Charmagne Incio - Third Year

Rule 24 Civil Procedure

Judge Leonor Quinones
Cases under Rule 24: DEPOSITIONS BEFORE ACTION OR PENDING APPEAL
Case 1:
THIRD DIVISION, G.R. No. 185527, July 18, 2012
HARRY L. GO, TONNY NGO, JERRY NGO AND JANE GO, PETITIONERS, VS.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HIGHDONE COMPANY, LTD., ET AL.,
RESPONDENTS.
The Conditional Examination Of A Prosecution Witness Cannot Defeat The
Rights Of The Accused To Public Trial And Confrontation Of Witnesses
The Facts:
Harry, Tonny, Jerry and Jane were charged with violation of Article 318 of
the Revised Penal Code (Other Deceits) before the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Manila in Criminal Case No. 396447. The private complainant in the
case, Highdone Company Ltd., was represented by a frail old businessman
from Laos,Li Luen Ping, who traveled from his country to attend the
hearing held on September 9, 2004. Several trial dates were subsequently
postponed due to his unavailability. On October 13, 2005, the private
prosecutor in the case filed a Motion To Take Oral Deposition of Li Luen
Ping, alleging that he could not attend the hearing in the Philippines on
doctors advice due to ill health since he was being treated in a lung
facility at the Cambodia Charity Hospital in Laos. Against the petitioners
opposition, the MeTC granted the motion. The RTC however, set aside the
MeTC order, and held that Section 17, Rule 23 on the taking of depositions
of witnesses in civil cases cannot apply suppletorily to the case since
there is a specific provision in the Rules of Court with respect to the
taking of depositions of prosecution witnesses in criminal cases, which is
primarily intended to safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused to
meet the witness against him face to face. When elevated to the CA, the
appellate court set aside the RTC order, holding that no rule of procedure
expressly disallows the taking of depositions in criminal cases. In any
case, the petitioners can still make timely objection thru counsel or thru
the consular officer who will take the oral depositions. The petitioners
elevated the case to the Supreme Court.
The Issue/s:
Whether or not Rule 23 on the taking of depositions of witnesses is
applicable in criminal prosecutions.
The Courts ruling:
We rule in favor of petitioners.
The Procedure for Testimonial Examination of an Unavailable Prosecution
Witness is Covered Under Section 15, Rule 119.
The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open
court.1 This is true especially in criminal cases where the Constitution
secures to the accused his right to a public trial and to meet the
witnessess against him face to face. The requirement is the safest and
most satisfactory method of investigating facts as it enables the judge to
test the witness credibility through his manner and deportment while
testifying.2 It is not without exceptions, however, as the Rules of Court
recognizes the conditional examination of witnesses and the use of their
depositions as testimonial evidence in lieu of direct court testimony.
Even in criminal proceedings, there is no doubt as to the availability of
conditional examination of witnesses both for the benefit of the defense,
as well as the prosecution. The Courts ruling in the case of Vda. de
Manguerra v. Risos3 explicitly states that
x x x As exceptions, Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court provide for the
different modes of discovery that may be resorted to by a party to an
action. These rules are adopted either to perpetuate the testimonies of
witnesses or as modes of discovery. In criminal proceedings, Sections 12,
13 and 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
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Judge Leonor Quinones
took effect on December 1, 2000, allow the conditional examination of
both the defense and prosecution witnesses. (Underscoring supplied) 4
The procedure under Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court allows the taking
of depositions in civil cases, either upon oral examination or written
interrogatories, before any judge, notary public or person authorized to
administer oaths at any time or place within the Philippines; or before any
Philippine consular official, commissioned officer or person authorized to
administer oaths in a foreign state or country, with no additional
requirement except reasonable notice in writing to the other party. 5
But for purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more
particularly of a prosecution witness who would forseeably be unavailable
for trial, the testimonial examination should be made before the court, or
at least before the judge, where the case is pending as required by the
clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. The pertinent provision reads thus:
SEC. 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. When it
satisfactorily appears that a witness for the prosecution is too sick or
infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or has to leave the
Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be
conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending. Such
examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his absence after
reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served on him shall
be conducted in the same manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or
refusal of the accused to attend the examination after notice shall be
considered a waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or
against the accused.
