Human Security Perspectives, Volume 1 (2004) Issue 2

New Wars and their Consequences for Human Security. Case Study: Colombia

New Wars and their Consequences for

Human Security
Case Study: Colombia
Christian Wlaschtz

This essay describes a few characteristics of Herfried Mnklers concept of

new wars and applies it to the Colombian conflict. The author focuses on the
consequences of such wars for human security by naming the principal groups
of victims in Colombia. The main emphasis of the article lies on the momentous
interrelation between economic profit and violence, which prolongs the conflict
and thus the human suffering.

I.

Introduction

At the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century, armed conflicts show(ed) characteristics which clearly distinguish them from classical wars
between states. Herfried Mnkler, a German political scientist, outlined some
typical elements in his book Die neuen Kriege (The New Wars)1.
First, I would like to provide some general information about this new
generation of wars by summarizing Mnklers most important thoughts. Then I
intend to introduce the armed conflict in Colombia as an example for his concept. In this context it is of paramount importance to emphasize the humanitarian
and social consequences of such wars. Finally, I am going to analyze the Colombian peace process and draw a few conclusions for the settlement of new
wars in general.

Mnkler, Herfried, Die neuen Kriege, Reinbek, Hamburg, 2002.

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Human Security Perspectives, Volume 1 (2004) Issue 2

New Wars and their Consequences for Human Security. Case Study: Colombia

II.

The concept of new wars

The concept of new wars has been developed to understand the differences in wars between states and those within a society. At first sight the latter
could be called civil wars, but applying this traditional term some of the main
characteristics of new wars remain excluded. In civil wars two or more parties
fight for power and government. Although civil wars can last a long time, they
usually end, when one of the combatant parties reaches positions of power and
governs the state.
New wars in contrast are not mainly about political power, but are
caused by particular and private interests of warlords, drug or armdealers etc.
Since they would lose most of their income sources, those parties have no interest in ending the war. It is quite obvious that this aspect has devastating effects
on the humanitarian situation of an affected society.
Mnkler differentiates between various particularities of new wars.
The most essential for a better understanding are:
Privatisation: Whereas previously wars were so expensive that only states were
able to wage them, nowadays armed conflicts without the objective to prevail
militarily against a regular hostile army can be maintained with small and relatively cheap weapons. 2
Asymmetrisation: Wars between states were symmetrical wars, meaning that
two political entities, which were considered as equally sovereign, entered war
against each other. Parties in asymmetrical wars tend to avoid big battles or decisive confrontations with their enemy. Instead they direct violence against the
civil population with the sole aim to create an atmosphere of constant fear and
thus a permanent source of income and/or a place of retreat. Consequently, the
civil population gets directly involved into the armed conflict and becomes the
target of adversary groups. The distinction between combatants and noncombatants is momentously extinguished.
Independence of martial violence: This means that martial violence gets out of
the control of regular military forces. The state has lost its monopoly on warfare.
Violence is applied by parties, which are not interested in symmetrical patterns
of warfare. This has severe consequences for international law as it exists today.
Mnkler concludes that even the recently founded International Criminal Court
(ICC) does not address these factors. 3
In my opinion Mnkler fails to distinguish between the jurisdiction of the ICC
and possible problems in its implementation. The ICC was established to prosecute genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by individuals no matter if they are state-representatives or non-state actors. The Statute of
2

Mnkler exhaustively describes not only the development of expensive and heavy
arms, but also the necessity to train military forces for an extended period. Both were not
possible for private warlords.
Mnkler, Herfried, Die neuen Kriege, at p. 105 cont.
3
Mnkler, Herfried, Die neuen Kriege, at p. 42.

