TUNNEL OPERATIONAL

CONTROL CONCEPT

IA/12-13/D/003/ST
Pre Contract Professional Consultancy Design Services
for AI Rayyan Road & AI Bustan Street South (P007)

AL RAYYAN ROAD

Al Rayyan Road
Junctions R6 Road Tunnel
Tunnel Operational Control Concept Strategy
Control Sheet
Doc. No. EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-RP-00220
Doc. No.: EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-RP-00220
Rev. D02
Rev. D02

Page i

Prepared by:

TUNNEL OPERATIONAL
CONTROL CONCEPT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.

INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................................... 1
1.1.Purpose of Document ............................................................................................................................... 1

2.

STAKEHOLDERS ....................................................................................................................................... 1

3.

RELEVANT DOCUMENTATION.................................................................................................................. 1
3.1 Relevant Documents ................................................................................................................................ 1
3.2 Relevant Drawings ................................................................................................................................... 2

4.

TYPE OF ROAD ......................................................................................................................................... 2

4.1.Junction R6 and R9 ................................................................................................................................... 5

5.

TUNNEL SYSTEMS .................................................................................................................................... 5

6.

USE CASE REVIEW FORMAT ..................................................................................................................... 5

7.

SYSTEM ACCESS ....................................................................................................................................... 6

8.

MODES OF OPERATION OF THE SYSTEMS (CONTROL HIERARCHY): ......................................................... 8

9.

AUTOMATIC ............................................................................................................................................ 9
9.1 TMC .......................................................................................................................................................... 9
9.2. TOA terminal ........................................................................................................................................... 9
9.3. TOA terminal (Tunnel Service Building) ................................................................................................... 9
9.4. Smoke Control Panel (SCP) ...................................................................................................................... 9
9.5. Local control at individual equipment panels ....................................................................................... 10

10.

USE CASES ......................................................................................................................................... 11

10.1.Fire Service ........................................................................................................................................... 11
10.2. Police ................................................................................................................................................... 15
10.3. Ambulance .......................................................................................................................................... 16
10.4. Road user ............................................................................................................................................ 17
10.5. TMC Operator ..................................................................................................................................... 19
10.6. Maintenance engineer ........................................................................................................................ 32

11.

SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................................ 37

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CONTROL CONCEPT

GLOSSARY
CCTV

Closed-Circuit TeleVision

EDP

Emergency Distribution Panel

EP

Emergency Panel

ERT

Emergency Roadside Telephone

IRT

Incident Response Team i.e. Emergency Services

TMC

Traffic Management Centre

TOA

Tunnel Operating Authority/Maintainer

TSB

Tunnel Service Building

HMI

Operator Interface

FDS

Functional Design Specification

PMCS

Tunnel Plant Monitoring and Control System

SCADA

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition

PLC

Programmable Logic Controller

MET

Metrological/Environmental/Traffic

MV

Medium Voltage, voltage above 1000 Vac

LV

Low Voltage, Voltage below 1000 Vac and above 50 Vac.

LCP

Local Control Panel

LCS

Lighting Control System

SCP

Smoke Control Panel

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CONTROL CONCEPT

1. Introduction
1.1. Purpose of Document
This document represents the highest level of description of the interaction between stakeholders
and the tunnel systems. The tunnel systems are defined by the System Architecture layout currently
being developed by KEO. Individual Use Cases have a system architecture that depicts the minimal
path for data/voice to be transferred from point to point as outlined within this document.

2. Stakeholders
The following parties use or hold a stake in the Tunnel systems:

Civil Defense
Police
Ambulance
SSD, MoI
Road user
TMC Operators
TOA/Maintainer(s)

3. Relevant Documentation
3.1 Relevant Documents
Document Number

Title

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-RP-00209

Tunnel SCADA PMCS Control Concept

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-RP-00210

Tunnel TMC/TSS SCADA/PMCS Control Interface

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-RP-00211

Tunnel PMCS Smoke Control Panel Control Interface

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-RP-00212

Tunnel PMCS Plant I/O Control Interface List

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-RP-00213

Tunnel CCTV Camera Specification

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-RP-00214

Mechanical, Electrical and Systems General Specifications

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-RP-00215

Tunnel Pumped Drainage Installations

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-RP-00216

Tunnel Fire Safety Systems Specification

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-RP-00217

Tunnel Panels

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-RP-00218

Tunnel Cross Passage Doors

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-RP-00219

Tunnel Way Finding Signs

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-RP-00220

Tunnel Operational Control Concept (This Document)

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-RP-00221

Tunnel Ventilation Control Concept

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-RP-00222

Junction R6 Road Tunnel Detailed Design M&E Systems

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-RP-00223

Contract 2 Underpasses Detailed Design M&E Systems

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-RP-00224

Not used

EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-RP-00225

Underpass Pumped Drainage installations

Table 1: Document list

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CONTROL CONCEPT

3.2 Relevant Drawings

Drawing No.
EXW-P007-0201-JF-KEO-DG00100-001
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00106-001
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00106-002
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00107-001
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00107-002
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00107-003
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00107-004
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00107-005
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00107-006
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00107-007
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00107-008
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00201-001
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00201-002
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00201-003
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00201-004
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00301-001
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00301-002
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00301-003
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00301-004
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00301-005
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00301-006
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00301-007
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00302-001
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00401-001
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-

