DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING 201

quickness, and, at the same ti me, w i t h c a u t i o n ; i n other

wo r d s , to exami ne subjects, and to do i t w i t h expedi ti on.
I n thi s wa y they have acqui red exceedi ng readiness i n a l l
thei r mental acts. The consequence o f thi s i s, that the
numerous mi nute circumstances, i n v o l v e d mor e or less i n
a l l subjects of di ffi cult i nqui r y, are passed i n r evi ew w i t h
such r ap i di ty , and are made i n so ver y small a degree the
objects o f separate attenti on, that they vani sh and are for -
gotten. Hence these persons, although the conclusi on to
whi c h they have come be sati sfactory, are unable to state
to others a l l the subordi nate steps i n the argument.
Ev er y thi ng has once been di sti nctly and f a i r l y before
thei r o wn mi nds, although w i t h that great r ap i di ty whi c h
is always i mpl i ed i n a habi t ; b u t thei r ar gument, as sta-
ted i n wor ds, o wi ng to thei r i nabi l i ty to arrest and i mbody
a l l the evanescent processes of tho ught, appears to others
defecti ve and confused.
CHAPTER X.
DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING.
<) 185. Of the subjects of demonstrative reasoning.
I n the remarks which have hitherto been made, the
subject of reasoning has been taken up i n the most gen-
eral point of view. The considerations that have been
proposed are applicable, i n the main, to reasoning i n all
its forms. But i t is necessary, i n order to possess a more
full and satisfactory conception of this subject, to exam-
ine i t under the two prominent heads of Moral and De-
monstrat ve.
There are various particulars i n which moral and de-
monstrative reasoning differ from each other j the consid-
eration of which wi l l suggest more fully their distinctive
nature. Among other things, demonstrative reasoning
differs from any other species of reasoning i n the subjects
about which i t is employed. The subjects are abstract
ideas, and the necessary relations among them. Those
202 DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING.
ideas or thoughts are called abstract whi ch are represent-
ative of such qualities and properties i n objects as can
be distinctly examined by the mi nd separate from other
qualities and properties wi th whi ch they are commonly
united. An d there may be reckoned, as coming within
this class of subjects, the properties of numbers and of geo-
metrical figures ; also extension, duration, wei ght, veloci-
ty, forces, &c , so far as they are susceptible of being accu-
rately expressed by numbers or other mathematical signs.
But the subjects of moral reasoning, upon whi ch we are
to remark hereafter more particularly, are matters of fact,
including their connexion wi th other facts, whether con-
stant or variable, and all attendant circumstances.That
the exterior angle of a triangle is equal to both the inte-
rior and opposite angles, is a truth whi ch comes wi thi n
the province of demonstration. That Homer was the au-
thor of the I l i ad, that Xerxes invaded Greece, &c , are
inquiries belonging to moral reasoning.
186. Use of definitions and axioms in demonstrative reasoning.
I n every process of reasoning, there must be, at the
commencement of i t, something to be pr oved; there must
also be some things, either known or taken for granted
as such, wi th whi ch the comparison of the propositions
begins. The prehminary truths i n demonstrative reason-
ings are involved i n such definitions as are found i n all
mathematical treatises. I t is impossible to give a dem-
onstration of the properties of a circle, parabola, ellipse,
or other mathematical figure, wi thout first having given a
definition of them. Defi ni ti ons, therefore, are the facts
assumed, the f i r s t principles i n demonstrative reasoning,.
from whi ch, by means of the subsequent steps, the conclu-
sion is derived.We fi nd something entirely similar i n
respect to subjects whi ch admit of the application of a
different form of reasoning. Thus, i n Natural Philosophy,
the general facts i n relation to the gravity and elasticity
of the air may be considered as first principles. From
these principles i n Physics are deduced, as consequences,
the suspension of the mercury i n the barometer, and its
fall when carried up to an eminence.
We mast not forget here the use of axioms i n the dem-
DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING.
