AVERMENTS IN COMPLAINT/ INFORMATION

People of the Philippines vs. Edgardo Barcena y Poca

G.R No. 168737 February 16, 2006
Facts:
Edgardo Barcena, the accused, is the common law wife of Nenita Barcena,
which is the mother of victim, Estrella Cabida. Barcena was charge with
qualified rape as defined and penalized under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal
Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, due to the fact that the victim
is a minor (15yrs old) and the accused was the common-law husband of his
mother.
Estrella testified that she was alone in their house in the morning of April
10, 1997, when suddenly the accused strangled and embraced her from
behind pulling her from their sala to the room, where she was ravished.
After the incident, she was warned by the accused not to tell anybody or
else she would be killed. The accused, however, raised the defenses of
denial and alibi. He testified that during April 10, 1997, on that morning he
reported for work at a Rice Mill and went home already in the evening. He
insisted that the rape case is motivated by the remorse of Nenitas relatives
against him, since he squandered the money of the latter. The alibi of the
accused was corroborated by his co-worker at the rice mill, which testified
that the accused really reported for work that day. The accused further
averred that the age of Estrella was not duly established due to the fact that
only a photocopy of the latters birth certificate was presented.
The lower court found the accused guilty of the offense of qualified rape
through the use of force or intimidation, having been committed with the
attendant circumstance of the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age
and the offender is the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
When the case was elevated to the CA, it was affirmed.
Issue: Whether or not the averments in the information/complaint was duly
established.
Held: Yes.
R.A. No. 7659, which took effect on December 31, 1993, imposes the death
penalty for rape committed under any of the circumstances provided under

Section 11 thereof. Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by

R.A. No. 7659, provides that the death penalty shall be imposed if the victim
of rape is under 18 years of age and the offender is the parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. Minority
and relationship constitute special qualifying circumstances, which, in
accordance with the settled rule, must be alleged in the information and
proven during trial.
In the instant case, the filial relationship between appellant and the
complainant has been sufficiently alleged in the information and established
during trial. Several witnesses from both the prosecution and the defense
testified that the appellant is the common law husband of Nenita, the
mother of the victim. In fact, the appellant himself admitted that he
exercised parental authority over the children, including the complainant, of
his common-law wife Nenita.
With regard to Etrellas minority; even granting that the certificate of live
birth is only a photocopy of the original, the same sufficiently proved
Estrellas age and minority. In People v. Cayabyab, we held that:
We are not unaware of our ruling in People v. Mantis that a mere photocopy
of the birth certificate, in the absence of any showing that the original copy
was lost or destroyed, or was unavailable, without the fault of the
prosecution, does not prove the victims minority, for said photocopy does
not qualify as competent evidence for that purpose.
However, there are other exceptions to the "best evidence rule" as expressly
provided under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the
subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following
cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party
against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after
reasonable notice;

(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents

which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact
sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole;
and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or
is recorded in a public office.
Without doubt, a certificate of live birth is a public record in the custody of
the local civil registrar who is a public officer. Clearly, therefore, the
presentation of the photocopy of the birth certificate of Alpha Jane is
admissible as secondary evidence to prove its contents. Production of the
original may be dispensed with, in the trial courts discretion, whenever in
the case at hand the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of
the document and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring
production.
Doctrine: Qualifying circumstances must be alleged in the information to be
appreciated by the court. Anything not alleged cannot be acted upon.

People of the Philippines vs. Juan Manggasin y Lucanas

G.R No. 130599-600

April 21, 1999

Facts:
Accused-appelant, Juan Maggasin, is the common-law spouse of Lilia
Mangasin, the latter being the mother of the victim Maria Fe Empimo.
Maria Fe testified before the lower court that at around 12 noon of
Spetember 3, 1991, she was allured/hypnotized by the accused which
rendered her unconscious, making it successful for the accused to ravish
her at that date. Right after the sexual incident, the accused warned her not
to tell her mother or else she and her mother will be killed. On another
date, November 14, 1995, on their small house, when everyone was asleep,
she was dragged then by the accused and was successfully ravished again

