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2004 Rules on Notarial Practice A.M. No. 02-8-13SC, July 6, 2004; Amended by A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC
February 19,2008
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC
February 19, 2008
RE: 2004 RULES ON NOTARIAL PRACTICE The Court Resolved, upon the recommendation of the
Sub Committee on the Revision of the Rules Governing
Notaries Public, to AMEND Sec. 12 (a). Rule II of the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, to wit:
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution
of the Court En Banc dated February 19, 2008.
"A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC-Re: 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice. The Court Resolved, upon the
recommendation of the Sub Committee on the
Revision of the Rules Governing Notaries Public,
to AMEND Sec. 12 (a). Rule II of the 2004 Rules
on Notarial Practice, to wit:
Rule II
DEFINITIONS
xxx
"Sec. 12. Component Evidence of Identity. The
phrase "competent evidence of identity"
refers to the identification of an individual based
on:
(a) at least one current identification
document issued by an official agency
bearing the photograph and signature of
the individual, such as but not limited to,
passport, drivers license, Professional
Regulations Commission ID, National
Bureau of Investigation clearance, police
clearance, postal ID, voters ID, Barangay
certification, Government Service and
Insurance System (GSIS) e-card, Social
Security System (SSS) card, Philhealth
card, senior citizen card, Overseas
Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA)
ID, OFW ID, seamans book, alien
certificate of registration/immigrant
certificate of registration, government
office ID, certification from the National
Council for the Welfare of Disable Persons
(NCWDP), Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD) certification; or
Very truly yours.
MA. LUISA D. VILLARAMA (sgd)
Clerk of Court
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice
RESOLUTION

Acting on the compliance dated 05 July 2004 and on the

proposed Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004 submitted
by the Sub-Committee for the Study, Drafting and
Formulation of the Rules Governing the Appointment of
Notaries Public and the Performance and Exercise of
Their Official Functions, of the Committees on Revision
of the Rules of Court and on Legal Education and Bar
Matters, the Court Resolved to APPROVE the proposed
Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004, with modifications,
thus:
2004 RULES ON NOTARIAL PRACTICE
RULE I
IMPLEMENTATION
SECTION 1. Title. - These Rules shall be known as the
2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.
SEC. 2. Purposes. - These Rules shall be applied and
construed to advance the following purposes:
(a) to promote, serve, and protect public interest;
(b) to simplify, clarify, and modernize the rules
governing notaries public; and
(c) to foster ethical conduct among notaries
public.
SEC. 3. Interpretation. - Unless the context of these
Rules otherwise indicates, words in the singular include
the plural, and words in the plural include the singular.
RULE II
DEFINITIONS
SECTION 1. Acknowledgment. - Acknowledgment
refers to an act in which an individual on a single
occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and
presents an integrally complete instrument or
document;
(b) is attested to be personally known to the notary
public or identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these
Rules; and (c) represents to the notary public that the signature on
the instrument or document was voluntarily affixed by
him for the purposes stated in the instrument or
document, declares that he has executed the
instrument or document as his free and voluntary act
and deed, and, if he acts in a particular representative
capacity, that he has the authority to sign in that
capacity.
SEC. 2. Affirmation or Oath. - The term Affirmation
or Oath refers to an act in which an individual on a
single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public;
(b) is personally known to the notary public or
identified by the notary public through competent
evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and
(c) avows under penalty of law to the whole truth of the
contents of the instrument or document.
SEC. 3. Commission. - Commission refers to the
grant of authority to perform notarial acts and to the
written evidence of the authority.
SEC. 4. Copy Certification. - Copy Certification
refers to a notarial act in which a notary public:

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(a) is presented with an instrument or document that is
neither a vital record, a public record, nor publicly
recordable;
(b) copies or supervises the copying of the instrument
or document;
(c) compares the instrument or document with the
copy; and
(d) determines that the copy is accurate and complete.
SEC. 5. Notarial Register. - Notarial Register refers
to a permanently bound book with numbered pages
containing a chronological record of notarial acts
performed by a notary public.
SEC. 6. Jurat. - Jurat refers to an act in which an
individual on a single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and
presents an instrument or document;
(b) is personally known to the notary public or
identified by the notary public through competent
evidence of identity as defined by these Rules;
(c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of
the notary; and
(d) takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public
as to such instrument or document.
SEC. 7. Notarial Act and Notarization. - Notarial Act
and Notarization refer to any act that a notary
public is empowered to perform under these Rules.
SEC. 8. Notarial Certificate. - Notarial Certificate
refers to the part of, or attachment to, a notarized
instrument or document that is completed by the notary
public, bears the notary's signature and seal, and states
the facts attested to by the notary public in a particular
notarization as provided for by these Rules.
SEC. 9. Notary Public and Notary. - Notary Public
and Notary refer to any person commissioned to
perform official acts under these Rules.
SEC. 10. Principal. - Principal refers to a person
appearing before the notary public whose act is the
subject of notarization.
SEC. 11. Regular Place of Work or Business. - The term
regular place of work or business refers to a
stationary office in the city or province wherein the
notary public renders legal and notarial services.
SEC. 12. Competent Evidence of Identity. - The phrase
competent evidence of identity refers to the
identification of an individual based on:
(a) at least one current identification document issued
by an official agency bearing the photograph and
signature of the individual; or
(b) the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not
privy to the instrument, document or transaction who is
personally known to the notary public and who
personally knows the individual, or of two credible
witnesses neither of whom is privy to the instrument,
document or transaction who each personally knows the
individual and shows to the notary public documentary
identification.
SEC. 13. Official Seal or Seal. - Official seal or
Seal refers to a device for affixing a mark, image or
impression on all papers officially signed by the notary
public conforming the requisites prescribed by these
Rules.

SEC. 14. Signature Witnessing. - The term signature

witnessing refers to a notarial act in which an
individual on a single occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and
presents an instrument or document;
(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified
by the notary public through competent evidence of
identity as defined by these Rules; and
(c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of
the notary public.
SEC. 15. Court. - Court refers to the Supreme Court
of the Philippines.
SEC. 16. Petitioner. - Petitioner refers to a person
who applies for a notarial commission.
SEC. 17. Office of the Court Administrator. - Office of
the Court Administrator refers to the Office of the
Court Administrator of the Supreme Court.
SEC. 18. Executive Judge. - Executive Judge refers
to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of a
city or province who issues a notarial commission.
SEC. 19. Vendor. - Vendor under these Rules refers
to a seller of a notarial seal and shall include a
wholesaler or retailer.
SEC. 20. Manufacturer. - Manufacturer under these
Rules refers to one who produces a notarial seal and
shall include an engraver and seal maker.
RULE III
COMMISSIONING OF NOTARY PUBLIC
SECTION 1. Qualifications. - A notarial commission may
be issued by an Executive Judge to any qualified person
who submits a petition in accordance with these Rules.
To be eligible for commissioning as notary public, the
petitioner:
(1) must be a citizen of the Philippines;
(2) must be over twenty-one (21) years of age;
(3) must be a resident in the Philippines for at
least one (1) year and maintains a regular place
of work or business in the city or province where
the commission is to be issued;
(4) must be a member of the Philippine Bar in
good standing with clearances from the Office of
the Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and
(5) must not have been convicted in the first
instance of any crime involving moral turpitude.
SEC. 2. Form of the Petition and Supporting Documents.
- Every petition for a notarial commission shall be in
writing, verified, and shall include the following:
(a) a statement containing the petitioner's personal
qualifications, including the petitioner's date of birth,
residence, telephone number, professional tax receipt,
roll of attorney's number and IBP membership number;
(b) certification of good moral character of the
petitioner by at least two (2) executive officers of the
local chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
where he is applying for commission;
(c) proof of payment for the filing of the petition as
required by these Rules; and
(d) three (3) passport-size color photographs with light
background taken within thirty (30) days of the

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application. The photograph should not be retouched.
The petitioner shall sign his name at the bottom part of
the photographs.
SEC. 3. Application Fee. - Every petitioner for a notarial
commission shall pay the application fee as prescribed
in the Rules of Court.
SEC. 4. Summary Hearing on the Petition. - The
Executive Judge shall conduct a summary hearing on
the petition and shall grant the same if:
(a) the petition is sufficient in form and substance;
(b) the petitioner proves the allegations contained in
the petition; and
(c) the petitioner establishes to the satisfaction of the
Executive Judge that he has read and fully understood
these Rules.
The Executive Judge shall forthwith issue a commission
and a Certificate of Authorization to Purchase a Notarial
Seal in favor of the petitioner.
SEC. 5. Notice of Summary Hearing. (a) The notice of summary hearing shall be published in
a newspaper of general circulation in the city or
province where the hearing shall be conducted and
posted in a conspicuous place in the offices of the
Executive Judge and of the Clerk of Court. The cost of
the publication shall be borne by the petitioner. The
notice may include more than one petitioner.
(b) The notice shall be substantially in the following
form:
NOTICE OF HEARING
Notice is hereby given that a summary hearing on
the petition for notarial commission of (name of
petitioner) shall be held on (date) at (place) at
(time). Any person who has any cause or reason
to object to the grant of the petition may file a
verified written opposition thereto, received by
the undersigned before the date of the summary
hearing.
_____________________
Executive Judge
SEC. 6. Opposition to Petition. - Any person who has any
cause or reason to object to the grant of the petition
may file a verified written opposition thereto. The
opposition must be received by the Executive Judge
before the date of the summary hearing.
SEC. 7. Form of Notarial Commission. - The
commissioning of a notary public shall be in a formal
order signed by the Executive Judge substantially in the
following form:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ______________
This is to certify that (name of notary public) of
(regular place of work or business) in (city or
province) was on this (date) day of (month) two
thousand and (year) commissioned by the
undersigned as a notary public, within and for the
said jurisdiction, for a term ending the thirty-first
day of December (year)
________________________
Executive Judge
SEC. 8. Period Of Validity of Certificate of Authorization
to Purchase a Notarial Seal. - The Certificate of
Authorization to Purchase a Notarial Seal shall be valid

for a period of three (3) months from date of issue,

unless extended by the Executive Judge.
A mark, image or impression of the seal that may be
purchased by the notary public pursuant to the
Certificate shall be presented to the Executive Judge for
approval prior to use.
SEC. 9. Form of Certificate of Authorization to Purchase
a Notarial Seal. - The Certificate of Authorization to
Purchase a Notarial Seal shall substantially be in the
following form:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF_____________
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORIZATION
TO PURCHASE A NOTARIAL SEAL
This is to authorize (name of notary public) of
(city or province) who was commissioned by the
undersigned as a notary public, within and for the
said jurisdiction, for a term ending, the thirtyfirst of December (year) to purchase a notarial
seal.
Issued this (day) of (month) (year).
________________________
Executive Judge
SEC. 10. Official Seal of Notary Public. - Every person
commissioned as notary public shall have only one
official seal of office in accordance with these Rules.
SEC. 11. Jurisdiction and Term. - A person commissioned
as notary public may perform notarial acts in any
place within the territorial jurisdiction of the
commissioning court for a period of two (2) years
commencing the first day of January of the year in
which the commissioning is made, unless earlier
revoked or the notary public has resigned under
these Rules and the Rules of Court.
SEC. 12. Register of Notaries Public. - The Executive
Judge shall keep and maintain a Register of Notaries
Public in his jurisdiction which shall contain,
among others, the dates of issuance or
revocation or suspension of notarial commissions,
and the resignation or death of notaries public.
The Executive Judge shall furnish the Office of the Court
Administrator information and data recorded in the
register of notaries public. The Office of the Court
Administrator shall keep a permanent, complete and
updated database of such records.
SEC. 13. Renewal of Commission. - A notary public may
file a written application with the Executive Judge for
the renewal of his commission within forty-five (45)
days before the expiration thereof. A mark, image
or impression of the seal of the notary public shall be
attached to the application.
Failure to file said application will result in the
deletion of the name of the notary public in the
register of notaries public.
The notary public thus removed from the Register of
Notaries Public may only be reinstated therein after he
is issued a new commission in accordance with these
Rules.
SEC. 14. Action on Application for Renewal of
Commission. - The Executive Judge shall, upon
payment of the application fee mentioned in