203
Fc
onstrations of mathemati cs. Ax i o ms are certai n self-ey
i dent propositions, or propositions the tr uth o f whi c h is
discovered by i ntui ti on, such as the f o l l o w i n g : " Thi ngs
equal to the same, are equal to one a n o t he r ; " " Fr o m
equals take away equals, and equals r e ma i n . " We g e n -
erally find a number of them pr efi xed to treatises of ge-
ometry, and other treatises i nv o l v i ng geometri cal p r i n c i -
l e s ; and i t has been a mi staken supposi ti on, whi c h has
ong pr evai led, that they are at the foundati on o f geomet-
r i cal and of a l l other demonstrative reasoni ng. Bu t
axi oms, taken by themselves, lead to no conclusions.
Wi t h thei r assistance alone, the t r u t h, i nvol ved i n pr oposi -
tions susceptible of demonstrati on, wo u l d have been be-
yond our reach.
Bu t axioms are by no means wi thout thei r use, although
thei r nature may have been misunderstood. They are
properly and or i gi nally i ntui ti ve perceptions of the t r u t h;
and whether they be expressed i n words, as we gen-
er ally find them, or not, is of but l i ttl e consequence, ex-
cept as a matter of convenience to begi nners, and i n g i v -
i n g i nstructi on. Bu t those i ntui ti ve perceptions whi c h
are always i mpl i ed i n them are essential hel p s ; and i f
by thei r ai d alone we should be unable to complete a
demonstrati on, we should be equally unable wi tho ut them.
We begi n w i t h defi ni ti ons; we compare together suc-
cessively a number of pr oposi ti ons; and these i ntui ti ve
perceptions of thei r agreement or disagreement, to whi c h,
when expressed i n wor ds, we gi ve the name of axi oms,
attend us at every step.
i 187. The opposites of demonstrative reasonings absurd.
I n demonstrations we consider only one side of a ques-
ti o n ; i t is not necessary to do anythi ng more than thi s.
The first pri nci ples i n the reasoning are g i v e n ; they are
not only supposed to be cer tai n, but they are assumed as
s u c h; these are fol l owed by a number o f proposi ti ons i n
succession, al l of whi c h are compared to gether ; i f the
conclusion be a demonstrative one, then there has been a
clear percepti on of certai nty at every step i n the tr ai n.
Whatever may be urged against an argument thus con-
ducted is of no consequence , the opposite of i t w i l l a! -
204 DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING.
ways i mply some fallacy. Thus, the proposition that the
three angles of a triangle are not equal to two right
angles, and other propositions, whi ch are the opposite of
what has been demonstrated, wi l l always be found to be
false, and also to involve an absurdi ty; that is, are in-
consistent wi th, and contradictory to, themselves.
But i t is not so i n Moral Reasoning. An d here, there-
fore, we find a marked distinction between the two great
forms of ratiocination. We may arrive at a conclusion
on a moral subject wi th a great degree of certai nty; not
a doubt may be left i n the mi n d ; and yet the opposite
of that conclusion may be altogether wi thi n the limits of
possibility. We have, for instance, the most satisfactory
evidence that the sun rose to-day, but the opposite might
have been true, without any inconsistency or contradic-
ti on, vi z. , That the sun di d not rise. Agai n, we have no
doubt of the great law i n physics, that heavy bodies de-
scend to the earth i n a line directed towards its centre.
But we can conceive of the opposite of this wi thout involv-
i ng any contradiction or absurdity. I n other words, they
might have been subjected, i f the Creator had so deter-
mined, to the influence of a law requiring them to move i n
a different direction. But, on a thorough examination of
a demonstrative process, we shall find ourselves unable to
admit even the possibility of the opposite.
<J 18S. Demonstrations do not admit of different degrees of belief.
When our thoughts are employed upon subjects which
come wi thi n the province of moral reasoning, we yield
different degrees of assent; we form opinions more or less
probable. Sometimes our belief is of the lowest k i n d ;
nothing more than mere presumption. New evidence
gives i t new strength; and i t may go on, from cne de-
gree of strength to another, t i l l all doubt is excluded, and
all possibility of mistake shut out. I t is different i n dem-
onstrations ; the assent whi ch we yi eld is at all times of
the highest ki nd, and is never susceptible of being regard-
ed as more or less. This results, as must be obvious on
the slightest examination, from the nature of demonstra-
tive reasoning.
I n demonstrative reasonings we always begin wi th
DEMONSTRATIVE REASONING.