Title
RAYYAN ROAD KEY PLAN M&E LAYOUT (SHEET 1 OF 1)
RAYYAN ROAD FIRE SAFETY TYPICAL PLAN & SECTIONS (SHEET 1 OF 2)
RAYYAN ROAD FIRE SAFETY TYPICAL PLAN & SECTIONS (SHEET 2 OF 2)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL-TU1 FIRE MAIN, HYDRANTS & VALVES
LOCATION (SHEET 1 OF 8)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL-TU1 FIRE MAIN, HYDRANTS & VALVES
LOCATION (SHEET 2 OF 8)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL-TU1 FIRE MAIN, HYDRANTS & VALVES
LOCATION (SHEET 3 OF 8)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL-TU1 FIRE MAIN, HYDRANTS & VALVES
LOCATION (SHEET 4 OF 8)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL-TU1 FIRE MAIN, HYDRANTS & VALVES
LOCATION (SHEET 5 OF 8)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL-TU1 FIRE MAIN, HYDRANTS & VALVES
LOCATION (SHEET 6 OF 8)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL-TU1 FIRE MAIN, HYDRANTS & VALVES
SECTION (SHEET 7 OF 8)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL-TU1 FIRE MAIN, HYDRANTS & VALVES
SECTION (SHEET 8 OF 8)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION 6 TUNNEL TU1 ILLUMINATED EMERGENCY WAY
FINDING SIGN LOCATIONS (SHEET 1 OF 4)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION 6 TUNNEL TU1 ILLUMINATED EMERGENCY WAY
FINDING SIGN LOCATIONS (SHEET 2 OF 4)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION 6 TUNNEL TU1 ILLUMINATED EMERGENCY WAY
FINDING SIGN LOCATIONS (SHEET 3 OF 4)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION 6 TUNNEL TU1 ILLUMINATED EMERGENCY WAY
FINDING SIGN LOCATIONS (SHEET 4 OF 4)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL-TU1 EDP, EP, CCP & TULDB LOCATIONS
(SHEET 1 OF 7)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL-TU1 EDP, EP, CCP & TULDB LOCATIONS
(SHEET 2 OF 7)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL-TU1 EDP, EP, CCP & TULDB LOCATIONS
(SHEET 3 OF 7)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL-TU1 EDP, EP, CCP & TULDB LOCATIONS
(SHEET 4 OF 7)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL-TU1 EDP, EP, CCP & TULDB LOCATIONS
(SHEET 5 OF 7)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL- TYPICAL SINGLE EMERGENCY PANEL
ARRANGEMENT (WITHOUT HYDRANT) (SHEET 6 OF 7)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL- TYPICAL INDIVIDUAL LIGHTING
DISTRIBUTION PANEL (SHEET 7 OF 7)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL-TU1 EDP, EP &CCP GROUP
ARRANGEMENT (SHEET 1 OF 1)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL TU1 PA/VA SYSTEM LOCATIONS (SHEET 1
OF 6)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL TU1 PA/VA SYSTEM LOCATIONS (SHEET 2

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CONTROL CONCEPT

Drawing No.
DG-00401-002
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00401-003
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00401-004
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00401-005
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00401-006
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00402-001
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00501-001
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00501-002
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00501-003
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00501-004
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00601-001
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00601-002
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00601-003
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00601-004
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00701-001
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00701-002
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00701-003
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00701-004
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00702-001
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00800-001
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00801-001
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00801-002
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00801-003
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00801-004
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00801-005
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEO-

Title
OF 6)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL TU1 PA/VA SYSTEM LOCATIONS (SHEET 3
OF 6)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 ROAD TUNNEL PA/VA SYSTEM LOCATIONS (SHEET
4 OF 6)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 ROAD TUNNEL PA/VA SYSTEM LOCATIONS (SHEET
5 OF 6)
AL RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 ROAD TUNNEL PA/VA CONFIGURATION
(SHEET 6 OF 6)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL TU1 PA/VA SCHEMATIC SHEET (SHEET 1
OF 1)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL TU1 GENERAL FIRE DETECTION &
WARNING (SHEET 1 OF 4)`
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL TU1 GENERAL FIRE DETECTION &
WARNING (SHEET 2 OF 4)`
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL TU1 GENERAL FIRE DETECTION &
WARNING (SHEET 3 OF 4)`
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL TU1 GENERAL FIRE DETECTION &
WARNING (SHEET 4 OF 4)`
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL TU1 VENTILATION LAYOUT (SHEET 1 OF
4)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL TU1 VENTILATION LAYOUT (SHEET 2 OF
4)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL TU1 VENTILATION LAYOUT (SHEET 3 OF
4)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL TU1 VENTILATION LAYOUT (SHEET 4 OF
4)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL TU1 LANE CONTROL SIGNS LOCATION
LAYOUT (SHEET 1 OF 4)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL TU1 LANE CONTROL SIGNS LOCATION
LAYOUT (SHEET 2 OF 4)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL TU1 LANE CONTROL SIGNS LOCATION
LAYOUT (SHEET 3 OF 4)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL TU1 LANE CONTROL SIGNS LOCATION
LAYOUT (SHEET 4 OF 4)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 ROAD TUNNEL PMCS/SCADA COMMUNICATION
NETWORK SHEET 1 OF 1
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL TU1 CCTV CAMERA SCHEMATIC (SHEET 1
OF 1)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL TU1 CCTV CAMERA LAYOUT (SHEET 1 OF
5)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 ROAD TUNNEL CCTV CAMERA SCHEMATIC (SHEET
2 OF 5)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 ROAD TUNNEL CCTV CAMERA SCHEMATIC (SHEET
3 OF 5)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 ROAD TUNNEL CCTV CAMERA SCHEMATIC (SHEET
4 OF 5)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 ROAD TUNNEL CCTV CAMERA SCHEMATIC (SHEET
5 OF 5)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL TU1 VAID CAMERA LAYOUT (SHEET 1 OF

