators
applying for a mayor's permit.
Private respondent Saturnino T. Jurado sent his agent to the
municipal treasurer's office to pay the license fee of P285.00
for thresher operators. Mapagu refused to accept the
payment and required him to first secure a mayor's permit.
Mayor Domingo Tuzon said that Jurado should first comply
with Resolution No. 9 and sign the agreement before the
permit could be issued. Jurado ignored the requirement.
Instead, he sent the P285.00 license fee by postal money
order to the office of the municipal treasurer who, however,
returned the said amount.
Jurado filed with the Court of First Instance of Cagayan a
special civil action for mandamus with actual and moral
damages to compel the issuance of the mayor's permit and
license. He filed another petition with the same court for
declaratory judgment against the said resolution (and the
implementing agreement) for being illegal either as a
donation or as a tax measure. Named defendants were the
same respondents and all the members of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Camalaniugan.
The trial court upheld the challenged measure. Jurado
appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the validity
of Resolution No. 9 and the implementing agreement.
Nevertheless, it found Tuzon and Mapagu liable for acting
maliciously and in bad faith when they denied Jurado's
application for the mayor's permit and license.
WON petitioners are liable in damages to private respondent
Jurado for having withheld from him the mayor's permit and
license because of his refusal to comply with Resolution No.
9.
Held: No
The private respondent anchors his claim for damages on
Article 27 of the New Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss
because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects,
without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an
action for damages and other relief against the latter, without
prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may
be taken.
In the present case, it has not even been alleged that the
Mayor Tuzon's refusal to act on the private respondent's
application was an attempt to compel him to resort to bribery
to obtain approval of his application. It cannot be said either
that the mayor and the municipal treasurer were motivated
by personal spite or were grossly negligent in refusing to
issue the permit and license to Jurado.
It is no less significant that no evidence has been offered to
show that the petitioners singled out the private respondent
for persecution. Neither does it appear that the petitioners
stood to gain personally from refusing to issue to Jurado the
mayor's permit and license he needed. The petitioners were
not Jurado's business competitors nor has it been established
that they intended to favor his competitors. On the contrary,
the record discloses that the resolution was uniformly applied
to all the threshers in the municipality without discrimination
or preference.
The Court is convinced that the petitioners acted within the
scope of their authority and in consonance with their honest
interpretation of the resolution in question. We agree that it
was not for them to rule on its validity. In the absence of a
judicial decision declaring it invalid, its legality would have to
be presumed. As executive officials of the municipality, they
had the duty to enforce it as long as it had not been repealed
by the Sangguniang Bayan or annulled by the courts.
The private respondent complains that as a result of the
petitioners' acts, he was prevented from operating his
business all this time and earning substantial profit
therefrom, as he had in previous years. But as the petitioners
correctly observed, he could have taken the prudent course
of signing the agreement under protest and later challenging
it in court to relieve him of the obligation to "donate."
Pendente lite, he could have continued to operate his
threshing business and thus avoided the lucro cesante that he
now says was the consequence of the petitioners' wrongful
act. He could have opted for the less obstinate but still
dissentient action, without loss of face, or principle, or profit.
Torio v. Fontanilla
On October 21, 1958, the Municipal Council of Malasiqui,
Pangasinan passed Resolution No. 159 whereby "it resolved
to manage the 1959 Malasiqui town fiesta celebration on
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January 21, 22, and 23, 1959." Resolution No. 182 was also
passed creating the "1959 Malasiqui Town Fiesta Executive
Committee" which in turn organized a subcommittee on
entertainment and stage, with Jose Macaraeg as Chairman.
The council appropriated the amount of P100.00 for the
construction of 2 stages, one for the "zarzuela" and another
for the "cancionan". Jose Macaraeg supervised the
construction of the stage.