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Section 3 above of this Rule, act on an application
for the renewal of a commission within thirty (30)
days from receipt thereof. If the application is
denied, the Executive Judge shall state the
reasons therefor.
RULE IV
POWERS AND LIMITATIONS OF NOTARIES PUBLIC
SECTION 1. Powers. - (a) A notary public is
empowered to perform the following notarial
acts:
(1) acknowledgments;
(2) oaths and affirmations;
(3) jurats;
(4) signature witnessings;
(5) copy certifications; and
(6) any other act authorized by these Rules.
(b) A notary public is authorized to certify the
affixing of a signature by thumb or other mark on
an instrument or document presented for
notarization if:
(1) the thumb or other mark is affixed in the presence
of the notary public and of two (2) disinterested and
unaffected witnesses to the instrument or document;
(2) both witnesses sign their own names in addition to
the thumb or other mark;
(3) the notary public writes below the thumb or other
mark: "Thumb or Other Mark affixed by (name of
signatory by mark) in the presence of (names and
addresses of witnesses) and undersigned notary public";
and
(4) the notary public notarizes the signature by thumb
or other mark through an acknowledgment, jurat, or
signature witnessing.
(c) A notary public is authorized to sign on behalf
of a person who is physically unable to sign or
make a mark on an instrument or document if:
(1) the notary public is directed by the person unable to
sign or make a mark to sign on his behalf;
(2) the signature of the notary public is affixed in the
presence of two disinterested and unaffected witnesses
to the instrument or document;
(3) both witnesses sign their own names ;
(4) the notary public writes below his signature:
Signature affixed by notary in presence of (names and
addresses of person and two [2] witnesses); and
(5) the notary public notarizes his signature by
acknowledgment or jurat.
SEC. 2. Prohibitions. - (a) A notary public shall not
perform a notarial act outside his regular place of
work or business; provided, however, that on
certain exceptional occasions or situations, a
notarial act may be performed at the request of
the parties in the following sites located within
his territorial jurisdiction:
(1) public offices, convention halls, and similar places
where oaths of office may be administered;
(2) public function areas in hotels and similar places for
the signing of instruments or documents requiring
notarization;
(3) hospitals and other medical institutions where a
party to an instrument or document is confined for
treatment; and

(4) any place where a party to an instrument or

document requiring notarization is under detention.
(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the
person involved as signatory to the instrument or
document (1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the
time of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or
otherwise identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these
Rules.
SEC. 3. Disqualifications. - A notary public is
disqualified from performing a notarial act if he:
(a) is a party to the instrument or document that is to
be notarized;
(b) will receive, as a direct or indirect result, any
commission, fee, advantage, right, title, interest, cash,
property, or other consideration, except as provided by
these Rules and by law; or
(c) is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor,
descendant, or relative by affinity or consanguinity of
the principal within the fourth civil degree
SEC. 4. Refusal to Notarize. - A notary public shall
not perform any notarial act described in these
Rules for any person requesting such an act even
if he tenders the appropriate fee specified by
these Rules if:
(a) the notary knows or has good reason to believe that
the notarial act or transaction is unlawful or immoral;
(b) the signatory shows a demeanor which engenders
in the mind of the notary public reasonable doubt as to
the former's knowledge of the consequences of the
transaction requiring a notarial act; and
(c) in the notary's judgment, the signatory is not acting
of his or her own free will.
SEC. 5. False or Incomplete Certificate. - A notary
public shall not:
(a) execute a certificate containing information known
or believed by the notary to be false.
(b) affix an official signature or seal on a notarial
certificate that is incomplete.
SEC. 6. Improper Instruments or Documents. - A notary
public shall not notarize:
(a) a blank or incomplete instrument or document; or
(b) an instrument or document without appropriate
notarial certification.
RULE V
FEES OF NOTARY PUBLIC
SECTION 1. Imposition and Waiver of Fees. - For
performing a notarial act, a notary public may charge
the maximum fee as prescribed by the Supreme Court
unless he waives the fee in whole or in part.
SEC. 2. Travel Fees and Expenses. - A notary public
may charge travel fees and expenses separate and
apart from the notarial fees prescribed in the preceding
section when traveling to perform a notarial act if the
notary public and the person requesting the notarial act
agree prior to the travel.
SEC. 3. Prohibited Fees. No fee or compensation of
any kind, except those expressly prescribed and allowed

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herein, shall be collected or received for any notarial
service.
SEC. 4. Payment or Refund of Fees. - A notary public
shall not require payment of any fees specified herein
prior to the performance of a notarial act unless
otherwise agreed upon.
Any travel fees and expenses paid to a notary public
prior to the performance of a notarial act are not subject
to refund if the notary public had already traveled but
failed to complete in whole or in part the notarial act for
reasons beyond his control and without negligence on
his part.
SEC. 5. Notice of Fees. - A notary public who charges
a fee for notarial services shall issue a receipt registered
with the Bureau of Internal Revenue and keep a journal
of notarial fees. He shall enter in the journal all fees
charged for services rendered.
A notary public shall post in a conspicuous place in his
office a complete schedule of chargeable notarial fees.
RULE VI
NOTARIAL REGISTER
SECTION 1. Form of Notarial Register. - (a) A notary
public shall keep, maintain, protect and provide for
lawful inspection as provided in these Rules, a
chronological official notarial register of notarial
acts consisting of a permanently bound book with
numbered pages.
The register shall be kept in books to be furnished by
the Solicitor General to any notary public upon request
and upon payment of the cost thereof. The register shall
be duly paged, and on the first page, the Solicitor
General shall certify the number of pages of which the
book consists.
For purposes of this provision, a Memorandum of
Agreement or Understanding may be entered into by
the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the
Court Administrator.
(b) A notary public shall keep only one active notarial
register at any given time.
SEC. 2. Entries in the Notarial Register. - (a) For
every notarial act, the notary shall record in the
notarial register at the time of notarization the
following:
(1) the entry number and page number;
(2) the date and time of day of the notarial act;
(3) the type of notarial act;
(4) the title or description of the instrument, document
or proceeding;
(5) the name and address of each principal;
(6) the competent evidence of identity as defined by
these Rules if the signatory is not
personally known to the notary;
(7) the name and address of each credible witness
swearing to or affirming the person's identity;
(8) the fee charged for the notarial act;
(9) the address where the notarization was performed if
not in the notary's regular place of work or business;
and
(10) any other circumstance the notary public may
deem of significance or relevance.
(b) A notary public shall record in the notarial register
the reasons and circumstances for not completing a
notarial act.

(c) A notary public shall record in the notarial register

the circumstances of any request to inspect or copy an
entry in the notarial register, including the requester's
name, address, signature, thumbmark or other
recognized identifier, and evidence of identity. The
reasons for refusal to allow inspection or copying of a
journal entry shall also be recorded.
(d) When the instrument or document is a contract, the
notary public shall keep an original copy thereof as part
of his records and enter in said records a brief
description of the substance thereof and shall give to
each entry a consecutive number, beginning with
number one in each calendar year. He shall also retain a
duplicate original copy for the Clerk of Court.
(e) The notary public shall give to each instrument or
document executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before
him a number corresponding to the one in his register,
and shall also state on the instrument or document the
page/s of his register on which the same is recorded. No
blank line shall be left between entries.
(f) In case of a protest of any draft, bill of exchange or
promissory note, the notary public shall make a full and
true record of all proceedings in relation thereto and
shall note therein whether the demand for the sum of
money was made, by whom, when, and where; whether
he presented such draft, bill or note; whether notices
were given, to whom and in what manner; where the
same was made, when and to whom and where
directed; and of every other fact touching the same.
(g) At the end of each week, the notary public shall
certify in his notarial register the number of instruments
or documents executed, sworn to, acknowledged, or
protested before him; or if none, this certificate shall
show this fact.
(h) A certified copy of each month's entries and a
duplicate original copy of any instrument acknowledged
before the notary public shall, within the first ten (10)
days of the month following, be forwarded to the Clerk
of Court and shall be under the responsibility of such
officer. If there is no entry to certify for the month, the
notary shall forward a statement to this effect in lieu of
certified copies herein required.
SEC. 3. Signatures and Thumbmarks. - At the time of
notarization, the notary's notarial register shall be
signed or a thumb or other mark affixed by each:
(a) principal;
(b) credible witness swearing or affirming to the identity
of a principal; and
(c) witness to a signature by thumb or other mark, or to
a signing by the notary public on behalf of a person
physically unable to sign.
SEC. 4. Inspection, Copying and Disposal. - (a) In the
notary's presence, any person may inspect an entry in
the notarial register, during regular business hours,
provided;
(1) the person's identity is personally known to the
notary public or proven through competent evidence of
identity as defined in these Rules;
(2) the person affixes a signature and thumb or other
mark or other recognized identifier, in the notarial
register in a separate, dated entry;
(3) the person specifies the month, year, type of
instrument or document, and name of the principal in

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the notarial act or acts sought; and
(4) the person is shown only the entry or entries
specified by him.
(b) The notarial register may be examined by a law
enforcement officer in the course of an official
investigation or by virtue of a court order.
(c) If the notary public has a reasonable ground to
believe that a person has a criminal intent or wrongful
motive in requesting information from the notarial
register, the notary shall deny access to any entry or
entries therein.
SEC. 5. Loss, Destruction or Damage of Notarial
Register. - (a) In case the notarial register is stolen, lost,
destroyed, damaged, or otherwise rendered unusable or
illegible as a record of notarial acts, the notary public
shall, within ten (10) days after informing the
appropriate law enforcement agency in the case of theft
or vandalism, notify the Executive Judge by any means
providing a proper receipt or acknowledgment,
including registered mail and also provide a copy or
number of any pertinent police report.
(b) Upon revocation or expiration of a notarial
commission, or death of the notary public, the notarial
register and notarial records shall immediately be
delivered to the office of the Executive Judge.
SEC. 6. Issuance of Certified True Copies. - The notary
public shall supply a certified true copy of the notarial
record, or any part thereof, to any person applying for
such copy upon payment of the legal fees.
RULE VII
SIGNATURE AND SEAL OF NOTARY PUBLIC
SECTION 1. Official Signature. In notarizing a paper
instrument or document, a notary public shall:
(a) sign by hand on the notarial certificate only the
name indicated and as appearing on the notary's
commission;
(b) not sign using a facsimile stamp or printing device;
and
(c) affix his official signature only at the time the
notarial act is performed.
SEC. 2. Official Seal. - (a) Every person commissioned as
notary public shall have a seal of office, to be procured
at his own expense, which shall not be possessed or
owned by any other person. It shall be of metal, circular
in shape, two inches in diameter, and shall have the
name of the city or province and the word Philippines
and his own name on the margin and the roll of
attorney's number on the face thereof, with the words
"notary public" across the center. A mark, image or
impression of such seal shall be made directly on the
paper or parchment on which the writing appears.
(b) The official seal shall be affixed only at the time the
notarial act is performed and shall be clearly impressed
by the notary public on every page of the instrument or
document notarized.
(c) When not in use, the official seal shall be kept safe
and secure and shall be accessible only to the notary
public or the person duly authorized by him.
(d) Within five (5) days after the official seal of a notary
public is stolen, lost, damaged or other otherwise
rendered unserviceable in affixing a legible image, the
notary public, after informing the appropriate law
enforcement agency, shall notify the Executive Judge in

writing, providing proper receipt or acknowledgment,

including registered mail, and in the event of a crime
committed, provide a copy or entry number of the
appropriate police record. Upon receipt of such notice, if
found in order by the Executive Judge, the latter shall
order the notary public to cause notice of such loss or
damage to be published, once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general
circulation in the city or province where the notary
public is commissioned. Thereafter, the Executive Judge
shall issue to the notary public a new Certificate of
Authorization to Purchase a Notarial Seal.
(e) Within five (5) days after the death or resignation of
the notary public, or the revocation or expiration of a
notarial commission, the official seal shall be
surrendered to the Executive Judge and shall be
destroyed or defaced in public during office hours. In
the event that the missing, lost or damaged seal is later
found or surrendered, it shall be delivered by the notary
public to the Executive Judge to be disposed of in
accordance with this section. Failure to effect such
surrender shall constitute contempt of court. In the
event of death of the notary public, the person in
possession of the official seal shall have the duty to
surrender it to the Executive Judge.
SEC. 3. Seal Image. - The notary public shall affix a
single, clear, legible, permanent, and photographically
reproducible mark, image or impression of the official
seal beside his signature on the notarial certificate of a
paper instrument or document.
SEC. 4. Obtaining and Providing Seal. - (a) A vendor or
manufacturer of notarial seals may not sell said product
without a written authorization from the Executive
Judge.
(b) Upon written application and after payment of the
application fee, the Executive Judge may issue an
authorization to sell to a vendor or manufacturer of
notarial seals after verification and investigation of the
latter's qualifications. The Executive Judge shall charge
an authorization fee in the amount of PhP 4,000 for the
vendor and PhP 8,000 for the manufacturer. If a
manufacturer is also a vendor, he shall only pay the
manufacturer's authorization fee.
(c) The authorization shall be in effect for a period of
four (4) years from the date of its issuance and may be
renewed by the Executive Judge for a similar period
upon payment of the authorization fee mentioned in the
preceding paragraph.
(d) A vendor or manufacturer shall not sell a seal to a
buyer except upon submission of a certified copy of the
commission and the Certificate of Authorization to
Purchase a Notarial Seal issued by the Executive Judge.
A notary public obtaining a new seal as a result of
change of name shall present to the vendor or
manufacturer a certified copy of the Confirmation of the
Change of Name issued by the Executive Judge.
(e) Only one seal may be sold by a vendor or
manufacturer for each Certificate of Authorization to
Purchase a Notarial Seal.
(f) After the sale, the vendor or manufacturer shall affix
a mark, image or impression of the seal to the
Certificate of Authorization to Purchase a Notarial Seal
and submit the completed Certificate to the Executive