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CONTROL CONCEPT

Drawing No.
DG-00802-001
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00802-002
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00802-003
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00802-004
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00802-005
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00803-001
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00901-001
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00902-001
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00902-002
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00903-001
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00904-001
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00904-002
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00905-001
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00906-001
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00906-002
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00906-003
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00907-001
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00908-001
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00908-002
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00908-003
EXW-P007-0201-MC-KEODG-00909-001
EXW-P007-0201-CD-KEODG-00212-005
EXW-P007-0201-CD-KEODG-00212-006
EXW-P007-0201-CD-KEODG-00208-001

Title
5)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 ROAD TUNNEL VAID SYSTEM SCHEMATIC (SHEET
2 OF 5)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 ROAD TUNNEL VAID CAMERA CONFIGURATION
(SHEET 3 OF 5)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL TU1 VAID CAMERA LAYOUT (SHEET 4 OF
5)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL TU1 VAID CAMERA CONFIGURATION
(SHEET 5 OF 5)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 TUNNEL TU1 VAID CAMERA SYSTEM SCHEMATIC
(SHEET 1 OF 1)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 ROAD TUNNEL ERT NETWORK (SHEET 1 OF 1)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 ROAD TUNNEL LHD DTS SCHEMATIC (SHEET 1 OF
2)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 ROAD TUNNEL LEAKY FEEDER (SHEET 2 OF 2)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 ROAD TUNNEL FIRE SAFETY SYSTEMS (SHEET 1 OF
1)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 ROAD TUNNEL LANE CONTROL SIGN SYSTEM
SCHEMATIC (SHEET 1 OF 2)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 ROAD TUNNEL DMS/LCS CONFIGURATION (SHEET
2 OF 2)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 ROAD TUNNEL IMPOUNDING SUMP VENTILATION
SCHEMATIC (SHEET 1 OF 1)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 ROAD TUNNEL SCP GA PANEL LAYOUT (SHEET 1
OF 3)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 ROAD TUNNEL SCP GA PANEL LAYOUT (SHEET 2
OF 3)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 ROAD TUNNEL SCP GA PANEL LAYOUT (SHEET 3
OF 3)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 ROAD TUNNEL TYPICAL SMOKE CONTROL
PANEL LAYOUT (SHEET 1 OF 1)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 ROAD TUNNEL - CROSS PASSAGE DOORS (SHEET 1
OF 3)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 ROAD TUNNEL - TYPICAL CROSS CONNECTION
DOORS (SHEET 2 OF 3)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 ROAD TUNNEL - DETAIL OF FIRE BRIGADE
CONNECTORS (SHEET 3 OF 3)
RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 ROAD TUNNEL - DETAIL OF FIRE BRIGADE
CONNECTORS (SHEET 3 OF 3)
Al RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 ROAD TUNNEL ATTENUATION TANK
SECTIONAL DETAIL (SHEET 5 OF 6)
Al RAYYAN ROAD JUNCTION R6 ROAD TUNNEL ATTENUATION TANK/PLANT
ROOM INSTALLATION SCHEMATIC (SHEET 6 OF 6)
Al RAYYAN ROAD UNDERPASS DRAINAGE CHANNEL DETAILS

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4. Type of road
4.1. Junction R6
The following table shows the type of highway carried by Junction R6:
Structure
Road Tunnel

Junction
R6

Highway
Al Bustan Street

Highway Type
Urban Distributor Dual Carriageway

Table 2: Type of Highway at Structure

5. Tunnel systems
The tunnel is served by a number of systems, some of these essential and critical for the tunnel
operation.

Medium Voltage & Low Voltage Supply System (MV & LV)
Tunnel Lighting System (LCS)
Tunnel Ventilation System (Vent)
Tunnel Drainage and pumping system
Smoke Control Panels (SCP)
Tunnel panels (EDPs, EPs with hosereels, portable extinguishers)
Cross Passage Doors/Inter-bore doors
Fire Main and Hydrants
Public Announcement System (PA)
Video Automatic Incident detection System (VAID)
Linear heat detection system
Radio Re-Broadcast System
Emergency Telephone System (ERT)
Wayfinding Signage
Service Maintenance Telephone System
Closed Circuit Television System (CCTV)
Radio Systems and leaky feeder system
Traffic Management Systems, LCS/DMS, Weather stations, Tunnel Flooding detection, Traffic
Lights.
Fibre Optic Tunnel Communication trunk system

To visualise what range of systems are installed in relation to the tunnel, and the categories with
which the stakeholders will interact are listed below.