Since the conditional examination of a prosecution witness must take
place at no other place than the court where the case is pending, the RTC
properly nullified the MeTCs orders granting the motion to take the
deposition of Li Luen Ping before the Philippine consular official in Laos,
Cambodia. We quote with approval the RTCs ratiocination in this wise:
The condition of the private complainant being sick and of advanced age
falls within the provision of Section 15 Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.
However, said rule substantially provides that he should be conditionally
examined before the court where the case is pending. Thus, this Court
concludes that the language of Section 15 Rule 119 must be interpreted to
require the parties to present testimony at the hearing through live
witnesses, whose demeanor and credibility can be evaluated by the judge
presiding at the hearing, rather than by means of deposition. Nowhere in
the said rule permits the taking of deposition outside the Philippines
whether the deponent is sick or not. (Underscoring supplied)6
Certainly, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and
not before the very same court where the case is pending would not only
deprive a detained accused of his right to attend the proceedings but also
deprive the trial judge of the opportunity to observe the prosecution
witness deportment and properly assess his credibility, which is
especially intolerable when the witness testimony is crucial to the
prosecutions case against the accused. This is the import of the Courts
ruling in Vda. de Manguerra7 where we further declared that
While we recognize the prosecutions right to preserve the testimony of
its witness in order to prove its case, we cannot disregard the rules which
are designed mainly for the protection of the accuseds constitutional
rights. The giving of testimony during trial is the general rule. The
conditional examination of a witness outside of the trial is only an
exception, and as such, calls for a strict construction of the
rules.8 (Underscoring supplied)
It is argued that since the Rules of Civil Procedure is made explicitly
applicable in all cases, both civil and criminal as well as special
proceedings, the deposition-taking before a Philippine consular official
under Rule 23 should be deemed allowable also under the circumstances.
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However, the suggested suppletory application of Rule 23 in the
testimonial examination of an unavailable prosecution witness has been
categorically ruled out by the Court in the same case of Vda. de
Manguerra, as follows:
It is true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the
rules of civil procedure apply to all actions, civil or criminal, and special
proceedings. In effect, it says that the rules of civil procedure have
suppletory application to criminal cases. However, it is likewise true that
criminal proceedings are primarily governed by the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Considering that Rule 119 adequately and squarely
covers the situation in the instant case, we find no cogent reason to apply
Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise. (Underscoring supplied)
The Conditional Examination of a Prosecution Witness Cannot Defeat the
Rights of the Accused to Public Trial and Confrontation of Witnesses
The CA took a simplistic view on the use of depositions in criminal cases
and overlooked fundamental considerations no less than the Constitution
secures to the accused, i.e., the right to a public trial and the right to
confrontation of witnesses. Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution
provides as follows:
Section 14. (1) x x x
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial and public trial, to
meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his
behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the
absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his
failure to appear is unjustifiable. (Underscoring supplied)
In dismissing petitioners apprehensions concerning the deprivation of
their constitutional rights to a public trial and confrontation, the CA
opined that petitioners would still be accorded the right to cross-examine
the deponent witness and raise their objections during the depositiontaking in the same manner as in a regular court trial.
