Legal Research Reviewer -MAKASIAR NOTES

Session 2. INTRODUCTION
1. Legal Research, Defined
- It is the process of finding the law, rules and regulations that govern activities of human
society.
- It is also defined as the investigation for information necessary to support legal
decision making.
2. Legal Research, Importance
-To provide competent representation* and uphold the standards of the legal profession.
*requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary
for representation.
3. Legal Research, Sources
-Involves the use of a variety of printed* and electronic sources.
*constitution, statutes, court decisions, administrative rules and scholarly commentaries
(What is the ESSENCE of Legal Research? - QUIZ)
Legal Research plays a very important role in recommending solutions to existing
problems of the society or in solving the already solved problems in better way.
It also helps to discover or invent new legal ideas and technologies for legal
professionals. As we know, that legal research can either make or break a case.
Therefore, legal professionals must carry out on their parts some level of legal
research before filing a lawsuit and giving verdict to it. Failing to pursue research,
a case fail to present its strength and verdicts may be made in favor of wrong
person. Legal research helps analyze legal professionals about the case effectively
and award justices to genuine victims
In the end legal research method helps to impart just and genuine verdict in favor
of true victims. It enables the legal system to function effectively. To effectively
function the judiciary of a country, legal professionals including legal research
have a crucial and very important role to play.
4. Legal Research and Bibliography, Distinguished
-Legal Research is the method or system of inquiry and investigation involving the
actual use of the law books, while Legal Bibliography is concerned with the study of the
materials essential to the inquiry of the researcher.
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Legal Research Reviewer -MAKASIAR NOTES

Legal Bibliography, Defined
-It is generally defined as the science or study of law books, their history, evolution and
description, their characteristics and use, including such details as their authors,
publishers, dates, editions and degree of authoritativeness.
5. Legal Bibliography, Importance
-The efficient use of law books can only be learned by study and application. It is an aid
in the process* of analyzing a legal question.
*where to find the law, in what book, and how
6. Legal Research and Bibliography, Aim
-In order to provide legal basis for a claim, one must present for consideration the
authority which must be applied, and which the court is bound to apply.
7. Sources of Law
Primary Sources -recorded laws and rules which will be enforced by state
*legislative actions, codes, statutes, judicial decisions, administrative laws (IRR)
Secondary Sources -publications that discuss or analyze legal doctrine
*treatises, commentaries, encyclopedias, legal writings (Academic Journals, IBP Journal
& Lawyers Review)
Finding Tools
*SCRA Quick-Index Digest, Phil Juris & Lex Libris
(What are the repositories of Legal Information? - QUIZ) BILE
1. Books
Appearance book cover, paper used, old vs. new look
Authority (PSP-VEC)
Primary mandatory and imperative
Secondary persuasive (not an authority at all); indexes to an authority
digests, commentary, etc.
Publisher
Volume
Edition year of publication
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Character
Statute books
Case books
Search books
Treaties
2. Institutional Publications
3. Law Libraries
4. Electronic Repositories
SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO LEGAL RESEARCH
Four Basic Steps to Legal Research: (IF-aRe-yoU = IF-R-U)
1. Identify and analyze significant facts
(Compiling a descriptive statement of legally significant facts)
Technique in analyzing FACTS: (T.A.R.P. RULE)
Thing or subject matter
Action, or a cause of action/group of defense
Relief sought
Persons or parties involved
2. Formulate the legal issues to be researched
(Classify or categorize the problem into general, and increasingly specific, subject areas
and to begin to hypothesize legal issues)
3. Research the issues presented
Process of researching the issue: (OIIR)
a. Organize and plan- best practice is to write down all sources to be
researched under each issue to be researched.
b. Identify, read and update all relevant constitutional provisions, statutes and
administrative regulations
c. Identify, read and update all relevant case law - i.e. laws applied in case files
d. Refine the search
4. Update (to determine whether the authorities have been interpreted or altered in any way,
or whether new cases, statutes or regulations have been published)
Session 3 LAWS
1.

Law, Defined
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Ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has care of the
community.
-St.Thomas Aquinas
-A rule of conduct, just and obligatory, promulgated by legitimate authority for the
common observance and benefit
2. Elements of Law
a. Ordinance for reason
-guidelines of what to do or not to do
b. For common good
c. Promulgated by competent authority
-by the legislature
d. For the betterment of the community
3. Sources of Laws
a. Primary sources - contain the actual law. Constitutions, court decisions, cases,
statutes, treaties and administrative regulations are all examples of primary sources.
b. Secondary sources - are materials, which comment, explain and annotate on these
primary sources. Usually, they include treaties, legal periodical, articles, legal
encyclopedias, annotations, law dictionaries, commentaries, continuing legal
education publications, opinions of the Attorney General, Secretary of the Ministry of
Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs and other agencies
4. Effectivity of Laws
- Art. 2, Civil Code. Laws shall take effect after 15 days following the
completion of the publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation, unless it is otherwise provided.
Taada vs Tuvera
136 SCRA 27
FACTS:
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the
principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette,
petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or
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cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and administrative orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case,
contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.
ISSUE:
W.O.N. publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid
and enforceable.
HELD:
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this
provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate
their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no
basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height
of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had
no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official
Gazette. The word shall therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That
duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of
public concern is to be given substance and validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a
requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he
must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that
presidential issuances of general application which have not been published have no force and
effect.
Taada vs Tuvera
146 SCRA 446
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent
argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise as
when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon
their approval.
ISSUES:
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W.O.N. a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not as
to their publication; and W.O.N. a publication shall be made in publications of general
circulation.
HELD:
The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not
mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any
other date, without its previous publication.
Laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking, all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them
directly. A law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or

as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably
affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some
of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public
of the content of the law.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official
Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not
called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.
The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.
Umali vs Estanislao
209 SCRA 446
FACTS:
RA 7167, providing additional exemptions to taxpayers, was signed and approved on December
1991 with the clause shall take effect upon its approval and was published on January 14,
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1992 in Malaya, a newspaper of general circulation. Petitioner filed a Petition for Mandamus to
compel the Secretary of Finance and the CIR, herein respondents, to implement RA 7167.
ISSUE:
W.O.N. RA 7167 took effect upon its approval or after 15 days upon its publication and if it
covers taxable income for year ended 1991.
HELD:
RA 7167 took effect on January 30, 1992, after 15 days upon publication and not upon its
approval on December 1991 because the effectivity clause is defective. In the second issue,
looking into the contemporaneous
legislative intent, the Act was intended to adjust the poverty threshold level at the time said Act
was enacted and not in the future.

Farias vs Executive Secretary

417 SCRA 503
FACTS:
RA 9006, The Fair Election Act, was signed into law by President Arroyo. Petitioners, members
of the Minority of the House of Representatives, filed a Petition to declare said Act
unconstitutional because it violated Sec. 26, Article 6 of the Constitution requiring every law to
have only one subject which should be expressed in its title. Moreover, it is violative of the Due
Process Clause of the Constitution with regards to Sec. 16 which states that This act shall take
effect immediately upon its approval.
HELD: The effectivity clause of RA 9006 is defective, but it does not render the entire law
defective. Under the case of Taada vs Tuvera, the phrase unless otherwise provided refers to
the date and not to publication, which is indispensable.
La Bugal-blaan Tribal Association, Inc. vs Ramos
421 SCRA 148
FACTS:
On July 25, 1987, two days before the convening of the First Congress, President Aquino, in her
exercise of legislative power during the Provisional Constitution, issued EO 279 with the clause
shall take effect immediately. EO 279 was published on August 3, 1987.
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ISSUE:
W.O.N. EO 279 violated EO 200 where a law shall take effect after 15 days following its
publication and W.O.N. legislative powers of the President ceased to exist upon the convening
of the First Congress two days after EO 279s issuance, thereby making such issuance invalid.
HELD:
EO 279 is an effective and validly enacted statute. There is nothing in EO 200 that prevent a
law from taking effect on a date other than, or before, the 15-day period after its publication.
The 15-day period only applies to those laws that do not provide for its own effectivity date.
When EO 279 was published, it became immediately effective upon its publication. On EO
279s validity, it was issued before the convening of the First Congress therefore the President
was validly exercising her legislative powers.

RP vs. Shell Petroleum

The appellate court reversed the decision dated 19 August 2003 of the Office of the
President OP No. Case 96-H-6574 and declared that Ministry of Finance (MOF) Circular
No. 1-85 dated 15 April 1985, as amended, is ineffective for failure to comply with
Section 3 of Chapter 2, Book 7 of the Admnistrtive Code of 1987, which requires the
publication and filing in the Office of the National Administration Register (ONAR) of
administrative issuances.
As early as 1986, this Court in Tanada v. Tuvera enunciated that publication is
indispensable in order that all statutes, including administrative rules that are intended to
enforce or implement existing laws, attain binding force and effect, to wit:
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private
laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin
fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature. Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive
orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers
whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present,
directly conferred by the Constitution.