6. Use case review format

The stakeholders each need to interact with the tunnel systems in different manners. These
interactions can be defined as use cases.
A use case will follow the format of:
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Objectives
Pre-conditions
Actions and mitigation measures
Post-conditions
Alternative scenarios

All use cases are accompanied by system architecture drawings particular to the use case. These
drawings depict the complete route of the signal in the integrated systems allowing system
integration and resilience tests to be drawn up.

7. System access
Not all plant systems are accessible to all control interfaces. Below is a diagram (Fig. 1) indicating
which plant systems are available to which control interfaces.
LCP

SCP

SCADA/
PMCS

TMC

AUTO

Tunnel Ventilation

Tunnel Lighting

Tunnel Drainage

Limited
Control

Electrical Systems

VAID

SCPs

Cross Passage
Doors

Wayfinding
Signage

PA System

Fig. 1
Plant System Control Access

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8. Modes of operation of the systems (Control hierarchy):

a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)

Local control at individual equipment panel.

Smoke Control Panel (SCP)
TOA terminal, (Tunnel Service Building)
TOA terminal, Traffic Management Centre
TMC terminal, Traffic Management Centre
Automatic control, (Non-incident controls)

This listing defines the levels of priority from the lowest (Automatic) to the highest (Local control) for
control of some of the systems within the tunnel. These are:

Tunnel Ventilation system

Tunnel Lighting system
Tunnel Drainage System
Tunnel Electrical Systems
Tunnel Fire/smoke alarm, VAID etc.
Tunnel ERTs, SCPs and EPs
Tunnel Cross Passage Doors
Tunnel Wayfinding Signage (Escape Signs)
Public Address system

Automatic mode is the default mode i.e. on absence of any other control mode requests, Automatic
mode will be assumed. In each mode if a higher priority mode is invoked by a control request for a
particular device, then the control request of the higher priority system will be executed.
On execution of a command the device status will remain the same until further request for control
is made. [Safety requirement]
In all modes of control all devices are monitored by the pair of Master PLCs and all events and
alarms are logged on a pair of SCADA duty/hot standby servers.
a) At the same time all data is passed to TOA for the attention of the TOA operator in respect
to plant availability status and maintenance issues.
b) At the same time all data is passed to TMC for the attention of the operator in respect to
tunnel traffic operational issues. In all modes of control the task of operational monitoring
and control of all highway devices remains with the TMC.
It is assumed that the services of the maintainer is available on a 24 hour per day 7 days a weeks
basis. The repair times for individual devices are of critical importance in order to maintain the
availability figures expected of devices.

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9. Automatic
In Automatic Control all tunnel devices are controlled by a pair of duty/hot standby master PLCs. In
this mode these functions are executed automatically as listed below:
a) Air pollution control via pollution sensors and ventilation fans,
b) Lighting control through the dedicated Lighting Control Unit whereby the level of lighting in
the tunnel is adjusted in tandem with the ambient light outside the tunnel measured by light
photometers and internal photocells.
c) Drainage pumping control where the level in the attenuation tank is controlled by 3 pumps.

9.1. TMC
In this mode the TMC traffic operator takes over the control of some devices in the tunnel via setting
up of emergency plans or directly commanding the devices on the TMC terminals.
In this mode the TMC traffic operator is NOT capable of controlling the Drainage Pumping Station in
any way.
a) TMC directly controls highway devices
Details of the requirements of each mode to be defined by TMC.

9.2. TOA terminal

In this mode either the operator or the TOA maintainer will be able to access the systems and
control them by:
a) Putting the device into Maintenance,
b) Then accessing and controlling the device either at the panel or via screens on the SCADA
terminal at the TMC
c) Control of drainage pumps and valves (Divert flow/Inhibit pumps)

9.3. TOA terminal (Tunnel Service Building)

In this mode either the operator or the TOA maintainer will be able to access the systems and
control them by:
a) Putting the device into Maintenance,
b) Then accessing and controlling the device either at the panel or via screens on the SCADA
terminal at the TSB.

9.4. Smoke Control Panel (SCP)

In this mode the Incident Response Team would have accessed the Smoke Control Panel. The
following devices are available for control through the SCP:

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Ventilation fans
Cross Passage Doors
Lighting
Drainage pumping station (Divert flow/Inhibit pumps)

The Incident Response Team must request control on the SCP and must release control on the SCP
after having dealt with the incident. Only one SCP can be in control at any point in time. [Safety
Requirement]

9.5. Local control at individual equipment panels

The maintainer should always put the device into maintenance before attending to the device at its
respective panel. (Subject to work permit procedures, H&S requirement) Once maintenance has
been completed control can be reinstated at the device panel. During this period access to that
device is not available at any other control level.

