Texts in Early Modern Philosophy

Editor-in-Chief: Richard H. Popkin

University of California
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The
Selected Works
of Pierre
Gassen di
~d~

9~~

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Craig B. Brush
Department of Modern Languages
Fordham University

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The Syntagma: Physics

inherent quality instilled in them by God at creation, each atom with

the same rate of motion. Rest can only be apparent, as atoms hold each
other in oscillation, ready to resume their rush at the first opportunity.
(Gassendi does not attempt to measure this motion or derive mathematical
laws concerning it or impact.) Sensation and vital functions are all
explained in terms of mechanical models, much as Descartes explains
them. Secondary qualities such as color must be accounted for by
different position and arrangements of the atoms; here Gassendi uses
the familiar classical example of letters ordered to make different words,
knowing full well that the phenomena of sensation will always retain
some mystery. He makes an exception of one secondary quality, heat,
which he ascribes to the liberation of atoms of a special shape.
Concerning space and time, Gassendi refuses to consider either in the
category of accident and promotes them to the status of absolute, infinite
entities that exist independent of any bodies or any motion which they
measure. His position on time differs from Aristotle's according to which
time cannot exist without being measured, from Descartes's according
to which it is divisible into separate and independent moments, and even
from Epicurus', according to which time is a quality of things. The result
is a theory very close to Newton's-and correspondingly far from
Leibnitz' s, the first truly relative theory of time. To make his concepts
of time and space theologically acceptable (anything infinite or eternal
must exist beyond God's power), Gassendi is forced to have recourse to
the scholastic notion of imaginary space and time. Any form of infinitude
in physics made him wary, and he avoided the radical conclusions that
a Nicolas of Gusa or a Giordano Bruno were willing to draw.

The Physics. Section I

BOOK II. ON PLACE AND TIME, OR ON
SPACE AND THE DURATION OF THINGS

Chapter One. Place and time do not

come under the division of reality (or being in
generaQ into substance and accident
Having already touched upon several principal topics concerning
the universe in general, before we speak specifically of the things
within it, it appears worthwhile to treat the subjects of place and
time, both of which transcend the universe in some fashion and
encompass it. Such a statement may appear quite unwarranted,
especially since our previous account concluded that the universe
is the aggregation of all things and that place and time are to be
considered as conditions of natural bodies, or the things in the
universe. But we must first know what general classification
things are to fall into. Because reality, or if you prefer, being,
is customarily divided into the two most general categories of
substance and accident so that if something is neither a substance
nor an accident it must be considered not real, or a nonbeing,
place and time have been counted among the accidents, in fact
among those belonging to corporeal objects under the genus
quantity. The question we must now inquire into is whether this
theory is right or wrong, or whether these two should be considered instead as real things, but of a nature that they are neither
substances nor accidents and are not included in that general
classification and should rather be considered as fundamental
elements of all classification. Furtherm9re, I shall add that, as I
said above, they are real things, or genuine entities, that actually
exist even when no one is conscious of them, and may be

Place and Time

The Syntagma: Physics
distinguished from fictions, such as chimeras and the like, which
have no existence except in the mind when they are being thought
about. Since it is a matter of the classification of real being (or
just what is a genuine thing), I must first speak on that subject....
7
(Here Gassendi reviews various classical positions.]
'-..._ From the above you may understand that as it is generally
argued that all being is either substance or accident, and that all
substance is either corporeal or incorporeal, and hence that all
accident is either corporeal or incorporeal (since it pertains to
substance, or a being having existence), and that of all the
corporeal accidents the first is quantity of which place and time
are species. From this you may understand that the common
opinion holds place and time to be corporeal accidents, and consequently that if there were no bodies upon which they depended
there would be neither place nor time. Smee, however, It appears
to us that even if there were no bodies, there would still remain
both an unchanging place and an evolving time, it is therefore
apparent that place and time do not depend upon bodies and are
not corporeal accidents. And they are not therefore mcorporeal
accidents (ones tliat would be present in the manner of accidents
in incorporeal substance), but they are certain incorporeal
natures of a different kind from those ordinarily called substances
~r accidents. w"!i.;';cc it follows that being, taken in its most
.:.,_;
general sense, is not adequately classified as substance and accident,
but that space and time must be added as two members of the
classification, as if to say that all being is either substance or
accident or place, in which all substances and all accidents exist,
or time, in which all substances and all accidents endure. This is
because there is no substance and no accident for which it is not
appropriate to say that it exists somewhere, or in some place, and

