Innholdsfortegnelse Constitution of society del 3, fra side 180 og ut

Innholdsfortegnelse Constitution of society del 2, fra side 180 og ut.....................................1

Chapter 4 (continued from part one).......................................................................................2
Critical Notes !"tructural "ociology! and #ethodological In di$idualism...........................18
%eferences.........................................................................................................................2&
%eferences Critical Notes '"tructural "ociology! and #ethodological Indi$idualism....28
(. Change, )$olution and *o+er...........................................................................................,0
Critical Notes *arsons on )$olution....................................................................................(2
%eferences Change, )$olution and *o+er.......................................................................(-
%eferences Critical Notes *arsons on )$olution............................................................&2
&. "tructuration .heory, )mpirical %esearch and "ocial Criti/ue........................................&,
Critical Notes "ocial "cience, 0istory and 1eography.....................................................10-
%eferences "tructuration .heory, )mpirical %esearch and "ocial Criti/ue...................112
%eferences Critical Notes "ocial "cience, 0istory and 1eography..............................11-
1lossary of .erminology of "tructuration .heory..............................................................121
3i4liography........................................................................................................................124
Inde5....................................................................................................................................1,,
Chapter 4 (continued from part one)
((180))
+hich he compares commodity relations to the 'mist6en$eloped regions of the religious +orld!. 7ust as
in religion 'the productions of the human 4rain appear as independent 4eings endo+ed +ith life, and
entering into relation 4oth +ith one another and the human race!, so it is in the '+orld of commodities!
+ith the 'products of men!s hands!.!! 8nother sense in +hich the term reification is often employed is to
refer to circumstances in +hich social phenomena 4ecome endo+ed +ith thing6li9e properties +hich
they do not in fact ha$e. 8gain there is a reputa4le ancestry for this coinage in #ar5 'In e5change
$alue, the social connection 4et+een persons is transformed into a relation 4et+een things....: ;inally,
'reification! is sometimes used to designate characteristics of social theories +hich treat concepts as
though they +ere the o4<ects to +hich they referred, as attri4uting properties to those concepts.
.he second of these senses is the one I shall adopt, 4ut it is not accepta4le as it stands 4ecause it
implies that the /uality of 4eing 'thing6li9e! does not need further e5plication and 4ecause it does not
ma9e it clear that reification is a discursi$e notion. .he concept should not 4e understood simply to
refer to properties of social systems +hich are 'o4<ecti$ely gi$en! so far as specific, situated actors are
concerned. %ather, it should 4e seen as referring to forms of discourse +hich treat such properties as
'o4<ecti$ely gi$en! in the same +ay as are natural phenomena. .hat is to say, reified discourse refers to
the 'facticity! +ith +hich social phenomena confront indi$idual actors in such a +ay as to ignore ho+
they are produced and reproduced through human agency.<
(
%eification thus should not 4e interpreted
to mean 'thing6li9e! in such a connotation= it concerns, rather, the conse/uences of thin9ing in this 9ind
of fashion, +hether such thin9ing is done 4y those +ho +ould call themsel$es social scientists or 4y
lay mem4ers of society. .he 'reified mode! should 4e considered a form or style of discourse, in +hich
the properties of social systems are regarded as ha$ing the same fi5ity as that presumed in la+s of
nature.
The Concept of Structural Principles
.he implications of the foregoing sections of this chapter can 4e
descri4ed as follo+s. "tructural constraint is not e5pressed in
((181))
terms of the implaca4le causal forms +hich structural sociologists ha$e in mind +hen they emphasi>e
so strongly the association of 'structure! +ith !constraint!. "tructural constraints do not operate
independently of the moti$es and reasons that agents ha$e for +hat they do. .hey cannot 4e compared
+ith the effect of, say, an earth/ua9e +hich destroys a to+n and its inha4itants +ithout their in any
+ay 4eing a4le to do anything a4out it. .he only mo$ing o4<ects in human social relations are
indi$idual agents, +ho employ resources to ma9e things happen, intentionally or other+ise. .he
structural properties of social systems do not act, or 'act on!, anyone li9e forces of nature to 'compel!
him or her to 4eha$e in any particular +ay. (;or further discussion in relation to pro4lems of empirical
research, see pp. ,04610.)
0o+e$er, there is a range of further notions rele$ant to spea9ing of 'structure! in social analysis, and
these re/uire special consideration. I shall discuss them in the follo+ing order. ;irst, ho+ should the
concept of 'structural principle! 4e de$eloped? "econd, +hat le$els of a4straction can 4e distinguished
in studying the structural properties of social systems? .hird, ho+ are di$erse social systems
articulated +ithin societal totalities?
In identifying structural principles the discussion has to mo$e 4ac9 from the formal to the rather
more su4stanti$e. @et me recall, to 4egin +ith, a main strand of structuration theory, introduced in the
first chapter. .he 'pro4lem of order! in the theory of structuration is the pro4lem of ho+ it comes a4out
that social systems '4ind! time and space, incorporating and integrating presence and a4sence. .his in
turn is closely 4ound up +ith the pro4lematic of time6space distanciation the 'stretching! of social
systems across time6space. "tructural principles can thus 4e understood as the principles of
organi>ation +hich allo+ recogni>a4ly consistent forms of time6space distanciation on the 4asis of
definite mechanisms of societal integration. Ara+ing upon a range of comparati$e and historical
studies,!! I propose a threefold classification of types of society as 4elo+
((182))
This scheme is described in some detail in A Contemporary Critique of Historical
Materialism, and I shall gloss it rather rapidly here." In tribal societies or small oral
cultures the dominant structural principle operates along an axis relating tradition and
kinship, embedding themselves in time and space. In these societies the media of social
and system integration are the same, depending overwhelmingly upon interaction in the
settings of locales of high presence availability. Of course, a variety of diferent sub-types of
society can be distinguished within this general category. I should emphasize that I do not
intend to present this classifcation as a surreptitious evolutionary scheme. Oral cultures
should not be understood as societies in which system integration has `not yet' become
disentangled from social integration. As Levi-Strauss has done more than anyone else to
make clear, tribal societies in which humankind has lived out all but a small fraction of
its history are substantially divergent from `civilizations', of whatever type. The invention
of writing, so closely involved with the formation of states and classes, alters the character
of time as lived experience, by the very means whereby it permits an expanding of time-
space distanciation.
The dominant structural principle of class-divided society which obviously also
includes a range of sub-types is to be
((183))
found along an a5is relating ur4an areas to their rural hinterlands. .he city is far more than a mere
physical milieu. It is a 'storage container! of administrati$e resources around +hich agrarian states are
4uilt. .he differentiation of city and countryside is the means of the separation of social and system
integration, although the t+o are not necessarily coincident, for the sym4iotic relation of city and
countryside may ta9e $arious forms.!! In class6di$ided societies traditional practices and 9inship
relations, e$en tri4al identifications, remain $ery prominent. .he state is una4le to penetrate deeply
into locali>ed customs, and sheer military po+er is one of the principal foundations upon +hich
go$ernment officialdom is a4le to 'contain! outlying regions +here direct administrati$e control is
particularly +ea9. Class6di$ided society is mar9ed, ho+e$er, 4y some disentangling of the four
institutional spheres distinguished a4o$e (p. ,,). .he polity, +ith its officials, is separated in some part
from the procedures of economic acti$ity= formal codes of la+ and punishment e5ist= and modes of
sym4olic co6ordination, 4ased in +ritten te5ts, ma9e their appearance.
#odern capitalism is not one type of 'ci$ili>ation! among others, and it does not mar9 an
e$olutionary de$elopment 'out of! class6di$ided societies. .he first genuinely glo4al type of societal
organi>ation in history, it has its origins in a dou4le discontinuity in the de$elopment of the Best.
.here are long6term di$ergencies in the formation of the Best, as compared +ith that of the other
ma<or 'ci$ili>ations!, o$er a period of some t+o millennia= )urope remained a 'state system!, and no
dominant imperial centre +as re6esta4lished in its midst after the disintegration of the %oman )mpire.
Bithin this 4road di$ergence, ho+e$er, a range of massi$e discontinuities from other types of society
+as introduced 4y the intert+ining of political and industrial re$olutions from the eighteenth century
on+ards. .he distincti$e structural principle of the class societies of modern capitalism is to 4e found
in the disem4edding, yet interconnecting, of state and economic institutions. .he tremendous
economic po+er generated 4y the harnessing of allocati$e resources to a generic tendency to+ards
technical impro$ement is matched 4y an enormous e5pansion in the administrati$e 'reach! of the state.
"ur$eillance C the coding of information rele$ant to the administration of su4<ect populations, plus
their direct super$ision 4y officials and administrators
((184))
of all sorts C 4ecomes a 9ey mechanism furthering a 4rea9ing a+ay of system from social integration.
.raditional practices are dispersed (+ithout, of course, disappearing altogether) under the impact of the
penetration of day6to6day life 4y codified administrati$e procedures. .he locales +hich pro$ide the
settings for interaction in situations of co6presence undergo a ma<or set of transmutations. .he old city
Ccountryside relation is replaced 4y a spra+ling e5pansion of a manufactured or 'created
en$ironment!.
8 categori>ation of intersocietal systems can 4e formulated C in a 4road +ay at least C in terms of
the a4o$e classification of society types as follo+s
.his categori>ation, it should 4e pointed out, is not at all symmetrical in respect of historical
chronology. .he smallest category figurati$ely C systems of tri4al societies C is 4y far the largest in
terms of span of time. Intersocietal systems in$ol$ing tri4al societies ha$e al+ays 4een relati$ely
fragmentary, ho+e$er, in the sense that they ha$e 4een confined in respect of their configurations
across time6space. .hey ha$e dominated the +orld for most of human history, 4ut they ha$e not
formed '+orld systems! in Ballerstein!s sense.
1-
.hat is to say, 'ci$ili>ations! ha$e de$eloped centres
of po+er +hich ha$e influenced large segments of the glo4e, and they ha$e fired the 'heat! of rapid
social change. Imperial +orld systems, ho+e$er, ha$e e5isted only in uneasy relation to a di$ersity of
forms of tri4al societies and ha$e fre/uently succum4ed to attac9s or pressures from such societies.
.he phase of the early capitalist +orld economy +as a transitory one in history, lasting no longer than
t+o centuries or so. Det
((185))
during that phase a greater variety of types of society existed in relation with one another
than at any other period before or afterwards. For since that time the increasing ascendancy
of Western capitalist societies, challenged only by the state socialist societies
20
in terms of
their industrial and military power, has implacably destroyed or corroded tribal and class-
divided societies, which perhaps are forever disappearing from the face of the earth. The
contemporary world system is, for the frst time in human history, one in which absence in
space no longer hinders system co-ordination. Is it necessary to stress again that the
development of the world nation-state system is not coeval with the expansion of cohesion or
consensus? For the same developments which have created at once that distinctively
modern form of society, the nation-state and its involvement in a global system of a new
type, have at the same time brought into being schisms which, in the nuclear age, threaten
the very survival of humanity as a whole.
21
Structures, Structural Properties
As I have previously emphasized, the concept of structure may be used in a technical and in
a more general way. Understood as rules and resources, structure is recursively implicated
in the reproduction of social systems and is wholly fundamental to structuration theory.
Used in a looser fashion, structure can be spoken of as referring to the institutionalized
features (structural properties) of societies. In both usages `structure' is a generic category
involved in each of the structural concepts given below:
structural principles: Principles of organization of societal totalities;
structures: Rule-resource sets, involved in the institutional articulation of social systems;
structural properties: Institutionalized features of social systems, stretching across time and
space.
The identifcation of structural principles, and their conjunctures in intersocietal systems,
represents the most comprehensive level of institutional analysis. That is to say, the analysis
of structural principles refers to modes of diferentiation and articulation of institutions
across the `deepest' reaches of time-space. The study
((186))
of structural sets, or structures, involves the isolating of distinct `clusterings' of
transformation/mediation relations implied in the designation of structural principles.
Structural sets are formed by the mutual convertibility of the rules and resources implicated
in social reproduction. Structures can be analytically distinguished within each of the three
dimensions of structuration, signifcation, legitimation and domination, or across these. I
have ofered elsewhere an illustration," on which I shall comment at rather greater length
here. This is the example of private property in Marx's analysis of modern capitalism.
Consider what is involved in the following structural set:
private property : oney : capital : la!our contract : profit
The structural relations indicated here mark out one of the most fundamental
transmutations involved in the emergence of capitalism and hence contribute in a
signifcant way to the overall structuration of the system. In feudalism (in my terminology,
one among other types of class-divided society) private property in the means of production
was based predominantly on ownership of land, and such ownership was hedged about with
numerous qualifcations upon alienability. In so far as these conversion relations pertained
at all, they were confned to marginal sectors of the economy. In capitalism, by contrast,
private ownership of the means of production takes on a diferent
.
form land becoming
only one type among other resources mobilized within production and a diversity of goods
becomes freely alienable. Essential to this process, Marx demonstrates, is the universalizing
of commodity form. The condition of such universalization is the development of a full-blown
money economy. Money, Marx says, is `the metamorphosed shape of all other commodities,
the result of their general alienation'.
23
Money (M) represents, on the one side, a sold
commodity (C) and, on the other, a commodity to be bought. M-C is a purchase but is at the
same time C-M, a sale: `the concluding metamorphosis of one commodity is the frst
metamorphosis of another' or, as Quesnay expressed the same thing in his Maximes
generales, `vendre est acheter.' The diferentiation of commodities into commodities and
money does not dissolve the material diferences between commodities; it develops, Marx
says, a modus vivendi, `a form in which they can exist side by side'.
24
((187))
C-M-C, the simplest form of the circulation of commodities, is the beginning point of
capital. As contrasted with the landed property of feudalism, capital frst takes the form of
money the capital of the merchant and the usurer. The frst distinction between money
and capital is simply a diference in the relation of transformation involved, expressed as M-
C-M. This formula expresses the transformation of money into commodities and of
commodities back into money in other words, buying in order to sell. Money which has
undergone this transformation has become capital. Like the other relation, M-C-M involves
two linked phases of transmutation. In the frst money is changed into a commodity; in the
second the commodity is changed back again into money. But the combination of these
phases, Marx argues, `constitutes a single moment' whereby a commodity is bought in order
to be sold. It might seem as though money has simply been exchanged for money more or
less, according to the success or otherwise of the transaction. But where money has been
transformed into capital it has gone through a `characteristic ' and original movement' quite
distinct in type from that of, say, a peasant who sells corn and uses the money thus
acquired to buy clothes. The transformations involved in M-C-M, as compared with C-M-C,
difer more than in the mere diference in the `direction' of change.
The diference is that in the C-M-C relation the money is converted into a use value,
which is then `consumed'. In the opposite form, M-C-M, the money is not spent; it is
`advanced' the secret of the transformation of money into capital. In the C-M-C form the
same element of money changes its place twice, completing the transaction. But the
contrary is the case in the M-C-M relation: in this connection it is not the money that
changes hands twice but the commodity. The transmutation of money into capital depends
upon the renewal of the operation, its `refux', which only the M-C-M relation makes
possible. M-C-M should thus more accurately be written as M-C-M', as an expansionary
process. The circulation of commodities has here become separated of from a direct
relation to use value. Capital trades not in use values but in exchange values.
M-C-M', however, can represent mercantile capital as well as industrial capital. It is
therefore only the `general formula for capital'. A further structural relation is implicated in
the development of industrial or manufacturing capital, one which,
((188))
like the altered nature of private property, presumes a major process of social change. This
further relation is the possibility of the transformation of capital into labour and vice versa,
something which presupposes a massive expropriation of workers from control of their
means of production, such that they have to ofer their labour power for sale on the market
in order to attain a livelihood. Labour power is a commodity that has the peculiar feature,
among others, of being a source of the creation of value. The capitalist labour contract is
inherently involved with the transformation of money into an equivalent of labour power.
`This relation has no natural basis, neither is its social basis one that is common to all
historical periods. It is clearly the result of a past historical development, the product of
many economic revolutions, of the extinction of a whole series of older forms of social
production.'" Thus the isolation of such a connection helps to diagnose one of the key
structural features of the novel institutional form constituted by capitalism. That labour
power is a commodity is not given in the `general formula for capital'.
The capitalist labour contract presumes that employer and worker `meet in the market' in
circumstances in which each is `formally free'. This is a basic aspect of the class relations of
capitalism. One is a buyer of labour power, the other a seller. The `owner' of labour power
sells it only for a defnite period, as does the employer who `takes on' labour. Slavery, in
which some persons are owned by others, does not permit the commodifcation of labour
power. The value of labour power, in common with that of other commodities, is governed by
the labour time involved in its production and therefore by what is demanded to ensure the
physical survival of those who supply labour. The transformation of the hire of labour power
into proft, of course, is dependent upon the generation of surplus value. `Necessary labour
time' is that given over to the sustaining of the source of labour power, the worker; surplus
labour is the source of proft.
((189))
.here is no definite cut6off point 4et+een the three le$els of a4straction distinguished in the a4o$e
diagram. .he specification of structural sets, as indicated pre$iously, is of 4asic importance to the
ela4oration of o$erall structural principles, 4ut the one tas9 o4$iously merges into the other. .he same
holds for the lo+est le$el of a4straction, the isolating of elements or a5es of structuration.
Aistinguishing elements of structuration preser$es the epoche of institutional analysis, 4ut 4rings the
le$el of study closer to the direct e5amination of relations of co6presence. In order to preser$e
continuity +ith the preceding discussion, let me follo+ through #ar5!s discussion in respect of a ma<or
feature of capitalist production, the di$ision of la4our. It is an analysis +ith +hich I am largely in
accord, although my main purpose here is an illustrati$e one.
2
.he di$ision of la4our, #ar5 see9s to sho+, is closely 4ound up +ith the nature of manufacture and
therefore +ith the structural relations portrayed in the foregoing paragraphs of this chapter. .he
di$ision of la4our lin9s the 4roader structural characteristics of capitalism, as identified pre$iously,
+ith the more pro5imate organi>ation of the industrial enterprise. #anufacture, a pre6eminent feature
of capitalism that has ad$anced 4eyond commerce, is associated +ith t+o modes of the emergence of
+or9shops. Ene is the assem4ling, under the control of a particular employer, of +or9ers +ith
different craft s9ills in a specific locale. .hese are co6ordinated in the ma9ing of a single product. 3ut
such co6ordination tends also progressi$ely to strip a+ay aspects of the s9ills originally possessed 4y
+or9ers, leading to the splitting up of tas9s into 'detailed! processes, 'each of +hich crystalli>es into
the e5clusi$e function of a particular +or9man, the manufacture, as a +hole, 4eing carried on 4y the
men in con<unction!.
22
8 second +ay in +hich manufacture arises is something of the re$erse of this.
It is the assem4ling +ithin one locale of a num4er of +or9ers +ho all do the same tas9, each +or9er
ma9ing the entire commodity. 0o+e$er, 'e5ternal circumstances!, #ar5 says, lead to changes in much
the same direction as those occurring in the first type of setting. @a4our is therefore redistri4uted=
instead of +or9ers all occupied in the same +ay side 4y side, operations 4ecome 4ro9en do+n into
detailed tas9s, organi>ed in a co6operati$e fashion. .he final form is thus the same in 4oth cases 'a
producti$e mechanism +hose parts are human 4eings!.
28
((190))
.he detailed di$ision of la4our is of ma<or importance to the organi>ation of the capitalist enterprise
in se$eral +ays. It enhances the opportunities for direct sur$eillance of the +or96force and the
consolidation of la4our discipline. 3ut it also 4oth e5presses and ma9es possi4le the connection of
la4our, as la4our po+er, +ith the technology of machine production. ;or the 'detail la4ourer! carries
out a circumscri4ed num4er of repetiti$e operations that can 4e co6ordinated +ith the mo$ements of
mechani>ed production processes. Ai$ision of la4our +ithin the enterprise is not simply an aspect or
e5tension of the di$ision of la4our outside, the 'di$ision of la4our in society!, 4ut these none the less
react upon one another. .he 'di$ision of la4our in society! depends upon the purchase and sale of
products of different sectors of industry= the di$ision of la4our +ithin the enterprise deri$es from the
sale of the la4our po+er of a plurality of +or9ers to an employer +ho applies it in a co6ordinated
fashion.
Ai$ision of la4our +ithin the +or9shop implies the undisputed authority of the capitalist o$er
men, that are 4ut parts of a mechanism that 4elongs to him. .he di$ision of la4our +ithin the
society 4rings into contact independent commodity6producers, +ho ac9no+ledge no other
authority 4ut that of competition.... It is $ery characteristic F#ar5 adds causticallyG that the
enthusiastic apologists of the factory system ha$e nothing more damning to urge against a
general organi>ation of the la4our of society than that it +ould turn all society into one immense
factory.
2-
.o analyse the di$ision of la4our in this +ay is to elucidate an a5is of structuration connecting the
internal form of the enterprise +ith 4roader aspects of the societal totality, indicating at the same time
contrasts +ith the 'di$ision of la4our in society!. Ef course, these relations could 4e spelled out in $ery
much greater detail. In institutional analysis this in$ol$es detailing the transformationHmediation
relations implicated in the 'clustering! of institutionali>ed practices across space and time. 0o+e$er,
once +e a4andon the epoche of institutional analysis, all the structural relations indicated a4o$e, at
+hate$er le$el, ha$e to 4e e5amined as conditions of system reproduction. .hey help to pic9 out 4asic
features. of the circuits of reproduction implicated in the 'stretching! of institutions across space and
time. 8nalysing circuits of reproduction, it should 4e clear, is not e/ui$alent to
((1"1))
identifying the sources of social stability alone. They serve indeed to indicate some of the
main forms of change involved in the transition from one type of societal totality to another.
What `must happen' for certain conditions of system reproduction to occur is posed as a
counterfactual question, not as a covert version of functionalism.
A reproduction circuit can be sketched in diagrammatic form (see fgure 11):
#i$ure 11
The reintroduction of the duality of structure means leaving the virtual time-space of
institutional analysis, thereby re-entering `history'. All structural properties of social
systems, to repeat a leading theme of structuration theory, are the medium and outcome of
the contingently accomplished activities of situated actors. The refexive monitoring of action
in situations of co-presence is the main anchoring feature of social integration, but both the
conditions and the outcomes of situated interaction stretch far beyond those situations as
such. The mechanisms of `stretching' are variable but in modern societies tend to involve
refexive monitoring itself. That is to say, understanding the conditions of system
reproduction becomes part of those conditions of system reproduction as such.
We can trace these observations through more concretely by returning to the structural
set discussed previously. The two opposed but complementary transformations C-M and M-
C occur, of course, only through the activities of buyers and sellers acting in a range of
divergent settings. According to Marx, the C-M-C relation brings into co-relation three
`dramatis personae'. The owner of a commodity comes into contact with a possessor of money,
the money becoming, Marx's words, `its transient
((1"2))
e/ui$alent6form!. #oney, the 'final term of the first transmutation!, is the origin of the third, the 4uying
of another commodity.
,0
3ut as #ar5 e5presses it, this is unsatisfactory. ;or structural relations are
not isomorphic to the acts of corresponding indi$iduals +ho personify them. It is in <ust such
tendencies of #ar5!s argument that one can see +here 8lthusser deri$es te5tual corro4oration for the
$ie+ that human agents are no more than 'supports! for modes of production. #oreo$er, it is also easy
to see ho+ such a style of analysis slips o$er into functionalism. ;or if the relations 4et+een structural
properties, once isolated, are treated as ha$ing their o+n inner dynamics!, as functional necessities
rather than as continually reproduced conditions, the acti$ities of historically situated indi$iduals do
indeed seem rather redundant. .he o$erall conditions of system reproduction are in no +ay
'guaranteed! 4y the structural relations upon +hich (counter6factually) they depend. Nor does
analysing those relations in $irtual time6space e5plain in any +ay +hy they came a4out. .his means
that it is highly important to shift conceptual gears +hen mo$ing from such analysis to the study of the
conditions of system reproduction.
3y circuits of reproduction I mean fairly clearly defined 'trac9s! of processes +hich feed 4ac9 to
their source, +hether or not such feed4ac9 is refle5i$ely monitored 4y agents in specific social
positions. Bhen #ar5 uses the term 'circuits of capital! he seems to ha$e something of this sort in
mind= ho+e$er, I +ant to refer to actual conditions of social reproduction, +hile #ar5 sometimes uses
the term in reference to +hat I ha$e called structural sets. %eproduction circuits can al+ays usefully 4e
e5amined in terms of the regionali>ation of locales. .here is no harm in thin9ing of such circuits as
ha$ing something in common +ith electronic circuits, +hich can 4e traced out in a $isual display C
the graphic techni/ues of time6geography, in fact, might 4e rele$ant here. .he reproduction circuits
associated +ith the #6C6#! set C as #ar5 himself ma9es clear C actually depend upon $ast
processes of change not <ust +ithin societies 4ut on an international scale. .he concentration of the
population in ne+ly e5panding (and internally transformed) ur4an areas is one of these processes of
change. Ethers concern the nature of the +or9place. 3ut as important as any of these is the
mechani>ation of transportation, the tremendous e5pansion of means of communication from the late
eighteenth century on+ards and the de$elopment of
((1"3))
electronic communication dating from the in$ention of the #orse Code.
Contradiction
It is commonly remar9ed that the concept of contradiction should remain a logical one rather than
4eing applied to social analysis. Ene can indeed see considera4le <ustification for such a <udgement
4ecause the term is often employed so $aguely that it has no particular connection +ith contradiction
in logic. 1i$en that it is used +ith some care, ho+e$er, I thin9 the concept to 4e an indispensa4le one
in social theory. I propose to use it in t+o senses that of 'e5istential contradiction! and that of
!structural contradiction!. )ach preser$es some continuity +ith the logical usage of the term +hile not
4eing a direct e5tension of that usage.
3y e5istential contradiction I refer to an elemental aspect of human e5istence in relation to nature
or the material +orld. .here is, one might say, an antagonism of opposites at the $ery heart of the
human condition, in the sense that life is predicated upon nature, yet is not of nature and is set off
against it. 0uman 4eings emerge from the 'nothingness! of inorganic nature and disappear 4ac9 into
that alien state of the inorganic. .his might seem to 4e an una4ashedly religious theme and as such to
4e the proper pro$ince of theology rather than social science. 3ut I thin9 it to he in fact of great
analytical interest, although I shall not attempt to de$elop that contention here.
"tructural contradiction refers to the constituti$e features of human societies. I suggest that
structural principles operate in contradiction. Bhat I mean 4y this is that structural principles operate
in terms of one another 4ut yet also contra$ene each other.: 'Contradiction! in this sense can 4e
further di$ided into t+o. 3y primary contradictions I refer to those +hich enter into the constitution
of societal totalities= 4y secondary contradictions I mean those +hich are dependent upon, or are
4rought into 4eing 4y, primary contradictions. I do not intend 4y these simply an a4stract series of
distinctions= they ha$e to 4e related to the study of the societal types descri4ed a4o$e. .he concept of
structural contradiction has reference to a specific characteri>ation of the state. )5cept in the case of
tri4al society, the state is regarded as the focus (although not as such also the origin) of
((1"4))
primary structural contradiction.
Ef the three types of society I ha$e distinguished, tri4al societies e5ist in closest relation to nature.
3y this I do not refer to their technological de$elopment, or at least not to that alone. In tri4al
societies human 4eings li$e closely +ith each other in conditions of co6presence and +ithin the
rhythms of nature in their day6to6day conduct, 4ut they also integrate the natural +orld cogniti$ely
!
+
ith their acti$ities. ;rom the point of $ie+ of ci$ili>ations C especially that of the modern Best C
this is something to 4e seen only negati$ely, a failure to rise to a higher le$el on a cogniti$e scale.
@e$i6"trauss e5presses this $ery +ell +hen he comments '8nthropology, +e are apt to say . . . is
concerned +ith societies that are non6ci$ili>ed, without a system of +riting, and pre- or non6industrial
in type.! In some respects, ho+e$er, it is 'modern! sAcieties that should 4e defined in negati$e terms.
Eur relations +ith one another are no+ only occasionally and fragmentarily 4ased upon 'generis
e5perience!, the 'concrete :apprehension: of cne person 4y another!.
,2
.he mythic '+orld $ie+! and
the modes cf representation that it employs ser$e to esta4lish homologies 4et+een natural and social
conditions or, more accurately, ma9e it possi4le to e/uate significant contrasts found on different
planes the 'geographical, meteorological, >oological, 4otanical, technical, economic, social, ritual,
religious and philosophical!.:
#yths mediate e5istential contradiction cogniti$ely. .hat is to say, in myth themes of incest, of
se5uality, of life and death are e5plored and 'e5plicated! for those +ho tell them and those +ho listen
to them. If tri4al societies are cold cultures C cultures +hich are not caught up in a flu5 of change to
+hich their institutions are geared C it is not 4ecause they are poorly 'adapted! to nature, as
e$olutionary theories +ould ha$e it. En the contrary, it is 4ecause those institutions intermingle +ith
nature in an immediate and em4racing fashion. )5istential contradiction is directly e5pressed, as it
+ere, in those institutions )y $irtue of the 9ey role of 9inship and of tradition. Iinship elations are the
main format around +hich that 'concrete !apprehension:! of indi$iduals of +hich @e$i6"trauss spea9s
is 4uilt. .hey are also the means +here4y life is produced C or, in he original sense of the term,
reproduced. .radition, on the ether hand, is the source of the in<ection of moral meaning into the
re$ersi4le time of day6to6day life= immersed in it, the finitude
((1"5))
of indi$idual e5istence is interpolated +ithin a dimension of moral timelessness. .here is no need to
portray such circumstances of social life as a %ousseauian idyll= the point is that +hether pastoral and
4ucolic life 'red in tooth and cla+!, or in oral cultures e5presses directly the pro5imity of humanity
and nature.
T%&'() S*C&+T, Pre-einence of e.istential contra/iction
(*ral cultures) (!sence of state
C)(SS-0&1&0+0 S*C&+T, Structural contra/iction2e.istential contra/iction State for: city2countrysi/e relation
C)(SS S*C&+T, Pre-einence of structural contra/iction
(Capitalis) State for: nation-state
.ri4al cultures are segmented in character. .hat is to say, they consist of multiple centres of high
presence a$aila4ility, in +hich the 4oundaries 4et+een different !societies! are usually not clearly
mar9ed. In such decentred systems structural contradiction is none5istent. )5istential contradiction
traces out the contours of the natural +orld. "tructural contradiction is signalled 4y the rise of the
state, +hich is in turn associated a4o$e all +ith the formation of cities. I do not mean to say that the
state is simply 4ased !in! the city. %ather, cities are po+er containers +hich, in con<unction +ith their
relations to the countryside, generate the structural ne5us of the state form. )5istential contradiction
is +ea9ened 4y the introduction of structural contradiction 4ut not dissol$ed altogether. .he city is a
milieu alien to that of nature and therefore helps to foster attitudes and sym4olic systems discrepant
from those that ally themsel$es +ith natural elements and e$ents. .he city +all may sym4olically
and materially seal off the ur4an milieu from the outside. 3ut traditional cities could e5ist only
through their transactions +ith their agrarian hinter6lands. .heir internal layout and architecture still
maintained close connections +ith the natural en$ironment, usually in con<unction +ith traditionally
esta4lished sym4ols. In traditional cities, as has 4een mentioned pre$iously, the distri4ution of areas
and the alignment of 4uildings often e5pressed sacred cosmological distinctions.
I do not propose to offer a discussion of the state or the origins of state po+er here.! "uffice it to say
that I hold the 'early state!
((196))
to 4e a contradictory formation in the follo+ing sense. .he state, e5pressing the cityCcountryside
relation, represents a ne+ type of structural principle that is counter to the old +hile still depending on
it. .he sym4ioticHantagonistic relation of city and countryside is the specific form of this structural
contradiction. 8s po+er containers, cities generate potential dynamism of a no$el type in 'history!.
.hat is to say, they 4rea9 +ith the 'ahistorical! character of cold cultures. In classCdi$ided societies
'economy! is typically not clearly distinct from 'polity!, and the sense in +hich the state lodges claims
to represent the society as a +hole is minimal. "tate po+er has not lost its connection +ith e5istential
contradiction and is sym4oli>ed in persistently religious form. .he state may ha$e escaped from
tradition in the sense of 4eing a4le to inno$ate through the use of consolidated po+er. 3ut it must none
the less continually yield to tradition in another +ay, 4ecause traditional 4eliefs and practices retain
their hold e$ery+here outside the main centres of concentration of state agencies. In so far as the
po+er of the state depends upon sur$eillance, this is centred primarily in the physical locales of the
agencies of state palace, temples and administrati$e 4uildings.
.he emergence of state64ased societies also alters the scope and pace of 'history! 4y stimulating
secondary contradictions. "tates 4ring into 4eing, or at least greatly accentuate, social relations across
considera4le reaches of time and space. .hat is to say, at the same time as they generate and
consolidate centrali>ed po+er, 'dra+ing in! $arious aspects of social acti$ity +ithin their scope, states
stimulate the de$elopment of other ties and interconnections +hich cut across the social and territorial
realms o$er +hich they claim so$ereignty. "tructural contradiction in this conte5t concerns the
so$ereignty of the state o$er a gi$en territorial area, +hich is antagonistic to and yet depends upon
processes that cut across that sphere of <urisdiction and in$ol$e different mechanisms. .hese include
e5ternal relations +ith other states 4ut also the e5istence of cross6cutting trading enterprises, religious
groups, intellectual communities and so on.
.he secondary contradictions associated +ith the formation of modern nation6states, +hose
de$elopment is intert+ined +ith that of industrial capitalism as a mode of economic enterprise, are
su4stantially different from those of pre$ious eras. .he connection 4et+een capitalism and the nation6
state, I ha$e argued
((197))
elsewhere," is not merely a fortuitous one. Nation-states, to express the matter in an
oversimplifed way, are the new power containers that replace cities. The transformation of
the citycountryside relation through the emergence of `created environments'
exemplifed by, but not limited to, the `built environment' of modern urbanism is part and
parcel of the formation of the nation-state. The transmuted character of space and of time is
essential to both the political formation of the state and the diferentiated `economy'. Such a
process of transmutation severs structural from existential contradiction, and the former
now becomes pre-eminent over the latter. Put in less wordy fashion, this means that human
social organization no longer has any symmetry with nature; nature becomes a means to the
expansion of production. The suppression of existential questions and problems is not, and
cannot be, wholly complete. Indeed, they are fundamental to the structural contradictions
introduced by capitalism and are part of what gives them their peculiarly explosive
potential.'
The primary contradiction of the capitalist (nation-)state is to be found in the mode in
which a `private' sphere of `civil society' is created by, but is separate from and in tension
with, the `public' sphere of the state. It is a mistake to suppose that civil society is everything
that lies outside the scope of the state, if that is taken to mean institutions which precede,
and are not incorporated within, the realm of state power. The origins of the modern state
are also the origins of the sphere of civil society so I wish to claim at any rate, although I
shall leave it here as a bald assertion. Civil society is the sector within which capital
accumulation occurs, fuelled by the mechanisms of price, proft and investment in labour
and commodity markets. I therefore take the contra-diction between civil society and state to
be at least roughly parallel to the classical formulation of the capitalist contradiction
between `private appropriation' and `socialized production'. The capitalist state, as a
`socializing' centre representing the power of the community at large, is dependent upon
mechanisms of production and reproduction which it helps to bring into being but which are
set of from and antagonistic to it.
Secondary contradiction in the novel global order ushered in by the advent of modern
capitalism is concentrated upon the tension between the internationalizing of capital (and of
capital-
((1"8))
istic mechanisms as a +hole) and the internal consolidation of nation6states. It is pro4a4ly 4ecause
these push in different directions that most schools of social theory ha$e seen the connections
4et+een capitalism and the nation6state as no more than an accident of history. .he dominant trend in
social thought, in fact, has tended to see nation6states as little more than epiphenomena of, or as mere
impediments to, the natural propensity of capitalist production to dissol$e political and cultural
differences. It is not hard to detect the origins of this type of $ie+ in nineteenth6century social
thought. .hey lie in classical political economy and in its main opponent, #ar5ism. ;or 4oth, in spite
of their ma<or di$ergencies in other respects, economic relationships disclose the true origin of
political formations, and it is economic change +hich is the leading source of transforming the
modern +orld. .his $ie+ fails to see that the separation of the 'economic!, as a sphere of continued
and rapid change, has as its necessary condition the po+er of the modern state. .he modern state is
intrinsically, not <ust contingently, a nation6state, e5isting in a +orld of other nation6states.
Bhat is the relation, analytically e5pressed, 4et+een contra6diction and conflict, since the t+o
terms are often used in the same 4reath?
Conflict Stru$$le !et3een actors or collectivities e.presse/ as /efinite social practices
(Structural) 0is4unction of structural principles
contra/iction of syste or$ani5ation
3y conflict I mean actual struggle 4et+een actors or groups, ho+e$er such struggle may 4e carried on
or through +hate$er sources it may 4e mo4ili>ed. Bhereas contradiction is a structural concept,
conflict is not. Conflict and contradiction tend to coincide 4ecause contradiction e5presses the main
'fault lines! in the structural constitution of societal systems. .he reason for this coincidence is that
contradictions tend to in$ol$e di$isions of interest 4et+een different groupings or categories of people
(including classes 4ut not limited to them). Contradictions e5press di$ergent modes of life and
distri4utions of life chances in relation to possi4le +orlds +hich the actual +orld discloses as
immanent. If contradiction does not ine$ita4ly 4reed conflict, it is 4ecause
((199))
the conditions under +hich actors not only are a+are of their interests 4ut are 4oth a4le and moti$ated
to act on them are +idely $aria4le. It is right to say, for e5ample, that the e5istence of class di$ision
presumes opposition of interest (as +ell as common interests). 3ut the conditions under +hich class
conflict occurs are certainly not to 4e inferred directly from this o4ser$ation. .hus in agrarian states or
class6di$ided societies conflict 4et+een dominant and su4ordinate classes is relati$ely rare= this is
mainly 4ecause there is $ery little contact 4et+een them +hich +ould supply the conte5ts in +hich
conflict could actually occur.
,2
8ccording to the conceptions I ha$e outlined a4o$e, the pre6eminence of e5istential contradiction is
characteristic of those societies immersed in traditionally sanctioned re$ersi4le time C societies +hich
'ha$e no history!. .he emergence of structural contradiction (the origins of +hich I am not concerned
to try to e5plain here) 'heats up! processes of social change. 3ut it is only +ith the de$elopment of
modern capitalism that such processes 4ecome '+hite6hot!. Compared +ith the modern +orld, +ith its
e5traordinary rates of prolonged social transformation, traditional empires and other types of state
appear to 4e mar9ed 4y an a4sence of change rather than the re$erse. Bhat #ar5 too9 to 4e
characteristic of the '8siatic mode of production!, and rather contemptuously referred to as social and
economic stagnation, is in fact a distinguishing feature of all large6scale agrarian societies of +hate$er
9ind. 8s one o4ser$er has remar9ed, it is the 'relati$ely o$er+helming a4sence of ma<or social and
economic change! that characteri>es the $ariant forms of society that e5isted across the face of +orld
history until some t+o or three centuries ago.
,8
#a9ing 0istory
I shall distinguish t+o main types of collecti$ity according to the form of the relations that enter into
their reproduction. I shall call these associations and organizations, and I shall separate them from
social movements. In associations, as in all social systems, social reproduction occurs in and through
the regulari>ed conduct of 9no+ledgea4le agents. .he settings of interaction in +hich routine
encounters occur are refle5i$ely monitored 4y
((266))
their constituent actors in the reproduction of mutually lin9ed role relationships. 3ut +hile such
monitoring is the condition of their reproduction, it does not ta9e the form of an acti$e attempt to
control or to alter the circumstances of reproduction. .here tends to 4e a close connection 4et+een
traditional modes of legitimacy and the pre$alence of associations. .radition is more than a particular
form of the e5perience of temporality= it represents the moral command of '+hat +ent 4efore! o$er the
continuity of day6to6day life. It is a mista9e to suppose that tradition, e$en in the coldest of cold
cultures, is +holly refractory to change or to di$ersification of conduct. "hils!s characteri>ation of
tradition is pro4a4ly $ery apt. .radition is li9e 'the mo$ement of raindrops on a +indo+pane. . . . 8
+a$ering stream of +ater slipping do+n+ard at an angle, comes into contact +ith another stream
mo$ing at a different angle. .hey fuse into a single stream for a 4rief moment, +hich then 4rea9s into
t+o streams, each of +hich might 4rea9 apart again, if the +indo+ pane is large enough and the rain
hea$y enough.!
,-
Bhat the metaphor does not carry, ho+e$er, is the $ery aspect of tradition +hich
grounds the routine in 'traditional societies!. In this respect @e$i6"trauss is surely right to emphasi>e
that tradition is the medium of the re$ersi4le time lin9ing the duree of daily life +ith that of the longue
duree of institutions.
.he distinction 4et+een associations on the one side and organi>ations and social mo$ements on the
other coincides +ith a distinction in modes of reproduction that I dre+ in the first chapter.
Ergani>ations and social mo$ements are collecti$ities in +hich the refle5i$e regulation of the
conditions of system reproduction looms large in the continuity of day6to6day practices. Ergani>ations
and social mo$ements are characteristically found in segments of class6di$ided societies C and,
indeed, in some degree mar9 their separation from tri4al societies. ;or refle5i$e self6regulation, as a
property of collecti$ities, depends upon the collation of information +hich can 4e controlled so as to
influence the circumstances of social reproduction. Information control, in turn, depends upon
information storage of a 9ind distinct from that a$aila4le in indi$idual recollection, in myths or story6
telling or in the practical consciousness of 'li$ed tradition!. .he in$ention of +riting, the prime mode
of the collation and storage of information in class6di$ided societies, mar9s a radical dis<uncture
((261))
in history. .his is true not only 4ecause the forms of storage and retrie$al of information generated 4y
+riting allo+ an e5pansion of time6space distanciation 4ut also 4ecause the nature of 'tradition!
4ecomes altered, changing the sense in +hich human 4eings li$e in! history. Class6di$ided societies
ha$e al+ays maintained. a strongly traditional foundation, especially outside the relati$ely restricted
sphere of cities. .he +or9s of philosophers of pre6Ch!in China concei$ed of the intersection of past
and present as a mo4ile relation, in +hich not only does 'present! penetrate into 'past! and $ice $ersa
4ut also history is 'flat! rather than linear. .hat is to say, it runs laterally rather than '4ac9+ards! into
time. @ife +as represented as go$erned 4y the li, or traditional rituals, continuously transmitted.
8ccording to 0sun .>u, '*ast and present are the same. .hings that are the same in 9ind, though
e5tended o$er a long period, continue to ha$e the self6same principle.!
40
None the less, the
introduction of +riting means that tradition 4ecomes $isi4le as 'tradition!, a specific +ay, among
others, of doing things. '.radition! +hich is 9no+n as such is no longer a time6honoured 4asis of
custom 4ut a discursi$e phenomenon open to interrogation.
"o far as 'history! is concerned, it is +orth +hile at this point to return to #ar5!s dictum that human
4eings 'ma9e history!. It +as not merely +himsical to as9 earlier +hat it is that is 'made! here, as the
de4ate 4et+een "artre and @e$i6"trauss sho+s. 8ll human 4eings li$e in history in the sense that their
li$es unfold in time, 4ut this they share in common +ith all things e5tant. 8s refle5i$ely founded
practice, human society is distinct from that of the animals, 4ut this in and of itself hardly e5plains
+hat 'history! is or +hat there is that is specific to human history. .o suggest that a response to these
issues has to 4e historical contains no parado5 4ecause, of course, 'history! trades on t+o meanings
the occurrence of e$ents in the elapsing of time and the chronicling or e5plication of those e$ents.
.he fact that today +e tend to elide the t+o senses is e5pressi$e of some 9ey features of the
contemporary era and again indicates +hat e5traordinary comple5ities underlie the innocent
proposition that human 4eings 'ma9e history!. ;or its elucidation presumes a philosophical account of
time. Be return here to some of the matters upon +hich I touched in the $ery first sections of this
4oo9 in relation to structuration theory.
((262))
@e$i6"trauss!s analysis of !sa$age thought! percepti$ely identifies some of the rele$ant /uestions. In
Totemism he sho+s a parallel 4et+een 3ergson!s concept of duree and ideas !common to all the
"iou5, from the Esage in the south to the Aa9ota in the north, according to +hich things and 4eings
are nothing 4ut materiali>ed forms of creati$e continuity!.
41
3ergson!s attempt to formulate a
philosophy of time, li9e the more po+erful notions of 0eidegger, can 4e seen as an endea$our to
escape from the !linear! or !unitary! $ie+ of time e5pressed in the +orld $ie+ of modern Bestern
culture. 3ergson +ants to apprehend duree as fusing the continuous and the discontinuous, the order
of differences that actually constitutes !reality!. "imilarly, in the cosmology of the "iou5, as one song
descri4es it
)$erything as it mo$es, no+ and then, here and there, ma9es stops. .he 4ird as it flies stops in
one place to ma9e its nest and in another to rest in its flight. 8 man +hen he goes forth stops
+hen he +ills. "o the god has stopped. .he sun, +hich is so 4right and 4eautiful, is one place
+here he has stopped. .he moon, the stars, the minds, he has 4een +ith. .he trees, the animals,
are all +here
he has stopped. ...
4
!6
In this $ersion of !history!, as the e5plication of e$ents, time is associated not +ith social change 4ut
+ith repetition, not +ith the capa4ility of human 4eings to transform the +orld or themsel$es 4ut +ith
their in$ol$ement in nature.
If !history!, in the phrase human 4eings 'ma9e history! means the con<unction of a linear $ie+ of
time +ith the idea that, through e5panding the 9no+ledge of their past, agents can change their future,
it is a conception that 4egins no earlier than Jico. Indeed, Jico!s +ritings might 4e seen as 4ridging an
older understanding of time and continuity and a ne+er, emergent one. .hus in a cele4rated passage C
/uoted and endorsed 4y .hompson
4,
C Jico asserts
It is true that men ha$e themsel$es made this +orld of nations, although not in full cogni>ance of
the outcomes of their acti$ities, for this +orld +ithout dou4t has issued from a mind often
di$erse, at times /uite contrary, and al+ays superior to the particular ends that men had proposed
to themsel$es. . . . .hat +hich did all this +as mind, for men did it +ith intelligence= it +as not
fate, for they did it 4y choice= not chance, for the results of their al+ays so acting are perpetually
the same.
44
((263))
.hompson is no dou4t correct to see in this an anticipation of #ar5, as many others ha$e done. 3ut
regarding Jico as a direct forerunner of #ar5 means ignoring features of his thought +hich preser$e a
di$ergent $ie+ of time and of 'e5perience!. .hompson casually dismisses +hat he calls 'Jico!s o+n
attempt to attri4ute to process a cyclical intelligi4ility!, concentrating instead upon 'his super4
e5pression of process! arguing, 'this is the point from +hich all sustained historical thought must
start.!
4(
3ut 'cyclical intelligi4ility! is fundamental to Jico!s $ie+s, and it is only relati$ely recent
'historical thought! that has ta9en as its point of departure 'history as process!.
#odern organi>ations and social mo$ements operate in a social +orld in +hich the retreat of the
gods and the dissol$ing of tradition create the conditions in +hich refle5i$e self6regulation is
manifested as history C and as sociology. .he modern era, dominated 4y the rise of capitalism in the
Best o$er a slim period of a fe+ centuries, is one mar9ed 4y the pre$alence of historicity, a+areness
of the 'progressi$e mo$ement! of society shaped 4y that $ery a+areness, the 'feeling for +orld
history! of +hich "pengler +rote. .he collation, analysis and retrie$al of information that 4oth
stimulates and e5presses historicity is made possi4le, first, 4y the de$elopment of printing and mass
literacy and, second, 4y the in$ention of electronic media of communication. )ach e5pands time6
space distanciation 4y an 'alienation! of communication in circumstances of co6presence. 8ny +ritten
te5t 4ecomes distanciated from its author= printing is for the most part a /uantitati$e e5tension of such
distanciation. )lectronic media separate presence in time from presence in space, a phenomenon of
decisi$e significance for contemporary forms of collecti$ity.
Ergani>ations and social mo$ements are +hat .ouraine calls 'decision6ma9ing units
!
,
4&
utili>ing
certain typical forms of resources (authoritati$e and allocati$e) +ithin discursi$ely mo4ili>ed forms
of information flo+. .he study of social mo$ements has 4een distinctly under6represented +ithin the
social sciences as compared +ith the $ast literature gi$en o$er to the numerous $ying ela4orations of
'organi>ation theory!. .here seems little <ustification for this in a century in +hich re$olutions and the
clash of ri$al doctrines oriented to+ards radical social change ha$e 4een so prominent, and one must
agree that .ouraine and others are right to claim that the notions of organi>ation and social
((204))
mo$ement are of e/ui$alent importance in the modern era. "ocial mo$ements can 4e conceptually
differentiated from population mo$ements, migrations, etc., precisely 4ecause they suppose a high
degree of refle5i$e self6regulation. "ocial mo$ements can 4e cogently defined as 'collecti$e
enterprises to esta4lish a ne+ order of life!.
42
Knli9e organi>ations, social mo$ements do not
characteristically operate +ithin fi5ed locales, and positioning +ithin them does not ha$e the clarity of
definition associated +ith 'roles!.
Cohn!s characteri>ation of millenarian mo$ements in medie$al )urope helps to indicate some of the
distincti$e elements of social mo$ements in the modern period. 8s descri4ed 4y Cohn, millenarian
mo$ements are inspired 4y the phantasy of a sal$ation +hich is to 4e
a)
collective, in the sense that it is to be enjoyed by the faithful as a group;
b)
terrestrial, in the sense that it is to be realized on this earth and not in some otherworldly
heaven;
c)
imminent, in the sense that it is to come both soon and suddenly;
d)
total, in the sense that it is utterly to transform life on earth, so that the new dispensation will
be no mere improvement on the present but perfection itself;
e)
accomplished by agencies which are consciously regarded as supernatural.''
D
Cohn!s +or9 has 4een cited so often that some caution is necessary against o$er6generali>ation on
the 4asis of it. Not all medie$al social mo$ements can readily 4e descri4ed in terms of the a4o$e
features, and, of course, millennarianism does not disappear +ith the closing of the #iddle 8ges. 3ut
+e can say +ith some confidence that most latter6day social mo$ements differ from all these
characteristics of millennarianism, +ith the e5ception of the second and, not infre/uently, the third.
4-
#odern social mo$ements are almost e5clusi$ely this6+orldly and are in$aria4ly oppositional in
character. .hey are situated in the same 'fields of historicity! as the organi>ations and associations they
confront.
.he la4our mo$ement may not pro$ide the solution to 'the riddle of history!, as #ar5 foresa+. 3ut it
is in certain +ays
((265))
prototypical of contemporary social mo$ements. In the circuit of capitalist reproduction discussed
earlier 'la4our po+er! appears as a commodity, to 4e 'translated! into other commodities. 0o+e$er,
la4our po+er, of course, is not a commodity li9e any other. @a4our mo$ements ha$e their origin in the
forms of 'defensi$e control! +here4y +or9ers see9 to achie$e some measure of mastery o$er
circumstances in +hich they are denied rights of participation in decisions that affect them. In so far as
la4our mo$ements ha$e 4een infused +ith socialism, and more particularly +ith #ar5ism, they
incorporate historicity in a direct fashion into the scope of their acti$ities. @a4our mo$ements ha$e
4een animated 4y much the same ne5us of ideas as the capitalist organi>ations against +hich they ha$e
4een pitted. Bhether reformist or re$olutionary, such mo$ements ha$e 4een concerned to foster,
although in an egalitarian fashion, those $ery forces of production +hich their opponents see9 to
de$elop through the accumulation of capital. 0ere, ho+e$er, is +here the la4our mo$ement ceases to
e5emplify modern social mo$ements in general. ;or #ar5 it +as to carry the 4urden of a general
reformation of the societal totality, acting in the general interest against the sectional interests
e5pressed 4y class di$isions. .he limits of this $ision ha$e 4ecome increasingly apparent, not only
4ecause of the failure of the proletariat to ma9e the re$olution,
(0
nor e$en 4ecause of the tendency to
reduce all sectional interests to class interests, 4ut e5actly 4ecause of an unco$ering of the historical
roots of historicity itself. Eur era is one +hich entertains radical dou4ts a4out the accomplishments of
enlightenment guided 4y science and 4y technological inno$ation, one in +hich historicity loses its
erst+hile un/uestioned pre6eminence.
In a similar +ay the capitalist enterprise is in some respects 4oth typical of modern organi>ations
and one of the main sources of inno$ation generating the circumstances in +hich they ha$e arisen. 8s
analysed 4y #ar5, capitalism is a mode of production in +hich refle5i$e self6regulation +ithin the
enterprise C a phenomenon clarified 4y Be4er!s demonstration of the significance of dou4le6entry
4oo969eeping to the capitalist firm C is not matched 4y refle5i$e control o$er economic life as a
+hole. 0o+e$er, as Be4er has again done more than anyone else to ma9e clear, refle5i$e self6
regulation gains momentum in many sectors of social life. 0erein lies one of the most profound issues
((266))
which faces us today. Is the expansion of a diversity of diferent forms of organization in
which the conditions of reproduction are refexively monitored a medium of emancipation
from pre-established modes of exploitative domination? There is no doubt that Marx believed
such to be the case in the context of his anticipation of the revolutionary overthrow of
capitalism by socialism. But Marx's critics and adversaries, from Weber to Foucault, have
provided more than good cause to treat this basic tenet of Marxism with caution, if not with
outright scepticism.
Critical Notes: !tructural !ociology and "ethodological In
di#idualism
3lau a Jersion of "tructural "ociology
.here are strong connections 4et+een an emphasis upon a 'structural approach!, as used 4y those
+riting outside traditions of structuralism, and o4<ecti$ism in the social sciences. "ome motifs
continually crop up in the +or9s of those +ho regard themsel$es as ta9ing such an approach. .hese
include particularly the Aur9heimian ideas that 'societies are more than the sum of their constituent
indi$iduals! and (a conception I ha$e already critici>ed) that structural properties are /ualities of
social systems +hich are to 4e defined solely in terms of their constraining influence o$er actors.
'"tructural approaches! also tend to stress endurance in time and e5tension in space. "tructures are
'supra6indi$idual! in the sense that they outli$e the indi$idual agent and spread +ell 4eyond the scope
of the acti$ity of indi$idual agents.!L .hese considerations o4$iously o$erlap considera4ly +ith
themes of my preceding discussion in this 4oo9. 3ut something of an epistemological element is often
in$ol$ed too. ;or it is fre/uently held, or assumed, that to e5amine structural features of social
acti$ity is to demonstrate causal influences o$er human conduct a9in to those +hich operate in nature.
.hus Ballace identifies the 'crucial difference! 4et+een +hat he calls 'social structuralist theory!
and 'social actionist theory! in the follo+ing +ay 'social structuralist theory treats purposi$eness and
other su4<ecti$e orientational factors as at least secondary and at most F?G irrele$ant in e5plaining
social phenomena. ...!M .he 4luntness +ith +hich this $ie+ is e5pressed is not at all unusual. Consider
a recent account on these lines set out 4y #ayhe+. #ayhe+ identifies the proper concerns of
sociology as 'structural!. "tructures refer to net+or9s of relations, and such net+or9s can and should
4e analysed +ithout any allusion to the characteristics of indi$iduals 'in structural sociology the unit
of analysis!, he says, 'is al+ays the social net+or9, ne$er the
((footnote))
*References may be found on pp. 224-6.
((268))
indi$idual.: 8 'structural approach! is here lin9ed, as is $ery often the case, +ith an endorsement of a
rather nai$e form of 4eha$iourism. #ayhe+ argues that 'structuralists do not employ su4<ecti$ist
concepts such as purpose or goals in their analysis.!
3lau has de$eloped a more sophisticated $ersion of ideas such as these in a num4er of recent
pu4lications, and his $ie+s no dou4t are representati$e of a su4stantial segment of sociological
opinion.! @i9e most 8nglo6"a5on sociological +riters, he +ill ha$e nothing to do +ith @e$i6"trauss!s
conception of structuralism or +ith 9indred standpoints. 0e also, ho+e$er, carefully separates himself
from functionalism, proposing a notion of structure 'stripped of its 4roader cultural and functional
connotations to its core properties!.! 8ccepting that 'structure! has 4een used $aria4ly 4y different
authors, he points out that it is usually agreed that, in its most elemental sense, it refers someho+ to
social positions and relations 4et+een social positions. 8s specified 4y 3lau, structural social science
is concerned +ith parameters of population distri4utions, not +ith actors as such. 8 'structural
parameter! is any criterion of categori>ing aggregates of indi$iduals rele$ant to social positions +hich
indi$iduals might occupy. 0e e5plains this as follo+s
.hus, +e spea9 of the age structure of a population, the 9inship structure of a tri4e, the authority
structure of an organi>ation, the po+er structure of a community, and the class structure of a
society. .hese are not types of social structure 4ut analytical elements of it distinguishing social
positions in one dimension only. .he different positions generated 4y a single parameter are
necessarily occupied 4y different persons C an indi$idual is either a man or a +oman, old or
young, rich or poor C 4ut the case differs for positions generated 4y se$eral parameters, 4ecause
the same person simultaneously occupies positions on different parameters. . . . "ocial structures
are reflected in di$erse forms of differentiation, +hich must 4e 9ept analytically distinct.!