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10. Use Cases

10.1. Fire Service
10.1.1. Use case 1
Objective: Incident Response teams may if other communication has failed use one of the four
Smoke Control Panel (SCP)s located at the entrance to each bore at both portals. The Incident
Response Team officer can use the SCPs in order to control the ventilation fans at the fan stations
(0%, 50% and 100%), select impound/inhibit under the spillage heading on the SCP panel and
thereby containing the spillage in the impounding sump/inhibit the pumps and to set the lighting
level (Full or Normal).
An indication on the SCP will show which zone the incident has been detected in.
Precondition:

There is no other SCP in control of the tunnel. Only one SCP can be in control of the tunnel at
any one time. An SCP has a higher priority in the control hierarchy than Automatic Control,
TMC control and TOA terminals at both the TMC and the TSB, but has a lower position in the
control hierarchy than local control at the systems local control panel.
The power to the SCP panel is on and there is no fault indicated on the panel.

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Incident Response Team operate SCP

SCP

Master PLC
B

Fibre Optic
Ethernet Switch

Master PLC
A

Discrete I/O

Fibre Optic
Ethernet Switch

Master PLC
B

Master PLC
A

Ethernet
Fibre Optic
Ethernet Switch

Fibre Optic
Ethernet Switch

Fibre Optic
Ethernet Switch

Fibre Optic
Ethernet Switch

PLC
Data link

Data link

Data link

Pumped
Drainage

Tunnel
Lighting

Fans

Actions & Mitigations: The Incident Response Team (IRT) Officer presses the CRTL REQ push
button on the SCP to take control of the SCP.
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The Control System checks that no other SCP is in control. Control is granted to the SCP by displaying
which SCP is in control. The other SCPs will also show which SCP is in control. The individual
equipments control buttons will light up indicating availability of equipment.
The Incident Response Team Officer uses the available equipment to manage the situation in the
tunnel. When complete the IRT Officer releases control from the SCP.
Post-condition: The SCP is released.
Alternative Scenario: The Incident Response Team Officer leaves the SCP without relinquishing
control from the SCP station. The TMC operator at the TMC can release the SCP in question remotely
by a password controlled function at the TMC terminal.

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10.1.2. Use case 2

Objective: The Incident Response Team makes use of the radio system in order to contact the TMC
traffic operator and other emergency services. The Radio Rebroadcast system provides repeaters for
wireless communication from within the tunnel to outside.
Precondition: The Fire service Radio rebroadcast system functioning.
Tunnel Service Building

TMC

Base Station
TMC operator

Tunnel Bore

Dual Hot Standby Leaky Feeders

Incident Response Team

Actions & Mitigations: None that relates to the system.

Post-condition: None that relates to the system.
Alternative Scenario: The Fire service radio Rebroadcast system is in a fault condition. The TOA/
Maintainer respond to the alarm and initiates repair.

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10.2. Police
10.2.1. Use case 1
Objective: Police personnel make use of the radio system in order to contact the TMC operator and
other emergency services. The Radio Rebroadcast system provides repeaters for wireless
communication from within the tunnel to outside.
Precondition: The Police Radio rebroadcast system functioning correctly.
Tunnel Service Building

TMC

Base Station
TMC operator

Tunnel Bore

Dual Hot Standby Leaky Feeders

Police

Actions & Mitigations: None that relates to the system.

Post-condition: None that relates to the system.
Alternative Scenario: The Police radio Rebroadcast system is in a fault condition. The Maintainer
responds to the alarm.

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10.3. Ambulance
10.3.1. Use case 1
Objective: Ambulance personnel make use of the radio system in order to contact the TMC operator
and other emergency services. The Radio Rebroadcast system provides repeaters for wireless
communication from within the tunnel to outside.
Precondition: The Ambulance Radio rebroadcast system is functioning correctly.
Tunnel Service Building

TMC

Base Station
TMC operator

Tunnel Bore

Dual Hot Standby Leaky Feeders

Ambulance

Actions & Mitigations: None that relates to the system.

Post-condition: None that relates to the system.
Alternative Scenario: The Ambulance radio Rebroadcast system fault. Maintainer responds to the
alarm.

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10.4. Road user

10.4.1. Use case 1
Objective: The road user only interacts with the system at a time of emergency. He/she can get in
touch with the TMC by mobile phone, by Emergency Roadside Telephones (ERT), by accessing the
fire extinguishers or by using the cross passage doors, all of which will raise an alarm except for the
mobile phone, to which the TMC operator must respond manually.
Precondition: The aforementioned systems are functioning correctly

The TMC Operator is Notified of a Hazard or

Incident by a Road User
TMC LAN Ethernet

TMC LAN Ethernet

TMC Terminal

TMC Terminal

TSS Server

FO Trunk

TSS Server

Tunnel Service
Building (Ethernet)

Ethernet Switch

Ethernet

Master PLC
B

Ethernet

Ethernet

Master PLC
A

Ethernet

PLC

Cross
Passage
Doors

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Telephones

Fire
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Actions & Mitigations: The operator at the TMC will receive an alarm/a call and/or indication on the
mimics. The SCADA system activates preset CCTV camera positions and the operator confirms the
incident or the operator confirms the incident by directing CCTV camera/s at the incident position.
The operator responds according to what he ascertains through CCTV monitors.
Post-condition: The TMC operator is aware of the incident and has acted appropriately.
Alternative Scenario: The TMC operator cannot ascertain the incident through the CCTV cameras. If
the alarm is persistent but no visible confirmation can be made through the CCTV system, then the
problem is a maintenance issue, due to faulty equipment.

