AFRIKA KORPS THEORY

by 2nd Lt. Jonathan Lockwood

It is all too easy to lose sight of the older games
with all the attention given to new releases. Although
THE GENERAL is less guilty of this than most other
hobby periodicals we too have succumbed in no
small measure to the glorification of what's new at
the expense of that which is seemingly familiar. One
has only to look at the feature articles of the past
year to see an alarming concentration of, if not
exactly review articles of new releases, at least a
combination of review-analysis slants in our major
features. In our attempts to analyze the new games
we also tend to review their features for the
uninitiated. As a consequence the older titles are
relegated more and more to the back of the issue, if
discussed at all. Therefore, perhaps it is time we
called a temporary halt to the worship of new titles,
and turned back the pages of time for an in depth
study of an old favorite. Such a look should not only
prove nostalgic to the old timers among us, but
highly informative to the newly initiated who haven't
had the benefit of 16 years of piecemeal "classics"
analysis. Given this premise, AFRIKA KORPS makes
as good a subject as any. Of all the classics only
STALINGRAD has received more ink in the hobby
press, and it has been forced into semi-retirement by
the emergence of THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN.
AFRIKA KORPS, however, remains a front line seller
with well over 100,000 copies sold and is indeed the
most often played game of the North African
campaign to this very day. For his part, Jon
Lockwood is well qualified to present this analysis.
He has competed in all of the national
championships held to date (the AH 500 regularly
held at ORIGINS) and regularly is among the 8 or 16
finalists, having made it into the final four this year.
As to the game itself, no other wargame in my
experience has carried its age so well. It is fitting
then that in view of its fast approaching 17th birthday, we honor it with this feature and a brand new
rulebook (announced elsewhere in this issue) to
finally cover the ambiguities which have cropped up
aver the course of 17 years of intense competition.
May the next 17 years be as enjoyable as the last 17
were.
My original purpose in writing THE
PALEVEDA GAMBIT in Vol.12, No.5 of THE
GENERAL was primarily to inject new life into an

otherwise stereotyped wargame; i.e., AFRIKA

KORPS. In my observations of literally dozens of
tournament AK games, I had noticed that play patterns among the competent players were strictly "by
the book." They HAD to be at that time, for any
significant deviation from the norm usually turned
out as not being very competent.
After I had introduced the Paleveda Gambit,
however, I noticed that in following tournaments the
Gambit was coming into more and more frequent use,
despite criticisms that it supposedly threw away two
2-2-6's to no good purpose. While the Gambit may or
may not have proven to be revolutionary in concept,
it has certainly produced more than a minor
rumbling. With this article I hope to bring out more
of what AFRIKA KORPS resembles to me in terms of
its chess like qualities, and to reexamine the various
aspects of the game from this perspective.
THE THREE FACTORS OF SPACE, FORCE,
AND TIME
This line of thinking draws directly from Dr.
Siegbert Tarrasch and his chess theories, but I'm
certain that he would forgive my taking a small
liberty with his ideas here.
In ANY wargame, but most apparently in
AFRIKA KORPS, three factors which are at primary
influence are space, force, and time. In AK space can
be defined as the area of the board which you control
and in which you have freedom of movement. At the
beginning of the game, the British player has nearly
unlimited freedom of movement with the initial
forces he possesses. The German player, although
starting from the Agheila bottleneck, has by virtue of
his highly mobile 21st Panzer Division the potential
to control a great deal of space after his first move. In
addition to this he threatens to control an area equally
as large on his second move. It is this threat which
forces a British response, for as the German freedom
of movement becomes greater, that of the British
player is correspondingly lessened. One of the facets
of the struggle then, is the continuing effort on the
part of the German player to restrict British freedom
of movement and expand his own, while the British
player attempts to maintain enough freedom of his
own to respond quickly to any German initiative and
restrict German movements wherever possible.
The second factor to be considered is force. In
most wargames force is simply the number of combat
factors available at any given moment to employ in
an attack. This, however, is too general definition.

AFRIKA KORPS THEORY

Force in AK is affected by certain rather unique
subfactors, one of which is the highly disparate
distribution of combat factors among the pieces on
both sides. For instance, it is fairly obvious to the
casual student of the game that an X number of
pieces comprised of 7-7-10's, 3-3-10's, and 2-2-12's
constitutes a more powerful force than an equal
number of 1-1-6's. This is a lasting disadvantage for
the British, mitigated somewhat by the availability of
substitute counters in August '42, and the occasional
doubled defensive positions which he can occupy. It
would seem that force is weighted largely on the side
of the German army. To an extent this is correct.
However, as most AK enthusiasts are generally
aware, the use of this superior German force is completely dependent upon the availability of supplies,
which in turn is dependent upon LUCK (the "fourth
factor", as I sarcastically refer to it). This is where
AK abruptly departs from chess (where the only luck
involved is in how incompetent an opponent you are
fortunate enough to draw). Nevertheless, the supply
rule does tend to even the score for the British, as he
receives supplies every turn and is not forced to
attack nearly so often as is the German. The general
conclusion which can be drawn from all this is that
force in AK favors the German in direct proportion to
the frequency with which he receives supplies. A
force of two panzer divisions without supplies for
attack have about as much value as a pinned queen in
chess.
The third important factor to be considered here
is time. Unlike chess, AK has a fixed time limit
within which either the German or the British player
must accomplish his objectives. However, as the
British player need only deny the German his objectives in order to win, and since the British gain much
additional force as the game progresses, we can
conclude from this that time is generally weighted in
favor of the British in AK. The only advantage which
the Germans possess in this area is that of having the
first move (or the advantage of one tempo, in chess
terminology). This initial advantage must be retained
for as long as possible, for with it the German player
can force a British response to his moves, at the very
least limiting the British freedom of movement, and
possibly create opportunities by which the German
can gain an eventual positional or material advantage.
We shall now examine fairly typical situations in
which these three factors interact.
(Figure 1: The envelopment of Tobruch.)