We disagree. There is a great deal of difference between the face-to- face
confrontation in a public criminal trial in the presence of the presiding
judge and the cross-examination of a witness in a foreign place outside
the courtroom in the absence of a trial judge. In the aptly cited case of
People v. Estenzo,9 the Court noted the uniqueness and significance of a
witness testifying in open court, thus:
The main and essential purpose of requiring a witness to appear and
testify orally at a trial is to secure for the adverse party the opportunity of
cross-examination. The opponent, according to an eminent authority,
demands confrontation, not for the idle purpose of gazing upon the
witness, or of being gazed upon by him, but for the purpose of cross
examination which cannot be had except by the direct and personal
putting of questions and obtaining immediate answers. There is also the
advantage of the witness before the judge, and it is this it enables the
judge as trier of facts to obtain the elusive and incommunicable evidence
of a witness deportment while testifying, and a certain subjective moral
effect is produced upon the witness. It is only when the witness testifies
orally that the judge may have a true idea of his countenance, manner and
expression, which may confirm or detract from the weight of his
testimony. Certainly, the physical condition of the witness will reveal his
capacity for accurate observation and memory, and his deportment and
physiognomy will reveal clues to his character. These can only be observed
by the judge if the witness testifies orally in court. x x x (Underscoring
supplied)10
The right of confrontation, on the other hand, is held to apply specifically
to criminal proceedings and to have a twofold purpose: (1) to afford the
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accused an opportunity to test the testimony of witnesses by crossexamination, and (2) to allow the judge to observe the deportment of
witnesses.11 The Court explained in People v. Seneris12 that the
constitutional requirement insures that the witness will give his
testimony under oath, thus deterring lying by the threat of perjury charge;
it forces the witness to submit to cross-examination, a valuable
instrument in exposing falsehood and bringing out the truth; and it
enables the court to observe the demeanor of the witness and assess his
credibility.13
As the right of confrontation is intended to secure the accused in the
right to be tried as far as facts provable by witnesses as meet him face to
face at the trial who give their testimony in his presence, and give to the
accused an opportunity of cross-examination,14 it is properly viewed as a
guarantee against the use of unreliable testimony in criminal trials. In the
American case of Crawford v. Washington,15 the US Supreme Court had
expounded on the procedural intent of the confrontation requirement,
thus:
Where testimonial statements are involved, we do not think the Framers
meant to leave the Sixth Amendments [right to confront witness face to
face] protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to
amorphous notions of reliability. Certainly, none of the authorities
discussed above acknowledges any general reliability exception to the
common-law rule. Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is
fundamentally at odds with the right of confrontation. To be sure, the
Clauses ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a
procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that
evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular
manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination. The Clause thus
reflects a judgment, not only about the desirability of reliable evidence (a
point on which there could be little dissent), but about how reliability can
best be determined. (Underscoring supplied)
The Webb Ruling is Not on All Fours with the Instant Case
The CA found the frail and infirm condition of the prosecution witness as
sufficient and compelling reason to uphold the MeTC Orders granting the
deposition-taking, following the ruling in the case of People v. Webb16 that
the taking of an unavailable witness deposition is in the nature of a
discovery procedure the use of which is within the trial courts sound
discretion which needs only to be exercised in a reasonable manner and in
consonance with the spirit of the law17.
But the ruling in the cited case is not instantly applicable herein as the
factual settings are not similar. The accused in the Webb case had sought
to take the oral deposition of five defense witnesses before a Philippine
consular agent in lieu of presenting them as live witnesses, alleging that
they were all residents of the United States who could not be compelled
by subpoena to testify in court. The trial court denied the motion of the
accused but the CA differed and ordered the deposition taken. When the
matter was raised before this Court, we sustained the trial courts
disallowance of the deposition-taking on the limited ground that there was
no necessity for the procedure as the matter sought to be proved by way
of deposition was considered merely corroborative of the evidence for the
defense18.
In this case, where it is the prosecution that seeks to depose the
complaining witness against the accused, the stringent procedure under
Section 15, Rule 119 cannot be ignored without violating the
constitutional rights of the accused to due process.
Finally, the Court takes note that prosecution witness Li Luen Ping had
managed to attend the initial trial proceedings before the MeTC of Manila
on September 9, 2004. At that time, Li Luen Pings old age and fragile
constitution should have been unmistakably apparent and yet the
prosecution failed to act with zeal and foresight in having his deposition
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or testimony taken before the MeTC pursuant to Section 15, Rule 119 of
the Revised Rules of Court. In fact, it should have been imperative for the
prosecution to have moved for the preservation of Li Luen Pings
testimony at that first instance given the fact that the witness is a nonresident alien who can leave the Philippines anytime without any definite
date of return. Obviously, the prosecution allowed its main witness to
leave the courts jurisdiction without availing of the court procedure
intended to preserve the testimony of such witness. The loss of its cause
is attributable to no other party.
Still, even after failing to secure Li Luen Pings conditional examination
before the MeTC prior to said witness becoming sick and unavailable, the
prosecution would capitalize upon its own failure by pleading for a liberal
application of the rules on depositions. It must be emphasized that while
the prosecution must provide the accused every opportunity to take the
deposition of witnesses that are material to his defense in order to avoid
charges of violating the right of the accused to compulsory process, the
State itself must resort to deposition-taking sparingly if it is to guard
against accusations of violating the right of the accused to meet the
witnesses against him face to face. Great care must be observed in the
taking and use of depositions of prosecution witnesses to the end that no
conviction of an accused will rely on ex parte affidavits and depositions19.