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Thereafter, the Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted, with Section 3 of Chapter 2,
Book VII thereof specifically providing that:
Filing.(1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines
Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on
the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months
from the date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any
party or persons.
(2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary,
shall
carry out the requirements of this
section under pain of disciplinary action.
(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and
shall be open to public inspection.
(Emphasis provided.)
Under the doctrine of Tanada v. Tuvera, the MOF Circular No. 185, as amended, is
one of those issuances which should be published before it becomes effective since it
is intended to enforce Presidential Decree No. 1956.
The said circular should also comply with the requirement stated under Section 3 of
Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 filing with the ONAR in
the University of the Philippines Law Center for rules that are already in force at
the time the Administrative Code of 1987 became effective. These requirements of
publication and filing were put in place as safeguards against abuses on the part of
lawmakers and as guarantees to the constitutional right to due process and to
information on matters of public concern and, therefore, require strict compliance.

Session 4. STATUTORY LAW

Statute, Defined -A written will of the legislature expressed according to the form
necessary to constitute it a law of the state and rendered authentic by certain prescribed
forms and solemnities

Classes of Statute Law

The 1987 Constitution
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Constitution, Defined
-The fundamental law or supreme law of the land promulgated by the people. A law, to
which all other laws must conform
-The written enactment by the direct action of the people by which the fundamental
powers of the government are established, limited and defined and by which these
powers are distributed among the several departments for their safe and useful
exercise for the benefit of the people
Treaties and International Agreements
Treaty, Defined
-An agreement between or among states which generally governs their mutual
conduct with one another.
-An international agreement embodied in single, formal instrument made between
entities, both or all of which are subjects of international law possessed of international
personality and treaty making capacity, and intended to create rights and obligations, or
to establish relationships, governed by international law.
(In case of irreconcilable differences between a treaty and a statute, which will prevail?
QUIZ)
In a situation, . . . where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made
between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that
municipal law should be upheld by the municipal court . . .for the reason that such courts
are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances.
And, yet, so incongruously, this formulation arrives at the following conclusion:
Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes effect a treaty may repeal
a statute and a statue may repeal a treaty. . . . Two contradictory principles find
themselves as bedfellows in the same ponencia infact in the same paragraph. The first
one upholds the supremacy of statutory or municipal law as a source of law, lex superior
derogat inferior. By its nature as a distinct source of law a statute always prevails over a
treaty rule. Whereas in the second lex posterior derogat priori the later-in-time
takes precedence; in which case the statutoryor municipal law prevails only when it is
enacted later than the treaty, assuming their conflict to be irreconcilable.
A treaty in the constitutional sense becomes valid and effective if two factors converge,
namely:
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a. It has entered into force by its own provisions;
b. It has been concurred in by the Senate as required by the Treaty Clause.

Statutes Proper, Parts

Title -gives the general statement of the subject matter
Lidasan vs COMELEC
21 SCRA 496
FACTS:
RA 4790 An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur was
signed into law consisting of 21 barrios, 12 of which are from the municipalities of Parang and
Buldon, province of Cotabato. The Office of the President recommended the COMELEC to
suspend the operation of the statute until clarified. Notwithstanding, the COMELEC declared
that the statute should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the SC. Hence the
petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Bara Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the
detached portion of Parang, Cotabato and a qualified voter.
HELD:
RA 4790 is unconstitutional because it violates the provision that no bill which may be enacted
into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill
Two-pronged purpose combined in one statute: It creates the municipality of Dianaton
purportedly from 21 barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao
del Sur; and It also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from Lanao
del Sur
RATIONALE:
Title to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those
concerned of the import of the single subject thereof.
A title which is so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the
purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in
referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the
act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad.
(Test of the sufficiency of a title QUIZ)
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a. The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, which
technical accuracy is not essential, and the subject need not be stated in express terms
where it is clearly inferable from the details set forth, a title which is so uncertain that
the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment
or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or
indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or
in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad.
b. In determining sufficiency of particular title its substance rather than its form should
be considered, and the purpose of the constitutional requirement, of giving notice to
all persons, interested, should be kept in mind by the court.
Preamble -states the reason for, or the objects of the enactment
People vs Echaves
95 SCRA 663
FACTS:
Fiscal Ello filed before the lower court separate informations against 16 persons charging them
with squatting penalized by PD 772. The informations were dismissed on the grounds that (1)
entry should be by force, intimidation or threat and not through stealth and strategy as alleged;
(2) PD 772 does not apply to the cultivation of a grazing land. Motion for consideration was
likewise denied. The phrase and for other purposes in the decree does not include agricultural
purposes because its preamble does not mention the Secretary of Agriculture and makes
reference to the affluent class. Hence, the appeal to this Court.
HELD:
Lower courts decision affirmed. The decree does not apply to pasture lands because its
preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communities or more
particularly to illegal constructions in squatting areas made by well-to-do individuals. The
squatting complained of involves pasture lands in rural areas. On the other hand, it is punished
by RA 947
RATIONALE:
The rule of ejusdem generis does not apply to PD 772 where the intent of decree is
unmistakable.

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Aglipay vs Ruiz
64 SCRA 201
FACTS:
Mons. Aglipay sought an issuance of prohibition from the court to prevent Director of Posts
from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd International Eucharistic
Congress which violates the provision that no public money or property shall ever be
appropriated, applied or used, directly or indirectly, for the benefit, or support of any sect,
church, denomination or the principle of separation of church and state.

HELD:
Petition denied. RA 4052 which appropriates a sum of P60,000 for the said stamps contemplates
no religious purpose in view. Stamps were not issued and sold for the benefit of the Roman
Catholic Church; nor money derived from the sale given to that church. Moreover, what is
emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila as the seat of that congress.
RATIONALE:
What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious liberty and not mere religious toleration.
Religious freedom, as a Constitutional mandate, is not inhibition of profound reverence for
religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs
Enacting Clause -indicates the authority which promulgates the enactment
Purview (Body) of the statute -contains the subject matter of the statute and shall
embrace only one subject
Provisos -acting as a restraint upon or as qualification of the generality of the language
which it follows
Interpretative Clause -legislature defines its own language or prescribes rules for its
construction
Repealing Clause -announces the legislative intent to terminate or revoke another statute
Saving Clause -restricts a repealing act and preserves existing powers, rights and pending
proceedings from the effects of the repeal
Separability Clause -if for any reason, any section or provision is held to be
unconstitutional or invoked, the other section or provision of the law shall not be affected
thereby.
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Effectivity Clause -when the law shall take effect (Article 2 of the New Civil Code)
Statutes enacted by the Legislature
Statute Proper, Kinds
o General -applies to persons, entities, things as a class omitting no one
o Special -particular persons, entities, things
o Local -specific, within territorial limits
o Public affects public at large, or all the persons or things within a jurisdiction.
o Private relates to, concerns and affects a particular individual.
o Penal -imposes punishment of an offense
o Remedial -remedy former laws, reform or extend rights
o Substantive -creates, defines, regulates the rights and duties of parties
o Labor -welfare of laborers, governs employer-employee relationship
o Tax -exaction of money from the state to achieve legislative or general objective
o Mandatory -non-compliance renders act void or illegal
o Directory -non-compliance does not invalidate act
As to performance
o Permanent -continues in performance until altered or repealed
o Temporary -fixed for a specified period
o Prospective -operates after it takes effect
o Retrospective -affects acts already committed before effectivity
o Repealing -revokes or terminates another statute
o Amendatory -addition to the original law for improvement (modifies or qualifies)
o Reference -refers to other statutes and make them applicable to the subject of the
new legislation
o Declaratory -establishes its meaning & correct construction

a)
b)
c)
d)
e)

HIERARCHY OF LAWS (CT-SLR)

Constitution
Treaties
Statutes
Local Legislations
Rules of Courts
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a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)

Classes of Philippine Laws (RCB PER)

Republic Acts (1900-1935)
Commonwealth Act (1935-1946)
Batas Pambansa (1984-1986)
Presdential Decree (1972-1986)
Executive Order (1986-1987)
Republic Act (1946-1972, 1987-present)

