Spring 2011

CS 155

Outline
Network Protocols and
Vulnerabilities

Basic Networking:

Network protocol stack

Vulnerabilities at several layers

Some network attacks

John Mitchell

Attacking host-to-host datagram protocols

Attacking network infrastructure

TCP Spoofing,
Routing
Domain Name System

Internet Infrastructure
ISP

Backbone

TCP Protocol Stack

ISP

Application protocol

Application
Transport

Local and interdomain routing

Application

TCP protocol

Transport

Network

IP protocol

IP

IP protocol

Network

Link

Data
Link

Network
Access

Data
Link

Link

TCP/IP for routing, connections

BGP for routing announcements

Domain Name System

Find IP address from symbolic name (www.cs.stanford.edu)

IP

Data Formats

Internet Protocol
Connectionless

TCP Header
Application

message

Transport (TCP, UDP)

segment

Network (IP)

packet

Link Layer

frame

Application message - data

TCP

data

TCP

data

IP TCP

data

ETH IP TCP

data

TCP

data

Notes:

ETF

Unreliable
Best effort

src and dest ports

not parts of IP hdr

Version

Flags

Header Length
Type of Service
Total Length
Identification
Fragment Offset
Time to Live
Protocol
Header Checksum

Source Address of Originating Host

Destination Address of Target Host
Options

IP Header

Link (Ethernet)
Header

Link (Ethernet)
Trailer

Padding
IP Data

IP Routing

IP Protocol Functions (Summary)

Meg

Routing

Office gateway

Packet

Source 121.42.33.12
Destination 132.14.11.51

121.42.33.12

Tom

Fragmentation and reassembly

132.14.11.1

ISP

IP host knows location of router (gateway)

IP gateway must know route to other networks

If max-packet-size less than the user-data-size

132.14.11.51

Error reporting

121.42.33.1

Internet routing uses numeric IP address

Typical route uses several hops

ICMP packet to source if packet is dropped

TTL field:

decremented after every hop

Packet dropped f TTL=0.

Prevents infinite loops.

UDP

Problem: no src IP authentication

Unreliable transport on top of IP:

Client is trusted to embed correct source IP

User Datagram Protocol

Easy to override using raw sockets

Libnet: a library for formatting raw packets with
arbitrary IP headers

No acknowledgment
No congenstion control
No message continuation

Anyone who owns their machine can send packets

with arbitrary source IP

response will be sent back to forged source IP

Implications:

(solutions in DDoS lecture)

Anonymous DoS attacks;

Anonymous infection attacks (e.g. slammer worm)

TCP

Transmission Control Protocol

TCP Header

Connection-oriented, preserves order

Sender
Break data into packets
Attach packet numbers

Receiver
Acknowledge receipt; lost packets are resent
Reassemble packets in correct order

Book

Mail each page

Reassemble book

1
19
1

Source Port
Dest port
SEQ Number
ACK Number
U A P P S F
R C S S Y I
G K H R N N

TCP Header

Other stuff
5

Review: TCP Handshake

C

Basic Security Problems

S
SN rand
SYN: ANC 0 C
C

1. Network packets pass by untrusted hosts

Listening

SN rand

SYN/ACK: ANS SN S
S
C
SNSN +1
ACK: ANSNC
S

Store SNC , SNS

Eavesdropping, packet sniffing

Especially easy when attacker controls a
machine close to victim

2. TCP state can be easy to guess

Wait

Enables spoofing and session hijacking

3. Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerabilities

Established

DDoS lecture

Received packets with SN too far out of window are dropped

1. Packet Sniffing

2. SYN Flooding

Promiscuous NIC reads all packets

Read all unencrypted data (e.g., wireshark)

ftp, telnet (and POP, IMAP) send passwords in clear!