C'"\ \

commonly considered, they still actually exist and do not depend upon the mind like a chimera since space endures steadfastly and time flows on whether the mind thinks of them or not.
However, so that all this may be understood a little more clearly,
it must be gone into further, particularly place, with which we
will draw a parallel in order to understand time.
And we must admit that place is a quantity, or some sort of
extension, namely the space or interval made up of the three
dimensions length, breadth, and depth in which it is possible to
hold a body or through which a body may travel. But at the sam~
time it must be said that its dimensions are incorporeal; so place
is an interval, or incorporeal space, or incorporeal quantity.
Therefore, two sorts of dimensions are to be distinguished, of
which the first may be called corporeal and the second spatial. Foi:....--- d
example, the length, width, and depth of some water contained in
a vase would be corporeal; but the length, width, and depth that
we would conceive as existing between the walls of the vase if the
water and every other body were excluded from it would be
spatial.
Now Aristotle denies that any other dimensions except the
corporeal exist or that there exists any interval (diastema) beyond
the body's that is being contained by the vase or in place; 1 but
several of the ancients believed that incorporeal dimensions did
exist for intervals, or for space, from which we derive the name
"spatial." In order not to cite Epicurus and the others, let what.
Nemesius has to say stand for them all : 2 "Indeed every body
is endowed with three dimensions, but not everything endowed
with three dimQnsions is a body. Of this sort arc place and
quantity, which are incorporeal beings." Therefore, in order to
understand that beyond corporeal dimensions there exist local, or
spatial, ones, let ns consider a tl1ing that has no body and let us

exists sometime, or at some moment, and in such a way that even

conceive through the exercise of our minds a container far more

if the substance of the accident should perish, the place would

continue nonetheless to abide and the time would continue
nonetheless to flow. From this we conclude that space and time
must be considered real things, or actual entities, for although they
arc not the same sort of things as substance and accident are

extensive than any vase. Let us reflect, if you please, upon the
1
2

Physics, IV, vi, viii, x, etc. {G.'s note.)

On Human Nature, ii. (G.'s note. Neinesius is a Christian philosopher of the

fourth century.)

386

The Syntagma: Physics

lunar sphere, as it is generally conceived, and let us also imagine

that the entire mass of elements inclnded within it according to
the Aristotelians has been destroyed by God and reduced to
nothing so that absolutely nothing remains in its place. I ask
whether or not after this reduction to nothing we do not still
conceive the same region between the surfaces of the lunar sphere
that had been there, but now empty of the elements and devoid
of every body. That God can preserve this lunar sphere intact and
reduce the bodies contained in it to nothing and prevent any
other body from taking their place no one would deny, except a
man who denies God's power. Moreover, even if someone
should deny this, contending that our argument serves no purpose
because we assume something impossible, nevertheless he must
know that this impossibility does not prevent us from making the
supposition and drawing the logically consistent conclusion in
the matter. In fact it is frequently necessary to proceed in this
fashion in philosophy, as when they tell us to imagine matter
without any form in order to permit us to understand its nature.
For it is no less necessary for matter always to have some form
than for region, or space, or place to have some body. Even
Aristotle, although he believes that the heavenly bodies move by
necessity, still insists that the motion of the skies is not rapid, so
that we may conceive of them as at rest, and from that infer the
reason why the earth is at rest. 3 And, to stick to our topic, in
order to prove that no other dimensions exist for a wooden
block in a vacuum than the dimensions in the block itself, he
assumes that the dimensions must be imagined without any
linear mass or other accidents. Therefore there is nothing that
prevents us from supposing that the entire region contained
under the moon or between the heavens is a vacuum, and once
this supposition is made, I do not believe that there is anyone who
will not easily see things my way.
3 On the Heavens, II, iii, [286b], and Physics, IV, xii [221b]. (G.'s note..What
Aristotle says in On the Heavens is: "the existence of the earth followed fron1
the necessity of having something fixed for ever if there was to be something

for ever in motion.")

