When Dictators Die

The worlds dictators are aging but

democrats shouldnt be too quick to rejoice.

BY ANDREA KENDALL-TAYLOR, ERICA FRANTZSEPTEMBER 10, 2015

There are 55 authoritarian leaders in power throughout the world. Eleven of these
leaders are 69 years old or older, and they are in varying stages of declining health.
Most of these aging dictators, such as Angolas Jose Eduardo Dos Santos (73 years
old), Kazakhstans Nursultan Nazarbayev (75 years old), and Zimbabwes Robert
Mugabe (91 years old), have been in power for decades. At first blush this paints a
hopeful picture for democracy watchers, who have recently documented a slow but
steady authoritarian resurgence. Surely the fact that 20 percent of the worlds
autocracies face the specter of succession provides an opportunity for new
democracies to emerge or does it?
Alternatively, perhaps the number of aging and ailing dictators is a cause for concern.
Some fear that the deaths of these longtime leaders will spark intense political
infighting or public unrest that could plunge their countries into chaos. The fact that
most of this aging cohort, such as Algerias Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Cameroons Paul

Biya, and Sudans Omar al-Bashir, has yet to identify a political successor seems to
add credibility to these concerns.
Both perspectives seem plausible but our research shows that there is little merit to
either of them. In our review of the 79 dictators who have died in office from 1946 to
2014, we find that the death of a dictator almost never ushers in democracy. Nor does
it typically bring down the regime. Instead, in the vast majority (92 percent) of cases,
the regime persists after the autocrats death. The deaths of Hugo Chavez in
Venezuela in 2013, Meles Zenawi in Ethiopia in 2012, and Kim Jong-Il in North Korea
in 2011 illustrate this trend. Compared to other forms of leadership turnover in
autocracies such as coups, elections, or term limits which lead to regime
collapse about half of the time, the death of a dictator is remarkably inconsequential.
Not only is it exceedingly rare for an autocrats death in office to result in democracy,
but it also does not improve a countrys longer-term prospects for liberalization.
Leaders who come to power following the death of an autocrat and who seek to
deviate from the status quo are likely to provoke resistance from the old guard
elements of the regime who maintain control over the levers of power and find it in
their interest to limit changes in the new system.It is often forgotten today that the
brutal Syrian dictator, Bashar al-Assad, came to power after his fathers death in 2000
with hopes of liberalizing his country. Soon after inheriting power, he began a series of
political reforms, including efforts to increase press freedoms, release political
prisoners, and expand Internet use. But President Assads ability to change the system
was limited by influential figures from his fathers regime who exerted their political
power and influence to block policy changes and inhibit their implementation.
We also find that coups and public revolts are rare following a dictators death. During
the year of a leaders death in office, coups have occurred in only six percent of cases,
compared to 32 percent when autocrats have left power via other means. Similarly,
mass public protests are far less likely to break out following a dictators death than
after other forms of authoritarian leader exit. This pattern persists even when we adjust
our timeframe and look at the five-year period following a leadership transition.
In some cases, such as Kuwait or Saudi Arabia, the resilience of authoritarian regimes
following the deaths of their leaders reflects the durability of monarchies, where highly
institutionalized succession processes ensure stability across generations. In other
cases, a regimes resilience is driven by the ability of fathers to position their sons as
heirs, such as in Syria (2000), Azerbaijan (2003), and Togo (2005). But countries with
less formal or obvious mechanisms for succession, such as Venezuela in 2013,
Zambia in 2008, or Turkmenistan in 2006, have also endured their leaders deaths.
Perhaps we shouldnt be surprised that there is little change following a dictators
death in office. Autocrats who die in office tend to be particularly adept politicians
having evaded myriad threats to their rule and they are likely to have fashioned
entrenched political systems capable of persisting beyond their passing. On average,
dictators who die in office have enjoyed 16 years in power, compared to just seven for
those who exit by all other means. Such longevity is only possible by developing an

inner circle of elite supporters who are highly invested in the status quo and equipped
with institutions that they can use to maintain it. In other words, the very strategies that
are key to a dictators ability to stay in office until death increase his regimes resilience
after his passing.
The presence of a well-functioning support party is among the key strategies that
enhance the durability of autocracies and facilitate the succession process. A strong
body of academic studies demonstrates the prolonging power of political parties in
authoritarian settings. While these parties differ from political parties in democracies,
they do serve important functions in autocracies, such as counter-balancing
interventionist militaries, distributing benefits to citizens, and promoting the regimes
ideology. Moreover, well-functioning political parties can coopt individuals with political
aspirations or those seeking to gain access to the spoils of office. Once these potential
political rivals to the regime are incorporated and incentivized to participate in the
system, the party serves as a focal point for negotiations over the choice of a new
leader who can continue to protect their interests.
Although a leaders death in office infrequently prompts the downfall of the regime or
instability, these events do occasionally occur. So when should we worry about
prospects for instability? Regimes governed by strongmen where political power is
highly concentrated in the hands of an individual tend to be more at risk of
instability following a leaders death. But even then, instability is rare because many
personalized regimes rule with the aid of a political party. The depth of the party
matters, and those that invest in their development tend to be the regimes that more
seamlessly outlive the death of the leader. For example, after the deaths of the highly
personalized regimes of both Hafez Assad in Syria in 2000 and Ethiopias Meles
Zenawi in 2012, the ruling political parties the Baathist party in Syria and the
Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) were critical in
ensuring the regimes resilience.
In addition to countries where the regime lacks an effective ruling party, we find that
countries that have recently experienced protests and domestic instability also have
an elevated risk of coups and protests in the wake of a leaders death. These findings
are consistent with a body of researchindicating that recent instability enhances the
prospects that a country will experience instability in the future. Periods of instability
produce segments of the population with networks and experience that prove useful in
mobilizing further protests in the face of any discontent during a leadership transition.
For example, previous episodes of instability likely contributed to unrest in the
aftermath of Guinean President Lasante Contes death in 2008 and Gabonese
President Omar Bongos death in 2009.
In another small subset of cases that we reviewed, a leaders death set into motion
dynamics that spurred instability in the longer term. In these cases, instability stems
not from immediate disagreements over a potential successor, but from the tactics the
new leader uses to consolidate power. In ethnically or geographically divided societies,
opportunistic leaders can leverage divisions to boost their popularity. This was the
case in Ivory Coast, where the death of President Felix Houphouet-Boigny in 1993

triggered the rise of Ivorian nationalism that planted the seeds for civil war nine years
later.
In its 2015 Freedom in the World report, Freedom House reported that the risk of a
widespread democratic decline is higher now than at any time in the last 25 years.
Unfortunately, our results show that the advanced age of 11 of the worlds autocrats
offers little hope for reversing this trend. Instead of creating space for change, the
deaths of these longstanding leaders will most likely leave in place the resilient
autocratic systems theyve created. Though most leadership transitions generate
opportunities for political transformation in dictatorships, death in office is not among
them. Death in office, it turns out, is a remarkably unremarkable event.
The opinions expressed in this article are the authors own and do not reflect the view
of the United States government.
In the photo, Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe falls after addressing supporters
upon his return from an African Union meeting in Ethiopia, Wednesday, Feb. 4, 2015.
Photo credit: ASSOCIATED PRESS
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