How a bill becomes a Law Steps

(Father SD, Pastor SS = FR.SD-PTR.SS) Based on Atty. Dellosas Discussion
1. First Reading - Any member of either house may present a proposed bill, signed by him,
for First Reading and reference to the proper committee. During the First Reading, the
principal author of the bill may propose the inclusion of additional authors thereof.
2. Referral to Appropriate Committee Immediately after the First Reading, the bill is
referred to the proper committee/s for study and consideration. If disapproved in the
committee, the bill dies a natural death unless the House decides otherwise, following the
submission of the report.
3. Second Reading If the committee reports the bill favorably, the bills is forwarded to the
Committee on Rules so that it may be calendared for deliberation on Second Reading. At
this stage, the bill is read for the second time in its entirely, together with the
amendments, if any, proposed by the committee, unless the reading is dispensed with by a
majority vote of the House.
4. Debates A general debate is then opened after the Second Reading and amendments
may be proposed by any member of Congress. The insertion of changes or amendments
shall be done in accordance with the rules of either House. The House may either kill
or pass the bill.
5. Printing and Distribution After approval of the bill on Second Reading, the bill is then
ordered printed in its final form and copies of it are distributed among the members of the
House three days before its passage, except when the bill was certified by the President.
A bill approved on Second Reading shall be included in the calendar of bills for Third
Reading.
6. Third Reading At this stage, only the title of the bill is read. Upon the last reading of a
bill, no amendment thereto is allowed and the vote thereon is taken immediately
thereafter, and yeas and nays entered in the journal. A member may abstain. As a rule, a
majority of the members constituting a quorum is sufficient to pass a bill.
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7. Referral to Other House If approved, the bill is then referred to the other House where
substantially the same procedure takes place.
8. Submission to Joint Bicameral Committee Differences, if any, between the Houses bill
and the Senates amended version, and vice versa are submitted to a conference
committee of members of both Houses for compromise. If either House accepts the
changes made by the other, no compromise is necessary.
9. Submission to the President a bill approved on Third Reading by both Houses shall be
printed and forthwith transmitted to the President for his action approval or disproval. If
the President does not communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated
within 30 days from receipt thereof, it shall become a law as if he signed it. Bill repassed
by Congress over the veto of the President automatically becomes a
law.
Session 5 CASE LAW
Case Law, Defined
Case Law, defined is the body of available writings explaining the verdicts in a case.
Case law is most often created by judges in their rulings when they write their decisions
and give the reasoning behind them, as well as citing precedents in other cases and
statutes that had a bearing on their decision. A single case may generate virtually no
written interpretations or opinions, or, as is the case with many that come before the
Supreme Court, it may generate a number of opinions as it works its way through various
lower-circuit courts. These collected opinions can be referred to in the future by other
judges when they make their rulings on similar cases, allowing the law to remain relative
consistent.
Case law is often referred to as common law in many regions of the world, and is also
known as judge-made law. This latter term derives from the fact that, while legislation is
technically passed in most countries by a separate legislative branch, courts are able to
exercise a moderate amount of quasi-legislative power through the use of precedent and
case law. Case law is viewed by most people as crucial part of a functioning judiciary, as
it allows for courts to transform decisions that may have taken a great deal of time and
energy to arrive at into a sort of de facto law, making future cases much easier to decide.

Classes of Case Law

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Decision Proper
Supreme Court Decisions
Court of Appeals Decisions
Sandiganbayan Decisions
Court of Tax Appeals Decisions
Regional Trial Courts Decisions
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and the Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts Decisions
Subordinate Decisions
Decisions of the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal
Decisions of Administrative Agencies Exercising Quasi-Judicial Powers
such as:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.

Commission on Elections
Civil Service Commissions
Commission on Audit
National Labor Relations Commission
Insurance Commission
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board

Supreme Court En Banc

En Banc means in the bench or full bench. It refers to a session where the entire
membership of a court will participate in the decision. The Supreme Court now may sit
En Banc or in three divisions. A decision or ruling issued by a division of the Supreme
Court has the same authority as that issued by the Supreme Court En Banc. By sitting in
divisions, the Supreme Court further increases is capacity to dispose of cases pending
before it.
En Banc Cases. Under Supreme Court Circular No. 2-89, where such referral is made,
the Court en banc may either accept the case or return the same to the Division,
depending upon the factual and legal backdrop of the controversy.
In the Resolution of the Court dated November 18, 1993, the following cases are
considered as en banc cases, or those that may be referred to the Court en banc:
Cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or
executive agreement, law, executive order, or presidential decree, proclamation,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question
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Criminal cases in which the appealed decision imposes the death penalty (N.B.
Death Penalty Law repaled)
Cases raising novel questions of law
Cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls
Cases involving decisions, resolutions or orders of the Civil Service Commission,
Commission on Elections, and Commissions on Audit
Cases where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge, officer or
employee of the judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of any
of them for a period of more than one (1) year or a fine exceeding P10,000 or both
Cases where a doctrine or principle laid down by the Court en banc or in division
may be modified or reversed.
Cases assigned to a division which in the opinion of at least three (3) members
thereof merit the attention of the Court en banc and are acceptable to a majority of
the actual membership of the court en banc
All other cases as the court en banc by a majority of its actual membership may
deem of sufficient importance to merit its attention.
Republic Vs Express Telecommunication Co., Inc.
373 SCRA 317
January 15, 2002
Ynares-Santiago, J:

1992 International Communications Corporation (Now Bayan Telecommunication) filed

an application with the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) for a
Certificate of Public Convenience or Necessity (CPCN) to operate digital cellular Mobile
System/Service (CMTS)
In a NTC order dated Dec. 1993, it states there that the case be ordered ARCHIVED
without prejudice to its reinstatement if and when the requisite frequency becomes
available.
Bayantel filed an Ex Parte Motion to Revive Case, citing that availability of new
frequency and Service providers are needed. NTC granted the motion on Feb. 2000
Respondent Express Telecommunication filed an opposition (Motion to dismiss) for
Bayantel application. He contended that there were no available radio frequencies that
could accommodate a new CMTS.
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NTC issued an Order granting in favor of Bayantel a provisional authority to operate
CMTS services as there is a need of telephone service provider and Bayantel is legally,
technically and financially qualified, as well as to ensure healthy competition among
CMTS providers.
Extelcom filed with CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking the annulment of
the order of NTC.
CA ruled in favor of Extelcom and annulled the NTC Memorandum
Bayantel filed Motion for Reconsideration.
CA denied all MR of the parties because of lack of merit
Bayantel and NTC filed petition for review. The court consolidate the 2 petitions.
Issue:
Whether the 1978 or 1993 NTC Rules of Practice and Procedure should govern in the approval
of Bayantels application
Ruling:
NTC was created by EO 546. It has the sole authority to issue Certificate of Public Convenience
and Necessity (CPCN). Such includes authority to determine areas of operations.
In granting Bayantel-provisional authority to operate CMTS the NTC applied Rule 15 Sec. 3 of
1978 Rules of Practice of Procedure. Board may grant on motion of the pleader or on its own
initiative.
The respondent erred in contending that NTC should have not apply the 1978 Rules of Practice
because 1993 Rules of Practice should have applied, wherein the phrase on its own initiative
was deleted.
Therefore, NTC is clothed with sufficient discretion to act on this matter, the need for a healthy
competitive environment in telecommunications is sufficient justification to issue Bayantel the
CPCN. NTC acted within its jurisdiction.
CA erred in annulling the order of the NTC granting Bayantel a provisional authority because as
a general rule purely administrative and discretionary functions may not be interfered with by
the courts. The exception is where the issuing authority
Apo Fruits vs. CA
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541 SCRA 117
December 19, 2007
Chico-Nazario, J:
Facts:
Apo Fruits Corporation (AFC) and Hijo Plantation Inc. (HPI) were owners of J
parcels of land in Davao.
Oct. 1995, they voluntarily sold properties to Department of Agrarian Reform
86.9M (AFC) and 164.40M (HPI) as payment for the lands but the 2 didnt agree with
the price
Complaint for determination of Just compensation was filed to DAR adjudication
Board. The board failed to render decision in 3 years.
26 M (AFC) and 45 M (HPI)was given as downpayment
Another complaint for determination of just compensation was filed in RTC Davao.
Decision In favor of AFC and HPI the trial court ruled that purchase price must be
higher than what the DAR offered with the 12% interest rate from the time complaint
was filed.
DAR appealed to CA. CA reversed RTC decision. DC reversed CA ruling and affirm
RTC decision with modification that 12% interest must be deleted. SC upheld RTC
decision. Thus LBP filed a motion for reconsideration to SC
Issue:
1. Whether or not there was a just compensation
2. Whether or not SC erred in upholding the RTC decision
Ruling: No, the land was taken without just compensation. RTCs finding must be sustained for
it based its ruling on evidence.
(If referral to SC en banc derived, SC decision maintained)
DAR failed to present evidence to prove/support that lower purchase price should be
given to AFC and HPI
It is unjust and oppressive to take/expropriate without giving just compensation. For just
compensation is defined as FULL and FAIR payment of the properly taken from the
owner by the government. The justification of the government on its power of
expropriation is for (1) public use (2) with just compensation.
The court ruled that in cases of conflicting jurisprudence, they shall be harmonized as to
equally apply and treat them not one from the other. Give effect to both.
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LBP erred in applying LBP v Celeda (court set aside just compensation they considered
one factor, which is the patent disparity of the prices gives to the respondent) Whereas
RTC considered all factors. The SC upheld the RTC decision because of this that they
properly arrived at the evaluation of just compensation considering their nature and
improvements.
LBP erred in applying LBP vs Banal (Failure of RTC to observe basic rules of procedures
in just compensation.) because what RTC did is they conducted ocular inspection, regular
having in compliance with all the decisions, rules and procedures.
The court reminded LBPs counsel that the Court En Banc is not an appellate tribunal to
which appeals from Division of the Court may be taken
The decision of the Division of the Court is as Good as SC en Banc itself.
Decision of the Division of Court can be referred only to court En Banc on special
specified grounds with courts discretion MR partially granted; 12% rate decided,
previous case was remanded to TRC; attorneys fees deleted.

