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thirteen vehicle borne improvised

explosive devices (VBIEDs)
Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs) are one of the most effective weapons in
the terrorists arsenal. They are capable of delivering a large quantity of explosives to a target
and can cause a great deal of damage.
Once assembled, the bomb can be delivered at a time of the terrorists choosing and with
reasonable precision, depending on defences. It can be detonated from a safe distance
using a timer or remote control, or can be detonated on the spot by a suicide bomber.
Building a VBIED requires a significant investment of time, resources and expertise. Because
of this, terrorists will seek to obtain the maximum impact for their investment.
Terrorists generally select targets where they can cause most damage, inflict mass
casualities or attract widespread publicity.
Effects of VBIEDs
VBIEDs can be highly destructive. It is not just the effects of a direct bomb blast that can be lethal,
flying debris such as glass can present a hazard many metres away from the seat of the explosion.
What you can do
If you think your shopping centre could be at risk from any form of VBIED you should:
ensure you have effective vehicle access controls, particularly at goods entrances and
service yards. Do not allow unchecked vehicles to park in underground service areas
directly below public areas where there will be large numbers of people and where there
is a risk of structural collapse
insist that details of contract vehicles and the identity of the driver and any passengers
approaching your goods/service areas are authorised in advance
ensure that delivery vehicles arriving at your centre are expected by the receiving unit
retailer before they are granted access into goods/service areas
consider a vehicle search regime at goods/service entrances that is flexible and can be
tailored to a change in threat or response level. It may be necessary to carry out a risk
assessment for the benefit of security staff who may be involved in vehicle access control
do what you can to make your shopping centre blast resistant, paying particular
attention to windows. Have the structures reviewed by a qualified security/structural
engineer when seeking advice on protected spaces
establish and rehearse bomb threat and evacuation drills. Bear in mind that, depending
on where the suspected VBIED is parked and the design of your building, it may be safer
in windowless corridors or basements than outside
consider using robust physical barriers to keep all but authorised vehicles at a
safe distance. Seek the advice of your local Police Counter Terrorism Security
Adviser (CTSA) on what these should be and on further measures such as
electronic surveillance including Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR)
and protection from flying glass
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assembly areas must take account of the proximity to the potential threat. You should
bear in mind that a vehicle bomb delivered into your building for instance via
underground car parks or through the front of your premises could have a far greater
destructive effect on the structure than an externally detonated device
train and rehearse your staff in identifying suspect vehicles, and in receiving and acting
upon bomb threats. Key information and telephone numbers should be prominently
displayed and readily available
it should be emphasised that the installation of physical barriers needs to be balanced
against the requirements of safety and should not be embarked upon without full
consideration of planning regulation and fire safety risk assessment.
See Good Practice Checklist Access Control in Appendix B
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fourteen chemical, biological and
radiological (CBR) attacks
Since the early 1990s, concern that terrorists might use CBR materials as weapons has
steadily increased. The hazards are:
Chemical
Poisoning or injury caused by chemical substances, including ex-military
chemical warfare agents or legitimate but harmful household or industrial
chemicals.
Biological
Illnesses caused by the deliberate release of dangerous bacteria, viruses or
fungi, or biological toxins such as the plant toxin ricin.
Radiological
Illnesses caused by exposure to harmful radioactive materials contaminating
the environment.
A radiological dispersal device (RDD), often referred to as a dirty bomb, is typically a device
where radioactive materials are combined with conventional explosives. Upon detonation, no
nuclear explosion is produced but, depending on the type of the radioactive source, the
surrounding areas become contaminated.
As well as causing a number of casualties from the initial blast, there may well be a longer-
term threat to health. A number of terrorist groups have expressed interest in, or attempted
to use, a dirty bomb as a method of attack.
Much of the CBR-related activity seen to date has either been criminal, or has involved
hoaxes and false alarms. There have so far only been a few examples of terrorists using CBR
materials. The most notable were the 1995 sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway, which
killed twelve people, and the 2001 anthrax letters in the United States, which killed five
people.
CBR weapons have been little used so far, largely due to the difficulty in obtaining the
materials and the complexity of using them effectively. Where terrorists have tried to carry
out CBR attacks, they have generally used relatively simple materials. However, Al Qaida and
related groups have expressed a serious interest in using CBR materials. The impact of any
terrorist CBR attack would depend heavily on the success of the chosen dissemination
method and the weather conditions at the time of the attack.
The likelihood of a CBR attack remains low. As with other terrorist attacks, you may not
receive prior warning of a CBR incident. Moreover, the exact nature of an incident may not
be immediately obvious. First indicators may be the sudden appearance of powders, liquids or
strange smells within the building, with or without an immediate effect on people.
Good general physical and personnel security measures will contribute towards resilience
against CBR incidents. Remember to apply appropriate personnel security standards to
contractors, especially those with frequent access to your site.