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Human Security Perspectives, Volume 1 (2004) Issue 2

New Wars and their Consequences for Human Security. Case Study: Colombia

the Court explicitly states that the notion of war crimes applies not only to international but also to internal wars.4 Thus in theory the court is an efficient instrument to prosecute all perpetrators of atrocities regardless of their status as
members of an official army or a group of mercenaries. However, only the future
will show, if the court can enforce its mandate in practice and overcome obvious
problems, such as the lack of a police-force, which makes it entirely dependent
on state-cooperation. Moreover, the ICC is an instrument of ex-post prosecution,
but not necessarily an effective strategy to prevent new wars.
Before concluding this first general part I would like to add one more
characteristic, which is very important in order to understand the length of the
conflict in Colombia: Mnkler points out that these new wars are fuelled with
resources for their continuation from the outside. That means that the parties
involved are closely related to what Mnkler calls channels of the shadowglobalization5. Thus the traffic of drugs, arms and other illegal goods provides
them with sufficient means to prolong a low intensity war.

III.

A short introduction into the conflict in Colombia

The objective of this chapter is to show the degeneration of an originally

political conflict to a new war.
The history of Colombia has been characterised by a process of consolidation of a democratic political system and by periods of violence.6 For evident
reasons I am focusing on this latter aspect now. In the early stage, the violence
was caused by sharp divisions between two political parties the Conservatives
and the Liberals. After the assassination of the Liberal leader Jorge Elicer
Gaitn in 1948, Liberals and Conservatives fought each other brutally the era
of violence, which lasted from 1948 to 1965, started. Particularly the Conservatives committed repressions throughout the whole society. As a reaction to that
Liberals and Communists began to organize self-defence groups, which later
were transformed into guerrilla forces. In 1964 around 100 armed groups operated in Colombia. Both parties maintained links of different intensity to them, so
that the state monopoly of force virtually ceased to exist.
In this context the foundation process of the Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia,
FARC) is most illuminating. According to their own myth, its foundation was
4

Comp. Articles 1 and 8 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court:
<http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm> All websites occurring in this essay
were last checked on 1 November 2004.
5
Mnkler, Herfried, Die neuen Kriege, at p. 21.
6
The historical overview is taken from: International Crisis Group, Colombias Elusive
Quest for Peace, Latin America Report, no. 1, March 26th 2002
<http://www.icg.org//library/documents/report_archive/A400594_26032002.pdf>.

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Human Security Perspectives, Volume 1 (2004) Issue 2

New Wars and their Consequences for Human Security. Case Study: Colombia

the reaction to a brutal attack of regular military forces against the district of
Marquetalia. This prompted the self-defense groups to transform into guerrilla
forces with the ideological backing of the Communist Party and financing of
Moscow. At that time the FARC not only intended to topple the regime and push
back US-influence, but also aimed at radical socio-economic reforms, especially
in the agrarian sector. This explains the strong support of peasants, the FARC
initially enjoyed. Nevertheless only in the 1980s the FARC obtained a national
profile after distancing itself from the Communist Party.
Another guerrilla group was founded almost simultaneously the Ejrcito de Liberacin Nacional (National Liberation Army, ELN). It had close ties
to Cuba and integrated students and supporters of the liberation theology. In
comparison to the FARC it has always remained a rather small group. Even
smaller guerrilla groups were the maoist Ejrcito Popular de Liberacin (Popular
Liberation Army, EPL) and the urban Movimiento 19 de Abril (19th AprilMovement, M-19).7
In the same measure as the guerrilla groups financed themselves more
and more through extorsions and kidnappings, landowners, drug barons and
other potential victims of kidnapping created at the beginning of the 1980s
armed defence forces, the precursors of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia
(United Self-Defence Groups of Colombia, AUC) known as the paramilitaries.8
These groups were financed and armed by the Colombian military trying to use
them as counter-insurgency forces. The territories cleaned from guerrillaforces were sold to drug bosses and paramilitary leaders. This was the beginning
of an internal war aiming at the protection of territories and resources, illegal
drug cultivations and paths of arm-trafficking of the respective armed groups.
Political objectives became more and more irrelevant to understand the continuation of this war.

IV.

The consequences for human security

In this essay I would like to call attention to the specific risks for human
security posed by new wars, taking as example the Colombian conflict.
Human security is a concept introduced into international relations in
order to combine already existing concepts like human rights or human development. It focuses on the safeguarding of comprehensive security of human
7

M-19 (Movimiento 19 de Abril, 19th April-Movement) traces its origins to the allegedly
fraudulent presidential elections of 19 April 1970, in which the populist party of the
former military dictator Rojas Pinilla, the National Popular Alliance (Alianza Nacional
Popular-Anapo), was denied an electoral victory.
See: <http://www.onwar.com/aced/chrono/c1900s/yr70/fcolombia1972.htm>.
8
This umbrella organization of all the Self-Defence Groups of Colombia was founded
in 1997.