7
Judge. Copies of the Certificate of Authorization to
Purchase a Notarial Seal and the buyer's commission
shall be kept in the files of the vendor or manufacturer
for four (4) years after the sale.
(g) A notary public obtaining a new seal as a result of
change of name shall present to the vendor a certified
copy of the order confirming the change of name issued
by the Executive Judge.
RULE VIII
NOTARIAL CERTIFICATES
SECTION 1. Form of Notarial Certificate. - The notarial
form used for any notarial instrument or document shall
conform to all the requisites prescribed herein, the
Rules of Court and all other provisions of issuances by
the Supreme Court and in applicable laws.
SEC. 2. Contents of the Concluding Part of the Notarial
Certificate. The notarial certificate shall include the
following:
(a) the name of the notary public as exactly indicated in
the commission;
(b) the serial number of the commission of the notary
public;
(c) the words "Notary Public" and the province or city
where the notary public is commissioned, the expiration
date of the commission, the office address of the notary
public; and
(d) the roll of attorney's number, the professional tax
receipt number and the place and date of issuance
thereof, and the IBP membership number.
RULE IX
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORITY OF NOTARIES PUBLIC
SECTION 1. Certificate of Authority for a Notarial Act. - A
certificate of authority evidencing the authenticity of
the official seal and signature of a notary public shall be
issued by the Executive Judge upon request in
substantially the following form:
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORITY FOR A NOTARIAL ACT
I, (name, title, jurisdiction of the Executive
Judge), certify that (name of notary public), the
person named in the seal and signature on the
attached document, is a Notary Public in and for
the (City/Municipality/Province) of the Republic of
the Philippines and authorized to act as such at
the time of the document's notarization.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have affixed below my
signature and seal of this office this (date) day of
(month) (year).
_________________
(official signature)
(seal of Executive Judge)
RULE X
CHANGES OF STATUS OF NOTARY PUBLIC
SECTION 1. Change of Name and Address. Within ten (10) days after the change of name of the
notary public by court order or by marriage, or after
ceasing to maintain the regular place of work or
business, the notary public shall submit a signed and
dated notice of such fact to the Executive Judge.
The notary public shall not notarize until:
(a) he receives from the Executive Judge a confirmation
of the new name of the notary public and/or change of
regular place of work or business; and

(b) a new seal bearing the new name has been

obtained.
The foregoing notwithstanding, until the
aforementioned steps have been completed, the notary
public may continue to use the former name or regular
place of work or business in performing notarial acts for
three (3) months from the date of the change, which
may be extended once for valid and just cause by the
Executive Judge for another period not exceeding three
(3) months.
SEC. 2. Resignation. - A notary public may resign his
commission by personally submitting a written, dated
and signed formal notice to the Executive Judge
together with his notarial seal, notarial register and
records. Effective from the date indicated in the notice,
he shall immediately cease to perform notarial acts. In
the event of his incapacity to personally appear, the
submission of the notice may be performed by his duly
authorized representative.
SEC. 3. Publication of Resignation. - The Executive Judge
shall immediately order the Clerk of Court to post in a
conspicuous place in the offices of the Executive Judge
and of the Clerk of Court the names of notaries public
who have resigned their notarial commissions and the
effective dates of their resignation.
RULE XI
REVOCATION OF COMMISSION AND DISCIPLINARY
SANCTIONS
SECTION 1. Revocation and Administrative Sanctions. (a) The Executive Judge shall revoke a notarial
commission for any ground on which an application for
a commission may be denied.
(b) In addition, the Executive Judge may revoke the
commission of, or impose appropriate administrative
sanctions upon, any notary public who:
(1) fails to keep a notarial register;
(2) fails to make the proper entry or entries in his
notarial register concerning his notarial acts;
(3) fails to send the copy of the entries to the Executive
Judge within the first ten (10) days of the month
following;
(4) fails to affix to acknowledgments the date of
expiration of his commission;
(5) fails to submit his notarial register, when filled, to
the Executive Judge;
(6) fails to make his report, within a reasonable time, to
the Executive Judge concerning the performance of his
duties, as may be required by the judge;
(7) fails to require the presence of a principal at the
time of the notarial act;
(8) fails to identify a principal on the basis of personal
knowledge or competent evidence;
(9) executes a false or incomplete certificate under
Section 5, Rule IV;
(10) knowingly performs or fails to perform any other
act prohibited or mandated by these Rules; and
(11) commits any other dereliction or act which in the
judgment of the Executive Judge constitutes good cause
for revocation of commission or imposition of
administrative sanction.
(c) Upon verified complaint by an interested, affected or
aggrieved person, the notary public shall be required to

8
file a verified answer to the complaint. If the answer of
the notary public is not satisfactory, the Executive Judge
shall conduct a summary hearing. If the allegations of
the complaint are not proven, the complaint shall be
dismissed. If the charges are duly established, the
Executive Judge shall impose the appropriate
administrative sanctions. In either case, the aggrieved
party may appeal the decision to the Supreme Court for
review. Pending the appeal, an order imposing
disciplinary sanctions shall be immediately executory,
unless otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court.
(d) The Executive Judge may motu proprio initiate
administrative proceedings against a notary public,
subject to the procedures prescribed in paragraph (c)
above and impose the appropriate administrative
sanctions on the grounds mentioned in the preceding
paragraphs (a) and (b).
SEC. 2. Supervision and Monitoring of Notaries Public. The Executive Judge shall at all times exercise
supervision over notaries public and shall closely
monitor their activities.
SEC. 3. Publication of Revocations and Administrative
Sanctions. - The Executive Judge shall immediately
order the Clerk of Court to post in a conspicuous place
in the offices of the Executive Judge and of the Clerk of
Court the names of notaries public who have been
administratively sanctioned or whose notarial
commissions have been revoked.
SEC. 4. Death of Notary Public. - If a notary public dies
before fulfilling the obligations in Section 4(e), Rule VI
and Section 2(e), Rule VII, the Executive Judge, upon
being notified of such death, shall forthwith cause
compliance with the provisions of these sections.
RULE XII
SPECIAL PROVISIONS
SECTION 1. Punishable Acts. - The Executive Judge shall
cause the prosecution of any person who:
(a) knowingly acts or otherwise impersonates a notary
public;
(b) knowingly obtains, conceals, defaces, or destroys
the seal, notarial register, or official records of a notary
public; and
(c) knowingly solicits, coerces, or in any way influences
a notary public to commit official misconduct.
SEC 2. Reports to the Supreme Court. - The Executive
Judge concerned shall submit semestral reports to the
Supreme Court on discipline and prosecution of notaries
public.
RULE XIII
REPEALING AND EFFECTIVITY PROVISIONS
SECTION 1. Repeal. - All rules and parts of rules,
including issuances of the Supreme Court inconsistent
herewith, are hereby repealed or accordingly modified.
SEC. 2. Effective Date. - These Rules shall take effect on
the first day of August 2004, and shall be published in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines
which provides sufficiently wide circulation.
Promulgated this 6th day of July, 2004.
164

Local Government Code RA No. 7160, Secs. 156-

ARTICLE VI

Community Tax
SECTION 156. Community Tax. Cities or municipalities
may levy a community tax in accordance with the
provisions of this Article.
SECTION 157. Individuals Liable to Community Tax.
Every inhabitant of the Philippines eighteen (18) years
of age or over who has been regularly employed on a
wage or salary basis for at least thirty (30) consecutive
working days during any calendar year, or who is
engaged in business or occupation, or who owns real
property with an aggregate assessed value of One
thousand pesos (P1,000.00) or more, or who is required
by law to file an income tax return shall pay an annual
additional tax of Five pesos (P5.00) and an annual
additional tax of One peso (P1.00) for every One
thousand pesos (P1,000.00) of income regardless of
whether from business, exercise of profession or from
property which in no case shall exceed Five thousand
pesos (P5,000.00).
In the case of husband and wife, the additional tax
herein imposed shall be based upon the total property
owned by them and the total gross receipts or earnings
derived by them.
SECTION 158. Juridical Persons Liable to Community Tax.
Every corporation no matter how created or organized,
whether domestic or resident foreign, engaged in or
doing business in the Philippines shall pay an annual
community tax of Five hundred pesos (P500.00) and an
annual additional tax, which, in no case, shall exceed
Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) in accordance with the
following schedule:
(1) For every Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) worth of
real property in the Philippines owned by it during the
preceding year based on the valuation used for the
payment of real property tax under existing laws, found
in the assessment rolls of the city or municipality where
the real property is situated Two pesos (P2.00); and
(2) For every Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) of gross
receipts or earnings derived by it from its business in
the Philippines during the preceding year Two pesos
(P2.00).
The dividends received by a corporation from another
corporation however shall, for the purpose of the
additional tax, be considered as part of the gross
receipts or earnings of said corporation.

9
SECTION 159. Exemptions. The following are exempt
from the community tax:
(1) Diplomatic and consular representatives; and
(2) Transient visitors when their stay in the Philippines
does not exceed three (3) months.
SECTION 160. Place of Payment. The community tax
shall be paid in the place of residence of the individual,
or in the place where the principal office of the juridical
entity is located.
SECTION 161. Time for Payment; Penalties for
Delinquency. (a) The community tax shall accrue on
the first (1st) day of January of each year which shall be
paid not later than the last day of February of each year.
If a person reaches the age of eighteen (18) years or
otherwise loses the benefit of exemption on or before
the last day of June, he shall be liable for the community
tax on the day he reaches such age or upon the day the
exemption ends. However, if a person reaches the age
of eighteen (18) years or loses the benefit of exemption
on or before the last day of March, he shall have twenty
(20) days to pay the community tax without becoming
delinquent.
Persons who come to reside in the Philippines or reach
the age of eighteen (18) years on or after the first (1st)
day of July of any year, or who cease to belong to an
exempt class on or after the same date, shall not be
subject to the community tax for that year.
(b) Corporations established and organized on or before
the last day of June shall be liable for the community tax
for that year. But corporations established and
organized on or before the last day of March shall have
twenty (20) days within which to pay the community tax
without becoming delinquent. Corporations established
and organized on or after the first day of July shall not
be subject to the community tax for that year.
If the tax is not paid within the time prescribed above,
there shall be added to the unpaid amount an interest
of twenty-four percent (24%) per annum from the due
date until it is paid.
SECTION 162. Community Tax Certificate. A
community tax certificate shall be issued to every
person or corporation upon payment of the community
tax. A community tax certificate may also be issued to
any person or corporation not subject to the community
tax upon payment of One peso (P1.00).

