First Phil.

International Bank v Cout of Appeals

[G.R. No. 115849. January 24, 1996]
Producers Bank (now called First Philippine International Bank), which has been under
conservatorship since 1984, is the owner of 6 parcels of land. The Bank had an agreement
with Demetrio Demetria and Jose Janolo for the two to purchase the parcels of land for a
purchase price of P5.5 million pesos. The said agreement was made by Demetria and Janolo
with the Banks manager, Mercurio Rivera. Later however, the Bank, through its conservator,
Leonida Encarnacion, sought the repudiation of the agreement as it alleged that Rivera was
not authorized to enter into such an agreement, hence there was no valid contract of sale.
Subsequently, Demetria and Janolo sued Producers Bank. The regional trial court ruled in
favor of Demetria et al. The Bank filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, Henry Co, who holds 80% shares of stocks with the said Bank, filed a motion for
intervention with the trial court. The trial court denied the motion since the trial has been
concluded already and the case is now pending appeal. Subsequently, Co, assisted by
ACCRA law office, filed a separate civil case against Carlos Ejercito as successor-in-interest
(assignee) of Demetria and Janolo seeking to have the purported contract of sale be declared
unenforceable against the Bank. Ejercito et al argued that the second case constitutes forum
shopping.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is forum shopping.
HELD: Yes. There is forum shopping because there is identity of interest and parties between
the first case and the second case. There is identity of interest because both cases sought to
have the agreement, which involves the same property, be declared unenforceable as against
the Bank. There is identity of parties even though the first case is in the name of the bank as
defendant, and the second case is in the name of Henry Co as plaintiff. There is still forum
shopping here because Henry Co essentially represents the bank. Both cases aim to have
the bank escape liability from the agreement it entered into with Demetria et al.
The Supreme Court also discussed that to combat forum shopping, which originated as a
concept in international law, the principle of forum non conveniens was developed. The
doctrine of forum non conveniens provides that a court, in conflicts of law cases, may refuse
impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most convenient or available forum and the
parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.

Manila Hotel Corp. v. NLRC

G. R. No. 120077. October 13, 2000

In May 1988, Marcelo Santos was an overseas worker in Oman. In June 1988, he was
recruited by Palace Hotel in Beijing, China. Due to higher pay and benefits, Santos agreed to
the hotels job offer and so he started working there in November 1988. The employment
contract between him and Palace Hotel was however without the intervention of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). In August 1989, Palace Hotel notified Santos
that he will be laid off due to business reverses. In September 1989, he was officially
terminated.
In February 1990, Santos filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against Manila Hotel
Corporation (MHC) and Manila Hotel International, Ltd. (MHIL). The Palace Hotel was
impleaded but no summons were served upon it. MHC is a government owned and controlled
corporation. It owns 50% of MHIL, a foreign corporation (Hong Kong). MHIL manages the
affair of the Palace Hotel. The labor arbiter who handled the case ruled in favor of Santos.
The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the labor arbiter.
ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD: No. The NLRC is a very inconvenient forum for the following reasons:
1. The only link that the Philippines has in this case is the fact that Santos is a Filipino;
2. However, the Palace Hotel and MHIL are foreign corporations MHC cannot be held liable
because it merely owns 50% of MHIL, it has no direct business in the affairs of the Palace
Hotel. The veil of corporate fiction cant be pierced because it was not shown that MHC is
directly managing the affairs of MHIL. Hence, they are separate entities.
3. Santos contract with the Palace Hotel was not entered into in the Philippines;
4. Santos contract was entered into without the intervention of the POEA (had POEA
intervened, NLRC still does not have jurisdiction because it will be the POEA which will hear
the case);
5. MHIL and the Palace Hotel are not doing business in the Philippines; their agents/officers are
not residents of the Philippines;
Due to the foregoing, the NLRC cannot possibly determine all the relevant facts pertaining to
the case. It is not competent to determine the facts because the acts complained of happened
outside our jurisdiction. It cannot determine which law is applicable. And in case a judgment
is rendered, it cannot be enforced against the Palace Hotel (in the first place, it was not served
any summons).

The Supreme Court emphasized that under the rule of forum non conveniens, a Philippine
court or agency may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so provided:
(1) that the Philippine court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to;
(2) that the Philippine court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and
the facts; and
(3) that the Philippine court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision.
None of the above conditions are apparent in the case at bar.