2
Figure 1 portrays a fairly common situation. It is
the German's June '41 turn. He has three supplies on
board, no casualties, and will execute an attack which
he feels is best calculated to drive the British into
Tobruch. The British have secured the Salum pass
and are prepared to reinforce both Tobruch and
Alexandria with June reinforcements.
How is this explained in terms of our three
factors? In terms of space, the German is on the verge
of converting Tobruch into an end-game position by
virtue of restricting British space to one square. With
regard to Alexandria, the British still command a
respectable amount of space in which to operate, so
in this part of the game it is still a tossup. In terms of
force, the Germans have an overall superiority on the
entire board, but only a kind of rough parity at
Tobruch where the British can easily reinforce. The
Germans are significantly superior at this point to the
Alexandria force facing it, but this superiority will
rapidly diminish with additional British
reinforcements and a less favorable supply table
combining to hamper his tactical superiority. Taking
the analysis in this light, it is not difficult to
comprehend why an immediate drive on Alexandria
is imperative for the German player.
(Figure 2: End Game Confrontation.)
In figure 2 we have an end-game position at
Alexandria on the German August 1, 1942 turn. The
Germans have captured Tobruch with no casualties
(on a desperation 1-1, of course), and are poised with
virtually their entire force and their most favorable
supply situation to begin the climactic battle. How do
the three factors interact here? The German here
controls most of the board, but in this situation that
does not matter. The British player presently controls
the space which matters most; that which protects his
home base from capture and nullifies the superior
German mobility. Space actually favors the British
player by virtue of his defensive position having
rendered it unimportant. Force and time are the
primary factors to be considered here. The German
has virtually his entire force to employ against the
bottleneck, plus an equal replacement capability and
a nearly equal supply situation. The British player has
an excellent defensive position, constant supplies for
counterattacks, a largely intact army, and an equal
replacement capability as counters to the German
advantages. More importantly, this turn the British
will receive substantial August reinforcements and
his substitute counters, giving him a rough parity in
the ability to concentrate forces vis-a-vis the German.

AFRIKA KORPS THEORY

Time is overwhelmingly in the British favor, and
should win the game for him.
These are but a couple of ways in which space,
force, and time interact in AK. Other positions, as
well as opening moves, will be examined in this
manner in our later discussions of the various openings, middle-game tactics, and end-game positions.
ATTRITION Vs. POSITION PLAY
Those of you who have played a goodly number
of different German opponents in AK may well
recognize your favorite (or not so favorite) opponent
in this discussion; most wargamers are varying
mixtures of these two types of players. Some of you
may be wondering why I am only discussing the
German side here; surely there are two types of
British play! WRONG! The British player is, by
necessity, first and foremost a POSITION player. He
cannot, and SHOULD NOT, play a constant game of
head-to-head slugging with the German except where
it is advantageous (Tobruch) or necessary
(Alexandria). This, of course, is largely dependent
upon what type of player the German opponent is;
which is the reason we are focusing our analysis
there.
ATTRITION PLAYER: This is the more common
of the two types of players, and is usually found
among novices. As the German, he is more apt to take
a tough position by direct combat rather than by
maneuver. This naturally results in his using supplies
rather lavishly. His great dream is to take Tobruch by
siege with no losses. As he is not afraid to risk
exchanges in 3-1 battles or A Elims in soakoffs, the
British player can expect heavy casualties for both
sides if he stands and fights. Such a player is also
highly dependent upon "lucky" supplies die rolls as
well as avoiding potentially costly exchanges and A
Elims. He is more likely, though of course not
certain, to follow a strategy of "Tobruch first."
How should a British player deal with such an
opponent? The basic idea for the British player to
keep in mind is to NEVER stand and fight on open,
undoubled terrain except at Alexandria. If you DO
stand your ground against this type of player, you are
trusting to luck as much as he is, for you have no way
of knowing how lucky or unlucky he is going to be
on a given turn or series of turns. Little sacrifices of
one or two 1-1-6's at a time and units sent behind his
lines are units well spent against this type of player.
POSITION PLAYER: I suppose some would

3
contend that this fellow should be called a maneuver
player, as maneuver is this fellow's primary stock in
trade. It is my contention that a positional German
player maneuvers so as to gain a superior positional
advantage over the British, while others will say that
the German maneuvers his units into certain positions
so as to be able to execute a more favorable
maneuver. The difference is more one of semantics
than anything else, so take your pick.
A positional player believes in moves which
force the British out of positions without a battle. He
conserves supplies and avoids an early siege of
Tobruch like the plague. He constantly looks for that
one opportunity to make a game-winning
envelopment of the British (or German) army via
automatic victory.
Now how does one play THIS type of player? As
I have previously-stated, there is only ONE real type
of British player; that being a positional one. So
while my answer may seem insulting to the more
expert players, it is nevertheless true; you play him
the same way you play the attrition player. The only
minor exception is that you do not sacrifice so many
1-1-6's as you would against the attrition player, instead preserving as large a force as possible for the
inevitable battle at Alexandria. Some positional
players don't have the stomach for an attritional
slugging match, and may head back to Tobruch in
desperation. Players like the ones I mentioned WILL
have the stomach however, so it is wise to preserve as
much force as possible for the decisive battle.
Alexandria is the toughest place on the board to
capture if the German supplies are not fairly regular,
so you all know what THAT means. That's right. Set
up your best possible line and pray for the
intervention of the infamous fourth factor. This does
not sound like a good thing to say in an article on
theory, but all players must inevitably face up to the
unpleasant reality that, all other factors being equal,
whichever side is getting more than its average share
of "lucky breaks" is the side which will have the
winning edge. Your biggest consolation is that this
edge is rarely more than a moderate one, so that
superior play on your part will largely serve to cancel
this edge.
It has probably become obvious to you by now
however, that it is a rare player who is purely attritional or positional in his style of play. The attritional
player requires more than average luck in order to
succeed; the positional player requires an
incompetent opponent in order to be able to play a

AFRIKA KORPS THEORY

consistently positional game. In tournament play it is
unlikely that you will get much of either on a regular
basis. I once read an article in which the author made
a statement to the effect that an expert AK player
(presumably German) could literally throw the die
away as he maneuvered his opponent into a trap.
Against mediocre players, that has a measure of truth,
but an expert British player is quite capable of
making that expert German player go scrambling
frantically looking for that die he so casually "threw
away" because against HIM he will definitely need it!
What point is this discussion leading up to? It is
that, as an expert (presumably) German player
opposing a British player of roughly equal ability. one
must know when the proper time is to switch from a
positional style to one of attrition. and vice versa. The
most obvious example is at the El Alamein position.
Here there is no room for maneuver; you have to slug
it out with the British in order to take the position.
The same rule holds for Tobruch. If one were to make
a general statement characterizing the two types of
players, it would be this; an attritional player counts
factors, whereas a positional player counts squares.
THE VARIOUS OPENINGS
In this section we will be looking at eleven different opening moves. Six of them are German, and
five are British. The general purpose of this section
will be to examine the various offensive and defensive setups for the strategical thought behind each.
Some of these openings are intended as answers to
other openings, as we shall discover.
GERMAN ATTACK OPENINGS
(Figure 3: The first printed German opening. Note
the
lack of progress by the Italians along the coast road
which indicates the German hasn't discovered the
advantages of leaving the coast road temporarily to
skirt Agedabia and thus save two MFs.)
Figure 3 shows a "golden oldie" if ever there was
one! Originally printed in Volume 1, No.5, this was
the first recorded attempt at defining a precise
strategy for AFRIKA KORPS. Although only the first
move is illustrated, the original article continued
through the next three moves (the last of which,
incidentally, was refuted rather decisively by a certain
James F. Dunnigan-a small world, indeed). As with
most first attempts, it suffered from a lack of
knowledge of the nuances of the game, but it was a