SECTION 163. Presentation of Community Tax Certificate

On Certain Occasions. (a) When an individual subject
to the community tax acknowledges any document
before a notary public, takes the oath of office upon
election or appointment to any position in the
government service; receives any license, certificate, or
permit from any public authority; pays any tax or fee;
receives any money from any public fund; transacts
other official business; or receives any salary or wage
from any person or corporation, it shall be the duty of
any person, officer, or corporation with whom such
transaction is made or business done or from whom any
salary or wage is received to require such individual to
exhibit the community tax certificate.
The presentation of community tax certificate shall not
be required in connection with the registration of a
voter.
(b) When, through its authorized officers, any
corporation subject to the community tax receives any
license, certificate, or permit from any public authority,
pays any tax or fee, receives money from public funds,
or transacts other official business, it shall be the duty
of the public official with whom such transaction is
made or business done, to require such corporation to
exhibit the community tax certificate.
(c) The community tax certificate required in the two
preceding paragraphs shall be the one issued for the
current year, except for the period from January until
the fifteenth (15th) of April each year, in which case, the
certificate issued for the preceding year shall suffice.
SECTION 164. Printing of Community Tax Certificates
and Distribution of Proceeds. (a) The Bureau of
Internal Revenue shall cause the printing of community
tax certificates and distribute the same to the cities and
municipalities through the city and municipal treasurers
in accordance with prescribed regulations.
The proceeds of the tax shall accrue to the general
funds of the cities, municipalities and barangays except
a portion thereof which shall accrue to the general fund
of the National Government to cover the actual cost of
printing and distribution of the forms and other related
expenses. The city or municipal treasurer concerned
shall remit to the national treasurer the said share of
the National Government in the proceeds of the tax
within ten (10) days after the end of each quarter.
(b) The city or municipal treasurer shall deputize the
barangay treasurer to collect the community tax in their
respective jurisdictions: Provided, however, That said

10
barangay treasurer shall be bonded in accordance with
existing laws.
(c) The proceeds of the community tax actually and
directly collected by the city or municipal treasurer shall
accrue entirely to the general fund of the city or
municipality concerned. However, proceeds of the
community tax collected through the barangay
treasurers shall be apportioned as follows:
(1) Fifty percent (50%) shall accrue to the general fund
of the city or municipality concerned; and
(2) Fifty percent (50%) shall accrue to the barangay
where the tax is collected.

Administrative Code of 1987, Secs. 41-42 as

amended by RA No. 6733
SECTION 41. Officers Authorized to Administer Oath.
(1) The following officers have general authority to
administer oath: Notaries public, members of the
judiciary, clerks of courts, the Secretary of the either
House of the Congress of the Philippines, of
departments, bureau directors, registers of deeds,
provincial governors and lieutenant-governors, city
mayors, municipal mayors and any other officer in the
service of the government of the Philippines whose
appointment is vested in the President.
(2) Oaths may also be administered by any officer
whose duties, as defined by law or regulation, require
presentation to him of any statement under oath.
SECTION 42. Duty to Administer Oath.Officers
authorized to administer oaths, with the exception of
notaries public, municipal judges and clerks of court,
are not obliged to administer oaths or execute
certificates save in matters of official business; and with
the exception of notaries public, the officer performing
the service in those matters shall charge no fee, unless
specifically authorized by law.
Republic Act No. 6733

July 25, 1989

AN ACT TO AMEND SECTION 21, TITLE I, BOOK I

OF THE REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987,
GRANTING MEMBERS OF BOTH HOUSES OF THE
CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES THE GENERAL
AUTHORITY TO ADMINISTER OATHS, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of

Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled::
Section 1. Section 21 of the Revised Administrative
Code is hereby amended to read as follows:
"SECTION 21. Officials authorized to administer
oath. - The following officers have general
authority to administer oaths, to wit:
"President; Vice-President; Members and
Secretaries of both Houses of the Congress;
Members of the Judiciary; Secretaries of
Departments; provincial governors and
lieutenant-governors; city mayors; municipal
mayors; bureau directors; regional directors;
clerks of courts; registrars of deeds; and other
civilian officers in the Philippine public service
whose appointments are vested in the President
of the Philippines and are subject to confirmation
by the Commission of Appointments; all other
constitutional officers; and notaries public. A
person who by authority of law shall serve in the
capacity of the officers mentioned above shall
possess the same power."
Section 2. Section 41 of the Administrative Code of
1987 is hereby amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 41. Officers Authorized to Administer Oath.
- The following officers have general authority to
administer oaths: President; Vice-President;
Members and Secretaries of both Houses of the
Congress; Members of the Judiciary; Secretaries
of Departments; provincial governors and
lieutenant-governors; city mayors; municipal
mayors; bureau directors; regional directors;
clerks of courts; registrars of deeds; other
civilian officers in the public service of the
government of the Philippines whose
appointments are vested in the President and
are subject to confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments; all other constitutional officers;
and notaries public."
Section 3. Nothing in this Act shall be construed as to
disauthorize any person now authorized to administer
oaths under existing laws.
Section 4. The Members and Secretaries of both
Houses of Congress may delegate the authority to
committee secretaries or any staffer thereof in the
conduct of a pending inquiry or investigation.

11
Section 5. Those authorized to administer oaths under
this Act shall not be required to keep a register of the
oaths they administer nor keep or submit copies of the
same, except in the case of notaries public, or as
otherwise required by existing laws.
Section 6. This Act shall take effect upon its publication
in at least one (1) national newspaper of general
circulation, and as to the amendments of Section 41 of
the Administrative Code of 1987, upon the effectivity of
said Code.

SC Circular 1-90
CIRCULAR NO. 1-90.
TO: ALL JUDGES OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS
(METC), MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES (MTCC),
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS (MTC), MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT
TRIAL COURTS (MCTC) SHARIA COURTS AND THE
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP)
SUBJECT: POWER OF THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT
JUDGES AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT JUDGES
TO ACT AS NOTARIES PUBLICEX OFFICIO.
For the information and guidance of all concerned,
quoted hereunder is the Resolution of the Court En
Banc dated December 19, 1989, in Administrative
Matter No. 89-11-1303 MTC, "Re: Request for
clarification on the power of municipal trial court judges
and municipal circuit trial court judges to act as
Notaries Public Ex Officio";
"Acting on a query regarding the power of municipal
trial court judges and municipal circuit trial court judges
to act in the capacity of notaries public ex officio in the
light of the 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct, the Court
Resolved to issue a clarification on the matter.cralaw
"Municipal Trial Court (MTC) and Municipal Circuit Trial
Court (MCTC) judges are empowered to perform the
function of Notaries Public ex officio under Section 76 of
Republic Act No. 296, as amended [otherwise known as
the Judiciary Act of 1948] and Section 242 of the
Revised Administrative Code. But the Court hereby lays
down the following qualifications on the scope of this
power:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"MTC and MCTC judges may act as Notaries Public ex
officio in the notarization of documents connected only
with the exercise of their official functions and duties
[Borne v. Mayo, Adm. Matter No. 1765-CFI, October 17,
1980. 100 SCRA 314; Penera v. Dalocanog, Adm. Matter
No. 2113-MJ, April 22, 1981, 104 SCRA 193.] They may
not, as Notaries Public ex officio, undertake the
preparation and acknowledgment of private documents,
contracts and other acts of conveyances which bear no
direct relation to the performance of their functions as
judges. The 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct not only
enjoins judges to regulate their extra-judicial activities
in order to minimize the risk of conflict with their judicial
duties, but also prohibits them from engaging in the
private practice of law [Canon 5 and Rule 5.07].
"However, the Court taking judicial notice of the fact
that there are still municipalities which have neither

lawyers nor notaries public, rules that MTC and MCTC

judges assigned to municipalities or circuits with no
lawyers or notaries public may, in the capacity as
notaries public ex officio, perform any act within the
competency of a regular notary public: Provided, That:
[1] all notarial fees charged be for the account of the
Government and turned over to the municipal treasurer
(Lapena, Jr. vs. Marcos, Adm. Matter No. 1969-MJ, June
29, 1982, 114 SCRA 572); and [2] certification be made
in the notarized documents attesting to the lack of any
lawyer or notary public in such municipality or circuit."
Feliciano, J., is on leave
Meneses vs. Venturozo, G.R. No. 172196, Oct. 19,
2011
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] of the
Court of Appeals Decision dated October 27, 2005 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 78217 and its Resolution dated April 5,
2006, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals Decision reversed and set
aside the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Dagupan City, Branch 40 in Civil Case No. D-9040, as
the appellate court declared respondent Rosario G.
Venturozo the owner of the land in dispute, and ordered
petitioner Adelaida Meneses to vacate and surrender
her possession thereof to respondent.
The facts are as follows:
On June 8, 1988, plaintiff Rosario G. Venturozo,
respondent herein, filed a Complaint[2] for ownership,
possession x x x and damages in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Dagupan City against defendant Adelaida
Meneses, petitioner herein, alleging that she (plaintiff) is
the absolute owner of an untitled coconut land,
containing an area of 2,109 square meters, situated at
Embarcadero, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, and declared
under Tax Declaration No. 239. Plaintiff alleged that
she purchased the property from the spouses Basilio de
Guzman and Crescencia Abad on January 31, 1973 as
evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale,[3] and that the
vendors, in turn, purchased the property from
defendant as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute
Sale[4] dated June 20, 1966. Plaintiff alleged that she
has been in possession of the land until May 1983 when
defendant with some armed men grabbed possession of
the land and refused to vacate despite repeated
demands prompting her to engage the services of
counsel. Plaintiff prayed that after preliminary hearing,
a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction be issued;
and that after hearing, a decision be rendered declaring
her as the owner of the property in dispute, ordering
defendant to vacate the property in question and to pay
her P5,000.00 as attorneys fees; P1,000.00 as litigation
expenses; P10,000.00 as damages and to pay the costs
of suit.

12
In her Answer,[5] defendant Adelaida Meneses
stated that plaintiff is the daughter of Basilio de
Guzman, the vendee in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
June 20, 1966 that was purportedly executed by her
(defendant) covering the subject property. Defendant
alleged that she never signed any Deed of Absolute
Sale dated June 20, 1966, and that the said deed is a
forgery. Defendant also alleged that she never
appeared before any notary public, and she did not
obtain a residence certificate; hence, her alleged sale of
the subject property to Basilio de Guzman is null and
void ab initio. Consequently, the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated January 31, 1973, executed by Basilio de Guzman
in favor of plaintiff, covering the subject property, is
likewise null and void. Defendant stated that she
acquired the subject property from her deceased father
and she has been in possession of the land for more
than 30 years in the concept of owner. Plaintiffs
allegation that she (defendant) forcibly took possession
of the land is a falsehood. Defendant stated that this is
the fourth case the plaintiff filed against her concerning
the land in question.
In her Counterclaim, defendant stated that in
view of the nullity of the falsified Deed of Absolute Sale
of the subject property, and the fact that plaintiff and
her father Basilio de Guzman had never been in actual
possession of the property, plaintiff is under legal
obligation to execute a deed of reconveyance over the
said property in her favor.
The issue before the trial court was whether the
sale made by defendant Adelaida Meneses in favor of
plaintiffs father, Basilio de Guzman, was valid.[6]
On July 18, 1991, the RTC of Dagupan City,
Branch 40 (trial court) rendered a Decision in favor of
defendant Adelaida Meneses. The dispositive portion of
the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered:
1)

Declaring the Deed of Absolute

and Definite Sale dated June 20,
1966 (Exhibit B) and the Deed of
Absolute and Definite Sale dated
January 31, 1973 (Exhibit A) null
and void ab initio;

2)

Declaring the defendant

Adelaida Meneses as the owner of
the property in question;

3)

Ordering the plaintiff Rosario G.