G.R. No. 130339

December 22, 1998

OMANFIL INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (THIRD DIVISION) and LORA
FELIPE, respondents.

In February 1993, Hyundai Engineering and Construction Co., Ltd., through its local agent,
Omanfil International Manpower Development Corporation, engaged Eduardo Felipe to work
as a rigger in Malaysia. In June 1993, the ferry boat in which Eduardo was assigned met an
accident. His body was never found.
A provision in the Malaysia labor law provides:
Where death has resulted from the injury, a lump sum equal to forty five months earnings or
fourteen thousand four hundred ringgit [RM], whichever is the less;
A local labor office in Malaysia then wrote a letter to Hyundai advising the latter of the
computation it arrived at, to wit;
45 months x US $620.04 (monthly salary of Eduardo) = US $27,902.02.
RM14,400 which is equivalent to US $5,393.29 is less than US $27,902.02, hence, Hyundai
deposited the lesser amount with the said labor office.
The wife of Eduardo, Lora Felipe, does not agree that Hyundai is liable for the lesser amount
hence she filed a labor case against Hyundais agent, Omanfil. The labor arbiter ordered
Omanfil to pay $27,902.02 to Lora. This was affirmed by the National Labor Relations
Commission. It was ruled that the Malaysian labor law is susceptible to two interpretations

because it is vague; that in case of doubt of labor laws, it must be construed in favor of the
laborer.
ISSUE: Whether or not the National Labor Relations is correct.
HELD: No. The Malaysian Law in question is not vague. Clearly what is due to Lora as death
benefit (for her dead husband) is 14,400 Malaysian Ringgit since that amount is less than US
$27,902.02. Further, it appears that the Director General of Labor of Malaysia certified that
Eduardo is only entitled to a maximum of RM14,000.00 pursuant to the labor law in question.
This certification is duly authenticated by Mr. Bayani V. Mangibin, our Consul General in
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Such authentication of the said Certification, which provides an
interpretation of said foreign labor law by none other than the Director of Labor of Malaysia is
proof of the foreign law. Further still, this was never contested by Lora.

G.R. No. 119602. October 6, 2000]

WILDVALLEY SHIPPING CO., LTD. petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS

and PHILIPPINE PRESIDENT LINES INC., respondents.

In the Orinoco River in Venezuela, it is a rule that ships passing through it must be piloted by
pilots familiar to the river. Hence, in 1988 Captain Nicandro Colon, master of Philippine
Roxas, a ship owned by Philippine President Lines, Inc. (PPL), obtained the services of Ezzar
Vasquez, a duly accredited pilot in Venezuela to pilot the ship in the Orinoco River.
Unfortunately, Philippine Roxas ran aground in the Orinoco River while being piloted by
Vasquez. As a result, the stranded ship blocked other vessels. One such vessel was owned
Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. (WSC). The blockade caused $400k worth of losses to WSC as
its ship was not able to make its delivery. Subsequently, WSC sued PPL in the RTC of Manila.
It averred that PPL is liable for the losses it incurred under the laws of Venezuela, to
wit: Reglamento General de la Ley de Pilotaje and Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje No 1
del Orinoco. These two laws provide that the master and owner of the ship is liable for the

negligence of the pilot of the ship. Vasquez was proven to be negligent when he failed to
check on certain vibrations that the ship was experiencing while traversing the river.
ISSUE: Whether or not Philippine President Lines, Inc. is liable under the said Venezuelan
laws.
HELD: No. The two Venezuelan Laws were not duly proven as fact before the court. Only
mere photocopies of the laws were presented as evidence. For a copy of a foreign public
document to be admissible, the following requisites are mandatory:
(1) It must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the records or by his deputy; and
(2) It must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice consular or consular agent or foreign service officer, and with the seal
of his office.
And in case of unwritten foreign laws, the oral testimony of expert witnesses is admissible,
as are printed and published books of reports of decisions of the courts of the country
concerned if proved to be commonly admitted in such courts.
Failure to prove the foreign laws gives rise to processual presumption where the foreign law
is deemed to be the same as Philippine laws. Under Philippine laws, PPL nor Captain Colon
cannot be held liable for the negligence of Vasquez. PPL and Colon had shown due diligence
in selecting Vasquez to pilot the vessel. Vasquez is competent and was a duly accredited
pilot in Venezuela in good standing when he was engaged.