4
creditable effort. Here are its salient features:
STRENGTHS:
1) A central thrust forcing a British defensive
move to guard the passes.
2) It isolates Bengasi on the first move.
WEAKNESSES:
1) N19 is not seized on first move, permitting the
British to occupy it on their turn. This in turn
hampers German freedom of maneuver.
2) 21/3 is badly misplaced isolating Bengasi
rather than aiding the rest of the 21st Pz.
3) Savena is horribly out of place in the southern
desert where the speedy 21/3 should be. It will
certainly not, as the authors believed, discourage a
good British player from sending a 1-1-6 on a raid.
The remainder of this opening I have decided not
to give, as a competent British opponent would not
respond in the way AH assumed at that time. We
must still remember in all fairness however, that this
was a first effort; after 13 years of successive
analysis, hindsight tends to be 20/20.
There were many other articles dealing with
German openings, but with few exceptions, they
assumed either extreme cowardice or outright
stupidity on the part of the British. The two openings
which follow are exceptions to that early trend.
(Figure 4: This extreme southern penetration
threatens both sides of the central escarpments, but is
cut off from the Italians and invites aggressive British
countermoves.)
The opening illustrated in figure 4 was originally
published in Vol.7, No.4 by William Searight. This is
the only German alternative to the soon-to-be
discussed Hazlett Opening. This used to be my
favorite German opening until a certain Carl
Paleveda showed me the error of my ways. The first
two turns of this opening are as follows:
D.A.K.1st: Bologna W3, Savena I3, Brescia J3,
Trenta, Pavia P13, 21/5, 104, No. 1 supply- T22, 21/3
U24, Rommel P13.
D.A.K.2nd: Bologna W3, Savena I3, Brescia F3,
Trenta I15, Pavia N17, 21/5, 104, No. 1 supply S29,
21/3 P29, No. 2 supply N15.
What has the author of this attack in mind? What
he is attempting to do, without really realizing it as
such, is to utilize the potential of the 21st Panzer's

AFRIKA KORPS THEORY

ability to threaten a lot of British space to its

maximum extent; put simply, he is trying to grab as
much of the board space from the British as he
possibly can on his first and second moves,
precipitating an early retreat into Tobruch. Against
the British defense as practiced at that time, it works
admirably. Here are its main features:

correspondingly.
2) It deals with Bengasi in the most economical
manner.
3) It poses a potential threat to Alexandria.
4) It positions the Italians so as to reach the battle
via the coast road in the most efficient manner,
assuming no resistance.

STRENGTHS:
1) Utilizes speed of 21st Panzer very well.
2) Potential strong threat to Alexandria. (21/3 can
capture it with Rommel's help on May II.)
3) Forces early retreat into Alexandria if standard
defense used.

WEAKNESSES:
Against the AH Standard Defense (to be
discussed next), there are no demonstrable
weaknesses. At the worst the German has an even
game with the British by June I. Against the yet-to-be
discussed Paleveda Gambit and to a lesser extent the
Garbutt Gambit, one might as well take this particular
opening with its normal continuations and stick it in
file 13. For continuation's sake, its next moves are:

WEAKNESSES:
1) Rommel is needlessly tied down trying to
boost the movement of units which would be better
off on the coast road.
2) The Afrika Korps has split itself into two
widely separated battle groups, each incapable of
immediately being able to support the other. This
flaw is the more serious one, inviting a refuting
countermove by the British. The British player has
two choices. He may move 2/3 to G4(!) as done by
Tom Hazlett in a Vol.12, No.4 series replay. A move
with potentially nastier long range implications is to
execute the Paleveda Gambit (see Volume 12, No.5).
Overall, this is the only German attack opening I
have seen that seems so potentially threatening, and
yet lends itself to such a decisive refutation. The next
opening we will discuss is not so vulnerable.
(Figure 5: The Hazlett opening concentrates on
securing the valuable O19 pass while still threatening
a "Recce Down & Out" move on Alexandria and
maintaining contact with the Italians. Note the
additional MF gained by the Italians in leaving the
coast road in anticipation of picking it up again next
turn at H5.)
The opening shown in figure 5 is the one most
commonly employed among competent tournament
players. Its author, who earlier advanced his ideas on
AK theory in the Afrika Korps Thesis (Vol. 8, No.3)
deserves due credit for an opening which has become
every bit as much the "Old Reliable" to AK players as
the Ruy Lopez is to chess. Let us look at its salient
features.
STRENGTHS:
1) The Recce unit seizes the strategic N19
escarpment, insuring further German freedom of
maneuver and reducing that of the British

April II: 21/5, 104 P22 or T26, 21/3 U29, Italians

advance as far as possible along road with exception
of Savena and Bologna besieging Bengasi.
May I: 21/3 advances toward Alexandria, remainder
of 21st to R29. Italians and 15th Panzer move to seal
off central desert.
May II and June I are spent cleaning up any
delaying 1-1-6's and driving the British into Tobruch.
I stated at the beginning of this opening that it was
the "Old Reliable" among tournament players. This is
because it is inherently very flexible. So much so
that, as we shall see later, an answer to the "unusual
openings" can be developed without changing its first
move. That will be dealt with later. Now we shall turn
our attention to some British defensive openings.
STANDARD DEFENSES
The British version of the "Old Reliable" opening was not developed by any one individual, as it
seems to have "evolved" from a series of articles.
Most of the articles dealt primarily with German
strategies, and British defenses were set up primarily
for illustrative purposes. Mr. Hazlett seems to have
synthesized these former British setups fairly
concisely in his own AK THESIS, so with maybe one
or two exceptions the setup is as given in that article.
(Figure 6: The standard British defense to the Hazlett
opening. Note that the 1-1-6s do not arrive until the
following turn if and when the 21st Panzer moves
onto the central escarpment.)
As seen in Figure 6, this defense takes up a