Venturozo to execute a Deed of
Reconveyance in favor of the
defendant Adelaida Meneses over
the property in question described
in paragraph 2 of the complaint;

4)

Ordering the plaintiff to pay to

the defendant P10,000.00 as

damages; and P1,000.00, as

litigation expenses.
SO ORDERED.[7]
The trial court found that defendant Adelaida
Meneses inherited the land in dispute from her father,
Domingo Meneses; that she did not sell her property to
Basilio de Guzman in 1966; and that the signature of
Adelaida Meneses on the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated June 20, 1966 is a forgery. The trial court stated
that the signature of Adelaida Meneses, as appearing
on the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966, is
very much different from her specimen signatures and
those appearing in the records of Civil Case No. 1096 in
the Municipal Trial Court of Mangaldan. It held that
since there was no valid transfer of the property by
Adelaida Meneses to Basilio de Guzman, the
conveyance of the same property in 1973 by Basilio de
Guzman to his daughter, plaintiff Rosario G. Venturozo,
was also invalid. The trial court stated that the claim
of plaintiff Rosario G. Venturozo, that her parents,
Spouses Basilio and Crescencia de Guzman, purchased
from defendant Adelaida Meneses the subject property
in 1966, is negated by defendants continued
possession of the land and she gathered the products
therefrom.
Plaintiff appealed the decision of the trial court
to the Court of Appeals.
On October 27, 2005, the Court of Appeals
rendered a Decision reversing the decision of the trial
court. The dispositive portion of the appellate courts
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed
decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Dagupan City (Branch 40) is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one
rendered declaring plaintiff-appellant the
owner of the subject land and ordering
defendant-appellee to vacate and
surrender possession thereof to the
former.[8]
The Court of Appeals stated that appellee
Adelaida Meneses failed to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that her signature on the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966 was a
forgery. Instead, she admitted on direct examination
that her signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale was
genuine, thus:
Q. I am showing to you Exhibit 6 and
Exhibit A for the plaintiff a Deed of
Absolute Sale o[f] Real Property of
one (1) Adelaida Meneses in favor of
Basilio de Guzman. Will you examine
this if you know this Deed of Absolute
Sale?
A. I do not know this document, sir.

13
Q. There is a signature over the name of
the vendor Adelaida Meneses which
was previously marked as Exhibit 6a and Exhibit A-1 for the plaintiff,
will you examine this signature, if do
you (sic) know this signature?
A. This is my signature, sir.[9]
According to the Court of Appeals, such
admission is binding on her, there being no showing
that it was made through palpable mistake or that no
such admission was made.[10]
The Court of Appeals also stated that mere
variance of signatures cannot be considered as
conclusive proof that the same were forged, as forgery
cannot be presumed.[11]Appellee Adelaida Meneses
should have produced specimen signatures appearing
on documents executed in or about the year 1966 for a
better comparison and analysis.[12]
The Court of Appeals held that a notarized
document, like the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale
dated June 20, 1966, has in its favor the presumption of
regularity, and to overcome the same, there must be
evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely
preponderant; otherwise, the document should be
upheld.[13] Moreover, Atty. Abelardo G. Biala the
notary public before whom the questioned Deed of Sale
was acknowledged testified and confirmed its
genuineness and due execution, particularly the
signature in question. The appellate court stated that
as against appellee Adelaida Meneses version, Atty.
Bialas testimony, that appellee appeared before him
and acknowledged that the questioned deed was her
free and voluntary act, is more credible. The testimony
of a notary public enjoys greater credence than that of
an ordinary witness.[14]
The Court of Appeals held that appellee Adelaida
Meneses failed to present clear and convincing
evidence to overcome the evidentiary force of the
questioned Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 1966,
which appears on its face to have been executed with
all the formalities required by law.
Adelaida Meneses motion for reconsideration
was denied for lack of merit by the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution[15] dated April 5, 2006.
Hence, Adelaida Meneses, substituted by her
heir, filed this petition raising this lone issue:
I

WHETHER THE DECISION OF THE

COURT OF APPEALS, WHICH REVERSED
THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, IS IN KEEPING WITH BOTH LAW
AND JURISPRUDENCE.[16]

Petitioner contends that her statement, made

during the course of her testimony in the trial court, was
taken out of context by respondent to be used merely
as an argumentative point. The examining lawyer used
the words, Do you know this signature? viz.:
Q. I am showing to you Exhibit 6 and
Exhibit A for the plaintiff a Deed of
Absolute Sale o[f] Real Property of
one (1) Adelaida Meneses in favor of
Basilio de Guzman. Will you examine
this if you know this Deed of Absolute
Sale?
A. I do not know this document, sir.
Q. There is a signature over the name of
the vendor Adelaida Meneses which
was previously marked as Exhibit 6a and Exhibit A-1 for the
plaintiff, will you examine this
signature, if do you (sic) know
this signature?
A. This is my signature, sir.[17]
Petitioner contends that in the above-quoted
transcript of stenographic notes, she was merely asked
if she was cognizant of such a signature as hers or
whether the signature appearing on the questioned
document was similar to that of her signature, and not if
she was the one who indeed affixed such signature on
the said deed of sale.
She avers that the general rule that a judicial
admission is conclusive upon the party invoking it and
does not require proof admits of two exceptions: (1)
when it is shown that the admission was made through
palpable mistake; and (2) when it is shown that no such
admission was in fact made. The latter exception allows
one to contradict an admission by denying that he
made such an admission. For instance, if a party
invokes an admission by an adverse party, but cites
the admission out of context, then the one making the
admission may show that he made no such admission,
or that his admission was taken out of context.[18] This
may be interpreted as to mean not in the sense in which
the admission is made to appear.[19]
Petitioner also contends that a comparison of the
signature on the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 20,
1966 and her specimen signatures, as well as her
genuine signature on pleadings, were made by the trial
court, and it ruled that her signature on the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966 was a forgery. She
submits that the trial courts evaluation of the credibility
of witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great
respect,[20] and the appellate court should have given
weight to the trial courts findings that her signature on
the said Deed of Absolute Sale was a forgery.
The petition is meritorious.
The rule is that the jurisdiction of the Court over
appealed cases from the Court of Appeals is limited to

14
the review and revision of errors of law allegedly
committed by the appellate court, as its findings of fact
are deemed conclusive.[21] Thus, this Court is not dutybound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence
already considered in the proceedings below.
[22]
However, this rule admits exceptions,[23] such as
when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to the findings and conclusions of the trial
court[24] like in this case.
The necessity of a public document for
contracts which transmit or extinguish real rights over
immovable property, as mandated by Article 1358 of
the Civil Code,[25] is only for convenience; it is not
essential for validity or enforceability. [26] As notarized
documents, Deeds of Absolute Sale carry evidentiary
weight conferred upon them with respect to their due
execution[27] and enjoy the presumption of regularity
which may only be rebutted by evidence so clear,
strong and convincing as to exclude all controversy as
to falsity.[28] The presumptions that attach to notarized
documents can be affirmed only so long as it is beyond
dispute that the notarization was regular. [29] A defective
notarization will strip the document of its public
character and reduce it to a private instrument.
[30]
Consequently, when there is a defect in the
notarization of a document, the clear and convincing
evidentiary standard normally attached to a dulynotarized document is dispensed with, and the measure
to test the validity of such document is preponderance
of evidence.[31]
In this case, it should be pointed out that
contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals, the Deed
of Sale dated June 20, 1966 did not comply with the
formalities required by law, specifically Act No. 496,
[32]
otherwise known as The Land Registration Act, which
took effect on January 1, 1903, as Section 127 of the Act
provides:
FORMS
Section
127. Deeds, conveyances, mortgages,
leases, releases, and discharges affecting
lands, whether registered under this
Act or unregistered, shall be
sufficient in law when made
substantially in accordance with the
following forms, and shall be as
effective to convey, encumber, lease,
release, discharge, or bind the lands as
though made in accordance with the
more prolix form heretofore in
use: Provided, That every such
instrument shall be signed by the
person or persons executing the
same, in the presence of two
witnesses, who shall sign the
instrument as witnesses to the
execution thereof, and shall be
acknowledged to be his or their free act
and deed by the person or persons
executing the same, before the judge

of a court of record or clerk of a

court of record, or a notary public, or
a justice of the peace, who shall
certify to such acknowledgment x x x.
[33]

In the Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 20,

1966, the Notary Public signed his name as one of the
two witnesses to the execution of the said deed; hence,
there was actually only one witness thereto. Moreover,
the residence certificate of petitioner was issued to
petitioner and then it was given to the Notary Public the
day after the execution of the deed of sale and
notarization; hence, the number of petitioners
residence certificate and the date of issuance (June 21,
1966) thereof was written on the Deed of Absolute Sale
by the Notary Public on June 21, 1966, after the
execution and notarization of the said deed on June 20,
1966.[34] Considering the defect in the notarization, the
Deed of Absolute Sale dated June 20, 1966 cannot be
considered a public document, but only a private
document,[35] and the evidentiary standard of its validity
shall be based on preponderance of evidence.
Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
provides that before any private document offered as
authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved either: (a) by anyone who
saw the document executed or written; or (b) by
evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker.
In regard to the genuineness of petitioners
signature appearing on the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
June 20, 1966,[36] the Court agrees with the trial court
that her signature therein is very much different from
her specimen signatures[37] and those appearing in the
pleadings[38] of other cases filed against her, even
considering the difference of 17 years when the
specimen signatures were made. Hence, the Court
rules that petitioners signature on the Deed of Absolute
Sale dated June 20, 1966 is a forgery.
The Court agrees with petitioner that her
admission was taken out of context, considering that in
her Answer[39] to the Complaint, she stated that the
alleged Deed of Sale purportedly executed by her in
favor of Basilio de Guzman is a forgery; that she never
signed the said Deed of Sale; that she did not appear
personally before the Notary Public; and that she did not
secure the residence certificate mentioned in the said
Deed of Sale. She also testified that she never sold her
land to Basilio de Guzman;[40] that she never met the
Notary Public, Attorney Abelardo Biala,[41] and that she
did not meet Basilio de Guzman on June 20, 1966.
[42]
The trial court found petitioner and her testimony to
be credible, and declared the Deed of Sale dated June
20, 1966 null and void ab initio. These circumstances
negate the said admission.
The Court finds the Notary Publics testimony
self-serving and unreliable, because although he

15
testified that petitioner was the one who submitted her
residence certificate to him on June 21, 1966,[43] the
next day after the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed
on June 20, 1966, Crescencia de Guzman, respondents
mother, testified that she and her husband got the
residence certificate from petitioner and gave it to the
Notary Public on June 21, 1966.[44] Thus, it is doubtful
whether the Notary Public really knew the identity of the
vendor who signed the Deed of Absolute Sale[45] dated
June 20, 1966.
The Court notes that the trial court found
petitioner and her testimony to be credible. It is a wellsettled doctrine that findings of trial courts on the
credibility of witnesses deserve a high degree of
respect.[46] Having observed the deportment of
witnesses during the trial, the trial judge is in a better
position to determine the issue of credibility.[47]
In fine, the preponderance of evidence is with
petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Court of Appeals Decision dated October 27, 2005 and
its Resolution dated April 5, 2006 in CA-G.R. CV No.
78217 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan
City, Branch 40 in Civil Case No. D-9040 is
hereby REINSTATED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
200

Tigno vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 129416, November 25,

DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The controversy in the present petition hinges on
the admissibility of a single document, a deed of sale
involving interest over real property, notarized by a
person of questionable capacity. The assailed ruling of
the Court of Appeals, which overturned the findings of
fact of the Regional Trial Court, relied primarily on the
presumption of regularity attaching to notarized
documents with respect to its due execution. We
conclude instead that the document has not been duly
notarized and accordingly reverse the Court of Appeals.
The facts are as follow:
On 11 January 1980, respondent spouses Estafino
and Florentina Aquino (the Aquinos) filed a complaint for
enforcement of contract and damages against Isidro
Bustria (Bustria).[1] The complaint sought to enforce an

alleged sale by Bustria to the Aquinos of a one hundred

twenty thousand (120,000) square meter fishpond
located in Dasci, Pangasinan. The property was not
registered either under the Land Registration Act or
under the Spanish Mortgage Law, though registrable
under Act No. 3344.[2] The conveyance was covered by a
Deed of Sale dated 2 September 1978.
Eventually, Bustria and the Aquinos entered into a
compromise agreement, whereby Bustria agreed to
recognize the validity of the sale, and the Aquinos in
turn agreed to grant to Bustria the right to repurchase
the same property after the lapse of seven (7) years.
Upon submission, the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, Branch VII, approved and incorporated the
compromise agreement in a Decision which it rendered
on 7 September 1981.
Bustria died in October of 1986.[3] On 1 December
1989, petitioner Zenaida B. Tigno (Tigno), in substitution
of her deceased father Isidro Bustria,[4] attempted to
repurchase the property by filing a Motion for
Consignation. She deposited the amount of Two
Hundred Thirty Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) with the
trial court, now Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 55 at
Alaminos, Pangasinan. On 18 December 1989, the
Aquinos filed an opposition, arguing that the right to
repurchase was not yet demandable and that Tigno had
failed to make a tender of payment. In anOrder dated
10 October 1999, the RTC denied the Motion for
Consignation.[5]
In June of 1991, Tigno filed a Motion for a Writ of
Execution, which was likewise opposed by the Aquinos,
and denied by the RTC. Then, on 6 September 1991,
Tigno filed an action forRevival of Judgment,[6] seeking
the revival of the decision in Civil Case No. A-1257, so
that it could be executed accordingly.[7] The Aquinos
filed an answer, wherein they alleged that Bustria had
sold his right to repurchase the property to them in a
deed of sale dated 17 October 1985.[8]
Among the witnesses presented by the Aquinos
during trial were Jesus De Francia (De Francia), the
instrumental witness to the deed of sale, and former
Judge Franklin Cario (Judge Cario), who notarized the
same. These two witnesses testified as to the occasion
of the execution and signing of the deed of sale by
Bustria. Thereafter, in their Formal Offer of
Documentary Evidence, the Aquinos offered for
admission as their Exhibit No. 8, the deed of sale
(Deed of Sale)[9] purportedly executed by Bustria. The
admission of the Deed of Sale was objected to by Tigno
on the ground that it was a false and fraudulent