Thus, the CA ignored the procedure under the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure for taking the deposition of an unavailable prosecution witness
when it upheld the trial courts order allowing the deposition of
prosecution witness Li Luen Ping to take place in a venue other than the
court where the case is pending. This was certainly grave abuse of
discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated
February 19, 2008 and the Resolution dated November 28, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Decision
ofthe Regional Trial Court which disallowed the deposition-taking in Laos,
Cambodia is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Case 2:
SECOND DIVISION, G.R. No. 92542 October 15, 1991, REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. ZENAIDA ELEPANO, Presiding Judge of
RTC Kalookan, Branch 128 and CORAZON SANTOS PUNSALAN,
respondents.
Taking Of Deposition In Adoption Cases Allowed Even Before Publication
(1991)
Corazon, employed by the United Nations Office in Geneva, filed a petition
for adoption of her nieces, Pinky and Ellen Mae on January 5, 1990 before
the RTC of Caloocan City. On January 5, 1990, she filed a Motion for
Taking Of Deposition, as she will not be able to testify on the hearing of
the adoption yet to be scheduled since she was required to report for work
on January 17, 1990 by the UN. The handling judge granted the motion,
set the taking of the deposition on January 12, and set the hearing of the
adoption for February 27, 1990, ordering the publication of the order and
furnishing the Office of the Solicitor General thereof. The scheduled
deposition proceeded on January 12, with no representative from the OSG.
They however filed an opposition to the taking of the deposition, averring
that Section 1 Rule 24 of the Rules of Court allows deposition only after
jurisdiction had been obtained over the person or property subject of the
action. Since the publication had not yet been complied with, then
deposition should not proceed. The trial court denied the motion. On
February 27, hearing on the adoption proceeded, and witnesses and
documentary exhibits were presented by the counsel for Corazon. The
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OSG did not appear during the hearings and subsequent hearing, thus the
trial court granted the petition for adoption filed by Corazon. Their motion
for reconsideration denied, the OSG elevated the case to the Supreme
Court.
The Supreme Court:
In brief, the argument of the OSG is that depositions should not be
allowed in adoption proceedings until the publication requirement has
been fully complied with. In support of its position, the OSG cites Rule 24
Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which provides
Section 1. Depositions pending action, when may be taken. By leave of
court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over
property which is the subject of the action, or without such leave after an
answer has been served, the testimony of any person, whether a party or
not, may be taken, at the instance of any party, by deposition upon oral
examination or written interrogatories. (emphasis supplied)
The petition has no merit.
The rule cited by the OSG is inapplicable to the case at bar.
While it is true that in an action in personam, personal service of
summons within the forum or voluntary appearance in the case is
essential for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, in an adoption case which involves the status of a person,
there is no particular defendant to speak of since the action is one in rem.
In such case, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is a nonessential condition for the taking of a deposition for the jurisdiction of the
court is based on its power over the res, to render judgment with respect
to such thing (or status, as in this case) so as to bar indifferently all
who might be minded to make an objection against the right so
established. (Banco Espanol Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921; Greg Alba
vs. de la Cruz, 17 Phil. 49).
Indeed, publication of the scheduled hearing for the petition for adoption
is necessary for the validity of a decree of adoption but not for the
purpose merely of taking a deposition. In taking a deposition, no
substantial rights are affected since depositions may or may not be
presented or may even be objected to when formally offered as evidence
at the trial of the main case later on.
In the instant case, We find no abuse of discretion committed by the
respondent judge in allowing the taking of private respondents
deposition. Due to urgent and compelling reasons beyond her control,
private respondent could not be present to testify at the trial of the main
case for adoption. The OSG, however, was notified of the scheduled taking
of the deposition, as well as of all the hearings of the petition for
adoption, but the OSG chose not to attend ALL the said hearings, without
explanation. The OSG, therefore, has no reason to invoke lack of
procedural due process.
Finally, it must not be forgotten that the philosophy behind adoption
statutes is to promote the welfare of the child and every reasonable
intendment should be sustained to promote that objective. (Santos et al.
vs. Aranzanso, et al. 16 SCRA 353). In the instant case, the record shows
that private respondents adoption of the minors shall redound to the best
interests of the latter.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.