Assigned Cases

1.) Ligot vs. Mathay 56 SCRA 823

Facts: Ligot served as a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines for three
consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-year span from December 30, 1957 to December 30, 1969. During
his second term in office (1961-1965), RA 4134 fixing the salaries of constitutional officials and certain other
officials of the national government was enacted into law and under section 7 thereof took effect on July 1, 1964.
The salaries of members of Congress (senators and congressman) were increased under said Act from P7,200.00 to
P32,000.00 per annum, but the Act expressly provided that said increases shall take effect in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution. Ligots term expired on December 30, 1969, so he filed a claim for retirement under
Commonwealth Act 186, section 12 (c) as amended by RA 4968 which provided for retirement gratuity of any
official or employee, appointive or elective, with a total of at least twenty years of service, the last three years of
which are continuous on the basis therein provided in case of employees based on the highest rate received and in
case of elected officials on the rates of pay as provided by law. HOR granted his petition however, Velasco, the then
Congress Auditor refused to so issue certification. The Auditor General then, Mathay, also disallowed the same. The
thrust of Ligots appeal is that his claim for retirement gratuity computed on the basis of the increased salary of
P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress (which was not applied to him during his incumbency which ended
December 30, 1969, while the Court held in Philconsa vs. Mathay that such increases would become operative only
for members of Congress elected to serve therein commencing December 30, 1969) should not have been
disallowed, because at the time of his retirement, the increased salary for members of Congress as provided by
law (under Republic Act 4134) was already P32,000.00 per annum.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ligot is entitled to such retirement benefit.

HELD: To allow petitioner a retirement gratuity computed on the basis of P32,000.00 per annum would be a subtle
way of increasing his compensation during his term of office and of achieving indirectly what he could not obtain
directly. Ligots claim cannot be sustained as far as he and other members of Congress similarly situated whose term
of office ended on December 30, 1969 are concerned for the simple reason that a retirement gratuity or benefit is a
form of compensation within the purview of the Constitutional provision limiting their compensation and other
emoluments to their salary as provided by law. To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms
expired on December 30, 1969 computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which they
were prohibited by the Constitution from receiving during their term of office) would be to pay them prohibited
emoluments which in effect increase the salary beyond that which they were permitted by the Constitution to receive
during their incumbency. As stressed by the Auditor-General in his decision in the similar case of petitioners
colleague, ex-Congressman Singson, (S)uch a scheme would contravene the Constitution for it would lead to the
same prohibited result by enabling administrative authorities to do indirectly what cannot be done directly.

2.) People vs. Jalosjos 324 SCRA 689

FACTS: Accused-appellant Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now confined at the
national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on 2 counts and acts of lasciviousness on 6 counts is
pending appeal. He filed a Motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of Congressman, including
attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a
non-bailable offense. He argues that the sovereign electorate of the 1st District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him
as their representative in Congress. Having been re-elected by his constituents, he has the duty to perform the
functions of a Congressman.
ISSUE: Whether or not re-election to a public office gives priority to any other right or interest, including the police
power of the State.
HELD: The privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law.
True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. In the exercise of suffrage, a free people
expects to achieve the continuity of government and the perpetuation of its benefits. However, inspite of its
importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. Our first
task is to ascertain the applicable law. We start with the incontestable proposition that all top officials of Government
executive, legislative, and judicial are subject to the majesty of law. There is an unfortunate misimpression in the
public mind that election or appointment to high government office, by itself, frees the official from the common
restrains of general law. Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a position. In fact, the
higher the rank, the greater is the requirement of obedience rather than exemption.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives, the later
customarily addressed as Congressmen, arises from a provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision
shows that the privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a
special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by
intendment, implication or equitable considerations. A Congressman like the accused-appellant, convicted under
Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code could not claim parliamentary immunity form arrest. He was subject to the
same general laws governing all persons still to be tried or whose convictions were pending appeal. x x x For
offenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there was no immunity from arrest.
The accused-appellant argues that a member of Congress function to attend sessions is underscored by Section 16
(2) , Article VI of the Constitution. However, the accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be
exempted from the operation of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel
absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a
Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by
law, it has constitutional foundations.

3.)