16
document which had not been acknowledged by Bustria
as his own; and that its existence was suspicious,
considering that it had been previously unknown, and
not even presented by the Aquinos when they opposed
Tignos previous Motion for Consignation.[10]
In an Order dated 6 April 1994, the RTC refused to
admit the Deed of Sale in evidence.[11] A Motion for
Reconsideration praying for the admission of said
exhibit was denied in an Orderdated 27 April 1994.[12]
Then, on 18 August 1994, a Decision was rendered
by the RTC in favor of Tigno. The RTC therein expressed
doubts as to the authenticity of the Deed of Sale,
characterizing the testimonies of De Francia and Cario
as conflicting.[13] The RTC likewise observed that
nowhere in the alleged deed of sale was there any
statement that it was acknowledged by Bustria;[14] that
it was suspicious that Bustria was not assisted or
represented by his counsel in connection with the
preparation and execution of the deed of sale[15] or that
Aquino had raised the matter of the deed of sale in his
previous Opposition to the Motion for Consignation.
[16]
The RTC then stressed that the previous Motion for
Execution lodged by Tigno had to be denied since more
than five (5) years had elapsed from the date the
judgment in Civil Case No. A-1257 had become final and
executory; but the judgment could be revived by action
such as the instant complaint. Accordingly, the RTC
ordered the revival of the judgment dated 7 September
1981 in Civil Case No. A-1257.[17]
The Aquinos interposed an appeal to the Court of
Appeals.[18] In the meantime, the RTC allowed the
execution pending appeal of its Decision.[19] On 23
December 1996, the Court of Appeals Tenth Division
promulgated a Decision[20] reversing and setting aside
the RTC Decision. The appellate court ratiocinated that
there were no material or substantial inconsistencies
between the testimonies of Cario and De Francia that
would taint the document with doubtful authenticity;
that the absence of the acknowledgment and
substitution instead of a jurat did not render the
instrument invalid; and that the non-assistance or
representation of Bustria by counsel did not render the
document null and ineffective.[21] It was noted that a
notarized document carried in its favor the presumption
of regularity with respect to its due execution, and that
there must be clear, convincing and more than merely
preponderant evidence to contradict the same.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that the RTC
erred in refusing to admit the Deed of Sale, and that the
document extinguished the right of Bustrias heirs to
repurchase the property.

After the Court of Appeals denied Tignos Motion for

Reconsideration,[22] the present petition was filed before
this Court. Tigno imputes grave abuse of discretion and
misappreciation of facts to the Court of Appeals when it
admitted the Deed of Sale. He also argues that the
appellate court should have declared the Deed of
Sale as a false, fraudulent and unreliable document not
supported by any consideration at all.
The general thrusts of the arguments posed by
Tigno are factually based. As such, they could normally
lead to the dismissal of this Petition for Review.
However, while this Court is not ordinarily a trier of
facts,[23] factual review may be warranted in instances
when the findings of the trial court and the intermediate
appellate court are contrary to each other.[24] Moreover,
petitioner raises a substantial argument regarding the
capacity of the notary public, Judge Cario, to notarize
the document. The Court of Appeals was unfortunately
silent on that matter, but this Court will take it up with
definitiveness.
The notarial certification of the Deed of Sale reads
as follows:
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)
PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN
MUNICIPALITY OF ALAMINOS

) S.S.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 17th day of

October 1985 at Alaminos, Pangasinan both parties
known to me to be the same parties who executed the
foregoing instrument.
FRANKLIN
CARIO
ExOfficio Notary Public
Judg
e, M.T.C.
Alaminos,
Pangasinan
There are palpable errors in this certification. Most
glaringly, the document is certified by way of
a jurat instead of an acknowledgment. A jurat is a
distinct creature from an acknowledgment. An

17
acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a
deed in going before some competent officer or court
and declaring it to be his act or deed; while a jurat is
that part of an affidavit where the officer certifies that
the same was sworn before him.[25] Under Section 127 of
the Land Registration Act,[26] which has been replicated
in Section 112 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
[27]
theDeed of Sale should have been acknowledged
before a notary public.[28]
But there is an even more substantial defect in the
notarization, one which is determinative of this petition.
This pertains to the authority of Judge Franklin Cario to
notarize the Deed of Sale.
It is undisputed that Franklin Cario at the time of
the notarization of the Deed of Sale, was a sitting judge
of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Alaminos. [29] Petitioners
point out, citing Tabao v. Asis,[30] that municipal judges
may not undertake the preparation and
acknowledgment of private documents, contracts, and
other acts of conveyance which bear no relation to the
performance of their functions as judges.[31] In response,
respondents claim that the prohibition imposed on
municipal court judges from notarizing documents took
effect only in December of 1989, or four years after
the Deed of Sale was notarized by Cario.[32]
Respondents contention is erroneous. Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) and Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) judges are empowered to perform the functions
of notaries public ex officio under Section 76 of Republic
Act No. 296, as amended (otherwise known as the
Judiciary Act of 1948) and Section 242 of the Revised
Administrative Code.[33] However, as far back as 1980
in Borre v. Moya,[34] the Court explicitly declared that
municipal court judges such as Cario may notarize only
documents connected with the exercise of their official
duties.[35] The Deed of Sale was not connected with any
official duties of Judge Cario, and there was no reason
for him to notarize it. Our observations as to the errant
judge in Borre are pertinent in this case, considering
that Judge Cario identified himself in the Deed of
Sale as Ex-Officio Notary Public, Judge, MTC:
[A notary ex officio] should not compete with private
law practitioners or regular notaries in transacting legal
conveyancing business.
In the instant case, it was not proper that a city judge
should notarize documents involving private
transactions and sign the document in this wise:
"GUMERSINDO ARCILLA, Notary Public Ex-Officio, City
Judge" (p. 16, Rollo, Annex D of Complaint). In doing

so, he obliterated the distinction between a

regular notary and a notary ex officio.[36]
There are possible grounds for leniency in
connection with this matter, as Supreme Court Circular
No. I-90 permits notaries public ex officio to perform any
act within the competency of a regular notary public
provided that certification be made in the notarized
documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary
public in such municipality or circuit. Indeed, it is only
when there are no lawyers or notaries public that the
exception applies.[37] The facts of this case do not
warrant a relaxed attitude towards Judge Carios
improper notarial activity. There was no such
certification in the Deed of Sale. Even if one was
produced, we would be hard put to accept the veracity
of its contents, considering that Alaminos, Pangasinan,
now a city,[38] was even then not an isolated backwater
town and had its fair share of practicing lawyers.
There may be sufficient ground to call to task Judge
Cario, who ceased being a judge in 1986, for his
improper notarial activity. Perhaps though, formal
sanction may no longer be appropriate considering
Judge Carios advanced age, assuming he is still alive.
[39]
However, this Decision should again serve as an
affirmation of the rule prohibiting municipal judges from
notarizing documents not connected with the exercise
of their official duties, subject to the exceptions laid
down in Circular No. 1-90.
Most crucially for this case, we should deem
the Deed of Sale as not having been notarized at all.
The validity of a notarial certification necessarily derives
from the authority of the notarial officer. If the notary
public does not have the capacity to notarize a
document, but does so anyway, then the document
should be treated as unnotarized. The rule may strike
as rather harsh, and perhaps may prove to be
prejudicial to parties in good faith relying on the
proferred authority of the notary public or the person
pretending to be one. Still, to admit otherwise would
render merely officious the elaborate process devised
by this Court in order that a lawyer may receive a
notarial commission. Without such a rule, the
notarization of a document by a duly appointed notary
public will have the same legal effect as one
accomplished by a non-lawyer engaged in pretense.
The notarization of a document carries considerable
legal effect. Notarization of a private document
converts such document into a public one, and renders
it admissible in court without further proof of its
authenticity.[40] Thus, notarization is not an empty
routine; to the contrary, it engages public interest in a

18
substantial degree and the protection of that interest
requires preventing those who are not qualified or
authorized to act as notaries public from imposing upon
the public and the courts and administrative offices
generally.[41]
On the other hand, what then is the effect on
the Deed of Sale if it was not notarized? True enough,
from a civil law perspective, the absence of notarization
of the Deed of Sale would not necessarily invalidate the
transaction evidenced therein. Article 1358 of the Civil
Code requires that the form of a contract that transmits
or extinguishes real rights over immovable property
should be in a public document, yet it is also an
accepted rule that the failure to observe the proper
form does not render the transaction invalid. Thus, it
has been uniformly held that the form required in Article
1358 is not essential to the validity or enforceability of
the transaction, but required merely for convenience.
[42]
We have even affirmed that a sale of real property
though not consigned in a public instrument or formal
writing, is nevertheless valid and binding among the
parties, for the time-honored rule is that even a verbal
contract of sale or real estate produces legal effects
between the parties.[43]
Still, the Court has to reckon with the implications
of the lack of valid notarization of the Deed of Sale from
the perspective of the law on evidence. After all, the
case rests on the admissibility of the Deed of Sale.
Clearly, the presumption of regularity relied upon
by the Court of Appeals no longer holds true since
the Deed of Sale is not a notarized document. Its proper
probative value is governed by the Rules of Court.
Section 19, Rule 132 states:
Section 19. Classes of documents.For the purpose of
their presentation in evidence, documents are either
public or private.
Public documents are:
(a)

(b)

The written official acts, or records of the

official acts of the sovereign authority,
official bodies and tribunals, and public
officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a
foreign country;
Documents acknowledged before a
notary public except last wills and
testaments; and

(c)

Public records, kept in the Philippines, of

private documents required by law to be
entered therein.

All other writings are private. (Emphasis

supplied.)
The Deed of Sale, invalidly notarized as it was, does
not fall under the enumeration of public documents;
hence, it must be considered a private document. The
nullity of the alleged or attempted notarization
performed by Judge Cario is sufficient to exclude the
document in question from the class of public
documents. Even assuming that the Deed of Sale was
validly notarized, it would still be classified as a private
document, since it was not properly acknowledged, but
merely subscribed and sworn to by way of jurat.
Being a private document, the Deed of Sale is now
subject to the requirement of proof under Section 20,
Rule 132, which states:
Section 20. Proof of private document.Before any
private document offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be
proved either:
(a)

By anyone who saw the document

executed or written; or

(b)

By evidence of the genuineness of the

signature or handwriting of the maker.

