\I-e read the cold cornn~entaries cf the Portuguese and t h e

gossiping tolerant anecdotes of the Malay Annals \Ire can feel

that these three ministers were men of unusual character: t h e
eldest, the Benclahara, calm, self-contained, temperate and cautious; the two younger men, passionate perhaps and hot-headed,
but gifted with an energy and a persistence that is rare among
men born under the sun r f t h e equator. Anc1 Malacca needed
tliem ; for i t was just when these three men were at the height of
their authority that tile town was startled by an unexljected and
most ominous apparition-the
first European fleet that ever
sailed into its barbour. That was in August, 1509; the
Admiral was the Portuguese, Diego Lopez de Sequeira.

*The Capture of Malacca, A.D. 1511.

I n an age accustomed to the comfort of modern sea-travel it is
not easy for a writer to convey more than a faint academic idea of
the hard lot of the first-comers to the Eastern Seas: the leaky
ships, the stifling cabins, the staie unpa;latable fowl, the putrid
water, the dirt, t h e overcrowding, the scurvy, the danger of storms,
the discomfort of the steamy tropical calms, and the anxiety of
approach to an uncharted and hostile coast. Yet if we are to take
the measure of men like d'Almeida and dlAlbuquerque we must try
a t least to realize the task tha'c was set before them. Columbus
and cia Gama had been simple navigators who staked their lives
upon their skill and upon the truth of their geographical beliefs.
The first "Viceroys" were men of another type, men .\vi~odreamed
dreams ancl saw visions of empire in the seemingly hopeless plan of
pitting the small frail ships of Portugal against the untamed vastness
of the Inclian Ocel~nand against the teeming millions who inhabited
its shores. D'dlmeiila, was the apostle of Sea-Power. H e saw
that with all their apparent weakness his ships had at their mercy
the cominerce of ~vholecontinents; ancl h e preached the doctrine
of a supreme navy. Altonso d'hlbuquerque disagreed. H e was a
vateran and distinguished soldier, a man of authol-ity, who believed
in Sea-Power but not in its all-suffjciency. H e mocked a t the
theory of an Eastern empire that owned no ports or 'docks and
.could not caulk a ship. eseept by the favonr of an ally. H e was
tihe apostle of the Naval Base, sea-power resting on .the shore.
Moreover, as a man ofiancient lineage, cousin-to Spaoiski'li'ihgs, himself a knight of. the Order of Christ, he mould not tjkB service
under Francis d'hlmeide.
*Reprinted fro111 tbe 'Singapore Diocesan AIagaaine', November 1911, pp.
8-13, by kind permission of the Anthor, nild of t h e Editor, the Rev. Frank G.
Swindell.

1i
I

1
I
I

King Emmanuel put an end to the cluacrel by naming both the

disputants Viceroys and by giving each of them a fleet i ~ n da
separate sphere of authority. This was in 1508. To another
adventurous spirit, Diego Lopez d e Sequeira, the King gave an
independent command, a squadron that was to operate outside the
waters of India and Africa and to bring new oceans m d e r the seapower of Portugal. These last were the ships that cost anchor a t
Malacca on that fateful 1st August, 1509.
As soon as t h e fleet was anchored a boat put off from the shore
to ask in the name of the Bendahara who Sequeira was and wliy
he .came. Sequeira had brought a n Brabic letter from King
Emmanuel to the Sultan of Malacca; he asked permission to deliver
it along with the gifts that went with such epistles. He mas forced
to wait. His arrival was an event of the first magnitude to Malacca;
was it wise to begin relations of which no man could predict the
end'? So thought the B e n d a h a r ~ . The Sultan saw no harm in
reading a letter and receiving gifts that co~nmittedhim to nothing;
he overruled his minister. A Portuguese named Teixeira wes sent
asbore and was conducted on an elephant to the palace, where he
had the desired audience of the King. It is not dificult to picture
the scene: the crowds outside who mobbed Teixeira i n their
inquisitiveness; and the silent staring faces thtlt lined each side of
the long palace-gangway up wl~ichan envoy mas expected to make
his way, with many halts and ceremonious bows at every few feet
of the passage and every step of the dais. Teixeira was a stranger
to Mali~yetiquette. R e presented his letter with a sailor's jovial
cordiality, and in a burst of further friendliness he fastened a
.necklace of beads round the neck of t h e Bendahara, just as though
that minister was an African Chief who would glory in such tinsel.
An angry murmur follor~redthe Portuguese as he fumbled with the
sacred person for the first noble in the country. "Let him alone:
heed him n o t ; he is only a mannerless boor", said t;he Bendehara.
Teixeira's bold and blustering assurance was intensifying the
nervousness, the fear of the Unknown, that chilled every heart in
llalacca. .
.
The days passed. N o man dared attack the strangers; yet !lo
man ventured to befriend thelli or trade with them, for who could
foresee the e n d ? The Indian merchants were anti-Portuguese to
a man ; they knew what trade-rivalry aleant. The Bendahera saw
that the strangers would be far less tolerant of oppression than the
I.ndiaas whom they wished to supplant; in the interest of.trade he
preached a holy war against the infidel. The warriors of the city
mere discreet. They were to get the hard blows of the. war, s n d
t h e Bendahara the pickings of the trade; they elected to arm and
wait: No one in fact wanted to fight. Sequeira had come for
customers. H e waited, hoping that the Malays would appreciate
his fi~cific'~policy,
but be could gain nothing Ily deln,y : it was the
one thing that the Mala\-s desired. Sequeira grew impatient, then
petulant, then menacing; the monsoon mas slipping by and he
,