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Human Security Perspectives, Volume 1 (2004) Issue 2

New Wars and their Consequences for Human Security. Case Study: Colombia

beings, including dimensions such as personal, economic, social or cultural security. The objective of such a concept must be to protect the physical integrity, the
material surviving and the conditions for the development of the potentiality of
individual human beings. It is thus complementary to the above mentioned well
known concepts and therefore not an alternative.
In the case of a conflict it is evident that human security is endangered in
various forms. On the one hand human life is at stake, on the other the whole
society suffers from sustainable and long-lasting consequences, such as misery,
starvation, militarization of society etc. In regard to Colombia it must be shown
first that this conflict can be defined as a new war. In my opinion there are
various characteristics, which point in this direction. As I elaborated in the historical overview, guerrilla groups, which in the beginning pursued political objectives have transformed into mere armed defence-forces of economic enterprises. Both guerrilla and paramilitary leaders are involved in the drug and arm
business and consider it necessary to defend their areas of influence. The number
of members of the respective armed groups range from 3.500 (ELN) to over
20.000 (FARC).9 Obviously the government is not able to control those private
forces; large territories ceased to be administered by public institutions.
Each of the parties tries to maintain authority in their respective territory
by establishing a management of fear among the civil population.10 This indicates a main difference between previous wars between states and those between
private parties. The integrants of the armed groups do not gain their subsistence
from a central and public authority; they rather take what they need and what
they want from the civil population. Thus the war remains quite cheap for their
leaders and the combatants depend on it to ensure their living the fatal interrelation between violence and subsistence comes into existence.11 One obvious
result is the tax system introduced by the armed groups, as soon as they bring a
territory under their control.
As a consequence they are not interested in concluding the war by causing considerable loss among their enemies, but only in protecting their zones of
drug cultivation and their sources of income. The income is also provided by
relations to commercial partners from the outside, i.e. international organized
crime. These external resources guarantee the continuation of the conflict by
guaranteeing permanent flows of profit for all the parties. This open war economy has considerable consequences for a peace process which should be demonstrated below.
As a conclusion it can be stated that virtually all the criteria for a new
war enumerated above are fulfilled. The next step is to shed light on the humanitarian consequences of this conflict pattern.
9

International Crisis Group, Colombias Elusive Quest for Peace, at p. 9 cont.

Mnkler, Herfried, Die neuen Kriege, at p. 29.
11
Mnkler, Herfried, Die neuen Kriege, at p. 29.
10

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The most evident result is the permanent insecurity of people living in

the zone of influence of one of the combating groups. The constant threat of
being displaced, harrassed or assassinated without protection obviously constitutes a situation of strain. The pressure to contribute economically to the subsistence of the combatants substitutes the regular voluntary economic balance of
producing, selling and buying by a system of forced material deliveries. A system of intimidation and sanctions stabilizes this kind of taxes.
Whenever the occupying power is forced to retreat by another conflict
party, the zone is cleaned of alleged collaborators of the former power. Either
blacklisted citizens are executed, or a part of or the whole local population must
leave their community within a fixed time-frame. The NGO Consultoria para los
Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento (Consultancy for Human Rights and
Displacement, CODHES) calculates that around 2.900.000 citizens were displaced from 1985 to 2003 with a sharp increase since 2000.12 This high number
of internally displaced persons (IDPs) constitutes a big challenge particularly to
the urban centers, where the IDPs ressort to. A study of the World Food Programme revealed that 80% of the IDPs live in conditions of extreme poverty
without access to sufficient nutritional food.13 At the same time the access to
other social facilities like hospitals and schools is very limited for IDPs. The
unemployment rate is extremely high among IDPs. All those factors contribute
to increasing social tensions in the urban centers.
As stated above new wars are cheaper than the traditional inter-statewars. The military equipment consists of light arms, machine guns and antipersonnel mines. The latter constitute an increasing threat both in rural and in
urban zones in the measure as the conflict between the different groups gains
intensity. More and more the civil population is affected by the diffusion of
landmines, especially in rural areas, where agricultural activities are hampered.
One very important aspect while speaking about human security is the
existence of illicit crop cultivations. They are often contested between the different armed groups and therefore a source for a negative impact on the population.
Among them ranks not only internal displacement, but also the effects of aerial
fumigation. There is evidence that the latter destroys not only illicit, but also licit
crops and consequently the economic base of a big number of peasants14. The
result of an investigation analyzing the health effects of the fumigation implemented by the Ecumenic Commission of Human Rights (CEDHU), Servicio Paz
y Justicia/Ecuador (SERPAJ) and others is quite alarming: Laboratory tests
12