AFRIKA KORPS THEORY

blocking position in the western passes, temporarily
thwarting the German's efforts to cramp his freedom
of space. A flanking attempt by the 21st Pz through
the central escarpments is similarly thwarted on the
following turn by the 1-1-6s. With the arrival of the
15th Pz however, the German now has a decisive
superiority in terms of force and can overrun with
devastating effect if no retreat is made. This is the
one great failing in this defense which is particularly
galling to me. It condemns the British game to a
passivity which is difficult to overcome in the middle
game unless the German has bad supply luck or
makes a compensatory bad move to give the British
an opportunity. It is certainly not an inferior defense
by any means; the British have roughly an even game
vis a vis the Hazlett Opening with the arrival of June
reinforcements. Herein however, lies the rub; an
EVEN game is NOT necessarily a WINNING game.
The purpose of an opening move in wargaming, as in
chess, is not simply to "hang in there" and hope for
good fortune to befall you. It is for the purpose of
gaining that potentially game-winning initial
advantage which can possibly be developed as the
game progresses into the DECISIVE advantage. That
extra turn or two of time you gain; that extra supply
you make him use; the improper dispositioning of
forces your opponent makes in response to your
move; any or all of these little advantages can later
prove to be the one that saved your neck. With a
leadup such as this, the more experienced among you
probably already KNOW what opening is next to be
discussed. As a final note for this opening however,
here is a summary of the Standard Defense's strengths
and weaknesses:
STRENGTHS:
1) Preserves British freedom of movement and
board control for first few critical turns.
2) Virtual certainty of holding Tobruch until June
reinforcements.
WEAKNESSES:
Tactically, there are none. The strategic weakness
here, however, is that the British are forced into early
passivity and experience increasing difficulty in
breaking out of this pattern prior to November.
UNUSUAL OPENINGS AND COUNTEROPENINGS
(Figure 7: The Paleveda Gambit risks force and
supply in an attempt to change the focus of the
German attack and force the 21st Panzer back to the
coast road.)

6
Even though the Paleveda Gambit shown in
figure 7 was authored by Carl Paleveda and myself, I
daresay that this is probably the most radical of the
unusual openings, violating certain tenets of opening
British defensive play as stated by Mr. Hazlett and
Mr. DeWitt, the two major writers on the subject to
date. These alleged violations of opening theory are
dealt with below.
VIOLATION #1: THE GAMBIT ABANDONS THE
WESTERN PASSES.
In all British defensive strategies to date, the emphasis has remained on the occupation of the western
passes around Mechili and Tmimi. The obvious
reason is to block a German thrust toward Tobruch, at
least temporarily. The positional weakness of this
move is that it permits the Germans and Italians to
unite their forces relatively early; something which a
good positional British player would like to be able to
delay for a time. The concentration of the German
player is squarely focused on Tobruch when the
standard defense is used, which is also undesirable
for the British. What the Paleveda Gambit boils down
to in terms of a chesslike opening is an early
complication of the tactical situation. It trades force
in a hoped-for favorable exchange for space and time.
This brings us to the second violation:
VIOLATION #2: THE GAMBIT SACRIFICES TWO
STRONG PIECES WHICH COULD BE BETTER
EMPLOYED IN DEFENSE OF TOBRUCH OR AS
PART OF A BRITISH DEFENSIVE LINE.
This criticism was voiced by Mr. Hazlett in a letter to the editor (Vol.13, No. 1) in which he gave his
analysis of the Paleveda Gambit and his suggested
counter-opening. He further goes on to say that
AFRIKA KORPS is, in the final analysis, a game of
attrition, and that the British cannot afford such a
high price for EVERY TURN (emphasis mine).
It is rare for me to have to publicly contradict
one of the more respected competitors and writers,
particularly in this field. But while I have great
respect for Tom's ability, I must contend that he has
totally missed the mark in his analysis. Aside from
the rather obvious fact that the British are NOT going
to be sacrificing a relatively high number of factors
every turn (they only do it once), as Mr. Hazlett
seems to be contending, I most heartily disagree with
his statement that AK is a game of attrition in the
final analysis. NO wargames are either basically

AFRIKA KORPS THEORY

attrition or maneuver. Rather, they are the skillful and
properly timed combinations of both. If a game
happens to be resolved by an attritional battle, it does
not follow at ALL that the game itself is basically
attritional. Conversely, if an AK game is won on a
brilliant enveloping maneuver, it does not follow (as
claimed in The Afrika Korps Thesis) that AK is
basically a game of maneuver. It is the relative skill
level of the opposing players which determines the
nature of any individual AFRIKA KORPS game, or of
ANY wargame. As I stated earlier in this section, the
purpose of an opening move in a wargame is to
attempt to gain that important initial advantage which
can prove to be the game-winner. By forcing an early
tactical complication in the situation, this is the basic
aim of the gambit. It is not solely designed as a minigame maneuver to keep the British on the outer
Tobruch escarpments until the arrival of June
reinforcements, although this generally tends to occur
as a natural and desirable consequence of its
employment. In essence, the equation that one is
attempting to solve in evaluating the Paleveda
Gambit is that of force versus time and space; how
does one place a value on these factors in the early
stages of a game?
VIOLA TION#3: IN ORDER FOR THE GAMBIT
TO CREATE MAXIMUM DELAY, IT
DELIBERATELY SACRIFICES A SUPPLY,
THEREBY GIVING THE GERMANS AN EXTRA
SUPPLY.
Many players seem to feel that a captured supply
is quite an advantage, somehow magically increasing
the German supply capacity. This is a fallacy which
bears correcting. In the first place, is a CAPTURED
supply worth as much as a regular supply? The
answer is no for this reason: A regular supply can
always be replaced by means of the supply table,
whereas a captured supply which is expended
CANNOT be replaced other than by capturing
another supply. The only tangible thing that a
captured supply gives its owner is one turn of attack,
which is certainly nice to have, but not necessarily
decisive. Moreover, in gaining the supply, the
Paleveda Gambit forces the German to spend one
turn and one REGULAR supply. Again, whether this
exchange gives an advantage of sorts to the British
remains for time and many games to tell. Here is a
summary of the Paleveda Gambit's strengths and
weaknesses:
STRENGTHS:
1) It severely hampers Italian movement, vir-

7
tually forcing the German to concentrate on the block
rather than on Tobruch.
2) It causes the German to waste both time and
force in order to eliminate it.
3) It completely thwarts a southern thrust and
also eliminates any immediate threat to Alexandria.
WEAKNESSES:
1) It give up two 2-2-6s, temporarily weakening
the British position in terms of force, as well as giving up a supply if not destroyed.
2) It grants the German at least a foothold in the
western passes, admittedly a valuable defensive
position.
Further illustrations of this gambit are found in
Vol.12, No.5.
I have a variation of the Paleveda Gambit which
I call the 2/3 variation which is purely in the experimental stage at this time, as I have not yet been
able to test it in face to face play. All moves are the
same as in the regular gambit, with the notable exception that the positions of 2/3 and 9A/20 are reversed;
this variation obviously makes the blocking force that
much more difficult to eliminate. It just as obviously
weakens the British force level at Tobruch to a
dangerous level, creating more favorable conditions
for siege. This opening's value lies in its shock effect
in face to face play. In this it reminds me somewhat
of the Kolibri or "Spike" Opening in chess. It seems
to say to your opponent, "See in what contempt I hold
you. I can play the most seemingly ridiculous
opening that I wish, and you are powerless to exact a
penalty." Until I am able to further explore the
continuations of this variation as to its actual
playability, it must remain in the realm of the
psychological "gaffe" opening. Further continuations
of this variation are left as an exercise for the reader.
(Figure 8: The Garbutt Gambit attempts to trade a 22-6 for a supply unit and a change in focus of the
German strategic plan.)
The Garbutt Gambit shown in figure 8 is harder
to overcome than it first appears, offering a lone 2-26 on C11 as bait. It is quite a lovely trap. If the
German smashes it immediately on a high-odds surrounded attack, he expends a supply, needlessly
diverts his force from its potential flanking maneuver,
and leaves N19 open for reoccupation by the British,
severely cramping German maneuver space. The
alternative of isolating the unit results in the same
cramped position for the German, his only added