The "zarzuela" entitled "Midas Extravanganza" was donated
by an association of Malasiqui employees of the Manila
Railroad Company in Caloocan, Rizal. One of the members of
the group was Vicente Fontanilla. Before the dramatic part of
the play was reached, the stage collapsed and Vicente
Fontanilla who was at the rear of the stage was pinned
underneath. Fontanilla was taken to the San Carlos General
Hospital where he died in the afternoon of the following day.
The heirs of Vicente Fontanilla filed a complaint with the
Court of First Instance of Manila to recover damages. Named
party-defendants were the Municipality of Malasiqui, the
Municipal Council of Malasiqui and all the individual
members of the Municipal Council in 1959. Judge Gregorio T.
Lantin dismissed the complaint.
The Fontanillas appealed to the Court of Appeals which
reversed the trial court's decision and ordered all the
defendants-appellees to pay jointly and severally the heirs of
Vicente Fontanilla.
WON the celebration of a town fiesta an undertaking in the
exercise of a municipality's governmental or public function
or is it of a private or proprietary character.
Held: Private or proprietary character
The powers of a municipality are twofold in character: public,
governmental, or political on the one hand, and corporate,
private, or proprietary on the other. Governmental powers
are those exercised by the corporation in administering the
powers of the state and promoting the public welfare and
they include the legislative, judicial, public, and political.
Municipal powers on the other hand are exercised for the
special benefit and advantage of the community and include
those which are ministerial, private and corporate.
This distinction of powers becomes important for purposes of
determining the liability of the municipality for the acts of its
agents which result in an injury to third persons. If the injury
is caused in the course of the performance of a governmental
function or duty no recovery, as a rule, can be had from the
municipality unless there is an existing statute on the matter,
nor from its officers, so long as they performed their duties
honestly and in good faith or that they did not act wantonly
and maliciously. With respect to proprietary functions, the
settled rule is that a municipal corporation can be held liable
to third persons ex contractu or ex delicto.
Section 2282 of the Chapter on Municipal Law of the Revised
Administrative Code provision simply gives authority to the
municipality to celebrate a yearly fiesta but it does not
impose upon it a duty to observe one. Holding a fiesta even if
the purpose is to commemorate a religious or historical event
of the town is in essence an act for the special benefit of the
community and not for the general welfare of the public
performed in pursuance of a policy of the state. The mere
fact that the celebration, as claimed, was not to secure profit
or gain but merely to provide entertainment to the town
inhabitants is not a conclusive test.
There can be no hard and fast rule for purposes of
determining the true nature of an undertaking or function of
a municipality; the surrounding circumstances of a particular
case are to be considered and will be decisive. The basic
element, however beneficial to the public the undertaking
may be, is that it is governmental in essence, otherwise, the
function becomes private or proprietary in character. Easily,
no governmental or public policy of the state is involved in
the celebration of a town fiesta.
Under the doctrine of respondent superior, petitioner-
municipality is to be held liable for damages for the death of
Vicente Fontanilla if that was attributable to the negligence of
the municipality's officers, employees, or agents. The Court of
Appeals found and correctly held that there was negligence.
It is incredible that any person in his right mind would
remove the principal braces of the stage and leave the front
portion of the stage practically unsupported as claimed by
the defendants. Moreover, if that did happen, there was
indeed negligence as there was lack of supervision over the
use of the stage to prevent such an occurrence.
At any rate, the guitarist who was pointed to as the person
who removed the two bamboo braces denied having done so.
The appellate court also found that the stage was not strong
enough considering that only P100.00 was appropriate for
the construction of two stages and while the floor of the
"zarzuela" stage was of wooden planks, the posts and braces
used were of bamboo material. Having failed to take the
necessary steps to maintain the safety of the stage for the
use of the participants in the stage presentation prepared in
connection with the celebration of the town fiesta,
particularly, in preventing non-participants or spectators from
mounting and accumulating on the stage which was not
constructed to meet the additional weight, the defendants-
appellees were negligent and are liable for the death of
Vicente Fontanilla.
