For defence, Make in India

deserves more thought

Government procurement requires skills that do not exist and capacity that has not been created
PREMVIR DAS

ecent reports indicate that the government has

approved proposals, all long pending, which will
lead to indigenous manufacture of submarines
and assorted other military equipment at an estimated
outlay of about ~80,000 crore. Follow-up action to identify those who can manufacture these, to negotiate with
them, to get them to upgrade their facilities, to contract
and equally important, to finalise the foreign collaborator, are not issues that can be resolved easily, no matter what the intent. It will take several years before any
of these projects, the submarines in particular, will see
the light of day. It has been claimed that orders issued
some months ago to allow FDI up to 49 per cent in
defence would facilitate this entire process; but that, at
best, may just turn out to be a pious hope.
The issues, however, are more complex. First, there
is only one shipyard in India, Mazagaon Docks (MDL) in
Mumbai, which can undertake construction of submarines without significant investment in its infrastructure. That shipyard is already tied up with the
building of six Scorpene class French submarines and
will remain so for another ten years at the very least.
Availability of skilled manpower including designers,
tradesmen and overseers is another constraint. For example, the quality of welding required for a vessel which can
withstand pressures of operating hundreds of meters
underwater is far more stringent than that needed for
ships that are built to operate on the surface. The same
is true for every other element involved in the manufacturing process. Next, almost every weapon and sensor
and propulsion units, both main and auxiliary, will need
to be imported as is being done for the Scorpenes.
Finally, all this work has to be overseen continuously for
quality assurance and those skilled in this work, all Navy
personnel, are limited in number. Almost all of this manpower is presently focused on the construction work
ongoing at MDL and to train additional people for such
highly skilled tasks is not something that can be easily
achieved. So, to begin a second line of production of
submarines will take more than just decisions on paper.
A more pragmatic decision, without compromising
the Make in India call, would have been to buy-andmake. One or, preferably, two platforms could have
been purchased outright from the chosen foreign collaborator and the rest built through technology transfer.
Experience shows that in such cases, the vessels that follow the first few get the advantage of design and equipment up-gradations which make them more potent and
effective than their predecessors. This was, reportedly,
the Navys proposal and a sound one but it has, evidently, been rejected. Under the scheme now approved,
we should not expect to see the first of the six submarines for at least the next 10-12 years and this too if all
the necessary steps are now taken speedily and implemented with determination.
Let us not forget that the first Scorpene, ordered to be
built at MDL in 2002, will take to the seas only in 2016
and that too when MDL already has experience of having built two German design boats earlier. By 2020, the
Navy will have just three of these submarines at the
most four, though that is very unlikely. All other boats,
and their numbers need not be speculated upon, will be
at least 25 years old and more, ready to go to the scrap
yard rather than to sea. By no stretch of the imagination
can this be considered a happy state of affairs. In this
same time frame, we will, in all probability, have two
indigenously built (with Russian assistance) nuclear
submarines in the Navys operational inventory but
that is a different ball game altogether.

Only one Indian shipyard can construct submarines without significant further investment in infrastructure

which we must concentrate. These facilities can absorb

Submarines, like ships and aircraft, are platforms
transfer of technology more easily as they already have
and technology transfer is quite easily available from
basic know-how and reasonably well-established expertmany sources. Similarly, equipment like generators,
ise. There is a mistaken view in some quarters that forcompressors, pumps and, to some extent, the less
eign vendors will find it easier to collaborate with comsophisticated high-powered engines, can also be made
panies in our private sector, but experience thus far
within the country. However, the weapons and sensors
belies that belief. They may do so only if they have conthat go into them require more intricate technology
trolling interest in these companies for which the limiinputs which involve not just know how but also know
tation of 49 per cent in FDI will not suffice.
why; the latter, understandably, is not easily available.
It is also highly unlikely that private sector manSo, when we talk of an item like anti-tank missiles, our
ufacturers will undertake investments where the
focus has to be on this critical need if the Make in India
returns are not commensurate with the interests of
theme is to become a reality and co-development foltheir shareholders, making cost of product an inhibitlowed by co-production is the required route. In this
ing consideration.
context, the decision to reject the American offer for
In short, the need is to focus on critical areas of force
Javelin missiles in favour of Israeli systems makes little
level and critical technologies where desired
sense unless, of course, that also involves
inputs are not easily available. As far back as
joint development. Even then, it seems unBy 2020, the Navy
1994, then Prime Minister Narasimha Rao
likely that Israel can match the technology will have just
ordered the constitution of a high-level
that is available with the US and one hopes
three Scorpene
group of experts under the chairmanship of
that this aspect has been kept in view.
submarines. All
Abdul Kalam, head of the Defence Research
Also, looked at in broader terms, the polit- other boats will
and Development Organisation (DRDO),
ical leverage afforded through a major arms
be 25 years old or
which was tasked to identify measures necdeal with the US, especially one that involves
more, ready to go
essary to convert the then existing 70:30
transfer of higher-end technology, can hardto the scrapyard
ly be equalled by Israel or most other counrather than to sea import/indigenous mix of military hardware
to 30:70 in the next ten years. It says sometries. As is well known, several co-developthing for the difficulty and complexity of this task that,
ment and production offers from America are on offer
20 years down the line, the 1994 dependency remains
and it would be advantageous to make use of them just
unchanged.
as we have done for the fifth generation combat fighter
As a desirable long-term goal, Make in India is not an
aircraft with Russia, difficulties and costs regardless.
issue with which anyone can disagree. What is debatable
Desirability aside, there are few private sector entiis the manner in which we should try to reach that
ties in India, including the bigger and better-known
objective. A practical step-by-step approach, recognisnames, which have the ability to produce much more
ing both capabilities and constraints, is more likely to see
than sub-assemblies or the less sophisticated equipus move in that direction than assumption of skills that
ment. To hope that any one of them will be able to
do not exist or of expectations that are unlikely to be met.
manufacture major platforms in the foreseeable future
is to live in a dreamland.
The writer was member of the Task Force on Higher Defence
Our own capabilities for producing frontline ships,
Management constituted by the government in 2000. He has
submarines, aircraft, tanks and so on will continue to lie
also served on the National Security Advisory Board
in the domain of the public sector, and this is the area in