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10.5. TMC Operator

10.5.1. Use case 1 Operator is informed of an incident via radio or
telephone message.
Objective: Operator to locate incident to decide what action to take.
Pre-condition: CCTV/VAID availability the TMC operator will not be giving the CCTV output
monitors his full attention. His attention will only be turned to them if an incident is detected by the
system itself and alerts him. Dealing with an incident reported over a call from a radio or telephone
message means the system has not yet detected the incident and it may prove difficult to locate /
deal with. See elsewhere for details of communication with the TOA via radio and for details of how
an ERT is used to connect to the TOA.
Actions and mitigation measures: TMC operator to locate incident from either vocal description, or
if an ERT is used to make the call, the phone will be highlighted on the TMC Operator display when
the user opens the ERT door.
Post conditions: TMC operator successfully locates the incident using the CCTV/VAID system and
proceeds to implement a suitable action plan to deal with it.
Alternative scenarios: TMC operator is unable to locate the incident as the camera nearest the
scene of the incident is undergoing maintenance. The incident will be confirmed with the operator if
any one of the Incident Response Teams (IRT) confirms the incident on the ground.

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10.5.2. Use case 2 System detects incident, informs operator and

offers an appropriate emergency plan
Incidents are detected by the system are by the following sensors:
1) VAID
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)

Smoke
Pedestrian/animal in the tunnel
Objects in tunnel
Slow moving vehicle
Stopped vehicle
Vehicle wrong way

2) EDPs, EPs, SCPs.

a) ERT door
b) Fire Extinguisher door
c) Fire Hydrant door
3) Crosspassage doors
a) Door is open
Objective: Operator is alerted of incidents in tunnel e.g. Smoke
Pre-conditions: SCADA link to TMC and TMC operator terminal is available and the VAID systems
availability.
Actions and mitigation measures: If the incident detected is smoke, then the fans are shut down in
the relevant bore. TMC operator confirms the hazard is genuine on the CCTV monitor and not a false
alarm. If the incident is genuine, the TMC operator takes appropriate action relevant to the hazard,
by either accepting the proposed plans or directly taking over devices in the tunnel according to the
established procedures.
PMCS terminals display TMC Control mode.
If maintainer is known to be working in the tunnel then the operator informs the maintainer of the
incident by using the All Call facility of the maintenance telephone system or using the radio
system. This facility calls all maintenance telephones in the service buildings and in the pump
plantroom area at the same time, while in the tunnel the radio system will be used.
During contraflow the Vehicle Wrong Way will be deactivated.
Post conditions: If the incident is genuine, operator takes appropriate action relevant to the hazard
according to established procedures.
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The TMC Operator is Notified of an Incident.

TMC LAN Ethernet

TMC LAN Ethernet

TMC Terminal

TMC Terminal

FO Trunk
TMC Server
TMC Server

Tunnel Service
Building (Ethernet)

Master PLC
B

Ethernet

Ethernet

Master PLC
A

Ethernet

Air
Quality
Sensors

Individual Connection
for Each Zone

PLC

VAID

Cross
Passage
Doors

Emergency
Telephones

Fire Ext

Alternative Scenario:
The plan chosen cannot be implemented because the devices needed for the task are not available.
A CCTV camera malfunction which leads to operator not being able to confirm the incident. In this
case the Operator has to seek confirmation from Emergency Services or Incident Response Team
Officer in or near the tunnel.

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10.5.3. Use case 3 Weather station/MET subsystem sets signals

automatically
Objective: An incident is detected and signals set without human input e.g. Fog.
Pre-condition: The Fog detection device is operational and the communications link to SCADA/PMCS
is functional.

TMC servers

Ethernet Switch

Ethernet Switch

FO Trunk

Fog
detector

Weather
station

Tunnel Service
Building (Ethernet)

Fog
detector

Weather
station

SCADA Servers

MET server
North

Met server
South

TCB Engineering Terminal

Actions and mitigation measures: The Weather stations are located above the tunnel (2 off) each of
these is equipped with a FOG detector that is connected to the MET PC server subsystems. When
visibility drops below a certain level, the MET PC server subsystems will request the setting of the
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reduced speed signals through the SCADA/PMCS to the TMC operator. The operator can confirm the
drop in visibility through the CCTV cameras at the weatherstation to verify the reduced visibility and
accept the request or deny the request. All actions will be logged by the SCADA system.
If the request is accepted then the TMC servers will then set the relevant ITS traffic plans.
Post conditions: When visibility is restored to an acceptable level, the signals are automatically
reset to their original state.
Alternative scenarios: Defective detection devices triggers signal setting when reduced speed
settings are not required. The request for setting of the traffic plans due to adverse weather
conditions can be confirmed through the roadside CCTV or weather station CCTV system, this will
also confirm if an false setting of traffic plans due to faulty equipment has been requested.
The TMC Operator is to deactivate device(s) and alert TOA/maintainers operatives to facilitate repair
of the weatherstations.