G.R. No. 114776

February 2, 2000

MENANDRO
B.
LAUREANO,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED

petitioner,

In 1978, Menandro Laureano was hired as a pilot by the Singapore Airlines Limited (SAL). In
1982 however, SAL was hit by recession and so it had to lay off some employees. Laureano
was one of them. Laureano asked for reconsideration but it was not granted. Aggrieved,
Laureano filed a labor case for illegal dismissal against SAL. But in 1987, he withdrew the
labor case and instead filed a civil case for damages due to illegal termination of contract
against SAL. Laureano filed the case here in the Philippines. SAL moved for the dismissal of

the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The motion was denied. On trial, SAL alleged
that the termination of Laureano is valid pursuant to Singaporean law.
The trial court ruled in favor of Laureano. SAL appealed the case raising the issue of lack of
jurisdiction, non applicability of Philippine laws, and estoppel, among others. The Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Singaporean Law is applicable to this case.
HELD: No. The specific Singaporean Law which holds valid the dismissal of Laureano is not
proved in court. As such, the trial court cannot make a determination if the termination is
indeed valid under Singaporean Law. Philippine courts do not take judicial notice of the laws
of Singapore. SAL has the burden of proof. SAL failed to prove such law hence Philippine law
shall apply. However, the case must be dismissed on the ground of estoppel. Under our laws,
all money claims arising from employer-employee relationships must be filed within three
years from the time the cause of action accrued. Laureanos cause of action accrued in 1982
when he was terminated but he only filed the money claim in 1987 or more than three years
from 1982. Hence he is already barred by prescription.

G.R. No. 145587

October 26, 2007

EDI-STAFFBUILDERS
INTERNATIONAL,
INC.,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ELEAZAR S. GRAN

petitioner,

In 1993, EDI-Staffbuilders, Inc. (EDI), upon request of Omar Ahmed Ali Bin Bechr Est. (OAB),
a company in Saudi Arabia, sent to OAB resumes from which OAB can choose a computer
specialist. Eleazar Gran was selected. It was agreed that his monthly salary shall be $850.00.
But five months into his service in Saudi Arabia, Gran received a termination letter and right
there and then was removed from his post. The termination letter states that he was
incompetent because he does not know the ACAD system which is required in his line of
work; that he failed to enrich his knowledge during his 5 month stay to prove his competence;
that he is disobedient because he failed to submit the required daily reports to OAB. Gran
then signed a quitclaim whereby he declared that he is releasing OAB from any liability in
exchange of 2,948.00 Riyal.
When Gran returned, he filed a labor case for illegal dismissal against EDI and OAB. EDI in
its defense averred that the dismissal is valid because when Gran and OAB signed the

employment contract, both parties agreed that Saudi labor laws shall govern all matters
relating to the termination of Grans employment; that under Saudi labor laws, Grans
termination due to incompetence and insubordination is valid; that Grans insubordination and
incompetence is outlined in the termination letter Gran received. The labor arbiter dismissed
the labor case but on appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the
decision of the arbiter. The Court of Appeals likewise affirmed the NLRC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Saudi labor laws should be applied.
HELD: No. The specific Saudi labor laws were not proven in court. EDI did not present proof
as to the existence and the specific provisions of such foreign law. Hence, processual
presumption applies and Philippine labor laws shall be used. Under our laws, an employee
like Gran shall only be terminated upon just cause. The allegations against him, at worst,
shall only merit a suspension not a dismissal. His incompetence is not proven because prior
to being sent to Saudi Arabia, he underwent the required trade test to prove his competence.
The presumption therefore is that he is competent and that it is upon OAB and EDI to prove
otherwise. No proof of his incompetence was ever adduced in court. His alleged
insubordination is likewise not proven. It was not proven that the submission of daily track
records is part of his job as a computer specialist. There was also a lack of due process.
Under our laws, Gran is entitled to the two notice rule whereby prior to termination he should
receive two notices. In the case at bar, he only received one and he was immediately
terminated on the same day he received the notice.
Lastly, the quitclaim may not also release OAB from liability. Philippine laws is again applied
here sans proof of Saudi laws. Under Philippine Laws, a quitclaim is generally frowned upon
and are strictly examined. In this case, based on the circumstances, Gran at that time has no
option but to sign the quitclaim. The quitclaim is also void because his separation pay was
merely 2,948 Riyal which is lower than the $850.00 monthly salary (3,190 Riyal).