The "Midas Extravaganza" which was to be performed during
the town fiesta was a "donation" offered by an association of
Malasiqui employees of the Manila Railroad Co. in Caloocan,
and that when the Municipality of Malasiqui accepted the
donation of services and constructed precisely a "zarzuela
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205 | P a g e Municipal Corporation
stage" for the purpose, the participants in the stage show had
the right to expect that the Municipality through its
"Committee on entertainment and stage" would build or put
up a stage or platform strong enough to sustain the weight or
burden of the performance and take the necessary measures
to insure the personal safety of the participants.
Petitioner or appellant Municipality cannot evade
responsibility and/or liability under the claim that it was Jose
Macaraeg who constructed the stage. The municipality acting
through its municipal council appointed Macaraeg as
chairman of the sub-committee on entertainment and in
charge of the construction of the "zarzuela" stage. Macaraeg
acted merely as an agent of the Municipality. Under the
doctrine of respondent superior, petitioner is responsible or
liable for the negligence of its agent acting within his assigned
tasks.
The Municipality stands on the same footing as an ordinary
private corporation with the municipal council acting as its
board of directors. It is an elementary principle that a
corporation has a personality, separate and distinct from its
officers, directors, or persons composing it and the latter are
not as a rule co-responsible in an action for damages for tort
or negligence (culpa aquiliana) committed by the
corporation's employees or agents unless there is a showing
of bad faith or gross or wanton negligence on their part. The
municipal councilors are not liable for the death of Vicente
Fontanilla. The records do not show that said petitioners
directly participated in the defective construction of the
"zarzuela" stage or that they personally permitted spectators
to go up the platform.


LIABILITY BY EXPRESS PROVISION OF LAW AND CONTRACTS
Art 34 and 2189, Civil Code
Art. 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force
refuses or fails to render aid or protection to any person in
case of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be
primarily liable for damages, and the city or municipality shall
be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein
recognized shall be independent of any criminal proceedings,
and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support
such action.
Art. 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable
for damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any
person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets,
bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their
control or supervision. (n)
City of Manila v. Teotico
On January 27, 1958, at about 8:00 p.m., Genaro N. Teotico
fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catchbasin or manhole
on P. Burgos Avenue as he was stepping down from the curb
to board a jeepney . Due to the fall, his head hit the rim of the
manhole breaking his eyeglasses and causing broken pieces
thereof to pierce his left eyelid. Several persons came to his
assistance and pulled him out of the manhole. One of them
brought Teotico to the Philippine General Hospital, where his
injuries were treated, after which he was taken home. In
addition to the lacerated wound in his left upper eyelid,
Teotico suffered contusions on different parts of his body.
These injuries and the allergic eruptions caused by anti-
tetanus injections administered to him in the hospital
required further medical treatment by a private practitioner.
Teotico filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a
complaint which was subsequently amended for
damages against the City of Manila, its mayor, city engineer,
city health officer, city treasurer and chief of police. The Court
of First Instance of Manila dismissed the complaint. On
appeal taken by plaintiff, this decision was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, except insofar as the City of Manila is
concerned, which was sentenced to pay damages to Teotico.
WON Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409 (Charter of the City of
Manila) or Article 2189 of the Civil Code is applicable to the
present case.
Held: Article 2189 of the Civil Code
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 409 (Charter of the City of
Manila) reads:
"The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries to
persons or property arising from the failure of the Mayor, the
Municipal Board, or any other city officer, to enforce the
provisions of this chapter, or any other law or ordinance, or
from negligence of said Mayor, Municipal Board, or other
officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said
provisions."
While Article 2189 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
provides:
"Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for
damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person
by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets,
bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their
control or supervision."