Tour. Straits Branch

. 'TI-IE CAPTURE OF SIALA.CCA, A.D. 1411,

7.3

could wait no more. Even a t this stage, war was not what he
wanted, nor did it suit the 3f;tlays. ';A situation of estreme delicacy
is always fraught with d i ~ peril
e
: and in this case the accidental
(or semi-accidental) firing of a n alarm-gun on a, Protuguese ship
led to hostilities over some petty mistalre. The fighting mas halfhearted but i t spread. The Malays on board t h e Portuguese ship
jumped into the sea; snoh European sailors as happened to be on
shore were seized and captured. 'Teixeira saw the error ~l-hentoo
late. H e was too weak to attack t h e sullen angry city, that had
now broken off all relations with h i m ; t h e nlonsoon was dying
away ; his ships were sadly in need of repair ;. ~ r l din t h e end he
had to sail home having tarnished the fame of his country and left
his luckless comrades a t the mercy of their foes.
According to Malay ideas t h e Bendahara wns the leader of the
resistance to Sequeira, He had done no fightiqg; indeed he had
done nothing a t all; hut a statesman who ncliieres stupendous
results by the simple process of inaction is n lrian who deserves
better of his country than the hero of a hutitlrecl r ostly fights. S o
thought the people; so, cloul~tless,thought the Bendahara himself.
The Sultan thought otherwise. He saw that "Uncle &lutahir" was
becoming far too great a personage; and he recalIed many old
g~*ievancesagainst his minister. There was the nvnncular wealth
to'be garnered; and there was that little matter of the Benclahara's
daughter which had never been explained to His Highness's proper
siltisfaction. H i s Highness sent two of his followers to summon
the Bendahars " to God's presence " as they politely put it. The
Bendahara bowed his bead and died. The men of his h o ~ ~ s e h o l d
died with him ; his daughter was carried off to the harem of the
Sultan ; and his riches were dissipated iv festivities at the wedding
of the Sultan's daugl~rerco the son of the Ruler of Fahang.
Suddenly,in the very milst of all this wassail the King's joy was
turned into bewilderment by the unespected reappearance of the
Portuguese fleet-this time in overpowering strengtli under t h e
Viceroy dlAlbuquerque himself.
As soon as King Ernmanuel had heard of the disaster to
Sequeira he had sent (March, 1510) three ships under Diego Mendez
de Vasconcellos to avenge the defeat. These ships sailed first to
India to consult with d'hlbnquerque. The great Viceroy was too
expert a commander to -1veaken his forces by dispersing them into
detachments; he detained Vasconcellos depending t h e complete
subjugation ,zf Goa and t h e organizakion of the naval base in India,
Then when all was
in theearly Summer of 1511, d'Al11uquerque
sailed out to attack I\ialacca with every ship and soldier that he
could muster. On the 1st July, 1511, he appearerl in the roads
with t h e entire force of Portuguese Indin,-nineteen ships, 800
European soldiers and 600 native sapoys,-with trumpets sounding
banners waving, guns firitig, and every demonsl.ration that might
be expected to create a panic among the junlrs in the 11nrbour aod
t h e warriors in the town,

R, A . Sac., NO.61,IgI?,

74

THE CAPTURE OF 1\IALACCA, A.D.