AFRIKA KORPS THEORY

compensation is the extra supply he saves by not
attacking. The lovely part about this gambit is that the
21st Pz is the only force which is able to take
immediate and decisive action against the "poisoned"
2-2-6 on C11. What is still more attractive about this
defense is that if the 21st continues with its normal
flanking maneuver to the south, (which is, by the
way, the proper response) then the proffered 2-2-6
can safely be withdrawn behind the western
escarpment line on May I, having accomplished its
purpose of cramping Italian mobility and freedom of
space without sacrificing one iota of force! It is for
this reason a very solid defense and therefore highly
playable. I strongly recommend it as an alternative to
the more conservative British players who would
LIKE to inhibit the German's operating space, but
who understandably balk at the deliberate sacrifice of
force inherent in the Paleveda Gambit (remember that
I said UNDERSTANDABLY, not JUSTIFIABLY).
As an answer to this defense, we will be
operating under the assumption that the German is
using the Hazlett Opening. Although this defense
presents a severe potential threat to the German's
operating space, he should take note of the fact that
the single 2-2-6 on C11 cannot force the issue by
itself. It is therefore quite feasible to decline the
gambit and proceed with a continuation along similar
lines of the Hazlett vs. Standard Opening. Such a line
might appear as follows:
APRIL II: Pavia C9, Brescia H9, Ariete H12. Savena
H3, Bologna J3, Trenta W3, Rommel F7, 21/3 U29,
21/5 P22, 21/104 T26, Supply units with Rommel.
Full use is made here of Rommel's bonus, as the
Italians can now threaten to cut off the 2-2-6 on May
I. (The British response to this is to pull back the 2-26 and substitute a more expendable 1-1-6 in its place.
The flanking maneuver executed by the 21st Pz
forces the same response by the British as in the
Standard Defense, so in this respect at least the
Garbutt Gambit is successfully declined. In order not
to expend a supply killing one 1-1-6 however, the
German is still forced to accept a somewhat cramped
opening as far as the Italians are concerned. Here is a
summary of the strengths and weaknesses of the
Garbutt Gambit:
STRENGTHS:
1) Performs same blocking action against a direct
thrust at Tobruch as does the Standard.
2) The 2-2-6 on C11 which is offered as bait effectively cramps Italian maneuver, but cannot be

8
taken or isolated without inviting a British countermove that cramps the 21st's maneuver space as well.
3) The opening is close enough to the Standard
Defense so as to transpose more easily into its more
familiar continuations.
WEAKNESSES:
1) Although the 2-2-6 cramps the Italians, it is
not aggressive enough to force a German response by
the 21st Pz. This means that the German can, with
only a slight modification of the Hazlett Opening,
transpose his game easily into lines similar to that of
Hazlett vs. Standard.
(Figure 9: The Newbury variant offers a gambit of its
own on the second British turn by offering up a 2-2-6
in exchange for threatening the German lines of
supply.)
The Newbury variation is actually a gambit
which is played off of the Standard Defense. I have
put this continuation at the end of our subsection on
unusual British openings to illustrate that the
Paleveda Gambit is not the sole opening that violates
opening theory for a positional advantage. The sole
distinguishing feature of this opening from the
standard defense is the westward sortie made usually
by 22 Gds on the British April II turn. Neither Mr.
Hazlett nor Mr. DeWitt seem to be proponents of the
move, but Mr. DeWitt does go into the maneuver in
more detail in his article A DECADE WITH DAS
AFRIKA KORPS (Vol.11, No.5). Therefore I will
draw from his article when examining prospective
German responses.
The Newbury Variation aims at disrupting the
incoming 15th Panzer's freedom of maneuver, while
at the same time forcing a German response to its
potential threat to his supply line. Put another way, it
is an attempt to sacrifice force in order to gain some
advantage in time and space. Mr. DeWitt gives three
responses; the only three that I can see as an
alternative to letting a savage little 2-2-6 run around
behind your lines uncaged. They are:
1) ATTACK THE UNIT. This grants a minute advantage in force to the British because of the expended supply, and modest advantages in time and
space.
2) ISOLATE THE UNIT WITH THREE OF YOUR
OWN. As the author admits, this ties down three units
for a month. This means a larger advantage in time
for the British than in the first alternative, a slight
advantage in space, and a small advantage in force

AFRIKA KORPS THEORY

for the German (a 2-2-6 is killed without expending a
supply.)
3) ISOLATE IT LATER WITH A NORTH-SOUTH
LINE EAST OF TOBRUCH. This seems to be the
best alternative, with No.2 and 1 following in that
order. This, of course, is dependent upon how quickly
the German gets into position to isolate it. If he takes
too long, the 2-2-6 can reach a position near the
German home base which severely cramps space for
his supply units. This grants the British an indirect
advantage in force, although he has no advantage in
time or space, except as at the Home Base as just
mentioned.
A final summary of the Newbury Variation
would be:
STRENGTHS:
1) Disrupts German maneuver space and forces a
response in order to guard supply lines.
2) Easily transposes into more familiar continuations for the British.
WEAKNESSES:
1) Involves a minor sacrifice of force.
2) The German has alternatives which can
minimize the advantages of this move if executed
quickly.
This concludes the subsection on unusual British
openings. Counteropenings to deal effectively with
these unusual openings, particularly the Paleveda
Gambit, have been developed with only minor
variations between the first two. We shall conclude
our study of the various openings with a study of
three counteropenings.
PALEVEDA GAMBIT DECLINED? GERMAN
COUNTEROPENINGS
(Figure 10: The Greenwood-Roberts counteropening
has the Italians performing a limited bypassing
maneuver while the 21/5, 104, and 3 occupy E11, F9,
and C12 respectively. This quickly constricts the
gambit but leaves the western passes to the British.
The Hazlett counter is identical except that the 7-7-10
occupies the escarpment west of Tmimi (F17). The
British can adopt a defensive line, but the release of
21/104 on the next turn as the Italians are able to
further tighten the noose on the gambit forces
prevents isolation of 21/5.)
The unusual thing about the authorship of this