.he tas9 of studying structural parameters, according to 3lau, delimits the distincti$e concern of
sociology.
.+o types of structural parameter can 4e distinguished. 'Nominal parameters! are lateral, separating
a gi$en population into categories, such as gender, religion or race= 'graduated parameters! are
hierarchical, differentiating indi$iduals along a
((26"))
scale, and include, for e5ample, +ealth, income and education. Ene of the main o4<ects of structural
study is to e5amine the relation 4et+een these parameters, in so far as they are associated +ith clusters
of interaction. Bhere there is considera4le differentiation along either parameter, there +ill 4e less
chance of such interaction clusters 4eing formed. *arameters can thus 4e analysed so as to e5plain the
forms and degrees of social differentiation and integration. 3lau +rites as a 'structural determinist!,
'+ho 4elie$es that the structures of o4<ecti$e social positions among +hich people are distri4uted e5ert
more fundamental influences on social life than do cultural $alues and norms!.: 0is aim is to e5plain
$ariations in the structural features of societies, not factors rele$ant to indi$idual attitudes, 4eliefs or
moti$es. "tructural analysis in his sense of the term, he notes, can 4e carried on +ithout in$estigating
o$erall characteristics of societies.
0o+e$er, he does ma9e claims rele$ant to those characteristics. .hus he remar9s, for e5ample, that
in small oral cultures 9inship is the main co6ordinating structural a5is of differentiation and
integration. Industriali>ed societies, 4y contrast, are characteri>ed 4y 'multiform heterogeneity!, the
comple5 intersection of structural parameters, producing di$erse forms of association and clusters of
interaction. In the current era, he adds, a considera4le structural consolidation is going on in Bestern
societies C 3lau!s o+n $ersion, in fact, of the looming threat of a !one6dimensional! social order.!
En the 4asis of these concepts, 3lau attempts to formulate +hat he calls a deducti$e theory of social
structure. .he theory 4egins from propositions in$ol$ing $ery simple analytical terms (for e5ample,
the si>e of aggregates or groups) and 4uilds up more comple5 generali>ations on this foundation. "ome
of the assumptions in$ol$ed, 3lau says, depend upon !essentially psycho6logical principles!= he /uotes
as an e5ample the generali>ation that people prefer to associate +ith others +ho ha$e traits similar to
their o+n. 0o+e$er, the structural properties analysed cannot 4e deri$ed directly from such
psychological theorems. 3lau!s deducti$e theory is a complicated affair, in$ol$ing se$eral do>en
generali>ations a4out 'structural effects!, ranging from the mar$ellously trite (!people associate not
only +ith mem4ers of their o+n groups 4ut also +ith mem4ers of other groups!), through
((216))
the mildly interesting although /uite de4ata4le (!decentrali>ation of authority in an association
increases informal association among administrati$e ran9s!) to the pro$ocati$e 4ut perhaps
su4stantially mista9en (!high rates of mo4ility promote structural change!). '.he theory is sociological!,
according to 3lau, 'in the specific sense that it e5plains patterns of social relations in terms of
properties of social structure, not in terms of the assumptions made, +hether or not these are deri$a4le
from psychological principles. .he nature of the logical formulations employed ma9es the
e5planations structural.!
10
3lau!s $ie+s are in some +ays idiosyncratic 4ut for the most part e5emplify the am4itions of
'structural sociology! in a general +ay. 0e e5presses in a cogent fashion the persistent feeling shared
4y many that sociology can and must 4e clearly separated from other neigh4ouring disciplines,
particularly psychology. .he point is made forci4ly that +hat gi$es sociology its distincti$eness is its
specific concern not only +ith social structure 4ut also +ith the +ays in +hich the constraining
properties of structure ma9e themsel$es felt in regard of the conduct of indi$iduals. 8ccording to 3lau,
neither the formulation of structural analysis nor structural e5planation needs to ma9e reference to
'$alues or norms!. In this latter respect he seems to di$erge from Aur9heim, 4ut in other +ays +hat he
has to say could 4e ta9en as a latter6day $ersion of a Aur9heimian manifesto. Aiscussion of the short6
comings of his standpoint +ill 4oth ser$e to reiterate features of structuration theory mentioned earlier
and help to point up aspects of !structure! and 'structural properties! as I +ant to understand those
terms.
.here are some interesting and instructi$e features of 3lau!s ideas. 0e s9irts functionalism, and he
a$oids identifying structural analysis +ith some une5plicated influence +hich society as a +hole! has
o$er its indi$idual mem4ers. 0e recogni>es that societies are not all of a piece C that is to say, that
one of the aims of structural study should 4e to sho+ e5actly +hat le$els of integration can 4e
disco$ered +ithin and 4et+een social groupings. None the less, the limitations of such a conception of
'structural sociology! are mar9ed.
3lau!s approach confuses the demand to distinguish the influence of structural properties from
psychological e5planations of conduct on the one hand +ith the assertion that structural
((211))
parameters can 4e defined independently of '$alues!, 'norms! or 'cultural traditions! on the other. 0is
programme of disco$ering the 'independent influence the structure of social positions in a society or
community e5erts on social relations! is supposed to 4e accomplished 'independently of cultural $alues
and psychological moti$es!.: 3ut reduction to psychological generali>ations is not the same as
formulation in terms of cultural $alues or meanings. .he latter ha$e reference to the ine$ita4ly
hermeneutic tas9 of the generation of social descriptions, parasitic upon agents! concepts that help
constitute them. 8 characteristic mista9e of the ad$ocates of structural sociology is to confuse t+o
different senses in +hich the 'o4<ecti$e! nature of structural properties can 4e counterposed to
'su4<ecti$ity!. "tructural parameters, as 3lau defines them, are 'non6su4<ecti$e! in the sense that they
cannot 4e descri4ed in terms of indi$idual predicates. 3ut they cannot 4e 'non6su4<ecti$e! in the sense
that they cannot 4e characteri>ed at all independently of 'cultural traditions!, +here this term refers to
agents! meanings. .hus 3lau regards 9inship categories as 'structural!. 3ut 9inship categories patently
depend upon concepts and discriminations employed 4y actors. .he $ery term 'position!, so 4asic to
3lau!s notion of structure, clearly in$ol$es agents! concepts. "ocial positions, li9e all other aspects of
'structural parameters!, e5ist only in so far as actors ma9e discriminations in their conduct 4ased upon
the attri4ution of certain identities to others.
.he notion that the study of structural parameters is con$ergent +ith the distincti$e character of
sociology might 4e plausi4le if there +ere some definite causal properties associated +ith them, thus
ma9ing 'sociological e5planation! con$ergent +ith 'structural e5planation!. 3ut the causal relations
supposedly at +or9 are o4scure C although e$idently supposed to operate in some +ay outside the
scope of the reasons that agents might ha$e for +hat they do. .hus 3lau proposes the generali>ation
that an organi>ation!s increasing si>e produces greater internal differentiation and hence raises the
proportion of administrati$e personnel it contains. 8ccording to him, this relationship can 4e grasped
'+ithout in$estigating the moti$es of indi$iduals in organi>ations!.!! 3ut, as 3lau de$elops it, this
proposition is false. If the implication +ere that certain typical moti$es can 4e assumed 4y the theorist,
and could 4e spelled out if necessary, the statement could 4e
((212))
defended. 3ut this is n
pt
+hat 3lau has in mind. 0e ma9es it clear that he thin9s that the
specification of moti$es (and reasons or intentions) is actually irrelevant to the factors in$ol$ed in
the generali>ation. 8nd this is not so at all. It is, on the contrary, necessary precisely
t
o its causal
e5plication. .he increased proportion of administrators +ill tend to come a4out as actors respond to
+hat they see to 4e ne+ pro4lems and issues +hich increased organi>ational si>e presents.:
.he !structural! generali>ations gi$en 4y 3lau may in fact on closer inspection turn out to 4e
formulae which actors use to produce the results indicated. If +e 9no+ nothing a4out +hat the agents
themsel$es 4eli,e$e they are doing C 4ecause this type of information is thought to 4e distinct from
the analysis of structural effects C +e cannot assess the li9elihood that such may 4e the case. .hose
+ho admirlNster organi>ations ha$e their o+n theoriesin6use a4out them and fray, indeed, 4e +ell
a+are of the academic literature on the su4<ecOt. Consider the proposition that decentrali>ation of
authority in c!rgani>ations increases informal associations 4et+een administrati$ ran9s. 8s +ith the
generali>ation a4out si>e and internal differentiation, this may presume intended conse/uences +hich
a
gents ha$e reasons for 4ringing a4out, or, alternati$ely, the out>ome may 4e largely unintended. It is
essential for the social o4ser$er to 9no+ +hich is the case in order to 4e a4le to elucidate +hat is
going on. 8t least some of the agents in$ol$ed could 4e acting in the light of the $ery generali>ation
+hich 3lau identifies. It might $ery +ell 4e that a policy of decentrali>ation is follo+ed specifically
in order to increase certain sorts of informal association among different ran9s of administrators
Bhat these commnts demonstrate is that a 'structural approach! to the social sciences cannot 4e
se$ered from an e5amination of the mechanisms of social reproduction. It is perfectly correct, of
curse, to emphasi>e that society is not a creation of indi$idual actors and that the structural properties
of social systems endure 4eyond the lifetimes of indi$iduals. 3ut structure, or structural *roperties,
or 'structural parameters!, e5ist only in so far as there rM continuity in social reproduction across time
and space. 8nd such continuity in turn e5ists only in and through the refle5i$el, monitored acti$ities
of situated actors, ha$ing a range of intended and unintended conse/uences. @et me
((213))
repeat there is no such thing as a distinctive category of `structural explanation ; only an
interpretation of the modes in +hich $arying forms of constraint influence human action. .here is
nothing mysterious a4out +hat 'influence! means here. .a9e the generali>ation that high rates of
mo4ility promote structural change. Be can pro4a4ly assume that high mo4ility rates are largely
unintended and that the resultant changes they induce are also, although it may 4e the case, for
e5ample, that educational policies ha$e 4een set up in order to enhance mo4ility and hence that +hat
is going on is part of a refle5i$ely monitored process. "uppose, ho+e$er, that the mo4ility in /uestion
is unintended, is that of +omen, is up+ard occupational mo4ility, and that the 'structural change! it
promotes is higher (or lo+er) di$orce rates. Be can pro4e +hat the causal influences might 4e, 4ut
only 4y 9no+ing a4out the moti$es and reasons of those in$ol$ed C +i$es, hus4ands and others. It
could 4e that +omen +ho 4ecome successful in occupational careers spend less time at home than
they +ould other+ise, leading to the (unintended) result of placing a strain on the marital relationship=
that they see marriage as unimportant compared +ith success at +or9= that their hus4ands resent their
success, etc.= or a com4ination of all of these for different indi$iduals.
(n (lternative7 8etho/olo$ical &n/ivi/ualis
Conceptions of distincti$ely !structural e5planation! in sociology ha$e long had a natural enemy in
methodological indi$idualism. .he de4ate 4et+een the t+o positions is in some part the
methodological counterpart to the dualism of su4<ect and social o4<ect that has characteri>ed the
ontology of the social sciences. 8lthough #a5 Be4er has fre/uently 4een adopted as a 'structural
sociologist!, he made his o+n preferences clear enough. In a letter +hich he +rote not long 4efore his
death he o4ser$ed 'if I ha$e 4ecome a sociologist . . . it is mainly in order to e5orcise the spectre of
collecti$e conceptions +hich still lingers among us. In other +ords, sociology itself can only proceed
from the actions of one or more separate indi$iduals and must therefore adopt strictly indi$idualistic
methods.!! 0uman action, as Be4er says in Economy and Society, 'e5ists only as the 4eha$iour of
one or more individual human 4eings!.
1(
.he de4ate o$er +hat claims
((214))
Be4er and other 'methodological indi$idualists! might in fact 4e ma9ing has stretched far and +ide,
4ut there is no dou4t a genuine difference of opinion 4et+een them and the 'structural sociologists!.
.he details may 4e comple5, 4ut the outline is relati$ely simple. .he methodological indi$idualists
agree +ith the $ie+ I ha$e stated a4o$e the search for 'structural e5planation! is futile and perhaps
e$en harmful.
@et me follo+ through one of the more influential accounts of the issues raised 4y $arious $ersions
of methodological indi$idual6ism. @u9es discusses and see9s to 'render harmless! each of +hat he
ta9es to 4e the main e5pressions of methodological indi$idual6ism.! .he doctrines that ad$ocate
methodological indi$idualism in$ol$e one or more of the follo+ing theses.
1)
'.ruistic social atomism!. .his is the $ie+ +hich holds that it is self6e$ident that social phenomena
can 4e e5plained only in terms of the analysis of the conduct of indi$iduals. .hus 0aye9 says
'.here is no other +ay to+ard an understanding of social phenomena 4ut through our
understanding of indi$idual actions directed to+ards other people and guided 4y their e5pected
4eha$iour!: (a formulation close to Be4er!s definition of 'social action!, in fact).
2)
.he idea that all statements a4out social phenomena C such as 3lau!s e5position of structural
parameters C can 4e reduced, +ithout loss of meaning, to descriptions of the /ualities of
indi$iduals. .his $ie+ +ould deny that 3lau!s tal9 of 'structure! ma9es any sense= he is merely
aggregating properties of indi$iduals.
,)
.he assertion that only indi$iduals are real. .hus it seems to 4e held 4y some +riters that any
concepts +hich refer to properties of collecti$ities or social systems (one might again instance
'structural parameters!) are a4stract models, constructions of the theorist, in some +ay that the
notion of 'indi$idual! is not.
4)
.he allegation that there cannot 4e la+s in the social sciences, sa$e in so far as there are la+s a4out
the psychological dispositions of indi$iduals.
18
8ll of these four elements +ould appear to 4e found in the much6/uoted statement that Bat9ins gi$es
of +hat he calls the !principle of methodological indi$idualism!
((215))
8ccording to this principle, the ultimate constituents of the social +orld are indi$idual people
+ho act more or less appropriately in the light of their dispositions and understanding of their
situation. )$ery comple5 social situation, institution or e$ent is the result of a particular
configuration of indi$iduals, their dispositions, situations, 4eliefs, and physical resources and
en$ironment. .here may 4e unfinished or half6+ay e5planations of large6scale social phenomena
(say, inflation) in terms of other large6scale phenomena (say, full employment)= 4ut +e shall not
ha$e arri$ed at roc964ottom e5planations of such large6scale phenomena until +e ha$e deduced
an account of them from statements a4out the dis6positions, 4eliefs, resources and inter6relations
of indi$iduals. (.he indi$iduals may remain anonymous and only typical dispositions, etc., may
4e attri4uted to them.)!:
@u9es!s 4om46disposal s/uad of arguments designed to defuse methodological indi$idualism
ad$ances on t+o fronts. None of the claims mentioned under the four categories is in the least 4it
plausi4le +hen e5amined closely. "ince the first is truistic (that is to say, tri$ially true), it is neither
here nor there. .hat 'society consists of people! is a '4anal proposition a4out the +orld! +hich is
'analytically true, that is, in $irtue of the meaning of +ords!.
20
.he second, third and fourth points are
demonstra4ly false. .he fact that the description or analysis of 9inship relations, such as those
designated as 'cross6cousin marriage!, cannot 4e accomplished +ithout reference to the
9no+ledgea4ility of human agents does not entail that such relations can 4e descri4ed solely in terms
of predicates of indi$iduals. If point (,) implies someho+ that only indi$iduals are directly o4ser$a4le,
it is mista9en C although there is no reason in any case to support the proposition, associated +ith
4eha$iourism, that only that +hich is o4ser$a4le is real. Be may not 4e a4le to o4ser$e the elements
3lau has in mind +hen he spea9s of structural parameters, 4ut +e certainly can o4ser$e social
phenomena in circumstances of co6presence, such as the formation and enactment of encounters.
;inally, point (4) is co$ered 4y +hat I ha$e said pre$iously there is no shortage of generali>ations in
the social sciences, although they do not ha$e the same logical form as uni$ersal la+s in natural
science.
.hese arguments, @u9e concedes, do not yet render methodo6
((216))
logical indi$idualism harmless. .hey do not e$en attac9 its main strength, +hich is concerned +ith
e5planation. .he most important assertion in the /uotation from Bat9ins, and perhaps also that from
0aye9, is to 4e found in the declaration that 'roc964ottom! e5planations of social phenomena ha$e to
in$ol$e the 'dispositions, 4eliefs, resources and inter6relations of indi$iduals!. It is here that @u9es
feels the potentially e5plosi$e po+er of methodological indi$idualism to lie, and from +here the fuse
has to 4e delicately remo$ed. Bhat are the 'dispositions, etc.! of indi$iduals? 8nd +hat, in any case, is
'e5planation!? 8s regards the latter, @u9es is a4le to demonstrate rather easily that many proponents of
methodological indi$idualism ha$e in mind an o$erly restricted notion of +hat e5planation is (this is
e/ually true of 3lau and most of the structural sociologists). .o e5plain is to ans+er a +hy /uestion,
and often this in$ol$es ma9ing a particular social phenomenon intelligi4le simply in the sense of
pro$iding an accurate characteri>ation of it.
21
)5planation here operates, as it +ere, on or around the
4aseline of the necessarily hermeneutic nature of the social sciences. It is undenia4ly important to
emphasi>e that 'e5planation! parta9es of the conte5tuality of all social acti$ity, +hether this 4e in
respect of the in/uiries of lay actors or those of sociological o4ser$ers. 0o+e$er, let us concentrate
upon the more confined meaning of 'e5planation! as ha$ing to do +ith the formulation not <ust of
generali>ations 4ut of causal generali>ations C in other +ords, generali>ations +hich do not simply
assert that a relation of an a4stract 9ind holds 4et+een t+o categories or classes of social phenomena
4ut also identify the causal connections in$ol$ed.
In +hat sense do these causal connections necessarily relate to indi$iduals? 8ccording to @u9es, in
some $ersions of methodological indi$idualism the /ualities of indi$iduals in$o9ed in e5planations are
physiological traits of the organism or organically gi$en needs. 3ut these e5planations turn out to 4e
/uite implausi4le. No one has 4een a4le to produce any accounts +hich reduce social phenomena to
organic properties. "o these forms of methodological indi$idualism are at 4est hypothetical claims=
they ha$e no direct 4earing upon the materials of study +ith +hich social scientists operate. In other
interpretations of methodological indi$idualism, ho+e$er, either the characteristics attri4uted to
indi$iduals and incorporated in e5planations do not
((219))
e5clude the possi4ility of more structural analyses, or these characteristics are co$ered 4y the re4uttal
of (,) a4o$e and do, in fact, in$ol$e social (structural) characteri>ations any+ay. 0ence
methodological indi$idualism has 4een neutrali>ed. .hose +ho ad$ocate a reductionism in$ol$ing
physiological characteristics of the organism cannot ma9e their claim count for anything as regards the
actual practice of the social sciences, 4ut others cannot find any properties of indi$iduals that are not
irreduci4ly 'contaminated! 4y the social.
.here @u9es lea$es the matter. I do not thin9 that this +ill do +e ha$e to formulate the issues rather
differently. 0o+e$er, 4efore pic9ing up some of the threads left dangling 4y @u9es!s discussion, it +ill
4e instructi$e to refer to some /uite similar pro4lems raised from a different /uarter C in interchanges
4et+een .hompson and 8nderson a4out the character of #ar5ism.
22
.hompson has long regarded
structural concepts as suspect, +ithout re<ecting them altogether, and has consistently emphasi>ed the
significance of studying the te5ture and $ariety of human agency. .hus in descri4ing the $ie+s
informing his analysis of class de$elopment in )ngland in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, he
comments, 'class is defined 4y men as they li$e their o+n history, and, in the end, this is its only
definition.!
2,
In the course of a sustained polemic against 8lthusser and those influenced 4y him C
prompting a 4oo96length reply from 8nderson C .hompson spells out the implications of his
standpoint in some detail. I shall ma9e no attempt to characteri>e the de4ate as a +hole 4ut shall
mention only a fe+ aspects of it +hich are rele$ant here.
8lthusser is ta9en to tas9 4y .hompson C rightly, in my opinion
24
C for offering a deficient
account of human agency and a deterministic conception of structure. 0uman 4eings are regarded not
as 9no+ledgea4le agents 4ut only as the 'supports! for modes of production. .his 'derogation of the
lay actor!, as I ha$e called it, .hompson e5presses in 4lunter fashion. 8lthusser, and most others
associated +ith either structuralism or functional6ism, 'proceed from the same :latent anthropology:,
the same ulterior assumption a4out :#an: C that all men and +omen (e5cept themsel$es) are bloody
silly'.
25
"ocial life, or human history, .hompson says, should 4e understood as 'unmastered human
practice!. .hat is to say, human 4eings act purposi$ely
((218))
and 9no+ledgea4ly 4ut +ithout 4eing a4le either to foresee or to control the conse/uences of +hat
they do. .o understand ho+ this happens +e need a term +hich, .hompson says, goes missing in
8lthusser it is +hat .hompson simply calls 'human e5perience!.
2&
)5perience is the connection
4et+een 'structure! and 'process!, the real material of social or historical analysis. .hompson stresses
that such a $ie+ does not 4ring him close to methodological indi$idualism. In fact, he finds a certain
affinity 4et+een methodological indi$idualism and 8lthusser!s #ar5ism. ;or 8lthusser 4elie$es that
'structures! e5ist only +ithin theoretical domains, not in reality itself= hence this stance resem4les the
nominalism of the methodological indi$idualists. 3ut yet in the end it is not easy to see <ust ho+
distinct .hompson!s ideas are from methodological indi$idualism. #any of the passages in his +or9
+here he characteri>es his o$erall $ie+s resem4le conceptions such as that of Bat9ins /uoted a4o$e.
.hus, tal9ing again of the concept of class, he insists 'Bhen +e spea9 of a class +e are thin9ing of a
$ery loosely defined 4ody of people +ho share the same categories of interests, social e5periences,
tradition and $alue6system, +ho ha$e a disposition to behave as a class, to define themsel$es in their
actions and in their consciousness in relation to other groups of people in class +ays.!
22
.here is much that is attracti$e a4out .hompson!s $ie+s, 4ut 8nderson does not find it difficult to
find some shortcomings in them. Bhen .hompson +rites of 'people! and of the primacy of
'e5perience!, ho+ are these seemingly transparent terms actually to 4e understood? In emphasi>ing
them .hompson clearly means to accentuate the significance of human agency in ma9ing history. 3ut
+hat 'agency! is remains une5plicated, in spite of the profusion of historical e5amples .hompson
offers in the course of his original +or9s and 4y +ay of critici>ing 8lthusser. ')5perience!
as +e 9no+ from Ailthey!s attempts to grapple +ith Erlebnis
is a notoriously am4iguous term. Ene use of the +ord, for e5ample, connects directly +ith empiricism,
in +hich e5perience is a passi$e registration of e$ents in the +orld, something $ery far from the acti$e
connotations of the term +hich .hompson +ishes to accentuate. #oreo$er, .hompson no+here
effecti$ely teases out the relation 4et+een action and structure. .his is e$en true of his ma<or 4oo9,
The Making of the English Working Class. .he 4oo9 opens +ith a cele4rated paragraph '.he
+or9ing class did
((21"))
not rise li9e the sun at the appointed time. It +as present at its o+n ma9ing! and its formation 'o+es as
much to agency as to conditioning!.
28
3ut in spite of the plaudits +hich the +or9 has <ustly recei$ed,
8nderson points out, it does not really resol$e the issues thus raised.
For if the claim for the co-determination of agency and necessity were to be substantiated, we
would need to have at a minimum a conjoint exploration of the objective assemblage and
transformation of a labour force by the Industrial Revolution, and of the subjective germination
of a class culture in response to it.... [But] the advent of industrial capitalism in England is a
dreadful backcloth to the book rather than a direct object of analysis in its own right.... The
jagged temporal rhythms and breaks, and the uneven spatial distributions and displacements, of
capital accumulation between 1790 and 1830 inevitably marked the composition and character
of the nascent English proletariat. Yet they fnd no place in this account of its formation.
29
.he interchange 4et+een .hompson and 8nderson is not at all conclusi$e, 4ut it is useful to place it
alongside the more a4stract de4ate a4out methodological indi$idualism. .he latter de4ate seems
largely played out, 4ut the li$eliness of the polemics 4et+een .hompson and 8nderson graphically
demonstrates that the issues are not dead. .here is one $ery important sense in +hich they cannot 4e.
)$ery research in$estigation in the social sciences or history is in$ol$ed in relating action to structure,
in tracing, e5plicitly or other+ise, the con<unction or dis<unctions of intended and unintended
conse/uences of acti$ity and ho+ these affect the fate of indi$iduals. No amount of <uggling +ith
a4stract concepts could su4stitute for the direct study of such pro4lems in the actual conte5ts of
interaction. ;or the permutations of influences are endless, and there is no sense in +hich structure
'determines! action or $ice $ersa. .he nature of the constraints to +hich indi$iduals are su4<ect, the
uses to +hich they put the capacities they ha$e and the forms of 9no+ledgea4ility they display are all
themsel$es manifestly historically $aria4le.
Conceptual clarification can at least help in suggesting ho+ these matters are 4est approached. Bhat
connects the arguments of .hompson +ith those of Bat9ins et al. is that 4oth rest their cases too much
upon an intuiti$e, untheori>ed conception of the
((226))
'indi$idual! or agent. .hey are /uite <ustified in 4eing suspicious of the aspirations of 'structural
sociology!, +hether it ta9es the form offered 4y 3lau or that ela4orated 4y 8lthusser. #ethodological
indi$idualism is not, as @u9es suggests, harmless in respect of the o4<ecti$es of 'structural
sociologists!. .he methodological indi$idualists are +rong in so far as they claim that social categories
can 4e reduced to descriptions in terms of indi$idual predicates. 3ut they are right to suspect that
'structural sociology! 4lots out, or at least radically underestimates, the 9no+ledge6a4ility of human
agents, and they are right to insist that 'social forces! are al+ays nothing more and nothing less than
mi5es of intended or unintended conse/uences of action underta9en in specifia4le conte5ts.
'"tructural sociology! and methodological indi$idualism are not alternati$es, such that to re<ect one
is to accept the other. In some respects, as @u9es says, the de4ate 4et+een the t+o sides is an empty
one. .he point is to discard some of the terms of the de4ate +hile ela4orating others further than any
of its contri4utors ha$e done. Bhat the 'indi$idual! is cannot 4e ta9en as o4$ious. .he /uestion here is
not that of comparing predicates 4ut of specifying +hat human agents are li9e C something I ha$e
tried to do in respect of the 4asic concepts of structuration theory. .his presumes a4andoning the
e/uation of structure +ith constraint. .he relation 4et+een ena4lement and constraint can 4e fairly
easily set out on a logical le$el, gi$en a 4eginning point in the notion of the duality of structure.
0istory is not 'unmastered human practices!. It is the temporality of human practices, fashioning and
fashioned 4y structural properties, +ithin +hich di$erse forms of po+er are incorporated C not 4y any
means as neat a turn of phrase, 4ut I thin9 it is more accurately put.
8 further /uestion raised 4y the de4ate o$er methodological indi$idualism is are collecti$ities
actors? Bhat does it mean to say, for e5ample, '.he go$ernment decided to pursue policy P!? or '.he
go$ernment acted /uic9ly in the face of the threat of re4ellion!? Jarious distinctions need to 4e
disentangled here. 8ction descriptions, as I ha$e mentioned in a pre$ious chapter, should not 4e
confused +ith the designation of agency as such. Neither descriptions of action nor accounts of
interaction can 4e gi$en purely in terms of indi$idual predicates. 3ut only indi$iduals, 4eings +hich
ha$e a corporeal e5istence, are agents. If collecti$ities or groups are not agents, +hy do +e sometimes
spea9 as
((221))
though they +ere, as in the a4o$e e5amples? Be tend to do so +hen there is a significant degree of
refle5i$e monitoring of the conditions of social reproduction, of the sort associated especially +ith
organi>ations, although not e5clusi$e to them. '.he go$ern6ment decided to pursue policy P! is a
shorthand description of decisions ta9en 4y indi$iduals, 4ut normally in some 9ind of consultation
+ith one another, or +here a resulting policy is normati$ely 4inding. Aecisions that are ta9en 4y
go$ernments or other organi>ations may not represent the desired outcome of all, or the most desired
outcome of any, of those +ho participate in ma9ing them. In such circumstances it ma9es sense to say
that participants 'decide! (indi$idually) 'to decide! (corporately) upon a gi$en course of action. .hat is
to say, indi$idual mem4ers of a Ca4inet may agree to 4e 4ound 4y the outcome of a meeting +ith
+hich they disagree or a proposal +hich they $oted against yet +hich found ma<ority support. It is
important to understand that '.he go$ernment decided . . .! or '.he go$ernment acted . . .! are
shorthand statements 4ecause in some situations it may matter a great deal +hich indi$iduals +ere the
main initiators or e5ecutors of +hate$er decisions +ere ta9en (or not ta9en) and +hate$er policies
follo+ed.
References: Structure, System, Social Reproduction
1 CP!, pp. 222-5.
2 CC"#, chapter 8.
3 Ibid., pp. 456. My discussion here modifes my earlier version of this problem only slightly. For
other sections drawn upon here, see pp. 15764 and 1669.
4 I have followed Eberhard's discussion closely in the preceding few paragraphs: Wolfram Eberhard,
Conquerors and Rulers (Leiden: Brill, 1965), p. 9, and passim.
5 Marshall G. S. Hodgson, `The interrelations of societies in history', Comparative Studies in Society
and History, vol. 5, 19623, p. 233.
6 H. A. Gailey, A History of Africa, 1800 to the Present (New York: Houghton-Mifin, 19702, 2 vols.;
Rene Grousset, The Empire of the Steppes (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1970).
7 T. Carlstein, `The sociology of structuration in time and space: a time-geographic assessment of
Giddens's theory', Swedish Geo-graphical Yearbook (Lund: Lund University Press, 1981); Derek
((222))
Layder, Structure, Interaction and Social Theory (London: Routledge, 1981); J. B. Thompson,
Critical Hermeneutics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Margaret S. Archer,
`Morphogenesis versus structuration: on combining structure and action', British Journal of
Sociology, vol. 33, 1982.
8 Carlstein, `The sociology of structuration in time and space', pp. 523. See also John Thompson,
Critical Hermeneutics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 1434.
9 Roy Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism (Brighton: Harvester, 1979), p. 42.
10 Emile Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method (London: Macmillan, 1982), pp. 39-40.
11 Ibid., pp. 50 and 52.
12 Ibid., pp. 23.
13 Karl Marx, Capital (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1970), p. 72. An
instructive discussion of this issue appears in Gillian Rose, The
Melancholy Science (London: Macmillan, 1978), chapter 3.
14 Karl Marx, Grundrisse (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976), p. 157.
15 See CP!, chapter 5.
16 Prepared for the writing of CCHM but not in the fnal version included therein.
17 The classifcation also leaves open the possibility of other types for example, state socialist
society as distinct from capitalism, as well, of course, as other forms of societal organization that
might conceivably develop in the future.
18 The view expressed in CCHM, p. 164, `The city is the locus of the mechanisms which produce
system integration', is rather inadequately formulated. Moreover, I do not want to convey that the
citycountryside relation is a unitary or single one; it is heterogeneous and complex when
considered across the generality of societies.
19 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System (New York: Academic Press, 1974); cf. Spengler: Is
it not ridiculous to oppose a "modern" history of a few centuries, and that history to all intents
localized in West Europe, to an "ancient" history which covers as many millennia incidentally
dumping into that "ancient history" the whole mass of the pre-Hellenic cultures, unprobed and
unordered, as mere appendix matter?' Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West (London: Allen &
Unwin, 1961), p. 38.
20 Cf. note 2 above.
21 Cf. my essay, `The nation-state and violence'.
22 CP! pp. 104-5.
((22,))
2, #ar5, Capital, p. 110.
24 I4id., pp. 110 and 10,.
2( I4id., p. 1&8.
2& ;or an earlier $ersion of some of these points, see CSAS, chapter &.
22 #ar5, Capital, $ol. 1, p. ,,2.
28 I4id., p. ,,8.
2- I4id., p. ,(&.
,0 #ar5, Capital, $ol. 1, p. 111.
,1 CP!, pp. 141ff.
,2 Claude @e$i6"trauss, Structural Anthropology (@ondon 8llen @ane, 1-&8), pp. ,&(6&.
,, Claude @e$i6"trauss, The Savage Mind (@ondon Beidenfeld N Nicolson, 1-&&), p. -,.
,4 .his is a ma<or preoccupation of Between Capitalism and Socialism.
,( CCHM, chapters 2, 8 and -. I also lea$e out of consideration here
the $ery important /uestion (also analysed in CCHM) of the
relations 4et+een capitalism, the state and class di$isions.
,& 8 theme more fully de$eloped in Between Capitalism and Socialism.
,2 "ee 7ohn 0. Iauts9y, The Politics of Aristocratic Empires (Chapel
0ill Kni$ersity of North Carolina *ress, 1-82) 'If a class is
concei$ed of as a grouping in conflict +ith another class, then,
indeed, aristocracies and peasantries are not classes at all! (p. 2().
,8 I4id., pp. (6&. "ee also 0enri 7. #. Claessen and *eter "9alni9,
The Early State (.he 0ague #outon, 1-28).
,- )d+ard "hils, Tradition (@ondon ;a4er N ;a4er, 1-81), p. 280.
40 8rthur Baley, Three Ways of Thought in Ancient China (@ondon
8llen N Kn+in, 1-,-), p. ,8. ;or an e5tended discussion, see 7. 1.
8. *ococ9, '.he origins of the study of the past!, Comparative
Studies in Society and History, $ol. 4, 1-&162.
41 Claude @e$i6"trauss, Totemism (@ondon #erlin, 1-&4), p. -8.
42 I4id. @e$i6"trauss also remar9s, '.he Aa9ota language possesses no +ord to designate time, 4ut it can e5press
in a num4er of +ays modes of 4eing in duration. ;or Aa9ota thought, in fact, time constitutes a duration in
+hich measurement does not inter$ene it is a limitless :free good:! (p. --). Interesting o4ser$ations
rele$ant to these issues are made in 3irgit "chintlhol>er, Die Aufosung des Geschichtbegrifs im
Strukturalisrnus, doctoral dissertation (0am4urg, 1-2,).
4, ). *. .hompson, The Poverty of Theory (@ondon #erlin, 1-28), pp. 8& and 2-1.
44 1. Jico, The New Science (Ithaca Cornell Kni$ersity *ress, 1-&8), p. ,82, para. 1108.
4( .hompson, The Poverty of Theory, p. 8&.
((224))
4& 8lain .ouraine, The Self Production of Society (Chicago Kni$ersity of Chicago *ress, 1-22), p. 2,8.
42 0er4ert 3lumer, 'Collecti$e 4eha$iour!, in 8lfred #. @ee, Principles of Sociology (Ne+ Dor9 3arnes N
No4le, 1-(1), p. 1--.
48 Norman Cohn, '#ediae$al millenarianism its 4earing upon the comparati$e study of millenarian
mo$ements!, in "il$ia @. .hrupp, Millenial Dreams in Action (.he 0ague #outon, 1-&2), p. ,1.
4- Cf. 7. 8. 3an9s, The Sociology of Social Movements (@ondon #acmillan, 1-22), pp. 2061, and passim.
(0 8ndre 1or>, Farewell to the Working Class (@ondon *luto, 1-82).
References Critical Notes: `Structural Sociology' and Methodological
Individualism
1 Cf. %aymond 3oudon, The Uses of Structuralism (@ondon 0einemann, 1-21). 3oudon categori>es a
num4er of di$ergent uses of the concept. ;or a rather different set of approaches, see *eter #. 3lau,
Approaches to the Study of Social Structure (@ondon Collier6#acmillan, 1-2().
2 Balter @. Ballace, '"tructure and action in the theories of Coleman and *arsons!, in 3lau, Approaches to the
Study of Social Structure, p. 121.
, 3ruce 0. #ayhe+, '"tructuralism $ersus indi$idualism!, *arts 1 and 2, Social Forces, vol. 5$, %$&', p. ()$.
4 I4id., p. ,48.
( *eter #. 3lau, Inequality and Heterogeneity (Ne+ Dor9 ;ree *ress, 1-22)= '"tructural effects!, American
Sociological Review, $ol. 2(, 1-&0= '*arameters of social structure!, in 3lau, Approaches to the Study of
Social Structure; '8 macrosociological theory of social structure!, American Journal of Sociology, $ol.
8,, 1-22.
* Inequality and Heterogeneity, p. ix.
2 '*arameters of social structure!, p. 221.
& Inequality and Heterogeneity, p. x.
- '*arameters of social structure!, pp. 2(26,. 'Bhat poses this threat is the dominant position of po+erful
organi>ations in contemporary society, such as the *entagon, the Bhite 0ouse, and huge conglomerates.
.he trend has 4een to+ard increasing concentration of economic and manpo+er resources and po+ers
deri$ed from them in giant organi>ations and their top e5ecuti$es, +hich implies a gro+ing consolidation of
ma<or resources and forms of po+er....!
10 Inequality and Heterogeneity, p. 24&.
11 '8 macrosociological theory of social structure!, p. 28.
((225))
12 Peter M. Blau, `A formal theory of diferentiation in organizations', American Sociology Review, vol.
35, 1970, p. 203.
13 This point is made in Stephen P. Turner, 'Blau's theory of diferentiation: is it explanatory?',
Sociological Quarterly, vol. 18, 1977. Some of these issues are aired again in Blau: `Comments on
the prospects for a nomothetic theory of social structure', Journal
,
for the Theory of Social
Behaviour, vol. 13, 1983. See also an extraordinary piece by Mayhew, in the same volume on
`Causality, historical particularism and other errors in sociological discourse'. Blau's contribution
continues to display the shortcomings I have indicated. (1) Hermeneutic elements in the
formulation of concepts of social analysis are suppressed in favour of the view that `the objective of
sociology is to study the infuence of the "social environment" on "people's observable tendencies"'
(p. 268). (2) Reference to agents' motives, reasons and intentions is persistently equated with
`psychology', relegated to a realm separate from the concerns of `sociology'. (3) A version of a
discredited philosophy of natural science, in which `explanation' is regarded as necessarily to do
with `nomothetic-deductive theorizing' (p. 265), is accepted unquestioningly. (4) No consideration is
given to the possibility that even if the philosophy of natural science thus implied were acceptable,
the character of `laws' in social science might be fundamentally diferent from laws of nature. (5)
The whole standpoint is wrapped up in the familiar but erroneous claim that social science, as
compared with natural science, is in the early phases of its development. Blau accepts that there
are, `at least so far', `no deterministic laws in sociology' (p. 266). But he expresses faith that these
will one day be found we certainly cannot write of the possibility because `nomothetic theory of
social structure is undoubtedly still in a most rudimentary stage' (p. 269).
14 Quoted in Wolfgang Mommsen, `Max Weber's political sociology and his philosophy of world
history', International Social Science Journal, vol. 17, 1965, p. 25. Of course, it is a moot point how
far Weber's substantive writings were guided by this principle.
15 Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), vol. 1, p. 13.
16 Steven @u9es, `Methodological individualism reconsidered', in Essays in Social Theory (London:
Macmillan, 1977).
17 F. A. Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949). p. 6.
18 @u9es also identifes a further connotation of methodological individualism, a doctrine of `social
individualism' which '(ambiguously) asserts that society has as its end the good of individuals'.
@u9es, `Methodological individualism reconsidered', pp. 1812.
((226))
19 J. W. N. Watkins, `Historical explanation in the social sciences', in
P. Gardiner, Theories of History (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959).
20 @u9es, `Methodological individualism reconsidered', p. 178.
21 Cf. NRSM, chapter 4.
22 E. P. Thompson, The Poverty of Theory (London: Merlin, 1978); Perry Anderson, Arguments within
English Marxism (London: Verso, 1980).
23 E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), p. 40.
24 CPST, chapter 1, and passim.
25 Thompson, The Poverty of Theory, p. 148.
26 Ibid., p. 30.
27 Ibid., p. 295. Italics in the original.
28 Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class, p. 9.
29 Anderson, Arguments within English Marxism, pp. 32-4.
$% Change, &#olution and 'o(er
I +ant to argue in this chapter for a deconstruction of a whole range of theories of social change,
particularly those of an evolutionary type, and for a reconstruction of the nature of power as inherent
in the constitution of social life. !o deconstruct theories of social change means to deny that some of
the most cherished ambitions of social theory including those of +historical materialism' can be
reali,ed. !his does not imply ma-ing the relatively wea- claim that such theories cannot be supported
by the available evidence. .t involves a much stronger and more controversial contention/ that they are
mista-en about the types of account of social change that are possible. 0 deconstruction of theories of
social change can proceed through three sets of considerations of progressively diminishing
generality, as below/
structural /eterination social evolution historical aterialis
level of $enerality
8 great deal of social science, in academic sociology as +ell as #ar5ism, has 4een 4ased upon the
presumption that it is possi4le to formulate theorems of structural causation +hich +ill e5plain the
determination of social action in general.!L #ost $ersions of structural determination are lin9ed to the
thesis that the social sciences can unco$er uni$ersal la+s, these la+s identifying the effects of
structural constraints. 8 gi$en occurrence or type of 4eha$iour +ould 4e sho+n to 4e an instance of a
general la+,
((footnote))
*References may be found on pp. 274-9.
((228))
certain 4oundary conditions for the operation of the la+ ha$ing 4een specified. 'Aetermination! here
e/uals a particular form of determinism. .he so6called 'co$ering la+! de4ate has e5plored these sorts
of issues at some length, and +ithout entering into it directly it is enough to say here that such a $ie+
is /uite inconsistent +ith the character of generali>ations in the social sciences as I ha$e portrayed it
pre$iously (see also pp. ,4,62).
2
.o deny that a general account of structural determination can 4e
achie$ed is to ta9e a stance to +hich a great deal of this 4oo9 is rele$ant.!
"ome theories of social change are lin9ed to the a4o$e conceptions. It has sometimes 4een thought,
for e5ample, that there are uni$ersal la+s go$erning social change and that a theory of social change
should 4e organi>ed around such la+s. 3ut there are many attempts to e5plain change +hich, +hile
they do not postulate la+s, specify certain limited principles of determination of change +hich are held
to apply in something li9e a uni$ersal fashion. 8mong these, e$olutionary conceptions ha$e 4een 4y
far the most prominent.
')$olutionism
!
, of course, cannot 4e easily categori>ed, since a $ariety of different standpoints ha$e
4een associated +ith the term, and the popularity of e$olutionary conceptions has +a5ed and +aned in
the social sciences. .he second half of the nineteenth century +as certainly the high point of
e$olutionism in social theory, inspired in some considera4le degree 4y the achie$ements of Aar+in in
4iology.! )$olutionary notions su4se/uently tended to drop out of fashion, especially among
anthropologists, +ho for the most part 4ecame strongly influenced 4y one or other interpretation of
'cultural relati$ism!. 3ut such notions retained some defenders in anthropology, and in archaeology
e$olutionism has consistently remained dominant. In the 8nglo6"a5on +orld the rise of functionalism,
as led 4y #alino+s9i and %adcliffe63ro+n in anthropology and su4se/uently in sociology 4y #erton
and *arsons, +as in some degree responsi4le for the eclipse of e$olutionary thin9ing, although a
re$i$al of e$olutionary theory +as later initiated 4y *arsons himself.!
)$olutionism and "ocial .heory
#any theories of e$olution form prime e5amples of +hat I ha$e
((22"))
called 'endogenous! or 'unfolding! models of change, +hich I ha$e critici>ed earlier. .hese sorts of
e$olutionary theory ha$e in fact often 4een closely connected +ith functionalism C the +or9s of
Comte 4eing a nota4le instance C and the separation 4et+een functionalism and e$olutionism
introduced 4y #alino+s9i and others should perhaps 4e regarded as something of an a4erration rather
than a natural state of affairs. Erganic metaphors ha$e often pro$ided the relation 4et+een the t+o. 8
plant or an organism contains +ithin itself a tra<ectory of gro+th, an unfolding of latent potentialities.
Change here is understood as go$erned 4y the mechanisms in$ol$ed in such unfolding, +ith societies
4eing regarded as clearly 4ounded unities. )5ternal conditions are held to accentuate or hold 4ac9
processes of gro+th, 4ut they are really a 4ac9ground against +hich the mechanisms of change
operate. "ome e$olutionary models ha$e treated change as inherently slo+ and cumulati$e. .hus
Aur9heim regarded political re$olution as agitation on the surface of social life, incapa4le of gi$ing
rise to ma<or transformations of society 4ecause the e$olution of 4asic social institutions is al+ays
necessarily slo+.'! 3ut unfolding conceptions of change are certainly not alien to theories +hich
propose that e$olution proceeds through processes of re$olutionary transition. #ar5!s $ie+s represent
a case in point. .he chief motor of social change, in the scheme #ar5 portrays in the '*reface! to A
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, is the e5pansion of the forces of production
+ithin a gi$en type of society. 8t some point such an e5pansion can no longer 4e contained +ithin the
e5isting institutions of the society, leading to a process of re$olution, follo+ing +hich the same
process occurs all o$er again.! .he sources of change are to 4e found in the tendential properties of
class societies, +hich contain the 'seeds of their o+n transformation!.
0o+ should the term 'e$olution! 4e understood? .he +ord itself comes from the @atin evolutio,
deri$ed from e- (!out of!) and volatus (!rolled!). It +as used to refer to the unrolling of parchment
4oo9s. .he concept +as not applied in anything li9e its modern sense until the late se$enteenth
century, +hen it came to mean an orderly process of change, passing through discerni4le stages.
Comte +as one of the first leading social thin9ers to ma9e e5tensi$e use of the notion, and his
formulation is not $ery different from those proposed 4y many su4se/uently (including *arsons, see
pp. 2&,C24). .he $ariation of societal types, their
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differentiation and synthesis, promoting 'order +ith continuity! C these +ere Comte!s themes.
`
8ucun
ordre reel ne peut plus s!eta4lir, ni surtout durer, s!il n!est pleinement compati4le avec le progres= aucun
grand progres ne saurait effecti$ement s!accomplir, s!il ne tend finalement a 1!e$idente consolidation
de 1!ordre.!
8
@et me mention some latter6day definitions of social or cultural e$olution, culled more or less at
random
Whether the adjective `biological' be used or not, the principle of evolution is frmly established as
applying to the world of living things. . . . Such basic concepts of organic evolution or variation,
selection, adaptation, diferentiation, and integration belong at the centre of our concern, when
appropriately adjusted to a social and cultural subject-matter. (Parsons)
9
Evolution can be considered as an interest in determining recurrent forms, processes and
functions. . . . Cultural evolution may be regarded as either a special type of historical
reconstruction or a particular methodology or approach. (Steward)
10
Evolution (both natural and social) is a self-maintaining, self-transforming and self-transcending
process, directional in time and therefore irreversible, which in its course generates every fresh
novelty, greater variety, more complex organization, higher levels of awareness, and increasingly
conscious mental activity. (Huxley)"
Evolution may be defned as a temporal sequence of forms: one form grows out of another; culture
advances from one stage to another. In this process time is as integral a factor as change of form.
The evolutionist process is irreversible and non-repetitive... . The evolutionist process is like the
historical, or difusionist, process in that both are temporal, and therefore irreversible and non-
repetitive. But they difer in that the former is nomothetic in character, whereas the latter is
idiographic. . . . To be sure, the evolutionist process always takes place somewhere and in a
temporal continuum, but the particular time and the particular place are not signifcant. It is the
temporal sequence of forms that counts. (White)
12
In both its biological and cultural spheres evolution moves simultaneously in two directions. On
the one side, it creates diversity through adaptive modifcation: new forms diferentiate
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from old. En the other side, e$olution generates progress higher forms arise from, and surpass,
lo+er. .he first of these directions is "pecific )$olution, and the second, 1eneral )$olution . . . a
different ta5onomy is re/uired in e5amining these t+o aspects of e$olution. Concerned +ith lines
of descent, the study of specific e$olution employs phylogenetic classification. In the general
e$olutionary outloo9 emphasis shifts to the character of progress itself, and forms are classed in
stages or le$els of de$elopment +ithout reference to phylogeny. ("ahlins):
.here are significant points of $ariation 4et+een these formulations. Bhat "ahlins calls 'specific
e$olution!, for e5ample, is the only sense of e$olution recogni>ed 4y "te+ard, +ho actually directly
re<ects 'general e$olution!. 3ut the definitions do tend to ha$e certain common traits, stated or implied,
and they can 4e utili>ed to characteri>e +hat a theory or approach has to 4e li9e to 4e +orth calling
'e$olutionary!. I shall ta9e it for granted that 'e$olution! is to 4e more than a casually applied term (to
+hich there can 4e no o4<ection), synonymous +ith 'de$elopment! or 'change!. ;or 'e$olutionary
theory! in the social sciences to ha$e a distincti$e meaning, I shall say, it should sho+ the follo+ing
characteristics. (I do not thin9 these are ar4itrary or o$erly strong.)
;irst, there must 4e at least some presumed conceptual continuity +ith 4iological e$olution. 8s the
a4o$e definitions ma9e clear, this is a criterion +hich many 4ut not all of those +ho regard themsel$es
as e$olutionary theorists are prone to emphasi>e. It is a claim that ma9es sense, for e$en if it originated
primarily +ithin social thought rather than in 4iology, it is the latter +hich has gi$en 'e$olution! a
fairly precise designation and ela4orated an account of e$olutionary transformations C one +hich
illuminates e$olution +ithout using any teleological notions at all. .o use the term 'e$olution! in the
social sciences is rather gratuitous if it does not ha$e at least some connections +ith the conceptual
$oca4ulary +hich has 4ecome esta4lished in 4iology. It does not follo+ from this that a complete
conceptual correspondence is either necessary or desira4le. )$olutionism, or at any rate Aar+inianism,
has recently come under strong attac9s +ithin natural science, and it is concei$a4le, if not at all li9ely,
that it may 4e discarded there +hile 4eing sustained in the realm of social science.
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"econd, social e$olutionism must specify something more than <ust a progression of change in
respect of certain designated criteria, that something 4eing a mechanism of change. .his point needs
loo9ing at in a certain amount of detail, 4ecause it is important. "ome e$olutionists tend to 4elie$e that
to defend the concept of e$olution in social theory, it is enough to sho+ that progression has occurred,
in respect of a certain social item or items, o$er the course of history from the earliest period of +hich
+e ha$e e$idence of human society up to the modern era. .hus, for e5ample, Bhite has constructed an
inde5 of e$olution on the 4asis of energy production. "ocieties, or in Bhite!s terminology, 'cultural
systems!, $ary as means of harnessing energy. "ome are more effecti$e in this regard than others.
Aifferent cultural systems may therefore 4e ran9ed along a scale 4y comparing coefficients deri$ed
from relating the amount of energy harnessed and e5pended to the num4er of human 4eings in$ol$ed
in those systems.
14
;rom Comte and "pencer on+ards, e$olutionary thin9ers ha$e referred to
increasing comple5ity, differentiation and so on. Ef course, 'e$olution! could 4e used <ust to refer to
such progression, a4stracted from time and space. It may 4e <ustifia4le to say, for e5ample, that small,
oral cultures are at one end of a continuum of energy consumption and distri4ution (or time6space
distanciation), +ith the modern, industriali>ed societies at the other. .here is no difficulty, either, in
sustaining the claim that certain technical de$elopments, or forms of social organi>ation, are
prere/uisites to others. ')$olution! in this sense is uncontentious as a concept. 3ut to use 'e$olution! in
this +ay is not to e5plain anything a4out social change and does not meet the criterion of ha$ing a
reasona4ly close affinity to 4iological e$olution.
.hird, a se/uence of stages of social de$elopment must 4e specified, in +hich the mechanism of
change is lin9ed to the displacement of certain types or aspects of social organi>ation 4y others. .hese
stages may 4e arranged in the form either of specific or of general e$olution, or some 9ind of
com4ination of the t+o. No presumption must 4e smuggled in such that progression up such an
e$olutionary scale means progress as <udged in terms of moral criteria, sa$e in so far as this is
e5plicitly <ustified in some +ay. 8s I shall emphasi>e 4elo+, e$olutionary theories are highly prone to
merge 'progression! +ith 'progress!
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4ecause of ethnocentric assumptions +hich, +hile pro4a4ly not logically implied in e$olutionism, are
$ery difficult in practice to a$oid.
;ourth, identifying a mechanism of social change means e5plaining change in some +ay +hich
applies across the +hole spectrum of human history, not as an e5clusi$e mechanism of change 4ut as
the dominant one. .here is no dou4t a4out the prime candidate here, since it figures some+here in
$irtually all e$olutionary theories, ho+e$er much they may differ in other respects. .his is 'adaptation!
C usually meaning adaptation to the material en$ironment.
Not all accounts of social change +hich depend upon the concept of adaptation are e$olutionary,
since they may not conform to the first three criteria. 3ut the notion of adaptation is so important in
e$olutionary theories that +ithout it they lose most of their cogency.
1(
It ma9es sense, therefore, to
hold that if in the e5plication of social change the concept of adaptation turns out to 4e +ithout $alue
(as I shall claim), e$olutionism is stripped of much of its appeal. 3ut I shall also pursue t+o further
critical a$enues of attac9 upon e$olutionary theories they force human history into a mould +hich it
does not fit descripti$ely, and they tend to 4e associated, although not ine$ita4ly, +ith a num4er of
unfortunate corollaries.
8daptation
.he concept of adaptation, used in a social conte5t, can 4e sho+n characteristically to 4e either (1)
$acuous, i.e., so +ide and $ague in its meaning as to 4e more confusing than illuminating, or (2)
implicated in a specious and logically deficient claim to functionalist e5planation, or (,) in$ol$ed in
the predication of dynamic tendencies in human societies that are demonstra4ly false.
.o address the first point the notion of adaptation can 4e used in a fairly precise +ay in 4iology,
+hence it deri$es,!! +here its usual meaning is to refer to modes in +hich the gene pool of organisms is
influenced 4y interaction +ith the en$ironment as a result of selecti$e sur$i$al traits. '8daptation! can
perhaps 4e formulated in a cogent +ay in social science if it is ta9en as a general la4el referring to the
gamut of processes +here4y human
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4eings respond to and modify features of their physical en$ironments. .hus %appaport defines the
term as 'the process 4y +hich organisms or groups of organisms, through responsi$e changes in their
states, structures, or compositions, maintain homeostasis in and among themsel$es in the face of 4oth
short6term en$ironmental fluctuations and long6term changes in the composition or structure of their
en$ironments!.: It is characteristic of e$olutionary social thought, ho+e$er, to e5tend this usage so
much that the term 4ecomes irremedia4ly amorphous. ;or instance, 0arding 4egins his discussion of
adaptation 4y defining the concept as 'the securing and conser$ing of control o$er the en$ironment!,
+hich is uno4<ectiona4le enough. 3ut he then goes on to say that in e$olutionary theory adaptation
concerns not <ust the relation 4et+een societies and nature 4ut 'the mutual ad<ustment of societies!.
Adaptation to nature will shape a culture's technology and derivatively its social and ideological
components. Yet adaptation to other cultures may shape society and ideology, which in turn act
upon technology and determine its future course. The total result of the adaptive process is the
production of an organized cultural whole, an integrated technology, society, and ideology, which
copes with the dual selective infuence of nature on the one hand and the impact of outside
cultures on the other.'"
8daptation here has simply 4ecome such a diffuse notion as to include all possi4le sources of
influence upon social organi>ation and transformationQ
.his sort of usage is entirely typical of e$olutionary theories in the social sciences (compare, for
e5ample, *arsons!s usage of the concept, discussed on pp. 220C1). .he reasons for this are plain
enough. Bhere 'adaptation! is specified +ith some degree of precision C as in the formulation 4y
%appaport C and +here +hat is adapted to is also clearly delimited, the notion is manifestly
inade/uate as a general mechanism of social change. If en$ironment means 'natural en$ironment!, and
if 'adapting! to it means responding to distinguisha4le changes in that en$ironment in +ays +hich ha$e
this effect of modifying e5isting organic or social traits, 'adaptation! simply is much too narro+ to 4e a
credi4le candidate for such a mechanism. It can 4e made plausi4le only 4y e5panding one or 4oth
aspects of its meaning C 4y
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including other societies (i.e., the 'social en$ironment!) +ithin the term 'en$ironment! andHor 4y
including as 'adaptation! more or less any ma<or social process +hich seems to further the chances of
maintaining a society in something li9e a sta4le form. Ence this has 4een done, ho+e$er, the concept
4ecomes so $ague that it is useless as a means of e5plaining anything at all.