It is true that, insofar as its territorial application is
concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a special law and the Civil
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Code a general legislation; but, as regards the subject- matter
of the provisions above quoted, Section 4 of Republic Act 409
establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City of
Manila for "damages or injury to persons or property arising
from the failure of" city officers "to enforce the provisions of"
said Act "or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence"
of the city "Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while
enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions." Upon the
other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a
particular prescription making "provinces, cities and
municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death of, or
injury suffered by, any person by reason" specifically "of
the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public
buildings, and other public works under their control or
supervision." In other words, said section 4 refers to liability
arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object
thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to
"defective streets, "in particular. Since the present action is
based upon the alleged defective condition of a road, said
Article 2189 is decisive thereon.
Under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for
the liability therein established to attach that the defective
roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality
from which responsibility is exacted. What said article
requires is that the province, city or municipality have either
"control or supervision" over said street or road. Even if P.
Burgos avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this
circumstance would not necessarily detract from its "control
or supervision" by the City of Manila, under Republic Act 409.
The determination of whether or not P. Burgos Avenue is
under the control or supervision of the City of Manila and
whether the latter is guilty of negligence, in connection with
the maintenance of said road, which were decided by the
Court of Appeals in the affirmative, is one of fact, and the
findings of said Court, thereon are not subject to review by
the Supreme Court.
Abella v. Municipality of Naga
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur sentencing the municipality of
Naga, now Naga City, to pay the plaintiff, now appellee, P300
damages resulting from the closing of a municipal street.
The defendant municipality by resolution ordered the closing
of that part of a municipal street which ran between the
public market and the plaintiff's property, and used the
closed thoroughfare to expand the market. As a consequence
of this resolution, and immediately after the passage of the
same, permanent, semi-permanent, as well as temporary
constructions were allowed by the defendant municipality of
Naga along the sidewalk of plaintiff's property and abutting
to said property, facing P. Prieto Street, and extending out in
the middle of the same street, hence depriving the plaintiff's
property of access to said street, and consequently retarding
her reconstructions.
WON appellant municipality of Naga is liable for damages to
Abella.
Held: Yes
The municipality or city of Naga was not charged with any
unlawful act, or with acting without authority, or with
invasion of plaintiff's property rights; the basis of the lower
court's decision is Section 2246 of the Revised Administrative
Code which provides that no municipal road, street, etc. or
any part thereof "shall be closed without indemnifying any
person prejudiced thereby."
That plaintiff was economically damaged is admitted in the
stipulation of facts and it is not disputed that the indemnity
assessed is within the bounds of the damages suffered. As a
matter of fact, the damages awarded seem to be nominal
judged by the description of the plaintiff's interests adversely
affected by the conversion of P. Prieto Street into a market.
Statutory obligations: Magna Carta for
Health Workers
See attachments
Credit financing: Sec 297 302





SATISFYING/EXECUTING JUDGMENT AGAINST MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
Tan Toco v. Municipal Council of Iloilo
Vda. de Tan Toco sued the municipal council of Iloilo for
P42,966.40, the purchase price of two strips of land, which
the municipality appropriated for street widening. Iloilo CFI
decided in favor of Tan Toco. Judgment upheld by SC. Due to
lack of funds, the municipality was unable to satisfy the
judgment. Tan Toco had a writ of execution issue against the
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property of the municipality. The sheriff attached two auto
trucks used for street sprinkling, one police patrol
automobile, police stations, and lots and concrete structures
therein used as markets. The provincial fiscal of Iloilo filed a
motion with the CFI praying that the attachment on the said
property be dissolved since the said attachment was null and
void as being illegal and violative of the rights of the
municipality. CFI granted the motion.
WON the abovementioned property of the municipality may
be attached.
HELD: No
The Civil Code divides the property of provinces and
municipalities into property for public use and patrimonial
property. The principle governing property of the public
domain of the State is applicable to property for public use of
the municipalities. Hence, property for public use of the
municipality is not within the commerce of man so long as it
is used by the public and, consequently, said property is also
inalienable and exempt from attachment and execution.