OLYMPIC MINES AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., vs. PLATINUM GROUP

METALSCORPORATION.
FACTS:
Olympic was granted "Mining Lease Contracts" by the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) covering mining are as located in Palawan.
With the passage of Republic Act No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (Mining
Act), these mining lease contracts became the subject of Mineral Production Sharing
Agreement (MPSA) applications by Olympic.
Olympic entered into an Operating Agreement with Platinum, under which Platinum was
given the exclusive right to control, possess, manage/operate, and conduct mining
operations, and to market or dispose mining products found in subject mining areas for a
period of twenty-five years.
In return, Platinum bound itself to pay Olympic a royalty fee of 2 of the gross
revenues. Olympic made various attempts to terminate the Operating Agreement and to
deprive Platinum of its rights and interests over the subject mining areas, alleging that
Platinum committed gross violations of the Operating Agreement. Olympic filed
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administrative cases against Platinum intent with the intent to terminate the Operating
Agreement and to revoke Platinums Small Scale Mining Permits.
During the pendency of these cases, Olympic transferred its MPSA applications to
Citinickel via a Deed of Assignment without notice to or the consent of Platinum, which
was approved by the Regional Director of Mines and Geosciences Bureau. Platinum filed
a complaint for quieting of title, damages, breach of contract, and specific performance
against Olympic before the RTC of Puerto Princesa, Palawan. Olympic filed a motion to
dismiss alleging that the trial court was without jurisdiction to rule on the issues raised in
the complaint, as these involved a mining dispute requiring the technical expertise of the
Panel of Arbitrators (POA)
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC or the POA has jurisdiction over Platinums complaint for quieting of
title, breach of contract, damages and specific performance.
RULING:
RTC has jurisdiction. As held in the case of Gonzales v. Climax-Arimco Mining, The
resolution of the validity or voidness of the contracts remains a legal or judicial question
as it requires the exercise of judicial function. It requires the ascertainment of what laws
are applicable to the dispute, the interpretation and application of those laws, and the
rendering of a judgment based thereon.
Clearly, the dispute is not a mining conflict. It is essentially judicial. The complaint was
not merely for the determination of rights under the mining contracts since the very
validity of those contracts is put in issue. Arbitration before the Panel of Arbitrators is
proper only when there is a disagreement between the parties as to some provisions of the
contract between them, which needs the interpretation and the application of that
particular knowledge and expertise possessed by members of that Panel. Decisions of the
Supreme Court on mining disputes have recognized a distinction between (1) the primary
powers granted by pertinent provisions of law to the then Secretary of

Lim vs. Pacquing

[G.R. No. 115044. January 27, 1995]
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Ponente: PADILLA, J.
FACTS:
The Charter of the City of Manila was enacted by Congress on 18 June 1949 (R.A. No.
409).
On 1 January 1951, Executive Order No. 392 was issued transferring the authority to
regulate jai-alais from local government to the Games and Amusements Board (GAB).
On 07 September 1971, however, the Municipal Board of Manila nonetheless passed
Ordinance No. 7065 entitled An Ordinance Authorizing the Mayor To Allow And Permit
The Associated Development Corporation To Establish, Maintain And Operate A Jai-Alai
In The City Of Manila, Under Certain Terms And Conditions And For Other Purposes.
On 20 August 1975, Presidential Decree No. 771 was issued by then President Marcos.
The decree, entitled Revoking All Powers and Authority of Local Government(s) To
Grant Franchise, License or Permit And Regulate Wagers Or Betting By The Public On
Horse And Dog Races, Jai-Alai Or Basque Pelota, And Other Forms Of Gambling, in
Section 3 thereof, expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits issued by local
governments.
In May 1988, Associated Development Corporation (ADC) tried to operate a Jai-Alai.
The government through Games and Amusement Board intervened and invoked
Presidential Decree No. 771 which expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits
to operate all forms of gambling facilities (including Jai-Alai) by local governments.
ADC assails the constitutionality of P.D. No. 771.
ISSUE: Whether or not P.D. No. 771 is violative of the equal protection and non-impairment
clauses of the Constitution.
HELD: NO. P.D. No. 771 is valid and constitutional.
RATIO: Presumption against unconstitutionality. There is nothing on record to show or even
suggest that PD No. 771 has been repealed, altered or amended by any subsequent law or
presidential issuance (when the executive still exercised legislative powers).

