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The Essential Ideas of Islamic Philosophy

A Brief Survey

Prof. Mashhad Al-Allaf

The Edwin Mellen Press, USA, 2006, ISBN: 0-7734-5848-4, HC, 345 pp.

Ibn Sins Metaphysics

Essence and Existence: The Possible and the Necessary
Existents, or beings, are of two kinds: the first is the possible, it can
be conceived essentially (as an essence) without a necessity to conceive it
as an existent being, because its essence is different from its existence. For
example, the conception of a triangle does not require its existence and
does not necessitate its existence outside the mind. Another example is
designing a house: the design of a house (in ones mind) does not
necessitate its existence in reality. It needs a cause (the builder) to make it
exist.

It is possible for this cause to determine its existence or its

nonexistenceby determining to keep it as a concept or a design and not a

real thing. This being which has the possibility of existence or
nonexistence is called the possible.
The second existent, or being, is the necessary, it is impossible to
conceive this without existence, as with God, whose essence and existence
cannot be separated. Thus, this being does not need a cause to give Him
existence because He is always in existence. To conceive of the necessary
as a nonexistent is impossible.
The possible must have a cause to actualize it, and the existence of
this possible will be the effect. A thing cannot be the cause of itself, and the
series of causes and effects cannot regress to infinity. Therefore, there
must be an ultimate cause for the possible, and this is God (the necessary
being).

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In his book The healing [ash-Shif],13 Ibn Sin discusses this issue, he
says that Things which are included in existence can be divided in the
mind into two [kinds]. One of these is that which, when it is considered in
itself, does not have its existence by necessity. And it is clear that its
existence is also not impossible, for if its existence were impossible, it
would not be included in existence. This thing is in the domain of
possibility. The other of these is that which, when it is considered in itself,
has its existence by necessity.14
Ibn Sin mentions some characteristics of this necessary being as not
relative, not changeable, not multiple; and they do not share in respect to
the existence that is peculiar to the necessary being. Ibn Sin also tries to
offer logical arguments to prove these characteristics. About these
characteristics he says,
The necessary existent does not have a cause, while the
possible does have a cause. The necessary existent is necessary in
respect to existence in all of its aspects. It is not possible for this
necessary, by itself, to be coequal with another existent, so that
each of them is equal with the other in respect to the necessity of
existence; thus both cannot necessarily accompany each other. It
is also not possible for that necessary being to be composed of a
multitude at all. It is not possible for the true nature of the
necessary being to be shared with something else in any way
whatsoever.15

Arthur Hyman translated this portion from Ibn Sins ash-Shif, in Ilhiyyt, ed.
G. C. Anawati and Sa'id Zayed (Cairo: Organization Generale des Imprimeries
Gouvernementales, 1960). See Arthur Hyman and James J. Walsh, ed., Philosophy in the
Middle Ages (Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, IN, 1973), pp. 241255. I
referred to Ibn Sins Kitb an-najt [Book of safety] (Beirut: Dr al-fq al-Jadda,
1985).
13

14

Compare with Ibn Sin, Kitb an-najt, p. 261.

15

Ibid., pp. 262263

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The Necessary Does Not Have a Cause
If that whose existence is necessary were to have a cause for its
existence, then its existence would be through that cause. But everything
whose existence is through some other thing does not have existence by
necessity. However, anything which does not have existence by necessity
(when it is considered in itself, apart from the other) is not necessary in
respect to existence through itself. Therefore, that whose existence is
necessary does not have a cause.
The Possible Cannot Be the Cause of its Existence
When the possible is considered in respect to itself, it has both its
existence and nonexistence from a cause. If it exists, then existence (as
distinguished from nonexistence) has come to it, and, if it does not exist,
then the possible is in a state of nonexistence (as distinguished from
existence).
Now each of these two attributes (existence and nonexistence) must
come to it (A) either from something else, or (B) not from something else.
A. If its existence comes from something else, then that other is
the cause.
B. However, it is a contradiction for it to be possible to come from
something else and not come from something else, because it is
evident that everything, which does not exist at first and then
exists, is determined by something other than itself.
Also, the essence of the possible is either sufficient for this
determination (for its existence or nonexistence) or the essence is not
sufficient for it.

