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GSM Network and Services

1. The document discusses authentication and encryption in GSM networks. It describes how the network authenticates users and ensures privacy through encryption. 2. A temporary mobile subscriber ID (TMSI) is allocated instead of the permanent IMSI number to avoid others from knowing a user's location or call details. 3. Authentication involves generating a signed response code (SRES) from the shared secret key (Ki) and a random number (RAND). Encryption involves deriving a ciphering key (Kc) from Ki and RAND to encrypt voice and data communications.

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TrevorP
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© © All Rights Reserved
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66 views

GSM Network and Services

1. The document discusses authentication and encryption in GSM networks. It describes how the network authenticates users and ensures privacy through encryption. 2. A temporary mobile subscriber ID (TMSI) is allocated instead of the permanent IMSI number to avoid others from knowing a user's location or call details. 3. Authentication involves generating a signed response code (SRES) from the shared secret key (Ki) and a random number (RAND). Encryption involves deriving a ciphering key (Kc) from Ki and RAND to encrypt voice and data communications.

Uploaded by

TrevorP
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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1

GSM Network and Services 2G1723 Johan Montelius


GSM Network and Services
Authentication and encryption
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GSM Network and Services 2G1723 Johan Montelius
Encryption

How do we authenticate the user?

part of the signaling layer

How do we ensure privacy?

Should people be able to listen in on my


conversation.

Should people be able to know that I'm


calling and to whom I'm calling?
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GSM Network and Services 2G1723 Johan Montelius
TMSI

We do not want to use our IMSI number


every time we signal to the network. Trudy
would be able to know that we are calling,
some one is calling us and also that we
have entered a location area.

Solution: allocate a temporary mobile


subscriber Identifier (TMSI) the first time
we do an attach, then only use the TMSI.

TMSI is local to a VLR!


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GSM Network and Services 2G1723 Johan Montelius
Location registration
Loc Upd. IMSI
MS VLR
Auth. resp.
Auth. req.
Loc. Upd. Accept.
Cipher mode
Realloc TMSI
Realloc Ack.
Cipher mode comp.
Stores IMSI/TMSI
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GSM Network and Services 2G1723 Johan Montelius
Authentication A3
A3 A3
Ki Ki Ki
Ki
RAND
SRES
IMSI
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GSM Network and Services 2G1723 Johan Montelius
Generation of session key A8
A8 A8
Ki Ki Ki
Ki
RAND
Kc
Kc
Done at the same time as
authentication.
IMSI
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GSM Network and Services 2G1723 Johan Montelius
Keeping Ki a secret
MS
AUC
VLR/HLR
TMSI
IMSI
RAND/SRAND/Kc RAND
SRES
Kc
Kc
IMSI/
Ki
Ki
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GSM Network and Services 2G1723 Johan Montelius
Encryption A5
A5
Kc
Kc(Data)
Data
FN
A5
Kc
Kc(Data)
Data
FN
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GSM Network and Services 2G1723 Johan Montelius
A5

A5/0 : no encryption.

A5/1 : original A5 algorithm

A5/2 : weaker algorithm created for export

A5/3 : strong encryption created by 3GPP


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GSM Network and Services 2G1723 Johan Montelius
A5

A5 is a stream cipher.

Uses three linear feed-back shift registers


(LFSR) of different length (19/21/22) and
variable clock. The xor of the three registers
is the bit stream that is then xored with the
plain text.

The key is the initial content of the


registers, in total 64 bits derived from Kc
and the frame number.
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GSM Network and Services 2G1723 Johan Montelius
Authentication and privacy
MS
BTS MSC/VLR
authentication
privacy
The network is not authenticated!
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GSM Network and Services 2G1723 Johan Montelius
From www.gsm-security.net

Alex Biryukov, Adi Shamir and David Wagner showed that they
can find the A5/1 key in less than a second on a single PC with
128 MB RAM and two 73 GB hard disks, by analyzing the output of
the A5/1 algorithm in the first two minutes of the conversation.

Ian Goldberg and David Wagner of the University of California at


Berkeley published an analysis of the weaker A5/2 algorithm
showing a work factor of 2^16, or approximately 10 milliseconds.

Elad Barkhan, Eli Biham and Nathan Keller of Technion, the Israel
Institute of Technology, have shown a ciphertext-only attack
against A5/2 that requires only a few dozen milliseconds of
encrypted off-the-air traffic. They also described new attacks
against A5/1 and A5/3.
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GSM Network and Services 2G1723 Johan Montelius
From www.gsm-security.net

Ian Goldberg and David Wagner of the University of California


at Berkeley demonstrated that all A8 implementations they
looked at, including the few that did not use COMP128, were
deliberately weakened. The A8 algorithm takes a 64-bit key, but
ten key bits were set to zero. The attack on the A8 algorithm
demonstrated by Goldberg and Wagner takes just 2^19 queries
to the GSM SIM *Subscriber Identity Module), which takes
roughly 8 hours.

Josyula R. Rao, Pankaj Rohatgi and Helmut Scherzer of IBM


and Stephane Tinguely of the Swiss Federal Institute of
Technology have published Partitioning Attacks: Or How to
Rapidly Clone Some GSM Cards which shows a method by
which COMP128 can be broken in less than a minute.

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