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10.5.4. Use case 4 TMC operator sets and clears plans to set Traffic
Management devices and signs.
Objective: Devices show desired messages within desired time
Pre-condition: Devices required to implement plan are operational and not in maintenance or under
SCP control. Communication link between TMC Operator Terminal and display devices is available.

TMC Operator sets & clears Traffic

Management Signs and Signals

ITS Application server

Ethernet Switch

Roadside ITS devices for implementing

traffic plans controlled through the FO trunk

FO Trunk

Ethernet Switch

TMC operator terminal

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Actions and mitigation measures: Operator selects a plan on the TMC Operator terminal to execute
what display devices are required to be set.
Once implementing the plan has achieved the desired effect then the operator clears the plan so the
devices will return to their normal state.
Post conditions: The traffic plan is cleared and the control devices are set to normal values.
Alternative scenarios: The devices do not obey the plan selected. An alarm is raised at the TMC and
roadside maintainer is dispatched.

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10.5.5. Use case 5 TMC operator sets fans

Objective: Fans settings change within desired time
Pre-condition: Availability of the TMC to fan system communication link. The fans must not be in
maintenance or under control of an Incident Response Team Officer at an SCP.

TMC LAN Ethernet

TMC LAN Ethernet

TMC Operator Terminal

TMC Operator Terminal

TMC Server
TMC Server

FO Trunk

Master PLC
B

Master PLC
A

Tunnel Service
Building (Ethernet)

Fibre Optic
Ethernet Switch

Fibre Optic
Ethernet Switch

PLC

Fibre Optic
Ethernet Switch

Fibre Optic
Ethernet Switch

PLC

Fan Controls and starters in LV Panel

Field fitted fans

Actions and mitigation measures: The TMC operator implements fan override to 0% or 100%
output. The operator relinquishes control.
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Post conditions: Fans to return to automatic operation.

Alternative scenarios:
a) More than 2 fans are unavailable either defective or undergoing maintenance. This means
100% output ventilation response is not possible. An alarm will be raised at the TMC
Operator Terminal and TOA/Maintainers terminals. The maintainer to attend within 24
hours. The TMC operator will have to assess the risk of the situation and if deemed
necessary implement mitigating safety measures for continued tunnel operation.
b) Either the maintainer or IRT at the SCP take over control of fans. This will be indicated to the
operator at the TMC Operator Terminal. The situation where the maintainer takes over the
operation of the fans would be under an agreed procedure in response to a maintenance
requirement.

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10.5.6. Use case 6 TMC operator sets tunnel lighting

Objective: The lighting level changes within desired time
Pre-condition: Availability of TMC to lighting communication link. The tunnel lighting control system
must not be in maintenance or under control of a Incident Response Team Officer at the SCP.

TMC Operator Sets Lighting

Ethernet

Ethernet

TMC OperatorTerminal

TMC Operator Terminal

TMC Server
TMC Server
Ethernet Switch

FO Trunk
Ethernet Switch

Tunnel Service
Building (Ethernet)

Ethernet Switch

Master PLC
B

Ethernet

Ethernet

Master PLC
A

Ethernet

Lighting Management Unit

(LMU)

Actions and mitigation measures: The TMC operator implements an override to the lighting system
to maximum output. The TMC operator relinquishes control.
Post conditions: The lighting has been set to maximum and returned back to Automatic control
when the TMC Operator relinquishes control.
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Alternative scenarios:
a) The TMC operator is overridden by the maintainer or by an Incident Response Team Officer
at the SCP. The TMC Operator will be made aware of this on the TMC Operator terminal by
visual alarm indication.
b) The lighting does not go to maximum and an alarm is raised at TMC operator terminal and
the maintenance terminals. The maintainer to attend within 4 hours.
c) Loss of power supplies A and B will cause the Lighting Controller to deselect the booster
lighting. Confirmation is sent back to SCADA/PMCS terminals.
d) Loss of power supplies A and B and loss of Diesel Generators will cause the Lighting
Controller to select Emergency Lighting i.e. Stage 1 Lighting. Confirmation is sent back to
SCADA/PMCS terminals.
e) In response to item d) the SCADA/PMCS must raise a priority alarm, as this is an area wide
supply failure and also loss of local supply facilities i.e. generators, the tunnel will have to be
closed (shut down) as emergency lighting and control facilities only will be maintained in a 2
hour window. The tunnel cannot be operated during a total loss of power situation. The
maintainer can be dispatched to try to restore the local supplies i.e. re-starting the
generators, however this cannot be guaranteed.

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10.5.7. Use case 7 TMC operator controls Public Address (PA)

system
Objective: The PA system responds within desired time
Pre-condition: The TMC Operator terminal to PA speaker communications link is available and the
speakers are not in maintenance. The operator can select only one message.