9
countermove is that both Donald Greenwood and
Tom Roberts came up with roughly the same
responses, but without each other's knowledge.
Greenwood developed his opening in pbm with me,
while Roberts had the somewhat more difficult task
of doing so while playing me under time pressures in
the 1975 AH 500. It looks very similar to the Hazlett
counteropening to follow, with a minor exception or
two. It does not concentrate on occupying the western
escarpment, instead preferring to "put the squeeze"
on the blocking force at first, then threatening to
overrun on May II and capture the supply. This forces
the British player to either blow up the supply, thus
isolating his units, or allow an overrun the following
turn to capture his supply and isolate the surviving
unit. It is so similar to the Hazlett Counteropening to
follow that I am going to briefly discuss it along with
this opening for comparison's sake.
The first opening move is naturally identical to
the original Hazlett Opening. Continuations are as
follows:
April II: 21/5-F17, 21/3-C12, 21/104-F9, Ariete &
Brescia G7, Pavia-E5, Savena-H3, Bologna-J3,
Rommel-H9.
May I: 21/5-H16, 21/104-F17, 21/3-C12, Ariete-E11,
Savena-C6, Brescia-F9, Pavia, Bologna-H12, 15/8,
15/115-M15, 15/33-M17.
Incidentally, in considering a British response to
the German April II move, it is wiser to move 7/31
Motor to C7 and not D8 as suggested by Mr. Hazlett.
This forces a position less favorable to the German as
far as obtaining a 5-1 surrounded attack is concerned.
Both counteropenings assume that the loss of a
supply in addition to two 2-2-6s is unacceptable to
the British, and therefore refutes the opening. For my
counterargument I merely refer the reader to the
earlier discussions of the Gambit as well as the
discussion of positional vs. attritional play. The
proper response of the Gambit to both of these
openings is to maintain the block for as long as
possible, even at the cost of a captured supply. The
gain in time and position should provide adequate
compensation. Neither of these openings can PREVENT the British from executing the Gambit; they
instead accept it and attempt to wrest advantage from
it. The last opening to be discussed attempts to
forestall use of the Gambit at all, but at a cost.
(Figure 11: The Lockwood Opening is really only

AFRIKA KORPS THEORY

useful against an opponent who is hopelessly
addicted to the gambit. Another variation sends the
two 2-3-4s at K5 through the central desert with
Rommel instead.)
The Lockwood "counteropening" shown in
figure 11 is more for illustrative, purposes than for
serious tournament use, as it yields the strategic hex
N19, enabling the British to execute a modified
Standard as shown, resulting in a decided positional
advantage for the British. It is rather meant to show
what it costs a player in terms of position when
deploying to stop a specific opening move by the
British. A knowledgeable British player simply has
too many countermoves. Further details of this
defense are again left as an exercise for the interested
reader. This concludes our examination of the various
openings.
THE MIDDLE-GAME
Studies have been made before of the "middlegame in wargames. Witness as examples of this
George Phillies' series on STALINGRAD a few years
back, as well as Tom Oleson's mammoth analysis of
ANZIO (Vol.10, No.5). As the terrain in AFRIKA
KORPS is pretty much confined to clear, escarpment,
and Qattara, our discussion of middle-game tactics
and strategy need not be THAT comprehensive.
Discussions of the middle-game have tended to be of
a general nature for the assumed reason that
individual games vary so much that such analysis
would be a Herculean task. But chess has far more
middle game combinations than do wargames,
especially AK. Has this prevented a plethora of books
on the middle game in chess from being written? It
certainly has not! And although each individual game
is different, there are patterns of play and tactical
situations which appear fairly regularly over the
course of many games. This then is the focus of our
discussion here.
THE GERMAN MIDDLE-GAME
For the German, the middle-game can be said to
begin with the investment of Tobruch, usually around
June I or II. Of course, if the German botches his
opening play, it may be July before the middle-game
starts. In some cases it never starts. Accepted practice
is for the German to initiate an all-out drive on
Alexandria to capture it before November, when
force takes a decisive swing in the British favor.
Experience and common sense have shown this to be
the generally superior course, so I am not about to

10
quarrel with it. The only exception to this rule is
given by Mr. Hazlett in the AK Thesis; he should
consider a siege of Tobruch if the British have lost
2/3 and a couple of other strong units. This
occurrence is quite uncommon, however. The good
British player knows that Tobruch is his only redoubt
which is capable of breaking the back of the German
army. We will assume therefore that our British
opponent is one who never weakens his Tobruch
garrison below two 4-4-7's, something a good player
should never do, anyway. A strong garrison
effectively "ups the stakes" beyond the courage of
most German commanders to risk any kind of attack.
(Figure 12: The infamous bottteneck pass where
flanking maneuvers can be blocked with relative
ease.)
In any event, what is the first obstacle that
presents itself to the German? The infamous K36
pass near Salum (see figure 12). Admittedly a
beautiful delaying position for the British because it
is a bottleneck of sorts, dealing with it depends here
upon the German supply situation. If he has maximum supplies on board, he is strongly urged to
follow the "axiom" stated by Mr. Burdick in an AK
series replay (Vol.12, No.4): always attack when at
maximum supply. The reasoning behind this axiom is
that the more times that a German has to roll for
supply, the greater the potential number that he can
receive; and the more supplies that he receives, the
more attacks or attacking turns that he can potentially
have; and finally, the more attacks that the German
can make, the more British force he will be able to
potentially destroy. Sound reasoning with which I
tend to agree. If you are going to be destined to get
lucky breaks, you might as well create as many
opportunities to get them as possible. The trouble
with this axiom is that there aren't many clairvoyant
wargamers around, and that supply "luck" can be
judged as good or bad only in retrospect. The
important consideration at the K36 pass is time,
though. Trying to maneuver the British out of this
position is too time consuming and favors the British.
I consider it imperative for the German to force the
pass by a high-odds attack, thus getting the British
into terrain which gives the German greater
opportunity to exploit his superiority in force.
Either before this time or during it, the British
may have sent a unit behind your lines on a raid. Mr.
Hazlett provides the best refutation in simply
stringing a line of units and zones of control to isolate
them. Two additional comments are in order when