Jimenez vs. Cabangbang 17 SCRA 876

Facts: Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National
Defense. On 14 Nov 1958, Cabangbang caused the publication of an open letter addressed to the Philippines. Said
letter alleged that there have been allegedly three operational plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP
officers, with the aid of some civilian political strategists. That such strategists have had collusions with communists
and that the Secretary of Defense, Jesus Vargas, was planning a coup dtat to place him as the president. The
planners allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez, among others, under their guise and that Jimenez et al may or may not
be aware that they are being used as a tool to meet such an end. The letter was said to have been published in
newspapers of general circulation. Jimenez then filed a case against Cabangbang to collect a sum of damages against
Cabangbang alleging that Cabangbangs statement is libelous. Cabangbang petitioned for the case to be dismissed
because he said that as a member of the HOR he is immune from suit and that he is covered by the privileged
communication rule and that the said letter is not even libelous.
ISSUES:

Whether or not the open letter is covered by privilege communication endowed to members of Congress.
Whether or not the said letter is libelous.
HELD: Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides The Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace. Be privileged from arrest during
their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or
debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place. The publication of the said letter is not covered by
said expression which refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such
as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session as well as
bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either
in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of
Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such at the time of the
performance of the acts in question. Congress was not in session when the letter was published and at the same time
he, himself, caused the publication of the said letter. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so
published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer of any Committee
thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by the lower court the said communication is not absolutely privileged.
The SC is satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to support Jimenez action for damages. Although the
letter says that plaintiffs are under the control of the persons unnamed therein alluded to as planners, and that,
having been handpicked by Vargas, it should be noted that defendant, likewise, added that it is of course possible
that plaintiffs are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have absolutely no knowledge. In other words, the
very document upon which plaintiffs action is based explicitly indicates that they might be absolutely unaware of
the alleged operational plans, and that they may be merely unwitting tools of the planners. The SC does not think

that this statement is derogatory to Jimenez to the point of entitling them to recover damages, considering that they
are officers of our Armed Forces, that as such they are by law, under the control of the Secretary of National Defense
and the Chief of Staff, and that the letter in question seems to suggest that the group therein described as planners
include these two (2) high ranking officers. Petition is dismissed.

4.)

Liban vs. Gordon GR no. 175352

Facts: Petitioners are officers of the Board of Directors of the QC Red Cross Chapter while Respondent is the
Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors. Petitioners allege that by accepting the
chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has ceased to be a member of the Senate - Sec. 13, Art.
VI, 1987 Constitution: No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other
office/employment in the Govt, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including govt-owned
or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term w/o forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed
to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected).
Petitioners cite Camporedondo v. NLRC which held that PNRC is a govt-owned or controlled corporation. Flores v.
Drilon held that incumbent national legislators lose their elective posts upon their appointment to another
government office.
Issue: Whether Section 13, Article VI of the Philippine Constitution applies to the case of respondent who
is Chairman of the PNRC and at the same time a Member of the Senate;
Whether respondent should be automatically removed as a Senator pursuant to Section 13, Article VI of the
Philippine Constitution
Rulling: the Court held that the office of the PNRC Chairman is NOT a government office or an office in
a GOCC. The PNRC Chairman is elected by the PNRC Board of Governors; he is not appointed by the
President or by any subordinate government official. The PNRC in itself is NOT a GOCC because it is a
privately-owned, privately-funded, and privately-run charitable organization controlled by a Board of
Governors four-fifths of which are private sector individuals. Thus, respondent Gordon did not forfeit his
legislative seat when he was elected as PNRC Chairman during his incumbency as Senator [as there is no
incompatibility between the two positions].

5.) Puyat vs. De guzman 113 SCRA 31

Facts: On 14 May 1979, Puyat and his group were elected as directors of the International Pipe Industries. The
election was subsequently questioned by Acero (Puyats rival) claiming that the votes were not properly counted
hence he filed a quo warranto proceeding before the Securities and Exchange Commission on 25 May 1979. Prior to
Aceros filing of the case, Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa purchased ten
shares of stock of IPI from a member of Aceros group. And during a conference held by SEC Commissioner de
Guzman (from May 25-31 79) to have the parties confer with each other, Estanislao Fernandez entered his
appearance as counsel for Acero. Puyat objected arguing that it is unconstitutional for an assemblyman to appear as
counsel (to anyone) before any administrative body (such as the SEC). This being cleared, Fernandez inhibited
himself from appearing as counsel for Acero. He instead filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in this said SEC
case for him to intervene not as a counsel but as a legal owner of IPI shares and as a person who has a legal interest
in the matter in litigation. The SEC Commissioner granted the motion in effect granting Fernandez leave to
intervene. Puyat then moved to question the Commissioners action.

ISSUE: Whether or not Fernandez, acting as a stockholder of IPI, can appear and intervene in the SEC case without
violating the constitutional provision that an assemblyman must not appear as counsel in such courts or bodies?

HELD: No, Fernandez cannot appear before the SEC body under the guise that he is not appearing as a
counsel. Even though he is a stockholder and that he has a legal interest in the matter in litigation he is still
barred from appearing. He bought the stocks before the litigation took place. During the conference he
presented himself as counsel but because it is clearly stated that he cannot do so under the constitution he
instead presented himself as a party of interest which is clearly a work around and is clearly an act after
the fact. A mere work around to get himself involved in the litigation. What could not be done directly
could not likewise be done indirectly.