International Crisis Group, Colombias Humanitarian Crisis, Latin America Report,

no. 4, July 9th 2003, at p. 2
<http://www.crisisweb.org//library/documents/report_archive/A401043_09072003.pdf>.
13
World Food Programme/Colombia, Vulnerabilidad a la Inseguridad Alimentaria de la
Poblacin Desplazada por la Violencia en Colombia (Bogot, June 2003) quoted in:
International Crisis Group, Colombias Humanitarian Crisis, at p. 6.
14
International Crisis Group, Colombias Humanitarian Crisis, at p. 11.

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proved that women exposed to fumigations suffer a much higher probability of

cancer and/or aborts because of cell-damages.15
Mnkler mentions one of the most tragic consequences of cheap new
wars, which is the recruitment of child soldiers.16 The motivation for children
and young people to join the armed groups is not limited to subsistence. Mnkler
exhaustively describes the increase of social reputation and the experience of
power carrying a machine gun as even more attractive motives to serve as combatant. They are often the most feared participants of new wars because of
their lack of inhibitions to exercise violence. Thus a high number of massacres
are committed by young soldiers. In Colombia there are different numbers of
involved children. They range from 6.000 to 7.000, however it constitutes a
widespread problem.17 Apart from voluntary joining a fighting group, there is a
lot of forced recruitment. This is one of the most important motives to leave the
home-village.
New wars tend to expand in space and to develop into transnational
conflicts. Therefore one of the most dangerous developments is the regionalization of the Colombian conflict. During my internship with UNHCR in Northern
Ecuador in 2002 I witnessed the increase of refugees coming in from Colombia.
The consequences were public discussions about the possible inflow of armed
members of the conflict parties mixed with refugees, which led to public resentment towards Colombians and to a very strict handling of asylum-recognitions.
Another consequence was the militarization of the border between Ecuador and Colombia. Thus the Colombian conflict has an immediate impact on
the neighbour states. This is increased by the US-sponsored Plan Colombia
initiated in 2000. The plan with a budget of US $ 7,5 billion aims at supporting
the counter-narcotics policy of the US principally by increasing military help to
Colombia. The Bush administration included the neighbour countries and designed the Andean Regional Initiative, which consists of a strong military, but
also of social and economic components. After 09/11 the global war against
terror directly affected Colombia, because the US-administration put every
armed group on the list of terrorist organizations.18 These circumstances obviously rendered negotiations more difficult and increased the danger of an armament race between the different groups.19
15

Comisin Ecumnica de Derechos Humanos (CEDHU), Servicio Paz y Justicia

(SERPAJ-Ecuador) et alii (ed.), Frontera: Daos genticos por las fumigaciones del
Plan Colombia, Quito, Marzo 2004.
16
Mnkler, Herfried, Die neuen Kriege, at p. 137 cont.
17
Worldwide there are around 300.000 child soldiers.
Delacampagne, Christian, Die Geschichte der Sklaverei, Artemis&Winkler-Verlag,
Dsseldorf, Zrich, 2004, at p. 299.
18
International Crisis Group, Colombias Elusive Quest for Peace, at p. 12 cont.
19
The context and the effects of the Plan Colombia and the Andean Regional Initiative
are broadly described in: Vargas, Alejo, El Plan Colombia y la Iniciativa Regional
Andina: Equivocada Respuesta al Problema Insurgente y poca Eficacia en la Lucha

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The US-military base in Manta/Ecuador is regularly used for fumigation

flights. Together with the strong military presence at the northern part of Ecuador and persistent allegations of Venezuelan support for the FARC this indicates
a strong probability that the neighbour countries will be involved more closely in
the Colombian conflict. Considering the social instability of both countries a
spill-over of an armed conflict could have destabilizing effects for the whole
region.