Place and Time

Now, I ask, since the sphere of the moon is circular, if you take
a point on its round surface, don't you think that there is a certain
interval, or distance, from that point to the one opposite it? And
isn't this distance a certain length, namely an incorporeal and
indivisible line which is the diameter of the sphere and on which
there is a midpoint that is the center of the realm or sphere and
where once the center of the earth existed? And do we not
forthwith imagine how much of the region surrounding this
center had been previously occupied by earth, by water, by air,
by fire ? Do we not assign mentally how much of each belongs
to the surface and how much to the depths? Then are not the
dimensions that we imagined from the start-length, width, and
depth-are they not present there? Clearly, wherever it is
possible to conceive some interval, or distance, it is also possible
to conceive a dimension because that interval, or distance, is of
a determinate ~asure, or can be measured. Therefore, this is
the nature of the dimensions that we call incorporeal and
spatial.
Moreover, if we continue and imagine the entire machine of
the heavens reduced by God to nothing in the same fashion, then
we conceive that this realm would be empty in the same fashion
and of the same nature as the vacuum that had existed beneath the
moon, and at the same time that the spatial dimensions of each
would be the same as the corporeal dimensions which had existed
distributed throughout the whole universe. Now if the universe
had been larger and larger in its previous existence to the point
of infinity, and then God had reduced it to nothingness in the
same way, we conceive that the spatial dimensions that would
have remained would have been larger and larger to the point of
infinity and we imagine that this space would have existed with
its dimensions extended in every direction to the point of infinity. Let us further imagine that God creates the universe a
second time exactly as it had been before; we understand that
what had been made in the first creation would be made ag:lln;
but it is apparent that according to the hypothesis we would
understand three things.

The Syntagma: Physics

The first is that space would be boundless (immensa) before God
created the universe, that it would still remain if He should
destroy the universe, and that of his own free will God delegated
this determined part of space's realm in which he created the
universe (leaving the remaining space, generally called imaginary
space, around it on all sides). And the total realm of space can
be comprehended in respect to the entire universe in such a way
that just as the totality of space corresponds to the totality of
the universe, so each part of space corresponds to some part of
the universe. Consequently there is no part of the universe, either
large or small, for which there is not some proportionately large
part of the universe's space.
The second is that this space would be totally immobile. And
it is not true that if God moves the universe from the place in
which it is situated, the space will therefore follow it and be moved
along with it, but the universe alone will move, traveling from
a certain portion of space that remains motionless through an
intervening motionless space into another equally motionless
space that receives it. Likewise, in the same way, when some
object, or part of the universe, moves from its place, the space in
which it is situated does not move along with it, but remains
motionless as it is left behind, and the space across which it
journeys is constantly motionless, as is the space toward which
it travels and which receives it.
The third is that these spatial dimensions, without which this
space lies unbounded in length, width, and depth, are to be understood to be incorporeal, as they are motionless, displaying therefore no resistance to bodies either penetrating them or resting in
them. Consequently, wherever there is a body, either in permanence or in transition, by this logic it occupies a part of space equal
to itself, and wherever it is possible to assign corporeal dimensions
we may understand that there are also incorporeal ones corresponding to them. There is therefore some truth in whatEmpiricus
attributes to the Epicureans when he says, "Empty [space] is
indeed straight, but nonetheless it cannot be twisted, for the

Place and Time

void is not mobile, either in part or in the whole." And this
is precisely why Aristotle proved that there is no interval except
a corporeal one or and no dimensions except corporeal ones. s
To continue, whenever we claim that an incorporeal interval
and incorporeal dimensions exist, it is abundantly clear and goes
without saying that this sort of incorporeal being differs from
the one that i~ a species of substance and refers to,Almighty God
and the intelligences, as well as the human mind. Obviously in
the case of the latter the word "incorporeal" does not imply the
mere absence of bodies and corporeal dimensions, but in addition
to that signifies the existence of an actual, genuine substance and
an actual, genuine nature with its appropriate faculties and
actions, whereas on the other hand, according to our statements
above, space cannot act or suffer anything to happen to it, but
merely has the negative quality (repugnantia) of allowing other
things to occupy it or pass through it. By the same reasoning we
must eliminate any scruple that might possibly arise from thinking
that space as here defined may be inferred to be uncreated and
independent of God, for since it has been said that it is indeed a
thing, it might seem to follow that God is not the author of all
things. But it is undeniable that by the words "space" and
"spatial dimensions" we do not mean anything but that space
which IS generally called imaginary and which the majority of
sacred doctors admit exists beyond the universe. And they do not
permit this space to be called imaginary merely because it depends
upon the imagination, like the chimera, but because we have an
image of its dimensions by analogy to the dimensions that appear
to our senses. Nor are they deterred by those who say that this
space is uncreated and independent of God alleging that it is
nothing positive, neither a substance nor an accident, under
which headings all things created by God are subsumed. On the
contrary, this concept appears to be far more acceptable than
another that the doctors commonly admit, namely that the
4

Against the Geometers [98]. (G.'s note.)