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Neither can it be tenably stated that the issue of the continued existence of ADCs
franchise by reason of the unconstitutionality of PD No. 771 was settled in G.R. No.
115044, for the decision of the Courts First Division in said case, aside from not being
final, cannot have the effect of nullifying PD No. 771 as unconstitutional, since only the
Court En Banc has that power under Article VIII, Section 4(2) of the Constitution.
And on the question of whether or not the government is estopped from contesting ADCs
possession of a valid franchise, the well-settled rule is that the State cannot be put in
estoppel by the mistakes or errors, if any, of its officials or agents. (Republic v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 209 SCRA 90)
CABUAY V. MALVAR
-No digest
Decision
It is only the decisions of the Supreme Court that establish jurisprudence or doctrines in the
Philippine Jurisdiction. It is important to study the decision of the Supreme Court because of the
Doctrine of Binding Precedent or Stare Decisis. An opinion is a statement by a court of the
reasons for the decision of a case. It is the decision and not the opinion of the court which
settles the point of law involved and makes the precedent. Only the Supreme Court itself could
overturn its decision though an En Banc Decision (decision decided when all justices of the
Supreme Court are present).
A decision of a court in its judgment of a case may be described in three different senses:
1. It may refer to the entire case
2. It may include both the conclusion reached and the reasons for reaching it
3. It may mean only the final conclusion in relation to the case.
DECISION V. RESOLUTION:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; SUPREME COURT; DISPOSITION OF
CASES; CASES ARE DECIDED WHILE MATTERS ARE RESOLVED;
REFERRAL TO EN BANC REFERS TO CASES NOT MATTERS.- A careful
reading of Article VIII, Section 4 (3) of the Constitution, however, reveals the intention of
the framers to draw a distinction between cases, on the one hand, and matters, on the other
hand, such that cases are decided while matters, which include motions, are resolved.
Otherwise put, the word decided must refer to cases; while the word resolved must
refer to matters, applying the rule of reddendo singula singulis. This is true not only in the
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interpretation of the above-quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3), but also of the other provisions
of the Constitution where these words appear. With the aforesaid rule of construction in
mind, it is clear that only cases are referred to the Court en banc for decision whenever the
required number of votes is not obtained. Conversely, the rule does not apply where, as in
this case, the required three votes is not obtained in the resolution of a motion for
reconsideration. Hence, the second sentence of the aforequoted provision speaks only of
case and not matter. The reason is simple. The above-quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3)
pertains to the disposition of cases by a division. If there is a tie in the voting, there is no
decision. The only way to dispose of the case then is to refer it to the Court en banc. On the
other hand, if a case has already been decided by the division and the losing party files a
motion for reconsideration, the failure of the division to resolve the motion because of a tie
in the voting does not leave the case undecided. There is still the decision which must stand
in view of the failure of the members of the division to muster the necessary vote for its
reconsideration. Quite plainly, if the voting results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is
lost. The assailed decision is not reconsidered and must therefore be deemed affirmed. Such
was the ruling of this Court in the Resolution of November 17, 1998.
Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a
majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case
and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members.
When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no
doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division
may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.
Fortich vs Corona
Facts:
Concerns the MR of the courts resolution dated November 17, 1998 and motion to refer the
case to the Court en banc. In previous case, the Court voted two-two on the separate motions for
reconsideration, as a result of which the decision was affirmed. The Court noted in a resolution
dated January 27, 1999 that the movants have no legal personality to seek redress before the
Court as their motion to intervene was already denied and that the motion to refer the case to the
Court en banc is akin to a second MR which is prohibited. In this motion, both respondents and
intervenors prayed that the case be referred to the case en banc in as much as their earlier MR
was resolved by a vote of two-two, the required number to carry a decision under the
Constitution (3 votes) was not met.
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Issue: WON failure to meet the three votes justifies the referral of the case to the court en banc
Held: No
Ratio: A careful reading of the constitutional provision reveals the intention of the framers to
draw a distinction between cases, on the one hand, and matters, on the other hand, such that
cases are decided while matters, which include motions, are resolved. Otherwise put, the
word decided must refer to cases; while the word resolved must refer to matters,
applying the rule of en bancbfor decision whenever the required number of votes is not
obtained. Conversely, the rule does not apply where, as in this case, the required three votes is
not obtained in the resolution of a MR. Hence, the second sentence eof the provision speaks
only of case and not matter. The reason is simple. Article VIII, Section 4(3)pertains to the
disposition of cases by a division. If there is a tie in the voting, there is no decision. The only
way to dispose of the case then is to refer it to the Court en banc. On the other hand, if a case
has already been decided by the division and the losing party files a MR, the failure of the
division to resolve the motion because of a tie in the voting does not leave the case undecided.
There is still the decision which must stand in view of the failure of the members of the division
to muster the necessary vote for its reconsideration. Quite plainly, if the voting results in a tie,
the motion for reconsideration is lost. The assailed decision is not reconsidered and must
therefore be deemed affirmed. Such was the ruling of this Court in the Resolution of November
17, 1998.
Issue: WON the referral to the court en banc is justified on the ground that the issues are of first
impression
Held: No
Ratio: The issues presented before us by the movants are matters of no extraordinary import to
merit the attention of the Court en banc
The issue of whether or not the power of the local government units to reclassify lands is
subject to the approval of the DAR is no longer novel, this having been decided by this Court in
the case of Province of Camarines Sur, et al. vs. Court of Appeals wherein we held that local
government units need not obtain the approval of the DAR to convert or reclassify lands from
agricultural to non-agricultural use .Moreover, the Decision sought to be reconsidered was
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arrived at by a unanimous vote of all five (5)members of the Second Division of this Court.
Stated otherwise, this Second Division is of the opinion that the matters raised by movants are
nothing new and do not deserve the consideration of the Court en banc. Thus, the participation
of the full Court in the resolution of movants motions for reconsideration would be
inappropriate.
Issue: WON the referral to the court en banc partakes of the nature of a second MR
Held: Yes
Ratio: The contention, therefore, that our Resolution of November 17, 1998 did not dispose of
the earlier MR of the Decision dated April 24, 1998 is flawed. Consequently, the present MR
necessarily partakes of the nature of a second motion for reconsideration which, according to
the clear and unambiguous language of Rule 56, Section 4, in relation to Rule 52, Section 2, of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, is prohibited. True, there are exceptional cases when this
Court may entertain a second motion for reconsideration, such as where there are
extraordinarily persuasive reasons. Even then, we have ruled that such second MRs must be
filed with express leave of court first obtained. In this case, not only did movants fail to ask for
prior leave of court, but more importantly, they have been unable to show that there are
exceptional reasons for us to give due course to their second motions for reconsideration.
Stripped of the arguments for referral of this incident to the Court en banc, the motions subject
of this resolution are nothing more but rehashes of the motions for reconsideration which have
been denied in the Resolution of November 17, 1998. To be sure, the allegations contained
therein have already been raised before and passed upon by this Court in the said Resolution.
Issue: WON the Win-Win Resolution was valid
Held: No
Ratio: This refers to the resolution by authority of the President modifying the Decision dated
29 March1996 of the OP through Executive Secretary Ruben Torres. NQSRMDCs (Norberto
Quisumbing) Application for Conversion is approved only with respect to 44 hectares as
recommended by the DA. The remaining100 hectares found to be suitable for agriculture shall
be distributed to qualified farmer beneficiaries (FBs) in accordance with RA 6657 The
resolution is void and of no legal effect considering that the March 29, 1996 decision of the
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Office of the President had already become final and executory even prior to the filing of the
MR which became the basis of the said Win-Win Resolution. While it may be true that on its
face the nullification of the Win-Win Resolution was grounded on a procedural rule
pertaining to the reglementary period to appeal or move for reconsideration, the underlying
consideration therefor was the protection of the substantive rights of petitioners. Just as a
losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also
has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his/her case. In other words,
the finality of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision accordingly vested appurtenant rights to the land
in dispute on petitioners as well as on the people of Bukidnon and other parts of the country
who stand to be benefited by the development of the property. Before finally disposing of these
pending matters, we feel it necessary to rule once and for all on the legal standing of intervenors
in this case. In their present motions, intervenors insist that they are real parties in interest
inasmuch as they have already been issued certificates of land ownership award, orCLOAs, and
that while they are seasonal farmworkers at the plantation, they have been identified by the
DAR as qualified beneficiaries of the property. These arguments are, however, nothing new as
in fact they have already been raised in intervenors earlier motion for reconsideration of our
April 24, 1998 Decision. Again as expressed in the opinion of Mr. Justice Martinez, intervenors,
who are admittedly not regular but seasonal farmworkers, have no legal or actual and
substantive interest over the subject land inasmuch as they have no right to own the land.
Rather, their right is limited only to a just share of the fruits of the land. Moreover, the WinWin Resolution itself states that the qualified beneficiaries have yet to be carefully and
meticulously determined by the Department of Agrarian Reform. Absent any definitive finding
of the DAR, intervenors cannot as yet be deemed vested with sufficient interest in the
controversy as to be qualified to intervene in this case. Likewise, the issuance of the CLOA's to
them does not grant them the requisite standing in view of the nullity of the Win-Win
Resolution. No legal rights can emanate from a resolution that is null and void. Melo:By
mandate of the Constitution, cases heard by a division when the required majority of at least 3
votes in the division is not obtained are to be heard and decided by the Court En Banc. The
deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission disclose that if the case is not decided in a
division by a majority vote, it goes to the Court En Banc and not to a larger division In a
situation where a division of 5 has only 4 members, the 5th member having inhibited himself or
is otherwise not in a position to participate, or has retired, a minimum of 3 votes would still be
required before there can be any valid decision or resolution by that division. There may, then,
be instances when a deadlock may occur, i.e., the votes tied at 2-2. It is my humble view that
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under the clear and unequivocal provisions of the 1986 Constitution, if the required majority is
not reached in a division, the case should automatically go to Court En Banc.
I submit that the requirement of 3 votes equally applies to motions for reconsideration because
the provision contemplates cases or matters (which for me has no material distinction
insofar as divisions are concerned) heard by a division, and a motion for reconsideration cannot
be divorced from the decision in a case that it seeks to be reconsidered. Consequently, if the
required minimum majority of 3 votes is not met, the matter of the motion for reconsideration
has to be heard by the Court En Banc, as mandated by the Constitution (par. 3, Sec. 4, Art.
VIII). To say that the motion is lost in the division on a 2-2 vote, isto construe something which
cannot be sustained by a reading of the Constitution. To argue that a motion for reconsideration
is not a case but only a matter which does not concern a case, so that, even though the vote
thereon in the division is 2-2, the matter or issue is not required to elevated to the Court En
Banc, is to engage in a lot of unfounded hair splitting.
Parts of Decision
a) Title the title of case is that which appears at its head. It usually consists of the name of
the plaintiff joined to that of the defendant by the abbreviation of the word versus.
b) Syllabus or headnote consists of summary statements of the points of law decided. The
purpose is to provide the lawyer with an index-digest of the case so that he may, in
general way, and without reading the whole case, determine whether or it is analogous to
the one which is briefing.
c) Statement of facts
d) Abstract of briefs of counsel, if any.
e) Opinion of the court
OPINION
Used to mean the reasons set out by
the court as the basis for decision
Used To mean the reasons and the
conclusion reached taken together as
one mental process.
The reasons by which it arrived at the
decision

DECISION
Final conclusion of the court

f) Decision or final judgment is rendered in the decision or judgment of the court,

irrespective of all seemingly contrary statements in the decision.
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OPINION
Informal expression of the
views of the court and
cannot prevail against its
final order of decision
Forms no part of the
judgment
g) Dissenting opinion, if any.
h) Concurring opinion, if any
NOTE:
a. The typical case is entitled by the names of the parties
b. After the title will come the syllabus summarizing the important points of the decision
c. The portion of the report that carries authority the opinion of the court. Although it
is the opinion of the court, it is commonly written on behalf of the court by a single
justice whose name precedes the opinion.
d. Then followed by the final disposition (decision) of the case. The decision itself is by
majority vote and is stated at the end of the motion. It may also be unanimous. It may
affirm, reverse or modify the decision of the lower court. The members of the court
who concur are then listed. A justice who agrees with the decision but not with the
opinion may write a separate concurring opinion. A justice who disagrees with the
decision may dissent, with or without writing a dissenting opinion
e. Opinions need not be signed. It is not uncommon for a court to write an unsigned and
usually shorter opinion per curiam (by the court) when for example, the point in issue
is thought to be well settled
Effect of Decided Case
a) Res Judicata it may be irrevocably and for all time determine the rights and duties of
the parties to the case.
- An authoritative settlement of the particular controversy before it
b) Stare Decisis it may set up standard according to which similar litigation, involving
other parties will be decided.
- As a precedent for future cases
Res judicata, Defined

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a matter adjudged, judicially acted upon or decided, or settled by judgment. It provides
that a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is
conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies; and constitutes an absolute bar
to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand or cause of action
is the rule that a final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on the
merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies and, as to them,
constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand or
cause of action.
No man is ought to be sued twice for the same cause of action
It is to the interest of the state that there should be an end to litigation.