"econd, it is often 4ecause of its $acuous character, as e5pressed in such formulations, that the
notion of adaptation features so +idely in spurious 'e5planations!. It is if little $alue indeed to claim
that those societies or types of society +hich ha$e sur$i$ed for a gi$en period of time, 4ecause they
sur$i$ed, must ha$e sur$i$ed. 3ut that is e5actly +hat e5planations +hich in$ol$e 'adaptation!
fre/uently amount to. .hus it is common to propose that the sur$i$al of a social item can 4e e5plained
in terms of its superior adapti$e capacity. 3ut ho+ is adapti$e capacity under6stood? In terms
compara4le +ith those a4o$e C all the elements +hich need to he in$o9ed if that item is to endure
+hile another does not. Bhere 'adaptation! is understood in a more limited +ay, ho+e$er, proffered
e5planations tend to 4e e/ually defecti$e, em4odying $ersions of functionalism.: 8n e5ample +hich is
typical of much of the rele$ant literature and has had a great deal of su4stanti$e influence is the
follo+ing, from 1. 0. Childe, +ho
starts from the obvious fact that man cannot live without eating. So a society cannot exist unless
its members can secure enough food to keep alive and reproduce. If any society approved beliefs
or institutions that cut of the food supply altogether (if for instance all Egyptian peasants had
felt obliged to work all year round building a superpyramid), or stopped reproduction (as a
universal and fanatical conviction of the virtue of celibacy would do), the society in question
would soon come to an end. In this limiting case it is quite obvious that the food supply must
exercise a fnal control in determining even beliefs and ideals. Presumably, then, methods of
getting a living in the end exercise a similar control more concretely. The way people get their
living should be expected in the long run to `determine' their beliefs and institutions.
20
0o+e$er, +hat is o4$ious to Childe does not follo+ at all from his premise. .o identify a functional
e5igency of a society or social item carries no implication at all, in and of itself, a4out its actual
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influence upon the shaping of the institutions +hich meet it.
.urning to the last of the three charges, adaptation +ould 4e gi$en e5planatory force if a dynamic
+ere found +hich success6fully interpreted the di$ersity and the succession of the ma<or types of
human society in history. 0ere e$olutionary theories sho+ themsel$es to 4e empirically +anting. If it
+ere the case that there +ere some sort of generali>ed moti$ational impulse for human 4eings
progressi$ely to 'adapt! more effecti$ely to their material en$ironments, there +ould 4e a 4asis for
sustaining e$olutionary theory. 3ut there is not any such compulsion.
21
8lternati$ely, it might 4e
supposed that some sort of e/ui$alent to natural selection could 4e found in respect of human
societies. .his is certainly +hat many nineteenth6century e$olutionists supposed. "pencer preferred his
term, 'sur$i$al of the fittest!, to 'natural selection!, 4ut the idea is the same. 0e interpreted 'sur$i$al!
less as a result of meeting the material re/uirements of a gi$en en$ironment than of 4esting other
societies militarily. .he formation of larger and larger societies through +ar, "pencer says, is an
ine$ita4le process through +hich the $arieties of men most adapted for social life supplant the less
adapted $arieties!.
22
3ut if this sort of $ie+ has 4ecome largely discarded today, e$en among
e$olutionists, it is for sound empirical reasons. .he influence of +ar upon social change is real
enough. 3ut military strength simply does not ha$e the o$erall e5planatory $alue necessary to turn
'adaptation! into a $ia4le e$olutionary mechanism. Ence +e start adding in other factors, ho+e$er, +e
are 4ac9 to the situation +here the concept e5plains e$erything and nothing.
)$olution and 0istory
0uman history does not ha$e an e$olutionary 'shape!, and positi$e harm can 4e done 4y attempting to
compress it into one. 0ere I shall list three reasons +hy human history does not resem4le an
e$olutionary model of the species and four dangers to +hich e$olutionary thought in the social
sciences is prone. #ost of the ground has 4een +ell6tra$ersed 4y critics of e$olutionism from the
nineteenth6century on+ards, 4ut it is perhaps +orth +hile spelling these items out. 8n e$olutionary
'shape! C a trun9 +ith 4ranches, or a clim4ing $ine, in +hich the elapsing of chrono6
112(233
logical time and the progression of the species are integrated C is an inappropriate metaphor 4y +hich
to analyse human society.
0uman 4eings ma9e their history in cogni>ance of that history, that is, as refle5i$e 4eings
cogniti$ely appropriating time rather than merely 'li$ing! it. .he point is a hac9neyed enough one, 4ut
usually figures in the discussions of e$olutionists only in relation to the /uestion of +hether or not
there is a distincti$e 4rea9 4et+een proto6humans and "omo sapiens. .hat is to say, they regard it
simply as something ne+ added to e5isting e$olutionary processes C another factor complicating
natural selection. .he nu4 of the matter, ho+e$er, is that the refle5i$e nature of human social life
su4$erts the e5plication of social change in terms of any simple and so$ereign set of causal
mechanisms. 1etting to 9no+ +hat goes on 'in! history 4ecomes not only an inherent part of +hat
'history! is 4ut also a means of transforming 'history!.
)$olutionary theory in 4iology depends upon postulates of the independence of the origin of species
and the unchangea4ility of species sa$e through mutation. .hese conditions do not apply in human
history. '"ocieties! simply do not ha$e the degree of 'closure! that species do. 3iologists can fairly
easily ans+er the /uestion +hat e$ol$es? 3ut there is no readily a$aila4le 'unit of e$olution! in the
sphere of the social sciences.
2,
I ha$e already made this point (pp. 1&,C8), 4ut it needs to 4e
repeated here. )$olutionists usually spea9 of the e$olution of either 'societies! or 'cultural systems!,
+ith the presumption that those +hich are most highly ad$anced are simply differentiated $ersions of
the less ad$anced. 3ut +hat constitutes a 'society! or 'culture! $aries +ith the $ery traits upon +hich
e$olutionary thin9ers tend to concentrate. .he de4ate 4et+een e$olutionists and 'diffusionists! helped
only to conceal this pro4lem 4ecause 4oth tended to treat societies or cultures as discrete entities,
differing primarily in respect of their di$ergent appraisals of the sources of change that affected them.
0uman history is not, to use 1ellner!s term, a '+orld6gro+th story!. 8s 1ellner remar9s, for t+o
centuries it has 4een difficult for anyone from the Best to
thin9 a4out human affairs +ithout the image . . . of an all6em4racing up+ard gro+th. . . . It
seemed a natural conclusion from the pattern of Bestern history, +hich +as generally treated as
the
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history of humanity. Western history seems to have a certain continuity and a certain persistent
upward swing or at any rate, so it seemed, and so it came to be taught. Emerging from the
river valleys of the Middle East, the story of civilization seems one of continuous and in the main
upward growth, only occasionally interrupted by plateaus or even retrogressions: history seemed
to creep gently around the shores of the Mediterranean and then up the Atlantic coast, things
getting better and better. Oriental empires, the Greeks, the Romans, Christianity, the Dark Ages,
the Renaissance, the Reformation, industrialization and struggle for social justice . . . the
familiar story, with variants especially in the later details, stresses and anticipation; all this is
extremely familiar and still forms the background image of history for most of us... . The picture
of course dovetailed with biological evolutionism, and the victory of Darwinism seemed to clinch
the matter. Two quite independent disciplines, history and biology, provided, it seemed, diferent
parts of the same continuous curve.
24
.he $oyage of the 4eagle sym4oli>ed, as it +ere, the <ourneys that 4rought )uropeans into contact
+ith di$erse and e5otic cultures, su4sumed and categori>ed +ithin an em4racing scheme in +hich the
Best naturally stood at the top. .here is no sign that e$olutionary schemes today are free from this sort
of ethnocentrism. Bhere can one find such a scheme in Bestern social science +hich holds that
traditional India is at the head of the scale? Er ancient China? Er, for that matter, modern India or
China?
2(
0o+e$er, there is no need to pose such /uestions C +hich are o4$iously not logically +aterproof in
terms of their damaging implications for e$olutionary theories C to sho+ that history is not a '+orld6
gro+th story!. .he history of "omo sapiens is more accurately portrayed as follo+s. No one can 4e
sure +hen "omo sapiens first appeared, 4ut +hat is certain is that for the $ast 4ul9 of the period during
+hich human 4eings ha$e e5isted they ha$e li$ed in small hunting6and6gathering societies. E$er most
of this period there is little discerni4le progression in respect of either social or technological change a
'sta4le state! +ould 4e a more accurate description. ;or reasons that remain highly contro$ersial, at a
certain point class6di$ided 'ci$ili>ations! come into 4eing, first of all in #esopotamia, then else+here.
3ut the relati$ely short period of history since then is not one mar9ed 4y the continuing
((23"))
ascent of ci$ili>ation= it conforms more to .oyn4ee!s picture of the rise and fall of ci$ili>ations and
their conflictual relations +ith tri4al chiefdoms. .his pattern is ended 4y the rise to glo4al pre6
eminence of the Best, a phenomenon +hich gi$es to 'history! /uite a different stamp from anything
that has gone 4efore, truncated into a tiny period of some t+o or three centuries. %ather than seeing the
modern +orld as a further accentuation of conditions that e5isted in class6di$ided societies, it is much
more illuminating to see it as placing a caesura upon the traditional +orld, +hich it seems irretrie$a4ly
to corrode and destroy. .he modern +orld is 4orn out of discontinuity +ith +hat +ent 4efore rather
than continuity +ith it. It is the nature of this discontinuity
the specificity of the +orld ushered in 4y the ad$ent of industrial capitalism, originally located and
founded in the Best
+hich it is the 4usiness of sociology to e5plain as 4est it can.
@et me conclude 4y 4riefly listing four dangers +hich e$olutionary thought courts C dangers +hich
are 4est a$oided 4y 4rea9ing +ith it in a radical +ay. .hey are those of +hat I shall call (1) unilineal
compression, (2) homological compression, (,) normati$e illusion and (4) temporal distortion.
.he first danger, unilineal compression, means the tendency of e$olutionary thin9ers to compress
general into specific e$olution. .hus feudalism precedes capitalism in )urope and is the social ne5us
from +hich capitalism de$elops. It is therefore, in one sense at least, the necessary forerunner of
capitalism. Is feudalism, then, a general 'stage! in the e$olution of capitalism?: "urely not, although
there are $ersions of #ar5ism, and other schools of social though also, that +ould ha$e it thus.
3y homological compression, the second danger, I refer to the tendency of some +riters to imagine
that there is a homology 4et+een the stages of social e$olution and the de$elopment of the indi$idual
personality. It is +orth discussing this in at least moderate detail 4ecause although it does not directly
depend upon the postulates of e$olutionism discussed thus far, it is none the less /uite often associated
+ith e$olutionary thought. 3aldly stated, it is supposed that small, oral cultures are distinguished 4y
forms of cognition, affecti$ity or conduct found only at the relati$ely early stages of the de$elopment
of the indi$idual in more e$ol$ed societies. .he le$el of comple5ity of societal organi>ation, for
instance, may 4e supposed to 4e mirrored 4y
((246))
that of personality de$elopment. 8 correlate of this $ie+ is that increased comple5ity of society
implies a heightened degree of repression of affect. ;reud!s Civilization and its Discontents is the
locus classicus of such a standpoint. ;reud uses the term 'ci$ili>ation! to refer to 'the +hole sum of
the achie$ements and the regulations +hich distinguish our li$es from those of our animal ancestors
and +hich ser$e t+o purposes C namely to protect men against nature, and to ad<ust their mutual
relations!.
5
! In strongly emphasi>ing progressi$e control o$er the material +orld, ;reud!s discussion of
'ci$ili>ation! C a notion a4out +hich much more could 4e said C shares some strong affinities +ith
historical materialism. *erhaps it is not as surprising as may appear at first sight, then, that some
#ar5ists ha$e pic9ed up other aspects of ;reud!s conception of social de$elopment.
#arcuse!s attempt to harness ;reud!s interpretation of !ci$ili>ation! to a criti/ue of the capitalist mode
of production accepts the fundamentals of ;reud!s $ie+. .he transmutation of !animal man! into the
'human 4eing! represents a mo$ement from primiti$e 4ar4arism to ci$ili>ation
#arcuse differs from ;reud only in supposing that the 'struggle +ith nature! that is the 4asis of human
material e5istence can 4e alle$iated 4y the producti$e forces generated 4y, 4ut not capa4le of humane
e5pression +ithin, the economic order of capitalism.
8 compara4le utili>ation of ;reud, although stripped of the $ision of a radical reconstitution of
society, is to 4e found in the +ritings of )lias. )lias 4uilds his theory $ery directly around the theorem
that increasing comple5ity of social life necessarily entails increased psychological repression
From the earliest period of the history of the Occident to the present, social functions have become
more and more diferentiated under the pressure of competition. The more diferentiated they
become, the larger grows the number of functions and thus of
((241))
people on whom the individual depends in all his actions. . . . As more and more people must
attune their conduct to that of others, the web of actions must be organized more and more
strictly and accurately.... The individual is compelled to regulate his conduct in an increasingly
diferentiated, more even and stable manner... . The web of actions grows so complex and so
extensive, the efort to behave `correctly' within it becomes so great, that beside the individual's
conscious self-control an absolute, blindly functioning apparatus of self-control is frmly
established.''
)lias does stress certain specific characteristics of the modern Best, 4ut these are largely su4merged in
a generali>ed e$olution6ism. In the 'less comple5 societies! there is lo+er indi$idual self6control,
greater spontaneous e5pression of emotion, etc. *eople in such societies are rather li9e children,
spontaneous and $olatile.
If this $ie+ is +rong, as I 4elie$e it to 4e, there is a $ariety of implications that can 4e dra+n as
regards 4oth the nature of modern capitalism and the li4erating potential that it might contain.
,0
3ut
+hy is it +rong, and +hat type of perspecti$e should replace it? In some part +e ha$e to loo9 to the
findings of modern anthropology, +hich surely dispel the idea that !primiti$e societies! are primiti$e in
anything other than their material technology. .he study of language perhaps pro$ides something of a
4aseline here. .here simply is no discerni4le correlation 4et+een linguistic comple5ity and the le$el of
material !ad$ance6ment! of different societies. .his fact in itself +ould indicate that there is unli9ely to
4e any general differences of psychic organi>ation 4et+een oral cultures on the one hand and
!ci$ili>ations! on the other. Be ha$e to 4e careful e$en +ith the supposition that ci$ili>ations are more
comple5 than oral cultures. Ci$ili>ations C 4ut, a4o$e all, that specific form of glo4al order ushered
in 4y the ascendancy of the Best o$er the past t+o centuries C in$ol$e greater time6space
distanciation than do oral cultures. .hey 4rac9et more e5tensi$e segments of time (pro4a4ly) and
space (certainly). 0o+e$er, some features of social acti$ity found in oral cultures, such as those
associated +ith 9inship institutions, are e5ceptionally comple5. Ef course, it might 4e pointed out that
;reud!s $ie+, and that of others +ho ha$e adopted a similar position, is centred upon the repression of
affect, or relati$e lac9 of it, in oral cultures. 3ut the e$idence
((242))
simply does not support the proposition that such cultures are uni$ersally associated +ith spontaneity
of emotional e5pression. "ome oral cultures (as the ego psychologists, among others, ha$e sought to
demonstrate) ha$e $ery strong moral prohi4itions that co$er a range of daily conduct, and the
repressions inculcated in child training may 4e $ery se$ere.:
3y the tendency of e$olutionary theory to normati$e illusion, the third danger, I mean the inclination
to identify superior po+er, economic, political or military, +ith moral superiority on an e$olutionary
scale. "uch an inclination is no dou4t closely related to the ethnocentric connotations of e$olutionism,
4ut it is not e5actly the same thing. .he concept of adaptation is again a ha>ardous one in this
connection. It has an ethically neutral sound, as if superior 'adapti$e capacity! +ere ipso facto
superiority in respect of normatively superior social traits. 5hen applied to human societies, however,
the term is more often than not a synonym for sheer might. .f the adage that might does not confer
right is an old one, it is fre6uently forgotten by evolutionary theorists as a conse6uence of their very
evolutionism.
(2
;inally, 4y temporal distortion, the fourth danger, I mean the procli$ity of e$olutionary thin9ers to
presume that 'history! can 4e +ritten only as social change, that the elapsing of time is the same thing
as change, the confusion of 'history! +ith 'historicity!.
Is historical materialism a form of e$olutionism? Bith certain reser$ations, +e may say that it is, if
the term is understood in a certain +ay. "uppose 'historical materialism! is understood in a $ery
general sense. .he term thus appropriated can refer to the idea, stated in the /uotation 'human 4eings
ma9e history!, that human social life is formed and reformed in praxis in the practical acti$ities
carried out in the enactment of e$eryday life. .his is e5actly the 9ind of $ie+ I ha$e tried to argue for
in setting out the 4asic tenets of structuration theory. 3ut 'historical materialism! is more commonly
used, especially among those +ho designate themsel$es #ar5ists, in a much more definite sense and
one +hich certainly has a great deal of te5tual support in #ar5. .his is 'historical materialism! 4ased
on the scheme of societal de$elopment +hich #ar5 and )ngels s9etch out in the first fe+ pages of
The German Ideology and in the Communist Manifesto and +hich #ar5 states succinctly and
4rilliantly in the '*reface! to 0 Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy.
((243))
.he $ie+s esta4lished in these sources conform to all the main criteria 4y +hich I ha$e identified
e$olutionism and also carry some of its no5ious secondary implications. It is true that #ar5 sometimes
+rote as though he +ere doing no more than producing a history of Bestern )urope. 3ut he +as surely
not <ust +riting an interpretati$e account of one corner of the +orld. 0is scheme of de$elopment,
in$ol$ing tri4al society, the ancient +orld, feudalism, capitalism, plus the 8siatic mode of production,
is an e$olutionary frame+or9 in +hich adaptation, in the guise of the e5pansion of the forces of
,
production, plays the leading role. Bhy is the 8siatic form of society 'stagnant! compared +ith the
Best? 3ecause it does not allo+ for the de$elopment of the forces of production 4eyond a certain
point. It +ould, of course, 4e a mista9e to 4rac9et #ar5 too closely +ith other $ersions of nineteenth6
century e$olutionism, his admiration for Aar+in not+ithstanding. 0is preoccupation +ith the
increasing mastery of nature +hich human 4eings achie$e e5presses a $ersion of the notion of
adaptation not essentially different from many other uses of the idea. 3ut in #ar5 there is an in$erted
0egelian dialectic, tortured into a particular de$elopmental shape, that has no direct analogue in more
orthodo5 e$olutionary theories.
#ar5!s e$olutionism is a '+orld6gro+th story! and displays the shortcomings of unilineal
compression and temporal distortion. 3ut one must o4<ect to it primarily in terms of the role it accords
to adapti$e mechanisms. Childe!s $ersion of historical materialism may 4e in some respects a
peculiarly crude one, 4ut it does ha$e the $irtue of 4ringing into the open assumptions that are often
more surreptitiously made. .he fact that human 4eings must sur$i$e in the material en$ironments in
+hich they li$e tells us nothing a4out +hether +hat they do in order to sur$i$e plays a dominant role
in social transformation.
I do not thin9 it possi4le to repair the shortcomings of either e$olutionary theory in general or
historical materialism in particular.: .hat is +hy I spea9 of deconstructing them. Be cannot replace
them, in other +ords, +ith a theory of a similar form. In e5plaining social change no single and
so$ereign mechanism can 4e specified= there are no 9eys that +ill unloc9 the mysteries of human
social de$elopment, reducing them to a unitary formula, or that +ill account for the ma<or transitions
4et+een societal types in such a +ay either.
((244))
8nalysing "ocial Change
.he foregoing considerations do not mean that +e cannot generali>e a4out social change and do not
imply that +e should relin/uish all general concepts in terms of +hich change might 4e analysed.
;i$e concepts are particularly rele$ant in this respect. I ha$e mentioned three C structural principles,
time6space edges and intersocietal systems C in the pre$ious chapter. .o these I +ant to add the
notions of episodic characteri,ation (or, more 4riefly, episodes) and world time.
,4
Structural principles (nalysis of o/es of institutional articulation
+piso/ic characteri5ations 0elineation of o/es of institutional chan$e of copara!le for
&ntersocietal systes Specification of relations !et3een societal totalities
Tie-Space e/$es &n/ication of connections !et3een societies of /ifferin$ structural type
:orl/ tie +.aination of con4unctures in the li$ht of refle.ively onitore/ ;history;
8ll social life is episodic, and I intend the notion of episode, li9e most of the concepts of
structuration theory, to apply to the +hole range of social acti$ity. .o characteri>e an aspect of social
life as an episode is to regard it as a num4er of acts or e$ents ha$ing a specifia4le 4eginning and end,
thus in$ol$ing a particular se/uence. In spea9ing of large6scale episodes I mean identifia4le se/uences
of change affecting the main institutions +ithin a societal totality, or in$ol$ing transitions 4et+een
types of societal totality. @et us ta9e as an e5ample the emergence of agrarian states. .o treat the
formation of a state as an episode means analytically cutting into 'history!, that is, identifying certain
elements as mar9ing the opening of a se/uence of change and tracing through that se/uence as a
process of institutional transmutation. "tate formation has to 4e studied in the conte5t of the
in$ol$ement of a pre6e5isting society in 4roader intersocietal relations (+ithout, of course, neglecting
endogenous forms of change), e5amined in the conte5t of the structural principles implicated in the
rele$ant societal totalities. .hus the accumulation
((245))
of surplus production on the part of spatially pro5imate $illage communities in areas of high potential
fertility may 4e one type of pattern leading to the emergence of a state com4ining those communities
under a single order of administration. 3ut it is only one among others. In many cases the co6
ordination of military po+er used coerci$ely to esta4lish a rudimentary state apparatus is the most
important factor. 8grarian states al+ays e5ist along time6space edges in uneasy relations of sym4iosis
and conflict +ith, and partial domination o$er, surrounding tri4al societies, as +ell, of course, +ith
other states +hich may struggle for hegemony o$er a gi$en area. .o insist that social change 4e studied
in '+orld time! is to emphasi>e the influence of $arying forms of inter6societal system upon episodic
transitions. If all social life is contingent, all social change is con<unctural. .hat is to say, it depends
upon con<unctions of circumstances and e$ents that may differ in nature according to $ariations of
conte5t, +here conte5t (as al+ays) in$ol$es the refle5i$e monitoring 4y the agents in$ol$ed of the
conditions in +hich they 'ma9e history!.
Be can categori>e modes of social change in terms of the dimensions represented 4elo+, these 4eing
com4ined in the assessment of the nature of specific forms of episode. In analysing the origins of an
episode, or series of episodes studied in a comparati$e fashion, $arious sorts of consideration are
ordinarily rele$ant. In the modern +orld the e5pansion in the time6space distanciation of social
systems, the intert+ining of different modes of regionali>ation in$ol$ed in processes of une$en
de$elopment, the prominence of contradictions as structural features of societies,
,(
the pre$alence of
historicity as a mo4ili>ing force of social organi>ation and transmutation C all these factors and more
supply a 4ac9drop to assessing the particular origins of an episode.
((246))
In referring to the type of social change in$ol$ed in an episode I mean to indicate 4oth ho+
intensi$e and ho+ e5tensi$e it is C that is to say, ho+ profoundly a series of changes disrupts or
reshapes an e5isting alignment of institutions and ho+ +ide6ranging such changes are. Ene idea that is
rele$ant here, +hich I ha$e outlined in some detail in other sources,
,
is that there may 4e 'critical
thresholds! of change characteristic of transitions 4et+een o$erall societal types. 8 set of relati$ely
rapid changes may generate a long6term momentum of de$elopment, that de$elopment 4eing possi4le
only if certain 9ey institutional transformations are accomplished initially. '#omentum! refers to the
rapidity +ith +hich change occurs in relation to specific forms of episodic characteri>ation, +hile
'tra<ectory! concerns the direction of change, as mentioned earlier.
@et us loo9 4riefly at the pro4lem of the emergence of agrarian states in order to illustrate the
concepts <ust introduced. 0o+ far can the de$elopment of such states 4e regarded as a single type of
episode? )$en such an apparently innocuous /uestion turns out to 4e much harder to ans+er than is
suggested 4y the relati$e simplicity of most theories +hich ha$e 4een put for+ard a4out such states C
for e5ample, that they ha$e their origins in +arfare, in irrigation schemes, in the rapid accumulation of
surplus production and so on. .o ma9e an episodic characteri>ation, as I ha$e mentioned, means
ma9ing a num4er of conceptual decisions a4out +hat social form is the 'starting point! of a presumed
se/uence of change, a4out +hat the typical tra<ectory of de$elopment is and a4out +here the 'end
point! is said to 4e.
;irst of all, +e might register that the term 'state! is an am4iguous one. It can refer either to the
o$erall form of a 'state64ased society! or to go$ernmental institutions of a definite type +ithin such a
society. .o simplify the issue, I shall ta9e 'state! for this purpose to mean the second of these
alternati$es. .he initial characteri>ation pro4lem, then, 4ecomes one of deciding the main contrasts
4eing loo9ed for in <u5taposing circumstances in +hich certain political institutions e5ist to those in
+hich they do not. .his /uestion does seem to admit of an ans+er, although not an uncontro$ersial
one. ;ollo+ing Nadel, +e may suppose that a state e5ists +hen the follo+ing conditions are found (a)
centrali>ed organs of go$ernment, associated +ith (4) claims to legitimate territorial control and (c) a
distinct dominant elite or class, ha$ing
((242))
definite modes of training, recruitment and status attri4utes.: "uch a formulation, or one $ery much
li9e it, has 4een adopted 4y many prominent contri4utors to the field, nota4ly in the case of classic
discussion of ;ortes and )$ans6*ritchard.: Bhat is the o4$erse, the type of social situation from +hich
states de$elop? .he ans+er might 4e thought to 4e self6e$ident C societies +hich do not possess state
institutions as defined a4o$e. 3ut matters are not, in fact, so o4$ious, or they are so only if +e
unthin9ingly apply an endogenous model. ;or it is pro4a4ly not usually the case that state institutions
de$elop +ithin an already constituted 'society! that remains more or less unchanged. En the contrary,
the de$elopment of states $ery often fuses pre$iously unarticulated social entities and may at the same
time 4rea9 up others that ha$e e5isted hitherto.
Be ha$e to 4ear this point in mind +hen distinguishing states from chiefdoms. It may 4e that the
latter are usually the antecedents of the former (and remain +hen states are destroyed or collapse), 4ut
the one rarely deri$es simply from the 'e5pansion! or 'internal differentiation! of the other. .he
distinction 4et+een states and chiefdoms is 4y no means as easy to ma9e as is seemingly often
presumed in the anthropological literature. .he normal 4asis of the distinction has to do +ith
centrali>ation. In contrast to states, chiefdoms ha$e a range of e/ui$alent office holders, under the
chief= these offices entail more or less the same po+er and status. .here is no dou4t that this
distinction does help to order the rele$ant empirical materials. None the less, the di$iding line can 4e
$ariously placed. Consider, for e5ample, the case of .ahiti.: 0ere there +ere three endogenous descent
groups, stratified in some degree 4y status and political responsi4ility. Chiefs, presided o$er 4y a
paramount chief, +ere dra+n from the upper of these groups +ithin different parts of the island. 3ut
are these groups +orth calling 'states!? Claessen says yes,
4
R 4ut the author +ho has de$oted most
energy to studying ancient .ahitian society, Eli$er, says no.
41
.he difference of opinion is not so much empirical as conceptual. It is important 4ecause it is
symptomatic of the difficulties in$ol$ed in specifying classes of social o4<ects. #y $ie+ is that
Claessen ma9es the criteria for the e5istence of states too la5. Ef course, it is apparent enough that
criteria of classification and the predication of definite mechanisms of
((248))
institutional articulation are not independent issues. Ene cannot start out +ith a theoretically neutral
ta5onomy and then later in<ect a theoretical interpretation into it. .hus on the 4asis of a sur$ey of
t+enty6one 'early states! Claessen claims that there is no specific association 4et+een such states and
ur4anism. 3ut, in fact, nearly all of the e5amples cited to reach this conclusion 4elong to his category
of inchoate states!, +hich +ould seem to me to 4e more accurately designated as chiefdoms.
42
0o+ should +e specify the tra<ectory of change to 4e loo9ed at? 8s posed in the e5isting literature,
this /uestion is often ans+ered not only +ithin an endogenous frame+or9 4ut also +ith regard to
implicitly e$olutionary premises. .hat is to say, it is posed in a unidirectional +ay, as to do only +ith
the de$elopment of states, the e5istence of the state 4eing ta9en as the end6point of the process. 3ut
+hy should episodes in$ol$ing agrarian states 4e thought of e5clusi$ely, e$en primarily, in this
fashion? .he de$elopment of a state in one particular region $ery often coincides +ith, and perhaps
4rings a4out, the dissolution or attenuation of other neigh4ouring states. .he dissolution of states is
no less common an occurrence than their initial formation, and there is little rationale for
concentrating on the one process to the e5clusion of the other C especially in so far as they are
recurrently lin9ed together. I +ould therefore 4e inclined to characteri>e the issue as follo+s. In
understanding processes of institutional change affecting agrarian states, +e are see9ing to analyse the
conditions gi$ing rise to the intersecting relations 4et+een chiefdoms and state forms.
)5pressed in this +ay, it should 4e clear +hy such a position is at odds +ith the usual concentration
on the 'origins! of the state. It is also unsurprising that the large literature on the 'origins! of the state
has not come up +ith support for the sorts of all6en$eloping generali>ation that ha$e often 4een
$entured. .hese fall into $arious types, according to the causal forces gi$en priority.!! *ro4a4ly the
most influential are those +hich emphasi>e demographic factors, +ar and the gro+th of the forces of
production. Childe!s +ritings ha$e had a su4stantial impact upon theories +hich are in the third of
these categories= in archaeology his +or9 has pro4a4ly 4een a more important source of #ar5ist
influence than the +ritings of #ar5 and )ngels themsel$es. .heories of this type tend to 4e strongly
e$olutionary and to
((24"))
presume that the 'origins! of the state are associated +ith either sheer technological change or the
accumulation of surplus production. Bhere such $ie+s do not amount to false functionalist
'e5planations!, they are simply inconsistent +ith empirical data. .here are some cases +hich come
close to fitting the 4ill C that is to say, +here surplus accumulation precedes the de$elopment of a
state and +here an emergent ruling class 'pushes! to+ards state formation. 3ut these are e5ceptional.:
*hases of state formation are often connected +ith declining producti$ity and +ealth rather than the
re$erse, although sometimes goods may 4e plundered from surrounding areas.
.he '+arfare theory! has attracted many adherents 4ecause if there is one aspect of agrarian (and
industriali>ed) states +hich is more or less chronic, it is participation in +ar. "pencer!s $ersion of
e$olutionism, of course, attri4uted great significance to +arfare prior to the de$elopment of the
industrial age. Bar is definitely $ery commonly in$ol$ed in the formation and the disintegration of
states C +hich, as I ha$e stressed, is often one and the same process. 3ut it is one thing to say that
states fre/uently engage in +arli9e acti$ities= it is another to say that such acti$ities play a dominant or
determinant role in the origins of those states and yet another to say that they play this role in the
formation (or decline) of all agrarian states. .he first statement is uno4<ectiona4le. .he second is at
4est only partially $alid. .he third is simply erroneous. Aemographic theories scarcely fare 4etter.
.hey usually suggest that population increase, the result of increasing 4irth rates in populations +hose
a$aila4le li$ing space is relati$ely confined, creates pressure leading to centrali>ation of authority and
differentiation of po+er.: Certainly, state64ased societies are larger, often $ery much larger, than tri4al
orders. Aemographic theories are often associated +ith the idea that the 'neolithic re$olution!
stimulates population increase, leading to state formation. 3ut this does not +or9 on either a general or
a more specific le$el. .he 4eginning of the neolithic is distant from the de$elopment of any 9no+n
state64ased societies. In more specific terms, it does not turn out that those states +hich +ere formed
in physically confined areas al+ays follo+ a 4uild6up of population pressure. .here are some instances
that seem to accord fairly +ell +ith the theory, 4ut many do not. .hus, e5amining state formation in
the Jalley of #e5ico and in #esopotamia, Aumont
((250))
reaches the conclusion that population gro+th cannot e5plain the de$elopment of state forms,
although the former is associated +ith the latter.: Ether research indicates that population may decline
in the period prior to state formation.
42
"ome accounts of state formation emphasi>e relations 4et+een societies other than that of +ar.
.hus *olanyi has studied the impact of long6distance trade on the de$elopment of states.
4
: .o my
9no+ledge, no one has offered this as a generali>ed theory of state formation= if anyone did, it +ould
fare e$en +orse than those mentioned a4o$e. .his sort of $ie+point does at least call attention to
aspects of the importance of intersocietal systems in processes of state formation and decay. 0o+e$er,
the mention neither of +ar nor of trade confronts the analytical issue of the nature of intersocietal
systems. 8s I ha$e stressed in the pre$ious chapter, it +ill not do to thin9 of such systems only as a
series of relations lin9ing clearly delimited societal +holes. .o study such systems means at the same
time to discard the assumption that the /uestion of +hat a 'society! is admits of a ready and easy
ans+er. Consider again the sorts of e5ample discussed 4y )4erhard. In a single geographical arena
numerous societies may e5ist in relati$ely close physical pro5imity 4ut +ithout much direct contact
4et+een them, although all are nominally or actually su4<ect to political rule from a centre.
4-
3y
contrast, in such an arena there may e5ist interlaced groupings /uite differently located in time6space
C this is one of the phenomena I ha$e in mind in spea9ing of 'time6space edges!. .hus, as in
traditional China, in #oghul India the 4ul9 of the Indian farmers had $irtually no contact +ith the
#oghuls. .heir languages, customs and religion +ere different. .he 4ig merchants +ere only
peripherally part of '#oghul society!, 4ut most of their contacts and affiliations +ith groups +ere
distri4uted o$er large distances, stretching across the su4continent and the +hole of the Near )ast.
#uch the same +as true of the priests, +ho 4elonged to associations spanning the su4continent and
sometimes 4eyond.
We should not be astonished to fnd certain folk tales in the whole Near East, in some parts of
South Asia and, fnally, on the Fu-kien coast of China, while we do not fnd them in the
Philippines or on Hainan Island. Miao tribes in Kui-chou for centuries preserved their own
customs, beliefs and tales in spite of Chinese settlements only a few miles away in which other
customs, beliefs and tales
((251))
were propagated. Miao and Chinese in such places did not interact, as a rule, except in the felds
of economic exploitation or military aggression. But the Miao in Kui-chou might have had the
same customs as Miao in Viet-nam because as we can often prove some contacts were
maintained even over long distances and long periods.
SO
.he points made so far suggest that theories of the 'origins! of the state tend to suffer from
shortcomings deri$ing from the characteri>ation of episodes in an endogenous andHor e$olutionary
form and a failure to e5amine societal organi>ation and change in the conte5t of intersocietal systems.
3ut to these ha$e to 4e added a neglect of the impact of '+orld time!. *utting these together, +e can
come to see that the type of theory often loo9ed to as e5plaining 'state origins! turns out to 4e a
chimera. In spea9ing of the influence of '+orld time!, I do not mean the arranging of e$ents or
happenings in a calendar of +orld history. I mean t+o things referred to 4y )4erhard in his use of the
phrase (although these are not clearly distinguished 4y him). )ach concerns factors limiting
generali>ations that might 4e made a4out types of episode. Ene refers to con<unctures, the other to the
influence of human 9no+ledgea4ility on social change. 3y 'con<unctures! I mean the interaction of
influences +hich, in a particular time and place, ha$e rele$ance to a gi$en episode C in this case, state
formation or decline. .he con<uncture of circumstances in +hich one process of de$elopment occurs
may 4e /uite different from that of another, e$en if their 'outcomes! C e.g. the consolidation of a
similar type of state apparatus C are similar. In order to understand ho+ this may come a4out, it is
essential to consider human refle5i$ity C and this is e5actly +hat many theories of state formation do
not do. Con<unctural conditions could 4e treated as compara4le +ith the '4oundary conditions! of la+s
+ere it not the case that they can enter into the thin9ing, and therefore the conduct, of human actors
+ho are a+are of them.
8dopting 4its of each of the theories pre$iously mentioned a4o$e, Claessen and "9alni9 list the
follo+ing elements as rele$ant to e5plaining state formation, although these are not al+ays found, they
say, and their relati$e importance may $ary from instance to instance
(1) population gro+th or pressure=
((252))
2)
+ar, con/uest or their threat=
,)
technological progress or the production of a surplus=
4)
ideology and legitimation=
()
the influence of already e5isting states.
(1
Bhile these are offered as if they +ere 'factors! of e/ui$alent logical status, (() is, in fact, different
from the others. .a9ing (() seriously means coping +ith all the issues I ha$e mentioned pre$iously in
regard to intersocietal systems, time6space edges and '+orld time!. It is simply a4surd to compress
these into a single additional 'factor! to 4e added to the other ones mentioned.
Be can 4egin to unpac9 some of the pro4lems in$ol$ed 4y considering the distinction introduced 4y
;ried, and +idely adopted since then, 4et+een 'pristine! and 'secondary! states.
(2
*ristine or primal
states are those +hich de$elop in areas +here no state forms ha$e pre$iously e5isted= secondary states
are those de$eloping in areas +here others ha$e e5isted 4efore them or are to 4e found near4y. .he
differences 4et+een these supply at least one main a5is in '+orld time! and 4ring intersocietal relations
directly into play. I ta9e it that my pre$ious discussion has indicated that the empirical identification of
primal states is e5ceedingly difficult. It is not possi4le to define primal states as those +hich ha$e
4ecome formed in geographically isolated en$ironments. ;or the influence of forms of political
organi>ation +hich are simply '9no+n a4out! are enough to ma9e a state a secondary state. .hus )gypt
of the Eld Iingdom is sometimes regarded as a primal state on the 4asis that it apparently de$eloped
in a geographically protected milieu (although the archaeological e$idence on this is, in fact, $ery
meagre). 3ut all that this means is that no pre$ious state form is 9no+n to ha$e e5isted there. .he
impact of pre6e5isting #esopotamian states certainly cannot 4e discounted.
(,
.he implication I +ish to dra+ is that the categories of primal and secondary states are highly
im4alanced. Instances of primal states are hard to come 4y, and in the nature of the case +e are ne$er
going to 4e a4le to 4e sure that cases +hich loo9 to 4e plausi4le candidates for 4elonging in the
category are any more than that. ;or it may 4e, of course, that traces of prior state influences ha$e
simply disappeared. It certainly follo+s that, +hile there is no 4ar to speculating a4out the modes of
((253))
de$elopment of primal states, it may 4e /uite misleading to treat +hat is 9no+n a4out them as a 4asis
for theori>ing a4out processes of state formation in general. It is li9ely to 4e $ery much more fruitful
to regard 'secondary states! as prototypical C that is to say, states +hich de$elop in a +orld, or in
regions of the +orld, +here there are already either states or political formations ha$ing a considera4le
degree of centrali>ation.
In a +orld of already e5isting states there is no difficulty in e5plaining the a$aila4ility of the idea of
the state, or of models of state formation, that could 4e follo+ed 4y aspiring leaders and their
follo+erships. Be are all familiar +ith the fact that the leaders of 7apan in recent times /uite
deli4erately C although after a good deal of e5ternal pressure from the Best C decided to adopt a
certain model of industrial de$elopment deri$ed from prior )uropean and 8merican e5perience. Bhile
this e5ample is no dou4t unusual in so far as the changes initiated +ere /uite sudden and $ery far6
reaching, it is hardly only in recent times that human 4eings in one conte5t ha$e 4een concerned to
emulate, or 4orro+ from, those in another in order to offset their po+er or influence. .he steps
in$ol$ed in state formation, in other +ords, ha$e pro4a4ly hardly e$er 4een un9no+n to those +ho
ha$e played leading parts in such a process. It is enough to surmise that state 4uilders ha$e almost
al+ays 4een a+are of ma<or aspects of the nature and 4asis of po+er of centrali>ed political formations
in order to e5plain a good deal a4out ho+ states ha$e come into 4eing and declined. Be do not ha$e to
imagine that it +as e$er common for indi$iduals or groupings to ha$e o$erall organi>ational plans in
mind for social change and then to set a4out implementing them. .hat is $ery largely a phenomenon of
the modern era.
Bhat, then, might a theory of state formation loo9 li9e, recast in these terms? ;irst of all, +e ha$e to
remem4er the point that the operation of generali>ed 'social forces! presumes specifia4le moti$ation on
the part of those influenced 4y them. .o spea9 of, for e5ample, 'population e5pansion! as a
contri4uting cause of state formation implies certain moti$ational patterns prompting definite sorts of
response to that e5pansion (and in$ol$ed in 4ringing it a4out). "econd, the influence of '+orld time!
means that there are li9ely to 4e considera4le differences in respect of the ma<or influences upon state
formation= an o$erall account
((254))
+hich +ill fit in some cases +ill not do so in others. .his does not mean that generali>ations a4out
state formation as a type of episode are +ithout $alue. 0o+e$er, they +ill pro4a4ly apply to a more
limited range of historical conte5ts and periods than the originators of most of the more prominent
theories ha$e had in mind.
#i$ure 12
Carneiro!s theory might 4e ta9en as an e5ample. 8 formal representation of it can 4e gi$en as in
figure 12. Carneiro emphasi>es the importance of +arfare in the origin of states. 3ut +arfare is more
or less chronic in societies of all 9inds, he says, and is thus not a sufficient e5planation of state
formation. Bar tends to lead to the formation of states, he claims, +hen those in$ol$ed are penned into
physically circumscri4ed areas of agricultural land, such as the Nile, .igrisC)uphrates and Indus
$alleys, the Jalley of #e5ico or the mountain and coastal $alleys of *eru. In such circumstances
+arfare may come to set up a pressure upon scarce resources +here migration out of the area is
unli9ely to occur. )sta4lished +ays of life come under strain, inducing some groups to see9 military
ascendancy o$er others and fostering attempts to centrali>e control o$er production. *opulation gro+th
tends to 4e a highly important contri4utory factor 4oth in stimulating conflicts o$er resources and in
promoting centrali>ation of administrati$e authority.
(4
8n entire $alley e$entually 4ecomes unified
under a single chiefdom, +hich, +ith further concentration of administrati$e resources, 4ecomes
distinguisha4le as a state. .he state may then push its o+n 4oundaries out+ards to con/uer and a4sor4
surrounding peoples. It is here (although Carneiro does not say so) that the theory
((255))
presumes the primacy of certain types of moti$e C and, +e can add, the li9ely influence of strategies,
models or diffuse influences from pre6e5isting political forms. It has to 4e inferred that in the face of
pressure on resources and esta4lished modes of conduct, those in$ol$ed do not alter such modes of
conduct so as to rene+ social co6operation. Kne/ual di$ision of resources does not follo+
mechanically from population pressure. 8lso, tendencies to+ards the strengthening of centrali>ed
control +ill not happen +illy6nilly in such a situation. .hey are li9ely to in$ol$e some sort of refle5i$e
understanding of 'social needs! 4y actors engaged in policies that strengthen such control, although no
one might intend the outcomes +hich actually come a4out.
8s is common in much of the rele$ant anthropological and archaeological literature, Carneiro!s
discussion is offered as a theory of the 'origin of the state!. .he phrase normally tends to refer to
primal states, although this is not made +holly clear in +hat the author has to say. I thin9 it is more
$alua4le, for reasons already mentioned, to mo$e a+ay from the distinction 4et+een primary and
secondary states. .he $ery same pattern as Carneiro treats as in$ol$ed in the 'origin! of the state may
also 4e a process of political dissolution or fragmentation. Carneiro!s theory is an interesting and
elegant one, 4ut it does not follo+ that in order to 4e defended it has to apply to all 9no+n cases of
state formation, e$en if it +ere possi4le easily to distinguish primal from secondary states. Carneiro
admits that cases can 4e readily found +hich the theory does not seem to fit. 0e then tries to modify it
in such a +ay as to gi$e it uni$ersal application, 4elie$ing that if it does not ha$e such a uni$ersal
character there must 4e something +rong +ith the theory. "tates do not al+ays de$elop in physically
confined geographical areas. .o co$er such cases, Carneiro introduces a concept of +hat he calls
'resource concentration!. Bhere natural resources are particularly concentrated +ithin any gi$en area,
people tend to 4ecome dra+n to that area, leading to a cro+ding of population +ithin it. Ence there is
a fairly dense population +ithin the area in /uestion, the pattern of state de$elopment +ill tend to
occur. 0o+e$er, thus e5tended the theory no longer loo9s as plausi4le, and it is surely 4est to conclude
that it only co$ers certain types of cases of state formation, not all. Ef course, it is $ery important to
see9 to disco$er <ust +here the limits of its $alidity lie. 3ut the fact that it
((256))
ser$es to illuminate only a gi$en range of instances does not necessarily imply that it is logically
fla+ed.
Change and *o+er
8nyone +ho reflects upon the phrase 'human 4eings ma9e history!, particularly +ithin the 4roader
scope of #ar5!s +ritings, is ine$ita4ly led to consider /uestions of conflict and po+er. ;or, in #ar5!s
$ie+, the ma9ing of history is done not <ust in relation to the natural +orld 4ut also through the
struggles +hich some human 4eings +age against others in circumstances of domination. 8
deconstruction of historical materialism means discarding some of the main parameters in terms of
+hich #ar5 organi>ed his +or9. 3ut in the case of po+er and its relation to conflict C some+hat
parado5ically C it is an effort of reconstruction that is needed. @et me loo9 at +hy that should 4e.
8 relati$ely superficial, although 4y no means unimportant, o4<ection to #ar5!s $arious
o4ser$ations on conflict and domination might 4e that they greatly e5aggerate the significance of class
struggle and class relations in history. Bhate$er 'history! is, it is certainly not primarily 'the history of
class struggles!, and domination is not founded in some generali>ed sense upon class domination, e$en
in the 'last instance!. 8 more fundamental pro4lem, ho+e$er, is the concept of po+er presumed,
although rarely gi$en direct e5pression, in #ar5!s +ritings. ;or #ar5 associates po+er (and the state,
as its em4odiment) +ith schism, +ith a di$ision of interest 4et+een classes. *o+er is thus lin9ed to
conflict and is represented as characteristic only of class societies. Bhile #ar5 +as a4le to de$elop a
formida4le analysis and indictment of domination in class6di$ided and capitalist societies, socialism
appears as a society in +hich domination is transcended. In this respect #ar5ism and socialism more
generally, as Aur9heim discerned,
((
share a good deal in common +ith their nineteenth6century
opponent, utilitarian li4eralism. )ach participates in a 'flight from po+er!, and each ties po+er
inherently to conflict. "ince in #ar5 po+er is grounded in class conflict, it poses no specific threat in
the anticipated society of the future class di$ision +ill 4e o$ercome as part and parcel of the initiation
of that society. ;or li4erals, ho+e$er, +ho deny the possi4ility of achie$ing such a re$olutionary
reorgani>ation of society, the
((259))
threat of po+er is omnipresent. *o+er signals the e5istence of conflict and the potentiality of
oppression= thus the state should 4e organi>ed in such a +ay as to minimi>e its scope, taming it
through parcelling it out in a democratic fashion.!
8 reconstructed theory of po+er +ould 4egin from the premise that such $ie+s are untena4le.
*o+er is not necessarily lin9ed +ith conflict in the sense of either di$ision of interest or acti$e
struggle, and po+er is not inherently oppressi$e. .he 4arrage of critical attac9s +hich *arsons!s
analysis of po+er pro$o9ed: should not allo+ us to ignore the 4asic correcti$es +hich he helped to
introduce into the literature. *o+er is the capacity to achie$e outcomes= +hether or not these are
connected to purely sectional interests is not germane to its definition. *o+er is not, as such, an
o4stacle to freedom or emancipation 4ut is their $ery medium C although it +ould 4e foolish, of
course, to ignore its constraining properties. .he e5istence of po+er presumes structures of domination
+here4y po+er that 'flo+s smoothly! in processes of social reproduction (and is, as it +ere, 'unseen!)
operates. .he de$elopment of force or its threat is thus not the type case of the use of po+er. 3lood
and fury, the heat of 4attle, direct confrontation of ri$al camps C these are not necessarily the
historical con<unctures in +hich the most far6reaching effects of po+er are either felt or esta4lished.
.hese things ha$ing 4een said, ho+e$er, it is necessary to separate structuration theory from 4oth of
the $ariant path+ays trodden 4y *arsons and 4y ;oucault. In associating po+er +ith so6called
'collecti$e goals!, *arsons sacrifices part of the insight that the concept of po+er has no intrinsic
relation to that of interest. If po+er has no logical connection +ith the reali>ation of sectional interests,
neither does it ha$e any +ith the reali>ation of collecti$e interests or 'goals!. #ore su4stanti$ely,
*arsons!s concentration upon normati$e consensus as the foundation of the integration of societies
leads him seriously to underestimate the significance of contestation of norms= and of the manifold
circumstances in +hich force and $iolence, and the fear of them, are directly in$ol$ed in the
sanctioning of action.! ;oucault!s reha4ilitation of the concept of po+er, on the other hand, is achie$ed
only at the cost of succum4ing to a Niet>schean strain in +hich po+er is seemingly prior to truth. In
;oucault, as in *arsons, although for different reasons, po+er is not related to a
((258))
satisfactory account of agency and 9no+ledgea4ility as in$ol$ed in the 'ma9ing of history!.
In order to de$elop these $arious o4ser$ations further, I +ant to discuss se$eral aspects of po+er
+ithin the conceptual frame+or9 of the theory of structuration. 8 primary concern must 4e the issue of
ho+ po+er is generated. Be ha$e to ta9e $ery seriously indeed *arsons!s contention that po+er is not a
static /uantity 4ut e5panda4le in relation to di$ergent forms of system property, although I shall not
adopt the ideas he +or9ed out in pursuing the implications of this $ie+.
.he notion of time6space distanciation, I propose, connects in a $ery direct +ay +ith the theory of
po+er. In e5ploring this connection +e can ela4orate some of the main outlines of domination as an
e5panda4le property of social systems. *o+er, I ha$e descri4ed in the opening chapter, is generated in
and through the reproduction of structures of domination. .he resources +hich constitute structures of
domination are of t+o sorts C allocati$e and authoritati$e. 8ny co6ordination of social systems across
time and space necessarily in$ol$es a definite com4ination of these t+o types of resources, +hich can
4e classified as 4elo+
(llocative %esources
8aterial features of the environent (ra3 aterials< aterial po3er sources)
2 8eans of aterial pro/uction2 repro/uction (instruents of pro/uction< technolo$y)
3 Pro/uce/ $oo/s (artifacts create/ !y the interaction of 1 an/ 2)
Authoritative %esources
1 *r$ani5ation of social tie-space (teporal-spatial constitution of paths an/ re$ions)
2 Pro/uction2repro/uction of the !o/y (or$ani5ation an/ relation of huan !ein$s in utual association)
3 *r$ani5ation of life chances (constitution of chances of self-/evelopent an/ self-e.pression)
.hese are not fi5ed resources= they form the media of the e5panda4le character of po+er in different
types of society. )$olutionary theories ha$e al+ays tended to gi$e priority to those in the left6hand
column, the $arious sorts of material resources employed in 'adaptation! to the en$ironment. 3ut, as
my preceding discussion has indicated, authoritati$e resources are e$ery 4it as 'infrastructural! as
allocati$e resources are. I do not at all +ant to
((25"))
deny the influence of the surrounding natural ha4itat upon patterns of social life, the impact that
ma<or sorts of technological in$ention may ha$e or the rele$ance of the material po+er resources that
may 4e a$aila4le and harnessed to human use. 3ut it has long 4een con$entional to emphasi>e these,
and I thin9 it $ery important to demonstrate the parallel significance of authoritati$e resources. ;or,
li9e #ar5ism, +e are still prisoners of the Jictorian era in so far as +e loo9 first of all to the
transformation of the material +orld as the generic moti$e force of human history.
It is clear that the garnering of allocati$e resources is closely in$ol$ed +ith time6space
distanciation, the continuity of societies across time and space and thus the generation of po+er.
0unters and gatherers ha$e little means of storing food and other material re/uisites and utili>e the
gi$en storehouse of nature in pro$iding for their needs the year around. .hey are in a $ery immediate
fashion dependent upon the 4ounty of nature C a fact +hich, ho+e$er, does not necessarily imply
impo$erishment. #oreo$er, ritual, ceremonial and religious acti$ities ordinarily loom much larger
than do the relati$ely limited material re/uirements of daily life. In agrarian communities at least
some 9ind of producti$e technology is employed, and the storehouse +hich the natural +orld
pro$ides is augmented in $arious +ays that facilitate the 'stretching! of social relations across time6
space. .hat is to say, different seasonal crops are gro+n, products are stored +here this is technically
possi4le, fields are allo+ed to lie fallo+ to protect the producti$e capacity of the society in the long
term and so on. In class6di$ided societies there may 4e a further de$elopment of agrarian per capita
producti$ity, although this is certainly 4y no means al+ays the case as compared +ith that of smaller
peasant communities. Irrigation schemes and other technical inno$ations usually do not so much
increase a$erage producti$ity as regulari>e and co6ordinate production. In larger agrarian states
storage of food and other perisha4le goods 4ecomes of the first importance. In modern capitalism
purchase and sale of manufactured foods is as fundamental to social e5istence as the e5change of the
+hole gamut of other commodities it is not an e5aggeration to say that the e5pansion of capitalism to
form a ne+ +orld economy +ould not ha$e 4een possi4le +ithout the de$elopment of a range of
techni/ues for the
((266))
preser$ation and storage of perisha4le goods, particularly food.
(-
3ut then capitalism also generates,
and is dependent upon, rates of technical inno$ation, coupled +ith a massi$e utili>ation of natural
resources, +hich are on an altogether different plane from anything +hich +ent 4efore.
Aescri4ed in such a manner, human history +ould sound (and has $ery often 4een made to sound)
li9e a se/uence of enlargements of the 'forces of production!. .he augmenting of material resources is
fundamental to the e5pansion of po+er, 4ut allocati$e resources cannot 4e de$eloped +ithout the
trans6mutation of authoritati$e resources, and the latter are undou4tedly at least as important in
pro$iding 'le$ers! of social change as the former. .he organi>ation of social time6space refers to the
forms of regionali>ation +ithin (and across) societies in terms of +hich the time6space paths of daily
life are constituted. 0unting6andgathering communities, and the relati$ely fe+ instances of larger
nomadic cultures, are the only societies +hose o$erall time6space organi>ation implies regular
mo$ement of the +hole group through time6space. 'Enly! is misplaced here. ;or hunting6andgathering
societies ha$e 4een the most typical form of human social organi>ation upon this earth until $ery
recent times. "patial fi5ity C the pinning do+n of locales to definite '4uilt en$ironments!, especially
in the form of cities C mar9s a ne+ departure in human history.
.he second category of authoritati$e resources, the productionH reproduction of the 4ody, should not
4e assimilated to category 2 in the classification of allocati$e resources. Ef course, the means of
material reproduction are necessary to the reproduction of the human organism= for most of human
history material limits of $arious sorts ha$e 9ept do+n the o$erall gro+th of population. 3ut the co-
ordination of num4ers of people together in a society and their reproduction o$er time is an
authoritati$e resource of a fundamental sort. *o+er does not, of course, depend solely upon the si>e of
a population 4rought together +ithin an administrati$e order. 3ut si>e of system organi>ation does
ma9e a $ery significant contri4ution to the generation of po+er. .he $arious constraining and ena4ling
characteristics of the 4ody that I discussed in chapter , are rele$ant here C indeed, they are the 4asis
upon +hich administrati$e resources in this sense are to 4e analysed. 0o+e$er, +e ha$e to add to these
the category of life chances, a
((261))
phenomenon again 4y no means sheerly dependent upon the material producti$ity of a society. .he
nature and scale of po+er generated 4y authoritati$e resources depends not only on the arrangement of
4odies, regionali>ed on time6space paths, 4ut also on the life chances open to agents. '@ife chances!
means, in the first instance, the chances of sheer sur$i$al for human 4eings in different forms and
regions of society. 3ut it also connotes the +hole range of aptitudes and capa4ilities +hich Be4er had
in mind +hen he introduced the term. .a9e <ust one e5ample mass literacy. 8 literate population can
4e mo4ili>ed, and can mo4ili>e itself, across time6space in +ays /uite distinct from those pertaining
+ithin largely oral cultures.
I ha$e already referred to the importance of storage of allocati$e resources as a medium of the
e5pansion of domination, a theme familiar in the literature of e$olutionary theory. #uch less familiar,
4ut of essential importance to the engendering of po+er, is the storage of authoritati$e resources.
'"torage! is a medium of !4inding! time6space in$ol$ing, on the le$el of action, the 9no+ledgea4le
management of a pro<ected future and recall of an elapsed past. In oral cultures human memory is
$irtually the sole repository of information storage. 0o+e$er, as +e ha$e seen, memory (or recall) is to
4e understood not only in relation to the psychological /ualities of indi$idual agents 4ut also as
inhering in the recursi$eness of institutional reproduction. "torage here already presumes modes of
time6space control, as +ell as a phenomenal e5perience of 'li$ed time!, and the 'container! that stores
authoritati$e resources is the community itself.
.he storage of authoritati$e and allocati$e resources may 4e understood as in$ol$ing the retention
and control of information or 9no+ledge +here4y social relations are perpetuated across time6space.