1511.

The effect was immediate. The ships in !he harbour-Chinese

junks and Gujereti trading-vessels-txied to sail away, but were
intercepted and brought back to their moorings with every skow of.
friendship. T h e y t h e n offered to join the Viceroy in t h e attack on
the town, but this offer was declined with thanks; the Portugnese
admiral could afford to bide his time. Meanwhile t h e Malays and
the Sultan were too dumbfoundered to a c t ; no boat put out from
the shore, no message was sent. By the following morning,
however, the Sultan, regaining some of his old assurance, sent a
boat to greet d'blduquerque and to say that the wicked Bendahara
who had instigated the attack on Sequeira had boen punished with
death for all t!lat he Iind'done. D'Alhuquerque replied, expressing
his gratification, I,ut ]?c~intingoat that the Portuguese prisoners had
not been released, and that pencling their release the town must be
regarded as accessory to tlze attaclr on Seqneira. The Snltan mas
now in a dilemma. B e realized that he could not keep t h e
prisoners wibhout removing his mask of friendliness, nor could l ~ e
release them without giving up his hostages for the security of the
town. H e tried the Rendahara's policy; he temporized, B u t
d'Albnquerque was no Sequeira. H e knew that any general attack
would be the signal for the death of his fellow-countrymen ; still,
risk must always be taken. .He entered into secret into secret
communication wit11 Ruy d1,4ranjo who was the leader among the
captives and his own personal friend. Ruy d'rlranjo spoke of
divided counsels in the city, and advised attack. The Viceroy
continued to feel his way. H e seized some of the shipping and
sent a few shots into the town. Then he waited. The hint was
taken ; Ruy d'hranjo was released.
The Vicorey was now in a stronger position. H e went on to
ask for a heavy indemnity and for permission to open IL permanent
trading-station at'Malacca. The Sultan demurred ; he might have
allowed t h e factory but he was quite unable to spare any money
for the purpose of buying off the Portuguese. Meanwhile the warparty in the town was coming slowly to the front. I t was headed
by t h e Sultan's son Alaedin, by the Prince of Pahang, and by the
young bloods of tlze place whe knew nothing of war and were eager
for the fame t h a t i t brings. The Sultan himself preferred peace
and quiet. He thought Ile could secure what he wanted by letting
t h e Portuguese and the war-party oblige e a c l ~ other with the
necessary quqntum of fighting; as for himself be was a peaceful
person who cared for none of these things. H e toId the Viceroy
that he was' poor and anxious for friendship, but quite unable
to meet the demands that x e r e being made upon him.
D'Albuquerque hegan now to prepare for war. H e knew his
own m-ind and had e definite policy : that of substituting a Portuguese
for a Malay government and leaving the foreign traders undishrbed.
H e gave the Javanese and Indian leaders assurances to that effect
and received their promise of neutrality in return. I n the matter
of local knowledge h e was well served by the fact that Ruy dlAranjo
Jour. Straits Brapcb