Any other private document need only be identified as

that which is claimed to be.
The Deed of Sale was offered in evidence as
authentic by the Aquinos, who likewise insist that its
enforceability militates against Tignos claim.
Correspondingly, the burden falls upon the Aquinos to
prove its authenticity and due execution. The Court of
Appeals clearly erred in not appreciating the Deed of
Sale as a private document and in applying the
presumption of regularity that attaches only to duly
notarized documents, as distinguished from private
documents.
Did the RTC err then in refusing to admit the Deed
of Sale? We hold that it did not. Section 20, Rule 132
provides ample discretion on the trier of fact before it
may choose to receive the private document in
evidence. The RTC wisely refused to admit the Deed of
Sale, taking great lengths as it did to explain its doubts
as to its veracity. The RTC was not convinced of the

19
proffered proof by the Aquinos, and the exercise of its
sound discretion as the primary trier of fact warrants
due respect.
The most telling observation of the RTC relates to
the fact that for the very first time respondents alleged
the existence of the Deed of Sale when they filed their
answer to petitioners current action to revive judgment.
[44]
Prior to the initiation of the present action, Tigno had
tried to operationalize and implement the Compromise
Agreement through two judicial means: consignation
and execution of judgment. The Aquinos duly opposed
these prior attempts of the petitioner to exercise the
right to repurchase, but they did not raise then the
claim that such right to repurchase was already
extinguished by the Deed of Sale. Tigno attempted to
exercise the right to repurchase only a few years after
the execution of the Deed of Sale to which respondents
themselves were signatories. Thus, it is incredulous that
the Aquinos did not invoke the Deed of Sale when they
opposed in court petitioners successive attempts at
consignation and execution of judgment. TheDeed of
Sale, if in existence and valid, would have already
precluded Tignos causes of action for either
consignation or execution of judgment. The only
believable conclusion, as drawn by the RTC, was that
the Deed of Sale had yet to be created when petitioner
moved in 1990 for consignation and execution of
judgmentan existential anomaly if we were to agree
with the respondents that such document had been
signed and notarized back in 1985.
The dubiousness in origin of the Deed of Sale is not
alleviated by the other observations of the RTC. It also
pointed to certain incredible aspects in the Aquinos tale
of events. It noted that no receipts were ever presented
by the respondents to evidence actual payment of
consideration by them to Bustria, despite the allegation
of the respondents that the amount was covered by
seven (7) receipts.[45] The Aquinos claimed that Bustria
kept all the receipts, an assertion which the RTC found
as unbelievable, citing ordinary human nature to ask for
receipts for significant amounts given and to keep the
same.[46] In itself, the absence of receipts, or any proof
of consideration, would not be conclusive since
consideration is always presumed. However, given the
totality of the circumstances surrounding this case, the
absence of such proof further militates against the
claims of the Aquinos.
We can appreciate in a similar vein the observation
of the Court of Appeals that Bustria did not bother to
seek his lawyers assistance as regards the execution of
the Deed of Sale, considering that the subject property
had previously been fiercely litigated. Although the

Court of Appeals was correct in ruling that the

document would not be rendered null or ineffective due
to the lack of assistance of counsel, the implausibility of
the scenario strikes as odd and therefore reinforces the
version found by the RTC as credible.
The Court likewise has its own observations on the
record that affirm the doubts raised by the Court of
Appeals. Isidro Bustria, who would die in 1986, was
already ninety-three (93) years old when he allegedly
signed the Deed of Sale in 1985. Still, the Aquinos
asserted before the RTC that Bustria traveled
unaccompanied from his home in Dasol, Pangasinan,
passing through two towns to Alaminos, to execute
the Deed of Sale. Without discrediting the
accomplishments of nonagenarians capable of great
physical feats, it should be acknowledged as a matter of
general assumption that persons of Bustrias age are
typically sedentary and rarely so foolhardy as to insist
on traveling significant distances alone.
Also of note is the fact that there are glaring
differences as to the alleged signature of Bustria on
the Deed of Sale and as it otherwise appears on the
judicial record. Bustrias signature in the
1981 Compromise Agreement is noticeably shaky which
is not surprising, considering that it was subscribed
when Bustria was eighty-nine (89) years old. However,
Bustrias signature on theDeed of Sale, which if genuine
was affixed when he was already ninety-three (93)
years old, is remarkably steady in its strokes. There are
also other evident differences between Bustrias
signature on the Deed of Sale and on other documents
on the record.
Admittedly, these doubts cast above arise in chief
from an appreciation of circumstantial evidence. These
have to be weighed against the findings of the Court of
Appeals that the fact that Bustria signed the Deed of
Sale was established by the respective testimonies of
witnesses De Francia and Judge Cario. In its own
appreciation of these testimonies, the RTC alluded to
notable inconsistencies in their testimonies. As a final
measure of analysis, the Court shall now examine
whether the appellate court was in error in reversing the
conclusion of the RTC on these testimonies.
The inconsistencies cited by the RTC were that De
Francia testified that Judge Cario himself prepared and
typed the Deed of Sale in his office, where the
document was signed,[47] while Judge Cario testified
that he did not type the Deed of Sale since it was
already prepared when the parties arrived at his office
for the signing.[48] On this point, the Court of Appeals
stated with utter nonchalance that a perusal of the

20
record revealed no material or substantial
inconsistencies between the testimonies of Judge Cario
and De Francia.
Strangely, the appellate court made no comment as
to the inconsistency pointed out by the RTC as to who
prepared the Deed of Sale. If the only point of
consideration was the due execution of the Deed of
Sale, then the Court of Appeals should have properly
come out with its finding. Other variances aside, there
are no contradictions in the testimonies of Judge Cario
and De Francia on the question of whether or not
Bustria signed the Deed of Sale.
However, as earlier established, the Deed of Sale is
a private document. Thus, not only the due execution of
the document must be proven but also its authenticity.
This factor was not duly considered by the Court of
Appeals. The testimonies of Judge Cario and De Francia
now become material not only to establish due
execution, but also the authenticity of the Deed of Sale.
And on this point, the inconsistencies pointed out by the
RTC become crucial.
The matter of authenticity of the Deed of Sale being
disputed, the identity of the progenitor of this allimportant document is a material evidentiary point. It is
disconcerting that the very two witnesses of the
respondent offered to prove the Deed of Sale, flatly
contradict each other on the basis of their own personal
and sensory knowledge. Worse, the purported author of
the Deed of Sale disavowed having drafted the
document, notwithstanding the contrary testimony
grounded on personal knowledge by the documentary
witness.
Establishing the identity of the person who wrote
the Deed of Sale would not ordinarily be necessary to
establish the validity of the transaction it covers.
However, since it is the authenticity of the document
itself that is disputed, then the opposing testimonies on
that point by the material witnesses properly raises
questions about the due execution of the document
itself. The inconsistencies in the testimonies of Judge
Cario and De Francia are irreconcilable. It is not
possible to affirm the testimony of either without
denigrating the competence and credibility of the other
as a witness. If Judge Cario was truthful in testifying
that he did not write the Deed of Sale, then doubt can
be cast as to the reliability of the notarial witness De
Francia. It takes a leap of imagination, a high level of
gumption, and perverse deliberation for one to
erroneously assert, under oath and with particularities,
that a person drafted a particular document in his
presence.

However, if we were to instead believe De Francia,

then the integrity of the notary public, Judge Cario,
would be obviously compromised. Assuming that Judge
Cario had indeed authored the Deed of Sale, it would
indeed be odd that he would not remember having
written the document himself yet sufficiently recall
notarizing the same. If his testimony as to authorship of
the document is deemed as dubious, then there is all
the reason to make a similar assumption as to his
testimony on the notarization of the Deed of Sale.
These inconsistencies are not of consequence
because there is need to indubitably establish the
author of the Deed of Sale. They are important because
they cast doubt on the credibility of those witnesses of
the Aquinos, presented as they were to attest to the due
execution and authenticity of the Deed of Sale. The
Court of Appeals was clearly in error in peremptorily
disregarding this observation of the RTC.
As a result, we are less willing than the Court of
Appeals to impute conclusive value to the testimonies
of de Francia and Judge Cario. The totality of the
picture leads us to agree with the trial court that
the Deed of Sale is ineluctably dubious in origin and in
execution. The Court deems as correct the refusal of the
RTC to admit the Deed of Sale, since its due execution
and authenticity have not been proven. The evidence
pointing to the non-existence of such a transaction is so
clear and convincing that it is sufficient even to rebut
the typical presumption of regularity arising from the
due execution of notarial documents. However, for the
reasons stated earlier, the Deed of Sale is ineluctably an
unnotarized document. And the lower court had more
than sufficient basis to conclude that it is a spurious
document.
Since the validity of the Deed of Sale has been
successfully assailed, Tignos right to repurchase was
not extinguished at the time of the filing of
the Petition for revival of judgment, as correctly
concluded by the RTC. The Court of Appeals being in
error when it concluded otherwise, the reinstatement of
the RTC Decision is warranted.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The
assailed Decision dated 23 December 1996
and Resolution dated 9 June 1997 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 49879 is REVERSED, and
the Decision dated 18 August 1994 of the Regional Trial
Court of Alaminos, Pangasinan, Branch 55, in Civil Case
No. A-1918 is REINSTATED. Costs against respondents.
SO ORDERED.

21
CHAPTER 2
PERSONS WHO MAY GIVE OR RECEIVE A
DONATION

Art. 748. The donation of a movable may be made

orally or in writing.
An oral donation requires the simultaneous delivery of
the thing or of the document representing the right
donated.
If the value of the personal property donated exceeds
five thousand pesos, the donation and the acceptance
shall be made in writing, otherwise, the donation shall
be void. (632a)
Art. 749. In order that the donation of an immovable
may be valid, it must be made in a public document,
specifying therein the property donated and the value
of the charges which the donee must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of
donation or in a separate public document, but it shall
not take effect unless it is done during the lifetime of
the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the
donor shall be notified thereof in an authentic form, and
this step shall be noted in both instruments.(633)
SUBSECTION 2. - Vigilance Over Goods
ARTICLE 1744. A stipulation between the common
carrier and the shipper or owner limiting the liability of
the former for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of
the goods to a degree less than extraordinary diligence
shall be valid, provided it be:
(1) In writing, signed by the shipper or owner;
(2) Supported by a valuable consideration other than
the service rendered by the common carrier; and
(3) Reasonable, just and not contrary to public policy.
NATURE, FORM AND KINDS OF AGENCY
Art. 1874. When a sale of a piece of land or any
interest therein is through an agent, the authority of the
latter shall be in writing; otherwise, the sale shall be
void. (n)
Form of contracts:

Art. 1358. The following must appear in a public

document:
(1) Acts and contracts which have for their object
the creation, transmission, modification or
extinguishment of real rights over immovable
property; sales of real property or of an interest
therein a governed by Articles 1403, No. 2, and
1405;
(2) The cession, repudiation or renunciation of
hereditary rights or of those of the conjugal
partnership of gains;
(3) The power to administer property, or any
other power which has for its object an act
appearing or which should appear in a public
document, or should prejudice a third person;
(4) The cession of actions or rights proceeding
from an act appearing in a public document.
All other contracts where the amount involved exceeds
five hundred pesos must appear in writing, even a
private one. But sales of goods, chattels or things in
action are governed by Articles, 1403, No. 2 and 1405.
(1280a)
CHAPTER 4
ANTICHRESIS
Art. 2134. The amount of the principal and of the
interest shall be specified in writing; otherwise, the
contract of antichresis shall be void. (n)
Title IX. - PARTNERSHIP
CHAPTER 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS

Art. 1771. A partnership may be constituted in any

form, except where immovable property or real rights
are contributed thereto, in which case a public
instrument shall be necessary. (1667a)
Art. 1773. A contract of partnership is void, whenever
immovable property is contributed thereto, if an
inventory of said property is not made, signed by the
parties, and attached to the public instrument. (1668a)
SUBSECTION 2. - Warranty Against Hidden
Defects
of or Encumbrances Upon the Thing Sold
Art. 1581. The form of sale of large cattle shall be
governed by special laws. (n)
CHAPTER 5
CHATTEL MORTGAGE
Art. 2140. By a chattel mortgage, personal property is
recorded in the Chattel Mortgage Register as a security
for the performance of an obligation. If the movable,
instead of being recorded, is delivered to the creditor or

22
a third person, the contract is a pledge and not a chattel
mortgage. (n)
CHAPTER 4
REFORMATION OF INSTRUMENTS (n)
Art. 1359. When, there having been a meeting of the
minds of the parties to a contract, their true intention is
not expressed in the instrument purporting to embody
the agreement, by reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable
conduct or accident, one of the parties may ask for the
reformation of the instrument to the end that such true
intention may be expressed.
If mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct, or accident has
prevented a meeting of the minds of the parties, the
proper remedy is not reformation of the instrument but
annulment of the contract.
CHAPTER 5
INTERPRETATION OF CONTRACTS
Art. 1370. If the terms of a contract are clear and leave
no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties,
the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control.
If the words appear to be contrary to the evident
intention of the parties, the latter shall prevail over the
former. (1281)
Art. 1371. In order to judge the intention of the
contracting parties, their contemporaneous and
subsequent acts shall be principally considered. (1282)
Art. 1372. However general the terms of a contract
may be, they shall not be understood to comprehend
things that are distinct and cases that are different from
those upon which the parties intended to agree. (1283)
Art. 1373. If some stipulation of any contract should
admit of several meanings, it shall be understood as
bearing that import which is most adequate to render it
effectual. (1284)
Art. 1374. The various stipulations of a contract shall
be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones
that sense which may result from all of them taken
jointly. (1285)
Art. 1375. Words which may have different
significations shall be understood in that which is most
in keeping with the nature and object of the contract.
(1286)
Art. 1376. The usage or custom of the place shall be
borne in mind in the interpretation of the ambiguities of
a contract, and shall fill the omission of stipulations
which are ordinarily established. (1287)
Art. 1377. The interpretation of obscure words or
stipulations in a contract shall not favor the party who
caused the obscurity. (1288)
Art. 1378. When it is absolutely impossible to settle
doubts by the rules established in the preceding
articles, and the doubts refer to incidental
circumstances of a gratuitous contract, the least
transmission of rights and interests shall prevail. If the
contract is onerous, the doubt shall be settled in favor
of the greatest reciprocity of interests.
If the doubts are cast upon the principal object of the
contract in such a way that it cannot be known what
may have been the intention or will of the parties, the
contract shall be null and void. (1289)