by the accused. Complainant said she related her ordeal to her mother, but
the latter just told her to keep her disgrace to herself.
The complaint reads as follows: That sometime during the last week of
March, 1995, in Brgy., Tambulilid, Ormoc City, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, JUAN MANGGASIN y
Lucanas alias Johnny, being then the step-father of the complainant herein
MARIA FE EMPIMO, by means of violence and intimidation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the said
MARIA FE EMPIMO, a seventeen (17) year old lass, against her will.
The accused rejected the victims claim, he averred that the first claim of
rape was false since he reported for work at that time, which the
complainants mother assented. The accused further contends that he and
the complainant engaged in an amorous relationship and had several
occasions of sexual intercourse and all started when the complainant was
seventeen (17) years old.
The trial court found him guilty of two (2) counts of rape and sentenced him
to DEATH. By virtue of R.A 7659, otherwise known as the Death Penalty
Law which provides that death penaly shall be imposed in the if the crime of
rape is committed when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and
the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim.
Issue:
Whether or not the imposition of death as penalty is correct.
Held: No.
As this Court has held, the concurrence of the minority of the victim and her
relationship to the offender being a special qualifying circumstance, which
increases the penalty as opposed to a generic aggravating circumstance
which only affects the period of the penalty, should be alleged in the
information, because of the accused's right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.
In this case, the informations in Criminal Case Nos. 4730-0 and 4731-0
alleged that accused-appellant, who is the stepfather of complainant,
succeeded in having carnal knowledge of the latter who was then below
eighteen (18) years of age. However, the evidence shows that accused-

appellant is not the complainant's stepfather because he and complainant's

mother were not really married but only lived in a common-law relationship.
To this effect are the testimonies of the complainant, her mother, and even
accused-appellant himself. Thus, although a common-law husband is subject
to punishment by death in case he commits rape against his wife's daughter,
nevertheless the death penalty cannot be imposed on accused-appellant
because the relationship alleged in the information in Criminal Case No.
4730-0 against him is different from that actually proven. Accordingly,
accused-appellant must be sentenced to the lesser penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
Doctrine: Qualifying circumstances must be alleged in the information. An
incorrect imposition of a qualifying circumstance in the information will not
be appreciated by the Court. This is anchored on the accuseds right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

DUPLICITY OF SUITS

ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ vs. The Honorable HARRIET O. DEMETRIOU

(in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, NCR,
Branch 70, Pasig), The Honorable FRANKLIN DRILON (in his
capacity as Secretary of Justice), JOVENCITO R. ZUO, LEONARDO
C. GUIYAB, CARLOS L. DE LEON, RAMONCITO C. MISON,
REYNALDO J. LUGTU, and RODRIGO P. LORENZO, the last six
respondents in their official capacities as members of the State
Prosecutor's Office)
G.R No. 111771-77

November 9, 1993

Facts:
Mayor Antionio L. Sanchez of Calauan, Laguna, was among others, charged
in connection of the rape-slay of Mary Elieen Sarmena and the killing of
Allan Gomez of seven (7) counts of rape with homicide which was requested
to be acted upon by the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission.
Mayor Sanchez was invited for investigation at Camp Vicente Lim, and was
immediately taken there. The Mayor was positively identified as suspect by
witnesses present in the investigation and was placed on arrest status and
taken to DOJ Manila. The respondent prosecutors immediately conducted an
inquest upon arrival, and after hearing a warrant of arrest was served.
Mayor Sanhez was forthwith taken to the CIS Detention Center, Cam
Crame, where he remains confined.
The respondent prosecutors filed with RTC of Calamba, Laguna, seven
informations charging Mayor Sancehz among others, with the rape and
killing of Mary Eileen Sarmaneta. Aftrer several days, the court issued a
warrant for the arrest of all the accused, including Mayor Sanchez, in
connection with the said crime. The Court later ordered the treasfer of the
venue of the seven cases to Pasig, where it was raffled to the sala of Judge
Demetriou. On that court, the seven informations were amended to include
the killing of Allan Gomez as an aggravating circumstance. On that same

day, petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations substantially on the