SYNC2

Eve

SYNC3

Network

Alice

S
SYNC1

Listening
Store data

SYNC4

Bob

SYNC5

Sweet Hall attack installed sniffer on local machine

Prevention: Encryption (next lecture: IPSEC)

3. TCP Connection Spoofing

Example DoS vulnerability

Why random initial sequence numbers? (SNC , SNS )

Suppose init. sequence numbers are predictable

Attacker can create TCP session on behalf of forged source IP

Breaks IP-based authentication (e.g. SPF, /etc/hosts )
TCP SYN
srcIP=victim

attacker

ACK
srcIP=victim
AN=predicted SNS
command

Suppose attacker can guess seq. number for an

existing connection:

Server

SYN/ACK
dstIP=victim
SN=server SNS

Victim

server thinks command

is from victim IP addr

[Watson04]

Attacker can send Reset packet to

close connection. Results in DoS.
Naively, success prob. is 1/232 (32-bit seq. #s).
Most systems allow for a large window of
acceptable seq. #s
Much higher success probability.

Attack is most effective against long lived

connections, e.g. BGP

Random initial TCP SNs

Wireless Threats

Unpredictable SNs prevent basic packet injection

but attacker can inject packets after

eavesdropping to obtain current SN

Random generator should be unpredictable

GPR06: Linux RNG for generating SNs is predictable
Attacker repeatedly connects to server
Obtains sequence of SNs
Can predict next SN
Attacker can now do TCP spoofing (create TCP session
with forged source IP)

TCP Congestion Control

Easy

Packet reception with directional antennas

Masquerading and Malicious AP

MAC address forgeable and s/w available (HostAP)

Session Hijacking, Man-in-the-Middle

Denial-of-Service: cost related evaluation

Source A

Destination

If packets are lost, assume congestion

Reduce transmission rate by half, repeat
If loss stops, increase rate very slowly
Design assumes routers blindly obey this policy

Message Deletion and Interception

Abuse of congestion control

Source

Easy, most wireless NICs have promiscuous mode

Message Injection/Active Eavesdropping

Most TCP stacks now generate random SNs

Passive Eavesdropping/Traffic Analysis

Destination

Source B

Destination

Amiable Alice yields to boisterous Bob

Alice and Bob both experience packet loss
Alice backs off
Bob disobeys protocol, gets better results

Routing Vulnerabilities
Common attack: advertise false routes

Routing Vulnerabilities

Causes traffic to go though compromised hosts

ARP (addr resolution protocol):
IP addr -> eth addr

Node A can confuse gateway into sending it traffic for B

By proxying traffic, attacker A can easily inject packets
(e.g. WiFi networks)
into Bs session

OSPF:

used for routing within an AS

BGP: routing between ASs

Attacker can cause entire Internet to send traffic

for a victim IP to attackers address.
Example: Youtube mishap (see DDoS lecture)

Interdomain Routing
earthlink.net

BGP overview

Stanford.edu

Iterative path announcement

BGP

Path announcements grow from destination to

source
Packets flow in reverse direction

Protocol specification

Autonomous
System

Announcements can be shortest path

Not obligated to use announced path

connected group of one or

more Internet Protocol
prefixes under a single
routing policy (aka domain)

OSPF

BGP example
1

[D. Wetherall]
27
265

7265

7
265

327

Security problems
4

3265

265
27

Issues

Potential for disruptive attacks

BGP packets are un-authenticated
Attacker can advertise arbitrary routes

65
27
627

Advertisement will propagate everywhere

Used for DoS and spam

(detailed example in DDoS lecture)

Incentive for dishonesty

Transit: 2 provides transit for 7

Algorithm seems to work OK in practice

ISP pays for some routes, others free

BGP is does not respond well to frequent node outages

DNS

Domain Name System

Hierarchical Name Space

Domain Name System

root
org

wisc

edu

net

com

stanford

ucb
cs

uk

cmu

ca

mit

ee

www

DNS Root Name Servers

DNS Lookup Example

Hierarchical service

Root name servers for

top-level domains
Authoritative name
servers for subdomains
Local name resolvers
contact authoritative
servers when they do
not know a name

www.cs.stanford.edu

Client

Local DNS
resolver

root & edu

DNS server

stanford.edu
DNS server
cs.stanford.edu
DNS server

DNS record types (partial list):