Art. 1379. The principles of interpretation stated in

Rule 123 of the Rules of Court shall likewise be observed
in the construction of contracts. (n)
CHAPTER 4
OBLIGATIONS OF THE VENDOR
Art. 1508. A negotiable document of title may be
negotiated by delivery:
(1) Where by the terms of the document the
carrier, warehouseman or other bailee issuing
the same undertakes to deliver the goods to the
bearer; or
(2) Where by the terms of the document the
carrier, warehouseman or other bailee issuing
the same undertakes to deliver the goods to the
order of a specified person, and such person or a
subsequent endorsee of the document has
indorsed it in blank or to the bearer.
Where by the terms of a negotiable document of title
the goods are deliverable to bearer or where a
negotiable document of title has been indorsed in blank
or to bearer, any holder may indorse the same to
himself or to any specified person, and in such case the
document shall thereafter be negotiated only by the
endorsement of such endorsee. (n)
CHAPTER 8
UNENFORCEABLE CONTRACTS (n)
Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable,
unless they are ratified:
(1) Those entered into in the name of another
person by one who has been given no authority
or legal representation, or who has acted beyond
his powers;
(2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of
Frauds as set forth in this number. In the
following cases an agreement hereafter made
shall be unenforceable by action, unless the
same, or some note or memorandum, thereof,
be in writing, and subscribed by the party
charged, or by his agent; evidence, therefore, of
the agreement cannot be received without the
writing, or a secondary evidence of its contents:
(a) An agreement that by its terms is not
to be performed within a year from the
making thereof;
(b) A special promise to answer for the
debt, default, or miscarriage of another;
(c) An agreement made in consideration
of marriage, other than a mutual promise
to marry;
(d) An agreement for the sale of goods,
chattels or things in action, at a price not
less than five hundred pesos, unless the
buyer accept and receive part of such
goods and chattels, or the evidences, or
some of them, of such things in action or
pay at the time some part of the
purchase money; but when a sale is made
by auction and entry is made by the
auctioneer in his sales book, at the time
of the sale, of the amount and kind of

23
property sold, terms of sale, price, names
of the purchasers and person on whose
account the sale is made, it is a sufficient
memorandum;
(e) An agreement of the leasing for a
longer period than one year, or for the
sale of real property or of an interest
therein;
(f) A representation as to the credit of a
third person.
(3) Those where both parties are incapable of
giving consent to a contract.
CHAPTER 3
FORM OF CONTRACTS
Art. 1356. Contracts shall be obligatory, in whatever
form they may have been entered into, provided all the
essential requisites for their validity are present.
However, when the law requires that a contract be in
some form in order that it may be valid or enforceable,
or that a contract be proved in a certain way, that
requirement is absolute and indispensable. In such
cases, the right of the parties stated in the following
article cannot be exercised. (1278a)
Art. 1357. If the law requires a document or other
special form, as in the acts and contracts enumerated in
the following article, the contracting parties may
compel each other to observe that form, once the
contract has been perfected. This right may be
exercised simultaneously with the action upon the
contract. (1279a)
Section 22 of Act No. 1147, enacted May 3, 1904,
provides that, "No transfer of large cattle shall be valid
unless registered, and a certificate of transfer secured
as herein provided."
RULE 130
Rules of Admissibility
3. Parol Evidence Rule
Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. When
the terms of an agreement have been reduced to
writing, it is considered as containing all the terms
agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and
their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms
other than the contents of the written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify,
explain or add to the terms of written agreement if he
puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or
imperfection in the written agreement;

(b) The failure of the written agreement to

express the true intent and agreement of the
parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the
parties or their successors in interest after the
execution of the written agreement.
The term "agreement" includes wills. (7a)
4. Interpretation Of Documents
Section 10. Interpretation of a writing according to its
legal meaning. The language of a writing is to be
interpreted according to the legal meaning it bears in
the place of its execution, unless the parties intended
otherwise. (8)
Section 11. Instrument construed so as to give effect
to all provisions. In the construction of an instrument,
where there are several provisions or particulars, such a
construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give
effect to all. (9)
Section 12. Interpretation according to
intention; general and particular provisions. In the
construction of an instrument, the intention of the
parties is to be pursued; and when a general and a
particular provision are inconsistent, the latter is
paramount to the former. So a particular intent will
control a general one that is inconsistent with it. (10)
Section 13. Interpretation according to circumstances.
For the proper construction of an instrument, the
circumstances under which it was made, including the
situation of the subject thereof and of the parties to it,
may be shown, so that the judge may be placed in the
position of those who language he is to interpret. (11)
Section 14. Peculiar signification of terms. The
terms of a writing are presumed to have been used in
their primary and general acceptation, but evidence is
admissible to show that they have a local, technical, or
otherwise peculiar signification, and were so used and
understood in the particular instance, in which case the
agreement must be construed accordingly. (12)
Section 15. Written words control printed. When an
instrument consists partly of written words and partly of
a printed form, and the two are inconsistent, the former
controls the latter. (13)

24
Section 16. Experts and interpreters to be used in
explaining certain writings. When the characters in
which an instrument is written are difficult to be
deciphered, or the language is not understood by the
court, the evidence of persons skilled in deciphering the
characters, or who understand the language, is
admissible to declare the characters or the meaning of
the language. (14)
Section 17. Of Two constructions, which preferred.
When the terms of an agreement have been intended in
a different sense by the different parties to it, that
sense is to prevail against either party in which he
supposed the other understood it, and when different
constructions of a provision are otherwise equally
proper, that is to be taken which is the most favorable
to the party in whose favor the provision was made.
(15)
Section 18. Construction in favor of natural right.
When an instrument is equally susceptible of two
interpretations, one in favor of natural right and the
other against it, the former is to be adopted. (16)
Section 19. Interpretation according to usage. An
instrument may be construed according to usage, in
order to determine its true character. (17)
RULE 132
Presentation of Evidence
B. AUTHENTICATION AND PROOF OF DOCUMENTS
Section 19. Classes of Documents. For the purpose
of their presentation evidence, documents are either
public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the
official acts of the sovereign authority, official
bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether
of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledge before a notary
public except last wills and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of
private documents required by law to the
entered therein.
All other writings are private. (20a)

Section 20. Proof of private document. Before any

private document offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be
proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed
or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the
signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as
that which it is claimed to be. (21a)
Section 21. When evidence of authenticity of private
document not necessary. Where a private document
is more than thirty years old, is produced from the
custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine,
and is unblemished by any alterations or circumstances
of suspicion, no other evidence of its authenticity need
be given. (22a)
Section 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved.
The handwriting of a person may be proved by any
witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such
person because he has seen the person write, or has
seen writing purporting to be his upon which the
witness has acted or been charged, and has thus
acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person.
Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given
by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with
writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party
against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be
genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. (23a)
Section 23. Public documents as
evidence. Documents consisting of entries in public
records made in the performance of a duty by a public
officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated. All other public documents are evidence, even
against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to
their execution and of the date of the latter. (24a)
Section 24. Proof of official record. The record of
public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of Section
19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced
by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested
by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or
by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not
kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such
officer has the custody. If the office in which the record
is kept is in foreign country, the certificate may be
made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any
officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed

25
in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office. (25a)
Section 25. What attestation of copy must
state. Whenever a copy of a document or record is
attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation
must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy
of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case
may be. The attestation must be under the official seal
of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the
clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such
court. (26a)
Section 26. Irremovability of public record. Any
public record, an official copy of which is admissible in
evidence, must not be removed from the office in which
it is kept, except upon order of a court where the
inspection of the record is essential to the just
determination of a pending case. (27a)
Section 27. Public record of a private document. An
authorized public record of a private document may be
proved by the original record, or by a copy thereof,
attested by the legal custodian of the record, with an
appropriate certificate that such officer has the custody.
(28a)
Section 28. Proof of lack of record. A written
statement signed by an officer having the custody of an
official record or by his deputy that after diligent search
no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist
in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate
as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the
records of his office contain no such record or entry. (29)
Section 29. How judicial record impeached. Any
judicial record may be impeached by evidence of: (a)
want of jurisdiction in the court or judicial officer, (b)
collusion between the parties, or (c) fraud in the party
offering the record, in respect to the proceedings. (30a)
Section 30. Proof of notarial documents. Every
instrument duly acknowledged or proved and certified
as provided by law, may be presented in evidence
without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment
being prima facie evidence of the execution of the
instrument or document involved. (31a)
Section 31. Alteration in document, how to
explain. The party producing a document as genuine
which has been altered and appears to have been
altered after its execution, in a part material to the
question in dispute, must account for the alteration. He
may show that the alteration was made by another,
without his concurrence, or was made with the consent

of the parties affected by it, or was otherwise properly

or innocent made, or that the alteration did not change
the meaning or language of the instrument. If he fails to
do that, the document shall not be admissible in
evidence. (32a)
Section 32. Seal. There shall be no difference
between sealed and unsealed private documents
insofar as their admissibility as evidence is concerned.
(33a)
Section 33. Documentary evidence in an unofficial
language. Documents written in an unofficial
language shall not be admitted as evidence, unless
accompanied with a translation into English or Filipino.
To avoid interruption of proceedings, parties or their
attorneys are directed to have such translation prepared
before trial. (34a)
NIRC SEC. 201. Effect of Failure to Stamp Taxable
Document. - An instrument, document or paper which
is required by law to be stamped and which has been
signed, issued, accepted or transferred without being
duly stamped, shall not be recorded, nor shall it or any
copy thereof or any record of transfer of the same be
admitted or used in evidence in any court until the
requisite stamp or stamps are affixed thereto and
cancelled.
Revised Penal Code Article 170 - Falsification of
legislative documents
The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum
period and a fine not exceeding 6,000 pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who, without proper authority
therefor alters any bill, resolution, or ordinance enacted
or approved or pending approval by either House of the
Legislature or any provincial board or municipal council.
Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or
notary or ecclesiastic minister. The penalty of prision
mayor and a fine not to exceed P5,000 pesos shall be
imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary
who, taking advantage of his official position, shall
falsify a document by committing any of the following
acts:
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature
or rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in
any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so
participate;
3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act
or proceeding statements other than those in fact made
by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
5. Altering true dates;
6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine
document which changes its meaning;

26
7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document
purporting to be a copy of an original document when
no such original exists, or including in such a copy a
statement contrary to, or different from, that of the
genuine original; or
8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the
issuance thereof in a protocol, registry, or official book.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any
ecclesiastical minister who shall commit any of the
offenses enumerated in the preceding paragraphs of
this article, with respect to any record or document of
such character that its falsification may affect the civil
status of persons.
Art. 172. Falsification by private individual and use of
falsified documents. The penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a
fine of not more than P5,000 pesos shall be imposed
upon:
1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the
falsifications enumerated in the next preceding article in
any public or official document or letter of exchange or
any other kind of commercial document; and

2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or

with the intent to cause such damage, shall in any
private document commit any of the acts of falsification
enumerated in the next preceding article.
Any person who shall knowingly introduce in evidence in
any judicial proceeding or to the damage of another or
who, with the intent to cause such damage, shall use
any of the false documents embraced in the next
preceding article, or in any of the foregoing subdivisions
of this article, shall be punished by the penalty next
lower in degree.