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Now if the essence is sufficient for one of the two attributes (existence
and nonexistence), then that thing is something whose essence is
necessary through itself (necessary being).
However, it was assumed that it is not necessary.
Therefore, this is a contradiction, and its essence cannot be sufficient.
If the existence of its essence is not sufficient for its existence but
something else bestows its existence upon it, then its existence proceeds
from the existence of some other thing different from it and this is
necessarily its cause.
Therefore, the possible has a cause which makes one of these two
attributes necessary for it, not through itself, but through a necessary
existent cause.16
Ibn Sin also considers the argument on the regression of causes and
effects to be impossible.
The necessary cause is required from the beginning. Otherwise, the
effect is brought by another thing through which its existence is
established (instead of nonexistence), and if that is brought by another
cause, then the series of causes and effects would go on to infinity.
If the series of causes and effects would go on to infinity, then it would
not be. (Ibn Sin meant that its existence would not be determined
because the chain of infinity would not come to an end.) This is absurd
because the regression to infinity is impossible and that through which it is
determined (the cause) would not yet exist.
However, it was assumed that the cause exists.
Therefore, it is clear that everything whose existence is possible will
not exist unless it is necessary in relation to its cause.
16

Ibid., p. 262 for comparison.

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The Impossibility of Two Coequal Existents Both Being
Necessary
Ibn Sins argument is long and complex. I quote the original text of
Ibn Sin, and then clarify it. In brief, Ibn Sin thinks that if the two
existents are both coequally necessary, then one of them is not the cause of
the other. Ibn Sin proves that both cannot be coequal in regard to the
necessity of their existence. As a result of this, he wants to prove that if the
two coequals exist, then they must have a cause other than themselves that
determines their existence. His argument proceeds in the following way.
It is not possible that that whose existence is necessary is
coequal with another whose existence is necessary, so that the
first exists with the second and the second exists with the first,
and [so that] one of them is not the cause of the other, but both
are coequals in regard to the necessity of [their] existence. For, if
one considers the essence of one of them in itself apart from the
other, it must be [A] that it is either necessary through itself or
[B] that it is not necessary through itself. Now, if [A] it is
necessary through itself, it must be that [since the two are
coequal] [A1] it also possesses necessity when it is considered
together with the second [that is, it is necessary through itself and
necessary through another]. Thus something would exist whose
existence is necessary through itself and whose existence is
necessary because of another. But this is absurd, as has
previously been shown. Or [A2] it is the case that [when that
whose existence is necessary through itself is considered together
with that which is coequal with it] it possesses no necessity in
respect to the other [that is, it is necessary through itself, possible
through another]. In that case, it would not be necessary that its
existence would follow from the existence of the other. But it
would be necessary that its existence does not have a relation to
the other, so that it can only exist when the other exists. [Thus
one could exist without the other which is against the assumption
that they are coequal.]
Now should it be the case [B] that [the first] is not necessary
through itself, it would follow [B1] that, considered in respect to

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itself, it would be something whose existence is possible, while,
considered in respect to the other, it would be something whose
existence is necessary. Then it must be [B1-1] that the second is
like the first [that is, it is possible in respect to itself, necessary in
respect to another], or [B1-2] the second is not [like the first].
Now, [B1-1] if the second is like the first [that is, it is possible in
respect to itself, necessary in respect to another], it again must be
that necessity of existence comes to the first from the second
either [B1-A1] insofar as the second is in the category of
something whose existence is possible, or [B1-A2] insofar as it is
in the category of something whose existence is necessary. Now
[B1-A2] if necessity of existence comes to the first from the
second, while the second is in the category of something whose
existence is necessaryyet not necessary through itself or
through some third thing which precedes it (as was stated
previously)but necessary through that which proceeds from it
[that is, the second must necessarily come from the first], the
necessary existence of the first would [then] be a condition in
which there is contained a necessary existence which comes after
the necessity of its own existence. In that case necessary existence
would not come to [the first principle] at all [from the second,
since it already possesses it].
But [B1-A1] if necessary existence comes to the first from the
second, while the second is in the category of something [whose
existence is] possible, then necessary existence comes to the first
from the essence of the second, while the second is in the
category of something possible. And it would be the case that the
essence of the second, which is in the category of something
possible, would impart to the first necessary existence, without
there having been imparted to the second the category of the
possible from the first, but [the first would have imparted to the
second the category of] the necessary. As a result, the cause of the
first would be the possible existence of the second, while the first
would not be the cause for the possible existence of the second.
Thus the two would not be coequal; I have in mind that which is
its cause essentially and that which is caused essentially.17

17

See Hyman, Philosophy, pp. 234244.