- NS: name server (points to other server)
- A:
address record (contains IP address)
- MX: address in charge of handling email
- TXT: generic text (e.g. used to distribute site public keys (DKIM) )

Caching
DNS responses are cached

Quick response for repeated translations

Useful for finding servers as well as addresses
NS records for domains

DNS Packet
Query ID:

16 bit random value

Links response to query

DNS negative queries are cached

Save time for nonexistent sites, e.g. misspelling

Cached data periodically times out

Lifetime (TTL) of data controlled by owner of data

TTL passed with every record
(from Steve Friedl)

Resolver to NS request

Response to resolver
Response contains IP
addr of next NS server
(called glue)
Response ignored if
unrecognized QueryID

Authoritative response to resolver

Basic DNS Vulnerabilities

Users/hosts trust the host-address mapping
provided by DNS:

bailiwick checking:
response is cached if
it is within the same
domain of query
(i.e. a.com cannot
set NS for b.com)

Obvious problems

final answer

DNS cache poisoning

Query:
a.bank.com

attacker wins if j: x1 = yj

local
DNS
resolver

a.bank.com
QID=x1

Interception of requests or compromise of DNS servers can

result in incorrect or malicious responses
e.g.: hijack BGP route to spoof DNS
Solution authenticated requests/responses
Provided by DNSsec
but no one uses DNSsec

If at first you dont succeed

(a la Kaminsky08)

Victim machine visits attackers web site, downloads Javascript

user
browser

Used as basis for many security policies:

Browser same origin policy,
URL address bar

ns.bank.com
IPaddr

256 responses:
Random QID y1, y2,
NS bank.com=ns.bank.com
A ns.bank.com=attackerIP

attacker

response is cached and

attacker owns bank.com

Victim machine visits attackers web site, downloads Javascript

Query:

user
browser

b.bank.com

local
DNS
resolver

attacker wins if j: x2 = yj

b.bank.com
QID=x2

ns.bank.com
IPaddr

256 responses:
Random QID y1, y2,
NS bank.com=ns.bank.com
A ns.bank.com=attackerIP

attacker

response is cached and

attacker owns bank.com
success after 256 tries (few minutes)

Defenses
Increase Query ID size.

Pharming
How?

DNS poisoning attack (less common than phishing)

a. Randomize src port, additional 11 bits

Now attack takes several hours

Change IP addresses to redirect URLs to fraudulent sites

Potentially more dangerous than phishing attacks
No email solicitation is required

DNS poisoning attacks have occurred:

b. Ask every DNS query twice:
Attacker has to guess QueryID correctly twice (32 bits)

Apparently DNS system cannot handle the load

January 2005, the domain name for a large New York ISP,
Panix, was hijacked to a site in Australia.
In November 2004, Google and Amazon users were sent to
Med Network Inc., an online pharmacy
In March 2003, a group dubbed the "Freedom Cyber Force
Militia" hijacked visitors to the Al-Jazeera Web site and
presented them with the message "God Bless Our Troops"

[DWF96, R01]

DNS Rebinding Attack

<iframe src="http://www.evil.com">

DNS Rebinding Defenses

DNS-SEC cannot
stop this attack

ns.evil.com
DNS server

171.64.7.115 TTL = 0

Firewall

192.168.0.100

corporate
web server
192.168.0.100

Browser mitigation: DNS Pinning

www.evil.com?

Refuse to switch to a new IP

Interacts poorly with proxies, VPN, dynamic DNS,
Not consistently implemented in any browser

Server-side defenses
www.evil.com
web server
171.64.7.115

Read permitted: its the same origin

Check Host header for unrecognized domains

Authenticate users with something other than IP

Firewall defenses

External names cant resolve to internal addresses

Protects browsers inside the organization

Summary
Core protocols not designed for security

Eavesdropping, Packet injection, Route stealing,

DNS poisoning

Patched over time to prevent basic attacks

(e.g. random TCP SN)

More secure variants exist (next lecture) :

IP -> IPsec
DNS -> DNSsec
BGP -> SBGP