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What you can do
review the physical security of your air-handling systems, such as access to intakes and
outlets
improve air filters or upgrade your air-handling systems, as necessary
restrict access to water tanks and other key utilities
review the security of your food and drink supply chains
consider whether you need to make special arrangements for mail or parcels, e.g. a
separate post room, possibly with dedicated air-handling, or even a specialist off-site
facility. (See Mail Handling on page 25)
the Home Office advises organisations against the use of CBR detection technologies as
part of their contingency planning measures at present. This is because the technology is
not yet proven in civil settings and, in the event of a CBR incident, the emergency
services would come on scene with appropriate detectors and advise accordingly. A basic
awareness of CBR threat and hazards, combined with general protective security
measures (e.g. screening visitors, CCTV monitoring of perimeter and entrance areas,
being alert to suspicious letters and packages) should offer a good level of resilience. In
the first instance, seek advice from your local police force CTSA
if you have a designated protected space this may also be suitable as a CBR shelter, but
seek specialist advice from your local police force CTSA before you make plans to use it
in this way
consider how to communicate necessary safety advice to staff and how to offer
reassurance. This needs to include instructions to those who want to leave, return to or
enter the building.
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fifteen suicide attacks
The use of suicide bombers is a very effective method of delivering an explosive device to a
specific location. Suicide bombers may use a lorry, plane or other kind of vehicle as a bomb or
may carry or conceal explosives on their persons. Both kinds of attack are generally perpetrated
without warning. The most likely targets are symbolic locations, key installations, VIPs or mass-
casualty crowded places.
When considering protective measures against suicide bombers, think in terms of:
using physical barriers to prevent a hostile vehicle from driving into your shopping centre
through goods/service entrances, pedestrian entrances or shop fronts
denying access to any vehicle that arrives at your goods/service entrances without prior
notice and holding vehicles at your access control points until you can satisfy yourself that
they are genuine
wherever possible, establishing your vehicle access control point at a distance from the
protected site, setting up regular patrols and briefing staff to look out for anyone
behaving suspiciously. Many bomb attacks are preceded by reconnaissance or trial runs.
Ensure that such incidents are reported to the police
ensure that no one visits your protected area without your being sure of his or her identity
or without proper authority. Seek further advice through your local police forces CTSA
effective CCTV systems may deter a terrorist attack or even identify planning activity.
Good quality images can provide crucial evidence in court
there is no definitive physical profile for a suicide bomber, so remain vigilant and report
anyone suspicious to the police.
See Hostile Reconnaissance - page 49
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sixteen firearm & weapon attacks
Attacks involving firearms and weapons are still infrequent but it is important to be prepared
to cope with such an incident.
The important advice below will help you plan.
In the event of an attack take these four actions:
Stay Safe
Under immediate GUN FIRE Take cover initially, but leave the area as soon as possible if
safe to do so
Nearby GUN FIRE - Leave the area immediately, if possible and it is safe to do so.
Leave your belongings behind.
Do not congregate at evacuation points.
COVER FROM GUN FIRE COVER FROM VIEW
Substantial brickwork or concrete Internal partition walls
Engine blocks of motor vehicles Car doors
Base of large live trees Wooden fences
Earth banks/hills/mounds Curtains
REMEMBER - out of sight does not necessarily mean out of danger, especially if you are not
in cover from gun fire.
IF YOU CANT ESCAPE - consider locking yourself and others in a room or cupboard.
Barricade the door then stay away from it.
If possible choose a room where escape or further movement is possible. Silence any sources
of noise, such as mobile phones, that may give away your presence.
See
The more information that you can pass to police the better but NEVER risk your
own safety or that of others to gain it. Consider using CCTV and other remote
methods where possible to reduce the risk. If it is safe to do so, think about the
following:
Is it a firearms / weapons incident? Exact location of the incident.
What else are they carrying? Number and description of gunmen.
Moving in any particular direction? Type of firearm -long-barrelled or handgun.
Are they communicating with others? Number of casualties / people in the area.
Tell
POLICE - contact them immediately by dialling 999 or via your control room, giving them
the information shown under See.
Use all the channels of communication available to you to inform staff, visitors,
neighbouring premises, etc of the danger.
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Act
Secure your immediate environment and other vulnerable areas.
Keep people out of public areas, such as corridors and foyers.
Move away from the door and remain quiet until told otherwise by appropriate
authorities or if you need to move for safety reasons, such as a building fire.
Armed Police
In the event of an attack involving firearms or weapons, a Police Officers priority is
to protect and save lives. Please remember:
Initially they may not be able to distinguish you from the gunmen.
Officers may be armed and may point guns at you.
They may have to treat the public firmly. Follow their instructions; keep hands in the air /
in view.
Avoid quick movement towards the officers and pointing, screaming or shouting.
Plan
Consider the following when planning for a firearms / weapons incident
1. How you would communicate with staff, visitors, neighbouring premises, etc.
2. What key messages would you give to them in order to keep them safe.
3. Have the ability to secure key parts of the building to hinder free movement of the
gunmen.
3. Think about incorporating this into your emergency planning and briefings
4. Test your plan at least annually.
If you require further information then please liaise with your Counter Terrorism Security
Adviser (CTSA).
seventeen communication
You should consider a communication strategy for raising awareness among staff and others
who need to know about your security plan and its operation. This will include the
emergency services, local authorities and possibly neighbouring premises.