"torage presumes media of information representation, modes of information retrieval or recall and, as
+ith all po+er resources, modes of its dissemination. Notches on +ood, +ritten lists, 4oo9s, files,
films, tapes C all these are media of information storage of +idely $arying capacity and detail. 8ll
depend for their retrie$al upon the recall capacities of the human memory 4ut also upon s9ills of
interpretation that may 4e possessed 4y only a minority +ithin any gi$en population. .he
dissemination of stored information is, of course, influenced 4y the technology a$aila4le for its
production. .he e5istence of mechani>ed printing, for
((262))
instance, conditions +hat forms of information are a$a
i
la4le and +ho can ma9e use of it. #oreo$er,
the character of the information medium C as #c@uhan, that no+ forgotten prophet, consistently
stressed C directly influences the nature of the social relations +hich it helps to organi>e.
&0
It is the containers +hich store allocati$e and
auth
oritati$e resources that generate the ma<or types
of structural principle in the constitution of societies indicated in the pre$ious chapter. Information
storage, I +ish to claim, is a fundamental phenomenon permitting time6space distanciation and a
thread that ties together the $arious sorts of allocati$e and authoritati$e
r
esources in reproduced
structures of domination. .he city, +hich only e$er de$elops in con<unction +ith the ela4oration of
ne$y forms of information storage, a4o$e all +riting, is the container or 'cruci4le of po+er! upon
+hich the formation of class6di$ided societies depends. 8lthough I ha$e /uoted it 4efore
else+liere,
&1
I cannot resist mentioning again here #umford!s o4ser$ation, +hich summari>es this
point in an e5emplary +ay
the first 4eginning of ur4an life, the first time the city p
l
oper 4ecomes $isi4le, +as mar9ed 4y a
sudden increase in p
o+
er in e$ery department and 4y a magnification of the role of po+er itself
in the affairs of men. 8 $ariety of institutions had hitherto
e
5isted separately, 4ringing their
num4ers together in a common
m
eeting place, at seasona4le inter$als the hunters! camp, the
s
Scred monument or shrine, the palaeolithic ritual ca$e, the
ne
o
i
lithic agricultural $illage C all
of these coalesced in a 4igger
me
eting place, the city. . . . .he original form of this container
lasted for some si5 thousand years= only a fe+ centuries ago did it
4
ein to
4rea9 up.'!
2
It 4egan to 4rea9 up, one should say, under the impact of
n
nodern capitalism, +hich de$eloped in
societal conte5ts that
hel
lped to form, and +ere shaped 4y, a ne+ type of po+er container the nation6
state. .he disappearance of city +alls is a ;)rocess con$ergent +ith the consolidation of a highly
ela4orated
i
type of administrati$e order operating +ithin tightly defined
ter
ritorial 4oundaries of its
o+n.
Critical Notes: 'arsons on &#olution
Bhile o$er the past fe+ decades there ha$e 4een forceful ad$ocates of an e$olutionary standpoint,
such as @eslie Bhite, it +ould pro4a4ly 4e true to say that their +or9 has not made a su4stantial
impact upon theoretical thin9ing in the social sciences. It is therefore of some interest that one of the
ma<or contri4utors to such thin9ing, .alcott *arsons, should ha$e sought to 4reathe fresh life into
e$olutionary theory, al4eit only in the later de$elopment of his +or9. "ince *arsons!s account of
e$olutionism has indeed mo4ili>ed considera4le support, I shall consider it in some detail here.
"ocial e$olution, *arsons argues, is an e5tension of 4iological e$olution, e$en if dependent upon
su4stantially different mechanisms. .here is no reason to assume that there is a sudden 4rea9 4et+een
4iological and social e$olution. .he '+atershed 4et+een su4human and human!, as *arsons calls it,
mar9s a phase in a $ery long6term process of de$elopment. 3oth forms of e$olution can 4e understood
in terms of uni$ersals C 'e$olutionary uni$ersals!. 8n e$olutionary uni$ersal, in *arsons!s
terminology, is any type of de$elopment 'sufficiently important to further e$olution! that it is li9ely to
crop up on more than one occasion in different conditions.! ! Jision is offered as an e5ample of an
e$olutionary uni$ersal in the sphere of the organic +orld. .he capa4ility of $ision allo+s for a +ider
range of co6ordinating responses to the surrounding en$ironment and thus has great adapti$e $alue.
Jision has not emerged only in one part of the animal 9ingdom 4ut has come a4out independently in
phyla molluscs, insects and $erte4rates. .he $isual organs of these groups are not of a single
anatomical form and cannot 4e regarded as 4elonging to a single e$olutionary process, 4ut $ision does
seem to 4e a prere/uisite for all higher le$els of 4iological e$olution.
.he 4iological potential of human 4eings for social e$olution depends upon the e$olutionary
uni$ersals of the hands and the
((footnote))
*References may be found on pp. 279-80.
((264))
4rain. 0a$ing independently mo$a4le fingers and an opposing thum4 allo+s for an e5traordinary
$ariety of manipulations of o4<ects in con<unction +ith arms ha$ing mo4ile <oints. .he human 4rain is
so much more de$eloped than those of other species that it ma9es possi4le the mastery of modes of
acti$ity and of cognition un9no+n among the lo+er animals, a4o$e all the capacity for the creation
and use of language. .hese traits gi$e human 4eings adapti$e ad$antages o$er the other species. .he
concept of adaptation, *arsons claims, is essential to 4oth 4iological and social e$olution. 8daptation,
he says, should not 4e understood to mean <ust the passi$e ad<usting of a gi$en species or type of
social system to en$ironmental conditions 4ut should include more acti$e sur$i$al factors. .he
adaptation of a li$ing system! can in$ol$e 'an acti$e concern +ith mastery, or the a4ility to change the
en$ironment to meet the needs of the system, as +ell as an a4ility to sur$i$e in the face of its
unaltera4le features!.
2
.his often means the capacity to cope +ith a range of en$ironmental challenges,
and especially +ith circumstances that pro$o9e uncertainty. 8n e$olutionary uni$ersal, in sum, is any
organic or social trait +hich augments the long6run adapti$e capa4ilities of a li$ing system to such a
degree that it 4ecomes a prere/uisite for higher le$els of de$elopment. .here is only one ma<or
difference 4et+een 4iological and social e$olutionary uni$ersals the first are not open to diffusion,
+hile the second are. .hus the conditions under +hich an adapti$e ad$antage originates may 4e
different from those +hich facilitate its later adoption 4y other social groupings.
0uman 4eings li$e in societies and create cultures. .he sym4olic aspects of culture, as *arsons
descri4es them, are $ital to adaptation. .he 'sym4ol! replaces the gene as the chief organi>ing
component of social e$olution. 8lthough 4ased upon a set of general organic capa4ilities, the sym4olic
/ualities of social systems ha$e to 4e learned ane+ 4y each generation. 'Cultural orientations! do not
implement themsel$es as genetic programmes do. Communication is the 4asis of culture and language
the 4asis of communication. @anguage is thus an elementary e$olutionary uni$ersal= there is no 9no+n
human society +hich does not possess a language. 8ccording to *arsons, sym4ol systems ha$e a
directi$e role 4oth in social organi>ation generally and in social change. .his is 4ecause they are at the
top of a cy4ernetic hierarchy in human societies. In *arsons!s 'action
((265))
scheme! they ran9 a4o$e the social system, personality and the organism. .he physical en$ironment
conditions, or sets limits to, the modes of conduct formed +ithin societies, 4ut it is the cultural system
+hich most directly regulates them.!
In its earliest forms culture is more or less synonymous +ith religion. %eligion, *arsons argues, is
one of four e$olutionary uni$ersals found in 'e$en the simplest action system!. .he others are
communication through language plus 9inship and technology 'their presence constitutes the $ery
minimum that may 4e said to mar9 a society as truly human.!
4
.hese relate to the o$erall properties of
action and thus to the general frame+or9 of 4iological e$olution. )$olution a+ay from the most
elemental types of action system can 4e analysed as a process of progressi$e differentiation, +hich
refers to functional speciali>ation. Aifferentiation can lead C although not ine$ita4ly C to increased
adapti$e capacity in respect of each specific function that is separated out, a process of 'adapti$e
upgrading!. .he lines along +hich differentiation proceeds can 4e +or9ed out in these terms. 1i$en
the cy4ernetic nature of social systems, these lines must 4e functional. .he increasing comple5ity of
systems, in so far as it is not due only to segmentation, in$ol$es the de$elopment of su4systems
speciali>ed a4out more specific functions in the operation of the system as a +hole and of integrati$e
mechanisms +hich interrelate the functionally differentiated su4systems.! .hese su4systems C
pattern maintenance, integration, polity and economy C are the 4asis of *arsons!s analysis.
In the simplest types of society, primiti$e society, the four su4systems sho+ only a $ery lo+ le$el
of differentiation. *rimiti$e societies are characteri>ed 4y a specific system of 'constituti$e
sym4olism!, +hich accords the group a definite cultural identity, separate from others. "uch
sym4olism is al+ays directly connected +ith 9inship relations C for e5ample, in the form of a myth
of ancestral gods +ho founded the community. .he myth 4oth unites the group and pro$ides an
interpretati$e frame+or9 for coping +ith the e5igencies of, and threats from, the natural +orld. Ene
of the distinguishing features of primiti$e societies is that constituti$e sym4olism is comprehensi$ely
in$ol$ed in the $arious spheres of life. It enters into religious, moral and technological acti$ities,
permeating them and rendering them part of a cohesi$e social unity. *arsons ta9es as an e5ample (as
Aur9heim did) the a4original societies of 8ustralia. .he social
((266))
organi>ation of these 8ustralian societies consists almost +holly of 9inship relations and the modes in
+hich they articulate +ith totemic practices, e5change relations and transactions +ith the en$ironment.
)conomic aspects of the latter are of the 'simplest sort!, depending upon hunting and the gathering of
4erries, roots and $arious sorts of edi4le insects. .he tri4al groups range o$er fairly 4road tracts of
territory, and although their constituti$e sym4olism has definite territorial reference, there are no
clearly defined territorial 4oundaries 4et+een different groups. Bhile 9inship relations are of essential
importance, there is no $ertical differentiation 4et+een 9in units= no set of clans has mar9edly greater
po+er, +ealth or religious prominence than any other. .he 8ustralian societies are functionally
differentiated 4y gender and 4y age, 4ut other+ise they consist of e/ui$alent segmental groupings
lin9ed 4y 9inship ties.
.he most primiti$e societies, such as the 8ustralian groups, can 4e distinguished from the 'ad$anced
primiti$e type!. .he transition is mar9ed 4y the 4rea9do+n of e/ui$alence 4et+een 9inship groups.
.his may happen +hen one group manages to secure resources +hich allo+ it to control the formation
of marriage ties= these resources may then 4e used to accumulate material +ealth and other 4ases of
po+er. 8 tendency to the $ertical differentiation of society replaces the more egalitarian character of
the simpler societies. )conomic change is associated +ith such a process settled residence,
agricultural or pastoral production replace the more errant procedures of hunting and gathering. .here
is still not a differentiated 'economy!, 4ut enhanced material producti$ity creates economic pressures
to+ards the consolidation of property rights and sta4ility of territorial control. 0o+e$er it may come
a4out, stratification is the first and most 4asic e$olutionary uni$ersal in the transition from more to less
primiti$e societies. "tratification tends first of all to emerge through the ele$ation of one lineage to a
pri$ileged ran9= the senior indi$idual in that lineage then usually ta9es the title of monarch. 8d$anced
primiti$e societies are considera4ly more heterogeneous than their forerunners, in$ol$ing ethnic,
religious and other oppositions, as +ell as class di$isions. .he 8frican 9ingdoms, such as the Tulu, are
the prime e5amples of societies of this type. *arsons accepts that in the Tulu 9ingdom, and in others
resem4ling it, military po+er +as of ma<or
((267))
significance in shaping and consolidating the social order. 3ut he emphasi>es that pro4a4ly of greater
importance +as the formation of a de$eloped religious culture, legitimi>ing the position of the 9ing
and fostering social solidarity.
8d$anced primiti$e societies, ho+e$er, still 4elong to the first phase of e$olution +hich *arsons
distinguishes. .he second is that of 'intermediate! societies, +hich contain t+o su4types, the 'archaic!
and the 'ad$anced intermediate!. 3oth are associated +ith the e5istence of +riting. 8rchaic societies
are characteri>ed only 4y +hat *arsons calls 'craft literacy!, that is, +riting +hich is used mainly for
administrati$e accounting and for the codification of magical and religious precepts. @iteracy is the
prerogati$e of small priestly groups and not part of the general education of the dominant class or
classes. 8ncient )gypt offers an e5ample of an archaic society. 8 society of this type has a
'cosmological! religious order, +hich 4oth generali>es and systemati>es constituti$e sym4olism more
than in primiti$e communities. It has a political and administrati$e apparatus, separated out in some
degree from religious duties. 8rchaic societies ha$e adapti$e /ualities superior to those of primiti$e
ones 4ecause they concentrate functional responsi4ility in the domains of the religious and the
political. .hese factors are further de$eloped in the ad$anced intermediate type of society, +hich
consists of 'historic empires! such as %ome or China. 8ll of these ha$e 4een deeply in$ol$ed +ith the
'+orld religions! of +hich #a5 Be4er +rote. .hey are characteri>ed 4y the massi$e scale of their
cultural inno$ations as a result of 'philosophic 4rea9throughs! +hich distinguish 4et+een the sacred
and the material +orld= 9ings are no longer gods.
"peciali>ed cultural legitimation is one e$olutionary uni$ersal that is 4rought into sharp definition
4y the ad$ent of historic empires. Its focus is political, it 4eing the means of the consolidation of
go$ernmental authority. '#eeting the legitimation need! implies the emergence of speciali>ed political
leaders in addition to the ruler.
Over an exceedingly wide front and relatively independently of particular cultural variations,
political leaders must in the long run have not only sufcient power, but also legitimation for it. . .
. The combination of diferentiated cultural patterns of legitimation with socially diferentiated
agencies is the essential aspect of the evolutionary universal of legitimation.'
((268))
8 second e$olutionary uni$ersal is the emergence of 4ureaucratic organi>ation. 8ccepting Be4er!s
thesis concerning the indispensa4ility of 4ureaucracy for the effecti$e large6scale mo4ili>ation of
po+er, *arsons argues that ad$anced intermediate societies sho+ a +ide e5pansion of the
administrati$e co6ordination of go$ern6ment, armed forces and other differentiated institutional
sectors. 8 third uni$ersal introduced 4y historic empires is the use of money in relation to mar9et
e5change. #ar9et e5change, according to *arsons, is a system of po+er that a$oids some of the
'dilemmas! of political po+er. *olitical po+er depends ultimately upon puniti$e sanctions imposed 4y
an administrati$e 4ody= money shares some of the /ualities of political po+er 4ut is a more
generali>ed resource +hich is spread among 'consumers! as +ell as 'producers!, a resource that
emancipates people 4oth from loyalty to specific political groups and from ascripti$e 9inship ties. 3ut
these three e$olutionary uni$ersals all presuppose a fourth 'a highly generali>ed uni$ersalistic
normati$e order!,! e5emplified in a system of la+. 0o+e$er, this 4rings us to the threshold of
modernity 4ecause some historic empires ha$e de$eloped 4ureaucratic organi>ation and mar9ets to a
fairly high degree +ithout a compara4le e5tension of forms of generali>ed la+.
.he de$elopment of the modern Best, the highest e$olutionary form in *arsons!s scheme, is related
to t+o 'seed64ed! societies that had a specific long6range influence, Israel and 1reece. (8 symptomatic
comment here is '3uddhism is 4y far the most conspicuous cultural comple5 mentioned so far that
had its most profound influence outside the society in +hich it originated. 3ut 4ecause it did not lead
to+ards modernity and 4ecause it had little 4asic significance for Bestern society, +e ha$e not
discussed it e5tensi$ely.!): 0o+ did some of the cultural features of these t+o societies 4ecome so
+idely diffused from their points of origin? 8nd +hat made possi4le the cultural inno$ations +hich
they produced? 8s regards the second of these /uestions, *arsons argues that in fact only small
societies +ith a reasona4le degree of political independence could ha$e gi$en rise to such cultural
no$elty. It could not ha$e come a4out in large empires +ith their e5tended territory and $ariety of
competing interests. .he first pro4lem is sol$ed precisely 4y the su4se/uent loss of independence on
the part of 4oth societies their cultural inno$ations
((26"))
4ecame ta9en up 4y important strata +ithin larger social entities. 7udaic and 1ree9 culture +as
adopted largely 4y 'scholar classes! rather than 4y dominant political groups= su4se/uently these
cultural influences 4ecame the 'principal societal anchorages! of esta4lished traditions in the Best. .he
modern type of society has emerged in this 'single e$olutionary area!, the Best.'!
.he emergence of Bestern society, *arsons asserts, represents a further 4rea9through in adapti$e
capacity as compared +ith intermediate societies. .he features of the Best permitting greater
differentiation than could 4e achie$ed hitherto include the further de$elopment of mar9ets, the
uni$ersali>ation of la+ and democratic association in$ol$ing citi>enship rights for the mass of the
population. .a9en together, these ha$e furthered the consolidation of the 'territorial unity! of societies
ha$ing their o+n clear 4oundaries. .he de$elopment of uni$ersali>ed la+ can 4e traced through the
articulation of Continental %oman la+ and )nglish common la+. .he second is most important in
terms of facilitating freedom of contract and the protection of pri$ate property. It is, *arsons says, 'the
most important single hallmar9 of modern society!= the )nglish legal order +as 'a fundamental
prere/uisite of the first occurrence of the Industrial %e$olution!.
10
It is also the condition of the
de$elopment of mass democracy. Aemocracy is in turn the condition of the effecti$e e5ercise of po+er
in a highly differentiated society. .hose societies +hich do not 4ecome democratic, including
'communist totalitarian organi>ations!, +ill not ha$e the adapti$e ad$antages of those that do. Bhich
society is farthest along the e$olutionary route today? Bhy, the Knited "tatesQ 8 comforting, if not
especially original, conclusion for an 8merican sociologist to reach after a grand sur$ey of human
e$olution as a +hole.:
.his sounds li9e the sort of thing that gets sociology a 4ad name C at least in the remainder of the
+orld. It might 4e tempting to ignore it on the 4asis of the /ualification that *arsons adds to+ards the
conclusion of his +or9 on e$olution that the reader should not 4e too concerned a4out the detail of his
discussion 4ecause +hat matters is 'the idea of the e$olutionary uni$ersal and its grounding in the
conception of generali>ed adapti$e capacity!.
12
In general I shall indeed o4ser$e this recommendation,
4ut, as I shall indicate, *arsons!s appro4ation of the K"8 is entirely in line +ith his $ersion of
e$olutionary thought.
((296))
*arsons!s theory meets all of the criteria I ha$e mentioned as distincti$e of e$olutionism. )$olution,
he ma9es clear, is more than <ust 'history!, and his account claims social and 4iological e$olution to 4e
4oth conceptually and su4stantially connected. .he familiar notion of adaptation once more ma9es its
appearance. *arsons specifies the progression in +hich he is most interested (the differentiation of
institutions) and has an o$erall interpretation of the mechanics of change that depends upon the
'cy4ernetic! influence of $alues and sym4ols. It also displays se$eral of the secondary +ea9nesses of
e$olutionary thought and 4y no means +atches the red light carefully enough to a$oid the mishaps to
+hich e$olutionary theories are so often su4<ect.
*arsons attaches considera4le importance to the idea that social e$olution is an e5tension of
4iological e$olution. No+, there is o4$iously a sense in +hich this thesis is uno4<ectiona4le. 8fter all,
it seems to 4e the case that physical characteristics of the 4ody (a large and neurologically comple5
4rain, upright posture and so on) +ere the precondition for the de$elopments of human society. .he
early de$elopment of human social association and culture +as pro4a4ly a sur$i$al trait allo+ing for
the e$olutionary success of "omo sapiens. 3ut +hat follo+s from this if +e discount the aesthetic
appeal of a theory that e5plains 4iological and social de$elopment +ith a single set of concepts? .he
ans+er is nothing. 3iological e$olution has to do +ith changes in heredity, in the genetic traits of
succeeding generations= these are e5plained economically and effecti$ely 4y a small num4er of
relati$ely simple mechanisms. "ocial e$olution concerns the relations 4oth 4et+een human societies
and the material en$ironment and 4et+een such societies. .he characteri>ation of 'e$olution! cannot
aptly 4e accorded to these phenomena, nor can a gi$en se/uence of changes 4e e5plained in
'e$olutionary! fashion, unless the operation of similar mechanisms 4e demonstrated. *arsons!s theory
is typical of e$olutionary accounts in arguing as if such a demonstration +ere gi$en 4y the
(undenia4le) fact that 4iological e$olution has 4een interconnected +ith the early de$elopment of
human culture. Bhat should 4e sho+n +ith e$idence is ta9en as if it +ere a source of e$idence.
.he concept of adaptation +hich *arsons introduces is as $ague and all6em4racing as any in the
literature, although it is not there4y untypical. 8daptation, he ma9es clear, has something to
((291))
do +ith 'sur$i$al! and something to do +ith interaction +ith the material +orld 4ut is 4y no means
limited to these. It is more 4roadly connected +ith the reduction of uncertainty C an idea *arsons
4orro+s from systems theory, as he does that of the cy4ernetic influence of sym4ols and $alues. 3ut
since 'uncertainty! is no+here defined, the thesis either is conceptually so diffuse as to 4e $irtually
useless or, if pushed more to+ards a definite empirical content, seems to 4e at 4est implausi4le.
"uppose +e ta9e t+o senses *arsons may ha$e in mind the reduction of uncertainties a4out the
$agaries of nature and the reduction of uncertainties in respect of future e$ents. Neither seems e$en to
ad$ance une/ui$ocally +ith the types of society *arsons portrays along his e$olutionary scale, let
alone contri4ute to their differential 'sur$i$al!. Increased control o$er the material en$ironment,
yielded 4y technological de$elopment or the manipulation of authoritati$e resources, is 4y no means
the same as reduced uncertainty of outcomes. 8 technologically more 'effecti$e! farmer, for e5ample,
might 4e more $ulnera4le to $ariations in the +eather than a hunter and gatherer. 8s regards the
reduction of future unpredicta4ilities, +ho could suppose that the +orld in +hich +e no+ li$e, +ith
its massi$e yet fluctuating rates of technological and economic change, political uncertainties and the
presence of nuclear +eaponry, is less uncertain than that of palaeolithic humanity?
#oreo$er, the guiding mechanism of e$olution that *arsons ties to the increasing adapti$e capacity
of his e$olutionary uni$ersals C the cy4ernetic control yielded 4y constitutional sym4olism C is
surely /uite uncon$incing. *arsons e$idently esta4lishes this approach in conscious opposition to
historical materialism, and other theories +hich he ta9es to resem4le it in holding that technology, or
economic organi>ation more generally, are the leading forces influencing social change. 3ut it is no
more plausi4le than are the theories he opposes. Ence more an argument 4y analogy seems to 4e
confused +ith the production of e$idence. In mechanical control systems cy4ernetic controls of lo+
energy can go$ern mo$ements in$ol$ing much greater energy e5penditure. *arsons then compares
this +ith the control of the gene o$er protein synthesis and other aspects of cell meta4olism, as if the
latter e5ample someho+ added +eight to his argument a4out the controlling influence of 'constituti$e
sym4olism! o$er
((292))
social change. .he supposed conceptual parallel does dou4le duty. It is appealed to as a source of the
thesis of the controlling position of sym4ols and $alues, 4ut then *arsons also +rites as though it also
in some +ay helped $alidate that thesis.
"uppose it +ere the case that the scheme of adapti$e capacity plus the 'cy4ernetic! influence of
constituti$e sym4olism did pro$ide a general e5planatory frame+or9 for social e$olution roughly
analogous to that 4y means of +hich 4iologists e5plain natural e$olution. .he pro4lem of +hat
'sur$i$al! means in the case of human societies, an issue that must 4e coupled in some degree +ith that
of +hat a 'society! is, +ould still demand much more attention than *arsons gi$es them. In 4iological
e$olution sur$i$al and e5tinction are e5clusi$e and clear alternati$es, 4eing lin9ed to the conditions
that determine differential reproduction. 8 population +hich cannot effecti$ely compete for the
en$ironmental inputs it needs cannot transmit its genes and hence dies out. 3ut there is no real
analogue to these circumstances in the social +orld. If adapti$e capacity is defined so +idely as to
include mo4ili>ation for +ar, the social units clearly often fail to 'adapt! in so far as they are
su4<ugated or destroyed 4y others. 3ut +hole types of society do not usually die out in this +ay.
#oreo$er, if coloni>ed or su4ordinated to other groups, rather than 4eing +iped out, pre6e5isting
forms of social organi>ation often continue to e5ist in recogni>a4ly similar guise +ithin an altered
social conte5t. .he /uestion of +hether they ha$e managed to 'sur$i$e! or not then turns a good deal
upon +hat +e decide is a 'society! or the appropriate unit of analysis for e$olutionary study. *arsons
4egs the /uestion in large part 4y 4uilding an ans+er to it into his actual classification of societies. It is
a mar9 of e$olutionary inferiority that 'primiti$e societies! lac9 clearly defined 4oundaries.: 8n
alternati$e $ie+ of the matter, ho+e$er, +ould 4e that the definition of +hat is to count as a distinct
'society! is more difficult to formulate than *arsons presumes it to 4e C until, at least, one approaches
the era of modern nation6states.
*arsons!s theory e5emplifies nearly all the damaging tendencies to +hich I ha$e suggested
e$olutionary accounts are typically su4<ect. It presents, seemingly +ithout /ualms, a '+orld6gro+th
story!= it slips into unilineal compression= and it almost ma9es a deli4erate $irtue of +hat I ha$e called
the normati$e illusion.
((293))
"ymptomatic of *arsons!s particular '+orld6gro+th story! is the discussion pro$ided of 'primiti$e
societies!. *arsons rather casually mentions that the 84original societies of 8ustralia are 'among the
most primiti$e societies 9no+n!
14
+ithout much further ela4oration. 0e thin9s of them at the lo+est
end of the scale, he ma9es it clear, in terms of their lac9 of differentiation, lo+ de$elopment of the
economy and pre6eminence of 9inship. 3ut +hat of the comple5ity of the 9inship system, the richness
of 8ustralian cultural productions of ritual and art? .hese go $irtually unmentioned 4ecause *arsons
ma9es the typical e$olutionary elision 4et+een 'primiti$eness! on certain dimensions, such as
technology, and 'primiti$eness! of societies as a +hole. Bhat of the tremendous di$ersity of small oral
cultures that ha$e e5isted across time and space, rightly emphasi>ed 4y the 'cultural relati$ists!?!
(
If
*arsons +ere concerned only +ith formulating a conception of general e$olution (that is, if he +ere
not an e$olutionist at all, in my understanding of the term), lac9 of reference to such di$ersity, and to
the fact that these societies ha$e dominated most of human history, could perhaps 4e <ustified. 3ut he
is certainly interested in specific e$olution too, trying to indicate the main direction of change +here4y
'primiti$e societies! 4ecome transformed into 'ad$anced primiti$e societies! and these into systems of
the 'intermediate! type.
Knilineal compression is e$ident in *arsons!s account of the impact of the 'seed64ed! societies,
+here there is a mar9ed shift in the forms of his discussion. Bhereas in relation to foregoing
e$olutionary types *arsons ranges o$er $ast e5panses of history, in analysing the rise of the Best his
discussion ine$ita4ly 4ecomes narro+er in its emphasis. It is surely uncon$incing to suppose that the
cultural inheritances from Israel and 1reece necessarily ha$e greater adapti$e $alue than other
4orro+ings +hich might ha$e 4een made from else+here. .he fact that they did 4ecome em4odied
+ithin )uropean culture indicates nothing a4out their e$olutionary $alue, as *arsons has earlier
specified it. *arsons here reads 'e$olutionary necessity! (the claim that one type of societal
organi>ation sho+s traits that ha$e to appear 4efore a 'higher! type can come into 4eing) into
'historical necessity! (the circumstance that since the designated elements did 4ecome part of )uropean
society, things 'must! ha$e happened in that +ay).
;inally, normati$e illusion. *arsons!s $ie+ that half a million
((274))
years of human history culminate in the social and political system of the Knited "tates +ould 4e
more than faintly ridiculous if it did not conform /uite neatly to his particular '+orld6gro+th story!. It
is gi$en +hate$er specious appeal it might ha$e 4y its connection +ith the theme of increasing
adapti$e capacity associated +ith e$olution. 8lthough *arsons might claim that his interpretation is
strictly analytical and carries no e$aluati$e o$ertones, such is palpa4ly not the case. If, for e5ample,
'democracy! is defined in a specific +ay, as more or less e/ui$alent to 'li4eral democracy as
e5emplified 4y the political order of the Knited "tates!, and if 'democracy! is made into an
e$olutionary uni$ersal for societies on the highest le$el of e$olution, then +hat other conclusion can
there 4e other than that +hich *arsons dra+s? 3ut it is as empty as most of the tenets of e$olutionism
tend to 4e.
References: Change, Evolution and o!er
1 Sometimes `determination' becomes another name for an objectivism that seeks to explicate
conduct primarily via structural constraint. Wright, for example, seeks to identify `a series of
distinct relationships of determination' based upon a `diferentiated scheme of structural
causality compatible with Marxist theory'. He distinguishes several modes of determination, but I
shall mention only two to convey the favour of what he has to say: `structural limitation' and
`selection'. The former refers to ways in which the structural properties of societies set limits to
what is possible within those societies. Thus, Wright asserts, the `economic structure' of
feudalism limits the form of the state that appears in feudal systems. While a representative
democracy with universal sufrage was `structurally impossible' within feudalism, a fairly wide
variety of state forms are compatible with feudal orders. `Selection' refers to `those social
mechanisms that concretely determine ranges of outcomes, or in the extreme case [?] specifc
outcomes, within a structurally limited range of possibilities'. Wright connects `selection' with the
determination of `specifc historical conjunctures'. In feudalism, economy and state relate in such
ways as to shape the forms of class division which occur, these forms of class confict becoming
expressed as concrete struggles between defnite groups.
((275))
The notion of `determination' here is ambiguously formulated. When Wright speaks of the
determination of `specifc outcomes' or `historical conjunctures' he seemingly has in mind a very
generalized sense of the term. Understood in this way, Wright's view would involve a full-blown
species of structural determinism, a version of a `structural sociology' in which human conduct is
to be explained as the outcome of social causes. But other remarks that Wright makes suggest
that he does not wish to adopt such a standpoint. Structural features of social systems, as his frst
category indicates, set limits within which an indeterminate range of outcomes can come about.
`Determination' here means `constraint' and does not discriminate between the several senses
which, I have suggested, that term characteristically embraces. To repeat, `structure' cannot be
identifed with `constraint', and the constraining aspects of structural properties cannot be
regarded as a generic form of `structural causality'. Since these points have been already dealt
with, there is no need to labour them further. See Erik Olin Wright, Class, Crisis and the State
(London: New Left Books, 1978), pp. 15-18.
2 Cf. CP!, pp. 230-3.
( NRSM, chapter 2.
4 Nisbet has pointed out, however, that social and biological evolutionism also developed separately
and that 'it is one of the more serious misconceptions of much modern writing in the history of
social thought that nineteenth-century social evolutionism was simply an adaptation of the ideas
of biological evolutionism, chiefy those of Charles Darwin, to the study of social institutions.'
Robert A. Nisbet, Social Change and History (London: Oxford, 1969), chapter 5.
5 Talcott Parsons, `Evolutionary universals in society', in A. R. Desai, Essays on Modernisation of
Underdeveloped Societies (Bombay: Thacker, 1971); idem, Societies, Evolutionary and Comparative
Perspectives (Englewood Clifs: Prentice-Hall, 1966).
6 Cf. `Durkheim's political sociology', in P!.
7 Karl Marx, `Preface' to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, in Karl Marx and Friedrich
Engels, Selected Writings (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1968).
8 Auguste Comte, Physique sociale (Paris: Hermann, 1975), p. 16.
$ Societies, Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives, p. 2.
10 Julian H. Steward, Theory of Culture Change (Urbana: University
of Illinois Press, 1955), p. 248.
11 Julian Huxley, `Evolution, cultural and biological', in William C. Thomas, Current Anthropology
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 3.
((276))
12 Leslie A. White, The Evolution of Culture (New York: McGraw-Hill 1959), pp. 29-30.
13 Marshall D. Sahlins and Elman R. Service, Evolution and Culture (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press, 1960), pp. 12-13. For other defnitions see, inter alia, the following: V. Gordon Childe, The
Progress of Archaeology (London: Watts, 1944); Theodosius Dobzhansky, Mankind Evolving (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1962); Sol Tax, The Evolution of Man (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1960); Robert A. Manners, Process and Pattern in Culture (Chicago: Aldine, 1964); Betty J.
Meggers, Evolution and Anthropology: a Centennial Appraisal (Washington: Anthropological Society,
1959); L. Stebbins, The Basis of Progressive Evolution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1969); Leslie A. White, `Difusion vs. evolution: an anti-evolutionist fallacy', American
Anthropologist, vol. 44, 1945; Alexander 8lland, Evolution and Human Behaviour (Garden City:
Natural History Press, 1967); Eliot D. Chapple, Culture and Biological Man (New York: Holt,
Rinehart & Winston, 1970); George W. Stocking, Race, Culture and Evolution (New York: Free Press,
1968).
14 Leslie A. White, `Evolutionary stages, progress, and the evaluation of cultures', Southwestern
Journal of Anthropology, vol. 3, 1947; idem, The Evolution of Culture, chapter 2.
15 For relevant discussions, see John W. Bennett, The Ecological Transition (New York: Pergamon Press,
1976); Alexander 8lland, Adaptation in Cultural Evolution (New York: Columbia University Press,
1970); M.-H. Appley, Adaptation-Level Theory: A Symposium, (New York: Academic Press, 1971); J.
Cohen, Man in Adaptation (Chicago: Aldine, 1968); Arthur S. Boughey, Man and the Environment
(New York: Macmillan, 1971); Rene Dubos, Man Adapting (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965);
Ronald Munson, Man and Nature (New York: ;elta, 1971); George A. Theodorson, Studies in Human
Ecology (New York: Row, Peterson, 1961); Andrew P. Vayda, Environment and Cultural Behaviour
(New York: Natural History Press, 1969); Niles Eldredge and Ian Tattersall, The Myths of Human
Evolution (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981).
16 There are biologists who would dispute this, however. Thus Ehrlich et al.: `Because of the extremely
loose application of the term adaptation in the biological literature, it might be wise to drop it
completely.' Paul R. Ehrlich et al., The Process of Evolution (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974), p. 337.
17 Roy A. Rappaport, `Ritual, sanctity and cybernetics
'
, American Anthropologist, vol. 73, 1971, p. 60.
For critical remarks, see Anne
((277))
Whyte, `Systems as perceived', in J. Friedman and M. J. Rowlands, The Evolution of Social
Systems (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1978).
18 Thomas G. Harding, `Adaptation and stability', in Sahlins and Service, Evolution and Culture, pp.
45 and 48.
19 Cf. Niklas Luhmann, `Funktion and Kausalitut', Soziologische Aufklrung, KolnOpladen, 1970,
vol. 1.
20 V. Gordon Childe, `Prehistory and Marxism', Antiquity, vol. 53, 1979, pp. 934. (This article was
originally written in the 1940s but not published in Childe's lifetime.)
21 CCHM, chapter 3. I do not see how the following statement of Lenski's can be defended: `Like a
species, a human society is an "isolated" population whose members share a pool of information
and are therefore bound to a common evolutionary path.' Gerhard Lenski, Human Societies (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1970), p. 60. For critical comments, see Pamela J. Utz, `Evolutionism
revisited', Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 15, 1973.
22 Herbert Spencer, The Principles of ociology (New York: Appleton, 1899), vol. 2, p. 110.
23 Cf. Colin Renfrew, `Space, time and polity', in Friedman and Rowlands, The Evolution of Social
Systems.
24 Ernest Gellner, Thought and Change (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1964), pp. 12-13.
25 V. S. Naipaul, India, a Wounded Civilization (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976).
26 Sahlins, `Evolution: specifc and general', in Sahlins and Service, Evolution and Culture, pp. 301.
27 Freud, Civilisation and its Discontents (London: Hogarth, 1969), p. 26.
28 Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization (New York: Vintage, 1955), p. 12.
29 Norbert Elias, The Civilising Process, $ol. I, The History of Manners (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978), vol. 2,
pp. 2323.
30 I pursue some of these themes in Between Capitalism and Socialism, vol. 2 of CCHM.
31 See some of the examples discussed in A. Kardiner, The Individual
and His Society (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939).
32 Perhaps it is worth re-emphasizing that this is a peril of evolutionism, not its logical implication.
Habermas is one author who has discussed this and many other points about evolutionism in an
illuminating and, as always, acute way. See Jurgen Habermas, Communication and the Evolution
of Society (Boston: Beacon, 1979), especially
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chapters 3 and 4; and `Geschichte and Evolution', in Zur Rekonstruktion des historischen
Materialismus (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1976).
33 As does Cohen's recent, philosophically sophisticated interpretation of historical materialism: G. A.
Cohen, Karl Marx's Theory of History, a Defence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978).
34 The second of these concepts I take from Eberhard. See Wolfram Eberhard, Conquerors and Rulers
(Leiden: Brill, 1965).
35 CCHM, chapter 10.
36 C07 CP!, pp. 228f.
37 S. F. Nadel, A Black Byzantium (London: Oxford University Press, 1942).
38 M. Fortes and E. E. Evans-Pritchard, African Political Systems (London: Oxford University Press,
1940).
39 Douglas L. Oliver, Ancient Tahitian Society (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1974).
40 Henri J. M. Claessen, `The early state in Tahiti', in Henri J. M. Claessen and Peter Skalnik, The
Early State (The Hague: Mouton, 1978).
41 Oliver, Ancient Tahitian Society.
42 Henri J. M. Claessen; `The early state: a structural approach', in Claessen and Skalnik, The Early
State.
43 See Ronald Cohen, `State origins: a reappraisal', in Claessen and Skalnik, The Early State; Robert
L. Carneiro, `A theory of the origin of the state', Science, no. 169, 1970; Morton H. Fried, The
Evolution of Political Society (New York: Random House, 1967); W. Koppers, `L'origine de l'Etat',
6th International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences, Paris, 1963, vol. 2;
Lawrence Krader, Formation of the State (Englewood Clifs: Prentice-Hall, 1968); G. Lenski, Power
and Privilege (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966); Robert Lowie, The Origin of the State (New York:
Harcourt, Brace, 1927); Elman R. Service, Origins of the State and Civilization (New York: Norton,
1975).
44 Cf. Service, Origins of the State and Civilization.
45 Carneiro, `A theory of the origin of the state'.
46 Louis Dumont, `Population growth and cultural change', South-western Journal of Anthropology, vol.
21, 1965; Service, Origins of the State and Civilization.
47 Henry T. Wright and Gregory Johnson, `Population, exchange and early state formation in
southwestern Iran', American Anthropologist, vol. 77, 1975.
48 Karl Polanyi, Trade and Markets in Early Empires (Glencoe: Free Press, 1957).
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49 Eberhard, Conquerors and Rulers, pp. 9f.
50 Ibid., p. 10.
51 Henri J. M. Claessen and Peter Skalnik, `Limits, beginning and end of the early state', in Claessen
and Skalnik, The Early State, p. 625.
52 Fried, The Evolution of Political Society.
53 Compare the judgements of Wilson and Kelley: John A. Wilson, The Culture of Ancient Egypt
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951); Allyn L. Kelley, `The evidence for Mesopotamian
infuence in pre-dynastic Egypt', Newsletter of the Society
.
for the Study of Egyptian Antiquities,
vol. 4, no. 3, 1974.
54 Carneiro, `A theory of the origin of the state'.
55 Emile Durkheim, Socialism (New York: Collier-Macmillan, 1962).
56 Cf. Bertrand Badie and Pierre Birnbaum, Sociologie de l'Etat (Paris: 1rasset, 1979), pp. 189f.
57 Including my own commentary in "`Power" in the writings of Talcott Parsons', in P!.
58 Cf. also Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power (Chichester: Wiley, 1979), p. 127, who asserts that `the
close association of the powerful with the dangerous is really only adequate for archaic societies
and archaic ways of thinking. . . .' This seems extraordinarily sanguine in a nuclear age.
59 Cf. Boris Frankel, Beyond the State (London: Macmillan, 1983). This is one of the few books to
emphasize the signifcance of mass food production and preservation for the development of
capitalism.
60 Marshall McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy (London: Routledge, 1962).
61 CCHM, p. 96.
62 Lewis Mumford, `University city', in Carl H. Kraeling and Robert M. Adams, City Invisible (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 7.
References: Critical Notes: arsons on Evolution
1 Talcott Parsons, `Evolutionary universals in society', American Sociological Review, vol. 29, 1964,
p. 339.
2 Ibid., p. 340.
3 T. Parsons, Societies, Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives (Englewood Clifs: Prentice-Hall,
1966), pp. 9-10.
4 T. Parsons, `Evolutionary universals in society', p. 342.
5 T. Parsons, Societies, Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives, p. 24. See also `The problem of
structural change', in Victor Lidz
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Parsons, Readings on Premodern Societies (Englewood Clifs: Prentice-Hall, 1972), pp. 52f.
6 'Evolutionary universals in society', p. 346.
7 Ibid., p. 351.
& Societies, Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives, p. 95.
9 Talcott Parsons, The System of Modern Societies (Englewood Clifs: Prentice-Hall, 1971), p. 1.
10 `Evolutionary universals in society', p. 353.
11 The System of Modern Societies, chapter 6.
12 `Evolutionary universals in society', p. 357.
13 The empty character of this view is apparent in the following quotation: `it is . . . clear that no
society could attain what we will call the "advanced primitive" level of societal evolution without
developing relatively clear-cut boundedness. Thus, a lack of boundedness seems to be an
important mark of a society's primitiveness.' Societies, Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives,
pp. 37-8.
14 Ibid., p. 36.
15 I do not mean to imply that the only choice available in respect of the normative connotations of
social theory lies between cultural relativism on the one side and evolutionism on the other.
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)% !tructuration *heory, &mpirical +esearch and !ocial Criti,ue
8 %eiteration of 3asic Concepts
It might 4e useful at this point to recapitulate some of the 4asic ideas contained in the preceding
chapters. I shall summari>e these as a num4er of points= ta9en together, they represent the aspects of
structuration theory +hich impinge most generally upon pro4lems of empirical research in the social
sciences.
(1) 8ll human 4eings are 9no+ledgea4le agents. .hat is to say, all social actors 9no+ a great deal
a4out the conditions and conse/uences of +hat they do in their day6to6day li$es. "uch
9no+ledge is not +holly propositional in character, nor is it incidental to their acti$ities.
Ino+ledgea4ility em4edded in practical consciousness e5hi4its an e5traordinary comple5ity C
a comple5ity that often remains completely une5plored in orthodo5 sociological approaches,
especially those associated +ith o4<ecti$ism. 8ctors are also ordinarily a4le discursi$ely to
descri4e +hat they do and their reasons for doing it. 0o+e$er, for the most part these faculties
are geared to the flo+ of day6to6day conduct. .he rationali>ation of conduct 4ecomes the
discursi$e offering of reasons only if indi$iduals are as9ed 4y others +hy they acted as they did.
"uch /uestions are normally posed, of course, only if the acti$ity concerned is in some +ay
pu>>ling C if it appears either to flout con$ention or to depart from the ha4itual modes of
conduct of a particular person.
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2).he 9no+ledgea4ility of human actors is al+ays 4ounded on the one hand 4y the unconscious and on
the other 4y unac9no+ledged conditionsHunintended conse/uences of action. "ome of the most
important tas9s of social science are to 4e found in the in$estigation of these 4oundaries, the
significance of unintended conse/uences for system reproduction and the ideological
connotations +hich such 4oundaries ha$e.
,).he study of day6to6day life is integral to analysis of the reproduction of institutionali>ed practices.
Aay6to6day life is hound up +ith the repetiti$e character of re$ersi4le time C +ith paths traced
through time6space and associated +ith the constraining and ena4ling features of the 4ody.
0o+e$er, day6to6day life should not 4e treated as the 'foundation! upon +hich the more ramified
connections of social life are 4uilt. %ather, these more far6flung connections should 4e
understood in terms of an interpretation of social and system integration.
4)%outine, psychologically lin9ed to the minimi>ing of unconscious sources of an5iety, is the
predominant form of day6to6day social acti$ity. #ost daily practices are not directly moti$ated.
%outini>ed practices are the prime e5pression of the duality of structure in respect of the
continuity of social life. In the enactment of routines agents sustain a sense of ontological
security.
().he study of conte5t, or of the conte5tualities of interaction, is inherent in the in$estigation of social
reproduction. !Conte5t! in$ol$es the follo+ing (a) the time6space 4oundaries (usually ha$ing
sym4olic or physical mar9ers) around interaction strips= (4) the co6presence of actors, ma9ing
possi4le the $isi4ility of a di$ersity of facial e5pressions, 4odily gestures, linguistic and other
media of communication= (c) a+areness and use of these phenomena refle5i$ely to influence or
control the flo+ of interaction.
&)"ocial identities, and the position6practice relations associated +ith them, are 'mar9ers! in the $irtual
time6space of structure. .hey are associated +ith normati$e rights, o4ligations and sanctions
+hich, +ithin specific collecti$ities, form roles. .he use of standardi>ed mar9ers, especially to
do +ith the 4odily attri4utes of age and gender, is fundamental in all
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societies, not+ithstanding large cross6cultural $ariations +hich can 4e noted.
2)No unitary meaning can 4e gi$en to 'constraint! in social analysis. Constraints associated +ith the
structural properties of social systems are only one type among se$eral others characteristic of
human social life.
8)8mong the structural properties of social systems, structural principles are particularly important,
since they specify o$erall types of society. It is one of the main emphases of structuration theory
that the degree of closure of societal totalities C and of social systems in general C is +idely
$aria4le. .here are degrees of 'systemness! in societal totalities, as in other less or more
inclusi$e forms of social system. It is essential to a$oid the assumption that +hat a 'society! is
can 4e easily defined, a notion +hich comes from an era dominated 4y nation6states +ith clear6
cut 4oundaries that usually conform in a $ery close +ay to the administrati$e pur$ie+ of
centrali>ed go$ernments. )$en in nation6states, of course, there are a $ariety of social forms
+hich cross6cut societal 4oundaries.
-).he study of po+er cannot 4e regarded as a second6order consideration in the social sciences.
*o+er cannot 4e tac9ed on, as it +ere, after the more 4asic concepts of social science ha$e 4een
formulated. .here is no more elemental concept than that of po+er. 0o+e$er, this does not
mean that the concept of po+er is more essential than any other, as is supposed in those $ersions
of social science +hich ha$e come under a Niet>schean influence. *o+er is one of se$eral
primary concepts of social science, all clustered around the relations of action and structure.
*o+er is the means of getting things done and, as such, directly implied in human action. It is a
mista9e to treat po+er as inherently di$isi$e, 4ut there is no dou4t that some of the most 4itter
conflicts in social life are accurately seen as 'po+er struggles!. "uch struggles can 4e regarded
as to do +ith efforts to su4di$ide resources +hich yield modalities of control in social systems.
3y 'control! I mean the capa4ility that some actors, groups or types of actors ha$e of influencing
the circumstances of action of others. In po+er struggles the dialectic of control al+ays
operates, although +hat use agents in su4ordinate
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positions can ma9e of the resources open to them differs $ery su4stantially 4et+een different
social conte5ts.
(10) .here is no mechanism of social organi>ation or social reproduction identified 4y social analysts
+hich lay actors cannot also get to 9no+ a4out and acti$ely incorporate into +hat they do. In
$ery many instances the 'findings! of sociologists are such only to those not in the conte5ts of
acti$ity of the actors studied. "ince actors do +hat they do for reasons, they are naturally li9ely
to 4e disconcerted if told 4y sociological o4ser$ers that +hat they do deri$es from factors that
someho+ act e5ternally to them. @ay o4<ections to such 'findings! may thus ha$e a $ery sound
4asis. %eification is 4y no means purely characteristic of lay thought.
.hese points suggest a num4er of guidelines for the o$erall orientation of social research.
;irst, all social research has a necessarily cultural, ethnographic or 'anthropological! aspect to it.
.his is an e5pression of +hat I call the dou4le hermeneutic +hich characteri>es social science. .he
sociologist has as a field of study phenomena +hich are already constituted as meaningful. .he
condition of 'entry! to this field is getting to 9no+ +hat actors already 9no+, and ha$e to 9no+, to 'go
on! in the daily acti$ities of social life.!L .he concepts that sociological o4ser$ers in$ent are 'second6
order! concepts in so far as they presume certain conceptual capa4ilities on the part of the actors to
+hose conduct they refer. 3ut it is in the nature of social science that these can 4ecome 'first6order!
concepts 4y 4eing appropriated +ithin social life itself. Bhat is 'hermeneutic! a4out the dou4le
hermeneutic? .he appropriateness of the term deri$es from the dou4le process of translation or
interpretation +hich is in$ol$ed. "ociological descriptions ha$e the tas9 of mediating the frames of
meaning +ithin +hich actors orient their conduct. 3ut such descriptions are interpretati$e categories
+hich also demand an effort of translation in and out of the frames of meaning in$ol$ed in
sociological theories. Jarious considerations concerning social analysis are connected +ith this
(1) @iterary style is not irrele$ant to the accuracy of social
((footnote))
*References may be found on pp. 368-72.
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descriptions. .his is more or less important according to ho+ far a particular piece of social
research is ethnographic C that is, is +ritten +ith the aim of descri4ing a gi$en cultural milieu to
others +ho are unfamiliar +ith it.
2).he social scientist is a communicator, introducing frames of meaning associated +ith certain
conte5ts of social life to those in others. .hus the social sciences dra+ upon the same sources of
description (mutual 9no+ledge) as no$elists or others +ho +rite fictional accounts of social life.
1offman is a4le /uite easily to intersperse fictional illustrations +ith descriptions ta9en from
social science research 4ecause he see9s $ery often to 'display! the tacit forms of mutual
9no+ledge +here4y practical acti$ities are ordered, rather than trying to chart the actual
distri4ution of those acti$ities.
,)'.hic9 description! +ill 4e called for in some types of research (especially that of a more
ethnographic 9ind) 4ut not in others. It is usually unnecessary +here the acti$ities studied ha$e
generali>ed characteristics familiar to those to +hom the 'findings! are made a$aila4le, and
+here the main concern of the research is +ith institutional analysis, in +hich actors are treated
in large aggregates or as 'typical! in certain respects defined as such for the purposes of the study.
"econd, it is important in social research to 4e sensiti$e to the comple5 s9ills +hich actors ha$e in
co6ordinating the conte5ts of their day6to6day 4eha$iour. In institutional analysis these s9ills may 4e
more or less 4rac9eted out, 4ut it is essential to remem4er that such 4rac9eting is +holly
methodological. .hose +ho ta9e institutional analysis to comprise the field of sociology in toto
mista9e a methodological procedure for an ontological reality. "ocial life may $ery often 4e
predicta4le in its course, as such authors are prone to emphasi>e. 3ut its predicta4ility is in many of its
aspects 'made to happen! 4y social actors= it does not happen in spite of the reasons they ha$e for their
conduct. If the study of unintended conse/uences and unac9no+ledged conditions of action is a ma<or
part of social research, +e should none the less stress that such conse/uences and conditions are
al+ays to 4e interpreted +ithin the flo+ of intentional conduct. Be ha$e to include here the relation
4et+een refle5i$ely
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monitored and unintended aspects of the reproduction of social systems, and the 'longitudinal! aspect
of unintended conse/uences of contingent acts in historically significant circumstances of one 9ind or
another.
.hird, the social analyst must also 4e sensiti$e to the time6space constitution of social life. In part
this is a plea for a disciplinary coming together. "ocial scientists ha$e normally 4een content to let
historians 4e specialists in time and geographers specialists in space, +hile they maintain their o+n
distincti$e disciplinary identity, +hich, if it is not an e5clusi$e concern +ith structural constraint, is
4ound up +ith a conceptual focus upon 'society!. 0istorians and geographers, for their part, ha$e 4een
+illing enough to conni$e at this disciplinary dissection of social science. .he practitioners of a
discipline, apparently, do not feel secure unless they can point to a sharp conceptual delimitation
4et+een their concerns and those of others. .hus 'history! may 4e seen as a4out se/uences of e$ents
set out chronologically in time or perhaps, e$en more am4iguously, a4out 'the past!. 1eography, many
of its representati$es li9e to claim, finds its distincti$e character in the study of spatial forms. 3ut if, as
I ha$e emphasi>ed, time6space relations cannot 4e 'pulled out! of social analysis +ithout undermining
the +hole enterprise, such disciplinary di$isions acti$ely inhi4it the tac9ling of /uestions of social
theory significant for the social sciences as a +hole. 8nalysing the time6space co6ordination of social
acti$ities means studying the conte5tual features of locales through +hich actors mo$e in their daily
paths and the regionali>ation of locales stretching a+ay across time6space. 8s I ha$e accentuated
fre/uently, such analysis is inherent in the e5planation of time6space distanciation and hence in the
e5amination of the heterogeneous and comple5 nature assumed 4y larger societal totalities and 4y
intersocietal systems in general.
In order to comment upon the empirical implications of the foregoing remar9s, I shall consider
se$eral separate pieces of research. .o preser$e a degree of continuity +ith e5amples I ha$e used
4efore, I shall use as illustrati$e cases material to do +ith education and +ith the state. "ince the
modern state e$ery+here encompasses attempts to monitor institutional reproduction through
influencing the nature of educational systems, these t+o 'areas! of research are, in fact, closely 4ound
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up +ith one another. .he first e5ample is a +ell69no+n study of conformity and re4ellion in a
+or9ing6class school in the #idlands of )ngland. It is primarily ethnographic in character and
contrasts in this respect, and in the country of its origin, +ith the second, a /uestionnaire study of
educational mo4ility in Italy. .he third and fourth e5amples dra+ upon empirical material directly
concerned +ith the acti$ities and in$ol$ements of modern states. Ene descri4es not so much a
particular research pro<ect as the +or9 of an author +ho has tried to com4ine empirical material +ith a
theoretical e5planation of the contradictory character of 'capitalist states!. .he other refers to a specific
piece of research C an attempt to analyse the origins of the di$ide 4et+een 'the City! and 'industry!
that has 4een a nota4le feature of 3ritish society for some t+o centuries or more.
I shall use each piece of research to illustrate certain partly distinct conceptual issues. @oo9ing to
4egin +ith at +hat I ta9e to 4e in many respects an e5emplary research report, I shall detail se$eral of
the main empirical emphases +hich connect +ith the ma<or tenets of structuration theory. I shall
su4se/uently concentrate upon three specific pro4lems. 0o+ should +e empirically analyse structural
constraint? 0o+ might +e gi$e empirical flesh to the notion of structural contradiction? 8nd +hat type
of research is appropriate to the study of the longue duree of institutional change?
.+o important /ualifications must 4e made 4efore mo$ing on to the main content of the discussion.
In specifying some of the connections 4et+een structuration theory and empirical research, I shall not
4e concerned +ith an assessment of the $irtues and the dra+4ac9s of different types of research
method or techni/ue. .hat is to say, I shall not see9 to analyse +hether ethnographic research is or is
not superior to, say, the use of /uestionnaires. I shall, ho+e$er, offer some comments upon the relation
4et+een so6called '/ualitati$e! research and '/uantitati$e! research. #ore6o$er, I shall +ant to pursue
the discussion in a direction not ordinarily held to 4e closely related to pro4lems of empirical +or9 C
4y indicating ho+ social research is tied to social criti/ue. In the concluding sections of this chapter I
shall try to sho+ +hy structuration theory is intrinsically incomplete if not lin9ed to a conception of
social science as critical theory.
.hese latter aspects of the discussion might seem, on the face
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of things, to mo$e on /uite a different plane from discussion of empirical research. 3ut the connection
is, in fact, a $ery close one indeed. ;or it +ill not do only to consider in +hat +ays empirical study can
4e illuminated $ia the concepts de$eloped in preceding parts of this 4oo9. 8ll research is carried on in
relation to e5plicit or implied e5planatory o4<ecti$es and has potential practical conse/uences 4oth for
those +hose acti$ities are in$estigated and for others. )lucidation of the character of these o4<ecti$es
and conse/uences is not easy, and demands coming to terms +ith some of the pro4lems posed +hen a
model 4ased directly upon appeal to the logical form of natural science is a4andoned. In e5amining
these pro4lems, I shall endea$our to limit as far as possi4le any forays into epistemology. #y aim is to
analyse +hat follo+s from the 4asic claim underlying all social research C that the researcher
communicates ne+ 9no+ledge pre$iously una$aila4le (in some sense or other) to the mem4ers of a
social community or society.