Rationale for the rule: The character of the public use to
which such kind of property is devoted. The necessity for
government service justifies that the property of public use of
the municipality be exempt from execution
Municipality of Makati v. CA
No citation
Pasay City Government v. CFI
V.D. Isip, Sons & Associates entered into a contract (Contract
of Agreement) with Pasay City (represented by then Mayor
Pablo Cuneta) for the construction of a new city hall. Isip
proceeded with the construction of the new city hall building
as per duly approved plans and specifications and
accomplished under various stages of construction the
amount of work (including supplies and materials) equivalent
to an estimated value of P1,713,096 of the total contract
price of P4,914,500.80. Pasay City paid only P1,100,000,
leaving a balance of P613,096.
Isip filed an action for specific performance with damages
against Pasay City before CFI Manila. The parties arrived at an
amicable agreement which was submitted to the Municipal
Board of Pasay City for its consideration. The Municipal Board
then enacted Ordinance No. 1012 which approved the
Compromise Agreement and also authorized and empowered
then incumbent City Mayor Jovito Claudio to represent the
city government. The court approved the compromise
agreement. Isip then filed an urgent motion seeking a
declaration of legality of the original contract and
compromise agreement. Motion granted. An application for
and notice of garnishment were made and effected upon the
funds of the city government with the PNB.
Pasay City filed an urgent motion to set aside the
abovementioned order and to quash the writ of execution
issued on the following grounds: (1) that the execution
sought was then still premature, the period of 90 days
stipulated not having elapsed as yet; (2) that the obligations
of the parties under the Compromise Agreement were
reciprocal and isip not having put up a new performance
bond in the sufficient amount equivalent to 20% of the
remaining cost of construction as per agreement, the Pasay
City cannot be obliged to pay the sum due as yet; (3) that the
Sheriff has no power or authority to levy or garnish on
execution the general funds, especially more so, the trust
funds of the Pasay City. Motion denied.
WON Pasay City government funds in PNB may be garnished
to effect the compromise agreement.
HELD: Yes
A compromise agreement not contrary to law, public order,
public policy, morals or good customs is a valid contract
which is the law between the parties themselves. A judgment
on a compromise is a final and executory. It is immediately
executory in the absence of a motion to set the same aside
on the ground of fraud, mistake or duress.
The general rule is that all government funds deposited with
the PNB by any agency or instrumentality of the government,
whether by way of general or special deposit, remain
government funds and may not be subject to garnishment or
levy (Commissioner of Public Highways v San Diego).
However, an ordinance has already been enacted expressly
appropriating the amount of P613,096.00 of payment to Isip.
Hence, the case is covered by the exception to the general
rule stated in the case of Republic v. Palacio: "Judgments
against a State in cases where it has consented to be sued,
generally operate merely to liquidate and establish plaintiff's
claim in the absence of express provision; otherwise they
cannot be enforced by processes of the law; and it is for the
legislature to provide for the payment in such manner as sees
fit."
Municipality of Paoay, Ilocos Norte v.
Manaois
Manaois obtained a judgment against Paoay. CFI Pangasinan
issued a writ of execution against the municipality. The
Provincial Sheriff of Ilocos Norte levied upon and attached
the following properties: (1) an amount of P1,712.01 in the
Municipal Treasury of Paoay representing the rental paid by
Tabije of a fishery lot belonging to the municipality, and; (2)
about forty fishery lots leased to thirty-five different persons
by the municipality. The municipality asked for the dissolution
of the attachment since they are properties for public use.
WON the properties can be levied
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Held: As to the fishery lots, NO. As to the revenues, YES.
Properties for public use like trucks used for sprinkling the
streets, police patrol wagons, police stations, public markets,
together with the land on which they stand held by municipal
corporations are not subject to levy and execution. Even
public revenues of municipal corporations destined for the
expenses of the municipality are also exempt from the
execution. The reason behind this exemption extended to
properties for public use, and public municipal revenues is
that they are held in trust for the people, intended and used
for the accomplishment of the purposes for which municipal
corporations are created, and that to subject said properties
and public funds to execution would materially impede, even
defeat and in some instances destroy said purpose (Vda. de
Tan Toco v. Municipal Council of Iloilo).