Physics IV, viii, 214b.

The Syntagma: Physics

390

essences of things are eternal, uncreated, and independent of

God, especially since the essences are the principal components of
substances and accidents. Surely if it is permissible to assert that
the essence of man had no beginning and will have no end and
that as it consists in the fact that man is a rational animal, it is of
such a necessity that it does not depend on God and no power at
all can make it any other way, how would it not be permissible
to assert the same about space, which is not one of those things
that can be created, as is man in whom the essence is so vitally
important? 6 Finally, what I have said about space must be understood as having been said also of time ....

Chapter Seven. What time is and

how it is distinguished from eternity
It remains to speak now of time, or duration, that is of the other
member that I said in the beginning belonged in the divfaion of
being into substance and accident. Everybody quite rightly
remembers what Saint Augustine said: "If no one asks me what
time is, I know the answer; ifI wish to explain to it an inquirer, I
do not know it." 7 For when we hear the words "daily" or "a
little while," we are not puzzled by what time is meant by them.
However, it is amazing what quandaries we are thrown in if we
desire to define what the genus and differentia, as they are called,
of time are. So, while Cicero says that "it is difficult to define
time in general terms," 8 we would almost say that it is impossible,
and that a satisfactory definition cannot be found. The reason
for this appears to be that following the twofold classification
of substance time is ordinarily considered as if it were some
accident existing in corporeal things whereas, whatever it is, it
would appear to be something incorporeal, like the void, clearly
6 The point is that the essence of space is to be neuter and passive; hence it
cannot present as many theological problems as a more active essence like
man's.
7
8

The Confessions. XI, xiv. {G.'s note.)

De inventione rhetorica, I [xvi, 39). (G.'s note.)

Place and Time

391

independent of the existence of any other thing, much as there

exists an incorporeal space, which, though called imaginary, is
the same as the one which constituted the nature of place, as I
have already demonstrated. In the same way there seems to exist
some incorporeal duration independent of bodies, which, though
called imaginary, is the same as the one which constitutes the
measure of time. For just as that space extends through every
position beyond mere place, which belongs to the universe and
all its parts, so this duration goes beyond mere time, which
belongs to the universe and all things existing in it and is conceived as having been extended beyond any beginning of the
universe and as extending without limit even if the universe were
destroyed. Hence, perhaps it would be sufficient if we said when
we imagine incorporeal things by analogy with corporeal ones
that there exist two diffusions, extensions, or quantities, one
permanent, namely place or space, and one successive, namely
duration or time just as there exist two corporeal extensions, 011e
permanent, namely magnitude, and one successive, namely
motion. Then in the same way that space was described earlier as
an incorporeal and immobile extension in which it is possible to
designate length, width, and depth so that every object might
have its place, so time may be described as an incorporeal fluid
extension in which it is possible to designate the past, present, and
future so that every object may have its time ....

[Gassendi lists the various theories of the classical philosophers

concerning time.]
Therefore, when it is objected that time is nothing on the
grounds that while it is said to consist of the past, present, and
future, the past no longer exists, the future does not yet exist,
and the present is totally evanescent, one may answer that this is
just as if it were objected that a flame is nothing 011 the grounds
that whatever existed before it no longer exists, whatever will
follow it does not yet exist, and whatever it is at present is
evanescent. The error in logic is apparent, for they consider
heterogeneous things as if they were homogeneous, or successive
things as if they were permanent, when they are totally distinct