AFRIKA KORPS THEORY

employing this north to south maneuver, however.
The first one is to never position any two of those
units in a straight line (so as to avoid the nasty trick
in figure 13). The second is to beware of any
concentration of British units near your weaker units
in the line. Otherwise the British can break the
isolation of its raiding units by a timely counterattack.
(Figure 13: By attacking at 1-3 or worse without
supply, the attacker can force a retreat outside to
supply if he survives. If unable to attack at worse than
1-2 odds an isolated unit could still attack out against
isolating units placed in a straight tine in relation to
each other if supply is available within five hexes.)
A possible exception to this method of dealing
with raiders can be considered if the raider is a 1-112. Since the British only have one of these units
before November its quick destruction will effectively remove for a good while your opponent's
capacity for a deep penetration of your space. This
being the case, one might consider having a 7-7-10
available south of the escarpment line as a "Recon
Killer." It does cost a supply, but the rewards in terms
of cutting down the British ability to maneuver
behind you are often compensatory.
As you advance, endeavor to keep as much of
your mobile force in a switch position on the escarpment line as possible. This has a forking effect on the
British defense and may force a retreat. Your goal,
failing an outright capture of Alexandria before
November, (which will not happen against better
British opponents) is to at least force the British into
the confines of the El Alamein position, where the
British will have a hard time forcing the German
back. It also renders the second 1-1-12 useless, as it
has no place to run to. Alexandria's principal
defensive strength lies not necessarily in the position
itself, but in the fact that the German's supply
capacity of three units dictates that the German will
be physically unable to attack continuously for more
than three turns at any given time, even if he should
be receiving maximum supplies. It also helps both
sides to know about where this point begins so that
they may plan accordingly. The Rommel unit, if it is
used to speed up a supply line, can help each supply
unit only twice during its trip to the front. Calculating
on this basis, we find our imaginary German "leash
line" to be at J49 at its easternmost extremity, and
then extending from there to the southwest in a
straight line. At the very best, the German must pause
for one turn after three turns of attack.

11
(Figure 14: Besides the Salum pass, the escarpment
line acts in concert with the irregular coastline to
produce several other bottlenecks shown here by the
red asterisks.)
Another major consideration for the German
during his advance on Alexandria is the presence of
the east-west escarpment line beginning at the K36
pass at Salum and terminating at O52. This line
creates several delaying positions for the British (see
figure 14). The consideration of whether to use force
or maneuver depends upon supply and on how much
force the British are prepared to risk in order to hold
it. If the British merely throw out two or three factors
and you do not have maximum supply on board, then
maneuver and isolation become the order of the day.
If, however, you have maximum supplies on board or
the British risk more than 4-5 factors in a position
which you are not able to immediately outflank or
threaten to do so, then force in the form of high-odds
attacks becomes necessary. Once the British are
confined to the El Alamein position, the end-game at
Alexandria begins. This is reserved for later
discussion.
(Figure 15: The usual method of investing Tobruch is
shown above a better way is illustrated below. The
best way of course is to place a 2-3-4 in each of the
three hexes surrounding Tobruch.)
One final item to be discussed before leaving the
German middle-game is the investment of Tobruch
(see figure 15). Most novice and intermediate players
employ two units at G24 and H26, usually two Italian
units. The faulty part about this position is that it
enables the British to spring units loose behind the
line of your advance, necessitating a delay while you
string a line across the board to isolate them. It is also
possible for the British to break out in November by
means of a 3-1 on one unit while soaking-off on the
other. Needless to say, this pair of threats can cost
you both space and time if they are permitted to be
carried out.
The second setup is mentioned by Mr. Hazlett in
the AK Thesis. It entails positioning two 2-3-4's at
H24 and H26, presumably to discourage an opponent
from springing units loose behind your lines. It
succeeds in stopping the first threat, but is completely
ineffective in containing a November breakout. If you
will notice, this setup gives the British another square
to move units out onto and to attack from. Even
though H25 is initially surrounded, the 3-1 which the

AFRIKA KORPS THEORY

British can easily obtain on one of the units will give
the other unit a retreat route when the soakoff attack
is made. My proposed modification is exceedingly
simple in itself, but there are two ways of carrying it
out. The first method is to leave three Italian units
behind at G24, H25, and H26 when you begin your
drive on Alexandria. This is the conservative method
for players who wish to seal Tobruch and concentrate
their undivided attention on Alexandria. For more
aggressive types who aren't forgetful, Mr. Hazlett's
setup is recommended until October I. You then send
one Italian unit racing back to Tobruch in order to
transpose into the first setup. The only trick here is to
be alert; if you forget until too late, you're in trouble.

12
our next discussion.
THE END-GAME: ALEXANDRIA
The end-game at Alexandria can be subdivided
into two basic subsections; those end-games in which
Tobruch has not already fallen, and those in which it
has. Books could be written on the various end-game
positions at Alexandria. However, as I do not have
access to a large number of various end-game
positions with which to analyze, this discussion will
necessarily be one of general principles and patterns
of play, with illustrations where appropriate.
END-PLAY WITHOUT FALL OF TOBRUCH

THE BRITISH MIDDLE-GAME

The point to remember as the British during the
middle-game is that Alexandria is your best ally in
terms of spinning out time; the more time which the
German consumes in trying to take Alexandria, the
less he will have available for the safe reduction of
Tobruch, and thus increases the possibility of his
being reduced to desperation die rolls. The key first
key step in any such strategy is the retention of
Alexandria until November reinforcements become
available to stabilize the situation.
Looking at figure 12 once again, we can see that
two 1-1-6s positioned at J36 and J37 stop a German
overrun with minimal force for one turn and expends
1 German supply. There are bottlenecks almost as
good as this slightly east of this position at Sidi
Barrani, as well as at Matruh. Maximum use must be
made of these bottleneck positions to delay a German
breakthrough while the remainder of your force
blocks attempts to turn your position by German
flanking maneuvers with elements of the 15th and
21st Pz. If you are opposed by an attritional player,
these tactics work fairly well. Against opponents
whom you know to be of expert or near expert
caliber, it is deemed wiser to fall back more quickly
so that your Alamein position will be that much
stronger. By that I don't mean turn and run, just be a
little more ready to fall back if the maneuver player is
beginning to stretch your lines dangerously thin.
Better to fall back a little faster and preserve force
than to chance losing a great deal of force via
automatic victory. Discussing play in any further
detail here would be repetitious, as much British
strategy can be derived from our previous discussion
of German "problems." Once there is no more room
for flanking maneuvers at either Alexandria or
Tobruch, then the end-game is reached, the subject of