--- Essential Requisites of Res Judicata (FinJurMer-ISC)

1. The former judgment must be final;
2. The court that rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
3. It is a judgment on the merits (rendered after consideration of evidence and stipulations);
and
4. There is between the first and the second actions an identity of parties, subject
matter and cause of action

Law of the Case, Defined

-the controlling legal rule of the decision between the parties.
-The doctrine that when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to
govern the same issue in subsequent stages in the same case
- The doctrine of "law of the case" is one of policy only, however, and will be disregarded when
compelling circumstances require a redetermination of the point of law decided on the prior
appeal. Such circumstances exist when an intervening or contemporaneous change in the law
has transpired by the establishment of new precedent by a controlling authority or the
overruling of former decisions.
Stare Decisis, Defined

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-The principle that the decisions of a court are a binding authority on the court that issued the
decisions and on the lower courts for the disposition of factually similar controversies. Stand on
what has been decided
-Adherence to precedents, states that once a case has been decided one way, then another
case, involving exactly the same point at issue, should be decided in the same manner.
NOTE: Supreme Court is not bound by this doctrine because it can overturn precedents.
Follow past precedent and do not disturb what has been settled. Matters already been decided
cannot be litigated again and again.
---- Kinds of Stare Decisis:
1. Vertical Stare Decisis -Duty of lower courts to apply the decisions of the higher courts to
cases involving the same facts. (Obligation)
2. Horizontal Stare Decisis -Higher courts must follow its own precedents (Policy)
Note: Constitutional Stare Decisis are judicial interpretations of the Constitution; while,
Statutory Stare Decisis are interpretations of statutes
---- Limits to application of Stare Decisis (PU-CD-BF)
a. It would not be followed if it were plainly unreasonable.
b. Where the courts of equal authority developed conflicting decisions
c. The binding force of the decision was the actual principle or principles necessary for the
decision; not the words or reasoning used to reach the decision.
---- Reasons why courts follow stare decisis (JIJEP)
a. It legitimizes judicial institution;
b. It promotes judicial economy; and,
c. It allows predictability.
---- Reasons when do courts refuse to be bound by stare decisis
a. Where its application perpetuates illegitimate and unconstitutional holding;
b. Where it cannot accommodate changing social and political understanding;
c. Where it leaves the power to overturn bad constitutional law solely in the hands of
Congress;
d. Where the activist judges can dictate the policy for the future courts while judges that
respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing with them.
Four-Pronged tests for Constitutional Litigations.
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a. Determine whether the rule has proved to be intolerable simply defying practical
workability;
b. Consider whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special
hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation;
c. Determine whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have the old rule
no more than a remnant of an abandoned doctrine; and,
d. Find out whether facts have so changed or come to be seen differently, as to have robbed
the old rule of significant application or jurisdiction.
Res Judicata and Stare Decisis, Effects
-The former to the settlement of the immediate controversy and the latter to the impact of the
decision as precedent
Res Judicata and Law of the case, Distinguished
-The former forecloses parties in one case, while the latter does not have the finality of the
former and applies only to a particular case.
Ratio decidendi and Obiter Dictum
The ratio decidendi of the case is the underlying principle, the legal reason, which caused the
case to be decided as it was decided, which is considered to have been necessary to the decision
of the actual issue between the litigants, and the concrete point decided in the case which is
limited strictly to the facts presented. The ratio decidendi is, consequently, usually broader than
the point decided. It may or may not be explicitly set forth in the opinion of the court:
sometimes it is assumed; however, it is often categorically or broadly stated. Obiter dictum is a
remark made or opinion expressed by a judge, in his decision upon a cause, that is, incidentally
or collaterally, and not directly upon the question before the court; or it is any statement of law
enunciated by the judge or court merely by way of illustration, argument, analogy or suggestion.
USA vs. Ruiz G.R. No. L-35645, May 22, 1985
Facts: The US had a naval base in Subic, Zambales which was one of those provided in the
Military Bases Agreement between the Phils. and the US. The US made an invitation for the
submission of bids for the repair of wharves in said base. Private respondent Eligio de Guzman
& Co., Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Subsequent thereto, the private
respondent received from the US 2 telegrams requesting it to confirm its price proposals and for
the name of its bonding company. The private respondent complied with the requests.
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Thereafter, private respondent received a letter which said that the company did not qualify to
receive an award for the projects because of its previous unsatisfactory performance rating. The
private respondent sued the US and the members of the Engineering Command of the US Navy.

Issue: Whether or not the complaint may prosper

Held: The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of
another State without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the
principles of independence and equality of States. However, the rules of International Law are
not petrified; they are constantly developing and evolving. And because the activities of states
have multiplied, it has been necessary to distinguish thembetween sovereign and
governmental acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts (jure gestionis).
The result is that State immunity now extends only to acts jure imperii.
A State may be said to have descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to
have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not
apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In the present case,
the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the US
and the Phils., indisputably a function of the government of the highest order. They are not
utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.
TAPIADOR No digest
EDGARDO V. ESTARIJA v. EDWARD F. RANADA and the HON. OMBUDSMAN
Aniano A. Desierto (now succeeded by Hon. Simeon Marcelo), and his DEPUTY
OMBUDSMAN for Mindanao, Hon. Antonio E. Valenzuela
G.R. No. 159314, 26 June 2006, Quisumbing, J. (En Banc)
The powers of the Ombudsman are not merely recommendatory. His office was given teeth to
render this constitutional body not merely functional but also effective. Under Republic Act No.
6770 and the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman has the constitutional power to directly
remove from government service an erring public official other than a member of Congress and
the Judiciary. Edgardo V. Estarija was the Harbor Master of the Philippine Ports Authority
(PPA), Port of Davao, Sasa, Davao City. As such, he issued the necessary berthing permit for all
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ships that docked in the Davao Port. In an administrative complaint for gross misconduct
against him, it was alleged
that he had been demanding money for the approval and issuance of berthing permits and for
monthly contributions from the Davao Pilots Association, Inc. (DPAI). The complaint also
alleged that in 1998, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) caught Estarija in possession of
the marked money used to entrap the latter. The Ombudsman ordered Estarijas preventive
suspension and filed a criminal case against him for violation of Republic Act No. 3019, The
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Subsequently, the Ombudsman in the administrative case,
found Estarija guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct and dismissed him from government
service with forfeiture of all leave credits and retirement benefits. In his motion for
reconsideration, Estarija claimed that his dismissal was unconstitutional since the
Ombudsmans administrative authority is merely recommendatory and that Rep. Act No.
6770 was also unconstitutional because it gives the Office of the Ombudsman additional powers
that are not provided for in the Constitution. The Ombudsman denied the motion for
reconsideration, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The appellate court held that the
attack on the constitutionality of Rep. Act No. 6770 was belated, having been made only in the
motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Ombudsman, and that Estarija failed to
overcome the presumption of constitutionality in favor of Rep. Act No. 6770.
In this petition for review on certiorari, Estarija contends that he cannot be liable for grave
misconduct because he did not commit extortion as he was merely prodded by Adrian Cagata,
an employee of the DPAI, to receive the money and that it makes no sense why he would extort
money
in consideration of the issuance of berthing permits since the signing of berthing permits is only
ministerial on his part. He also maintains that Rep. Act No. 6770 is unconstitutional because the
Ombudsman has only the powers enumerated under Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution,
which powers do not include the power to directly remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure a
government official. According to him, the Ombudsmans power is merely to recommend the
action to the officer concerned. The Solicitor General maintains otherwise, arguing that the
framers of the 1987 Constitution did not intend to spell out, restrictively, each act which the
Ombudsman may or may not do, since the purpose of the Constitution is to provide simply a
framework within which to build the institution.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not there is substantial evidence to hold Estarija liable for dishonesty and
grave misconduct;
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2.) Whether or not the power of the Ombudsman to directly remove, suspend, demote, fine,
or censure erring officials is constitutional
RECENT JURISPRUDENCE POLITICAL LAW
HELD: The petition is DENIED.
Estarija is liable for dishonesty and grave misconduct
Estarija did not deny that he went to the DPAI office to collect, and that he actually received,
the money which he demanded from the DPAI as monthly contribution. Since there was no
pending transaction between the PPA and the DPAI, he had no reason to go to the latters office
to collect any money. Even if he was authorized to assist in the collection of money due the
agency, he should have issued an official receipt for the transaction, but he did not do so.
The powers of the Ombudsman are not merely recommendatory In passing Rep. Act No. 6770,
the Congress deliberately endowed the Ombudsman with the power to prosecute offenses
committed by public officers and employees to make him a more active and effective agent of
the people in ensuring accountability in public office. Moreover, the legislature has vested the
Ombudsman with broad powers to enable him to implement his own actions. Lastly, the
Constitution gave Congress the discretion to give the Ombudsman other powers and functions.
The Constitution does not restrict the powers of the Ombudsman in Sec. 13, Art. XI of the 1987
Constitution, but allows the legislature to enact a law that would spell out the powers of the
Ombudsman. Through the enactment of Rep. Act No. 6770, specifically Sec. 15, par. 3, the
Congress gave the Ombudsman such powers to sanction erring officials and employees, except
members of Congress and the Judiciary. The powers of the Ombudsman are not merely
recommendatory. His office was given teeth to render this constitutional body not merely
functional but also effective.
Thus, under Rep. Act No. 6770 and the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman has the
constitutional power to directly remove from government service an erring public official other
than a member of Congress and the Judiciary.