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The Structure of Ibn Sins Argument
In this lengthy argument about the type of the existence of the two
coequals, Ibn Sin seems to argue in this way:
If we consider the essence of one of them in itself apart from the
other, then (A) it is either necessary through itself, or (B) it is not
necessary through itself.
A. If it is necessary through itself, then (since the two are coequal)
it must be that
A1. it also possesses necessity when it is considered together
with the second (i.e., it is necessary through itself and
necessary through another).
Thus, something would exist whose existence is necessary through itself
and whose existence is necessary because of another. However, this is
absurd, as has previously been shown. Or
A2. It possesses no necessity in respect to the other (i.e., it is
necessary through itself, possible through another). In that
case, it would not be necessary that its existence would follow
from the existence of the other.
But it would be necessary for it that its existence does not have a relation
to the other, so that it can only exist when the other exists. Thus, one could
exist without the other which is against the assumption that they are
coequal.
B. It is not necessary through itself, so it follows:

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B1. When it is considered in respect to itself, it would be
something whose existence is possible. While considered in
respect to the other, it would be something whose existence is
necessary. Then it must be that
B1-1. the second is like the first, i.e., it is possible in respect
to itself, necessary in respect to another. Or
B1-2. The second is not like the first. Now, [B1-1] if the
second is like the first (i.e., it is possible in respect to itself,
necessary in respect to another), it again must be that
necessity of existence comes to the first from the second,
either
B1-2a. insofar as the second is in the category of something
whose existence is possible, or
B1-2b. insofar as it is in the category of something whose
existence is necessary.
Now [B1-2b] if necessity of existence comes to the first from the
second, while the second is in the category of something whose existence is
necessaryyet not necessary through itself or through some third thing
which precedes it (as was stated previously), but necessary through that
which proceeds from it (i.e., the second must necessarily come from the
first), the necessary existence of the first would then be a condition in
which there is contained a necessary existence which comes after the
necessity of its own existence. In that case, necessary existence would not
come to the first principle at all from the second since it already possesses
it.
However [B1-2a], if necessary existence comes to the first from the
second, while the second is in the category of something whose existence is

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possible, then necessary existence comes to the first from the essence of
the second, while the second is in the category of something possible. And
it would be the case that the essence of the second, which is in the category
of something possible, would impart to the first necessary existence,
without there having been imparted to the second the category of the
possible from the first, but the first would have imparted to the second the
category of the necessary.
As a result, the cause of the first would be the possible existence of the
second, while the first would not be the cause for the possible existence of
the second. Thus the two would not be coequal.
An Argument to Prove that the Necessary Being is One
Ibn Sin presents an argument on the oneness of God:
That whose existence is necessary must necessarily be one
essence. For if it was not, it would be a multitude, each one of
whose [parts] would be something whose existence is necessary.
It would follow then, that each one of these [parts] would not
at all differ from another in regard to the notion which is its true
nature, or that [one part] would differ from another.
Now, if one [part] would not differ from another in regard to
the notion which belongs to its essence essentially (yet one [part]
differs from another in that it is not the other and this is
undoubtedly a difference), then one [part] will differ from
another in regard to some other notion . . .
Now each one of these parts is differentiated from the other
through this [principle], while it is not differentiated from the
other through the notion itself [that is, the essence], but it is
differentiated from the other through some other notion.
The things which are other than the notion [of the essence]
and which are adjoined to the notion [of the essence] are the
accidents and the consequences which are not essential.
Now these consequences occur to the existence of something
[1] insofar as it is this [particular] existence and in this case it is
necessary that the whole thing agrees in [this consequence]. But