Philippine Aluminum Wheels vs FASGI Enterprises

GR 137378; 12 October 2000
Facts:
On 01 June 1978, FASGI Enterprises Incorporated (FASGI), a corporation
organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of

California, United States of America, entered into a distributorship

arrangement with Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Incorporated (PAWI), a
Philippine corporation, and Fratelli Pedrini Sarezzo S.P.A. (FPS), an Italian
corporation. The agreement provided for the purchase, importation and
distributorship in the United States of aluminium wheels manufactured by
PAWI. FASGI then paid PAWI the FOB value of the wheels. Unfortunately,
FASGI later found the shipment to be defective and in non-compliance with
the contract.
On 21 September 1979, FASGI instituted an action against PAWI and FPS for
breach of contract and recovery of damages in the amount of US$2,316,591.00
before the United States District Court for the Central District of California. In
the interim, two agreements were entered by the parties but PAWI kept on
failing to discharge its obligations therein. Irked by PAWIs persistent default,
FASGI filed with the US District Court of the Central District of California the
agreements for judgment against PAWI.
On 24 August 1982, FASGI filed a notice of entry of judgment. Unable to
obtain satisfaction of the final judgment within the United States, FASGI filed
a complaint for enforcement of foreign judgment, before RTC Makati. The
Makati court, however, dismissed the case, on the ground that the decree was
tainted with collusion, fraud, and clear mistake of law and fact. The lower
court ruled that the foreign judgment ignored the reciprocal obligations of the
parties. While the assailed foreign judgment ordered the return by PAWI of
the purchase amount, no similar order was made requiring FASGI to return to
PAWI the third and fourth containers of wheels. This situation amounted to
an unjust enrichment on the part of FASGI. Furthermore, the RTC said,
agreements which the California court had based its judgment were a nullity

for having been entered into by Mr. Thomas Ready, counsel for PAWI, without
the latters authorization. However, the Court of Appeals reversed this
decision.
Issue: WON the Philippine Court may enforce the said foreign judgment.
Held:
In this jurisdiction, a valid judgment rendered by a foreign tribunal may be
recognized insofar as the immediate parties and the underlying cause of action
are concerned so long as it is convincingly shown that there has been an
opportunity for a full and fair hearing before a court of competent jurisdiction;
that trial upon regular proceedings has been conducted, following due citation
or voluntary appearance of the defendant and under a system of jurisprudence
likely to secure an impartial administration of justice; and that there is
nothing to indicate either a prejudice in court and in the system of laws under
which it is sitting or fraud in procuring the judgment. PAWI claims that its
counsel, Mr. Ready, has acted without its authority. Verily, in this jurisdiction,
it is clear that an attorney cannot, without a clients authorization, settle the
action or subject matter of the litigation even when he honestly believes that
such a settlement will best serve his clients interest. However, PAWI failed to
substantiate this complain with sufficient evidence. Hence, the foreign
judgment must be enforced.
Even if PAWI assailed that fraud tainted the agreements which the US Court
based its judgment, this cannot prevent the enforcement of said judgment.
PAWI claimed that there was collusion and fraud in the signing of the
agreements. Although the US Court already adjudicated on this matter, PAWI
insisted on raising it again in this Court. Fraud, to hinder the enforcement
within this jurisdiction of a foreign judgment, must be extrinsic, i.e., fraud

based on facts not controverted or resolved in the case where judgment is

rendered, or that which would go to the jurisdiction of the court or would
deprive the party against whom judgment is rendered a chance to defend the
action to which he has a meritorious case or defense. In fine, intrinsic fraud,
that is, fraud which goes to the very existence of the cause of action such as
fraud in obtaining the consent to a contract is deemed already adjudged, and
it, therefore, cannot militate against the recognition or enforcement of the
foreign judgment.