205
certai n first pri nci ples or tr uths, ei ther k n o wn or taken for
g r a n t e d ; and these ho l d the fi rst place, or are the fo und-
ati on of that series of proposi ti ons over whi c h the mi n d
successively passes u n t i l i t rests i n the conclusi on. I n
mathemati cs, the fi rst pr i nci ples, o f whi c h we here speak,
are the defi ni ti ons.
We begi n, ther efor e, w i t h wha t i s acknowledged b y
a l l to be tr ue or certai n. A t every step there i s an i n t u i -
ti ve percepti on o f the agreement or disagreement o f the
{)ropositions whi c h are compared together. Consequent-
y, however far we may advance i n the compari son o f
them, there is no possi bi li ty o f f a l l i n g short o f that degree
of assent w i t h whi c h i t i s acknowl edged that the series
commenced.So that demonstrati ve cer tai nty may be
j udged to amount to thi s. Whenever we arri ve at the
last step, or the conclusi on o f a series o f proposi ti ons, the
mi n d , i n effect, i ntui ti v el y perceives the r el ati on, whether
i t be the agreement or di sagreement, coincidence or want
of coincidence, between the last step or the conclusi on,
and the condi ti ons i nvolved i n the proposi ti ons at the
commencement o f the seri es; and, therefore, demonstra-
ti ve cer tai nty i s v i r t u a l l y the same as the cer tai nty o f in
tui ti on. Al t ho u g h i t arises on a di fferent occasion, and
i s, therefore, enti tled to a separate consi derati on, there is
no difference i n the degree of beli ef.
189. Of tha use of diagrams in demonstrations.
I n conducti ng a demonstrati ve process, i t is frequently
the case that we make use o f vari ous ki nds o f fi gures or
di agr ams. The proper use o f di agr ams, o f a square, ci r -
cle, tr i angl e, or other fi gur e whi c h we deli neate before
us, is to assist the mi n d i n keepi ng i ts ideas di sti nct, and
to help i n compari ng them together w i t h readiness and
correctness. They are a sort of auxi li ar i es, br ought i n to
the help of our i ntellectual i nfi r mi ti es, but are not abso-
l utel y necessary; since demonstrati ve r easoni ng, wher e-
ever i t may be found, resembles any other k i n d o f reason-
i n g i n thi s most i mpor tant respect, v i z. , i n bei ng a com-
pari son o f our ideas.
I n pr oof that ar ti fi ci al di agrams are onl y auxi li ar i es,
and are not essentially necessary i n demonstrations i t
S
206 MORAL REASONING.
may be remarked, that they are necessarily all of them
imperfect. I t is not wi thi n the capability of the wi t and
power of man to frame a perfect circle, or a perfect tr i -
angle, or any other figure whi ch is perfect. We might
argue this from our general knowledge of the imperfec-
tion of the senses; and we may almost regard i t as a
matter determined by experiments of the senses them-
selves, aided by optical instruments. " There never was,"
says Cudworth, " a straight li ne, triangle, or circle, that we
saw i n all our lives, that was mathematically exact; but
even sense itself, at least by the help of microscopes,
might plainly discover much unevenness, ruggedness, flex-
uosity, angulosity, irregularity, and deformity i n them."*
Our reasonings, therefore, and our conclusions, wi l l not
apply to the figures before us, but merely to an imagined
perfect figure. The mind can not only originate a figure
internally and subjectively, but can ascribe to i t the attri-
bute of perfection. An d a verbal statement of the prop-
erties of this imagined perfect figure is what we under-
stand by a defi ni ti on, the use of whi ch, i n this ki nd of
reasoning i n particular, has already been mentioned
CHAPTER XL
MORAL REASONING.
190. Of the subjects and importance of moral reasoning.
Mo r a l reasoning, whi ch is the second great division or
ki nd of reasoning, concerns opinions, actions, and events;
embracing, i n general, those subjects whi ch do not come
wi thi n the province of demonstrative reasoning. The
subjects to whi ch i t relates are often briefly expressed, by
saying that they are matters o f f a c t ; nor would this defi-
ni ti on, concise as i t is, be li kely to give an erroneous idea
of them.
Ski ll i n this ki nd of reasoning is of great use i n the
formation of opinions concerning the duties and the gen-
* Treatise concerning Im-mitable Morality, bk. iv., ch iii.