Property, however, which is patrimonial and which is held by
municipality in its proprietary capacity is the private asset of
the town and may be levied upon and sold under an ordinary
execution. The same rule applies to municipal funds derived
from patrimonial properties.
The fishery or municipal waters of the town of Paoay, Ilocos
Norte, which had been parceled out or divided into lots and
later let out to private persons for fishing purposes at an
annual rental are not subject to execution. They do not
belong to the municipality. They may well be regarded as
property of State. What the municipality of Paoay hold is
merely what may be considered the usufruct or the right to
use said municipal waters, which is not also subject to
execution.
But the revenue or income coming from the renting of these
fishery lots is subject to execution. Unlike revenue derived
from taxes, municipal licenses and market fees, revenue from
rentals were granted by the Legislature merely to help or
bolster up the economy of municipal government, and hence
are not indispensable for the performance of governmental
functions. They are also not definite or fixed; it depends upon
the amounts which prospective bidders or lessees are willing
to pay. This activity of municipalities in renting municipal
waters for fishing purposes is a business for the reasons that
the law itself allowed said municipalities to engage in it for
profit. And it is but just that a town so engaged should pay
and liquidate obligations contracted in connection with said
fishing business, with the income derived therefrom.

PENAL PROVISIONS AND REPEALING CLAUSE
Sec. 511. Posting and Publication of Ordinances with
Penal Sanctions. (a) Ordinances with penal sanctions
shall be posted at prominent places in the provincial
capitol, city, municipal or barangay hall, as the case may
be, for a minimum period of three (3) consecutive weeks.
Such ordinances shall also be published in a newspaper
of general circulation, where available, within the
territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit
concerned, except in the case of barangay ordinances.
Unless otherwise provided therein, said ordinances shall
take effect on the day following its publication, or at the
end of the period of posting, whichever occurs later.
(b) Public officer or employee who violates an
ordinance may be meted administrative disciplinary
action, without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate
civil or criminal action.
(c) The secretary to the sanggunian concerned shall
transmit official copies of such ordinances to the chief
executive officer of the Official Gazette within seven (7)
days following the approval of the said ordinance for
publication purposes. The Official Gazette may publish
ordinances with penal sanctions for archival and
reference purposes.
Sec. 512. Withholding of Benefits Accorded to Barangay
Officials. Willful and malicious withholding of any of the
benefits accorded to barangay officials under Section 393
hereof shall be punished with suspension or dismissal
from office of the official or employee responsible
therefor.
Sec. 513. Failure to Post and Publish the Itemized
Monthly Collections and Disbursements. Failure by the
local treasurer or the local chief accountant to post the
itemized monthly collections and disbursements of the
local government unit concerned within ten (10) days
following the end of every month and for at least two (2)
consecutive weeks at prominent places in the main office
building of the local government unit concerned, its plaza
and main street, and to publish said itemization in a
newspaper of general circulation, where available, in the
territorial jurisdiction of such unit, shall be punished by a
fine not exceeding Five hundred pesos (P500.00) or by
imprisonment not exceeding one (1) month, or both such
fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court.
Sec. 514. Engaging in Prohibited Business Transactions
or Possessing Illegal Pecuniary Interest. Any local official
and any person or persons dealing with him who violate
the prohibitions provided in Section 89 of Book I hereof,
shall be punished with imprisonment for six (6) months
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and one day to six (6) years, or a fine of not less than
Three thousand pesos (P3,000.00) nor more than Ten
thousand pesos (P10,000.00), or both such imprisonment
and fine, at the discretion of the court.