392

The Syntagma: Physics

in kind, and worlds apart. Indeed they are examining the former
with the criterion of the latter, and behave like men who measure
a straight line with a compass, or judge weight with a yardstick,
or length with scales. They are demanding of successive things
something that is not iu their nature; and if it were in their
nature, they would not be successive. For make their parts stand
still, make them cease to flow, make them rest in place; then they
will not be successive, but permanent. But is nothing actual if
it is not permanent? It must be confessed that nothing actual
exists permanently if it is not permanent, but also that something
actual exists in its own way, namely successively, if it is successive. For just as the nature of the first consists in the fact that its
parts are always the same and it may be said of it as a whole
"it is, it is, it is"; so the nature of the second consists in the fact
that its parts are not always the same and concerning it as a whole
it can only be said "it was, it is, it will be." This is obviously
because there is no simple verb by which we may signify its
entire existence which contains not only the present, but also the
future and the past since it is not always the same. There is no need
to spend any longer on this, especially as the dispute may well
appear to be one of words. I need only observe that Posidonius
appears to have done wisely when, according to Stobaeus, 9
undaunted by a sophistical subtlety, he expressed the opinion
that the time we call the present must not be taken too strictly as
analogous to a mathematical point, bnt rather broadly, as the
minimum span of time apparent to the senses in which what is
future and what is past are joined. Similarly Aristotle allowed
us to say "Now is approaching, since today is approaching; now
has reached us since today has reached us." 10 We usually speak
of the "present" day, and not without reason. Apollodorus says
the same thing, that we are right to speak of the "present"
year, and it would not be any different if we said the "present"
century and so forth.
Eclogarum physicaruni et ethicarum [I, viii, 42]. (G.'s note.)
10 Physics, N, xiii [222a]. (G.'s note.)

Place and Time

393
Moreover it does not seem that Epicurus is right to say that the
day or the mght IS long or short relying only on a time that
. .111
. onr thought, for they are long or short instead relying
dev1se
on a llme which flows by 111 the meanwhile whether we think
about it or not. For that day or that night is not long for a man
full of hope or short for one filled with fear; and it stretches out
or is shortened because of th('ir thoughts. Nor may Aristotle say
that llme IS the measure of some motion which would not exist
'hout a measurer, 11 or 111
. the last analysis whatever the time
wit.
ts, It elapses and has its before and after whether it is being
measured or not. Still it is true that men do make use of motion
relate to it, and measure it, especially the motion of the heavens'
in their designation, discrimination, and partition of time';
divisions. But time does not therefore depend upon the motion
itself or its parts,. whether numbered or not, for the very good
reason that It exists before the motion of the heavens and we
perceive most clearly that time is not multiple while celestial
monons are. Nor would there be several times if several universes
an.d several celestial motions were created by God. I had this in
m111d when I suggested previously that Aristotle's objection
(aga111st those who concluded that time was the motion of the
heavens that if there were more than one heaven or universe
there would also be more than one time because there would b~
n:ore than one motion) did not take sufficiently into account that
his argument could be turned against himself when he defined
time as the measure of this same motion.12 For if there were
several universes and several motions of prinrnm mobiles, would
not one be able to infer that there existed tlierefore several times
simultaneously since there would be several simultaneous
measures of the motions some earlier, some later? But if you say
there would be one measure or standard for all tlie motions and
we assume that there would be some motions faster than others
how, since there would be several parts, some before others, som~
after, could tliere be one measure or one standard for all? Secondly
11
12

As in Physics, IV, xi, 219b.

Physics, IV, x, 218b.

394

The Syntagma: Physics

how would you defend the fact that there would be one time
by this measure when there would be more than one subject of
motion, and so of time ?
Perhaps, as usually is done, you would distinguish internal
time from external. For example, you say that the motions of the
lower beings have an internal time of their own, and in addition
an external common time would also apply to them, the time of
the primum mobile; thus you will say that a particular time
applies to each of them and a general time to all of them. But you
would not be able to designate this general time since there exists
no general motion which would be regarded as the standard of
before and after, nor are your particular times of any account
unless you admit that ten hours have passed when ten bodies or
spheres have moved through one hour and that one hour has
gone by twice as fast as another because one of the motions was
twice as fast as the other.
And so it seems that in his objection Aristotle glimpsed the
nature of time, but he passed beyond it when he defined it as the
measure of a motion. In fact time is a certain flux, as I have
already said many times, that is no less independent of motion
than of rest, with which not only several but indeed innumerable
diverse motions may coexist. And it is as far from the truth that
time is the measure of celestial motion as that celestial motion
is the measure of time if only for the reason that the measure
ought to be better known than the thing being measured. Those
philosophers who make a distinction and recognize the existence
of a time tl1ey call imaginary catch a glimpse of this. They also
grant that before the creation of the universe a certain time
flowed by within which they admit that the universe could have
been made before it was, a time which flows during the existence
of the universe and will continue to flow when the universe
ceases to be. But because of their preconceived notions they proceed too far and declare that there therefore exists a certain time
which they call true and real, for example like the one defined by
Aristotle, which had its beginnings with the motion of the
heavens, which stangs still when the motion is interrupted and