grounds now raised in this petition, which, however, was denied.
Mayor Sanchez now argues that the seven information against him should
be quashed because, among others, he is being with seven homicides
arising from the death of only two persons.
Issue:
Whether or not the information is correct, wherein seven counts of homicide
was charged which arose from the death of only two persons.
Held: Yes.
It is clearly provided in Rule 110 of the Rules of Court that:
Sec. 13.
Duplicity of offense. A complaint or information must charge but
one offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a
simple punishment for various offenses.
Rape with homicide comes within the exception under R.A. 2632 and R.A.
4111, amending the Revised Penal Code.
The petitioner and his six co-accused are not charged with only one rape
committed by him in conspiracy with the other six. Each one of the seven
accused is charged with having himself raped Sarmenta instead of simply
helping Sanchez in committing only one rape. In other words, the allegation
of the prosecution is that the girl was raped seven times, with each of the
seven accused taking turns in abusing her with the assistance of the other
six. Afterwards, their lust satisfied, all seven of them decided to kill and
thus silence Sarmenta.
Every one of the seven accused is being charged separately for actually
raping Sarmenta and later killing her instead of merely assisting the
petitioner in raping and then slaying her. The separate informations filed
against each of them allege that each of the seven successive rapes is
complexed by the subsequent slaying of Sarmenta and aggravated by the
killing of Allan Gomez by her seven attackers. The separate rapes were
committed in succession by the seven accused, culminating in the slaying of
Sarmenta.
It is of course absurd to suggest that Mary Eileen Sarmenta and Allan
Gomez were killed seven times, but the informations do not make such a

suggestion. It is the petitioner who does so and is thus hoist by his own
petard.
This argument was correctly refuted by the Solicitor General in this wise:
Thus, where there are two or more offenders who commit rape, the
homicide committed on the occasion or by reason of each rape, must be
deemed as a constituent of the special complex crime of rape with homicide.
Therefore, there will be as many crimes of rape with homicide as there are
rapes committed.
In effect, the presence of homicide qualifies the crime of rape, thereby
raising its penalty to the highest degree. Thus, homicide committed on the
occasion or by reason of rape, loses its character as an independent offense,
but assumes a new character, and functions like a qualifying circumstance.
However, by fiction of law, it merged with rape to constitute a constituent
element of a special complex crime of rape with homicide with a specific
penalty which is in the highest degree, i.e. death.
Doctrine: In the crime of Rape with Homicide, the Homicide partakes the
element of force and intimidation in rape. Hence, the crime of Rape and
Homicide are not distinct from each other. By virtue of this, it does not run
afoul the rule on duplicity of suits, although there were only two counts of
death in this case, each one who participated in the crime shall be charged
with one count of Rape with Homicide.

Geruncio H. Ilagan, Claro Pinon and Rosend Pinon vs. Hon. Court of
Appeals, Hon. Arturo A. Romero, Salavado Q. Quimpo and Hometrust
Development Corporation
G.R No. 110617

December 29, 1994

Facts:
Petitioners herein were charged with eight infromations of estafa. It were
adduced that by means of false manifestations and fraudulent
representations which they made to prospective lots and house and lot
buyers, by representing themselves that they are authorized to

collect/receive and issue receipts of payments from said buyers. Another

information states that petitioners herein confederating with each other,
defrauded and deceived HOMETRUST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, by
being agents by the corporation on a commission basis with the restriction
however, that the Agents cannot receive any form of payment from buyers
as well as to issue any receipts, and after receiving sum of money from
prospective buyers as downpayment, misappropriate and convert to their
own personal use the said amount and despite several demands upon them
to return, failed and refused to restitute the same.
Petitioners moved to quash the informations on the ground of duplicity of
offenses charged. The same was dismissed by the trial court declaring that
each informations show different private complainants and different
transactions on different dates. Unfazed, the same was elevated to the CA
by writ of certiorari which was still denied.
Issue:
Whether or not the offenses charged in the eight informations actually
constitute only one offense or were correctly considered as eight separate
crimes of estafa.
Held: The lower court and the CA were correct in considering eight
separate crimes of estafa.
The crime of estafa committed against respondent corporation, on the one
hand, and those committed against the lot buyers, on the other, are
definitely separate felonies. They were dictated by different criminal
intents, committed under different modes of commission provided by the
law on estafa, perpetrated by different acts, consummated on different
occasions, and caused injury to different parties.
The crime of estafa against respondent corporation was committed through
unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, specifically as provided in Paragraph
1(b) of Article 315, Revised Penal Code. The operative act in the
perpetration thereof was the failure to turn over or deliver to respondent
corporation the amounts collected by the accused, despite their duty to do
so. The felony was consummated on the dates when and at the places where
such amounts were to be delivered to respondent corporation under the
agency agreement therefor or within a reasonable time from receipt of the
payments made by the lot buyers. The aggrieved party was respondent
corporation which suffered damages basically to the extent of the sums
collected in its behalf but not delivered or accounted for by the accused.