Ombudsman vs. Mojica GR 146486

The case had its inception on 29 December 1999, when twenty-two officials and employees of
the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman (OMB) for the Visayas, led by its two directors, filed a
formal complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman requesting an investigation on the basis of
allegations that then Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, private respondent Arturo Mojica,
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committed the following: 1. Sexual harassment against Rayvi Padua-Varona; 2. Mulcting
money from confidential employees James Alueta and Eden Kiamco; and 3. Oppression against
all employees in not releasing the P7,200.00 benefits of OMB-Visayas employees. The
complaints in Criminal Case No. OMB-0-00-0615 and Administrative Case No. OMB-ADM-000-0316, were dismissed.
Thereupon, on 15 January 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before this Court a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and
alternatively, an original special civil action for certiorari under Sec. 1, Rule 65 of the same
rules,
ISSUE: Is the Deputy Ombudsman an impeachable officer under Section 2, Article XI of the
1987 Constitution?
RULING: The 1987 Constitution, the deliberations thereon, and the opinions of constitutional
law experts all indicate that the Deputy Ombudsman is not an impeachable officer. The court
has likewise taken into account the commentaries of the leading legal luminaries on the
Constitution as to their opinion on whether or not the Deputy Ombudsman is impeachable. All
of them agree in unison that the impeachable officers enumerated in Section 2, Article XI of the
1986 Constitution is exclusive. In their belief, only the Ombudsman, not his deputies, is
impeachable. The impeachable officers are the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President,
the members of the Supreme Court, the members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman. (see Art. XI, Sec. 2) The list is exclusive and may not be increased or reduced by
legislative enactment.
The rule that an impeachable officer cannot be criminally prosecuted for the same offenses
which constitute grounds for impeachment presupposes his continuance in office. Hence, the
moment he is no longer in office because of his removal, resignation, or permanent disability,
there can be no bar to his criminal prosecution in the courts. Nor does retirement bar an
administrative investigation from proceeding against the private respondent, given that, as
pointed out by the petitioner, the formers retirement benefits have been placed on hold in view
of the provisions of Sections 12 and 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Borja v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 133495; 295 SCRA 157
September 3, 1998
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Facts: Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected Vice Mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term
ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became Mayor upon the death of the
incumbent, Cesar Borja. On May 11, 1992, he ran and was elected Mayor for a term of three
years which ended on June 30, 1995. On May 8, 1995, he was re-elected Mayor for another
term of three years ending July 30, 1998. On March 27, 1998, Capco filed a certificate of
candidacy for Mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin
Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for Mayor, sought Capcos disqualification on the theory
that the latter would already have served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998
and would thereafter be ineligible to serve for another term after that. The COMELEC ruled in
favor of Capco saying that In both the Constitution and the Local Government Code, the threeterm limitation refers to the term of office for which the local official was elected. It made no
reference to succession to an office to which he was not elected. Capco won in the elections
against Borja.
Issue: Whether a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law and
serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in that office for the
purpose of the three-term limit.
Held: The Court ruled in favor of Capco. The term served must therefore be one for which the
official concerned was elected. If he is not serving a term for which he was elected because he
is simply continuing the service of the official he succeeds, such official cannot be considered
to have fully served the term notwithstanding his voluntary renunciation of office prior to its
expiration. There is a difference between the case of a vice-mayor and that of a member of the
House of Representatives who succeeds another who dies, resigns, becomes incapacitated, or is
removed from office. The vice-mayor succeeds to the mayorship by operation of law. On the
other hand, the Representative is elected to fill the vacancy. In a real sense, therefore, such
representative serves a term for which he was elected. To consider Capco to have served the
first term in full (when he succeeded the mayorship upon demise of Cesar Borja) and therefore
ineligible to run a third time for reelection would be not only to falsify reality but also to unduly
restrict the right of the people to choose whom they wish to govern them. Hence, the petition
was dismissed.
Aldovino, Jr. vs. Comelec
G.R. No. 184836 December 23, 2009
Brion, J.:
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Facts: The respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City for three
consecutive terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. In
September 2005 or during his 2004-2007 term of office, the Sandiganbayan preventively
suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he then faced. This Court, however,
subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayans suspension order; hence, he resumed performing the
functions of his office and finished his term.
Issue: Is the preventive suspension of an elected public official an interruption of his term of
office for purposes of the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution
and Section 43(b) of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160, or the Local Government Code)?
Ruling:
General requisites for the application of the three term limit
1. that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post; and
2. that he has fully served three consecutive terms
LECAROZ V. SANDIGANBAYAN [305 SCRA 469 (1998)]
November 10, 2010
Facts: Francisco, Mayor of Santa Cruz, Marinduque, and son Lenlie, KB chair and SB member,
Lecaroz were charged with 13 counts of estafa through falsification of public documents.
Alleged that Francisco did not recognize appointment of Red as new KB chair in Matalaba and
SB member. Alleged that Leslie continued to receive salary even after his term has expired.
Convicted by Sandiganbayan
Issue: WON Lecaroz is criminally liable?
Held: No. Acquitted
1. SB term: 6 yrs. If sectoral/group rep term is coterminus with sectoral term
2. KB term: till last Sunday, November 1985 or until new officers have qualified
3. Lenlie can hold over.
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- Law doesnt say he can or is prevented from doing so. Thus he can stay until succession
qualifies
- Duldulao v. ramos: law abhors vacuum in public offices
- Foley v. mcnab: hold over: avoid hiatus in performance of government function
- Barnes v. Holbrook: holdover to prevent public convenience from suffering due to vacancy
4. Red not qualified. Oath administered by Batasang Pambansa member whos not authorized to
do so is invalid
5. lack of criminal intent
- appointment not recognized since there were no authenticated copies of appointment papers
- Francisco sought advice of MILG Secretary Pimentel regarding Reds papers: Provincial
Memo Circular 86-02: No authentication from President cant assume position; Memo-Circ. 8617: SB, Splung, Splala: Hold office, be compensated until replaced by president or MILG
- Executive Silence on hold over for 30 yrs not equal to prohibition
- Francisco: well respected. Perhaps he just made erroneous interpretation. Mabutol v Pascual
and Cabungcal v. Cordova: misrepresentation is not equal to bad faith, thus not liable
- Falsification: no document statement from offended to narrate facts and facts were not proven
wrong or false.
- Conspiracy not proven: should be established separately for crime and must meet same
degree of proof
- Strong enough to show community of criminal design
- Blood relation is not equivalent to conspiracy
CUENCO V. Fernan, In Re: Raul and Morales Vs. Enrile No Digest
People v. Galit
(GR No. L-51770, 20 March 1985)
Facts:
Francisco Galit was picked up by the Montalban police on suspicion for the killing of Mrs.
Natividad Francisco, a widow. After he was taken by the Montalban police, the case was
referred to the National Bureau of Investigation in view of the alleged limited facilities of the
Montalban police station. Accordingly, Galit was brought to the NBI where he was investigated
by a team headed by NBI Agent Carlos Flores. The following day, Galit voluntarily executed a
Salaysay admitting participation in the commission of the crime, also implicating Juling and
Pabling Dulay as his companions in its commission. As a result, he was charged with the crime
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of Robbery with Homicide before the Circuit Trial Court of Pasig. During trial, a witness stated
that he overheard Galit quarrelling with his wife about his intention to leave their residence
immediately because he and his two companions robbed and killed Natividad Fernando. On the
other hand, Galit denied participation in the commission of the crime and also assailed the
admissibility of the extrajudicial confession extracted from him through torture, force and
intimidation. He recounted that he was mauled and tortured by the NBI officers by covering his
face with a rag and pushing his face into a toilet bowl full of human waste. He had no counsel
when the confession was extracted from him. He admitted what the investigating officers
wanted him to admit and he signed the confession they prepared. Later, against his will, he
posed for pictures as directed by his investigators, purporting it to be a re-enactment. This
notwithstanding, the trial court found Galit guilty and sentenced him to suffer the death penalty.
Issue:
W/N Francisco Galit should be acquitted on the ground that his extrajudicial confession is
inadmissible.
Ruling:
YES. The evidence presented by the prosecution does not support a conviction. In fact, the
findings of the trial court relative to the acts attributed to the accused are not supported by
competent evidence. There were no eyewitnesses, no property recovered from the accused, no
state witnesses, and not even fingerprints of the accused at the scene of the crime. The only
evidence against the accused is his alleged confession. The alleged confession and the pictures
of the supposed re-enactment are inadmissible as evidence because they were obtained in a
manner contrary to law. Galit acquitted.
Issue: How is the inadmissibility of the extrajudicial confession shown?
Ruling: Through the statement itself. The first question was a very long Tagalog question
followed by a monosyllabicanswer. It does not satisfy the requirements of the law that the
accused be informed of his rights under the Constitution and our laws. Instead, there should be
several short and clear questions and every right explained in simple words in a dialect or
language known to the person under investigation. The accused is from Samar and there is no
showing that he understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of his arrest, the accused was not
permitted to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or a friend. In fact, his sisters and other
relatives did not know that he had been brought to the NBI for investigation and it was only
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about two weeks after he had executed the Salaysay that his relatives were allowed to visit him.
His statement does not even contain any waiver of right to counsel and yet during the
investigation he was not assisted by one. At the supposed reenactment, again accused was not
assisted by the counsel of his choice. These constitute gross violation of his rights.
- The correct procedure for peace officers to follow when making an arrest and in conducting a
custodial investigation, according to Morales v. Ponce Enrile: At the time the person is arrested,
it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason of the arrest and he must
be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional right to remain
silent and to counsel, and that any statementhe might make could be used against him. The
person arrested shall have the right to communicate with hislawyer, a relative, or anyone he
chooses by the most expedient meansby telephone if possibleor by letteror messenger. It shall
be the duty of the arresting officer to see that this is accomplished. No custodialinvestigation
shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested,
by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee
himself or by anyoneon his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not
be valid unless made with theassistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the
procedure herein laid down, whetherexculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
- Trial courts are cautioned to look carefully into the circumstances surrounding the taking of
any confession,especially where the prisoner claims having been maltreated into giving one.
Where there is any doubt as toits voluntariness, the same must be rejected in toto
Quinto vs Comelec
G. R. No. 189698
FACTS:
Petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition against the COMELEC for issuing a resolution declaring appointive officials who
filed their certificate of candidacy as ipso facto resigned from their positions. In this defense,
the COMELEC avers that it only copied the provision from Sec. 13 of R.A. 9369.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the said COMELEC resolution was valid.
HELD:
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NO. In the Farias case, the petitioners challenged Sec. 14 of RA. 9006 repealing Sec. 66 of
the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) for giving undue benefit to elective officials in comparison
with appointive officials. Incidentally, the Court upheld the substantial distinctions between the
two and pronounced that there was no violation of the equal protection clause. However in the
present case, the Court held that the discussion on the equal protection clause was an obiter
dictum since the issue raised therein was against the repealing clause. It didnt squarely
challenge Sec. 66.
Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 unduly discriminated appointive and elective officials. Applying the 4
requisites of a valid classification, the proviso does not comply with the second requirement
that it must be germane to the purpose of the law.
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental
position to promote ones candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence of the
electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of
the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be
motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also
justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electorate arena, while still in
office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be
attending to their campaign rather than to their office work.
Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without distinction as
to whether they occupy high positions in government or not. Certainly, a utility worker in the
government will also be considered as ipso facto resigned once he files his certificate of
candidacy for the election. This scenario is absurd for, indeed, it is unimaginable how he can
use his position in the government to wield influence in the political world.
The provision s directed to the activity any and all public offices, whether they be partisan or
non partisan in character, whether they be in the national, municipal or barangay level.
Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right involved on
such a sweeping scale.
Importance of Precedents
-The importance of precedent is summed up in the words of Lord Gardiner in London
Tramways Co. vs. London City Council where he said, '...[justices] regard the use of precedent
as an indispensable foundation upon which to decide what is the law and its application to
individual cases. It provides at least some degree of certainty upon which individuals can rely in
the conduct of their affairs, as well as a basis for an orderly development of legal rules'.
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Quinto V. COMELEC
COMELEC issued a resolution declaring appointive officials who filed their certificate of
candidacy as ipso facto resigned from their positions.
FACTS:
Petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition against the COMELEC for issuing a resolution declaring appointive officials who
filed their certificate of candidacy as ipso facto resigned from their positions. In this defense,
the COMELEC avers that it only copied the provision from Sec. 13 of R.A. 9369.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the said COMELEC resolution was valid.
HELD: NO.
In the Farias case, the petitioners challenged Sec. 14 of RA. 9006 repealing Sec. 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code (OEC) for giving undue benefit to elective officials in comparison with
appointive officials. Incidentally, the Court upheld the substantial distinctions between the two
and pronounced that there was no violation of the equal protection clause.
However in the present case, the Court held that the discussion on the equal protection clause
was an obiter dictum since the issue raised therein was against the repealing clause. It didnt
squarely challenge Sec. 66.
Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 unduly discriminated appointive and elective officials. Applying the 4
requisites of a valid classification, the proviso does not comply with the second requirement
that it must be germane to the purpose of the law.
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental
position to promote ones candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence of the
electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of
the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be
motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also
justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the electorate arena, while still in
office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of duty because they would be
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Legal Research Reviewer -MAKASIAR NOTES