Place and Time

395
ceases when it stops. I say because of their preconceived notions
since if we look at the matter seriously, it does not seem that this
is any other time than one they call imaginary and one that is
necessary only in order for them to grant that it flowed when the
sun stood still and Joshua fought for a time against the king of
the Amorites.
To put the matter in a clearer light, let us resume what we have
already begun concerning the comparison and parallel, as it
were, which is apparent between this iniaginary time, or duration,
and the place, or space, also called imaginary, for the nature of
the former can be illuminated not a little by the nature of the
latter, which we have already examined....
As place, considered in itself, is totally unbounded, so time,
considered in itself has neither beginning nor end. And, as any
particular _moment of time is the same in all places, so any
portion of space remains the same at all times. Likewise, as space
remains the same and motionless whether something exists in
it or not, so time always elapses at the same rate whether anything
endures in it or not, whether it is in motion or at rest, and
whether it moves faster or slower. And, as space cannot be broken
in two by any force, but remains continuous, the same, and motionless, so tinie cannot be stilled and suspended by any force, but
proceeding unimpeded always flows without variation. Again, as
a portion of place, or limitless space, has been carved out in which
the universe was stationed, so a part of infmite tinie was selected
in which the universe exists. Furthermore, as any single body
(or more generally any single thing) to the extent that it is here
or there appropriates a certain part of the universe's space, or
place, to itself, so also any particular thing to the extent that
it exists now or then arrogates to itself a certain part of the
universal duration. Moreover, as we say "everywhere" and
"somewhere" in relation to place, so we say "always" and
"sometimes" in relation to time. This occasioned Plotinus' rebuke
to the Peripatetics for having those two categories called "where"
and "when" distinct from the genera "place" and "time."13
13

The Enneads, VI, i, 13-14. {G.'s note.)

The Syntagma: Physics

Hence, as it is fitting for created things to be only "somewhere"
in respect to place and "sometime" in respect to time, so it is
fitting for the creator to be "everywhere" in respect to place
~d "always" in respect to time; and sb those two outstanding attributes apply to him, immensity according to which he
is present in every place, and eternity, by which he endures for
all time. Finally, as place has unchanging dimensions that correspond to the length, width, and depth of bodies, so time has
successive dimensions which are the equivalent of the motion of
bodies. Whence it happens that as we measure length, width, and
depth by a yardstick, so we apportion the flux of time by the
motion of a clock. And since there is no more general, constant,
or single motion than the sun's, we adopt this motion as a sort
of general clock for measuring the flux of time. Not that if the
sun moved faster of slower, time would therefore move more
rapidly or more slowly, bnt whatever the motion of the sun
happens to be, we use it for the division of time. If, for example,
it were twice as fast, time would not therefore be twice as fleet,
but only the space of two days would equal the space of one of
those we now have; and if it were twice as slow, one day would
equal two. In my opinion this is how we should understand what
Plutarch reports of Empedocles, 14 that he thought that in the
beginning the days lasted much longer than they do now, more
specifically that in the time when men were first formed a day
was as much as is now occupied by two months. Clearly we must
believe that the motion of the sun has become sixty times faster
since those days.
From these considerations it is apparent that time is not
something dependent upon motion or posterior to it, but is
merely indicated by motion as something measured is by its
measure. For otherwise it would be impossible to know how
much time we spend doing sometl1ing or not doing it. Therefore
we raise our eyes to the celestial motion and say that time has
fled in proportion to its quantity. And since the observation of
14

Of the Sentiments Concerning Nature with which the Philosophers were Delighted.

V, xviii, 907F. Plutarch says ten 1nonths, not two.