There should also be arrangements for dealing with people who may be affected by your
security operation but who are not employees of your organisation (e.g. customers, clients,
contractors, visitors).
It should be remembered that immediately following a terrorist attack, mobile telephone
communication may be unavailable due to excessive demand.
Security issues should be discussed and determined at Board level and form a part of the
organisations culture.
Security Managers should regularly meet with staff to discuss security issues and encourage
staff to raise their concerns about security.
Consideration should be given to the use of the organisations website and/or publications to
communicate crime prevention and counter terrorism initiatives.
All shopping centres should consider having a supply of posters and material (even via web
links) to support crime prevention and counter terrorism messages and initiatives.
All Security Managers should involve their local Police Counter Terrorism Security Adviser
when considering improvements to their shopping centre and/or its environs.
See Good Practice Checklist Communication in Appendix G
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eighteen hostile reconnaissance
Operation Lightning is a national intelligence gathering operation to record, research,
investigate and analyse:
suspicious sightings
suspicious activity
at or near:
crowded places
or prominent or vulnerable:
buildings
structures
transport infrastructure.
The ability to recognise those engaged in hostile reconnaissance could disrupt an
attack and produce important intelligence leads.
Primary Role of Reconnaissance
obtain a profile of the target location
determine the best method of attack
determine the optimum time to conduct the attack.
Hostile reconnaissance is used to provide information to
operational planners on potential targets during the
preparatory and operational phases of terrorist operations.
Reconnaissance operatives may visit potential targets a
number of times prior to the attack.
Where pro-active security measures are in place,
particular attention is paid to any variations in security
patterns and the flow of people in and out.
What to look for.
significant interest being taken in the outside of your
shopping centre including parking areas, delivery
gates, doors and entrances
groups or individuals taking significant interest in the
location of CCTV cameras and controlled areas
people taking pictures filming making notes sketching of the security measures at
shopping centres. Tourists should not necessarily be taken as such and should be treated
sensitively, but with caution
overt/covert photography, video cameras, possession of photographs, maps, blueprints etc,
of critical infrastructures, electricity transformers, gas pipelines, telephone cables etc
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possession of maps, global positioning systems, (GPS), photographic equipment, (cameras,
zoom lenses, camcorders). GPS will assist in the positioning and correct guidance of
weapons such as mortars and Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs). This should be considered
a possibility up to one kilometre from any target
vehicles parked outside buildings of other facilities, with one or more people remaining in
the vehicle, for longer than would be considered usual
parking, standing or loitering in the same area on numerous occasions with no apparent
reasonable explanation
prolonged static surveillance using operatives disguised as demonstrators, street sweepers,
etc or stopping and pretending to have car trouble to test response time for emergency
services, car recovery companies, (AA, RAC etc) or local staff
simple observation such as staring or quickly looking away
activity inconsistent with the nature of the building
noted pattern or series of false alarms indicating possible testing of security systems and
observation of response behaviour and procedures, (bomb threats, leaving hoax devices or
packages)
the same vehicle and different individuals or the same individuals in a different vehicle
returning to a location(s)
the same or similar individuals returning to carry out the same activity to establish the
optimum time to conduct the operation
unusual activity by contractors vehicles
recent damage to perimeter security, breaches in fence lines or walls or the concealment in
hides of mortar base plates or assault equipment, i.e. ropes, ladders, food etc. Regular
perimeter patrols should be instigated months in advance of a high profile event to ensure
this is not happening
attempts to disguise identity motorcycle helmets, hoodies etc, or multiple sets of clothing
to change appearance
constant use of different paths, and/or access routes across a site. Learning the route or
foot surveillance involving a number of people who seem individual but are working
together
multiple identification documents suspicious, counterfeit, altered documents etc
non co-operation with police or security personnel
those engaged in reconnaissance will often attempt to enter premises to assess the internal
layout and in doing so will alter their appearance and provide cover stories
in the past reconnaissance operatives have drawn attention to themselves by asking
peculiar and in depth questions of employees or others more familiar with the environment
sightings of suspicious activity should be passed immediately to the shopping
centre control room for CCTV monitoring and the event recorded for evidential
purposes.
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Reconnaissance operatives may also seek additional
information on:
width surveys of surrounding streets exploring the range of tactical options available to
deliver the device
levels of internal and external security are vehicle/person/bag searches undertaken?
THE ROLE OF THE RECONNAISSANCE TEAM HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY
IMPORTANT TO TERRORIST OPERATIONS.
Reconnaissance trips may be undertaken as a rehearsal to involve personnel and
equipment that will be used in the actual attack e.g. before the London attacks on 7th July
2005, the bombers staged a trial run nine days before the actual attack.
Reporting suspicious activity to police that does not require an immediate
response, contact the ANTI-TERRORIST HOTLINE 0800 789 321
ANY INCIDENT THAT REQUIRES AN IMMEDIATE RESPONSE DIAL 999.