V.

What to do about a new war?

Since the consequences of a new war for human security are terrible,
the question of how to deal with such a war is of utmost importance. As mentioned above there are various aspects, which do not foster a peaceful and quick
solution of such conflicts: the unwillingness of the parties to end the conflict; the
material dependance of the combatants on the continuation of the conflict; the
profits made by the leaders, the intransparency of the involved parties and the
causes for the conflict etc.
Analyzing the role of third parties or mediators, Mnkler names two incentives to finally make progress in the peace process: the introduction of a supreme power, which convincingly threatens to exterminate the conflict parties
militarily, or the potential availability of huge material resources in case of a
peace agreement. In the latter case the conflicting parties should be persuaded to
enjoy the so called peace dividend. As alternative to negotiation solutions
Mnkler mentions the possibility of military interventions, which are motivated
by the high costs of the continuation of the conflict (spill-over, refugees, international crime, formation camps for terrorists etc.).20
In the case of Colombia previous peace negotiations failed to deliver a
lasting agreement. In the 1980s a traumatic development for the FARC has certainly diminished its motivation to get involved in further peace processes. After
the political branch of the FARC, the Unin Patritica, had achieved a good
result in the elections of 1986, its members were virtually exterminated by the
paramilitary forces. The same happened to the political wing of M-19 after the
elections of 1990.21
The last peace process up to now was initiated by President Andrs Pastrana in 1998, when he even ceded a demilitarised zone as big as Switzerland to
the FARC in order to establish a safe negotiation area for them. Pastrana made
the process a personal concern, but failed to involve third parties. The FARC on
the contrary managed to hold the demilitarised zone under their control until
contra el Narcotrfico, in Montfar, Csar, Whitfield, Teresa (ed.), Turbulencia en los
Andes y Plan Colombia, Quito, 2003, at p. 141-178.
20
Mnkler, Herfried, Die neuen Kriege, at p. 28 and 224 cont.
21
International Crisis Group, Colombias Elusive Quest for Peace, at p. 5 cont.

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February 2002. In the end it was clear that the zone was used to cultivate illicit
crops and to hide victims of kidnappings. After various attempts to achieve a
ceasefire agreement, the peace talks came to an end on 20 February 2002, when
Pastrana ordered the army to retake the zone. Pastrana himself failed to present a
comprehensive strategy for the negotiations and was strongly critized for that.22
His succesor lvaro Uribe, a hardliner, intensified the war against the
insurgents and a comprehensive peace process seems out of view at the moment.
Rather it seems that the option of an indirect intervention by the US (Plan Colombia etc.) is more appealing to the Colombian government.

VI.

Conclusion

The war in Colombia demonstrates the complex mixture of political,

economic and private interests at stake, which render every peace process so
complicated. Apart from the Colombian example I would like to emphasize the
new challenge for humanitarian law, which is the legal framework to protect
human security. Private combatants even though they are bound by existing
norms of individual responsibility can hardly be prosecuted, since they officially
do not belong to any political entity.
The humanitarian consequences of the new wars are terrible throughout the world, whether in Congo, Sudan or in Afghanistan. The destabilization
of whole regions, particularly if weak states are concerned, is a realistic danger
of the future. To prevent this and the consequent loss of human life and security
is one of the most immediate tasks of the international community.

22

International Crisis Group, Colombias Elusive Quest for Peace, at p. 20 cont.

For a profound analysis of the 1998-2002 peace negotiations, see: Isacson, Adam, Was
Failure Avoidable? Learning from Colombias 1998-2002 Peace Process. The Dante B.
Fascell North-South Center Working Paper Series, no. 14, March 2003
<http://www.miami.edu/nsc/publications/pubs-WP-pdf/WP14.pdf>.

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