G.R. No. 110263. July 20, 2001

Asiavest Merchant Bankers v CA

In 1985, the High Court of Malaysia ordered the Philippine National Construction Corporation
(PNCC) to pay $5.1 million to Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad. This was the result of
a recovery suit filed by Asiavest against PNCC in Malaysia for PNCCs failure to complete a
construction project there despite due payment from Asiavest. Despite demand, PNCC failed
to comply with the judgment in Malaysia hence Asiavest filed a complaint for the enforcement
of the Malaysian ruling against PNCC in the Philippines. The case was filed with the Pasig
RTC which eventually denied the complaint. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the RTC.
Asiavest appealed. In its defense, PNCC alleged that the foreign judgment cannot be
enforced here because of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to PNCC, collusion and/or fraud,
and there is a clear mistake of law or fact. Asiavest assailed the arguments of PNCC on the
ground that PNCCs counsel participated in all the proceedings in the Malaysian Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Malaysian Court judgment should be enforced against PNCC in
the Philippines.
HELD: Yes. PNCC failed to prove and substantiate its bare allegations of want of jurisdiction,
want of notice, collusion and/or fraud, and mistake of fact. On the contrary, Asiavest was able
to present evidence as to the validity of the proceedings that took place in Malaysia. Asiavest

presented the certified and authenticated copies of the judgment and the order issued by the
Malaysian Court. It also presented correspondences between Asiavests lawyers and
PNCCs lawyers in and out of court which belied PNCCs allegation that the Malaysian court
never acquired jurisdiction over it. PNCCs allegation of fraud is not sufficient too, further, it
never invoked the same in the Malaysian Court.
The Supreme Court notes, to assail a foreign judgment the party must present evidence of
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
Otherwise, the judgment enjoys the presumption of validity so long as it was duly certified
and authenticated. In this case, PNCC failed to present the required evidence.

B.M. No. 1678

December 17, 2007

PETITION
FOR
LEAVE
TO
BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.

RESUME

PRACTICE

OF

LAW,

In 1998, Atty. Benjamin Dacanay went to Canada to seek medical help. In order for him to
take advantage of Canadas free medical aid program he became a Canadian citizen in 2004.
In 2006 however, he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to Republic Act 9225 of
the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003. In the same year, he returned to
the Philippines and he now intends to resume his practice of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Benjamin Dacanay may still resume his practice of law.
HELD: Yes. As a rule, the practice of law and other professions in the Philippines are reserved
and limited only to Filipino citizens. Philippine citizenship is a requirement for admission to
the bar. So when Dacanay became a Canadian citizen in 2004, he ceased to have the
privilege to practice law in the Philippines. However, under RA 9225, a Filipino lawyer who
becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if
he reacquires his Filipino citizenship in accordance with RA 9225. Hence, when
Dacanay reacquires his Filipino citizenship in 2006, his membership to the Philippine bar was
deemed to have never been terminated.
But does this also mean that he can automatically resume his practice of law right after
reacquisition?

No. Dacanay must still comply with several conditions before he can resume his practice of
law, to wit:
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is
especially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioners knowledge of Philippine laws and
update him of legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyers oath which will not only remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to
maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine
bar.

G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

In 1972, Alice Reyes, a Filipina, and Richard Upton, an American, married in Hong Kong.
However, in 1982, Upton obtained a divorce decree in Nevada, USA.
Later, Reyes married Theodore Van Dorn.
In 1983, Upton filed a civil case against Reyes in Pasay City. Upton was petitioning that he
be granted management rights over a property in Manila (The Galleon). It was his contention
that the divorce decree they obtained abroad do not apply to properties in the Philippines,
hence, despite the divorce, Reyess property in the Philippines remained conjugal with Upton.
Judge Manuel Romillo, Jr. agreed with Upton. The judge ruled that the divorce decree issued
by the Nevada court, a foreign court, cannot prevail over the declared national policy of the
Philippines which prohibits divorce.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Romillo, Jr. is correct.
HELD: No. Under Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the
policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public
policy and morality (nationality principle). Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this
case, the divorce in Nevada Upton from the marriage from the standards of American Law,

under which divorce dissolves the marriage. Thus, pursuant to his national law, Upton is no
longer the husband of Reyes. He would have no standing to sue as Reyess husband as he
is not entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is bound by the decision of his own
countrys court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not
repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal property.
Further, the SC declared, Alice Reyes van Dorn should not be discriminated against in her
own country if the ends of justice are to be served.

TITLE: Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil v Hon. Corona Ibay-Somera

CITATION: GR No. 80116, June 30, 1989| 174 SCRA 653

FACTS:
Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a
German national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal
Republic of Germany. They have a child who was born on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella Pilapil
Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated in private respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding
against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The petitioner then
filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the RTC Manila on
January 23, 1983.
The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of
the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner.
On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila
alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and
another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983.

ISSUE: Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even though
they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued.

HELD:
The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can
legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, it
appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his
country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in
the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private
respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery
case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.