.he 8nalysis of "trategic Conduct
8ccording to structuration theory, t+o types of methodological 4rac9eting are possi4le in sociological
research. In institutional analysis structural properties are treated as chronically reproduced features of
social systems. In the analysis of strategic conduct the focus is placed upon modes in +hich actors
dra+ upon structural properties in the constitution of social relations. "ince this is a difference of
emphasis, there is no clear6cut line that can 4e dra+n 4et+een these, and each, crucially, has to 4e in
principle rounded out 4y a concentration upon the duality of structure. .he analysis of strategic
conduct means gi$ing primacy to discursi$e and practical consciousness, and to strategies of control
+ithin defined conte5tual 4oundaries. Institutionali>ed properties of the settings of interaction are
assumed methodologically to 4e 'gi$en!. Be ha$e to ta9e care +ith this, of course, for to treat
structural properties as methodologically 'gi$en! is not to hold that they are not produced and
reproduced through human agency. It is to concentrate analysis upon the conte5tually situated
acti$ities of definite groups of actors. I shall suggest the
((28"))
#i$ure 13
follo+ing tenets as important in the analysis of strategic conduct the need to a$oid impo$erished
descriptions of agents! 9no+ledge6a4ility= a sophisticated account of moti$ation= and an interpretation
of the dialectic of control.
Consider the research descri4ed 4y *aul Billis in his 4oo9 Learning to Labour.' Billis +as
concerned to study a group of +or9ing6class children in a school located in a poor area of
3irmingham. 8lthough the group studied +as /uite small, Billis!s research is 4oth compelling in its
detail and suggesti$e in dra+ing implications that range far 4eyond the conte5t in +hich the study
+as actually carried out. 8s I shall try to sho+, it conforms closely to the main empirical implications
of structuration theory. Bhat gi$es the research these /ualities? In some considera4le part, at least, the
ans+er is that Billis treats the 4oys concerned as actors +ho 9no+ a great deal, discursi$ely and
tacitly, a4out the school en$ironment of +hich they form a part= and that he sho+s <ust ho+ the
re4ellious attitudes +hich the 4oys ta9e to+ards the authority system of the school ha$e certain
definite unintended conse/uences that affect their fate. Bhen lea$ing school the 4oys ta9e up
uns9illed, unre+arding <o4s, thus facilitating the reproduction of some general features of capitalist6
industrial la4our. Constraint, in other +ords, is sho+n to operate through the acti$e in$ol$ement of
the agents concerned, not as some force of +hich they are passi$e recipients.
((290))
@et us loo9 first of all at discursi$e and practical consciousness as reflected in Billis!s study. Billis
ma9es it clear that 'the lads! can say a great deal a4out their $ie+s on authority relations in the school
and +hy they react to them as they do. 0o+e$er, such discursi$e capa4ilities do not <ust ta9e the form
of propositional statements= 'discourse! has to 4e interpreted to include modes of e5pression +hich are
often treated as uninteresting in sociological research C such as humour, sarcasm and irony. Bhen
one of 'the lads! says of the teachers, '.hey!re 4igger than us, they stand for a 4igger esta4lishment
than +e do..he e5presses a propositional 4elief of the sort familiar from responses to inter$ie+
/uestions posed 4y researchers. 3ut Billis sho+s that humour, 4anter, aggressi$e sarcasm C elements
of the discursi$e stoc9 in trade of 'the lads! C are fundamental features of their 9no+ledgea4le
'penetration! of the school system. .he <o9ing culture of 'the lads! 4oth displays a $ery comple5
understanding of the 4asis of teacher!s authority, and at the same time directly /uestions that authority
4y su4$erting the language in +hich it is normally e5pressed. 8s Billis points out, !pissta9es!,
'9iddings! and '+indups! are difficult to record on tape and especially to represent in the print of
research reports. 3ut these, and other discursi$e forms that rarely find their +ay into such reports, may
sho+ as much a4out modes of coping +ith oppressi$e social en$ironments as more direct comments or
responses. In the author!s +ords
The space won from the school and its rules by the informal group is used for the shaping and
development of particular cultural skills principally devoted to `having a laf. The `laf is a multi-
faceted implement of extraordinary importance in the counter-school culture . . . the ability to
produce it is one of the defning characteristics of being one of `the lads' `We can make them
laf, they can't make us laf.' But it is also used in many other contexts: to defeat boredom and
fear, to overcome hardship and problems as a way out of almost anything. In many respects
the `laf is the privileged instrument of the informal, as the command is of the formal . . . the 'laf
is part of an irreverent marauding misbehaviour. Like an army of occupation of the unseen,
informal dimension, `the lads' pour over the countryside in a search for incidents to amuse,
subvert and incite.'
En the le$el of 4oth discursi$e and practical consciousness it
((2"1))
might seem as though the conformist children C those +ho more or less accept the authority of the
teachers and their educational goals, rather than re4elling against them C +ould 4e most
9no+ledgea4le a4out the social system of the school. 0o+e$er, Billis ma9es a good case to the effect
that on 4oth le$els of consciousness 'the lads! are more 9no+ledgea4le than the conformists. 3ecause
they acti$ely contest the authority relations of the school, they are adept at pic9ing out +here the 4ases
of the teachers! claims to authority lie, and +here their +ea9est points are as the +ielders of discipline
and as indi$idual personalities. Epposition is e5pressed as a continuous nagging at +hat teachers
e5pect and demand, usually stopping short of outright confrontation. .hus in the classroom the
children are e5pected to sit still, to 4e /uiet and to get on +ith their +or9. 3ut 'the lads! are all
mo$ement, sa$e +hen the teacher!s stare might free>e one of them transitorily= they gossip
surreptitiously or pass open remar9s that are on the $erge of direct insu4ordination 4ut can 4e
e5plained a+ay if challenged= they are al+ays doing something else other than the +or9 re/uired of
them 4ut are ready +ith some sort of spurious <ustification +hen it is re/uired. .hey ha$e in$ented
'e5periments +ith trust! +ithout, it seems, ha$ing read 1arfin9el !@et!s send him to Co$entry +hen he
comes:, :@et!s laugh at e$erything he says:, :@et!s pretend +e can!t understand and say, '0o+ do you
mean?! all the time.:
0o+ should one assess the moti$ational content of the oppositional acti$ities of 'the lads!? .his
depends in some degree upon material +hich Billis did not set out directly to e5plore. 3ut it is clear
that regarding 'the lads! as s9illed and 9no+ledgea4le agents suggests a different account of their
moti$ation from that implied in the 'official! $ie+ of them, as 'louts! or '+rec9ers! una4le to appreciate
the importance of the educational opportunities the school offers C the counterpart to the sociologese
of 'imperfect sociali>ation!. .he moti$es +hich prompt their acti$ities and underlie the reasons they
ha$e for +hat they do cannot 4e +ell6e5plicated as a result of a deficient understanding of the school
system or its relations +ith other aspects of the social milieux that are the 4ac9drop to their li$es.
%ather, it is 4ecause they 9no+ a great deal a4out the school and the other conte5ts in +hich they
mo$e that they act as they do. "uch 9no+ledge may 4e carried primarily in their practical acti$ities or
((2"2))
in discourse +hich is highly conte5tuali>ed, although in Billis!s account 'the lads! emerge as much
more articulate than others in the school +ould pro4a4ly ac9no+ledge. 0o+e$er, the 4ounds of +hat
they 9no+ a4out the circumstances in +hich they li$e out their li$es are fairly confined. Certainly, they
reali>e that their chances of getting anything other than inferior and unedifying <o4s are poor, and this
reali>ation influences their re4ellious attitudes to+ards the school. 3ut they ha$e at most an imprecise
a+areness of aspects of the +ider society that influence the conte5ts of their o+n acti$ity. It might 4e
plausi4le to infer a general underlying moti$ational pattern C perhaps partly unconscious C of an
attempt to esta4lish modes of conduct +hich in<ect some 9ind of meaning and colour into a dra4 set of
life prospects that are, ho+e$er diffusely, accurately seen as such. Be cannot satisfactorily understand
the moti$ation of 'the lads! unless +e see that they do grasp, although in a partial and conte5tually
confined +ay, the nature of their position in society.!
Billis descri4es in a $ery insightful manner the dialectic of control +ithin the school setting. 3oth
'the lads! and their teachers are specialists in the theory and practice of authority, 4ut their respecti$e
$ie+s as to its necessity and formal o4<ecti$es are deeply opposed. .eachers recogni>e that they need
the support of the conformist children to ma9e the sanctions a$aila4le to them stic9, and that po+er
cannot 4e e5ercised effecti$ely if puniti$e sanctions ha$e to 4e applied fre/uently. .he deputy head
re$eals himself as a de5trous *arsonian theorist of po+er +hen he comments that the running of a
school depends mainly upon the e5istence of a certain moral consensus, +hich cannot 4e forci4ly
implanted in children. *uniti$e sanctions should 4e used only as a last resort 4ecause they are a sign of
the failure of effecti$e control rather than the 4asis of it 'Dou can!t go thro+ing suspensions around all
the time. @i9e the foot4all referees today, I mean they!re failing 4ecause they!re reduced to the ultimate
so /uic9ly, someho+. . . . the yello+ card comes out first of all, and once they!$e done that, they!$e
either got to send the player off or ignore e$erything else he does in the game.! .eachers 9no+ this, and
'the lads! 9no+ that they 9no+ it. 0ence 'the lads! are a4le to e5ploit it to their o+n ad$antage. In
su4$erting the mechanics of disciplinary po+er in the classroom, they assert their autonomy of action.
#oreo$er, the fact that the school is some+here in
((2"3))
+hich they spend only part of the day and part of the year is $ital to the 'counter6culture! +hich they
ha$e initiated. ;or it is out of school, a+ay from the ga>e of the teachers, that pursuits can 4e freely
engaged in +hich +ould 4e anathema in the school setting.
Knintended Conse/uences 8gainst ;unctionalism
Billis!s research is not only a super4 ethnographic study of an informal group +ithin a school= it is
also an attempt to indicate ho+ the acti$ities of 'the lads!, +ithin a restricted conte5t, contri4ute to the
reproduction of larger institutional forms. Billis!s study is unusual, compared +ith a great deal of
social research, 4ecause he stresses that 'social forces! operate through agents! reasons and 4ecause his
e5amination of social reproduction ma9es no appeal at all to functionalist concepts. 0is interpretation
of the connection 4et+een the school !counter6culture! and +ider institutional patterns, e5pressed
concisely, runs as follo+s. .he oppositional modes of 4eha$iour of 'the lads! +hile at school leads
them to +ant to lea$e school to go out to +or9. .hey +ant the financial independence +hich +or9 +ill
pro$ide= at the same time, ho+e$er, they ha$e no particular e5pectations a4out any other types of
re+ard that +or9 might offer. .he aggressi$e, <o9ing culture +hich they ha$e de$eloped +ithin the
school milieu actually /uite strongly resem4les that of the shop6floor culture of the +or9 situations
into +hich they tend to mo$e. 0ence they find the ad<ustment to +or9 relati$ely easy, and they are
a4le to tolerate the demands of doing dull, repetiti$e la4our in circumstances +hich they recogni>e to
4e uncongenial. .he unintended and ironical conse/uence of their 'partial penetration! of the limited
life chances open to them is acti$ely to perpetuate the conditions +hich help to limit those $ery life
chances. ;or ha$ing left school +ith no /ualifications and entered a +orld of lo+6le$el manual la4our,
in +or9 +hich has no career prospects and +ith +hich they are intrinsically disaffected, they are
effecti$ely stuc9 there for the rest of their +or9ing li$es. '.he +or9ing6class lad is li9ely to feel that it
is already too late +hen the treacherous nature of his pre$ious confidence is disco$ered. .he cultural
cele4ration has lasted, it might seem, <ust long enough to deli$er him through the closed factory doors!
C or,
((2"4))
more often no+adays, to a life of chronic unemployment or semi6employment.
No+, all of this could ha$e 4een stated in a functionalist mode and 'e5plained! in functional terms.
.hus it could 4e argued that industrial capitalism 'needs! large num4ers of people either to +or9 in
unre+arding manual la4our or to 4e part of an industrial reser$e army of the unemployed. .heir
e5istence is then 'e5plained! as a response to these needs, someho+ 4rought a4out 4y capitalism C
perhaps as a result of some unspecified 'social forces! +hich such needs call into play. .he t+o types
of account can 4e contrasted, as 4elo+
In (1), the sort of $ie+ de$eloped 4y Billis, a gi$en set of social acti$ities (the oppositional
4eha$iour of 'the lads!) is interpreted as purposeful action. In other +ords, those acti$ities are sho+n to
4e carried on in an intentional +ay, for certain reasons, +ithin conditions of 4ounded
9no+ledgea4ility. "pecification of those 4ounds allo+s the analyst to sho+ ho+ unintended
conse/uences of the acti$ities in /uestion deri$e from +hat the agents did intentionally. .he
interpretation in$ol$es an attri4ution of rationality and of moti$ation to the agents concerned. .he
actors ha$e reasons for +hat they do, and +hat they do has certain specifia4le conse/uences +hich
they do not intend. In (2) little attempt is made to detail the intentionality of the agents! conduct. It is
pro4a4ly assumed that the conduct is intentional in some +ay, that it has, in #erton!s terminology,
manifest functions. 3ut usually in functionalist interpretations this is not regarded as especially
interesting 4ecause attention is concentrated upon attri4uting rationality to a social system, not to
indi$iduals. .he identification of a functional need of the system is presumed to ha$e e5planatory
$alue, calling into play conse/uences +hich in some +ay meet that need. #erton!s functional
interpretation of the 0opi rain ceremonial (see pp. 12C1,) fits this scheme e5actly. .he intentional
features of 0opi participation in the ceremonial
((2"5))
are gi$en short shrift C the 'purpose! of the rain ceremonial is to 4ring rain, and this it does not do. En
the face of things, participation in the ceremonial is an irrational acti$ity. 0o+e$er, +e can identify a
functional need to +hich the ceremonial corresponds, generating a positi$ely functional conse/uence.
"mall societies need a unitary $alue system to hold them together= participation in the rain ceremonial
reinforces such a $alue system 4y regularly 4ringing the community together in circumstances in
+hich adherence to group $alues can 4e pu4licly affirmed.
I ha$e pre$iously indicated +hy (2) +ill not do and +hy it is not an e5planation at all of +hate$er
acti$ities are in /uestion. Cohen has recently suggested an ingenious +ay in +hich it might 4e rescued,
ho+e$er.'! .his is 4y postulating +hat he calls !conse/uence la+s!. Interpretation (2) is not an
e5planation 4ecause it does not supply a mechanism lin9ing the positing of a functional need and the
conse/uences that are presumed to ensue for the +ider social system in +hich the acti$ities to 4e
e5plained are in$ol$ed. In esta4lishing 'conse/uence la+s! +e set up generali>ations to the effect that
+hene$er a gi$en social item is functional for another, the first social item is found to e5ist.
"u4sumption of a particular instance of social acti$ity under a conse/uence la+ can 4e regarded as an
'unela4orated! functionalist e5planation. 3ut 'unela4orated! functionalist e5planations are not
e5planations at all and, moreo$er, ha$e the dangerous side6property of implying that a higher degree of
cohesion e5ists than may in fact 4e the case in the social systems to +hich they refer. .o say that (2) is
'unela4orated! is to admit ignorance of the causal connections +hich lin9 the social item or acti$ities
concerned +ith their functional conse/uences. Bhat +ould these connections 4e if disco$ered? .hey
+ould 4e precisely of the sort gi$en in (1) C a specification of intentional action (or types of
intentional action) ha$ing unintended outcomes (or types of outcomes). In other +ords, (2) is $ia4le
only +hen transmuted into (1). 3ut in (1) it is not necessary to use the term 'function! at all. .he term
'function! implies some sorts of teleological /uality that social systems are presumed to ha$e social
items or acti$ities are held to e5ist 4ecause they meet functional needs. 3ut if the fact that they ha$e
functional outcomes does not e5plain +hy they e5ist C only an interpretation of intentional acti$ity
and unintended conse/uences does that C the acti$ities may 4ecome more readily se$ered from
((2"6))
those outcomes than 'conse/uence la+s! +ould imply. .he conduct of 'the lads! leads to conse/uences
functional for the reproduction of capitalist +age la4our as a result of their 'partial penetration! of their
life circumstances. 3ut this $ery 'partial penetration!, as Billis argues, may 4e potentially radicali>ing
for the indi$iduals in$ol$ed, in +hich case it could lead to disrupti$e rather than cohesi$e
conse/uences for the +ider social system.
.he +or9 of functionalist authors has 4een $ery important in social research precisely 4ecause it has
directed attention to the disparities 4et+een +hat actors intend to do and the conse/uences +hich
ensue from +hat they do. 3ut +e can identify, and attempt to resol$e, the issues in$ol$ed more
unam4iguously 4y dispensing +ith functionalist terminology altogether. .here are three types of
circumstance in +hich functionalist language is commonly used. 8ll are important in social analysis
4ut can easily 4e e5pressed in non6functionalist terms.
"uppose +e render Billis!s findings in a functionalist mode, as follo+s ')ducation, in a capitalist
society, has the function of allocating indi$iduals to positions in the occupational di$ision of la4our.!
;irst, such a statement is accepta4le if understood as an implicit counterfactual.
10
#any functionalist
assertions, or pur6ported 'e5planations!, can 4e read in this +ay. In fact, they set up a relation +hich
calls for e5planation, rather than e5plaining it. Be can e5press the statement in a different manner,
+ithout using 'function!, as follo+s 'In order for the occupational di$ision of la4our to 4e maintained,
the educational system has to ensure that indi$iduals are allocated differentially to occupational
positions.! .he force of 'has to! here is counterfactual= it in$ol$es identifying conditions that must 4e
met if certain conse/uences are to follo+. It sets up a research pro4lem, and understood as as9ing a
/uestion rather than as ans+ering one, it is entirely legitimate. 3ut the use of the term 'function! can 4e
misleading 4ecause it suggests that the 'has to! refers to some sort of need that is a property of the
social system, someho+ generating forces producing an appropriate (functional) response. Be might
suppose that +e ha$e resol$ed a research pro4lem +hen all that has 4een done is actually to esta4lish a
pro4lem that demands research. "econd, the statement may 4e read as referring to a feed4ac9 process
+hich depends +holly upon unintended conse/uences. 8s I ha$e already indicated, to say
')ducation .. .
((2"9))
has the function of allocating indi$iduals. . . .! fudges o$er the differences 4et+een intended and
unintended aspects of social reproduction. It is therefore not clear in such statements ho+ far the
processes in /uestion are the result of 'causal loops!, and ho+ far they are incorporated in processes of
+hat I ha$e earlier called refle5i$e self6regulation. "ocial needs e5ist as causal factors implicated in
social reproduction only +hen they are recogni>ed as such 4y those in$ol$ed at some point and acted
upon 4y them. .he educational system in +hich 'the lads! are in$ol$ed +as supposedly esta4lished in
order to further e/uality of opportunity. Its su4stanti$e results, in respect of perpetuating immo4ility,
run counter to this, 4ut they are not so planned 4y the #inistry of )ducation or some other directi$e
4ody of the state. If they +ere C if education +ere deli4erately organi>ed 4y po+erful decision6
ma9ers in order to perpetuate the class system C the process concerned +ould 4e su4stantially
different. Ef course, this is a comple5 matter. 8ll modern education systems in$ol$e attempts at
refle5i$e regulation, +hich often lead to conse/uences that re4ound upon those +ho initiate
educational policies. 3ut to lea$e these comple5ities unstudied is to fail to grasp the actual conditions
of reproduction. .he result can 4e some form of o4<ecti$ism C +hate$er happens does so as the
result of social forces as ine$ita4le as la+s of nature. 8lternati$ely, ho+e$er, there could 4e a
tendency to accept some 9ind of conspiracy theory. Bhate$er happens does so 4ecause someone or
other designed that it should. If the former, the characteristic $ie+ of functionalism, is associated +ith
not according enough importance to intentional action, the second deri$es from failing to see that the
conse/uences of acti$ities chronically escape their initiators.
.he Auality of "tructure
I ta9e it that it is clear from my discussion earlier in this 4oo9 that the concept of the duality of
structure, fundamental to structuration theory, is implicated in the ramified senses that the terms
'conditions! and 'conse/uences! of action ha$e. 8ll social interaction is e5pressed at some point in and
through the conte5tualities of 4odily presence. In mo$ing from the analysis of strategic conduct to a
recognition of the duality of structure, +e ha$e to 4egin to 'thread out+ards! in time and space. .hat is
to
((2"8))
say, +e ha$e to try to see ho+ the practices follo+ed in a gi$en range of conte5ts are em4edded in
+ider reaches of time and space C in 4rief, +e ha$e to attempt to disco$er their relation to
institutionali>ed practices. .o pursue the illustration dra+n from Billis!s +or9, ho+ far do 'the lads!,
in de$eloping an oppositional culture +ithin the school, dra+ upon rules and resources more 4roadly
in$ol$ed than in the immediate conte5ts of their action?
Be can specify analytically +hat is in$ol$ed in ma9ing the conceptual mo$e from the analysis of
strategic conduct to e5amination of the duality of structure as 4elo+ (institutional analysis +ould
4egin at the other end, as the up+ard arro+ indicates)
intersections of re$ions=spatial sprea/ a3ay fro the ie/iate conte.ts of
interaction
routini5ation - teporal sprea/ a3ay fro the ie/iate conte.ts of interaction
.ransferring analysis from the situated acti$ities of strategically placed actors means studying, first,
the connections 4et+een the regionali>ation of their conte5ts of action and +ider forms of
regionali>ation= second, the em4eddedness of their acti$ities in time C ho+ far they reproduce
practices, or aspects of practices, that are long6esta4lished= third, the modes of time6space
distanciation +hich lin9 the acti$ities and relationships in /uestion to features of o$erall societies or
to inter6societal systems.
Billis actually pro$ides a $ery percepti$e discussion of some of these phenomena, e$en if his
terminology is different. .he formal hierarchy of the school, of course, incorporates modes of conduct
and normati$e e5pectations that are 4roadly spread across different sectors of the society, although
strongly influenced 4y class di$isions. .he school as a locale is physically separate from the
+or9place and is temporally separated from the e5perience of +or9 in the life spans of children.
Bhile school and +or9place share o$erall patterns of disciplinary po+er, they are not merely aspects
of a single institutional form. 8s Billis points out, the discipline of the school has a strongly
morali>ed tone to it, +hich
I
>y tie-space /istanciation
fors of societal totality
((2""))
is lac9ing in the +or9place. "chool discipline em4odies an 'a4stract educational paradigm,
maintaining and reproducing +hat it ma9es possi4le!.: .he moral character of this a5is of authority, or
the normati$e claims on +hich it is focused, influences the nature of the re4ellious su4culture. In their
manifest disregard for the minutiae of school routines !the lads! do more than de$iate 4eha$iourally
from +hat is e5pected of them= they sho+ their re<ection of the moral prerogati$es upon +hich the
teachers! authority supposedly rests. .he resources a$aila4le to the staff in see9ing to assert their
authority, ho+e$er, at the same time in$ol$e more than these claims to legitimation. .he staff are
'resource centres! for the distri4ution of 9no+ledge, recogni>ed as a scarce commodity 4y the
conformist children, if not 4y 'the lads!, and they ha$e the more direct control o$er the timing and
spacing of acti$ities that ma9e up the organi>ation of classrooms and of the school timeta4le as a
+hole. Ef course, in all this the teaching staff are dra+ing indirectly upon entrenched sources of
institutional support in the +ider society.
12
;or their part, the attitudes and conduct of !the lads! are certainly not +holly in$ented de novo 4y
them= they dra+ upon a fund of e5perience 4uilt into their li$es outside the school and 4uilt up
historically +ithin +or9ing6class communities in general. Children +ho disaffiliate themsel$es from
the norms and e5pected 4eha$iour of the school en$ironment are a4le to ma9e use of this fund of
e5perience. In transforming elements of it and 4ringing them to 4ear upon the school milieu, they help
to reproduce those $ery characteristics in the +ider conte5t, although they use it inno$ati$ely, not in a
mechanical fashion. .he neigh4ourhood and the street pro$ide sym4olic forms of youth culture that
are also in a more direct +ay the source of themes articulated in the counter6school culture. Billis
mentions too the importance of stories related 4y adults a4out life on the shop floor, especially those
concerned +ith attitudes to+ards authority. *arents help to transmit +or9ing6class culture to their
children, 4ut o4$iously they do not all 4eha$e in an identical fashion or share the same $ie+s.
#oreo$er, there is a considera4le degree of independent fashioning of outloo9 4et+een parents and
children. "ome parents e5press attitudes /uite similar to those of 'the lads!, +hile others disappro$e
strongly and forci4ly of their 4eha$iour. Det others, +ho are +ary of the $alues of the school or are
hostile to them,
((366))
ha$e children +ho conform closely to e5pected standards of school conduct. .he interchange 4et+een
the acti$ities of 'the lads! and influences from the 4roader society, in other +ords, is one +hich is
'+or9ed upon! 4y all in$ol$ed.
8s a refle5i$ely monitored social phenomenon, the national school system ma9es use of
sociological research and psychology. 3oth ha$e filtered do+n into the practical organi>ation of this
particular school (no dou4t the teachers there are no+ thoroughly familiar +ith Billis!s o+n study).
.here has 4een a mo$e to+ards a some+hat more 'progressi$e! outloo9 in respect of the organi>ation
of the curriculum and of classroom teaching arrangements. Ene of the main conte5ts in +hich 'the
lads! come into direct contact +ith academic research dra+n from the +ider society is in relation to
$ocational guidance, +hich there is no+ a statutory re/uirement for all schools to pro$ide. Careers
guidance is influenced mostly 4y psychological theory and psychological testing and is ta9en seriously
inside the school. 8s Billis sho+s, despite a certain egalitarian aura, careers guidance strongly reflects
middle6class $alues and aspirations. Centred upon '+or9!, the $ie+s promulgated tend to contrast
rather $igorously +ith the attitudes and ideas a4out +or9 +hich C in their o+n particular
appropriation C 'the lads! ha$e pic9ed up from parents and others in the neigh4ourhood and
community. .hey ma9e fun of, or are indifferent to+ards, the material pro$ided in careers lessons. 3ut
this response is not simply a negati$e one. .hey consider that they ha$e insights into the true character
of +or9 denied to the conformist children C and perhaps they ha$e. .he conformists ha$e to do things
the 'hard +ay!, through ac/uiring /ualifications, 4ecause they ha$e not the +it to do 4etter. "ur$i$al in
the +orld of +or9 demands guts, determination and an eye to the main chance.
It is not hard to see ho+ these $ie+s, pic9ed up and ela4orated from esta4lished +or9ing6class
en$ironments of la4our, help to plunge 'the lads! into those $ery en$ironments +hen they lea$e school.
.he sources of discontinuity +ith the 'official! norms of the school in some part offer continuity,
unofficially, +ith the conte5ts of +or9. It is the counter6school culture +hich pro$ides the main guide
that 'the lads! follo+ in going out to +or9. Eften in the $ie+s of 4oth the 4oys and their parents there
is a direct connection 4et+een authority relations in the school and at
((301))
+or9, pro$iding cogniti$e and emoti$e lin9s 4et+een the t+o that are /uite different from those
'officially! sanctioned in either. Be can see in this a temporally long6esta4lished and spatially
+idespread 4asis of e5perience, rene+ed in $arying +ays 4y each generation for +hom the disparate
and physically separate social +orlds of school and +or9 are 4ridged. .he $ie+s of 'the lads! to+ards
the school orient them to+ards the future, 4ut they see the future as 'flat! C more of the same C rather
than as ha$ing any of the progressi$e /ualities associated +ith the essentially middle6class notion of a
career. .hey are not interested in choosing particular <o4s, and they drift into +hat they do rather than
deli4erately confronting a range of alternati$es and then opting for one among them. '.he lads!, as
Billis ma9es clear, commit themsel$es to a life of generali>ed la4our. .hey do not ha$e any such
notion of 'generali>ed la4our! in mind. #oti$ated 4y a desire for the 4est +ages that can 4e got
immediately and 4y the presumption that +or9 is essentially disagreea4le, they ma9e such a
commitment in their conduct.
@oo9ed at in a +ider time6space frame+or9, then, there is a process of the regeneration of +or9ing6
class culture +hich 4oth helps gi$e rise to, and is effected through, the situated acti$ities of groups li9e
'the lads!. 8s Billis comments
The informal and formal processes of the school are obviously vital in preparing labour power in a
certain way, but the home, family, neighbourhood, media and non-productive working-class
experience in general are equally vital for its continuous reproduction and daily application to the
labour process. In a converse way it is important to assess the degree to which the shop foor,
both in its objective dimensions and in the oppositional culture it throws up, reacts back upon
the non-productive sites of the reproduction of labour power and infuences them in a certain way
so that, as we have seen with the counter-school culture, there may be an unseen and often
unintended circle of meaning and direction which acts ultimately to preserve and maintain a
particular confguration perhaps again at a tangent to the intentions of ofcial policy."
In raising the /uestion of la4our po+er a connection is pro$ided +ith the transformationHmediation
relations I discussed illustrati$ely in chapter 4. I shall not co$er this ground again 4ut shall
((362))
simply indicate ho+ the structural relations in$ol$ed may 4e +or9ed through analytically in terms of
the situated acti$ities of the counter6school culture. Ether structural sets, 4esides that discussed
pre$iously, implicated in the reproduction of industrial capitalism as an o$erall societal totality, can 4e
represented as follo+s
14
private property : oney : capital : la!our contract : in/ustrial authority
private property : oney : e/ucational a/vanta$e : occupational position
.he transformations on the left6hand side of the first set are the same as analysed 4efore. 0o+e$er, the
con$erti4ility of the structural properties to+ards the right6hand side depend upon +ays in +hich the
la4our contract is 'translated! into industrial authority. 8s #ar5 sho+ed in great detail, the form of the
capitalist la4our contract is /uite different from the ties of fealty +hich e5isted 4et+een lord and serf
in the feudal order. .he capitalist la4our contract is an economic relation 4et+een employer and
employee, the meeting of t+o 'formally free! agents in the la4our mar9et. Ene main aspect of the ne+
form of la4our contract is that the employer hires not 'the +or9er! 4ut the +or9er!s la4our po+er. .he
e/ui$alence of la4our po+er is essential C as is that pro$ided 4y the unitary e5change medium of
money C to the structural transformations in$ol$ed in the e5istence of industrial capitalism as a
generic type of production system. 84stract la4our is /uantifia4le in e/ui$alent units of time, ma9ing
the /ualitati$ely different tas9s that indi$iduals carry out in the $arious 4ranches of industry
interchangea4le to the employer. .he la4our contract is transformed into industrial authority $ia the
economic po+er +hich employers, as a class, are a4le to e5ert o$er +or9ers once the $ast ma<ority of
the latter are rendered propertyless.
8ccording to #ar5, for these relations to e5ist 'the o+ner of money must meet in the mar9et +ith
the free la4ourer, free in the dou4le sense, that as a free man he can dispose of his la4our po+er as his
o+n commodity, and that on the other hand he had no other commodity for sale, is short of e$erything
necessary for
((363))
the realisation of his la4our po+er.!!! No+ the 'must! here could 4e read or implying a functional
'e5planation! of the phenomena in /uestion, as if the statement e5plains +hy those phenomena come
a4out. .here certainly are strong functionalist leanings in #ar5!s formulation of some of the 9ey
arguments in his account of capitalist de$elopment. 3ut let us agree to interpret the 'must! in the +ay
+hich I ha$e suggested is uno4<ectiona4le, as posing a /uestion to 4e ans+ered. "uch /uestions can 4e
as9ed not <ust in relation to the early origins of capitalism 4ut also in regard of its continued
reproduction as an o$erall institutional order C there are no mechanical forces +hich guarantee that
reproduction from day to day or from generation to generation.
Bhat Billis!s research helps to indicate, in the situated conte5ts of action of the lads!, is ho+ the
structural relations identified a4o$e are sustained in, and reproduced 4y, that action. 3ecause of their
$ery 'partial penetration! of the school system, their indifference to the character of +or9, yet
+illingness to enter the +orld of la4our, the lads! constitute themsel$es as 'a4stract la4our po+er!. .he
assumption that all +or9 is the same confirms the conditions of the e5changea4ility of la4our po+er
structurally in$ol$ed in the capitalist la4our contract. .here is pathos here, 4ecause if Billis!s account
is $alid, the oppositional culture of 'the lads! effecti$ely leads them to integrate their acti$ities more
closely, in some respects, +ith the institutions of the order they oppose than do the conformists.
0o+e$er, in the $ery comple5ity of this relationship +e can see the importance of not attempting
merely to 'read off! action from structure or $ice $ersa C of resisting, in other +ords, the dualism of
o4<ecti$ism and of su4<ecti$ism. .he situated acti$ities of 'the lads!, complicated as they are in respect
of the meshing of intended and unintended conse/uences, are only one tiny corner of a massi$ely
comple5 o$erall process of institutional reproduction. .he same conclusion has to 4e reached if +e
consider the right6hand side of the other structural set, the institutional features ma9ing for the con6
$erti4ility of educational ad$antage into differentiated occupational positions. .here are some
relati$ely direct +ays in +hich possession of money can 4e con$erted into educational ad$antage, that
in turn can 4e translated into pri$ileged occupational position. .hus pri$ate education can 4e
purchased, yielding higher possi4ilities of achie$ing occupational re+ards than are open to
((364))
those mo$ing through the state educational sector. 3ut the translation of one into the other for the
most part in$ol$es much more comple5 reproduction circuits.
.he identification of structural sets is a $ery useful de$ice for conceptuali>ing some of the main
features of a gi$en institutional order. 3ut, as I ha$e emphasi>ed pre$iously, structures refer to a
$irtual order of relations, out of time and space. "tructures e5ist only in their instantiation in the
9no+ledgea4le acti$ities of situated human su4<ects, +hich reproduce them as structural properties of
social systems em4edded in spans of time6space. )5amination of the duality of structure, therefore,
al+ays in$ol$es studying +hat I ha$e earlier called dimensions or a5es of structuration.
.he *ro4lem of "tructural Constraint
@et me no+ mo$e on to the /uestion of structural constraint. 0ere I shall ta9e lea$e of the 4oys of
0ammerto+n school. I do not +ant to imply that ethnographic research such as that carried out 4y
Billis is refractory to consideration of this pro4lem. En the contrary, much of +hat Billis has to say
can 4e understood precisely as a su4tle and theoretically sophisticated, as +ell as empirically rich,
in/uiry into the nature of structural constraint. 3ut neither ha$e I any +ish to claim that ethnographic
studies ha$e any sort of primacy o$er other types of social in$estigation, and for purposes of
institutional analysis +e are often (though not ine$ita4ly) interested in larger aggregates than can
comforta4ly 4e dealt +ith in ethnographic terms. @et me shift countries as +ell as research studies,
and use as a 4asis for discussion research carried out into educational opportunity in *iemonte, in
north6+est Italy.!! .he research reports the results of a /uestionnaire and an inter$ie+ sur$ey carried
out among high school pupils, in$ol$ing in all some ,,000 indi$iduals. .hose inter$ie+ed in the
larger of the t+o pieces of research +ere all young people +ho had started to loo9 for +or9 not more
than a year prior to 4eing contacted.
.he research +as thus concerned +ith themes /uite similar to those of Billis!s study, especially
+ith attitudes to+ards school and +or9. It also e5emplifies aspects of the refle5i$e monitoring of
system reproduction on the part of the state so characteristic
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of contemporary societies. .he indi$iduals inter$ie+ed +ere registered in lists set up 4y an 8ct of
*arliament +hich had the o4<ecti$e of aiding school6lea$ers in finding employment. .he 8ct offered
4enefits to employers ta9ing on young people and allo+ed for $arious forms of training on the <o4 and
so on. .he research pro<ect +as itself part of the attempt of the authorities refle5i$ely to influence
conditions of social reproduction. It +as sponsored 4y the local go$ernment partly in response to a
rather surprising outcome of pre$ious policy concerned +ith school6lea$ers. .he go$ernment had
offered &00 /uite +ell6paid <o4s to out6of6+or9 high school and college graduates for a period of a
year. 0o+e$er, a third of those to +hom the <o4s +ere offered refused them. "uch a reaction
confounded those +ho had initiated the policy, +ho had apparently 4elie$ed that the unemployed
+ould ta9e any reasona4ly +ell6paid employment +hich +as offered. .o in$estigate the matter, they
financed the study.
.he author of the research report, 1am4etta, analyses his material in such a +ay as to 4ring it to
4ear $ery firmly upon /uestions of structural constraint. In ta9ing up $arious educational options, he
as9s, are indi$iduals 'pushed! or do they '<ump!? In +hat sense, if any, are there forces a9in to those
portrayed 4y 'structural sociologists! +hich impel indi$iduals into specific courses of action?
1am4etta first of all sets up the research results in a manner resem4ling a myriad of other studies in
+hich this type of standpoint has 4een adopted. .hus, for e5ample, class 4ac9ground can 4e sho+n to
influence the nature of educational choice. 8n 'upper6class! child has four times the chance of reaching
higher education than one from a '+or9ing6class! 4ac9ground. Bhat do such differences tell us? .hey
do not, as they stand, indicate the mechanisms +here4y the o4ser$ed correlations are produced= and
+hate$er influences are responsi4le are far from une/ui$ocal in their effects, for many upper6class
children do not enter higher education, +hile a certain proportion of +or9ing6class children do. None
the less, such o4ser$ations do indicate that there is more influencing educational choice than factors
+hich could effecti$ely 4e represented as an aggregate of separately ta9en decisions. %e$ie+ing
similar findings for a range of studies carried out mostly in North 8merica, @ei4o+it> demonstrates
that the 'e5plained! $ariance in completed years of schooling in terms of socio6economic 4ac9ground
ranges
366 Structuration Theory, Empirical Research and Social Critique
4et+een 10 and 42 per cent.:
Clearly, these connections are only diffusely e5pressed +hen gi$en in the form of such gross
correlations. 1am4etta therefore see9s to loo9 more closely at sources of inter6class $ariance,
controlling statistically for a num4er of possi4ly influential factors. Controlling for economic
differences as inde5ed 4y per child family income, and for 'cultural resources! as measured 4y parents!
education, the results sho+ that father!s occupation C pro4a4ly the single most common empirical
inde5 of class 4ac9ground used in research C still has considera4le effect upon educational
destination. .he results also indicate a se/uential process of effects occurring. Bor9ing6class children
are more li9ely than others to 4e +eeded out at a relati$ely early stage in terms of lea$ing school at the
earliest a$aila4le opportunity. 3ut those +ho do stay on are more li9ely to go to uni$ersity than higher6
class children +ho stay on= the latter, in other +ords, are more li9ely to lea$e once the more ad$anced
phases of the educational process are reached. .his suggests that higher6class families perhaps tend
more or less automatically to 9eep their children in education 4eyond the ordinary school6lea$ing age.
In other +ords, there are influences 'pushing! up+ards, not <ust do+n+ards, against +or9ing6class
children. Bor9ing6class parents do not tend to 9eep their children in education unless there is some
particular reason to do so C an e5ceptionally gifted child, one particularly moti$ated to remain in
school, and so on.
Bere the +or9ing6class children pushed, or did they <ump? Bere they 'pulled from the front!
through ha$ing +hat Billis calls a 'partial penetration! of the life chances confronting them? 3y
further statistical analysis of his material, 1am4etta is a4le to sho+ that +or9ing6class children are
considera4ly more responsi$e to lac9 of educational success, prior to the initial decision of +hether to
stay on at school or lea$e, than are higher6class children. .his suggests that +or9ing6class families and
children ha$e a realistic understanding of the difficulties they face in !getting on! in the school system.
Be can at least $enture an interpretation of +hy +or9ing6class children, ha$ing stayed on at school,
tend to 4e less li9ely to lea$e than the others. ;or these children, and for their parents, staying on
in$ol$es more of a commitment (to $alues that are culturally 'alien!) than in the case of those in the
higher classes. .he material costs are also greater,
((369))
since for the parents the marginal cost of 9eeping a child in school is more su4stantial than for higher6
class families. Ence the commitment has 4een made, there is a greater cultural and material
'in$estment! to 4e protected than in the case of the higher6class children.
Ino+ledge of la4our mar9ets, as +ell as attitudes to+ards +or9 in general, can 4e presumed to
influence such decisions. 0ere 1am4etta discusses a conception of 4eha$iour in la4our mar9ets +hich
has attracted considera4le attention in Italy the 'par9ing theory!. 8ccording to this $ie+, the length of
education tends to 4e in$ersely related to chances of social mo4ility at early school6lea$ing ages. In
order to a$oid 4eing unemployed, pupils stay on longer at school. .he implied moti$ational account in
the par9ing theory is that, ceteris paribus, +or9 is preferred to school. .hose +ho ha$e proposed the
theory! ha$e gi$en an account of actors! moti$es and reasons +hich is 4oth largely implicit and 'thin!.
None the less, the par9ing theory is interesting 4ecause it yields certain counter6intuiti$e possi4ilities
C for e5ample, it indicates that length of education, in certain circumstances, may 4e in$ersely related
to the le$el of economic de$elopment of a neigh4ourhood or a region. .hus 3ar4agli found that, in
Italy as a +hole, a$erage per capita income is positi$ely correlated +ith rate of school attendance in
the age group 11C1(. En the other hand, the rate of staying on, after the age at +hich it is legally
possi4le to lea$e school, is correlated negati$ely +ith per capita income and +ith other measures of
pro$incial economic de$elopment. 0e concludes that, as a result of the greater difficulties in finding
employment, those in poorer pro$inces tend to stay on at school.!!
"ince, ho+e$er, the par9ing theory is 'thin! in moti$ational terms, it does not allo+ us to consider
$arious possi4le interpretations of such results. ;or e5ample, +ould the pattern of staying on at school
4e the same if there +ere no possi4le economic 4enefits to 4e deri$ed from longer school attendance?
0ere the par9ing theory +ould suggest conclusions different from those of 'human capital! theories,
+hich regard educational decisions in cost64enefit terms. In order to assess these $ariant possi4ilities
1am4etta correlated decision to stay on in education to uni$ersity le$el +ith economic differences in
the *iemonte region. .he results indicate that this is not <ust a matter of
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negati$e choice, as the par9ing theory suggests= staying on is in some part a positi$e decision, 'pulled!
4y the attractions of the opportunities that further education offers. 3ut 'human capital! theories are
themsel$es o$ersimplified in terms of the moti$ational assumptions they in$ol$e, as the research
sho+s. #oreo$er, such theories are una4le to grasp unintended outcomes of a plurality of separately
considered courses of action. .here may 4e per$erse conse/uences +hich result unintentionally from
decisions to stay on in order to ma5imi>e occupational re+ards. )ach indi$idual might act in the
e5pectation of higher 4enefits, 4ut if too many act in this +ay, the e5pected 4enefits e$aporate.
20
.he /uestion 1am4etta originally posed C +ere they pushed or did they <ump? C leads him to go
4eyond the usual confines of structural sociology. 0e is a4le to analyse his empirical material in such
a +ay as to mo$e from an institutional perspecti$e to+ards the study of purposi$e conduct. 0is
research su4<ects are more than <ust 'sociological dopes!. %ather than directly discussing 1am4etta!s
analysis of his results, ho+e$er, I shall follo+ lines of thought de$eloped in a pre$ious chapter. @et
me repeat +hat I ha$e said a4out constraints on action pre$iously. ;irst, constraints do not 'push!
anyone to do anything if he or she has not already 4een 'pulled!. In other +ords, an account of
purposi$e conduct is implied e$en +hen the constraints limiting courses of action are $ery se$ere.
"econd, constraints are of $arious 9inds. It is important in this case to distinguish 4et+een constraint
deri$ing from differential sanctions and structural constraint. .hird, to study the influence of
structural constraint in any particular conte5t of action implies specifying rele$ant aspects of the
limits of agents! 9no+ledgea4ility.
@et us ta9e these issues in re$erse order. "o far as the third point is concerned, it is apparent that a
good deal of +hat 1am4etta has to say is in fact to do +ith identifying the 4ounds of agents!
9no+ledgea4ility. ;or instance, he de$otes some considera4le attention to specifying +hat parents and
children are li9ely to 9no+ a4out la4our mar9ets in their local area. .his is manifestly important. .he
same is true of 9no+ledgea4ility in respect of the school milieu. 8 study of a statistical type cannot
produce material of the richness of detail offered in Billis!s +or9. 3ut inferences can 4e made C and
4ac9ed up 4y the research material, as 1am4etta sho+s C a4out the sorts of 9no+ledge
((36"))
parents and children are li9ely to ha$e of the 'cash $alue! of education.
In regard of the second point, it should 4e pointed out that there are $arious sorts of sanction +hich
affect the position of the children= these can /uite easily 4e distinguished from sources of structural
constraint. "chool attendance and the minimum school6lea$ing age are fi5ed 4y la+. *arents and
children sometimes disregard this legal o4ligation, especially in southern areas of Italy, 4ut for most it
sets the frame+or9 +ithin +hich the sorts of decisions analysed 4y 1am4etta are ta9en. Children are
also su4<ect to informal sanctions on the part of parents and of other figures in the school. "ince
parents ha$e to support those of their progeny +ho stay on at school, they ha$e a strong economic
sanction +ith +hich to influence +hether or not their children go on into further education= of course,
a range of other more su4tle sanctioning mechanisms are also li9ely to 4e in$ol$ed. "tudies li9e
Billis!s ma9e it apparent enough that a $ariety of such mechanisms e5ist in the school en$ironment
also.
@et me mo$e finally to the first issue. Identifying structural constraint in a specific conte5t or type
of conte5t of action demands consideration of actors! reasons in relation to the moti$ation that is at
origin of preferences. Bhen constraints so narro+ the range of (feasi4le) alternati$es that only one
option or type of option is open to an actor, the presumption is that the actor +ill not find it +orth
+hile to do anything other than comply. .he preference in$ol$ed is the negati$e one of +ishing to
a$oid the conse/uences of non6compliance. If the agent 'could not ha$e acted other+ise! in the
situation, it is 4ecause only one option e5isted, gi$en that agent!s +ants. .his must not 4e confused, as
I ha$e consistently emphasi>ed, +ith the 'could not ha$e done other+ise! that mar9s the conceptual
4oundary of action= it is e5actly this confusion that structural sociologists tend to ma9e. Bhere only
one (feasi4le) option e5ists, a+areness of such limitation, in con<unction +ith +ants, supplies the
reason for the agent!s conduct. It is 4ecause the constraint C understood as such 4y the actor C is the
reason for that conduct that the ellipsis of structural sociology is readily made.! Constraints also, of
course, enter into the reasoning of actors +hen a +ider range of options is in$ol$ed. 8gain +e ha$e to
4e careful here. ;ormal models of preference or decision6ma9ing may, in any particular
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set of circumstances, offer an analytically po+erful +ay of interpreting connections 4et+een structural
properties, 4ut they do not su4stitute for more detailed in$estigations of agents! reasoning +hich
ethnographic research pro$ides. Consider once more the conduct of 'the lads!. 8n 'economic! model
undou4tedly ma9es some sense of their reasoning. "eeing that formal education has little to offer them
in respect of +or9 prospects, they effecti$ely decide to cut their losses 4y getting out to +or9 as soon
as they possi4ly can. 0o+e$er, such a representation of their 4eha$iour con$eys nothing of the
su4tleties or the comple5ity +hich Billis!s study re$eals.
1am4etta!s study is concerned +ith the influence of structural constraint +ithin the immediate
situation of action +hich confronts the school6lea$ers. "uch a restricted focus is no dou4t <ustified,
gi$en the ine$ita4ly confined nature of any indi$idual piece of research. 3ut o4$iously the influence of
structural constraints o$er the course of action in /uestion could potentially 4e e5amined in much
more depth. .hus one could in$estigate ho+ the actors! moti$es and processes of reasoning ha$e 4een
influenced or shaped 4y factors in their up4ringing and prior e5periences and ho+ those factors ha$e
in turn 4een influenced 4y general institutional features of the +ider society. 0o+e$er, such 'social
forces! could in principle themsel$es 4e studied in e5actly the same +ay as the phenomena directly
in$ol$ed in 1am4etta!s research. "tructural constraints, in other +ords, al+ays operate $ia agents!
moti$es and reasons, esta4lishing (often in diffuse and con$oluted +ays) conditions and conse/uences
affecting options open to others, and +hat they +ant from +hate$er options they ha$e.
Contradiction and the )mpirical "tudy of Conflict
*ursuing the connected topics of education and the state pro$ides a material thread of continuity in
proceeding to consider a further range of /uestions rele$ant to empirical +or9. I ha$e suggested in an
earlier chapter that the concept of contradiction can 4e usefully connected to notions of structural
properties and structural constraint. #y discussion in that chapter +as 4oth relati$ely short and highly
a4stract. I claimed that the notion of contradiction can 4e gi$en a clear sense in social theory, and that
((311))
it is +orth distinguishing from conflict, +here the latter term denotes some form of acti$e antagonism
4et+een actors and collecti$ities. @et me no+ attempt to defend this claim in an empirical conte5t,
concerning myself only +ith +hat I earlier called 'structural contradiction!. .he most important and
interesting of recent attempts to gi$e the concept of contradiction a definite empirical content are to 4e
found in the +or9 of authors influenced 4y game theory, +ho adopt a $ie+point e5plicitly lin9ed to
methodological indi$idualism.
22
Ene of these authors, 3oudon, has +ritten e5tensi$ely upon
education and state policy. .he +or9 of another, )lster, is one of the main sources 1am4etta dre+
upon in the study <ust analysed.
3oudon and )lster associate contradiction +ith the unintended conse/uences of action, a su4class of
the 'per$erse effects! that may result from the intentional acts of a plurality of indi$iduals. )lster
distinguishes t+o $arieties of contradiction thus understood that in$ol$ing 'counterfinality!, and that
in$ol$ing 'su4optimality!.
2=
.he first of these is associated +ith +hat )lster calls the fallacy of
composition C the mista9en $ie+ that +hat is possi4le for one person in a gi$en set of circumstances
is necessarily possi4le simultaneously for e$eryone else in those circumstances. ;or e5ample, it does
not follo+ from the fact that anyone can deposit all his or her money in a 4an9, and gain interest on it,
that e$eryone can do so.
)lster!s point is that many instances of the fallacy of composition can 4e redescri4ed as in$ol$ing
contradictory social relations. Contradictory conse/uences ensue +hen e$ery indi$idual in an
aggregate of indi$iduals acts in a +ay +hich, +hile producing the intended effect if done in isolation,
creates a per$erse effect if done 4y e$eryone. If all the audience in a lecture hall get to their feet to
o4tain a 4etter $ie+ of the spea9er, no one +ill in fact do so. If each farmer in a gi$en area attempts to
ac/uire more land 4y cutting do+n trees, resulting in soil erosion 4ecause of deforestation, e$eryone
+ill end up +ith less land than in the first place. .hese are outcomes not only that no one intends 4ut
also that run counter to +hat e$eryone in the situation +ants= none the less, they deri$e from conduct
that is intended to satisfy +ants, and could do so for indi$iduals, +ere it not for the fact that the
conduct in /uestion 4ecomes generali>ed. Consider #ar5!s discussion of the tendency of the rate of
profit to fall in capitalist
((312))
economies.
24
In circumstances in +hich the economy is gro+ing at such a pace as to a4sor4 a$aila4le
sources of la4our, +ages +ill tend to increase as employers e5perience a scarcity of suita4le la4our
po+er. .o offset this, employers introduce technical inno$ations +hich sa$e on la4our costs. Bhile
indi$idual industrialists may deri$e greater profita4ility from such a response, the o$erall amount of
surplus $alue, and therefore of profit, in the economy declines, since the ratio of constant to $aria4le
capital has risen. Ence all those in a gi$en sector of the economy ha$e introduced the same
technological inno$ation, they may all 4e +orse off than they +ere 4efore.
.he second type of contradictory relation, su4optimality, is defined in terms of game theory. It is
+here all participants in a game6theoretical situation opt for a solution strategy, a+are that the other
participants +ill do so as +ell and that all could ha$e o4tained as much, and one more, if another
strategy had 4een adopted. Knli9e the case of counterfinality, those in$ol$ed are a+are of the
outcomes to +hich their 4eha$iour can lead in $arious con<unctions +ith the action of others.
"upposing farmers producing a particular crop +ill 4e a4le to secure higher profits if they form a
cartel. If a cartel is formed, it +ill 4e e$en more profita4le for the indi$idual farmer to flout the cartel
agreement, in order to gain from it +ithout 4eing 4ound 4y it. 8s all the farmers are a+are that such is
the case, no cartel is esta4lished.
2(
3oudon has applied a some+hat compara4le interpretation to
research into education and social mo4ility. In the 1-&0s higher education e5panded in $irtually all
the industriali>ed countries. 8s educational le$els rose, more and more people too9 up occupations for
+hich, according to the formal demands of the +or9 in$ol$ed, they +ere mar9edly o$er6/ualified.
*artly as a response to the frustrations thus incurred, in many countries there +as set up +hat has
come to 4e called 'short6cycle! higher education C short courses offering more fle5i4le, short6term
options. 0o+e$er, fe+ chose to enter such courses. Bhy should this 4e? 3oudon suggests that the
failure of short6cycle education can 4e understood in terms analogous to those of the prisoner!s
dilemma C a su4optimal result of rational decisions ta9en 4y the student population in cogni>ance of
their pro4a4le outcome. %esearch sho+s that persons choosing short6cycle courses of study do indeed
ha$e chances of getting +ell6paid <o4s not inferior
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to those +ho ha$e follo+ed longer, more traditional courses. #ost students also seem to 4e a+are of
this fact. "o one +ould intuiti$ely assume C as did the go$ernments +hich instituted them C that a
high proportion of students +ould choose the short6cycle courses. E4$ious though it might appear,
3oudon points out, this assumption +ould 4e incorrect. .he choices students ma9e depend, as does the
prisoner!s dilemma, upon the fact that each indi$idual is choosing in the 9no+ledge that others are
ma9ing choices from the same alternati$es. "tudents actually do ma5imi>e their chances 4y choosing
long6term education, e$en 9no+ing that others are li9ely to thin9 the same +ay and e$en though some
indi$iduals +ould profit more from selecting the short6term option.:
.he formulations of )lster and 3oudon are attracti$e 4ecause they ena4le a clear meaning to 4e
gi$en to contradiction (although 3oudon does not himself use the term) and 4ecause they indicate ho+
the notion might 4e accorded an empirical content. .he conse/uences of intended acts are
contradictory +hen those conse/uences are per$erse in such a +ay that the $ery acti$ity of pursuing an
o4<ecti$e diminishes the possi4ility of reaching it. .he difficulties +ith such a conception of
contradiction, ho+e$er, are fairly o4$ious. It is closely associated +ith the use of models dra+n from
game theory. No+, there is no dou4t that game6theoretical models can 4e $ery useful in empirical
research, in respect of suggesting 4oth pro4lems to 4e in$estigated and ho+ research results might 4e
interpreted. 3oudon!s +or9 in the sociology of education is a case in point. 3ut the scope of the
application of game theory in the social sciences ne$ertheless seems limited. 8lthough game6
theoretical models may 4e elegant and satisfying +hen stated a4stractly or mathematically, their
relation to actual conduct is often /uite tenuous.
.he empirical applications of game6theoretical models are easiest to defend +hen certain particular
circumstances are found +hen definite 'decisions! are to 4e made= +here the alternati$e conse/uences
in$ol$ed are /uite easily specified= and +here the decisions in /uestion are ta9en separately 4y an
aggregate of indi$iduals not in direct communication +ith one another. "uch circumstances are not
infre/uently disco$ered in modern societies, 4ut there are $ery many conte5ts of social life +hich are
not of such a 9ind. If the lin9age +ith game theory is one source
((314))
of limitation upon this type of approach to the concept of contradiction, another is the affiliation +ith
methodological indi$idualism, e5plicitly adopted 4y )lster in particular. .he connection may 4e
logically a contingent one, 4ut it is not hard to see +hy the t+o tend to go together. Contradiction is
located 4y )lster in the dis<unction 4et+een indi$idual acts, underta9en separately, and their composite
conse/uences. It is largely limited to +hat I ha$e called the analysis of strategic conduct. In this
standpoint there is no +ay of understanding contradiction as implicated in the structural conditions of
system reproduction.
It is such an understanding +hich I ad$ocate as ha$ing a 4roader significance for social theory than
that suggested 4y )lster and 3oudon and as offering more scope for empirical +or9. I +ant not to
/uestion the importance of their ideas 4ut rather to complement them. Contradictory outcomes of the
sort they discuss may 4e supposed often to 4e lin9ed systematically to +hat I ha$e termed structural
contradiction. I +ish to understand the concept of contradiction less a4stractly than they do, in addition
to separating it from the premises of methodological indi$idualism. .hat is to say, I +ant to connect
the notion in a su4stanti$e +ay to the o$erall types of societal totality distinguished earlier, such that
although there may 4e many e5amples of secondary contradiction, these are deri$ati$e of the dominant
contradictory modes in +hich societies are structured. 0o+e$er, as I ha$e defined them, primary and
secondary structural contradictions still preser$e the same core of meaning +hich )lster gi$es to the
term= the conditions of system reproduction depend upon structural properties +hich act to negate the
$ery principles upon +hich they are 4ased.
8s an e5ample of some pertinent reflections upon the primary contradiction of capitalist states, let
me refer to some of Effe!s +ritings on the su4<ect.
22
.hey are logically and su4stanti$ely compati4le
C at least, in some of their main aspects C +ith the ideas I ha$e ad$anced in this 4oo9, and they ha$e
generated a good deal of illuminating empirical +or9. .he institutional form of the capitalist state is
descri4ed in terms of the follo+ing traits (among others).