attending to their campaign rather than to their office work.
Sec. 13 of RA. 9369 pertains to all civil servants holding appointive posts without distinction as
to whether they occupy high positions in government or not. Certainly, a utility worker in the
government will also be considered as ipso facto resigned once he files his certificate of
candidacy for the election. This scenario is absurd for, indeed, it is unimaginable how he can
use his position in the government to wield influence in the political world.
The provision s directed to the activity any and all public offices, whether they be partisan or
non partisan in character, whether they be in the national, municipal or brgy. level. Congress has
not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right involved on such a
sweeping scale..
February 22, 2010
In a 10-5 vote, the Supreme Court reversed its Decision rendered in the case of Quinto vs.
Comelec last December 2009 and declared that appointed officials, including members of the
judiciary and the Comelec itself, who have filed their certificate of candidacy for the May 10
elections are already deemed resigned. In the Resolution dated 22 February 2010, the Court said
that its December 2009 Decision failed to consider the threat to government posed by the
partisan potential of a large and growing bureaucracy: the danger of systematic abuse
perpetuated by a powerful political machine that has amassed the scattered powers of
government workers so as to give itself and its incumbent workers an unbreakable grasp on
the reins of power. The Court added that in the case at bar, the probable harm to society in
permitting incumbent appointive officials to remain in office, even as they actively pursue
elective posts, far outweighs the less likely evil of having arguably protected candidacies
blocked by the possible inhibitory effect of a potentially overly broad statute.
The Resolution was penned by no less that Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno. Concurring with the
Chief Justice were Justices Conchita Carpio Morales, Arturo D. Brion, Diosdado M. Peralta,
Mariano C. Del Castillo, Roberto A. Abad, Martin S. Villarama, Jr., Jose P. Perez, and Jose C.
Mendoza. Dissenting were Justices Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura (the ponente in the original
Decision), Renato C. Corona, Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, and
Lucas P. Bersamin.
Jandy J. Agoy, petitioner vs. Araneta Center, Inc., respondent
G.R. No. 196358March 21, 2012Abad, J.
If you believe, you will receive whatever you ask for in prayer.
Matthew 21:22

Legal Research Reviewer -MAKASIAR NOTES

Facts:
Petitioners case for review on the Court of Appeals dismissal of
his case on serious misconduct and dishonesty, was denied by the Supreme through a minute
resolution dated 15 June 2011. Petitioners motion to rescind said minute resolution was again
denied through the Courts 21 September 2011 resolution. Upon receipt, Agoy filed a motion
torescind the same or have his case resolved by the Court En Banc for proper disposition
through a signed resolution or decision.
Issues:
Whether or not the copies of the minute resolutions dated 15 June 2011 and 21September 2011
that Agoy received are authentic; and Whether or not it was proper for the court to deny his
petition through a minute resolution.
Ruling:
Yes. The stated minute resolutions signed by the Assistant Clerk of Court and the Deputy Clerk
of Court are authentic. The signatories are duly authorized by the Court. As held in Borromeo
vs. Court of Appeals (264 SCRA 388), minute resolutions are the results of the deliberations by
the Justices of the Court but are promulgated by the Clerk of Court or his assistants to effect
prompt dispatch of the actions of the Court. Yes. It is proper for the Court to deny Agoys
petition through a minute resolution. While the Constitution requires every court to state in its
decision clearly and distinctly the fact and the law on which it is based, the Constitution
requires the court, in denying due course to a petition for review, merely to state the legal basis
for such denial. Such legal basis is the absence of reversible error in the challenged decision,
resolution or order of the court. In addition, when there is no reversible error in the decision of
the CA and the Court denies the petition, there is no need for it to fully explain the denial, since
it already means that it agrees with and adopts the findings and conclusions of the CA. The
motion to rescind was denied for lack of merit.
(No Dissenting Opinion of Justice Puno Lambino Vs. COMELEC)
(No Dissenting Opinion of Sandoval-Gutierrez Chavez Vs. Public Estates Authority)

If you believe, you will receive whatever you ask for in prayer.
Matthew 21:22