---+

ancl the other prisoners had spent ' t w o years in the town and had
;come to know the locality, the language, and the foreign merchants.
Still the task before him ~ v a sa hard one. I n those days the
chaunel o f . the Malacca River turned sllarply. to the right after
-reaching t h e sea and allowed ships to lie a t anchor off the
mudbanlis on which the houses are now built. Disembarkation on
those rnndbanks mas impossible; the key of t h e position was the
.landing-place a t the mouth of the river and a t the foot of St.
Paul's IIill, but unfortunately for the Portuguese this point lay
~beyonclthe reach of the covering-fire of their ships' guns w'kile i t
was exposed to the Ere of every Malay stockade and building in the
vicinity. The Viceroy tried to grapple with . the 'difficulty by
building a sort of armed raft or floating-battery -which could float
in shallo~vwater and be moored at the mouth of the river so as to
silence the Malay gnn-fire and cover tile landing of the troops.
T h o battery mas a failure. It grounded in t h e wrong place was
e x ~ o s e dto a very heavy fire, and was only saved irom capture by
the heroism of its commander, dntonio cl18breu who .stuck to his
'post though wonnded grievously. At last d'A1buquerque was
compelled to attack without the help of any artillery' to cover his
advance; he sent out a strong force, cleared t h e landing-place of
.fhe enemy's troops b y a sudden I-US~I,
and then forced u p . t h e
.floating-battery to a more colrlnlanding position ~ v h e r eit made
shott.\r.ork of the Malay defences. This advantage was not secured
\\.ithoul; Ilei~ryloss ; for after the first surprise of the first Portuguese
atti~clcthe i\l$ays had rushed together from all. quarters and llecl
made a no st, desperate onslaught upon the landing party wl~icll
they endeavoured to t l ~ r o wl~aclrinto the sea. The prime Alaeclin,
nlounted on nu elephant, h e ~ d e dthis charge in person ; and the
Portuguese lost 60 men before it was repulsed. This success %nil
the destruction of tile Malay defences encouraged the Portuguese
to follow up their advantage by an attack upon the mosques and
pzlaces on St. Panl's Hill, but tho 3ialnys byere numerous and
were fighting under covet while the Tice~oy'st,rooys oFere bewildered
by the confused mass of building and were driven back with heavy
loss. So ended the day. The Portuguese had cleared the landiogplace ; and that mas all.
The crowning attack took place on St. Jalnes'Day, the 24th
Juiy, 1511. The Viceroy landed troops again under cover of the
guns of his floating-bi~ttery11ut when once they had corne :&shore
they were chargecl by i~ -?\7ild rnoh of 700 bilalnys s i ~ dmerceuicries
under tlie Prince Allzeclin in person. The ijgllt was long auil
furious; ancl though i t put the Pottngoese to henvy loss it could
only end in one w a y : armour, supelior weapons, discipline,-everything was on their side. Tlle Malays retreated once more to
t h e shelter of t h e buildings that had served tl:enl so well o n t l ~ o
previous day. This time d'Albuquerque advanced with .more
caution ; he burnt the buildings as h e went along. The work was
slow and cruel, for the clefenclers shot down poisoned arrows upon

76

THE CAPTURE O F IIALACC.4,

d.D.

1511.

the attacking Portug~lese, who nrere burdened with t h e weight of

theit armour, and exhausterl by the heat of the sun and by the fire
nud smoke from the bnrning l~ouses. Aga.in nnd again, with
cliininisl~ingforces, did the Prince Aloedin lead out his men in
sudden rushes and v i n momentary srlccess, only to be repulsed in
t l ~ eend. So too, now m d again from the upper reaches of the
river, did the Laksau~ena H t ~ n gNadirn send dotvn his mar-cnnoes
or fireships to take the enemy in the rear or harass his communications-all to no avail. Night separated the colilbatacts ; and t h e
Portuguese retreated to their ships, saddenecl by their heavy losses
and by their consciousness that the work of destrnction was only
half ,zccoml>lished.
On the follocving clay tile T'iceroy disernburliad his men once
more a n d pl.o.:eedecl with every preca~ltionto assail the smoking
ruins t b a t hnd covorecl the resistance of the l a s t two days. H e
found no one to oppose him. Prince Alaedin and his Ilaksamanz
had retreated up the river and were awaiting attack a t Pagoh on a
battlefield of their o l r ~ ichoosing. The Prince of Pahang had gone
back to his own country a s t h e f i g b t i ~ gllad lost nll attraction for
him. Tlle Sultan had seen the burrling of the palace and was n o t .
sore that his 1)olicy of lazy neutrality would justify him in meeting
the Viceroy face to face; he removed himself w i i l ~ all possible
clespatcli beyond the reach of any Pol.taguese marauding party.
The aged bedridden Bencla11:~ra who hnd succeeded the murdered
i\lutabir was borne off in a litter by his loving relatives tvhils he
invoked curses on the cowardice of a generation that was not as the
warriors of his y o u t l ~ . The Malay power was broken. T h e
Javanese, Burmese and Indian n~erchantswere for peace a t a n y
price it~ld hastened to rriake their s~ibmissionto the Viceroy, and,
;u a11 earnest of their goodi\rill, helped him to disloclge tlie Prince
Alaedin from his chosen lair a t Pi~goh. The prince fled far away ;
a few scattered bands of outlt~wsrepresented all that was left of tlw
famous Malay ewpire of Malacca.

Jour. Straits Branch K. A. Soc. No. 61,1912.