Place and Time

397

this motion was commonly found to be difficult, the movements

of readily familiar objects such as water, sand, wheels, or the pins
of sundials were adapted to the celestial motion so that since it
was easy to glance at them, it was possible to take a count of
them and of the time. This is the reason why I said a short while
ago that the heavens are a sort of general clock, for they are inasmuch as all our clocks imitate them as closely as possible and are
called upon to help us when we cannot see them. As I demonstrated a short time ago that time is independent of celestial
motion and does not fail to exist before and after it, I might then
pomt out that time may be conceived as flowing when the
heavens are at rest, and that it flows while the heavens move
and I might suggest as an illustration what sacred history record;
concerning Joshua. Clearly no one would believe that time did
not pass while Joshua did battle with the Amorites when the sun
stood still and that almost as many hours as would make up a
whole day did not pass, for Scripture testifies "And there was no
day so long before it or after it," 15 in which the word "long"
cannot be understood in any relation except the flnx of time.
Snppose then that the heavens now stood still (they could be
stopped by God), do yon not see tliat time would continue to
flow just as when the heavens were in motion? Yon will say, how
could there be hours if the sun did not distinguish between them?
Th~y would exist not because they were distinguished by the
sun s actual motion, but because they were distinguishable in
terms of motion of the sun which could have taken place in that
time. In the meantime they could be distinguished by the flow
of the water clock or some other time machine. So we say that the
universe could have been created a thousand years before the
creation not because at that time years were being distinguished
by the repeated revolutions of the sun, but because time flowed,
of which the revolutions of the sun such as we now have them
could have been an adequate measure. Do not say that all these
times are imaginary, for there is no other way that we can under15 Joshua 10: [ 14] (G.'s note. I have revised the usual translation to include the
word "long" as the Latin does.)

The Syntagma: Physics

stand that time continues to flow withoqt the motion of the
heavens.

The Physics. Section I

BOOK III ON THE MATERIAL PRINCIPLE,
OR THE PRIMARY FORM OF MATTER

Chapter Eight. It is apparent that atoms may

be accepted as the material component (principium)
of things, or as the primary form of matter
Hence, to present at last our conclusion that apparently the
opinion of those who maintain that atoms are the primary and
universal material of all things may be recommended above all
others, I take pleasure in beginning with the words of Aneponymus. After his opening remark that "There is no opinion so false
that it does not have some truth mixed in with it, but still the
truth is obscured by being mixed with the false," he then continues, "For in their assertion that the world is made up of atoms
the Epicureans spoke the truth, but in their assertion that ~ese
atoms had no beginning and that they flew about separately m a
great void, and then coalesced into four great bodies they were
telling fairy tales." 16 I say I take pleasure from these words for
one can draw the inference that there is nothing to prevent us
from defending the opinion which decides that the matter of the
world and all the things contained in it is made up of atoms,
provided that we repudiate whatever falsehood is mixed in with
it. Therefore, in order to recommend the theory, we declare first
Dialogus de substantiis physicis. (G.'s note. Aneponymus is the little-~o~n
Guillaume de Conches, ro8o-ca. II 50, philosopher and teacher at the Un1vers1ty

16

of Pari)

Atoms

399

that the idea that atoms are eternal and uncreated is to be rejected
and also the idea that they are infinite in number and occur in any
sort of shape; once this is done, it can be admitted that atoms are
the primary form of matter, which God created finite from the
beginning, which he formed into this visible world, which,
finally, he ordained and permitted to undergo transformations
out of which, in short, all the bodies which exist in the universe
are composed. So stated, such an opinion has no evil in it which
has not been corrected just as it is necessary to correct opinions in
Aristotle and others which make matter eternal and uncreated in
the same way, as others also make it infinite. In the meantime,
this theory of matter has the advantage that it does not do a bad
job of explaining how composition and resolution into the
primary elemental particles is accomplished, and for what reason
a thing is solid, or corporeal, how it becomes large or small,
rarefied or dense, soft or hard, sharp or blunt, and so forth. For
indeed these questions and others like them are not so clearly
resolved in other theories where matter is considered as both
infinitely divisible and either pure potentiality (as they say) or
endowed with a certain shape from among a very small range of
possibilities, or endowed with primary and secondary qualities,
which either do not suffice to explain the variety in objects or are
useless, as is clear from what I have already said.
Next we declare that the idea that atoms have impetus, or the
power to move themselves inherent in their nature, is to be rejected and also its consequence that they have motion by which
they have been wandering and have been impelled every which
way for all time. It may then be admitted that atoms are mobile
and active (actuosas) from the power of moving and acting which
God instilled in them at their very creation, and which functions
with his assent, for he compels all things just as he conserves all
things. By this means such an opinion is also quite correct just as
others which attribute motion and activity to matter must be
corrected; to be specific, ones like Plato's, which holds that matter
wandered without shape from eternity until its movement was
reduced to order by the demiurge. (Incidentally, it appears that