(1) '*olitical po+er is prohi4ited from organi>ing production
according to its o+n political criteria.! In other +ords, large
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sectors of economic organi>ation are co6ordinated not 4y go$ernment 4ut 4y acti$ities engaged
in +ithin 'pri$ate! spheres of economic enterprise. .he institutional foundation of these spheres
is to 4e found in pri$ate property and in the secular 'o+nership! of la4our po+er.
2)
'*olitical po+er depends indirectly C through the mechanisms of ta5ation and dependence on the
capital mar9et C on the $olume of pri$ate accumulation.! .hat is to say, the state is funded 4y
ta5ation deri$ed from processes of economic de$elopment +hich state agencies do not directly
control.
,)
'"ince the state depends on a process of accumulation +hich is 4eyond its po+er to organi>e, e$ery
occupant of state po+er is 4asically interested in promoting those conditions most conduci$e to
accumulation!.
2%
.he third point is an important addition to the first t+o, since it ser$es to a$oid the implication of an
untutored functionalism. It is made clear that the phenomena identified in the first t+o points are
9no+n to those in state agencies, +hich act in the light of that 9no+ledge.
Bhy is the capitalist state, thus characteri>ed, a contradictory social form? 3ecause the $ery
conditions that ma9e possi4le the state!s e5istence call into play, and depend upon, mechanisms that
run counter to state po+er. '*ri$ate appropriation!, to use the traditional terminology, demands
'sociali>ed production! at the same time as it negates it. 8nother +ay to e5press this C de$eloped in
an analytically po+erful +ay 4y Effe C is to say that, +hile the state depends upon the commodity
form, it also depends simultaneously upon negating the commodity form. .he most direct e5pression
of commodification is the 4uying and selling of $alues= +hen $alues are no longer treated as
e5changea4le in terms of money, they lose their commodified character. .he contradictory nature of
the capitalist state is e5pressed in the push and pull 4et+een commodification, decommodification
and re6commodification. .a9e as e5amples the pro$ision of health care and pu4lic transport. .he
setting up of sociali>ed medicine means de6commodifying important aspects of health care and
esta4lishing them on 4asis other than that of +hether or not indi$iduals +ho need treatment can pay
for it. 0o+e$er, those +ho ha$e least need of sociali>ed medicine C the
((316))
more affluent sections of the population, +hich tend to opt for pri$ate medicine e$en though pu4licly
pro$ided medical ser$ices are a$aila4le C ha$e to contri4ute disproportionately to paying for it $ia
graduated ta5ation. .hey are li9ely therefore to apply pressure to putting some of the ser$ices of pu4lic
medicine 4ac9 upon a commercial 4asis. #uch the same applies to pu4lic transport. .hose in the
higher ta5 4rac9ets, +ho contri4ute most to the financing of pu4lic transport, are li9ely to do much of
their tra$elling in pri$ate cars. .hey +ill pro4a4ly therefore 4e resistant to policies +hich treat pu4lic
transport as a general good for the community rather than as a commercially $ia4le set of ser$ices.
"ince those in lo+er income groups are li9ely to ha$e opposing $ie+s, go$ernment policy may
$acillate 4et+een the denationali>ation and renationali>ation of such ser$ices as successi$e parties,
representing different class interests, come to po+er.
2-
Effe!s analysis raises in a trenchant fashion the pro4lem of the relation 4et+een contradiction and
conflict, 4ut 4efore ta9ing this up directly I +ant to pursue the theme of secondary contradiction.
*rimary contradictions may 4e lin9ed in a $ariety of more or less direct +ays +ith secondary ones.
"ome may 4e $ery general in character, 4ut others may 4e much more conte5tuali>ed. Consider the
follo+ing e5amples, chosen at random from the sociological literature. .hey are instances of per$erse
outcomes, 4ut I thin9 it can reasona4ly 4e said that they e5press contradictions.
1)8 study of the elderly and the pro$ision of supplementary 4enefits. In the Knited "tates
supplementary insurance 4enefits +ere introduced to impro$e the lot of old people on lo+
incomes. 3ut these had the effect of raising the le$el of their income such that they recei$ed a
fe+ dollars o$er the re/uirements of eligi4ility for state medical aid. Conse/uently, medical
co$erage +as denied to them, so that many +ere +orse off than 4efore.
2)8 study of the police. In Ne+ Dor9 City, in order to reduce the cost of o$ertime +or9ed 4y officers
on the e5isting staff, additional patrolmen +ere placed on the streets. 0o+e$er, the main source
of police o$ertime is the processing of arrests. .he increased num4er of police on the streets led
to more arrests 4eing made, thus e5acer4ating the situation the ne+ policy +as supposed to
remedy.
((319))
(,) 8n analysis of ur4an rioting in Aetroit. 8 large6scale effort +as made in the late 1-&0s to try to
pre$ent a recurrence of riots in the ghettos of Aetroit 4y pro$iding increased +elfare 4enefits and
employment opportunities for those in inner6city areas. 0o+e$er, large num4ers of poor people
+ere attracted to the city from outside to ta9e ad$antage of the programmes offered. #any of
these +ere una4le to find employment in the city and thus s+elled the ran9s of the unemployed
further. Ethers too9 <o4s +hich might other+ise ha$e fallen to the city!s o+n chronically
unemployed. .he conditions diagnosed as conduci$e to the out4rea9 of rioting +ere thus
augmented rather than reduced.
,0
"uch e5amples ser$e to dri$e home the li9ely connection 4et+een structural contradiction,
contradiction in the sense of )lster and 3oudon, and the occurrence of social conflict. 3riefly put, I
+ant to ad$ance the follo+ing proposal contradiction is li9ely to 4e lin9ed directly to conflict +here
per$erse con6se/uences ensue or are considered 4y those in$ol$ed to 4e li9ely to ensue. I do not
suggest that contradictions al+ays generate per$erse conse/uences or that all per$erse conse/uences
are contradictory. 3ut contradiction is a sort of structural per$ersity and is li9ely constantly to thro+
off per$erse conse/uences in the modes in +hich it is e5posed in the conduct of situated actors.
*er$erse outcomes are li9ely to generate resentment, and therefore at least potential mo4ili>ation for
struggle, precisely 4ecause of their 're4ound effects!. .hat is to say, things are +orse than they +ere
4efore in circumstances in +hich all or the ma<ority of those in$ol$ed could e5pect them to 4e 4etter.
.he study of per$erse conse/uences of a contradictory 9ind is thus fruitful ground for the e5amination
of the origins of conflicts. 3ut +e can see that it is $ery limiting to identify contradiction +ith such
conse/uences per se; for on the one hand structural contradiction need not lead to per$erse
conse/uences at all, and on the other per$erse conse/uences are not the only circumstances associated
+ith contradiction that can stimulate conflict.
*er$erse conse/uences, it may 4e said, are contingent outcomes that may 4e 4rought a4out in
circumstances of structural contradiction. #ore generic stimulating conditions of conflict are to 4e
found in the association 4et+een contradiction and collecti$e interests. Capitalism is a class society,
and the
((318))
contradiction 4et+een 'pri$ate appropriation! and 'sociali>ed production! is loc9ed into class di$isions
+hich in turn e5press opposing interests. .he articulation 4et+een contradictions and interests may, of
course, $ary. 3ut it is reasona4le to assert that the greater the con$ergence of contradictions, primary
and secondary, the more there +ill 4e an o$erriding alignment of interest di$isions, and the more li9ely
that open conflict +ill de$elop along the 'fault line! of those contradictions. Be may suggest that there
are three sets of circumstances particularly rele$ant to e5amining the relation 4et+een contradiction
and conflict the opacity of action, the dispersal of contradictions and the pre$alence of direct
repression." 3y the 'opacity! of action, I mean, in Billis!s terms, the degree of penetration +hich
actors ha$e of the contradictory /ualities of the social systems in +hich they are in$ol$ed. Insight into
the nature of contradictions may initiate action directed to+ards resol$ing or o$ercoming them. 3ut it
+ould 4e a specious argument that lin9s such insight only to social change. Contradiction is a source
of dynamism, 4ut an understanding of this on the part of lay actors can promote attempts to sta4ili>e a
gi$en state of affairs as much as to transform it. .he importance of this point is su4stanti$ely $ery
considera4le in respect of #ar5!s prognostications a4out the supposed transition from capitalism to
socialism. #ar5 held that as the mem4ers of the +or9ing class come increasingly to grasp the
contradictory nature of capitalist production, they +ill mo4ili>e to change it. 0e does not seem to ha$e
attached much +eight to the possi4ility that dominant groups in the society might ac/uire an
understanding of the system sophisticated enough in some part to sta4ili>e it. .he e5panding role of
the state can 4e seen <ust in these terms. .he state is not <ust caught in the push and pull of primary
contradiction= state agencies may see9 to monitor the conditions of system reproduction in such a +ay
as to minimi>e the conflicts that might other+ise tend to 4rea9 out.
.he degree of fusion or dispersal of contradictions is li9ely to $ary according to t+o main sets of
conditions. Ene is that of 'une$en de$elopment!, the other that of regionali>ation. @ittle needs to 4e
said a4out the concept of une$en de$elopment here, or a4out its empirical applications. It is usually
associated +ith #ar5ist thought, and particularly +ith the +ritings of .rots9y and @enin, 4ut its
elucidation and application ha$e 4y no means
((31"))
4een confined to #ar5ism. .he notion does, ho+e$er, ha$e a 4roader application than has ordinarily
4een recogni>ed. It has usually 4een thought of only in relation to large6scale processes of change=
there is no reason +hy it cannot 4e useful in more restricted time6space conte5ts as +ell. .he idea of
regionali>ation is certainly rele$ant here. 8 particular regional 'spread!, in con<unction +ith differential
rates of change, may ser$e to produce a 4uild6up of contradictions and pro4a4ly also of per$erse
conse/uences. .his is e5actly the sort of situation, for e5ample, +hich @enin diagnosed as pertaining
in %ussia after the turn of the t+entieth century. Ether forms of regionali>ation, ho+e$er, may produce
a diffusion or segmentation of contradictions. Bhere this is the case, conflict +hich occurs is li9ely to
4e 4oth fragmented and cross6cutting, so that the outcomes of some struggles +ill cancel out those of
others. 3y direct repression I mean the use of force or the threat of its use to inhi4it the emergence of
acti$e struggle. .he use of force may normally 4e ta9en precisely as one of the e5pressions of the
occurrence of conflict, 4ut the threat of its use, or certain tactical sho+s of force, may also e/ually +ell
ser$e to pre$ent sources of dissension from emerging as o$ert struggle. 8nyone +ho is prone to argue
that control of the means of $iolence cannot 4e used to dampen conflicts of a profound and deep6lying
9ind should ponder cases such as that of "outh 8frica.
,2
Institutional "ta4ility and Change
I shall loo9 finally at a piece of research +hich, unli9e the others discussed, has 4een in some part
directly influenced 4y structuration theory. .he +or9 in /uestion is Ingham!s recent in$estigation of
the role of the City in 3ritain o$er the past t+o hundred years or so.
,,
.he empirical pro4lem that
Ingham sets out to study is ho+ the City, the financial centre 4ased in @ondon, has maintained its pre6
eminence o$er 3ritain!s industrial capital for such a lengthy period. 0is more general concern is +ith
the nature of the modern state.
.he organi>ations that collecti$ely ma9e up the City, according to Ingham, are concerned mainly
+ith acti$ities that can 4e descri4ed as 'commercial!. .hese acti$ities in$ol$e, among other things, the
financing of trade, the insurance of commodities and
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transport, and foreign e5change transactions. .hey ha$e to do not only +ith the relations 4et+een
3ritain and other states 4ut also +ith the ramifications of capitalistic enterprise on a glo4al scale. #ost
significant in this respect is the part the City has played in the management of domestic currency as
'+orld money!, a means of e5change $alid internationally. Ingham critici>es theories +hich treat the
City as 4eing concerned +ith 'finance capital!. .he acti$ities of the City are certainly financial in the
sense that they are 4ound up +ith the circulation of capital, 4ut the City is concerned primarily +ith
4ro9erage in all forms, +ith profit6ma9ing from pro$iding intermediary ser$ices 4et+een those
directly engaged in the producti$e use of capital.
Ingham sho+s that in order to understand ade/uately the sur$i$al of the po+er of the City since the
late eighteenth century, it is necessary to re<ect the endogenous style of theori>ing +hich has
dominated the pre$ious literature and to grasp ho+ leading organi>ations +ithin the City ha$e reacted
to contingent political e$ents. 3oth #ar5 and later #ar5ists, such as 0ilferding, sought to e5plain (or
to e5plain a+ay) the role of the City in terms mainly of endogenous conceptions of capitalist
de$elopment. #ar5 recogni>ed, and commented upon, the distincti$e /ualities of the City in 3ritish
economic life in the nineteenth century, and he analysed the origins of these in terms of some of the
traits of the 3ritish economy as it mo$ed from the dominance of commercial to that of industrial
capital. 3ut the de$elopment of industrial capitalism, according to #ar5!s $ie+, +ould soon oust
commercial and 4an9ing capital from such a central position. 8s industrial production ad$anced,
producti$e capital +ould come to pre6dominate economically and politically o$er the more
traditionally esta4lished '4an9ocracy!. #ar5!s discussion of the matter pro$ides little clue, therefore, as
to ho+ it has come a4out that the economic and political po+er of the City has 4een sustained in the
long term. 0ilferding!s standpoint, +or9ed out at a later date, is e/ually fla+ed. 8ccording to
0ilferding, the formation of 'finance capital! C the merging of 4an9ing and large6scale industry C has
occurred at a more leisurely pace in 3ritain than else+here. 3ut the same process +ill e$entually occur
there as has ta9en place in other societies. 3ritain!s manufacturing supremacy in the nineteenth century
allo+ed the country temporarily to lag 4ehind= ho+e$er, international competition +ould ensure that
the same
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pattern +ould e$entually emerge.
,4
"uch a pattern has not come into 4eing. Bhy not? Ingham!s thesis is that modern 3ritish society has
4een mar9ed 4y 4eing not only the first industrial economy 4ut also a centre for +orld commercial
transactions. .he most important traits of the City, Ingham argues, ha$e to 4e understood in relation to
the nature of nation6states. "tates ha$e their o+n currencies 4ut cannot easily control the flo+ of these
outside their o+n territories= moreo$er, the $alues and sta4ility of different currencies $ary +idely. .he
City early on C partly, 4ut 4y no means +holly, 4ecause of 3ritain!s industrial strength in the
nineteenth century C 4ecame a centre for an accepted form of '+orld money! and an international
clearing house for the settlement of transactions. .he $irtual monopoly +hich the City +as a4le to
achie$e o$er certain types of commercial transaction, plus the introduction of the goldCsterling
standard, depended upon a range of political conditions. .hese ha$e to 4e distinguished from the
sources of 3ritain!s industrial supremacy. .he importance of the City, and of sterling, has lasted +ell
4eyond the point at +hich 3ritain +as the +orld!s leading industrial po+er. 3y the end of the ;irst
Borld Bar the Knited "tates had 4ecome the +orld!s strongest economy, 4ut, contrary to the
e5pectations of many in the 1-20s and 1-,0s, Ne+ Dor9 did not supplant @ondon as the +orld!s main
clearing house.
8ccording to Ingham!s account, these phenomena are to 4e understood in the follo+ing terms. In the
early nineteenth century a series of fiscal reforms +as introduced in 3ritain. .he intention of the
reformers +as mainly to try to cope +ith the long6standing de4ts that the state had accumulated,
e5acer4ated 4y the Napoleonic Bars. .he result, ho+e$er, +as to further a concentration of monied
interests, separate from the industrial entrepreneurs, in the City institutions. .he 4urgeoning +ealth of
the City made possi4le the sur$i$al of certain sectors of the aristocracy +hen faced 4y the diminishing
importance of the agrarian economy +hich +as its po+er 4ase. 8s part of a 'gentlemanly e5change!,
City merchants and 4an9ers in turn ac/uired the trappings of aristocracy. It +as not only a definite type
of class po+er +hich +as enhanced 4y the particular processes affecting the de$elopment of the City
in the nineteenth century= these same processes led to the perpetuation, and indeed strengthening,
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of 'pre6industrial! commercial capitalism. .he City +as physically separate from the industrial North
C a dramatic e5ample of regionali>ationQ C remaining 4oth economically and politically distinct
from the centres of industrial capitalism. It 4ecame strongly centrali>ed under the control of the 3an9
of )ngland, and the 4an9ing system 4ecame oriented first and foremost to maintaining the sta4le role
of sterling as a 'trusted! form of +orld money.6
(
8 further important aspect of this process +as the
state!s fiscal policy in ensuring sterling!s formal $alidity, +hich the City!s narro+ly economic acti$ity
alone could not guarantee.
Bhat is important a4out Ingham!s appraisal of 3ritish economic and political de$elopment, in this
conte5t at any rate, is less the /uestion of +hether or not it is $alid than the general theoretical
standpoint it e5presses. In critici>ing endogenous models Ingham!s analysis a$oids +hat might 4e
regarded as the de$elopmental determinism that is 4uilt into many theories a4out modern societies. 3y
this I mean a type of thin9ing a4out social change +hich implies that in a society of a gi$en type there
is only 'one +ay for+ard!, +hich e$ery particular society must at some point follo+ if it is of that type.
.hus 'industrial capitalism!, it might 4e supposed, has certain generic patterns of de$elopment that are
repeated in all societies +hich can 4e so characteri>ed. If some societies do not display these patterns,
it must 4e 4ecause they are lagging 4ehind= for some reason their de$elopment has 4een retarded. .his
type of thin9ing $ery often also in$ol$es a particular $ersion of functionalism. If certain processes of
de$elopment are 'necessary! to a society, or type of society, it is 4ecause they are functionally re/uired
4y the institutional order of that society. .he implied functional needs 'e5plain! +hy a certain path of
de$elopment 'must! 4e follo+ed. It should 4e emphasi>ed again that the 'must! here is <ustified only if
understood in a counter6factual conte5t. .hus it might 4e argued that +hat 'must! or 'had to! happen in
3ritain at the turn of the t+entieth century +as a scrapping of the 'o4solete! commercial role of the
City in the face of the 'needs! of industrial capital. "uch an argument is at least potentially illuminating
if understood counter6factually. In other +ords, +e can as9 the /uestion +hat +ere the conse/uences
for industrial capital of the fact that the position of po+er of the City +as maintained? 3ut if the 'must!
is ta9en to ha$e e5planatory force, the result is a positi$e 4arrier to understanding +hy things
((323))
too9 the course they did, as Ingham!s +or9 demonstrates in pellucid fashion.
.he research successfully s9irts a further tendency associated +ith endogenous models. .his is the
presumption that the society +hich is most ad$anced in respect of +hate$er social traits are 4eing
studied can 4e treated as an e5emplar for research purposes.
,&
.hus in the nineteenth century 3ritain
+as regarded, 4y #ar5 among many others, as sho+ing other societies an image of their o+n future=
as the most industrially ad$anced country 3ritain presaged de$elopments that others +ere 4ound to
follo+. Uuite understanda4ly, there are fe+ +ho +ould regard 3ritain in such a +ay in the closing
decades of the t+entieth century... . 3ut has the style of thin9ing that this $ie+ represents disappeared
along +ith 3ritain!s retreat into economic o4scurity? 3y no means. No+adays it is the Knited "tates,
as the most 'economically ad$anced! society, that fulfils a compara4le role in social theory and in
research C e$en if rarely as une/ui$ocally as in *arsons!s $ersion of e$olutionism. No+, I do not deny
that it may 4e useful, for some purposes, to ran9 societies according to their le$el of de$elopment in
respect of criteria of one sort or another. It is also legitimate and necessary to attempt to specify +hat
is generic to the institutional order of different societies. 3ut 'comparati$e research! must 4e +hat the
term says. .hat is to say, +e ha$e to recogni>e that 'typical! processes of de$elopment can 4e assessed
only 4y direct comparison 4et+een different societies, not 4y assuming that any one society can 4e
treated as a model of an endogenous de$elopment process.
.he original rise to prominence of the City, Ingham ma9es clear, +as largely an unintended outcome
of fiscal measures instituted for other reasons. Bhat therefore for #ar5, and for most su4se/uent
#ar5ists, 4elonged only to the early phases of capitalist de$elopment, commercial 4ro9erage and
usury, 4ecame a lasting feature of 3ritish capitalism. *recisely 4ecause the dominant position of the
City +as gradually lin9ed to its role as a 4ro9er for transactions across national 4oundaries, the same
phenomenon +as unli9ely to 4e repeated else+here. 3ut if the dominant position +hich the City
esta4lished in the early part of the nineteenth century +as su4stantially unintended, su4se/uent
policies defending and e5panding its po+er +ere usually of a /uite different sort. 8fter the turn of the
t+entieth century the
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3ritish economy faced intensified competition from other industriali>ed and industriali>ing countries.
In these circumstances the economic hegemony of the City 4ecame seriously threatened, internally and
e5ternally. In large part, as Ingham!s analysis discloses, policies promoted 4y groups either in 4an9ing
or in the .reasury, or in 4oth, +ere acti$ely and successfully directed at defending the pri$ileged role
of City organi>ations.
Ingham!s research displays a particular and compelling sensiti$ity to pro4lems of '+orld time!. .he
City came to ta9e on its modern form in relation to a definite con<uncture of e$ents in the early part of
the nineteenth century. Its persistence as a centre of commercial acti$ities +as dependent upon
3ritain!s position as the leading industrial po+er and upon the in$ol$ement of the country in a
+orld+ide e5pansion of capitalistic relations. .hose +ho pushed through the fiscal reforms of the
early nineteenth century 4elie$ed that the merchants, +ho had managed to ta9e o$er a great deal of
erst+hile Autch and ;rench trade, +ould 4e a4le to consolidate 3ritain!s economic strength on the
4asis of com4ining a ;ree .rade policy +ith adherence to the 1old "tandard. .he *resident of the
3oard of .rade, 0us9issen, for instance, in$o9ed comparisons +ith Jenice in pre$ious centuries. .he
effecti$eness of such influences +as possi4le, ho+e$er, only 4ecause of the particular class alliance
+hich Ingham descri4es. #oreo$er, the conditions of the initial consolidation of the po+er of the City,
he ma9es clear, +ere su4stantially different from those allo+ing for the sustaining of that po+er in
su4se/uent periods. Auring the nineteenth century the role of the City in the +orld economy has a
direct economic 4ase in the success of 3ritain as an industrial producer. In the t+entieth century this
ceased to 4e the case= the 'industrial! and 'commercial! sectors of the 3ritish economy 4ecame oriented
to different sets of in$ol$ements. It +as the City!s position as a +orld monetary 4ro9er, 4y then
esta4lished internationally, +hich ena4led it to sustain its po+er. 3ut 4y this time, 4ecause of the
changing ne5us of circumstances nationally and internationally, the prosperity of the City pro4a4ly
actually presupposed the relati$e decline of 3ritish industry.
Ingham!s +or9 demonstrates that the conditions +hich influenced the rise of the City, and +hich
ha$e su4se/uently sustained its pri$ileges, are in some su4stantial degree political.
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.he City is pro4a4ly 4est not regarded as a 'part! of the state, 4ut 4oth internally and e5ternally its
economic po+er has depended in a profound +ay upon political factors. .he hegemony of the City
+ithin the 3ritish economy has 4een fostered 4y the close lin9s that ha$e e5isted 4et+een the
'4an9ocracy! and the higher le$els of go$ernment. 3ut the role of the City has also 4een $itally shaped
4y its focal position in 4ro9erage acti$ities on an international scale. It is e$ident that no conception
+hich treats the state either as a unitary phenomenon or as some sort of collecti$e actor could cope
+ith the materials that Ingham analyses. Certain 9ey policy dimensions C for e5ample, those
concerned +ith the 1old "tandard in the 1-,0s C ha$e strongly affected the fate of the City. .hey can
4e ade/uately understood only in terms of shifting allegiances and coalitions 4et+een strategically
placed groupings of indi$iduals, sometimes ha$ing outcomes that none of them intended.
En a more general plane, lessons can 4e dra+n from the analysis of the modern state that are similar
to those I ha$e indicated follo+ from the study of traditional states. .he study of 'state formation!, as I
ha$e sought to demonstrate, is li9ely to 4e $ery seriously misconcei$ed if understood either in a /uasi6
e$olutionary +ay or in terms of endogenous notions. 8n ade/uate 'theory! of the traditional or the
modern state simply cannot loo9 li9e most of the theories +hich currently predominate in the
literature. ;or one thing, the le$el of generality +hich such theories can 4e presumed to ha$e is li9ely
to 4e much lo+er than their proponents imagine. Ef course, for a general category li9e 'agrarian state!
or 'capitalist state! to e5ist at all there must 4e certain common institutional features +hich they share,
and from this it can 4e inferred that they also are li9ely to share some common dynamic tendencies.
3ut to demonstrate +hat these are is not at all the same as e5plaining se/uences of de$elopment or
change +hich ta9e place. .he sorts of 9no+ledge +hich certain indi$iduals or groups, especially the
more po+erful, may ha$e of such dynamic tendencies can 4ecome part of those $ery tendencies and
can act to shape them in specific +ays. ;actors +hich are of determinate importance in one time and
place, or at one particular con<uncture, may 4ecome relati$ely insignificant else+here 4y $irtue of the
$ery influence +hich they had first of all. .he conditions +hich originally ga$e rise to the City!s
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dominance o$er industry +ere not the same as those +hich allo+ed that position later to 4e sustained.
"ome of the pro4lems raised 4y the nature of theories and generali>ations +ill 4e ta9en up in the
sections +hich follo+. 3ut in concluding this part of the discussion, it may 4e as +ell to raise a
/uestion +hich might 4e pro$o9ed in the reader!s mind 4y the empirical studies I ha$e used to
illustrate some of the contentions of structuration theory. Ingham!s +or9 might ha$e 4een partly
influenced 4y these contentions, 4ut the other studies analysed +ere +ritten /uite independently. Bhy
4other +ith cum4ersome notions li9e 'structuration! and the rest if first6rate social research can 4e
done +ithout them? .here are $arious comments +hich should 4e made in response to this. .he ideas
4uilt into structuration theory allo+, in the +ays I ha$e tried to demonstrate, for $arious /uite 4asic
criticisms and emendations to 4e made to the research +or9 analysed. If this is so of +hat I ta9e to 4e
superior pieces of research, such criticisms +ould ha$e to 4e made much more forci4ly of research of
poorer /uality. #oreo$er, all of the research analysed +as informed 4y serious and prolonged
theoretical reflection a4out the issues in$estigated. It is perhaps particularly important to stress this in
respect of Billis!s +or9. Ene might easily portray it as nothing less, 4ut nothing more, than an
outstandingly percepti$e piece of ethnography. In fact, Billis!s 4oo9 contains a su4stantial theoretical
analysis of pro4lems of social reproduction, and there can 4e no dou4t that this +as a ma<or stimulus
to the research conducted as +ell as to the mode of its interpretation. "ince Billis!s theoretical
discussion follo+s lines similar, at least in some +ays, to the $ie+s I ha$e de$eloped, it is not
surprising that his research +or9 should pro$ide an especially illuminating source for e5amining the
implications of those $ie+s.
0o+e$er, there is a point to he made more important than either of these. .here is, of course, no
o4ligation for anyone doing detailed empirical research, in a gi$en locali>ed setting, to ta9e on 4oard
an array of a4stract notions that +ould merely clutter up +hat could other+ise 4e descri4ed +ith
economy and in ordinary language. .he concepts of structuration theory, as +ith any competing
theoretical perspecti$e, should for many research purposes 4e regarded as sensiti>ing de$ices, nothing
more. .hat is to say, they may 4e useful for thin9ing a4out
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research pro4lems and the interpretation of research results. 3ut to suppose that 4eing theoretically
informed C +hich it is the 4usiness of e$eryone +or9ing in the social sciences to 4e in some degree
C means al+ays operating +ith a +elter of a4stract concepts is as mischie$ous a doctrine as one
+hich suggests that +e can get along $ery +ell +ithout e$er using such concepts at all.
Ara+ing .ogether the .hreads "tructuration .heory and ;orms of %esearch
In the preceding sections I ha$e discussed a $ariety of forms of social research, +hich it is not
possi4le to dra+ together under a single heading. .hat is to say, research +or9 is underta9en to
attempt to clarify many different issues, according to the nature of the pro4lems the in$estigator sets
out to illuminate. In indicating some of the implications of structuration theory for empirical research,
I do not mean to suggest that there is only one format of research +hich e$eryone henceforth should
adopt. .hat is part of the point of concentrating upon studies +hich ha$e mostly 4een underta9en
outside any immediate influence of the concepts I ha$e ela4orated. I said earlier that I did not propose
to analyse the rele$ance that structuration theory may or may not ha$e for e$aluating specific types of
research methods C participant o4ser$ation, sur$ey research, and so on. It is, ho+e$er, 4oth possi4le
and +orth +hile to loo9 more generically at the tas9s of social research informed 4y structuration
theory and at the conse/uences of the foregoing discussion of research +or9 for the traditional de4ate
4et+een '/ualitati$e! and '/uantitati$e! methods in social research.
(
?ereneutic +luci/ation of #raes of 8eanin$ (1)
&nvesti$ation of Conte.t an/ #or of Practical Consciousness
(The @nconscious)
(2)
I
&/entification of 'oun/s of Ano3le/$ea!ility (3)
W Specification of &nstitutional *r/ers
(4)
.he methodological 'insertion! of the research in$estigator into
+hate$er material is the o4<ect of study can 4e made at any of the
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four le$els indicated a4o$e. 8ll social research presumes a hermeneutic moment, 4ut the presumption
may remain latent +here research dra+s upon mutual 9no+ledge that is une5plicated 4ecause
researcher and research inha4it a common cultural milieu. .he more $ociferous ad$ocates of
/uantitati$e research repress the essential significance of (1) in t+o +ays. .hey either ta9e (1) to 4e
purely descripti$e rather than e5planatory, or else they fail to see that it enters into the formulation of
their research +or9 at all. 3ut research concerned +ith (1) may 4e 4oth e5planatory and generali>ing.
It has to do +ith ans+ering +hy6/uestions that stem from the mutual unintelligi4ility of di$ergent
frames of meaning. Naturally, such /uestions arise across the $arying conte5ts of single societies as
+ell as 4et+een societies. %esearch +hich is geared primarily to hermeneutic pro4lems may 4e of
generali>ed importance in so far as it ser$es to elucidate the nature of agents! 9no+ledgea4ility and
there4y their reasons for action, across a +ide range of action6conte5ts. *ieces of ethnographic
research li9e that of Billis C or li9e, say, the traditional small6scale community research of field+or9
anthropology C are not in themsel$es generali>ing studies. 3ut they can easily 4ecome such if carried
out in some num4ers, so that <udgements of their typicality can <ustifia4ly 4e made.
0ermeneutic aspects of social research are not necessarily illuminating to those +ho are the su4<ects
of that research, since their main outcome is the elucidation of settings of action considered as 'alien
milieux'. "uch is not the case +ith the in$estigation of practical consciousness. "tudying practical
consciousness means in$estigating +hat agents already 9no+, 4ut 4y definition it is normally
illuminating to them if this is e5pressed discursi$ely, in the metalanguage of social science. Enly for
ethnomethodology is the analysis of practical consciousness a circumscri4ed 'field! of study. ;or all
other types of research the interpretation of practical consciousness is a necessary element, implicitly
understood or e5plicitly stated, of 4roader features of social conduct.
8s I ha$e consistently stressed, identifying the 4ounds of agents! 9no+ledgea4ility in the shifting
conte5ts of time and space is fundamental to social science. .he in$estigation of (,), ho+e$er,
presumes some considera4le 9no+ledge of le$els (1), (2) and (4). Bithout them +e are 4ac9 +ith an
untutored form of structural
((32"))
sociology. .he study of the unintended conse/uences and unac9no+ledged conditions of action, as I
ha$e emphasi>ed +hen discussing Billis!s research, can and should 4e carried on +ithout using
functionalist terminology. Bhat is 'unintended! and 'unac9no+ledged
!
, in any conte5t or range of
conte5ts of action, is usually 4y no means a simple matter to disco$er. No study of the structural
properties of social systems can 4e successfully carried on, or its results interpreted, +ithout reference
to the 9no+ledgea4ility of the rele$ant agents C although many proponents of structural sociology
imagine that this is e5actly +hat defines the pro$ince of 'sociological method!.
@e$el (4), the specifying of institutional orders, in$ol$es analysing the conditions of social and
system integration $ia identification of the main institutional components of social systems. .hose
institutional forms are most important +hich, in terms of designated structural principles, can 4e
specified as o$erall 'societies!. Ence more, ho+e$er, I ha$e 4een at some pains to stress that it is only
+ith many reser$ations that the main unit of analysis in social science can 4e said to 4e a 'society!.
Institutional orders fre/uently cross6cut +hate$er di$isions can 4e recogni>ed 4et+een o$erall
societies.
It is in the relation 4et+een (1) and (2) on the one hand and 4et+een (,) and (4) on the other that a
di$ision 4et+een '/ualitati$e! and '/uantitati$e! methods is often located. 8 fondness for /uantitati$e
methods has, of course, long 4een a trait of those attracted to o4<ecti$ism and structural sociology.
8ccording to this type of standpoint, analysing conditions of social life that stretch +ell 4eyond any
immediate conte5ts of interaction is the prime o4<ecti$e of social science, and grasping the 'hardened!
nature of the institutional components of social life can 4est 4e accomplished through classification,
measurement and statistical methods. E4$iously the idea that the o$erriding concern of the social
sciences is +ith unco$ering la+6li9e generali>ations a4out social conduct is closely related to this
procli$ity. .here is a strong, and often deli4erate, echoing of the !macro!H!micro! di$ision here. .hose
+ho fa$our /uantitati$e methods as the main 4asis of +hat ma9es social science 'science! are prone to
emphasi>e the primacy of so6called macrosociological analysis. .hose +ho ad$ocate /ualitati$e
methods as the foundation of empirical research in the social sciences, on the
((330))
other hand, emphasi>e (1) and (2) in order to point up the necessarily situated and meaningful
character of social inter6action. .hey tend often to 4e directly hostile to the use of /uantitati$e methods
in social science, on the grounds that /uantification and the use of statistical method impose a fi5ity on
social life that it does not in fact ha$e. It is not difficult to see in the conflict 4et+een these positions a
methodological residue of the dualism of structure and action, and sho+ing such a dualism to 4e
spurious +ill allo+ us to tease out further some of the empirical implications of the duality of
structure.
.o see ho+ this is so, let us return again to that concept, in an empirical setting different from those
discussed so far. .he follo+ing is a transcript of a strip of interaction in a courtroom. .hose in$ol$ed
are a <udge, a pu4lic defender (*A) and a district attorney (A8), and their e5change concerns a
prisoner +ho has pleaded guilty to a second6degree 4urglary charge. .he /uestion 4eing discussed is
+hat sentence the culprit should 4e gi$en.
PD: Dour honour, +e re/uest immediate sentencing and +ai$e the pro4ation report.
JUDGE: Bhat!s his record?
PD: 0e has a prior drun9 and a 1.8 Fgrand theft, autoG. Nothing
serious. .his is <ust a shoplifting case. 0e did enter the I6#art
+ith intent to steal. 3ut really all +e ha$e here is a petty theft. JUDGE: Bhat do the people
ha$e?
DA: Nothing either +ay.
JUDGE: 8ny o4<ections to immediate sentencing?
DA: No.
JUDGE: 0o+ long has he 4een in?
PD: )ighty6three days.
JUDGE: I ma9e this a misdemeanour 4y *C article 12 and sentence you to ninety days in County
7ail, +ith credit for time ser$ed.
,2
"uch a situated strip of interaction, li9e any other, can readily 4e prised open to indicate ho+ +hat
seems a tri$ial interchange is profoundly implicated in the reproduction of social institutions. )ach
turn in the tal9 e5changed 4et+een participants is grasped as meaningful 4y them (and 4y the reader)
only 4y the tacit in$ocation of institutional features of the system of criminal <ustice. .hese are dra+n
upon 4y each spea9er, +ho (rightly) assumes them to 4e mutual 9no+ledge held also 4y the others.
((331))
Note that the content of such mutual 9no+ledge presumes $astly more than <ust a+areness of the
tactics of 'proper procedure! in such cases, although that is also in$ol$ed. )ach participant 9no+s a
$ast amount a4out +hat a 'legal system! is, a4out normati$e procedures of la+, a4out +hat prisoners,
ad$ocates, <udges do, etc. In order to '4ring off! the interaction, the participants ma9e use of their
9no+ledge of the institutional order in +hich they are in$ol$ed in such a +ay as to render their
interchange 'meaningful!. 0o+e$er, 4y in$o9ing the institutional order in this +ay C and there is no
other way for participants in interaction to render +hat they do intelligi4le and coherent to one another
C they there4y contri4ute to reproducing it. #oreo$er, it is essential to see that in reproducing it they
also reproduce its 'facticity! as a source of structural constraint (upon themsel$es and upon others).
.hey treat the system of <ustice as a 'real! order of relationships +ithin +hich their o+n interaction is
situated and +hich it e5presses. 8nd it is a 'real! (i.e., structurally sta4le) order of relationships
precisely 4ecause they, and others li9e them in connected and similar conte5ts, accept it as such C not
necessarily in their discursi$e consciousness 4ut in the practical consciousness incorporated in +hat
they do.
It is important not to confuse this o4ser$ation +ith the famous dictum of B. I. .homas that if actors
'define situations as real, then they are real in their conse/uences!. .homas!s proposition suggests that
there are circumstances +hich are not in fact 'real! (i.e., are fictitious or imaginary), 4ut ne$ertheless
ha$e actual conse/uences 4ecause people 4elie$e in them. #erton too9 this as a starting6point for his
formulation of the self6fulfilling prophecy, in +hich a state of affairs comes to e5ist 4y the $ery fact of
its announcement. No+, I do not dou4t at all the importance 4oth of the self6fulfilling prophecy and of
a range of phenomena lin9ed to it. 3ut it is not the prototype of the 'facticity! of structural properties
contained in the duality of structure. .he point is a more su4tle and more profound one, lin9ing the
$ery possi4ility of the mutual intelligi4ility and coherence of situated interaction to 'facticity! on a
4roadly 4ased institutional le$el.
Notice also ho+ intimately and fundamentally the 'facticity! of the institutional order is lin9ed to
po+er, +hich it 4oth e5presses and facilitates in the details of the interaction. ;or the 'acceptanceas6
real! that is 4uilt into the mutually intelligi4le continuity of the
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interaction is the $ery foundation of the legal system as an e5pression of modes of domination.
'8cceptance6as6real
!
em4odied in concrete modes of procedure plainly does not mean the same thing
as discursi$ely according legitimation to the system, although of course it 4y no means precludes it
either. 8s a system of po+er relations, 'acceptance6as6real! has much more far6reaching implications
than does the actual differential po+er that the participating agents are a4le to 4ring to the interaction
to ma9e their particular $ie+s count. 0o+e$er, it is noticea4le that the se/uence of tal9 does not
follo+ the more 'democratic! rules that con$ersations 4et+een peers ordinarily display, and does
directly reflect differential po+er. .hus the <udge has the right to interrupt +hat the others say, to pose
particular types of /uestions and to control the se/uence of tal9, +hich the others do not ha$e, at least
to the same degree. .he fact that the con$ersation does not ha$e a con$entional turn6ta9ing form is
made intelligi4le 4y the mutual ac9no+ledgement that the <udge has a certain institutionali>ed social
identity, allocating him definite prerogati$es and sanctions.
@et me formulate this at a more general le$el to ma9e its connotations clear. 8ll social interaction is
situated +ithin time6space 4oundaries of co6presence (+hether or not this 4e e5tended $ia media such
as letters, telephone calls, etc.). Its situated character, as I ha$e discussed in detail in chapters 1 and 2,
is directly in$ol$ed +ith the inde5ical nature of the '4ringing off! of mutually intelligi4le
communication. 3ut the situatedness of interaction is not a 4arrier to that institutional 'fi5ity! demon6
strated 4y institutional orders across time and space. It is its $ery condition, <ust as the e5istence of
those institutional orders is the condition of the most transient forms of social encounter or
con$ersation. .he refle5i$e monitoring of social conduct is intrinsic to the 'facticity! +hich the
structural properties of social systems display, not something either marginal or additional to it. Bilson
has e5pressed this in the follo+ing +ay. 8s an account of the significance of the concept of the duality
of structure, I could not 4etter it
the social +orld is constituted 4y situated actions produced in particular concrete situations, that
are a$aila4le to the participants for their o+n recognition, description, and use as +arranted
((,,,))
grounds for further inference and action on those same occasions as +ell as su4se/uent ones.
"ituated actions are produced through conte5t6free, conte5t6sensiti$e mechanisms of social
interaction, and social structure is used 4y mem4ers of society to render their actions in particular
situations intelligi4le and coherent. In this process, social structure is an essential resource for and
product of situated action, and social structure is reproduced as an o4<ecti$e reality that partially
constrains action. It is through this refle5i$e relation 4et+een social structure and situated action
that the transparency of displays F the mutual intelligi4ility of conductG is accomplished 4y
e5ploiting the conte5t6dependence of meaning.!:
Ence the point of this is fully understood, the idea that there is either a clear6cut di$ision or a
necessary opposition 4et+een /ualitati$e and /uantitati$e methods disappears. Uuantitati$e techni/ues
are usually li9ely to 4e demanded +hen a large num4er of 'cases! of a phenomenon are to 4e
in$estigated, in respect of a restricted $ariety of designated characteristics. 3ut 4oth the collection and
interpretation of /uantitati$e material depends upon procedures methodologically identical to the
gathering of data of a more intensi$e, '/ualitati$e! sort. .his is +hy 1am4etta!s study can 4e used to
focus upon some of the same pro4lems as those in$estigated 4y Billis. 1am4etta!s data concern a large
num4er of indi$iduals, Billis!s material only a handful. 1am4etta!s +or9 in$ol$es the use of a 4attery
of sophisticated research methods, +hile Billis!s study consists +holly of ethnographic reporting, 3ut
1am4etta!s research, no less than that of Billis, presupposes a grasp of situated action and meanings
+ithout +hich the formal categories of the theoretical metalanguage employedl 4y the researcher
+ould ha$e neither sense nor application. 8ll so6called '/uantitati$e! data, +hen scrutini>ed, turn out
to 4e composites of '/ualitati$e! C i.e., conte5tually located and inde5ical C interpretations produced
4y situated researchers, coders, go$ernment officials and others. .he hermeneutic pro4lems posed 4y
ethnographic research also e5ist in the case of /uantitati$e studies, although these may 4e in some
large part '4uried! 4y the e5tent to +hich the data in$ol$ed ha$e 4een '+or9ed upon!. 8ttempts to
produce scaling measures, eliminate selection 4ias, produce consistent sampling techni/ues, etc.,
operate +ithin these confines. .hey do not in any +ay
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logically compromise the use of /uantitati$e methods, although no dou4t they lead us to appraise the
nature of /uantitati$e data rather differently from some of the ad$ocates of structural sociology.
(1) and (2) are thus as essential for understanding (,) and (4) as $ice $ersa, and /ualitati$e and
/uantitati$e methods should 4e seen as complementary rather than antagonistic aspects of social
research. )ach is necessary to the other if the su4stanti$e nature of the duality of structure is to 4e
'charted! in terms of the forms of institutional articulation +here4y conte5ts of interaction are co6
ordinated +ithin more em4racing social systems. .he one point +hich does need to 4e forci4ly
stressed is that social researchers should 4e alert to the modes in +hich /uantitati$e data are produced.
;or, unli9e the mo$ement of mercury +ithin a thermometer, social data are ne$er only an 'inde5! of an
independently gi$en phenomenon 4ut al+ays at the same time e5emplify +hat it is they are 'a4out! C
that is, processes of social life.
#utual Knowledge versus Common Sense
)mpirical research self6e$idently has no rationale if it does not someho+ generate ne+ 9no+ledge
+hich +as not a$aila4le 4efore. "ince all social actors e5ist in situated conte5ts +ithin larger spans of
time6space, +hat is no$el to some such actors is not to others C including, among those others, social
scientists. It is, of course, in these 'information gaps! that ethnographic research has its specific
importance. In a 4road sense of the term this sort of research is e5planatory, since it ser$es to clarify
pu>>les presented +hen those from one cultural setting encounter indi$iduals from another +hich is in
some respects /uite different. .he /uery 'Bhy do they act (thin9) as they do?! is an in$itation to enter
the culturally alien milieu and to ma9e sense of it. .o those already +ithin that milieu, as Binch and
many others ha$e pointed out, such an enterprise may 4e inherently unenlightening. 0o+e$er, much
social research, in terms of 4oth the empirical material it generates and the theoretical interpretations
+hich may 4e lin9ed to it, has critical connotations for 4eliefs +hich agents hold. .o in$estigate +hat
such connotations might 4e +e ha$e to consider the /uestion of e5actly in +hat sense the social
((335))
sciences re$eal ne+ 9no+ledge and ho+ such 9no+ledge might connect +ith the criti/ue of false
4elief. .hese matters are comple5, and I shall not attempt to deal here +ith more than certain aspects
of them.
.he critical endea$ours of the social sciences, li9e those of natural science, are 4ound up +ith the
logical and empirical ade/uacy of reported o4ser$ations and theories associated +ith them. 8s "chut>
and many others ha$e /uite rightly emphasi>es, the critical character of social science in this respect
normally departs /uite sharply from the 4eliefs and theories6in6use incorporated +ithin the conduct of
day6to6day social life. 8ll social actors, it can properly 4e said, are social theorists, +ho alter their
theories in the light of their e5periences and are recepti$e to incoming information +hich they may
ac/uire in doing so. "ocial theory is 4y no means the special and insulated pro$ince of academic
thin9ers. 0o+e$er, lay actors are generally concerned a4o$e all +ith the practical utility of the
'9no+ledge! that they apply in their daily acti$ities, and there may 4e 4asic features of the
institutional organi>ation of society (including, 4ut not limited to, ideology) +hich confine or distort
+hat they ta9e to 4e 9no+ledge.
It is surely plain that the 're$elatory model! of natural science cannot 4e directly transferred to the
social sciences. Common6sense 4eliefs a4out the natural +orld are corrigi4le in the light of the
findings of the natural sciences. .here are no particular logical difficulties in understanding +hat is
going on in such circumstances, e$en though there may 4e social 4arriers to the reception of scientific
ideas.
,-
.hat is to say, lay 4eliefs are open to correction, in so far as this is necessary, 4y the input of
no$el scientific theories and o4ser$ations. .he natural sciences can in principlle demonstrate that
some of the things that the lay mem4er of society 4elie$es a4out the o4<ect +orld are false, +hile
others are $aliid. It is more complicated, for 4etter or for +orse, in the social sciences. .he 'findings!
of the social sciences, as I ha$e emphasi>ed, are not necessarily ne+s to those +hom those findingss
are a4out.
.he iissues in$ol$ed here ha$e 4ecome $ery mur9y indeed as a result of the push and pull 4et+een
o4<ecti$ist and interpretati$e formulaitions of social science. .he former ha$e tended to apply the
re$eelatory model in an uninhi4ited +ay to the social sciences.
11((*33
.hat is to say, they ha$e regarded common6sense 4eliefs in$ol$ed in social life to 4e
unpro4lematically corrigi4le in terms of the enlightenment +hich the social sciences can deli$er.
.hose influenced 4y hermeneutics and ordinary6language philosophy, ho+e$er, ha$e esta4lished
po+erful o4<ections to this nai$e standpoint. Common6sense 4eliefs, as incorporated in day6to6day
language use and action, cannot 4e treated as mere impediments to a $alid or $eridical
characteri>ation of social life. ;or +e cannot descri4e social acti$ity at all +ithout 9no+ing +hat its
constituent actors 9no+, tacitly as +ell as discursi$ely. )mpiricism and o4<ecti$ism simply suppress
the +hole issue of the generation of social descriptions $ia the mutual 9no+ledge +hich sociological
o4ser$ers and lay mem4ers of society hold in common.
40
.he trou4le is, ha$ing reached this
conclusion, those ad$ocating interpretati$e forms of social science find it difficult or impossi4le to
maintain that critical edge +hich the opposite type of tradition has rightly insisted upon in <u5taposing
social science and common sense. .he tas9s of social science then seem precisely limited to
ethnography C to the hermeneutic endea$our of the 'fusion of hori>ons!.
41
"uch a paralysis of the
critical +ill is as logically unsatisfactory as the untutored use of the re$elatory model.
8 +ay out of this impasse can 4e found 4y distinguishing mutual 9no+ledge from 'common
sense!.
42
.he first refers to the necessary respect +hich the social analyst must ha$e for the
authenticity of 4elief or the hermeneutic entree into the description of social life. 'Necessary! in this
statement has logical force to it. .he reason +hy it characteristically ma9es more sense to spea9 a4out
'9no+ledge! rather than '4elief! +hen spea9ing of ho+ actors find their +ay around in the conte5ts of
social life is that the generation of descriptions demands the 4rac9eting of scepticism.V! 3eliefs, tacit
and discursi$e, ha$e to 4e treated as '9no+ledge! +hen the o4ser$er is operating on the
methodological plane of characteri>ing action. #utual 9no+ledge, regarded as the necessary mode of
gaining access to the 'su4<ect matter! of social science, is not corrigi4le in the light of its findings= on
the contrary, it is the condition of 4eing a4le to come up +ith 'findings! at all.
It is 4ecause mutual 9no+ledge is largely tacit C carried on the le$el of practical consciousness C
that it is not o4$ious that respect for the authenticity of 4elief is a necessary part of allethnographic
+or9 in the social sciences. .he attac9s led 4y those influenced 4y
((,,2))
phenomenology and ethnomethodology upon more orthodo5 conceptions of social science ha$e
undou4tedly 4een of ma<or importance in elucidating the nature of mutual 9no+ledge. 3ut in
spea9ing of !common sense! or e/ui$alent terms in a diffuse +ay they ha$e not separated out
analytically the methodological issue from that of criti/ue. In distinguishing mutual 9no+ledge from
common sense I mean to reser$e the latter concept to refer to the propositional 4eliefs implicated in
the conduct of day6to6day acti$ities. .he distinction is largely an analytical one= that is to say,
common sense is mutual 9no+ledge treated not as 9no+ledge 4ut as falli4le 4elief. 0o+e$er, not all
mutual 9no+ledge can 4e e5pressed as propositional 4eliefs C 4eliefs that some states of affairs or
others are the case. #oreo$er, not all such 4eliefs are capa4le of 4eing formulated discursi$ely 4y
those +ho hold them.
Aistinguishing 4et+een mutual 9no+ledge and common sense does not imply that these are al+ays
easily separa4le phases of study in actual social research. ;or one thing, the descripti$e language used
4y sociological o4ser$ers is al+ays more or less different from that used 4y lay actors. .he
introduction of social scientific terminology may (4ut does not necessarily) call in /uestion
discursi$ely formulated 4eliefs (or, +here connected in an ensem4le, 'theories6in6use!) +hich actors
hold. Bhere contested descriptions are already employed 4y the agents studied, any description gi$en
4y o4ser$ers, e$en using actors! categories, is directly critical of other a$aila4le terminologies that
could ha$e 4een used. Bhat is a 'li4eration mo$ement! from one perspecti$e might 4e a 'terrorist
organi>ation! from another. .he choice of one term rather than the other, of course, implies a definite
stance on the part of the o4ser$er. It is less immediately apparent that the choice of a more 'neutral!
term does as +ell= its use, ho+e$er, also indicates a critical distance +hich the o4ser$er ta9es from the
concepts applied 4y the actors directly in$ol$ed.
In any research situation there may 4e 4eliefs accepted 4y participants +hich so grate upon those
held 4y the o4ser$er that the o4ser$er e5presses critical distance from them, e$en in +hat is other+ise
a purely ethnographic study. 8n anthropologist may feel no /ualms a4out asserting, '.he P gro+ their
crops 4y planting seeds e$ery autumn!, since it is mutually held as
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9no+ledge 4et+een him or her and the mem4ers of culture P that the planting of seeds at an
appropriate time of the year e$entuates in a particular crop. 3ut that anthropologist is li9ely to say,
'.he P 4elie$e their ceremonial dance +ill 4ring rain! indicating a gap 4et+een +hat he or she and
those in culture P 4elie$e to 4e the case a4out the conditions under +hich rainfall occurs.:
.he e5amples mentioned in the a4o$e paragraph indicate that e$en purely ethnographic social
research C that is, research +hich follo+s the confined goal of descripti$e reportage C tends to ha$e
a critical moment. Bhile this does not compromise the logical distinction 4et+een mutual 9no+ledge
and common sense, it does mean specifying more directly +hat is in$ol$ed in that moment of criti/ue,
+hich in other types of research is usually more directly de$eloped.
I ha$e to emphasi>e at this point the modest dimensions of the discussion +hich follo+s. 8nalysing
logically +hat is in$ol$ed in the garnering of mutual 9no+ledge, as +ell as +hat is in$ol$ed in the
criti/ue of common6sense 4elief, raises /uestions of epistemology +hich it +ould 4e out of the
/uestion to discuss e5hausti$ely here. .he ideas I shall de$elop in +hat follo+s are intended to supply
no more than an outline format, +hich presumes a definite epistemological $ie+ +ithout supporting it
in detail. .here are t+o senses, I +ant to claim, in +hich social science is rele$ant to the criti/ue of lay
4eliefs construed as common sense (+hich includes, 4ut does not gi$e any special priority to, the
criti/ue of ideology). .he critical acti$ities in +hich social scientists engage as the core of +hat they
do ha$e direct implications for the 4eliefs +hich agents hold, in so far as those 4eliefs can 4e sho+n to
4e in$alid or inade/uately grounded. 3ut such implications are especially important +here the 4eliefs
in /uestion are incorporated into the reasons actors ha$e for +hat they do. Enly some of the 4eliefs
+hich actors hold or profess form part of the reasons they ha$e for their conduct. Bhen these are
su4<ected to criti/ue in the light of claims or findings of social science, the social o4ser$er is see9ing
to demonstrate that those reasons are not good reasons.
.he identification of agents! reasons is normally intimately 4ound up +ith the hermeneutic pro4lems
posed 4y the generating of mutual 9no+ledge. 1i$en that this is so, +e should distinguish
((33"))
+hat I shall call 'credi4ility criteria! from the '$alidity criteria! rele$ant to the criti/ue of reasons as
good reasons. Credi4ility criteria refer to criteria, hermeneutic in character, used to indicate ho+ the
grasping of actors! reasons illuminates +hat e5actly they are doing in the light of those reasons.
Jalidity criteria concern criteria of factual e$idence and theoretical understanding employed 4y the
social sciences in the assessment of reasons as good reasons. Consider the famous case of the red
maca+s, much discussed in the anthropological literature. .he 3ororo of Central 3ra>il say, 'Be are
red maca+s.! Ae4ated 4y Jon den Steinen, Aur9heim and #auss, among others, the statement has
seemed to many to 4e either nonsensical or hermeneutically impenetra4le. .he issue +as, ho+e$er,
recently ta9en up 4y an anthropologist +ho had the chance to rein$estigate the matter at source,
among the 3ororo.
as
0e found that the statement is made only 4y men= that 3ororo +omen tend to
o+n red maca+s as pets= that in $arious +ays in 3ororo society men are peculiarly dependent upon
+omen= and that contact +ith the spirits is made 4y men and red maca+s independently of +omen. It
seems plausi4le to infer that 'Be are red maca+s! is a statement in +hich men ironically comment
upon their inde4tedness to +omen and at the same time assert their o+n spiritual superiority to them.
In$estigation of +hy the statement is made helps to clarify the nature of the statement. .he
in$estigation of credi4ility criteria, in respect of discursi$ely formulated 4eliefs at any rate, usually
depends upon ma9ing clear the follo+ing items +ho e5presses them, in +hat circumstances, in +hat
discursi$e style (literal description, metaphor, irony, etc.) and +ith +hat moti$es.
8ssessment of $alidity criteria is go$erned solely 4y the con<unction of 'internal! and 'e5ternal
criti/ue! generated 4y social science. .hat is to say, $alidity criteria are the criteria of internal criti/ue
+hich I hold to 4e su4stantially constituti$e of +hat social science is. .he main role of the social
sciences in respect of the criti/ue of common sense is the assessment of reasons as good reasons in
terms of 9no+ledge either simply una$aila4le to lay agents or construed 4y them in a fashion different
from that formulated in the metalanguages of social theory. I see no 4asis for dou4ting that the
standards of internal criti/ue in the social sciences carry o$er directly to e5ternal criti/ue in this
respect. .his statement is a strong one, and it is particularly at this
((346))
<uncture that a specific epistemological standpoint is presupposed. It presumes, and I presume, that it
is possi4le to demonstrate that some 4elief claims are false, +hile others are true, although +hat
'demonstrate! means here +ould need to 4e e5amined as closely as +ould 'false! and 'true!. It
presumes, and I presume, that internal criti/ue C the critical e5aminations to +hich social scientists
su4mit their ideas and claimed findings C is inherent in +hat social science is as a collecti$e
endea$our. I intend to ris9 the disfa$our of the philosophically sophisticated 4y asserting, +ithout
further ado, that I hold these things to 4e the case. In a different conte5t, ho+e$er, it +ould clearly 4e
necessary to defend such contentions at some considera4le length.