The TMC Operator sets a PA message

Ethernet

Ethernet

TMC OperatorTerminal

TMC Operator Terminal

TMC Server
TMC Server

Ethernet Switch

FO Trunk
Ethernet Switch

Tunnel Service
Building (Ethernet)

Ethernet Switch

Master PLC
B

Ethernet

Ethernet

Master PLC
A

Ethernet

PA
Control

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Actions and mitigation measures: The TMC operator selects a preset message from a menu within
the TMC Operator Terminal and applies it to the 2 zones (One zone for each bore) within the tunnel.
The TMC operator selects to stop the message playing.
Post condition: The message is played continuously until the TMC operator instructs the system to
stop playing the message.
Alternative scenarios:
a) The message does not stop when instructed. Alarm is raised at the TMC Operator
Terminal and the maintenance terminals. The maintainer is to attend.
b) A message is played unsolicited. The operator will try to stop it. An alarm is raised at
the TMC Operator Terminal and the maintenance terminals. The maintainer is to
attend.

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10.6. Maintenance engineer

10.6.1. Use case 1 Setting of contra flow operation
Objective: To set contra flow operation
Pre-condition: It is assumed that this scenario is covered by a risk assessment and a traffic control
plan such that appropriate Signs, Message Signs and speed limits can be set up by the TMC Traffic
operator including the deployment of traffic management control measures and plans.
Traffic Management set up by the appropriate authority.
All stakeholders are informed i.e. see section 2 on page 1.
TMC PMCS terminal or TSB terminal are available.
Contra Flow operation setting is NOT available at the TMC.
Vehicle wrong way on the VAID system must be inhibited during contraflow operation.

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TOA/Maintainer Initiates Contra Flow

Ethernet

Remote
Maintenance
Terminal at the TMC

Ethernet
Switch

FO Trunk

TCB Engineering Terminal

Ethernet
Switch

Ethernet

SCADA Servers

Master PLC
B

Ethernet

Master PLC
A

Ethernet
Ethernet

PLC

Serial Link

Lighting
Management
Unit

Actions & Mitigations:

The maintainer/operator at the TOA/Maintainer terminal chooses Contra Flow operation for a
particular bore. Lighting Controller will adjust portal lighting and internal lighting.
Post-condition: It is assumed that this operation is an extended scenario and the return to normal
operation is described within a formal plan/procedure of execution, it will therefore not be
described here.
Alternative Scenario: Very little possibility for alternative scenarios, since these are major
operations and as such should be covered by major repair planning operation.

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10.6.2. Use case 2 Non-automatic device/system control during

maintenance
Objective: To Monitor and Control tunnel devices via SCADA and at the equipment panels. Devices
available for control purposes are:

Ventilation fans at the Motor Control Centres

Cross passage doors at the EDP/EP
Lighting at the LCP
Public Address system PA System rack
Attenuation tank pumping station at the midpoint sump plantroom.

Pre-condition: The planning of an operation must not be taking out plant that may be detrimental to
setting of an emergency plan or if it does then procedures are required to be in place allowing the
operator to reinstate the systems at short notice. [Safety Requirement] Each type of plant has its
own effect on the emergency plans and therefore procedures must be developed to cater for each
type of equipment/system. The FDS should help in determining the consequence of plant
unavailability, so that maximum limits can be set. This is off course not always possible and therefore
we have another case if the maintainer Infringes on the minimum plant availability.
Infringe
Infringe means the tunnel systems lack of availability to perform the tasks required to ensure the
road safety to all attending stakeholders at the tunnel during an incident.

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Non-Infringe Scenario

Advise TMC Operator

Infringe Scenario
(See below for process chart)
Maintainer to provide Method statement
& risk assessment

Procedures for Work Permits

to be defined

TMC to issue Work Permit

SCADA terminal in TSB & TMC is used.

The equipment is put into
Maintenance and indicated on the
system availability whiteboard.

Carry out maintenance

Yes
Can the equipment
be returned back
into operational
condition?

Sign work permit off as complete

No
Sign work permit off as incomplete

END

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Infringe Scenario

Advise TMC Operator

TMC Operator puts the mitigation

measures in place (Operation manual)

Operational procedures for every eventuality

need to be in place beforehand in the
OPERATIONS manual.

TMC Operator informs the TOA

maintainer under which conditions he
can proceed

Back to Non-Infringe scenario

Post-condition:
1. Equipment to be reinstated back into operation.
2. The operator is informed as to which systems are taken out for maintenance in all stages
of the maintainers work, through the TMC/PMCS system within a set period (Critical
response time) [Safety Requirement].
3. Mitigation measures have to be defined in the Operations manual when extended
maintenance/repair time is required.
Alternative scenario:

Equipment cannot be put back into operation. In case of infringement of the system
availability the Operations & Maintenance manuals should include advice/mitigation
measures for tunnel operation with reduced system availability.

Mitigation measures for the operator to be worked out e.g. reduce speed limit.

If incident occurs when the maintainer is on site, the operator has the duty of care to inform
the maintainer by maintenance telephones All Call facility and/or the radio system. [Safety
Requirement]

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11. Summary
This document has been compiled to provide a framework for the further development of the
system topology/hierarchy and to provide a guide for the TMC operator in his compilation of
mitigation measures and operational traffic procedures and plans.
It is anticipated that the document will be further developed as tunnel system providers are
appointed and requirement clarifications are developed by Ashghal/TMC/Maintainers.

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