This is definitely the most favorable situation for

the British. The big consolation for the defender here
is that Alexandria, unlike Tobruch, cannot be taken on
one lucky die roll. The most common situation that
occurs is one in which the Germans have the British
confined at Alexandria with anywhere from two to as
many as seven turns remaining before November
reinforcements arrive. The general suggestion that I
can offer here is to combine force with delicacy; if a
square can be attacked from another square without
the attacker's having to soak-off, then expose only
one factor to such an attack. If you have a salient in
your line, one factor should he placed in the
unoccupied salient square to present less of a target.
If an escarpment square such as Ruweisat or Alam
Halfa is part of your line, then your strongest units
should be occupying it. These principles are
illustrated in figure 16. A protruding undoubled
square in your line is a potential disaster in terms of
force, as the German should have no problem getting
a 6-1 with no soakoff using two 7-7-10's and a 4-5-6
(unless of course, you think sticking stronger units
out there will make your position any safer).
(Figure 16: The principles of solid defense in the
end-game are well illustrated in this example.)
During the first stages of the end-game in this
situation, you are as strong as you are ever going to
be before November. If you are going to counterattack, then hit the small Italians and Recces first. In
an attritional slugging match, you must deprive the
German of his soakoff units whenever you get the
chance. Once he runs out of those, he will be hard put
to both attack and hold his line, let alone make soakoffs. If you are going to he conservative however,
then remember this; the southern end of your line is
less worth holding than the northern end, for the

AFRIKA KORPS THEORY

13

obvious reason that Alexandria lies directly behind

the northern end. If you are going to trade off space
for time in order to strengthen the line elsewhere,
then the south is the place to do so.

over anyway if you had been forced to counterattack

at low odds in the earlier situation. At least this way,
your force maintains a threat to the Germans should
they take Alexandria.

Once November rolls around, most British

players breathe a big sigh of relief, thinking that the
game is won. Although the British receive a big boost
in their force position and may even out number the
Germans on the board, the advantage is not entirely
in the British favor. For one thing, the supply table
from December, 1941, to the end of the game is
highly favorable to the Germans as illustrated earlier,
they will be enabled to maintain a constant attack for
as many as 75% of the remaining turns. Coupled their
ten factors of November reinforcements, this bode ill
for the British if they are backed up too close to their
home base. If your position is somewhat cramped,
your counteroffensive should have the limited
objective of regaining the Ruweisat line. After
regaining that line, any further action on your part
depends on how the German reacts to your limited
counter-offensive. If he panics and heads back to
Tobruch, advance cautiously and be prepared to grab
back as much space as you can if his attack on
Tobruch is successful. You will need it.

GERMAN END-PLAY: How do the Germans go

about battering their way into Alexandria? Much of
this can be inferred from our previous discussion of
British end-play problems, so this discussion need not
be as long. Your main area for attacks should always
be along the coast whenever possible, as this directly
threatens your opponent's home base and cramps his
space for counterattacking. If your opponent gives
you an undoubled salient in his line, hit it at high
odds, especially if it is in the north. If it is in the
south, your best bet would be to ignore it. Such
attacks there are a waste of time.

(Figure 17: The Qattara Redoubt is a seldom used

ploy which can be a game saver under the right
circumstances. Up to three major units are at sea with
the rest drawn behind the relative safety of the
Qattara Depression to await developments.)

What to do if you are faced with a turn or two

without attack supply and a potential British
counterattack? You might consider figure 18 as a
possibility. The only problem here is that the British
may launch 1-2 attacks on your exposed 7-7-10's,
hoping to eliminate one at the cost of four factors in
exchange. If you are leery of such attacks, you might
as well forget it. Is it better to present a lowpercentage target than to stack weak units around and
with the 7-7-10, giving the British easier targets to
attack? Besides, if the Britisher is that fanatical about
getting a shot at your strong units, he can soakoff on
the weak units and still get his 1-2. The point I am
making here is, why worry? If your opponent has a
penchant for counterattacking, he is going to do it no
matter what kind of target you present. In that case,
you would be wiser to position your forces so as to
force as many soakoffs as possible. The setup in
figure 18 should be used against an opponent whom
you think is very conservative and not given to taking
risks.

This last position, shown in figure 17, is one not

seen too often in AK, although it has great potential
for the British. It occurs when the Germans are very
close to Alexandria, but the British cannot safely
counterattack, even with their November
reinforcements largely intact. This "redoubt" position
is highly interesting, as the 4-4-7's are sent to sea
where they will shuttle back and forth with the 4-47's already in Tobruch, while the remainder of your
force takes up the bottleneck position with three
supply units as shown. The German must now either
waste a great deal of time clearing out the redoubt or
leave a large garrison to contain it. As this force has
no base to guard, they can attack any German
garrison, even at low odds, virtually without fear. The
larger the garrison, the more hampered the Germans
will be at Tobruch. If it is too small, the British could
retake Alexandria or force a halt in the German siege
of Tobruch. Of course, if the Germans make a lucky
series of attacks on Tobruch to take it, the game is
practically over. But it would probably have been

Whenever possible, Ruweisat and Alam Halfa

should be taken by attacking from a square next to it
and soaking off on the position itself, forcing a
British retreat or counterattack. Along the coast, don't
be afraid of soaking off in order to make good attacks
in the north. Always keep in mind that the British
concentration of force makes him far less suited to
attack than does yours.

(Figure 18: A useful shield for a supply-less German

who does not want to give back ground to shield
himself from British counterattacks, unless that
opponent has a fondness for 1-2 attacks against
exposed 7-7-10s.)

AFRIKA KORPS THEORY

As a last case in point, what should the German
do if the British retreat into the Qattara redoubt? If
the British force is weak and you are pressed for
time, leave three units to contain the force and head
for Tobruch. You will have to take your chances if the
British make a breakout attempt there. In all other
cases, the German should reduce the force to the
point where the German feels that he can safely
return to Tobruch. This varies with individual
preference, so no hard and fast recommendations will
be made here.
END-PLAY WITH FALL OF TOBRUCH
This situation, although far less favorable to the
British, is also far less commonly found among
competent players. If it occurs very early in the game,
the British are finished against a competent player. If
it occurs later in the game, usually as the result of a
successful desperation assault, the result will be a
down-to-the-wire slugging match with the British
probably being eventually forced into low-odds
attacks to protect their home base. Distinguishing
features of this end-play are:
1) More counterattacks by the British at every
opportunity especially when the Germans are very
close to Alexandria.
2) Absence of the Qattara redoubt maneuver, for
obvious reasons.
3) A greater willingness to resort to low-odds
attacks on the part of the British.
4) Very conservative German play. Why should
he take risks at this point?
THE END-GAME: TOBRUCH
Discussing siege tactics at Tobruch is relatively
pointless, as Hazlett and DeWitt have discussed its
basic points already. They are:
1) Hit the strongest unit at 3-1 or better and
soakoff with Italians.
2) Once the garrison is weakened to the point
where it can be reasonably attempted, 3-1 the
strongest unit and 1-2 the remainder. Be certain that
you launch the 1-2 first, and that you attack with
enough factors so that if successful both defending
units are removed.
3) A 1-1 or 2-1 should be attempted only when
limited time or heavy casualties dictate its necessity.

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