It can 4e sho+n, I thin9, that there is a non6contingent relation 4et+een demonstrating a social
4elief to 4e false, and practical implications for the transformation of action lin9ed to that 4elief.
4
:
Critici>ing a 4elief means (logically) critici>ing +hate$er acti$ity or practice is carried on in terms of
that 4elief, and has compelling force (moti$ationally) in so far as it is a reason for action. Bhere the
4elief in /uestion informs a segment or aspect of conduct in relation to the natural +orld, sho+ing it
to 4e false +ill (ceteris paribus) cause the agent to change his or her 4eha$iour in +hate$er respects
are rele$ant. If this does not happen, the presumption is that other considerations are o$erriding in
the agent!s mind, that the implications of the falsity of the 4elief are misunderstood or that the actor
does not in fact accept that its falsity has 4een con$incingly sho+n. No+ social 4eliefs, unli9e those
to do +ith nature, are constituti$e elements of +hat it is they are a4out. ;rom this it follo+s that
criticism of false 4elief (ceteris paribus) is a practical intervention in society, a political
phenomenon in a 4road sense of that term.
0o+ does this discussion of 4elief relate to the claim that all competent actors not only 9no+ +hat
they are doing (under some description or another) 4ut must do so for social life to ha$e the character
+hich it does? .he /uestion can 4est 4e ans+ered 4y reference to a concrete e5ample. Consider
$oting in a 'one person, one $ote! situation. "uch a practice clearly in$ol$es all potential $oters
9no+ing +hat a '$ote! is, that they are only permitted to $ote once, that they can only $ote in their
o+n name, etc. It is only if participants 9no+ these things, and act appropriately, that +e could tal9
of a 'one person, one $ote! system e5isting at all.
((341))
0o+ far such a phenomenon could $alidly 4e said to e5ist if only a certain proportion of people +ere
fully a+are of the rele$ant concepts is a hermeneutic pro4lem. .o say that actors 'must! 9no+ +hat
they are doing for $oting to e5ist is to specify +hat counts as a $alid description of the acti$ity.
0o+e$er, there is no dou4t that some persons in$ol$ed might not 9no+ +hat $oting is, or might not
9no+ all the procedures in$ol$ed in $oting, and that their acti$ity could influence the outcome of the
$ote. 1enerali>ing, +e could say that any indi$iduals can ma9e mista9es a4out +hat is in$ol$ed in
any aspects of any social con$ention. 3ut no one can 4e mista9en most of the time a4out +hat he or
she does, or that person +ill 4e regarded as incompetent 4y other actors= and there is no aspect of any
con$ention that most agents can 4e +rong a4out most of the time. Ef course, +e ha$e to recogni>e
other possi4ilities. 8gents positioned in some sectors of a society might 4e /uite ignorant of +hat
goes on in others= actors might 4elie$e that the outcomes of their acti$ities are different from +hat
they in fact are= and the redescription of a conte5t of action in the concepts of social science might
represent +hat is going on in +ays different from those +ith +hich the agent is familiar.
Be can assume, to repeat, that ne+ 9no+ledge de$eloped in the social sciences +ill ordinarily ha$e
immediate transformational implications for the e5isting social +orld. 3ut +hat is co$ered 4y ceteris
paribus? Knder +hat conditions +ill this not 4e so?
1)#ost o4$ious, +here the circumstances descri4ed or analysed are to do +ith past e$ents and relate
to social conditions +hich no longer pertain. In case it should 4e thought that this again allo+s
for a clear6cut distinction 4et+een history and social science, it should 4e pointed out that e$en
purely ethnographic studies of dead cultures may $ery +ell 4e treated as illuminating current
circumstances, often 4y the $ery contrasts they re$eal. Be undou4tedly cannot say in principle
that 9no+ledge a4out situations that no longer e5ist is irrele$ant to other conte5ts in +hich that
9no+ledge might 4e dra+n upon in a transformati$e +ay. .he influence of 'Caesarism! in
nineteenth6century politics in ;rance, satiri>ed 4y #ar5, is a good e5ample.
2)Bhere the conduct in /uestion depends upon moti$es and reasons +hich are not altered 4y ne+
information that
((342))
4ecomes a$aila4le. .he relationships in$ol$ed here may 4e $ery much more complicated than
may appear at first sight. Bhat seem to 4e t+o sets of independent phenomena (for e5ample, the!
statement of a generali>ation and acti$ities referred to 4y that generali>ation) may in fact 4e
intimately connected. #ost of the more familiar 'la+s! or generali>ations of neo6classical
economics, it might 4e thought, are statements 9no+ledge of +hich +ill not alter the circum6
stances to +hich they relate. .hat is to say, they depend upon patterns of moti$ation and
reasoning on the part of lay agents +hich are unli9ely to alter no matter ho+ far those
generali>ations 4ecome familiar. 3ut the de$elopment of economics has played a role in creating
the $ery conditions in +hich the generali>ations in /uestion hold, promoting a calculating attitude
to+ards the deployment of capital and so on C a phenomenon I shall discuss further 4elo+.
,)Bhere the ne+ 9no+ledge or information is used to sustain e5isting circumstances. .his may, of
course, happen e$en +here the theories or findings concerned could, if utili>ed in certain +ays,
modify +hat they descri4e. .he selecti$e appropriation of social scientific material 4y the
po+erful, for e5ample, can turn that material to ends /uite other than those that might 4e ser$ed if
it +ere more +idely disseminated.
4)Bhere those +ho see9 to apply the ne+ 9no+ledge are not in a situation to 4e a4le to do so
effecti$ely. .his is e$idently often a matter of access to the resources needed to alter an e5isting
set of circumstances. 3ut it must also 4e pointed out that the possi4ility of discursi$ely
articulating interests is usually assymetrically distri4uted in a society. .hose in the lo+er echelons
of society are li9ely to ha$e $arious limitations upon their capa4ilities of discursi$ely formulating
interests, particularly their longer6term interests. .hey are less li9ely than those in superordinate
positions to 4e a4le to transcend the situated character C in time and in space C of their
acti$ities. .his may 4e so 4ecause of inferior educational opportunities, 4ecause of the more
confined character of their typical milieux of action (in 1ouldner!s terms, they are more li9ely to
4e 'locals! than cosmopolitans) or 4ecause those in superordinate positions simply ha$e a greater
range of accessi4le information a$aila4le to them.
((343))
.hose in the lo+er echelons are also unli9ely to ha$e access to a coherent and conceptually
sophisticated discourse in terms of +hich to connect their interests to the conditions of their
reali>ation.
()Bhere +hat is claimed as 9no+ledge turns out to 4e in some part false. It is surely e$ident enough
that there is no necessary con$ergence 4et+een the $alidity of ideas or o4ser$ations produced in
the social sciences and their appropriation 4y lay actors. Jarious possi4ilities deri$e from this,
including that +here4y $ie+s +hich +ere originally false can 4ecome true as a result of their
propagation (the self6fulfilling prophecy). It 4y no means ine$ita4ly follo+s that the adoption of
in$alid findings +ill 4e unconse/uential in respect of the conduct they purport to descri4e.
&)Bhere the ne+ 9no+ledge is tri$ial or uninteresting to the actors to +hom it has reference. .his case
is rather more significant than might appear 4ecause of the differences that may e5ist 4et+een the
preoccupation of lay actors and those of social o4ser$ers. 8s "chut> puts it, the rele$ances of
social scientists are not necessarily the same as those of the actors +hose 4eha$iour they see9 to
e5plicate.
2)Bhere the form of 9no+ledge or information generated inhi4its its actuali>ation or conceals certain
+ays in +hich it might 4e actuali>ed. 3y far the most important case in /uestion is that of
reification. 3ut the possi4le implications +hich this raises are again comple5. %eified discourse
produced in the social sciences may ha$e different effects +here the discourse of lay actors is also
reified than +here it is not.
Benerali5ations in Social Science
"ocial life is in many respects not an intentional product of its constituent actors, in spite of the fact
that day6to6day conduct is chronically carried on in a purposi$e fashion. It is in the study of the
unintended conse/uences of action, as I ha$e often emphasi>ed, that some of the most distincti$e tas9s
of the social sciences are to 4e found. It is also here that the prime concern of social scientists inclined
to+ards o4<ecti$ism and structural sociology is located. .hose +ho spea9 of the e5planatory
((344))
o4<ecti$es of the social sciences as 4ound up +ith the disco$ery of la+s do not do so +hen outcomes
are more or less completely intended. .hus, for e5ample, the dri$ers of cars regularly stop +hen
traffic lights are red and start off again +hen they go green. 3ut no one suggests that stopping at
traffic lights can 4e represented as a la+ of human social conduct. .he la+s in$ol$ed are of a <uridical
9ind. Ari$ers 9no+ +hat the red lights are for, ho+ they themsel$es are supposed to react according
to the codes of traffic 4eha$iour, and +hen they stop on the red or start on the green they 9no+ +hat
they are doing and do it intentionally. .he fact that such e5amples are not tal9ed of as la+s, e$en
though the 4eha$iour in$ol$ed is $ery regular, indicates that the pro4lem of la+s in social science is
$ery much 4ound up +ith unintended conse/uences, unac9no+ledged conditions and constraint.
3y la+s! structural sociologists ordinarily mean uni$ersal la+s of the 9ind thought to e5ist in the
natural sciences. No+, there are many de4ates a4out +hether or not such la+s do in fact e5ist in
natural science and, if so, +hat their logical status is. 3ut let us suppose that they do e5ist and follo+
the standard interpretation of their logical form. Kni$ersal la+s state that +hene$er one set of
conditions, specified in a definite +ay, is found, a second set of conditions +ill 4e found also +here
the first set causes the second. Not all causal statements, of course, are la+s, and not all causal
relations can 4e su4sumed under (9no+n) la+s. Nor are all statements of a uni$ersal form la+s.
0empel gi$es the e5ample '8ll 4odies consisting of pure gold ha$e a mass of less than 100,000
9ilograms.! .here is no 9no+n case +here this statement does not hold, 4ut unless some causal
mechanism +ere disco$ered to e5plain +hy this should 4e so, it +ould pro4a4ly not 4e regarded as an
e5ample of a la+.! Ao uni$ersal la+s e5ist in the social sciences? If not, +hy ha$e so many of those
affiliated +ith structural sociology typically placed all of their eggs in that particular e5planatory
4as9et? .he plain ans+er to the first /uestion is that they do not. In natural science, or at least in some
of the ma<or areas of natural science, there are many e5amples of la+s that appear to conform to the
uni$ersal la+ type. In social science C and I +ould include economics, as +ell as sociology +ithin
this <udgement C there is not a single candidate +hich could 4e offered uncontentiously as an
instance of such a la+ in
((345))
the realm of human social conduct. 8s I ha$e argued else+here,
48
the social sciences are not
latecomers as compared +ith natural science. .he idea that +ith further research such la+s +ill
e$entually 4e unco$ered is at 4est mar9edly implausi4le.
If they do not e5ist, and +ill ne$er e5ist, in social science, +hy ha$e so many supposed that the
social sciences should pursue such a chimera? No dou4t in considera4le part 4ecause of the s+ay that
empiricist philosophies of natural science ha$e held o$er the social sciences. 3ut this is surely not all
there is to it. 8lso in$ol$ed is the supposition that the only +orth+hile 9no+ledge a4out social actors
or institutions +hich the social sciences should 4e interested in o4taining is that +hich those actors do
not themsel$es possess. Bith this comes the inclination to reduce 9no+ledge imputed to actors to a
minimum, thus 4roadening the scope for the operation of causal mechanisms +hich ha$e their effects
independently of the reasons that indi$iduals ha$e for +hat they do. No+, if this 9ind of $ie+ is not
$ia4le, on grounds I ha$e discussed in some detail in this 4oo9, +e ha$e to loo9 again at the nature of
la+s in social science. .hat there are no 9no+n uni$ersal la+s in social science is not <ust
happenstance. If it is correct to say, as I ha$e argued, that the causal mechanisms in social scientific
generali>ations depend upon actors! reasons, in the conte5t of a 'mesh! of intended and unintended
conse/uences of action, +e can readily see +hy such generali>ations do not ha$e a uni$ersal form. ;or
the content of agents! 9no+ledgea4ility, the /uestion of ho+ 'situated! it is and the $alidity of the
propositional content of that 9no+ledge C all these +ill influence the circumstances in +hich those
generali>ations hold.
Ence more at the ris9 of upsetting the more philosophically minded reader, I propose simply to
declare that reasons are causes, accepting that this no dou4t implies a non60umean account of
causality. #ore properly put, in the terminology I ha$e introduced the rationali>ation of action is
causally implicated, in a chronic manner, in the continuation of day6to6day actions.
4-
.he
rationali>ation of action, in other +ords, is a ma<or elements of the range of causal po+ers that an
indi$idual, qua agent, displays. .his is so 4ecause doing something for reasons means applying an
understanding of '+hat is called for! in a gi$en set of circumstances in such a +ay as to shape +hate$er
is
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done in those circumstances. .o ha$e reasons for doing something is not the same as to do something
for reasons, and it is the difference 4et+een these that spells out the causal impact of the
rationali>ation of action. %easons are causes of acti$ities +hich the indi$idual !ma9es happen! as an
inherent feature of 4eing an agent. 3ut since the refle5i$e monitoring of action is 4ounded, as I ha$e
fre/uently insisted, there are causal factors +hich influence action +ithout operating through its
rationali>ation. It follo+s from +hat has 4een said pre$iously that these are of t+o types unconscious
influences and influences +hich affect the circumstances of action +ithin +hich indi$iduals carry on
their conduct.
.he second of these is 4y far the more important for purposes of social analysis, 4ut since
!circumstances of action! is a $ery general term, it needs spelling out some+hat. 8ll action occurs in
conte5ts that, for any gi$en single actor, include many elements +hich that actor neither helped to
4ring into 4eing nor has any significant control o$er. "uch ena4ling and constraining features of
conte5ts of action include 4oth material and social phenomena. In so far as social phenomena are
concerned, it has to 4e emphasi>ed that +hat for one indi$idual is a controlla4le aspect of the social
milieu may he for others something +hich 'happens! rather than something +hich is !made to happen!.
#any of the most delicately su4tle, as +ell as the intellectually most challenging, features of social
analysis deri$e from this.
No+, it can he accepted that all a4stract generali>ations in the social sciences are, e5plicitly or
implicitly, causal statements. 3ut, as I ha$e 4een concerned to stress throughout this hoo9, it matters a
great deal +hat type of causal relations are in$ol$ed. .hat is to say, situations +here those concerned
'ma9e happen! a regulari>ed outcome differ su4stantially from those in +hich such an outcome
'happens! in a +ay +hich no participant has intended. "ince agents! 9no+ledge a4out the conditions
influencing the generali>ation is causally rele$ant to that generali>ation, these conditions can 4e
altered 4y changes in such 9no+ledge. .he self6fulfilling prophecy is one, 4ut only one, e5ample of
this phenomenon.
Caution is in order here. .here are al+ays 4oundary conditions to the operations of la+s in natural
science. 3ut these do not affect the in$ariant causal relation that is at the core of the e5planatory tas9s
for +hich reference to the la+ can 4e made. In
((349))
the case of generali>ations in social science, the causal mechanisms are inherently unsta4le, the degree
of insta4ility depending upon ho+ far those 4eings to +hom the generali>ation refers are li9ely to
display standard patterns of reasoning in such a +ay as to produce standard sorts of unintended
conse/uence. Consider the sort of generali>ation suggested 4y 1am4etta!s study 'the higher up
children of +or9ing6class origins are in an educational system, the lo+er the chance they +ill drop out,
as compared to children from other class 4ac9grounds.! 0ere the unintended conse/uences pointed to
form a statistical pattern, the result of an aggregate of decisions of indi$iduals separated in time and
space. I ta9e it that no one +ould suggest this to e5press a uni$ersal la+, 4ut it is none the less a
potentially illuminating generali>ation. .he causal relation it presumes depends upon the 9inds of
decision6ma9ing specified 4y 1am4etta. 3ut, as that author points out, if the parents or children (from
any of the classes) got to 9no+ a4out the generali>ation, they could 4uild it into their assessment of the
$ery situation it descri4es and therefore in principle undermine it.
Be can say, as many others ha$e, that generali>ations in the social sciences are 'historical! in
character as long as +e 4ear in mind the many senses +hich that term can assume. In this particular
connotation it means only that the circumstances in +hich generali>ations hold are temporally and
spatially circumscri4ed, depending as they do upon definite mi5es of intended and unintended
conse/uences of action. 1i$en that such is the case, is it +orth calling generali>ations in the social
sciences 'la+s!? .his depends entirely upon ho+ strictly one +ishes to interpret the term 'la+!. In my
opinion, since in natural science 'la+! tends to 4e associated +ith the operation of in$ariant relations,
e$en in the case of la+s that are not uni$ersal in form, it is prefera4le not to use the term in social
science. In any case, it is important to a$oid the implication of the ad$ocates of structural sociology
that 'la+s! are found only +hen unintended conse/uences are in$ol$ed in a significant +ay in respect
of a gi$en series of phenomena. 1enerali>ations a4out human social conduct, in other +ords, may
directly reflect ma5ims of action +hich are 9no+ingly applied 4y agents. 8s I ha$e stressed in this
chapter, <ust ho+ far t. its is the case in any specified set of circumstances it has to 4e one of the main
tas9s of social research to in$estigate.
((348))
.he *ractical Connotations of "ocial "cience
.he social sciences, unli9e natural science, are ine$ita4ly in$ol$ed in a !su4<ectCsu4<ect relation! +ith
+hat they are a4out. .he theories and findings of the natural sciences are separate from the uni$erse of
o4<ects and e$ents +hich they concern. .his ensures that the relation 4et+een scientific 9no+ledge and
the o4<ect +orld remains a 'technological! one, in +hich accumulated 9no+ledge is 'applied! to an
independently constituted set of phenomena. 3ut in the social sciences the situation is different. 8s
Charles .aylor puts it 'Bhile natural science theory also transforms practice, the practice it transforms
is not +hat the theory is a4out. . . . Be thin9 of it as an :application: of the theory.! In the social
sciences, 'the practice is the o4<ect of the theory. .heory in this domain transforms its o+n o4<ect.!
"0
.he implications of this are $ery considera4le and 4ear upon ho+ +e should assess the achie$ements
of the social sciences as +ell as their practical impact upon the social +orld.
If +e +ere to accept the $ie+ of those +ho suppose that the social sciences should he simulacra of
the natural sciences, there is no dou4t that the former must 4e accounted a failure. "ocial science has
not come up +ith the sorts of precise la+ found in the more sophisticated areas of natural science and,
for reasons to +hich I ha$e already alluded, +ill not do so. En the face of things, it +ould loo9 as
though the demise of the aspiration to create a 'natural science of society! mar9s the end of the idea
that the social sciences could e$er affect 'their +orld!, the social +orld, to the degree that the natural
sciences ha$e influenced 'theirs!. ;or generations those +ho ha$e proposed naturalistic sociologies
ha$e done so on the 4asis of the notion that social science needs to 'catch up! +ith natural science 4oth
intellectually and practically. In other +ords, it is held that the natural sciences ha$e demonstra4ly
outstripped the social sciences in terms of their intellectual achie$ements and, therefore, their practical
conse/uences. .he pro4lem is for the social sciences to reco$er the ground that has 4een lost in order
to apply their findings to control e$ents in the social +orld in a parallel fashion. Comte!s programme
+as founded upon this type of standpoint, and it is
((349))
one +hich has thereafter 4een consistently reiterated in one guise or another.
.he follo+ing is a typical formulation of it, from an author +hc other+ise is far from 4eing a
follo+er of Comte
As social scientists we share with all fairly educated people in the world a general disturbing
understanding that in our feld of study progress is very much slower than in the natural
sciences. It is their discoveries and inventions which are compelling radical changes in society,
while ours, up till now, have been very much less consequential. There is spreading a creeping
anxiety about the dangerous hiatus inherent in this contrast. While man's power over nature is
increasing fast and, indeed, acceleratingly fast, man's control over society, which means in the
frst place over his own attitudes and institutions, is lagging far behind. In part, at least, this is
due to a slower pace in the advance of our knowledge about man and his society, the knowledge
that should be translated into action for social reform.'
8t first sight nothing loo9s more o4$ious than that the transformati$e impact of the natural sciences
has 4een incompara4ly greater than that of the social sciences. Natural science has its paradigms, its
agreed6upon findings, 9no+ledge of high generality e5pressed +ith mathematical precision. In the
natural sciences the 'founders! are forgotten or regarded as the originators of ideas that ha$e only
anti/uarian interest. .he fusion of science and technology has generated forms of material
transformation on the most e5traordinary scale. "ocial science, on the other hand, is apparently
chronically ri$en +ith disagreements, una4le to forget its !founders!, +hose +ritings are regarded as
ha$ing an importance of a lasting 9ind. 1o$ernments today might on occasion loo9 to the social
sciences as a source of information for policy decisions= 4ut this seems of tri$ial and marginal con6
se/uence +hen compared +ith the glo4al impact of natural science. .he greater social prestige +hich
natural science en<oys as compared +ith the social sciences seems +ell in line +ith their differential
accomplishments and material influence.
3ut is this con$entional $ie+ of social science as the poor relation correct? Ene can at least say it
4ecomes much less easy to sustain if +e ta9e into account the significance of the dou4le hermeneutic.
.he social sciences, to repeat, are not insulated
((356))
from 'their +orld! in the +ay in +hich the natural sciences are insulated from 'theirs!. .his certainly
compromises the achie$e6ment of a discrete corpus of 9no+ledge of the type sought 4y those +ho ta9e
natural science as a model. 0o+e$er, at the same time it means that the social sciences enter into the
$ery constitution of 'their +orld! in a manner +hich is foreclosed to natural science.
Consider the follo+ing
8 man +ho is made a prince 4y fa$our of the people must +or9 to retain their friendship= and
this is easy for him 4ecause the people as9 only not to 4e oppressed. 3ut a man +ho has 4ecome
prince against the +ill of the people and 4y the fa$our of the no4les should, 4efore anything else,
try to +in the people o$er= this too is easy if he ta9es them under his protection. Bhen men
recei$e fa$ours from someone they e5pected to do them ill, they are under a great o4ligation to
their 4enefactor= <ust so the people can in an instant 4ecome more amica4ly disposed to+ards the
prince than if he had sei>ed po+er 4y their fa$our.
(2
#achia$elli!s theorem is not <ust an o4ser$ation a4out po+er and popular support in politics. It +as
intended to 4e, and has 4een accepted as, a contri4ution to the actual mechanics of go$ern6ment. It can
4e said, +ithout e5aggeration, that the practice of go$ernment has ne$er 4een /uite the same since
#achia$elli!s +ritings 4ecame +ell 9no+n. .heir influence is not at all easy to trace. '#achia$ellian!
has 4ecome a pe<orati$e term partly for reasons +hich ha$e nothing much to do +ith the actual content
of +hat #achia$elli +rote C for e5ample, 4ecause of the reputed 4eha$iour of rulers +ho put their
o+n construction upon +hat he had to say. *rinciples +hich can 4e applied 4y princes can also 4e
applied 4y those +ho are su4<ect to their reign and 4y others opposed to them. .he practical
conse/uences of tracts such as #achia$elli!s are li9ely to 4e tortuous and ramified. .hey are $ery far
from the situation in +hich the findings of the social sciences are collated and assessed in one sphere
(the 'internal criti/ue! of professional specialists) and simply 'applied! in another (the +orld of
practical action). 3ut they are more typical of the fate of social scientific 9no+ledge than is the latter
picture.
No+, the /uestion of +hether it is <ustified to call #achia$elli a 'social scientist! might 4e disputed
on the grounds that his +ritings
((351))
precede the era in +hich reflection upon the nature of social institutions 4ecame systemati>ed.
"uppose, ho+e$er, +e loo9 to the later period of the closing decades of the eighteenth century and the
opening part of the nineteenth century. .his +as the time at +hich, it might 4e argued, detailed
empirical research into social issues +as initiated. "ome ha$e regarded the period as the first phase in
+hich the social sciences +ere gi$en an e$idential 4ase +hich could 4egin to resem4le that of natural
science. 0o+e$er, +hat is stri9ing is that the techni/ues of research de$eloped, and the 'data!
generated, immediately 4ecame a significant part of the society +hich they +ere used to analyse. .he
4urgeoning of official statistics is 4oth symptom and material result of this process. .heir gathering
+as made possi4le 4y the use of systematic methods of social sur$eying. .he de$elopment of such
methods is insepara4le from the ne+ modes of administrati$e control +hich the collection of official
statistics permitted. Ence esta4lished, official statistics in turn allo+ed for ne+ types of social analysis
C research into, for e5ample, demographic patterns, crime, di$orce, suicide, etc. 0o+e$er the
literature on these topics in turn +as re6incorporated in the practice of those concerned +ith the
production of the rele$ant statistics. @iterature on suicide, for e5ample, is +idely read 4y coroners,
court officials and others, including those +ho contemplate or carry out suicidal acts.
(,
Ef course, the de$elopment of theoretical matelanguages and the speciali>ation demanded 4y the
intensi$e study of specific areas of social life ensure that the social sciences do not 4ecome +holly
merged +ith their 'su4<ect matter!. 3ut once it is grasped ho+ comple5, continuous and intimate is the
association 4et+een 'professional! and lay social analysts, it 4ecomes easy to see +hy the profound
impact of social science upon the constitution of modern societies is hidden from $ie+. 'Aisco$eries!
of social science, if they are at all interesting, cannot remain disco$eries for long= the more
illuminating they are, in fact, the more li9ely they are to 4e incorporated into action and there4y to
4ecome familiar principles of social life.
.he theories and findings of the natural sciences stand in a 'technological! relation to their 'su4<ect
matter!. .hat is to say, the information they generate has practical significance as a 'means! applied to
altering an independently gi$en and autonomous
((352))
+orld of o4<ects and e$ents. 3ut the social sciences do not stand only in a 'technological! relation to
their 'su4<ect matter!, and their incorporation into lay action is only marginally a !technological! one.
#any possi4le permutations of 9no+ledge and po+er stem from this. .o demonstrate such to 4e the
case +e might go 4ac9 to the e5ample of #achia$elli!s o4ser$ations a4out the nature of politics. .he
follo+ing are possi4le in$ol$ements and ramifications of #achia$elli!s +ritings
1)
#achia$elli may in su4stantial part ha$e gi$en only a particular form of e5pression to +hat many
rulers, and no dou4t others too, 9ne+ already C they might $ery +ell e$en ha$e 9no+n some of
these things discursi$ely, although it is unli9ely that they +ould ha$e 4een a4le to e5press them
as pithily as #achia$elli did.
2)
.hat #achia$elli +rote the te5ts he did introduced a ne+ factor, once they 4ecame a$aila4le, +hich
did not e5ist pre$iously +hen the same things +ere 9no+n, if they +ere 9no+n.
,)
'#achia$ellian! 4ecame a term of a4use among those +ho heard of the ideas that #achia$elli
espoused +ithout necessarily ha$ing any first6hand 9no+ledge of the te5ts. #achia$elli +as
+idely thought in )ngland to 4e a pur$eyor of depra$ities 4efore the first )nglish translation of
The Prince +as pu4lished in 1&40.
4)
.he sort of discourse +hich #achia$elli made use of in his +ritings +as one element or aspect of
fundamental changes in the legal and constitutional orders of modern states. .o thin9 a4out
'politics! in a particular and su4stanti$ely no$el +ay +as essential to +hat 'politics! 4ecame.
(4
()
8 ruler +ho +as thought to 4e a follo+er of #achia$elli, and to try to go$ern according to
#achia$ellian precepts, might find them harder to apply than one +ho +as not 9no+n to he
such. 8 ruler!s su4<ects, for e5ample, +ho 9ne+ of the precept that a populace tends to 4e
particularly recepti$e to fa$ours gi$en 4y one +ho is e5pected to 4e oppressi$e might 4e
suspicious of <ust those fa$ours.
&)
#achia$elli +as +ell a+are of most of the preceding points and +arned of some of their
implications e5plicitly in The Prince. "e$eral of these points therefore 4ecome e$en more
((353))
comple5 in so far as a+areness of them itself 4ecomes part of political acti$ity.
3ut +hy should #achia$elli!s formulations remain significant today, and 4e seriously discussed as
rele$ant to e5isting societies, if they ha$e 4een in $arying +ays a4sor4ed into those societies? Bhy
cannot those +or9ing in the social sciences forget their 'founders!, as natural scientists do? .he ans+er
might ha$e to do precisely +ith the constituti$e character of the ideas +hich a thin9er li9e #achia$elli
4oth formulates and represents. #achia$elli pro$ides us +ith the means of considered reflection upon
concepts and practices +hich ha$e 4ecome part of the nature of so$ereignty, political po+er, etc., in
modern societies. In studying his +ritings +e get a sense of +hat it is that is distincti$e of the modern
state 4ecause #achia$elli +rote at a relati$ely early period in its de$elopment. No dou4t also
#achia$elli unco$ers, or gi$es a specific discursi$e form to, principles of go$ernment +hich ha$e
$ery generali>ed application to states of all 9inds. 0o+e$er, the main reason +hy #achia$elli!s
+ritings do not 'date! is that they are a series of (stylistically 4rilliant) reflections a4out phenomena
+hich they ha$e helped to constitute. .hey are formulations of modes of thought and action +hich are
rele$ant to modern societies not only in their origins 4ut also in their more permanent organi>ational
form. 8n archaic natural scientific theory is of no particular interest once 4etter ones ha$e come along.
.heories +hich 4ecome part of their 'su4<ect matter! (+hile perhaps in other +ays resisting such
incorporation) necessarily retain a rele$ance +hich anti/uarian natural science theories do not ha$e.
;urthering the critical character of social science means fostering a de$eloped conceptual a+areness
of the practical connotations of its o+n discourse. .he fact that the social sciences are deeply
implicated in +hat it is they are a4out suggests a 4asic role for the history of ideas. .hus, for e5ample,
"9inner!s studies of the emergence of modern forms of discourse on the post6medie$al state
demonstrate ho+ these ha$e 4ecome constituti$e of +hat the state is.
((
In sho+ing that the nature of
the modern state presumes a citi>enry +hich itself 9no+s +hat the modern state is and ho+ it +or9s,
"9inner helps us to see ho+ specific and distincti$e that state form is and ho+ intert+ined +ith
discursi$e
((354))
changes +hich 4ecame part of lay social practices.
.he social sciences cannot pro$ide (rele$ant) 9no+ledge that can 4e 'held 4ac9!, ready to stimulate
appropriate social inter$entions +here necessary. In natural science the e$idential criteria in$ol$ed in
deciding among theories and hypotheses are (in principle, and usually also in practice, +ith e5ceptions
such as @ysen9oism) in the hands of its specialist practitioners. .hey can get on +ith the <o4 of sifting
e$idence and formulating theories +ithout interruption from the +orld to +hich the e$idence and the
theories refer. 3ut in the social sciences this situation does not pertain C or, more accurately put, it
pertains least in respect of theories and findings +hich ha$e most to offer in terms of their re$elatory
$alue. .his is a large part of the reason +hy the social sciences might appear to pro$ide much less
information of $alue to policy6ma9ers than do the natural sciences. .he social sciences necessarily
dra+ upon a great deal that is already 9no+n to the mem4ers of the societies they in$estigate, and
supply theories, concepts and findings +hich 4ecome thrust 4ac9 into the +orld they descri4e. .he
'gaps! +hich can 4e made to appear 4et+een the specialist conceptual apparatus and findings of the
social sciences and the 9no+ledgea4le practices incorporated into social life are $ery much less clear
than in natural science. Jie+ed from a 'technological! standpoint, the practical contri4utions of the
social sciences seem, and are, restricted. 0o+e$er, seen in terms of 4eing filtered into the +orld they
analyse, the practical ramifications of the social sciences ha$e 4een, and are, $ery profound indeed.
Critical Notes: !ocial !cience, -istory and .eography
0istorians, I ha$e said, cannot properly 4e regarded as specialists along a dimension of time, any more
than geographers can 4e regarded as specialists along a dimension of space= such disciplinary
di$isions, as ordinarily concei$ed, are concrete e5pressions of the repression of time and space in
social theory. .hey ha$e a counterpart in the idea that social science is concerned +ith la+s of a
uni$ersal, or at least a highly general, nature. 0ere +e ha$e the neat traditional 4rea9do+n 4et+een
social science and history, the one supposedly preoccupied +ith generali>ation that is indifferent to
time and place, the other analysing the unfolding of e$ents situated in time6space. I do not thin9 it
necessary, in the light of the main ideas I ha$e sought to de$elop in this 4oo9, to la4our the point as to
+hy this traditional idea is hollo+.
If historians are not specialists in time, +hat of the $ie+ that they are specialists in the study of the
past? .his $ie+ is not only perhaps intuiti$ely attracti$e 4ut has 4een defended 4y many eminent
historians as +ell as philosophers. Ea9eshott e5plicates the term 'historical past! as follo+s.!L .he
+orld +hich an indi$idual percei$es, he says, is 'unmista9a4ly present!. I stand on a 9er4 in a street
and o4ser$e +hat goes on around me. 8s I stand there, time passes, 4ut I attend to a 'continuous
present!, in +hich 'the passage of time is mar9ed 4y no noticea4le change or e$en suggestion of
mo$ement.!
2
I see a man +ith a +ooden leg ho44ling 4y. 0e is part of the 'continuous present!, unless
I percei$e him not as a man +ith a +ooden leg 4ut as a man +ho has lost his leg. "uch an a+areness of
the past, Ea9eshott argues, is 4rought a4out not 4y neglect of the present 4ut 4y a particular
interpretation of the present that attends to +hat is e$o9ed 4y the +ord 'lost!. .he present in historical
understanding is composed
((footnotes))
*References may be found on pp. 371-2.
((,(&))
of +hate$er are recogni>ed as sur$i$als or relics of a 'conser$ed past!
an historian!s only entry into the past is 4y means of these sur$i$als. 8nd the first concern of an
historical in/uiry is to assem4le them from +here they lie scattered in the present, to reco$er
+hat might ha$e 4een lost, to impose some 9ind of order upon this confusion, to repair the
damage they may ha$e suffered, to a4ate their fragmentariness, to discern their relationships, to
recognise a sur$i$al in terms of its pro$enance, and thus to determine its authentic character as a
4ygone practical or philosophical or artistic, etc., performance.!
.hrough fragments of the past +hich ha$e sur$i$ed, the historian attempts to reco$er those aspects of
the past +hich ha$e not done
so.
.his interpretation of the nature of history could 4e understood in t+o some+hat different +ays,
concei$ing history to 4e concerned either +ith the reco$ery of a lost past or +ith specific techni/ues of
te5tual hermeneutics someho+ peculiar to the historian. 8ccording to the first interpretation, history
+ould ha$e a definite 'su4<ect matter! of its o+n= according to the second, the distinguishing feature of
history +ould 4e primarily methodological. 3ut neither of these has much plausi4ility +hen e5amined
a little more closely. 3y 'present!, as his e5ample of the indi$idual on the street corner ma9es clear,
Ea9eshott means something close to +hat I ha$e called 'presence!. 3ut the limits of presence are
spatial as +ell as temporal. .he interpretati$e retrie$al of a lost past cannot easily 4e se$ered C and
neither should it 4e C from the interpretati$e elucidation of cultural differences scattered 'laterally!
across the face of the glo4e. ;or all such analysis in$ol$es the co6ordination of the temporal and spatial
in su4tle and intricate +ays. .he reader +ho does not concede this point +ill not ha$e much sympathy
+ith structuration theory as I ha$e de$eloped it in the preceding pages. If Ea9eshott!s $ie+ is regarded
as a methodological one, on the other hand, it implies that the distincti$eness of history lies in the arts
of the historian, as a specialist in the interpretation of te5ts or relics +hich sur$i$e from past eras. .his
idea certainly has a great deal of support among historians, and not +ithout reason, for it is e$ident
enough that the e5pert perusal and elucidation of te5ts or
((359))
material relics is a primary preoccupation of historical research. #any social scientists might also see a
di$ision of la4our 4et+een history and social science along these lines= those actors in +hom the social
scientist is interested, 4eing ali$e, can 4e communicated +ith directly, +hile those in +hom the
historian is interested, 4eing dead, cannot 4e. .he difference is plainly an important one, not only
4ecause the li$ing can ans+er /uestions +hereas the dead cannot 4ut also 4ecause the li$ing can also
ans+er 4ac9. .hat is to say, they can acti$ely /uestion, or alter their acti$ity in terms of, +hate$er
'findings! are disseminated a4out them. 0o+e$er, it does not follo+ that a +orth+hile di$ision could
4e made 4et+een history and social science along these lines. ;or most social science is done in and
through te5ts and other 'secondary! materials, as history is. .he efforts a social scientist might e5pend
in direct communication +ith the agents +ho are the su4<ects of his or her research in$estigations are
li9ely to 4e tiny compared +ith those +hich must 4e spent +or9ing through te5tual materials.
#oreo$er, ho+ far there are interpretati$e pro4lems to 4e resol$ed in ma9ing sense of te5ts C using
them as e5emplifications as +ell as descriptions of a gi$en conte5t of acti$ity C depends not upon
'distance! in time 4ut upon ho+ much has to 4e made of ho+ little, and upon the degree of cultural
difference in$ol$ed.
If there are t+o disciplines, then, +hose intersection concerns the limits of presence, they are surely
those of archaeology and hermeneutics archaeology, 4ecause this is the su4<ect par excellence +hich
is concerned +ith relics or remains, the 4rie6W4rac +ashed up on the shore of modern times and left
there as the social currents +ithin +hich it +as created ha$e drained a+ay= hermeneutics, 4ecause all
sur$i$als of a 'conser$ed past! ha$e to 4e interpreted, regardless of +hether they are pots or te5ts, and
4ecause this tas9 of reco$ering the past is conceptually and methodologically indistinguisha4le from
mediating the frames of meaning found in coe5isting cultures.
If social science is not, and cannot 4e, the history of the present, and if it is not, and cannot 4e,
concerned simply +ith generali>ations out of time and place, +hat distinguishes social science from
history? I thin9 +e ha$e to reply, as Aur9heim did (al4eit ha$ing follo+ed a different line of reasoning
to arri$e at this result) nothing C nothing, that is, +hich is conceptually
((358))
coherent or intellectually defensi4le. If there are di$isions 4et+een social science and history, they are
su4stanti$e di$isions of la4our= there is no logical or methodological schism. 0istorians +ho speciali>e
in particular types of te5tual materials, languages or 'periods! are not freed from in$ol$ement +ith the
concepts of, and the dilemmas inherent in, social theory. 3ut, e/ually, social scientists +hose concerns
are the most a4stract and general theories a4out social life, are not freed from the hermeneutic
demands of the interpretation of te5ts and other cultural o4<ects. 0istorical research is social research
and $ice $ersa.
.o say this is surely no longer the heresy it may once ha$e 4een. @et us first of all consider +hat has
4een happening from the side of history. 84rams summari>es things $ery +ell +hen he says of the
+or9 of historians
the really significant de$elopment of the past t+enty years has 4een the pu4lication of a solid
4ody of theoretically self6conscious historical +or9 +hich has progressi$ely made nonsense of
earlier conceptions of history as someho+, in principle, not engaged in the theoretical +orld of
the social sciences. "ocial change is made 4y people doing ne+ things. 8s the ac9no+ledged
masterpieces of the discipline of history 4ecome increasingly theoretically e5plicit, and as the
unity of theoretical method 4et+een history and sociology 4ecomes there4y steadily more
o4$ious, the continued insistence of a rump of professional historians that theory is not part of
their trade 4ecomes steadily less firmly the effecti$e 4asis of the institution! of history and
steadily more plainly an ineffectual nostalgia.
4
.he 9ey phrase here is 'unity of theoretical method!. .he pro4lems of social theory, of agency,
structure and forms of e5planation, are pro4lems shared in general 4y all the social sciences, +hate$er
the di$ision of la4our that in other respects may e5ist 4et+een them.
"tone has +ritten percepti$ely of the influence of the social sciences upon history o$er the t+o
decades mentioned 4y 84rams.! "tone distinguishes se$eral +ays in +hich those in$ol$ed in the 'ne+
history! ha$e 4een influenced 4y the social sciences. 0istorians, he agrees +ith 84rams, ha$e 4een
made more a+are of their inescapa4le in$ol$ement +ith social theory. .hat is to say, they ha$e come
to accept that they cannot lea$e entirely
((35"))
implicit the theoretical presuppositions that guide their +or9= in ma9ing them e5plicit, they are putting
on the ta4le cards +hich pre$iously they might ha$e preferred to 9eep concealed in their hands. Ether
contri4utions from the social sciences ha$e 4een more methodological. Uuantifying methods ha$e
4een applied +ith some success to a range of different historical issues C a phenomenon of
importance if only 4ecause the use of such methods is a /uite no$el departure in history.
In respect of these contri4utions, ho+e$er, there has 4een a contrary pressure from those concerned
to ad$ance the claims of so6called 'narrati$e history!. .he de4ate 4et+een the ad$ocates of the 'ne+
history! on the one side and proponents of 'narrati$e history! on the other in some main respects can
aptly 4e seen as the historians! $ersion of the self6same dualism of action and structure that has dogged
the de$elopment of social science in general. .hose +ho fa$our narrati$e history o4<ect to the manner
in +hich the 'ne+ history! tends to offer accounts of human conduct +hich imply that such conduct is
the outcome of social causes outside the influence of the actors in$ol$ed. .hey are right to do so. ;or
the usefulness of importing into history styles of theori>ing that are fla+ed at source is li9ely to he
strictly limited. 3ut to propose 'narrati$e history! as an alternati$e to 'analytical history!, as if +e ha$e
to opt for one +holly at the e5pense of the other, is surely mista9en.
Narrati$e history is supposedly the telling of stories, in conscious ac9no+ledgement of the common
root +hich 'history! has +ith 'story! and of the fact that histoire means 4oth. .he stories told ha$e to
conform to the demands of factual e$idence, 4ut +hat holds them together and commands the assent of
the reader is the coherence of the plot, the mode in +hich the purposi$e character of the acti$ity of
those descri4ed is con$eyed and the conte5ts of acti$ity descri4ed. .hus )lton remar9s, in the course
of descri4ing +hat narrati$e history is 'In order that action may 4e understood, its setting,
circumstances and springs must 4e made plain!,! a statement +hich is uno4<ectiona4le. 8s discussed 4y
)lton and others, narrati$e and +hat I ha$e earlier referred to as ethnography are more or less the same
thing. 3ut <ust as it does not follo+ that the use of ethnographic techni/ues has to 4e ine$ita4ly
associated +ith su4<ecti$ism, so it does not follo+ that narrati$e history has any logical connection
+ith a theoretical position
((,&0))
+hich +ould re<ect structural concepts. .he ad$ocates of narrati$e history are /uite <ustified in
o4<ecting to the indiscriminate importation of the concepts of structural sociology into the +or9 of
historians. 3ut they are not right to suppose that such concepts can 4e ignored altogether. Bhat ma9es
a narrati$e a persuasi$e 'story! is not <ust the coherence of the plot 4ut, as )lton says, understanding
the 'setting, circumstances, and springs! of action. 0o+e$er, the settings and circumstances +ithin
+hich action occurs do not come out of thin air= they themsel$es ha$e to 4e e5plained +ithin the $ery
same logical frame+or9 as that in +hich +hate$er action descri4ed and 'understood! has also to 4e
e5plained. It is e5actly this phenomenon +ith +hich I ta9e structuration theory to 4e concerned.
@et us 4riefly loo9 at the matter from the aspect of recent de$elopments in social science,
concentrating particularly upon sociology. "ociology one might say, has its origins in modern history,
concei$ed of as the analysis of the origins and impact of industrial capitalism in the Best. 3ut +here
such pro4lems +ere ta9en up 4y the post6"econd Borld Bar generation of sociological +riters, they
often succum4ed to the forms of e$olutionism I ha$e earlier 4een concerned to critici>e. )$olutionism,
it should 4e clear, can easily 4e an enemy of history rather than the ally it might superficially seem to
4e. ;or it encourages a high6handed disrespect for matters of historical detail 4y cramming human
history into pre6pac9ed schemes.
Bhere e$olutionism has not made much head+ay there has 4een a $ery strong tendency to identify
'sociology!, and its separation from 'history!, in <ust these terms +hich I ha$e earlier condemned as
$acuous. @ipset!s description of such a $ie+ is characteristic
the tas9 of the sociologist is to formulate general hypotheses, hopefully set +ithin a larger
theoretical frame+or9, and to test them. . . . 0istory must 4e concerned +ith the analysis of the
particular set of e$ents or processes. Bhere the sociologist loo9s for concepts +hich su4sume a
$ariety of particular descripti$e categories, the historian must remain close to the actual
happenings and a$oid statements +hich, through lin9ing 4eha$iour at one time or place to that
else+here, lead to a distortion in the description of +hat occurred in the set of circumstances
4eing analysed.!
((361))
3ut +hat this di$ision descri4es is one 4et+een generali>ing concerns and more specific ones, not
4et+een sociology and history.!
.he term 'sociology! +as in$ented 4y Comte and, until /uite recent times, for the most part
preser$ed a strong connection +ith the style of thin9ing of +hich he +as so prominent a
representati$e. #any +ho ha$e disa$o+ed 4oth e$olutionism and functionalism ha$e none the less
associated sociology +ith some of the main tenets of o4<ecti$ism. .he 'general hypotheses! of +hich
@ipset spea9s are commonly thought of in the manner I ha$e discussed a4o$e, as la+s +hich e5press
causal relations that operate someho+ independently of the $olition of the agents to +hose conduct
they refer. It is not <ust the contrast 4et+een the 'nomothetic! and the idiographic! that sociologists tend
to ha$e in mind here. If, as structural sociology suggests, the distincti$eness of sociology is to 4e
found precisely in its o$erriding concern +ith structural constraint, the implication can 4e dra+n that
historians +or9 in closer touch +ith the conte5tuali>ed acti$ities of purposi$e agents. If it is in this
manner that 'sociological! concepts are understood +hen imported into history, it is easy to see +hy
the ad$ocates of narrati$e history are suspicious of them and ho+ they can defend +hat they do as
'history!, compared +ith 'sociology!. 3oth sides lend support to a disciplinary dichotomy that ma9es
no logical or methodological sense.
Bhat has changed, and is changing, sociology is no dou4t in $ery large degree the decline of the
hegemony +hich o4<ecti$ism and functionalism once en<oyed. .he repression of time in social theory,
as perpetrated 4y sociologists at any rate, +as definitely also a repression of history C time, history,
social change all tend to 4e assimilated +ithin functionalism.R 3ut there has also come a4out a
disillusionment +ith the t+o types of tradition +hich dominated the analysis of the industrially
ad$anced societies until some t+o decades ago C the 'theory of industrial society! on the one hand
and #ar5ism on the other.
1
R In the period after the "econd Borld Bar 4oth of these tended to ha$e a
strong e$olutionary tinge to them, as +ell as displaying se$eral of the secondary traits I ha$e indicated
are associated +ith e$olutionism. In particular, each tended to 4e hea$ily )uropocentric. .he challenge
+hich 'dependency! and '+orld system! theory posed to these de$elopmental schemes has played some
considera4le part
((362))
in attac9ing )uropocentric assumptions. 3ut there is also clear e$idence of the impact of the 'ne+
history!, +hich has indicated that many of the suppositions +hich sociologists made a4out pre6
capitalist )urope +ere pro4a4ly 4asically mista9en.:
0o+e$er, sociologists ha$e a great deal more to learn from the +or9 of historians than most +ould
currently admit. Ene might propose as a 9ey e5ample the +or9 of 3raudel, lauded among the 'ne+
historians! 4ut still largely un9no+n to those +ho concei$e themsel$es to 4e +or9ing in 'sociology!.
3raudel!s +riting displays the early influence +hich sociology, particularly as filtered through the
Annee Sociologique group, had upon the de$elop6ment of history in ;rance. No dou4t in some +ays
it reflects the shortcomings of the sociological $ie+s of that group. 3ut it also goes far 4eyond the
limitations of those $ie+s in other respects, and not only in its su4stanti$e content 4ut also in its
theoretical sophistication holds out great interest for sociology. .he 'dialogue 4et+een structure and
con<uncture!
12
+hich 3raudel +ants to capture is parallel to that +hich I see9 to represent in a more
detailed +ay in structuration theory. 3raudel is the historian of the longue dur~e, 4ut he is also
e5plicitly concerned to connect the contingent and the short6term +ith institutions that endure o$er
long periods of time.
Bho could seem further apart, at first sight, than 3raudel and 1offman? Bholly incompati4le
figures, one might thin9, and e$en to mention them in the same 4reath seems faintly ludicrous.
3raudel studies history o$er se$eral centuries, +hile 1offman resolutely a$oids any analysis of the
de$elopment of the institutional conte5ts +ith +hich social acti$ity occurs. Det 4oth anchor their
studies in the e$ents of daily life. Bhat connects them is a pre6eminent concern +ith time, not as
chronological duration 4ut as inherent in the comple5ities of social reproduction. 8s I ha$e tried to
indicate, +e can learn a lot from 1offman a4out ho+ the most deeply sedimented institutions are
reproduced= 1offman is not aptly regarded as the theorist of the tri$ial or the ephemeral. Per contra,
3raudel should not 4e seen as proposing the study of $ast s+eeps of history in +hich indi$idual
actors appear as the playthings of irresisti4le social currents, a 'deterministic, fatalistic history!.:
0istory is the structuration of e$ents in time and space through the continual interplay of agency and
structure the interconnection of the mundane nature
((363
of day6to6day life +ith institutional forms stretching o$er immense spans of time and space.
In pointing to important con$ergences 4et+een the +or9 of historians and sociologists today I do
not +ish to suggest only that history should 4ecome more sociological and sociology more historical.
.here is more at sta9e than that. 8 reco$ery of time and space for social theory means theori>ing
agency, structure and conte5tuality as the focus for research pro4lems in 4oth.
Conte5tuality means space as +ell as time, and here +e can turn to the relation 4et+een geography
and sociology. 1eography has long 4een a less intellectually fashiona4le su4<ect than history, and there
are far fe+er discussions in the literature of the relation 4et+een geography and sociology than there
are of history and sociology. #any sociologists ha$e +orried a4out ho+ far 'sociology! is, or should
4e, 'historical! C in different +ays, according to ho+ each term is understood C 4ut to my 9no+ledge
$ery fe+ ha$e felt the same dis/uiet in respect of geography. .his is pro4a4ly due not <ust to the
differential intellectual repute of history and geography 4ut also to the greater transparency +hich the
concept of space seems to ha$e as compared +ith that of time. Aistance in space is apparently easy to
comprehend and to cope +ith conceptually= distance in time is not. It might seem to follo+ from such
reasoning 4oth that space can 4e left to the geographers and that the study of spatial forms is relati$ely
uninteresting. 3ut this conclusion +ould 4e a superficial one. .he phrase might seem 4i>arre, 4ut
human 4eings do 'ma9e their o+n geography! as much as the 'ma9e their o+n history!. .hat is to say,
spatial configurations of social life are <ust as much a matter of 4asic importance to social theory as are
the dimensions of temporality, and, as I ha$e often accentuated, for many purposes it is appropriate to
thin9 in terms of time6space rather than treating time and space separately.
.he roots of human geography in the late nineteenth century ha$e a certain amount in common +ith
those of sociology= as in the case of history, human geography +as influenced in a significant manner
4y Aur9heim and those affiliated to the Annee Sociologique. .his is true of 4oth %at>el and Jidal de
la 3lache, perhaps the t+o most influential figures in the early formation of geography. %at>el!s
+atch+ord +as 'Aie #enscheit ist ein "tuc9 der )rde!,
14
4ut he also emphasi>ed the importance of
social
((364))
organi>ation as an independently esta4lished phenomenon. Aur9heim rightly sa+ in %at>el!s +or9 a
'potential ally! for the conception of sociology that he +ished to de$elop.: Jidal!s concept of genre de
vie directly e5presses the influence of Aur9heim= as ta9en o$er 4y @ucien ;e4$re, Jidal!s ideas ha$e
had a ma<or impact upon the +or9 of ;rench historians, including 3raudel.!
&
3raudel!s concentration
upon the #editerranean area as a +hole, rather than upon 4oundaries defined 4y nation6states or
political designations of ')urope!, strongly reflects the emphases of Jidal. .he influence of %at>el and
Jidal +ithin sociology su4se/uently, ho+e$er, has 4een +ea9. In the decades follo+ing the "econd
Borld Bar sociology and geography mostly +ent in their o+n separate directions.
"ince then, ho+e$er, things ha$e changed. .he detecta4le con$ergence of research has perhaps not
4een as great as that 4et+een history and sociology, 4ut human geography has certainly largely
reco$ered the close affiliation +ith sociology +hich it used to en<oy in pre$ious generations.: .he
'ne+ geography! of the 1-&0s, li9e the 'ne+ history!, +as strongly influenced 4y the importation of
/uantitati$e methods from else+here in the social sciences. .he idea that geography is primarily
a4out the study of regionali>ation tended to 4e displaced 4y a more a4stract emphasis upon spatial
form. )choing the flu5 of ideas else+here in the social sciences, the 'ne+ geography! has already
su4stantially succum4ed to criti/ues of empiricism +hich ha$e had such a strong impact throughout
modern social and political thought. .he result, ho+e$er, is that the +or9 of geographers today has
as much to contri4ute to sociology as sociologists can offer in return. ;or human geography has
come to contain many of the same concepts, and to 4e in$ol$ed +ith the same methodological
de4ates, as sociology.
In the preceding chapters I ha$e tried to ma9e clear +hat I regard as some of the chief respects in
+hich geographical concepts can 4e incorporated into structuration theory. I do not, of course, mean
to suggest that the +or9 of 0agerstrand and his follo+ers e5hausts +hat geography has to offer
sociology. 3ut it is particularly rele$ant to structuration theory for reasons I ha$e attempted to
specify. It offers insights of a theoretical nature, +hen su4<ected to a proper critical assessment, 4ut
also research techni/ues that can 4e directly applied in empirical +or9. .ime6
((365))
geography offers three ad$antages o$er esta4lished social research techni/ues, +ith +hich, of course,
it can in any case 4e com4ined. Ene is that it sensiti>es research +or9 to the conte5tualities of
interaction, especially in so far as these connect +ith the physical aspects of the milieux in +hich
actors mo$e. #ost social research, as practised 4y sociologists, has 4een a$erse to e5amining
connections 4et+een physical and social aspects of milieux, +ith the honoura4le e5ceptions of the
Chicago school and so6called 'ecological! theorists.!! 8nother is that it directs our attention to the
significance of routini>ation in the day6to6day acti$ities that are at the core of social institutions. .he
third is that, in de$eloping the idea of day6to6day life as a series of intersecting time6space paths, time6
geography offers a mode of charting and of analysing patterns of social reproduction.:
.he attempt to supplant the notion of regionali>ation in geography 4y more a4stract models of
spatial form I regard largely as a mista9en endea$our. I do not thin9 it useful to see9 to ma9e the
analysis of regionali>ation the specific and peculiar concern of geography. 8s I ha$e tried to
emphasi>e, regionali>ation is a notion that should 4e seen as ha$ing a ma<or role in social theory.
%egionali>ation is 4est understood not as a +holly spatial concept 4ut as one e5pressing the clustering
of conte5ts in time6space. 8s such it is a phenomenon of /uite decisi$e significance to sociology, on
4oth a theoretical and an empirical le$el. No single concept helps more to redress the misleading
di$isions 4et+een 'micro6! and 'macro6sociological! research= no concept helps more to counter the
assumption that a 'society! is al+ays a clear6cut unity +ith precisely defined 4oundaries to it. 8s
adopted +ithin sociology, the pro4lems +ith the notion of regionali>ation are, first, that it has figured
primarily +ithin ur4an sociology= second, that it has 4een used primarily +ith reference to
neigh4ourhoods= and, third, that ur4an sociology has tradition6ally 4een understood as one 'field! of
sociology among others.
)ach of these usages should 4e called in /uestion. 8s I ha$e tried to formulate it, regionali>ation is
certainly not e/ui$alent to 'regional science! 4ut none the less has a $ery 4road usage. 'Kr4an
sociology! is one of the main concerns that has 4een shared 4y geographers and sociologists and +here
interchange 4et+een the t+o disciplines has 4een most profuse. .here are interesting parallels 4et+een
the +or9 of Jidal, 4ased mainly on rural
((366))
en$ironments, and that of the Chicago school, 4ased upon ur4an ones. *ar9 9ne+ of the +ritings of
;rench human geography, although he seems to ha$e +or9ed out his main concepts independently of
it. It is unfortunate that *ar9!s influence has 4een strongest in respect of ur4an ecology, mar9ed 4y a
formalist conception of space and emphasi>ing an o4<ecti$ist standpoint. In his later +or9 *ar9
adhered to the $ie+ that if +e are a4le to 'reduce all social relations to relations of space!, +e can
en$isage that
'
it +ould 4e possi4le to apply to human relations the fundamental logic of the physical
sciences.!
20
3ut in his earlier +ritings he emphasi>ed much more the neigh4ourhood as a
conte5tuali>ing phenomenon, ordered 4y and e5pressing distincti$e social traits as genres de vie. It is
this sort of emphasis +hich needs to 4e retained, +hile 4eing regarded as associated +ith
regionali>ation in general rather than +ith ur4an neigh4ourhoods in particular.