Sec. 515. Refusal or Failure of Any Party or Witness to
Appear before the Lupon or Pangkat. Refusal or willful
failure of any party or witness to appear before the lupon
or pangkat in compliance with a summons issued
pursuant to the provisions on the Katarungang
Pambarangay under Chapter 7, Title One of Book III of
this Code may be punished by the city or municipal court
as for indirect contempt of court upon application filed
therewith by the lupon chairman, the pangkat chairman,
or by any of the contending parties. Such refusal or
willful failure to appear, shall be reflected in the records
of the lupon secretary or in the minutes of the pangkat
secretary and shall bar the complainant who fails to
appear, from seeking judicial recourse for the same
cause of action, and the respondent who refuses to
appear from filing any counterclaim arising out of, or
necessarily connected with the complaint.
A pangkat member who serves as such shall be entitled
to an honorarium, the amount of which is to be
determined by the sanggunian concerned, subject to the
provisions in this Code cited above.
Sec. 516. Penalties for Violation of Tax Ordinances. The
sanggunian of a local government unit is authorized to
prescribe fines or other penalties for violation of tax
ordinances but in no case shall such fines be less than
One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) nor more than Five
thousand pesos (P5,000.00), nor shall imprisonment be
less than one (1) month nor more than six (6) months.
Such fine or other penalty, or both, shall be imposed at
the discretion of the court. The sangguniang barangay
may prescribe a fine of not less than One hundred pesos
(P100.00) nor more than One thousand pesos
(P1,000.00).
Sec. 517. Omission of Property from Assessment or Tax
Rolls by Officers and Other Acts. Any officer charged
with the duty of assessing real property who willfully fails
to assess, or who intentionally omits from the
assessment or tax roll any real property which he knows
to be taxable, or who willfully or negligently
underassesses any real property, or who intentionally
violates or fail to perform any duty imposed upon him by
law relating to the assessment of taxable real property
shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not less
than One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) nor more than Five
thousand pesos (P5,000.00), or by imprisonment of not
less than one (1) month nor more than six (6) months, or
both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the
court.
The same penalty be imposed any officer charged with
the duty of collecting the tax due on real property who
willfully or negligently fails to collect the tax and institute
the necessary proceedings for the collection of the same.
Any other officer required by this Code to perform acts
relating to the administration of the real property tax or
to assist the assessor or treasurer in such administration,
who willfully fails to discharge such duties shall, upon
conviction be punished by a fine of not less than Five
hundred pesos (P500.00) nor more than Five thousand
pesos (P5,000.00) or imprisonment of not less than one
(1) month nor more than six (6) months, or both such
fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court.
Sec. 518. Government Agents Delaying Assessment of
Real Property and Assessment Appeals. Any government
official who intentionally and deliberately delays the
assessment of real property or the filing of any appeal
against its assessment shall, upon conviction, be
punished by a fine of not less than Five hundred pesos
(P500.00) nor more than Five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00), or by imprisonment of not less than one (1)
month nor more than six (6) months, or both such fine
and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court.
Sec. 519. Failure to Dispose of Delinquent Real Property
at Public Auction. The local treasurer concerned who
fails to dispose of delinquent real property at public
auction in compliance with the pertinent provisions of
this Code, and any other local government official whose
acts hinder the prompt disposition of delinquent real
property at public auction shall, upon conviction, be
subject to a fine of not less than One thousand pesos
(P1,000.00) nor more than Five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00), or imprisonment of not less than one (1)
month nor more than six (6) months, or both such fine
and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
Sec. 520. Prohibited Acts Related to the Award of
Contracts Under the Provisions on Credit Financing. It
shall be unlawful for any public official or employee in
the provincial, city, or municipal government, or their
relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity
or affinity, to enter into or have any pecuniary interest in
any contract for the construction, acquisition, operation,
or maintenance of any project awarded pursuant to the
provisions of Title Four in Book II hereof, or for the
procurement of any supplies, materials, or equipment of
any kind to be used in the said project. Any person
convicted for violation of the provisions of said Title shall
be removed from office and shall be punished by
imprisonment of not less than one (1) month, nor more
than two (2) years, at the discretion of the court, without
prejudice to prosecution under other laws.