With respect to the lot buyers, the offense of swindling was committed by
deceit or false pretenses employed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud, more specifically as provided in Paragraph 2(a) of
the same article of the Code, that is, by the accused falsely pretending to
possess the power to collect the payments due from said buyers, despite the
peculiar but specific prohibition imposed by their said principal. The felony
was perpetrated through the aforesaid the deceitful misrepresentations
which made possible the unauthorized collections. The offense was
consummated upon receipt by the accused of the amounts in the different
occasions and places where the payments were made by the lot buyers. The
aggrieved parties were the lot buyers who individually and separately
suffered damages by being deprived not only of their money but primarily of
their property rights to and in the lots they respectively purchased.
Doctrine: The rule provides that one information should only contain one
offense. If the crime is Estafa which could be committed by a single offender
to different prospective victims by different criminal motives, each offense
is distinct from each other. Each information then is distinct from each
other which only constitute one count.

CONTINUING CRIMES
Miriam Defensor Santiago vs. Hon. Justice Francis Garchitorena,
Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines.
G.R No. 109266

December 2, 1993

Facts:
Petitioner was charged of the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3 of
R.A No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, allegedly commited by her favoring unqualified aliens with
the benefit of the Alien Legalization Program.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, to enjoin the
Sandiganbayan from proceeding with the case on the ground that said case
was intended solely to harass her as he was then a presidential candidate.
On another date, petitioner filed a motion for inhibition of Presiding Justice
Garchitorena. The Sandiganbayan, of which Justice Garchitorena is a
member, set the criminal case for arraignment. Petitioner then moved to
defer the arraignment of the ground that there was a pending motion for
inhibition, and that petitioner intended to file a motion for a bill of
particulars. Motion to defer arraignment was denied later on. A day after
being denied the motion, petitioner filed a motion for a bill of particulars,
stating that unless she was furnished with the names and identities of the
aliens, she could not properly plead and prepare for tiral. The arraignment
was then reset to another date and the Sandiganbayan was ordered to act
upon the disqualification of Justice Garchitorena and the motion for bill of
particulars.
At the hearing for the motion for a bill of particulars, the prosecution stated
that they would file only one amended information against petitioner,
however, the prosecution filed a motion to admit the thirty-two (32)
Amended informations. At a later date, the Sandiganbayan admitted the 32

Amended Informations and ordered the petitioner to post bail bonds. Hence,
this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan is correct in admitting the 32 Amended
Informations; does the offense fall under the ambit of delito continuado or
continuing crimes?
Held: It is a continuing crime. Hence, the Sandigan is not correct in
admitting the 32 Amended Informations.
The Supreme Court held that technically, there was only one crime that was
committed in petitioners case, and hence, there should only be one
information to be filed against her.
Simply put, a delito continuado is an offense consisting of a series of acts
arising from one criminal intent or resolution (Criminal Law, 1988 ed. Pp.
53-54). In the case at bench, the original information charged petitioner
with performing a single criminal act that of her approving the
application for legalization of aliens not qualified under the law to enjoy
such privilege. The 32 Amended Informations aver that the offenses were
committed on the same period of time, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988.
The strong probability even exists that the approval of the application or the
legalization of the stay of the 32 aliens was done by a single stroke of the
pen, as when the approval was embodied in the same document.
Likewise, the public prosecutors manifested at the hearing the motion for a
bill of particulars that the Government suffered a single harm or injury. The
Sandiganbayan in its Order dated November 13, 1992 stated as follows: . . .
Equally, the prosecution has stated that insofar as the damage and
prejudice to the government is concerned, the same is represented not only
by the very fact of the violation of the law itself but because of the adverse
effect on the stability and security of the country in granting citizenship to
those not qualified.
Doctrine: A continuing crime comprises of several acts but only constitute
of one offense, because the sole criminal motive of the offender.