Kr4an sociology is not merely one 4ranch of sociology among others. It is of the first importance to
stress this, and in ac9no+ledging it recent de$elopments in ur4an theory ha$e helped further to
crum4le some of the di$isions 4et+een geography and sociology. 8s I ha$e indicated pre$iously, a
consideration of the nature of cities is of ma<or importance in analysing issues that are usually
presented as purely logical in character, including especially the microHmacro pro4lem. .he term 'city!
is misleading here. If cities ha$e $irtually e$ery+here played a 9ey role in the organi>ation of large6
scale societies, the city in class6di$ided societies is not the city of the modern era. In so far as modern
ur4anism is e5pressi$e of a ne+ type of organi>ation of time6space, it is discontinuous +ith traditional
cities, and its origins are coterminous +ith those of the capitalist6industrial type of society. .here is no
need to agree +ith all the themes of Castells!s +or9 to accept that he has 4een important in shifting
the emphasis in ur4an theory a+ay from 'ur4an sociology! to+ards a stress on the generic significance
of ur4anism for social theory.
21
.he analysis of ur4anism, as the 4asis of the 'created en$ironment!,
+ould certainly occupy a main position in any empirical programme of study +hich structuration
theory might help generate a4out industriali>ed societies today.
Bhat can sociologists learn from the +or9 of geographers? Not only the importance of
regionali>ation and techni/ues of studying it, 4ut also the significance of +hat geographers
traditionally call
((369))
place (4ut I prefer to call locale) in the reproduction of social practices. *red!s +ritings may 4e /uoted
as an instructi$e e5ample, com4ining as they do the empirical study of ur4anism +ith a perspecti$e
influenced 4y 4oth time6geography and structuration theory.
22
8s *red /uite rightly points out, the
concept of the 'situated! character of social interaction can 4e ade/uately fleshed out empirically only
if +e grasp ho+ the 'reproduction of particular cultural, economic and political institutions in time and
space are continuously 4ound up +ith the temporally and spatially specific actions, 9no+ledge 4uild6
up, and 4iographies of particular indi$iduals!.
2,
.he co6ordination of the daily paths of indi$iduals
+ithin a gi$en range of locales, plus +hat some researchers ha$e called a 'sense of place!, are
concreti>ed aspects of the duality of structure. .he dialectic of 'daily path! and 'life path! is the +ay in
+hich the continuity of the 4iography of the indi$idual is e5pressed in, and also e5presses, the
continuity of institutional reproduction. 8 sense of place seems of ma<or importance in the sustaining
of ontological security precisely 4ecause it pro$ides a psychological tie 4et+een the 4iography of the
indi$idual and the locales that are the settings of the time6space paths through +hich that indi$idual
mo$es. ;eelings of identification +ith larger locales C regions, nations, etc. C seem distinguisha4le
from those 4red and reinforced 4y the locali>ed conte5ts of day6to6day life. .he latter are pro4a4ly
much more important in respect of the reproduction of large6scale institutional continuities than are the
former.
24
*red suggests that research should e5plore the dou4le sense +hich the phrase 'ta9ing place!
can assume. "ocial acti$ity ta9es place in definite locales, 4ut this is not to 4e understood <ust as the
passi$e locali>ation of such acti$ity +ithin particular situations. 0uman acti$ities 'ta9e place! 4y
appropriating and transforming nature, no+here more e$idently so than in the created en$ironment of
modern ur4anism.
Bhat, 4y +ay of return, can geographers learn from sociologists? *erhaps little indeed, since o$er
the last fe+ years geographers ha$e 4ecome +ell a+are of the de4ates and issues current in sociology.
Ene contri4ution +hich can 4e made, ho+e$er, is to help to 4rea9 do+n the supposition that there can
4e a distincti$e 'science of space!. In human geography spatial forms are al+ays social forms.
Consider the assertion, representati$e of a certain type of geographical literature, that geography is
concerned to esta4lish 'the spatial connections 4et+een sets of
((,&8))
facts 4y finding spatial la+s! and to elucidate 'the connections 4et+een the la+s themsel$es, 4y
constructing spatial theories, +hich are the patterns or systems in the domain of spatial pro4lems!.
2(
"uch formulations, of course, e5press a conception of la+s +hich I ha$e earlier discarded as inapt=
they represent an attempt to form a 'social physics in a spatial conte5t!.
2&
#ore important, ho+e$er,
they suppose that space has its o+n intrinsic nature, a proposal that is logically /uestiona4le and
empirically unfruitful. "pace is not an empty dimension along +hich social groupings 4ecome
structured, 4ut has to 4e considered in terms of its in$ol$ement in the constitution of systems of
interaction. .he same point made in relation to history applies to (human) geography there are no
logical or methodological differences 4et+een human geography and sociologyQ
References: Structuration "heory, Empirical Research and Social
Criti#ue
1 Cf. NRSM, chapter ,.
2 *aul Billis, Learning to Labour (;arn4orough "a5on 0ouse, 1-22).
, I4id., p. 11.
4 I4id., pp. 2-6,0.
( I4id., p. ,,.
& Cf. especially i4id., chapter (.
2 Uuoted i4id., p. &4.
8 I4id., p. 102.
- 1. 8. Cohen, Karl Marx's Theory of History, a Defence (E5ford Clarendon *ress, 1-28).
10 0ere I dra+ upon my discussion in 'Commentary on the de4ate!, a de4ate a4out functionalism, in
Theory and Society, $ol. 11, 1-82.
11 Billis, Learning to Labour, p. &&.
12 I4id., pp. &8ff.
1, I4id., p. 102.
14 "ee CPST, pp. 1046&.
1( Iarl #ar5, Capital, $ol. 1 (@ondon @a+rence and Bishart, 1-20), p. 1&-.
1& %eported in Aiego 1am4etta, 'Bere .hey *ushed or did .hey 7ump?!, *h.A. dissertation,
Cam4ridge Kni$ersity, 1-82.
((,&-))
12 8. @ei4o+it>, ';amily 4ac9ground and economic success a re$ie+ of the e$idence!, in *. .au4man,
Kinometrics: Determinants of Socioeconomic Success Between and Within Families (8msterdam
North 0olland, 1-22).
18 #. 3ar4agli, Disoccupazione intellettuale e sisterna scolastico in Italia (3ologna Il #ulino, 1-24).
1- I4id.= /uoted in 1am4etta, 'Bere .hey *ushed or did .hey 7ump?!, pp. 22(6&.
20 I4id., pp. 24,64.
21 NRSM, chapter ,.
22 7on )lster, Logic and Society, Contradictions and Possible Worlds (Chichester Biley, 1-28)= idem,
Ulysses and the Sirens (Cam4ridge Cam4ridge Kni$ersity *ress, 1-2-)= %. 3oudon, The
Unintended Consequences of Social Action (@ondon #acmillan, 1-82).
2, )lster, Logic and Society, chapter (.
24 I4id., pp. 11,618.
2.( .his is the phenomenon made +ell 9no+n 4y Elson= see #ancur Elson, The Logic of Collective
Action (Cam4ridge, #ass. 0ar$ard Kni$ersity *ress, 1-&,).
2& 3oudon, The Unintended Consequences of Social Action, chapter 4= critical comments are made 4y
)lster in Logic and Society, pp. 12&62.
22 "ee especially the no+ classic article 4y Effe and %onge Claus Effe and Jol9er %onge, '.heses on
the theory of the state!, New German Critique, $ol. &, 1-2(.
28 I4id., p. 2(0.
2- Effe!s o+n research has 4een concerned particularly +ith education and la4our mar9ets. 0is
argument is that educational and training policies are strongly influenced 4y the percei$ed need to
enhance the salea4ility of la4our po+er. '@aisse> faire!, and '+elfare state6protecti$e! policies are
compared +ith ones concerned +ith 'administrati$e re6commodification! see Claus Effe,
Struktur-probleme des kapitalistischen Staates (;ran9furt "uhr9amp, 1-22)= idem,
Berufsbildungsreform. (;ran9furt "uhr9amp, 1-2().
,0 )ach of these three cases comes from "am A. "ie4er, Fatal Remedies (Ne+ Dor9 *lenum *ress,
1-81), pp. &061, &268, 8(.
,1 CPST, p. 144.
,2 8 point made 4y "9ocpol= see .heda "9ocpol, States and Social
Revolutions (Cam4ridge Cam4ridge Kni$ersity *ress, 1-2-), p. 5ii.
,, 1. I. Ingham, Capitalism Divided? The City and Industry in Britain
(@ondon #acmillan, 1-84).
,4 %udolf 0ilferding, Finance Capital (@ondon %outledge, 1-81).
((,20))
,( Ingham, Capitalism Divided?
,& I ha$e critici>ed this tendency in se$eral sources= see Capitalism and Modern Social Theory
(Cam4ridge Cam4ridge Kni$ersity *ress, 1-21), chapter 1(= CSAS, Introduction= CPST, chapter
&.
,2 .he e5ample comes from .homas *. Bilson, to +hose +or9 on this matter I am greatly inde4ted.
"ee 'Uualitati$e :$ersus: /uantitati$e methods in social research!, Aepartment of "ociology,
Kni$ersity of California at "anta 3ar4ara, 1-8, (mimeo). *u4lished in 1erman in
the Kolner Zeitschrift fir Soziologie and Sozialpsychologie, $ol. ,4,
1-82. "ee also Aouglas B. #aynard and .homas *. Bilson 'En the reification of social
structure!, in "cott 1. #cNall and 1ary N.
0o+e, Current Perspectives in Social Theory, vol. 1 (1reen+ich, Conn. 78I *ress, 1-80).
,8 Bilson, 'Uualitati$e :$ersus: /uantitati$e methods in social research!, p. 20.
,- Cf. CPST. pp. 2486(,.
40 *eter Binch, The Idea of a Social Science (@ondon %outledge, 1-&,).
41 0ans61eorg 1adamer, Truth and Method (@ondon "heed N Bard, 1-2().
42 CPST, pp. 2(06,.
4, NRSM, pp. 1(06,.
44 I4id.
4( 7. C. Croc9er, '#y 4rother the parrot!, in 7. A. "apis and 7. C. Croc9er, The Social Use of Metaphor
(*hiladelphia Kni$ersity of *ennsyl$ania *ress, 1-22)= also discussed in Aan "per4er,
'8pparently irrational 4eliefs!, in #artin 0ollis and "te$en @u9es, Rationality and Relativism
(E5ford 3lac9+ell, 1-82).
4& %oy 3has9ar, The Possibility of Naturalism (3righton 0ar$ester, 1-2-), pp. 80ff.
42 Carl 1. 0empel, Philosophy of Natural Science ()ngle+ood Cliffs *rentice60all, 1-&&), p. ((.
48 'Classical social theory and the origins of modern sociology!, in
PCST.
4- "ee NRSM, chapter 1, and passim.
(0 Charles .aylor= '*olitical theory and practice!, in Christopher @loyd, Social Theory and Political
Practice (E5ford Clarendon *ress, 1-8,), p. 24. Cf. 8lso 8lasdair #acIntyre, '.he
indispensa4ility of political theory!, in Aa$id #iller and @arry "iedentop, The Nature of Political
Theory (E5ford Clarendon *ress, 1-8,).
(1 1unnar #yrdal, '.he social sciences and their impact on society!, in .eodor "hanin, The Rules of
the Game (@ondon .a$istoc9, 1-22), p. ,48.
((,21))
(2 Niccolo #achia$elli, The Prince (0armonds+orth *enguin, 1-&1), p. &-.
(, "ee 7. #a5+ell 8t9inson, Discovering Suicide (@ondon #acmillan, 1-28).
(4 "ee Uuentin "9inner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, 2 $ols. (Cam4ridge Cam4ridge
Kni$ersity *ress, 1-28)= idem, Machiavelli (E5ford E5ford Kni$ersity *ress, 1-81).
(( "9inner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought.
References: Critical Notes: Social Science, $istory and %eography
1 #ichael Ea9eshott, On History (E5ford 3asil 3lac9+ell, 1-8,).
2 I4id., p. 2.
, I4id., p. ,2.
4 Cf. *hilip 84rams, Historical ociology (@ondon Epen 3oo9s, 1-82), p. ,00.
( @a+rence "tone, The Past and the Present (@ondon %outledge, 1-81), pp. 1&ff. and passim.
& 1. %. )lton, The Practice of History (@ondon ;ontana, 1-&2), p. 12,.
2 ". #. @ipset, '0istory and sociology some methodological considerations!, in ". #. @ipset and
%ichard 0ofstadter, ociology and History (Ne+ Dor9 3asic 3oo9s, 1-&8), pp. 226,.
8 Cf. 8rthur @. "tinchcom4e, Theoretical Methods in Social History (Ne+ Dor9 8cademic *ress,
1-28).
- Cf. ';unctionalism apres la lutte!, in P!.
10 "ee 'Classical social theory and the origins of modern sociology!, in P8!.
11 Charles .illy, As Sociology Meets History (Ne+ Dor9 8cademic *ress, 1-81), pp. ,2ff.
12 ;. 3raudel, The Mediter
r
anean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II (@ondon
;ontana, 1-2,), $ol. 2, p. 2(2.
1, "tone, The Past and the Present, p. 1-.
14 ;riedrich %at>el, Anthropogeographie ("tuttgart, 18--), $ol. 1, p. 2,.
1( )mile Aur9heim, re$ie+ of Anthropo-Geographie, $ol. 1, L'Annee Sociologique, $ol. ,, 18-86-, p.
((1. 0o+e$er, in this and in other re$ie+s Aur9heim +as also $ery critical of %at>el.
1& @ucien ;e4$re, 8 Geographical Introduction to History (@ondon %outledge, 1-(0).
12 Cf., inter alia, Aere9 1regory, Ideology, Science and llnman Geography (@ondon 0utchinson,
1-28).
((,22))
18 "ee, for e5ample, 8mos 0. 0a+ley, Human Ecology (Ne+ Dor9 %onald *ress, 1-(0).
1- "ome important applications in this respect are offered in .. Carlstein, Time, Resources, Society and
Ecology (@und Aepart6ment of 1eography, 1-80).
20 %. *ar9, '0uman ecology!, American Sociological Review, $ol. 1, 1-,&, p. 2. It is true that *ar9
sometimes softened this position some+hat.
21 #anuel Castells, 'Is there an ur4an sociology?! in C. 1. *ic9$ance, Urban Sociology: Critical Essays
(@ondon .a$istoc9, 1-2&), and other pu4lications. Cf. also the $oluminous +ritings of 0enri
@efe4$re.
22 "ee especially 8llan *red, '*o+er, e$eryday practice and the discipline of human geography!, in
Space and Time in Geography (@und 1leerup, 1-81)= Nigel .hrift and 8llan *red, '.ime6
geography a ne+ 4eginning!, Progress in Human Geography, $ol. (, 1-81= and 8llan *red,
'"tructuration and place on the 4ecoming of sense of place and structure of feeling!, Journal for
the Theory of Social Behaviour, $ol. 1,, 1-8,.
2, *red, '"tructuration and place!, p. 4&.
24 8nne 3uttimer and Aa$id "eamon, The Human Experience of Space and Place (Ne+ Dor9 "t
#artin!s *ress, 1-80)= Di6;u .uan, '%ootedness $ersus sense of place!, Landscape, $ol. 24, 1-80.
2( A. 8medeo and %. 1. Colledge, An Introduction to Scientifc Reasoning in Geography (Ne+ Dor9
Biley, 1-2(), p. ,(.
2& Aere9 1regory, Ideology, Science and Human Geography (@ondon 0utchinson, 1-28). p. 2,.
((,2,))
.lossary of *erminology of !tructuration *heory
.his list includes either neologisms or terms employed differently from esta4lished usage. It is
intended only to summari>e formulations offered in the te5t, not to elucidate them further.
8llocati$e resources #aterial resources in$ol$ed in the generation of po+er, including the natural
en$ironment and physical artifacts= allocati$e resources deri$e from human
dominion o$er nature
8nalysis of strategic "ocial analysis +hich places in suspension
conduct institutions as socially reproduced, concentrating upon ho+ actors
refle5i$ely monitor +hat they do= ho+ actors dra+ upon rules and
resources in the constitution of inter6action
8uthoritati$e Non6material resources in$ol$ed in the
resources generation of po+er, deri$ing from the capa4ility of harnessing the acti$ities
of human 4eings= authoritati$e resources result from the dominion of some
actors o$er others
Class6di$ided society 8grarian states in +hich there is class di$ision of discerni4le 9inds 4ut
+here such class di$ision is not the main 4asis of the principle of
organi>ation of the society
Conte5tuality .he situated character of interaction in time6space, in$ol$ing the setting of
interaction, actors co6present and communication 4et+een them
Contradiction Epposition of structural principles, such that each depends upon the other and yet
negates the other= per$erse conse/uences associated +ith such
circumstances
((,24))
Credi4ility criteria .he criteria used 4y agents to pro$ide reasons for +hat they do, grasped in such a
+ay as to help to descri4e $alidly +hat it is that they do
Aialectic of control .he t+o6+ay character of the distri4uti$e aspect of po+er (po+er as
control)= ho+ the less po+erful manage resources in such a +ay as to e5ert
control o$er the more po+erful in esta4lished po+er relationships
Aiscursi$e Bhat actors are a4le to say, or to gi$e $er4al
consciousness e5pression to, a4out social conditions, including especially the conditions of
their o+n action= a+areness +hich has a discursi$e form
Aou4le hermeneutic .he intersection of t+o frames of meaning as a logically necessary part of social
science, the meaningful social +orld as constituted 4y lay actors and the
metalanguages in$ented 4y
social scientists= there is a constant 'slippage! from one to the other in$ol$ed
in the practice of the social sciences
Auality of structure "tructure as the medium and outcome of the conduct it recursi$ely
organi>es= the structural properties of social systems do not e5ist outside of
action 4ut are chronically implicated in its production and reproduction
)pisodic Character6 .he designation, for comparati$e purposes,
i>ation of forms of institutional change= episodes are se/uences of change ha$ing a
specifia4le opening, trend of e$ents and outcomes, +hich can 4e compared
in some degree in a4straction from definite conte5ts
)5ternal criti/ue Criti/ue of lay agents! 4eliefs and practices, deri$ed from the theories and
findings of the social science
0istoricity .he identification of history as progressi$e change, coupled +ith the
cogniti$e utili>ation of such identification in order to further that change.
0istoricity in$ol$es a particular $ie+ of +hat
'
history
!
is, +hich means using
9no+ledge of history in order to change it
((,2())
0omeostatic loops Causal factors +hich ha$e a feed4ac9 effect in system reproduction, +here
that feed4ac9 is largely the outcome of unintended conse/uences
Institutional analysis "ocial analysis +hich places in suspension the s9ills and a+areness of actors,
treating institutions as chronically reproduced rules and resources
Intersocietal systems "ocial systems +hich cut across +hate$er di$iding lines e5ist 4et+een
societies or societal totalities, including agglomerations of societies
Internal criti/ue .he critical apparatus of social science, +here4y theories and findings are
su4<ected to e$aluation in the light of logical argument and the pro$ision of
e$idence
Ino+ledgea4ility )$erything +hich actors 9no+ (4elie$e) a4out the circumstances of their
action and that of others, dra+n upon in the production and reproduction of
that action, including tacit as +ell as discursi$ely a$aila4le 9no+ledge
@ocale 8 physical region in$ol$ed as part of the setting of interaction, ha$ing
definite 4oundaries +hich help to concentrate inter6action in one +ay or
another
#utual 9no+ledge Ino+ledge of 'ho+ to go on! in forms of life, shared 4y lay actors and
sociological o4ser$ers= the necessary condition of gaining access to $alid
descriptions of social acti$ity
Entological security Confidence or trust that the natural and social +orlds are as they appear to
4e, including the 4asic e5istential parameters of self and social identity
*ractical Bhat actors 9no+ (4elie$e) a4out social
consciousness conditions, including especially the conditions of their o+n action, 4ut cannot
e5press discursi$ely= no 4ar of repression, ho+e$er, protects practical
consciousness as is the case +ith the unconscious
((,2&))
%ationali>ation of .he capa4ility competent actors ha$e of
action '9eeping in touch! +ith the grounds of +hat they do, as they do it, such that
if as9ed 4y others, they can supply reasons for their acti$ities
%efle5i$e #onitoring .he purposi$e, or intentional, character of
of action human 4eha$iour, considered +ithin the flo+ of acti$ity of the agent= action
is not a string of discrete acts, in$ol$ing an aggregate of intentions, 4ut a
continuous process
%efle5i$e "elf6 Causal loops +hich ha$e a feed4ac9 effect in
regulation system reproduction, +here that feed4ac9 is su4stantially influenced 4y
9no+ledge +hich agents ha$e of the mechanisms of system reproduction
and employ to control it
%egionali>ation .he temporal, spatial or time6space differentiation of regions either +ithin or
4et+een locales= regionali>ation is an important notion in counter64alancing
the assumption that societies are al+ays homogeneous, unified systems
%eproduction circuit 8n institutionali>ed series of reproduction relations, go$erned either 4y
homeostatic causal loops or 4y refle5i$e self6regulation
%outini>ation .he ha4itual, ta9en6for6granted character of the $ast 4ul9 of the acti$ities of
day6to6day social life= the pre$alence of familiar styles and forms of
conduct, 4oth supporting and supported 4y a sense of ontological security
"ocial integration %eciprocity of practices 4et+een actors in circumstances of co6presence,
understood as continuities in and dis<unctions of encounters
"tratification model 8n interpretation of the human agent, stressing three 'layers! of cognitionH
moti$ation discursi$e consciousness, practical consciousness and the
unconscious
"tructuration .he structuring of social relations across time and space, in $irtue of the
duality of structure
"tructural principles *rinciples of organi>ation of societal totalities= factors in$ol$ed in the
o$erall institutional alignment of a society or type of society
((,22))
"tructural properties "tructured features of social systems, especially institutionali>ed
features, stretching across time and space
"tructure %ules and resources, recursi$ely implicated in the reproduction of social
systems. "tructure e5ists only as memory traces, the organic 4asis of human
9no+ledgea4ility, and as instantiated in action
"tructures %ule6resource sets, implicated in the institutional articulation of social
systems. .o study structures, including structural principles, is to study
ma<or aspects of the transformationH mediation relations +hich influence
social and system integration
"ystem .he patterning of social relations across time6space, understood as
reproduced practices. "ocial systems should 4e regarded as +idely $aria4le
in terms of the degree of 'systemness
!
they display and rarely ha$e the sort
of internal unity +hich may 4e found in physical and 4iological systems
"ystem integration %eciprocity 4et+een actors or collecti$ities across e5tended time6space,
outside conditions of co6presence
.ime6space .he stretching of social systems across time6
distanciation space, on the 4asis of mechanisms of social and system integration
.ime6space edges Connections, +hether conflictual or sym4iotic 4et+een societies of differing
structural types
Jalidity criteria .he criteria appealed to 4y social scientists to <ustify their theories and
findings and assess those of others
Borld time Con<unctures of history that influence the nature of episodes= the effects of
the under6standing of historical precedents upon episodic characteri>ations
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south+estern Iran!, American Anthropologist, $ol. 22, 1-2(
Teru4a$el, )$itar, Patterns of Time in Hospital Life (Chicago Kni$ersity of Chicago *ress, 1-2-)
Teru4a$el, )$itar, Hidden Rhythms (Chicago Kni$ersity of Chicago *ress, 1-81)
Tiff, *aul, Semantic Analysis (Ithaca Cornell Kni$ersity *ress, 1-&0)
Inde1
Abrams, P., 358
absence and presence, 142 'acceptance-as-real', 3312
'accordion efect' of action, 1011, 13 accountability, 30
acquiescence, 176
actors/action/agency, xvi, xxiiiii, 314,
2815, 289
body, 667
childhood and, 58
'frame of reference', xx, xxxvivii opacity of, 318
power and, 1416
rationalization of, 36, 13, 281, 289, 345, 376
refexive monitoring of, 56, 191, 376 in schools, 28994, 308
society and, 1704 adaptation, 2336, 264, 26970 'administrative and political spacing', 146 'afordance', 47
agents see action
agrarian states, 246, 2489, 259
see also tribal societies
allocative resources, 31, 33, 25862, 373 Althusser, L., 30, 192, 21718, 220 'analytical space', 146
analysis of strategic conduct, 28893, 298,
((373))
Anderson, P., 21719 anthropology, xxxi, 228, 284
anticipations, 93, 99
anxiety, 49, 5160, 634, 104 appearance, 7980 appropriation of time, 237
archaeology, 357 Aries, P., 121
Artaud, A., 125 'articulateness', 44 associations, 199200
asylums, 145, 153, 157
Australian aborigines, 2656, 273 authoritative resources, 25862, 373 'authority constraints', 117
see also control
autonomy: body, 50; loss of, 623; move-ment towards, 538, 64
'availability, presence', 73, 118, 1213 axes see elements
Bachrach, P., 15
back regions, 56, 62, 68, 12230, 138, 156 Barbagli, M., 307
Barre, T., 146
basic security system, 41
Becker, E., 54
beliefs, common-sense, 33443
Benedict, R., 67 Bergson, H., 202
Bettelheim, B., 613, 87, 156
biological and organic evolutionism, 22934, 263, 270 see also natural science
Blau, P. M., 141, 20713
body
activity, 667 autonomy, 50
communication, xxiv v, 7481, 124, 142, 282
constraints, 111, 117, 1745
control, 50, 56, 62, 64
development, 56
discipline, 145, 148, 151, 157
front and back regions, 56, 62
'locus of active self', 36
reproduction of, 258, 260
spatiality, 646 time and, 347
see also slips of tongue
Boomer, D. S., 101
((,-,))
3oudon, %., ,11C14, ,12 4oundaries, 111, 121, 1(&
mar9ers, 24, 121, 1,2, 282 3ourdieu, *., 1,,
4rain6damaged people, (-, &(C&
3raudel, ;., ,&2, ,&4
!4undles! see encounters 4ureaucracy, 1(1C4, 2&8 3urgess, ). B., 1,0
Caillois, %., 24
!capa4ility constraints!, 11,, 122C, capital, circuits of, 1-2
capitalism (class society)
descri4ed, 182C-2, 1-(, 1-2 emergence of, 2&8C-
financial institutions, ,20C2 institutional forms, ,14C1( #ar5ist analysis of, 18&C-2 production in, 2(-C&0
reproduction of, ,02
careers, timing of, 14-C(0
Carlstein, .., 11&, 1&-C20, 122 Carneiro, %., 2(4C(
Castells, #., ,&&
categori>ation of conte5tuality, 1,2 causes, reasons as, ,4(C& centre6periphery distinctions, 1,1 change, e$olution and po+er, 222C80
adaptation, 2,,C&
e$olution and history, 2,&C4, e$olution, *arsons on, 2&2C24, 22-C80 e$olutionism and social theory, 228C,, po+er and change, 2(&
C&2 social change, analysing, 244C(&
change and institutional sta4ility, ,1-C22
change, resistance to, 121
chiefdoms, 242
see also tri4al societies
Childe, 1. 0., 2,(, 24,, 248
childhood
an5iety, 4-, (4
de$elopment in, (2C,
play, 18
regression to, &1C4, 12-, 1(& China, ancient, 1&(C8, 201, 2(0C1 Choms9y, 8. N., 21, (8
circuits of reproduction, 1-0C2 !circumstances of action!, ,4&
cities, 55$, 1,0, 14,C4, 18,, 1-(C2, ,&(C& City (financial centre), ,1-C22
!
ci$ili>ation!, concepts of, 2,8C41
Claessen, 0. 7. #., 242C8. 2(1
class
6di$ided society, 14,, 182C4, 1-(, 20061, 2,8, 2(-, ,2,
education and, 28-C,0& passim
6society see capitalism struggle and relations, 2(& closing encounters, 2,, 2(, 28,
!clustering of institutions!, 1&4C(
C6#6C relations, 182, 1-1 code of conduct, 88
see also rules
coding, theory of, ,1 Cohen, 1. 8., 2-(
Cohn, N., 204
!collecti$e goals!, 2(2 collecti$ity, 1--C20& Collins, %., 140C2
!coloni>ation!, 1(&
commodity relations, 12-C80, 18&C8, 1-1C2, ,1(
common sense, ,,4C4, communication, 2-, 12,, 14,
see also 4ody= speech competence of actors, 4 comple5ity of social life, 240C1 compliance, 12&
composition fallacy, ,11 compression, unilineal, 2,-, 22,
Comte, 8., 22-C,0, 2,2, ,4-, ,&1 concentration camps, &1C4, 82 confidence, (,
!confinement!, 14(
see also institutions, total conflict
and contradiction, 1-,, ,10C1-
and po+er, 2(&
!con<unctures!, 2(1
consciousness, 55iii
!articulateness! and, 44
discursi$e, 55iii, 2, 41, 2-0C1, ,24 practical, 55iii, 555, 2, 41C(, 2-0C1, ,22C,4, ,2(
present and, 4-
reducti$e theory of, (C2 consciousness, self and social encounters, 41C10-
)ri9son an5iety and trust, (1C&0 ;reud slips of tongue, -,C104, 10- 1offman encounters and routine, &8C2,
positioning, 8,C-2
((,-4))
presence, co6presence, social integration, &4C8
refle5i$ity, discursi$e, and practical consciousness, 41C( routinisation and moti$ation, &0C4 seriality, 2,C8
tal9 and refle5i$ity, 28C8,
unconscious, time and memory, 4(C(1 see also unconscious
'conse/uence la+s!, 2-(C&
constraints, 55$ii, 1&-C80, 28,, ,04C10 4ody, 111, 112, 124C( 'capa4ility!, 11,, 122C, 'coupling!, 12&C8, 114, 11&, 12,, 12(
in education, 28-, ,0(, ,08C10 material, 124C& po+er and, 12,, 12(C& reification and, 12-C80 sanctions and, 124C&
contaminations, -,, -2, --
conte5tuality, 21, 118, 1,2, 282, ,&,, ,2, see also locale
continuity, 4&C2, 2,0 contract, la4our, 122, 188 contradiction, 1-,C-, ,1,C14, ,2,
conflict and, 1-8, ,10C1-
control, 28,, 28-
dialectic of, 1&, ,24
o$er material en$ironment, 221
in schools, 2-2, 2-8C- con$ersation, 8,, 101 see also speech
co6presence, 4, ,&, &-C22, 282 communication and, 14,
locales and, 12,C4
social integration and, &4C8
time6space 4oundaries of, ,,2
see also encounters= presence counterfinality, ,12
'coupling constraints! see constraints !co$ering la+! de4ate, 228 credi4ility criteria, ,24 'critical situations!, &0 cueing de$ices, 2,C4
cultural e$olution, 2,0, 2,2 cultures, other, ignorance of, -1C2
Aahrendorf, %., 5i$
Aar+in, C., 228, 2,1, 24,
day6to6day life, 55iiiC$, 111C1(, 1,2C4, 282, 28(, ,4(, ,&2
death
'ci$il!, 1((
threat of, 12('decision6ma9ing! units, 20, deducti$e theory of social structure, 20-C10
democracy, de$elopment of, 2&-, 224 demographic factors in de$elopment of
state, 248C-, 2(1C( Aescartes, %., 4,
description, 28(
'de$eloping countries!, 184 dialectic of control, 1&, ,24 Ailthey, B., 1, 218
discipline, 14(C(2
disclosure, 124C,0, 1(&
discursi$e consciousness see consciousness discursi$e formulation of rule, 2, discursi$e refle5i$ity, 41C( dispersal of contradictions, ,18C
1- distances, shrin9ing, 114 distanciation see time6space distanciation di$isi4le materials, 11( di$ision of la4our, 18-C-0 domains, 11(C1&
domination, 2-, ,1C, see also po+er
dou4le hermeneutic, 555$, 284, ,24 dualism of o4<ecti$ism and su4<ecti$ism, 55C55i
duality of structure, 2(C-, 1-1, 28-, 2-2C,04, ,,2, ,24
duree, ,, 8, 22, &1, 200, 202 as 're$ersi4le time!, ,( segmentation of, 2,
temporality of, &-
see also longue duree Aur9heim, )., 5iiiCi$, 8, 210, ,(2
on internal structure, 2( on political re$olution, 22- on po+er, 2(&
on red maca+s pro4lem, ,,-
on structure and constraint, 1&-C24,
((12&))
dynamic of e$olution, 2,&
)4erhard, B., 55i5, 2(0C1, ,22 ecological constraints, 11& ecology, geographical, ,&(C& 'economic! concept, ,4
economy su4system, 2&( educationHschools, 28&C,10 passim 4ac9 regions, 1,8
discipline, 142C(0, 1(4, 1(2 mo4ility, Italy, 282, ,04C10 po+er and, 1,&
spatiality in, 1,,C(, 142
((395))
surveillance in, 136, 138 time-space patterns in, 1338 working class, 287304 passim
ego see id
ego-identity, 5960
egocentric speech, 59
Egypt, ancient, 252
elements of theory of structuration, 140, 1889
agency and power, 1416 agent, agency, 514
duality of structure, 258 institution, forms of, 2834 structure, structuration, 1625 time, body, encounters, 347
Elias, N., 121, 129, 2401
Elster, J., 31114, 317
Elton, G., 35960
embarrassment see shame `emergent properties', 171 empirical research, social critique
and structuration theory, xxixxxx,
281371
concepts, basic, reiterated, 2818 contradiction and confict, 31019 duality of structure, 297304 functionalism, against, 293
7 generalisations in social science, 3437 history, geography and social science, 35568, 3712
institutional stability and change, 31927
mutual knowledge versus common sense, 33443
practical connotations of social science, 34854
research forms and structuration theory, 32734
strategic conduct, 28893 structural constraint, problem of, 304

10
enablement, 173
enclosure, 124, 127, 130, 156, 145 and disclosure, 73
encounters, xxvxxvi, 7081, 112, 116, 132
routine and, 6873
rules and, 879
time and body, 347
see also body; co-presence `endogenous' models of change, 1634, 229
energy production, 232
Engels, F., xxi, 242
episodes, xxix, 244, 246, 248, 251, 374
see also routines Erikson, E.
on anxiety and trust, 5060
on child development, 524, 56, 5860
on conscious and unconsciousness, 41
on `initiative', 62 ethnic segregation, 13 ethnography, 284310 passim Evans-Pritchard, E. E., 247
evolution/ism
history and, 23643, 3601
Parsons on, 262-74, 27980
social theory and, 22833
exercise, 1501
existential contradiction, 1935, 197, 199 `experience, human', 218
`experiments with trust', xxiii, 23, 81, 291 explanation, xviiiix, 216
external critique, 339, 374
facade, 1245
face, 54, 65, 67, 124, 282
face-to-face see encounters
facility, 29
`facticity', 3312 Febvre, L., 364
fetishism, commodity, 179
fnancial institutions, 31927
`frst-order' concepts, 284
focused interaction, 70, 72
forgetting, 935 formulae, 20, 22, 212
Fortes, M., 247 Foucault, M., xxvi, 257
on power, 15, 32
on timing and spacing, 14458, 1601 frames, 879
Freud, Anna, 52 Freud, S., 5, 52
on action, 50
on childhood development, 536
on civilization, 2401
on ego and id, 7, 412, 51, 5960
on slips of tongue, 6, 9, 49, 92104, 109 Fromkin, V. A., 102
front regions, 56, 62, 12230 functionalism, xxvi, xxxi, 1,-2289, 303, 322, 361
against, 2937
game theory, 31213
((396))
Garfnkel, H.
on 'etcetera clause', 66
on 'experiments with trust', xxiii, 23, 81, 291
on 'meaning', 71 on rules, 18
on settings, xxv vi gatherings, 702 Gehlen, A., 66
Gellner, E., xxix, 237 'general evolution', 231 generalizations, xix, 3437
genetics, 270, 272 geography, 286, 3712 sociology and, 3638
time, xxv, 11019, 132
Gibson, J. S., 47 Giddens, A., 169 Gofman, E.
on bodily appearance and posture, 55, 67, 136, 1578
on co-presence, xxiv, 41, 64
on encounters and routines, 367, 56, 64, 6875, 789, 83
fctional illustration, 285
on inferiority, 91
on institutions, 1536, 362
on language, 101, 103
macrosociology, against, 139
on mental illness, 79 on 'positioning', 86
on 'protective devices', 50
on rules, 878
on time-space structures, 116, 119, 1245, 136, 139, 1538
Goldstein, L., 65
Gouldner, A. W., xiv, 69, 342
graduated parameters, 208
Greece, ancient, 2689, 273
Guihert, J. A., 151 guilt, 567, 67
Habermas, J., xxxvivii, 31
Hagerstrand, T.
on 'coupling constraints', 768, 114, 116
on 'stations', 119
on time geography, xxv, 11118, 123,
1324, 174, 364 Harding, T. G., 234 Hayek, F. A., 214, 216
Heidegger, M., xxii, 34, 45, 65, 202 Hempel, C. G., 344
hermeneutics, xx, xxii, xxxv, 12, 26, 284,
289, 32734, 357, 374 'heterogeneity, multiform', 209 Hilferding, R., 320
historical materialism, xxix, 227, 2423 historicity, 203, 374
history, xxviiix, 286, 341, 347 evolution and, 13643 making, 199206
social science and, 3556, 3712
time and, 34
'holding on and letting go', 546 homeostatic loops, 278, 375 homological compression, 23942
Hopi rain ceremonial, 2945 Homey, K., 51
hospitals, 146, 153, 157 Hsun Tzu, 201
humour, 99
Huxley, J., 230
hysteria, 1256
I, concept of, 7, 413, 50, 57
id, ego, super-ego concept, 7, 413, 5960
identifcation with oppressors, 63
identity, 165, 282
ideology in development of state, 252 ignorance of other cultures, 912 inattention, deliberate, 75 India, Moghul, 250
individual see actors
individualism, 21415, 220 indivisible objects, 115 inevitability of social forces, 178
infants, 47, 49
see also childhood
'information fltering', 27, 48 information storage, 262 Ingham, G. K., 31924 initiative versus guilt, 567
institutionalized practice
and intentions, 1214
of reproduction, 282 institutions/institutional
analysis, 289, 375
'clustering of'', 1645 defned, 17, 24
discipline, 14557 passim forms, 2834, 31415
longue duree of, 356, 61, 85, 170, 200 order, 31, 33, 32734
((397))
reductive concept of, 5 resistance to change, 171 spacing in, 1467
stability and change, 31927
time, xxv, 156
total, 88, 124, 145, 1537 integration, social, 13944, 265, 289 'intelligence, practical', 58 intensive rules, 22
intentionality, 4, 812
interaction, 8, 70, 72, 118, 282, 3301 intermediate societies, 267 internal critique, 339, 375 interpretative scheme, 29
intersection, 142, 298
inter-societal systems, xxvii, 164, 184, 244,
((375))
introjection, 54
irrational outcome to rational actions, 13 irreversibility, 35, 230 Israel, ancient, 2689, 273 Italy, educational mobility, 287, 304
10
Janelle, D. G., 114 Japan, 253
journey to work, 154
Kant, I., 46
Kardiner, A., 51
'keying
'
/`keys', 74, 88 kinship, 194, 209, 266 'knowing a form of life', 29 knowledge
mutual, 4, 33443 new, 3413
knowledgeability, xxx, 34, 212, 267, 902, 281

2, 289, 375
bounds of, 32734
of school pupils, 291, 308
labour, 302
contract, 177, 188
division of, 18990
market, adjustment to, in schools, 2934, 299303, 307, 31213 movements, 205
Lacan, J., 51, 124
Laing, R. D., 81, 125
language, xvi, xxxxii, 28, 282 and locomotor skills, 589 mastery of, 523, 56, 589 rules, 212, 24
in societies, 264lateral ignorance of other cultures, 91 Laver, J. D. M., 101
law
codifed rules, 23
emergence of, 2689
rights and obligations and, 30
in social science, 214 universal, 3445
legitimation, 29, 31, 33, 165, 252, 267 Leibowitz, A., 305
Lenin, V. I., 31819 Levi-Strauss, C., 208
on 'reversible time', 35
and Sartre, 201
on tradition, 200
on tribal societies, 182, 194
life
chances, 258, 261
cycle, 85, 113
path, 115
span, 35, 111
Linton, R., 83
Lipset, S. M., 3601 literacy, 267
literary style, 2845
'locale', 73, 11822, 132, 134, 375
co-presence and, 1234
of regionalization, 1234, 128, 132, 367
social system and, 1645
see also contextuality Lockwood, D., xiv
locomotor skills, 589 'locus of active self', 36
longue duree of institutions, 356, 61, 85,
170, 200
'looseness', 27, 103
Lowell, R., 35
Luhmann, N., xxxvivii Lukes, S., 15, 21417, 220
Machiavelli, 350, 3523
McLuhan, M., 262
macro, against, xxvi, 13944, 365 madness see mentally ill
Malinowski, B., 2289
maps and paths of time-space, 11213, 1324, 367
Marcuse, H., 240
markers, 74, 121, 137, 282
Marx, K. and Marxism, xiii, xv, xxi, 199 on Britain, 320, 323
on capitalism, 18692
on City, 320
((,-8))
on commodity relations, 12-C80, 18&C-2
on e$olutionism, 242C,
on history, 55$iii, 201, 204
on la4our po+er, 122 on po+er, 122, 2(& on profit, ,11
on reification, 180 on social change, 22-
on structural relations, ,02C,
on une$en de$elopment, ,18
material
en$ironment, control o$er, 221
constraints, 124C& #aurice of Erange, 148 #auss, #., ,,-
#ayer, C., -,, -&C8, 102 #ayhe+, 3. 0., 202C8 #6C6# relations, 182, 1-1C2
#ead, 1. 0., 5i$, 4, meaning
constitution of, 18 theory of, ,2
memory, 4(C(1
mental illness, 2-C81, 1(,, 1(&C8 #eringer, %., -,C4, -&C8, 102 #erleau6*onty, #., (-, &(C&
#erton, %. I., 555ii, 12C14, 228, 2-4 methodological indi$idualism and
structural sociology, 202C21, 224C& micro, against, 55$i, 1,-C44, ,&( 'microtranslation! of 'structural pheno6
mena!, 140
military discipline, 148 millenial mo$ements, 204 #ills, C. Bright, 5i$ mista9es see slips6of6tongue
'modalities! of structuration, 28C- momentum of social change, 24( monastery, 142
money, 18&C8, 1-1C2, 2&8
monitoring of conduct, 44
moralistic discipline in school, 2-8C- mother, (,C4
moti$ation
of action, (C&
parapra5es and, 10,C4
routinisation and, &0C4
in schools, 2-1
and slips of tongue, 4-C(0, -& strategic conduct and, 28- unconscious and, (C2
'multiform heterogeneity!, 20-
#umford, @., 2&2
mutual 9no+ledge, 4, ,2(
$ersus common sense, ,,4C4, mutuality, (,
myths, 1-4
'narrati$e history!, ,(-C&0
nation6states, 1&(C8, 1-2C8
see also state
natural science and social science, 5$i, 1, 1&,, ,,(, ,48C(1
see also 4iological
'natural selection!, 2,&C2
'naturali>ation!, 2(
negati$e information filters, 48
Neisser, K., 48
Niet>sche, ;., 2(2, 28,
nominal parameters, 208
norm, 2-
normati$e
illusion, 2,-, 242, 22,
regulation theory, ,1
Ea9eshott, #., ,((C& o4<ecti$ism, 55, 55$ii, (1, ,&1 o4<ecti$ity, 122
Eedipal phase, (2
Effe, C., ,14C1&
Eli$er, A. @., 242
ontological insecurity, &2
ontological security, 2,, (0, 2(, 28, 8&, 12(, ,2(
see also trust
opacity of action, ,18
opening encounters, 2,C4 oral cultures see tri4al cultures 'order +ith continuity!, 2,0
organic see 4iological= natural science organi>ations, 1--C200, 20, origin of social change, 24(
pac9ing, 112, 11&, 1(2 *alm, %., 114
parameters, 208C11 parapra5es see slips of tongue
*areto, J., 5iiiCi$ *ar9, %., 1,0, ,&& 'par9ing theory!, ,02 paroled prisoners! units, 88
*arsons, ..
on e$olution, 228C,0, 2,4, 2&2C24, 22-C80
influence of, 5iiiCI$, 55, 555$iC$ii
((,--))
on 'normati$e functionalism!, ,0
on po+er, 1(, 2(2C8 on role, 84
on social constraints, 1&-
on time, ,(
'partial penetration!, 2-&, ,0, 'partitioning!, 14(C& past, 4(, ,((C&
see also history
paths and maps, time6space see maps pattern maintenance su4system, 2&( perception, 4&C2
periphery6centre relations, 1,1 perse$erations, -,, -- personality
changes, &1C4
de$elopment, (2C,
'per$erse outcomes!, 1,, ,1&C12 phenomenology, 2 *iaget, 7., (-
place see locale
play, 18
*olanyi, I., 2(0
politics, ,4, 2&2
po+er and, ,14C1(, ,(0C,
re$olution, 22-
polity su4system, 2&( *ollard, 8., 1,&C2 population see demographic
positioning, 55i$C$, 8,C-2
see also 4ody, communication post6sonances, -,, -- po+er, 2-
agency and, 14C1& change and, 2(&C&2 conflict and, 2(& constraint and, 12,, 12(C& domination and, ,1C2 financial, ,20
institutional order and, ,,1
politics and, ,(0C, in schools, 1,&, 2-2 state and, ,14C1( study of, 28,
time6space distanciation, 2(8C-
+ea9 theory of, 112
see also change, e$olution and po+er= discipline
practical
connotations of social science, ,48C(4 consciousness, 55iii, 555, 2, 41C(, 2-0C1, ,22C,4, ,2( 'intelligence!, (8
*red, 8., 114, ,&2 predicta4ility, 28( presence, ,((
a4sence and, 142 'a$aila4ility!, 2,, 118, 121C,
see also co6presence present, 4(, 4-, ,(( presenta4ility, 80 pre6sonances, -,, --
'primal or pristine states!, 2(2, 2(( primary contradiction, ,1&
primiti$e societies see tri4al
principles see structural principles
prisms of daily conduct, 114C1(
prisons, 88, 1(,C4, 1(2 pri$acy, 122, 12- production
of 4ody, 2(8, 2&0
forces of, 22-, 248, 2(0, 2(8C&0 'progress! and 'progression!, 2,2C, pro<ection, (4
pro<ects, &, 11,, 112
properties see structural properties psychoanalysis see ;reud
/ualitati$e and /uantitati$e methods in social research, ,22C8, ,,,C4 Uuesnay, 8., 18&
%adcliffe63ro+n, 8. %., 228
radio tal9, -8C101, 10,
%appaport, %. 8., 2,4
rationali>ation of action, ,C&, 1,, 281, 28-, ,4(, ,2&
%at>el, ;., ,&,C4
reasons as causes, ,4(C&
recall see memory
reductionism, (
refle5i$eHrefle5i$ity
of conduct, 5$i, 5iiiCiii
defined, ,
discursi$e, 41C(
monitoring of action, (C&, 1-1, 28-, ,2& reproduction of social systems, 28(C& self6regulation, 20(, ,2&
state and, 2(1
tal9 and, 28C8,
regionali>ation, 55$, 11-C,2, 2-8, ,18C1- disclosure and self, 12&C-
defined, ,2&
front and 4ac9 regions, 122C&
as generic, 1,0C2
geography and, ,&(C&
((400))
J
modes of, 11922
regression, 614, 129, 156
reifcation, 2(C&, 17980, 284 religion, 2&(, 2&2
repetition, 55i$
repression, (2, (2, 2401, 318 reproduction
body, 2(8, 2&0
circuit, 22C8, 1902, ,2&
capitalist, 302
institutionalized practice of, 282 social, 24, 171, 28&, 2-,, 302
system, 19
research forms and structuration theory, 32734
resociali>ation, &,C4
resourceHs
allocati$e and authoritative, ,1, ,,, 2(8C&2
'concentration', 2((
pressure on, 2(4C(
see also rules
'response cries!, 81C2
'relevatory model', ,,(
reversible time, ,(C&, 1--C200, 282 revolution, political, 22-
%e5, J., 5i$
rites of passage, 61
role, 8,C&
routine/routinization, 55iii, 19, (0, &0C4, &8C2,, 82, 11113, 282, 2-8, ,2& see also duree: episodes
rules, 555, 1725, 82C-, 2-8C- see also resources
Rykwert, J., 144
Sahlins, M. D., 231
!"t Augustine's problem', ,( sanctions, 18, 2-, 1746 "artre, 7.6*., 22, 201
"aussure, ;. de, ,2
!sa$age thought', 202
see also tribal societies schizophrenia, 81
schools see education
Schutz, 8., 4, &, 22, 2,, ,,(, 343 Searle, J. %., 20
secondary
contradiction, 1967, 316 !states!, 2(2C,
'second-order' concepts, 284 'seed-bed' societies, 2&8C-, 22, segmentation of contradiction, 319
selection, 48
natural, 2,&C2 self
disclosure and, 1269
'-fulflling prophecies', 555ii -monitoring, 80 -regulation, 20(, ,2& 'territories of the', 155
-warmth see face
see also consciousness, self and social encounters
seriality, 2,C8
settings see locale sexual
acti$ity, 115, 129
character of parapraxes, --C100 shame, ((C2, &2
shift +or9, 11920 Shils, E., 200
shrinking distances, 114 signifcation, 2-, 313 situational
'improprieties', madness as, 2- 'withdrawal', 156 Skalnik, P., 251
"9inner, U., ,(,
slips of tongue, &, 4-C(0, 93104, 10- social
actionist theories, 202C8
'atomism', truistic, 21415
change, 55$iiiCi5
critique see empirical research etc development stages, 2,2C,
encounters see encounters
evolution, 222
integration, 28, 648, 22, 8-C-0, ,2& life, 21C,, 2401
movements, 199200, 20,C( occasions see encounters
position, 8,C& relations, 2(C&, 8-
reproduction see structure, system etc science/sociology, 5iiiC$ii, 21314
generalisations in, 3437
history and geography and, ,((C&8, 3712
practical connotation of, 34854 structuralist theories, 202C8
structure, deductive theory of, 20910 'system', 55$iC$ii, 13944, 1638
reproduction of, 28&, 2-,, ,02 !theory!, defned, 5$iC55, 228C,,, 24456
((401))
sociali>ation, 120
`society', 24, 1&,C8, 207, 283, 298
agent and, 120C4 concept, xxvivii
constitution of see structuration
sound, 42, 967
`space', 14&
see also time, space etc spacingHspatiality, &4C&, 76, 1,,C(,
14&C2, 363, 3678 `specifc e$olution!, 2,1 speech, 59, 83, 101, 12(
distur4ances see slips of tongue Spencer, H., 232, 236, 249 "pengler, O., 20,
'stable state', 238
stages of social de$elopment, 2323 state
de$elopment of, 182, 1-(C&, 24656, 3256
modern, 2867, 353 nation6, 1&(C8, 1-2C8, 283
po+er and, ,14C1( !sta4le!, 238
'stations!, 11&, 11-, 1,( see also locale
statistics, ,(1
"te+ard, 7. 0., 230
Stone, @., 358
storage of resources, 2602 strategic conduct, 28893, 298 stratification model, 3, 5, 41, 376 structural
constraints see constraints contradictions see contradictions determination, 2278 parameter, 208, 210C11
'phenomena, microtranslation of', 140 principles, 12, 180C(, 244, 283, 376 properties, 24, 18(C-,, 2889, 377 relations, school, 302
sets, 18&, 18-, 1-1, 3024 sociology and methodological individualism, 202C21, 2246
structuration, 376
change, conflict, power, 22780 consciousness, self and social encounters, 41C10- elements of theory, 1C40
structure, system, social reproduction, 1&2C22&
theory, empirical research and social criti/ue, 281C,2,
time, space and regionalisation, 110C&1 structure, xxvii, xxxi, 1625, 29, 1&-C24, 208, 377
see also duality= resources= rules structure, system, social reproduction, 1&2C22&
constraint and reification, 17980 constraint, senses of, 1749 contradiction, 1-,C-
history, ma9ing, 199206
societies, social system, 1&,C8 structural principles, 180C(
structural sociology and methodological indi$idualism, 202C21, 2246 structure and constraint Aur9heim and others, 1&-C24
structures, structural properties, 18(C-, structures, 12, 23, 18(C-,, 377 su4<ecti$ity, xx, xxvii, 1C2
su4optimality, ,12
'su4stanti$e! conceptions, ,4
su4stitutions, 93, 99
su4systems, 265
suicide, 8, 62
"ulli$an, 0. S., (1C2, 12(
superiority concept, 242
sur$eillance, 122, 1,&, 138, 1(2, 1834 `survival of fttest', 2367
sym4olic form of early cities, 144 sym4olism, xxxvii, 323, 2&4C(, 2702 system, 25, 377
integration, 28, 1,-C44, 289 reproduction, 1-
see also structure, system etc `systemness', 36, 72, 283
tact, 756, 78, 86 tal9, 73, 7883
see also slips of tongue= speech
Taylor, C., ,48 Taylor, ;., 142
technological progress, 252, 271
tension, dissipation of, 12-
'territories of self!, 1((
theatre, 12(
theory of structuration see elements 'therapeutic spacing!, 14&
Thomas, W. I., ,,1
.hompson, ). *., 2023, 212C1-
time
appropriation of, 237
body and encounters, ,4C2
controlled in institutions, 1(&
((402))
geography, 55$, 110C1-, 1,2 history, ,4, ,&1
irre$ersi4le, ,(
memory and, 4(C(1
rec9oning in Ia4ylia, 1,, re$ersi4le, ,(C&, 1--C200, 282 +orld, 55i5, 244, 2(1, 2(,, ,24, ,22
time, space and regionali>ation, 110C&1 against micro and macro, 1,-C44 ;oucault on, 144C (8, 1&0C1 regionali>ation, 11-C,2
time, space, conte5t, 1,2C- time6geography, 110C1- time6space, 55i$
hands, 21
4ody6positioning in, 142
4oundaries of, 282, ,,2
city and, 14,C4
class6di$ided societies and, 14, constitution of social life, 28& distanciation, 121, 181, 2(8C-, 2-8, ,22 edges, 55$ii, 1&4, 244, ,22 maps
and paths, 112C1,, 1,2C4 organi>ation, 2(8, 2&0
patterns in schools, 1,,C8 positioning in, 8,C-2
timing of careers, 14-C(0
total institutions see institutions .oulmin, "., 44
.ouraine, 8., 20,
trade, 2(0
tradition, 200
tra<ectory of social change, 24(, 248 transformation, 555i, ,01
transport, 114, 12,
transpositions, -,, --
tri4alHprimiti$e societies and oral cultures, -2, 24&C-, 2(-C&0 descriptions of, 181C2, 184, 1-4C(, 20-
*arsons on, 2&(C2, 22,
segmentation, 14,
.rots9y, @., ,18
!truistic social atomism!, 214C1( trust, (1C&0
'e5periments +ith!, 55iii, 2,, 81, 2-1
see also ontological security turn6ta9ing, 2&C2, 102, 111, 114
typology of contours of interaction, 20C2
uncertainty, reduction of, 221
unconscious, 55iii, 555i, 4C2, 282, 28-, ,22 meanings of, 44
repression and, (2
time and memory, 4(C(1
see also consciousness'une$en de$elopment!, ,18
unfocused interaction, 20, 22
!unfolding! models of change, 1&,C4, 22- unilineal compression, 2,-, 22, unintentional actions, conse/uences of,
-C14
Knited "tates
as culmination of e$olution, 2&-, 224 finance in, ,21, ,2,
per$erse outcomes in, ,1&C12 uni$ersals, e$olutionary, 2&, unpredicta4ility, &2
ur4an see cities
usage and rule, 20
$acuousness of adaptation, 2,,, 2,( $alidity criteria, ,,-, ,22 '$alue6consensus!, 555$ii
$ertical ignorance of other cultures, -1C2 Jico, 1., 202C,
Jidal de la 3lache, *., ,&,C(
!$oca4ulary of moti$e!, 8-
$oluntarism, 555$ii
Jon den Steinen, I., ,,-
Jygots9y, @. "., (8C-
Ballace, B. @., 202
Ballerstein, I., 184
+arfare, 248C-, 2(2, 2(4
Bat9ins, 7. B. N., 214, 21&, 218C1- Be4er, #., 5iiiCi$, 555$i
on 4ureaucracy, 1(1C4, 2&8
on 'life chances!, 2&1
on religion, 2&2
on self6regulation, 20(
on se/uence of e$ents, 1,
on sociology, 21,C14
+estern society see capitalism
Bhite, @. 8., 2,0, 2,2, 2&,
Bieder, A. @., 88
Billis, *., 28-C,0- passim, ,18, ,2&, ,2-, ,,,
Bilson, .. *., ,,2
Binch, *., 18, 2-
'+ithdra+al!, situational, 1(&
Bittgenstein, 55ii, 18, 20C1, ,2, &&, 24 +or9ing class education, 282, 28-C,04 passim
+orld time, 55i5, 244, 2(1, 2(,, ,24, ,22 '+orld6gro+th story!, 2,2C8, 24,, 222C, Bright, ). E., 224C(
+riting, -2, 200C1, 2&2
Zerubavel, )., 120C1
>oning see regionali>ation
of grand sociological theory in )nglish of the past decade.!