ch4 5
ch4 5
Discussion Topics
1 Financial Institutions are increasingly faced with the problems of
persuading individuals to save saving for retirement is paramount (though
repayment of a mortgage is a high priority for some people). Government,
too, is concerned with liabilities on the Exchequer as the population ages.
Forecasts of a growing elderly population are top of the list on which the
Treasury seeks economic solutions.
2 For both the public and private sectors, the paper `Family Fortunes, a
Guide to Saving for Retirement', by D. R. Cooper, which is printed directly
after this list of discussion topics, is timely, in that it quantifies the amounts
which breadwinners must save in order to meet standard of living
expectations during their post-employment days. The model developed is a
yardstick for individual investment and for the levels of national savings
which the Government must encourage in order to maintain prosperity as the
population ages.
3 The model can be run on a wide variety of assumptions, and for
different sectors of the population. The conclusions from some scenarios
appear to contradict some long-held views on pensions and pension
provision. A number of interesting discussion points arise:
(1) Savings over the whole of a person's working lifetime are generally
considered prudent and desirable. However, for some households,
attempting to save while the wage earners are young will cause
unnecessary hardship and short-term debt. In these cases, savings for
pensions should start when the children have left home and the first
mortgage has been paid. Should occupational pensions schemes and
state schemes be adjusted to accommodate `cash rich' and `cash poor'
periods?
(2) Low wage earners have no financial incentives to save, because their
pension entitlements will not exceed state means tested benefits. A
rational decision for some people is not to save for retirement under the
present system. State encouragement to save, such as tax relief on
pension contributions and gross build up on investment earnings, are
not sufficient or appropriate for this group. Is some alternative form of
state encouragement to save required?
# Institute of Actuaries and Faculty of Actuaries
2
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
FAMILY FORTUNES
A GUIDE TO SAVING FOR RETIREMENT
By D. R. Cooper
abstract
The paper investigates the level and incidence of saving required in order to maintain the
standard of living that a household experiences whilst of working age into retirement. In order to
do this, a model has been constructed that follows the income and expenditure of a household,
allowing for tax and social security, as well as changing family circumstances. The model can be
used to explain how a household should save in order to achieve a given standard of living in
retirement.
The author concludes that the usual message, to save a fixed proportion of income
throughout a working lifetime, is at best not helpful and at worst could lead to a lower standard
of living over the household's lifetime. People can and should manage the timing of their saving
and borrowing in order to achieve optimum incomes.
keywords
Saving; Pensions; Financial Planning; Means Test
contact address
D. R. Cooper, William M. Mercer Ltd., 38-40 Trinity Square, London EC3N 4DJ, U.K. Tel:
+44(0)20-7977-8684; Fax: +44(0)20-7977-8892; E-mail: [email protected]
".
Introduction
1.1 The purpose of this paper is to investigate the level and incidence of
saving required to maintain the standard of living that a household
experiences whilst of working age into retirement. In order to do this, we
have constructed a model that follows the income and expenditure of a
household, allowing for tax and social security, as well as changes in family
circumstances. The model is based on one devised by Hamilton, that
considers the position for households in Canada (Hamilton, 2000). The
model can be used to explain how a household should save to achieve a given
standard of living in retirement.
1.2 The obvious way of saving for retirement is through a pension
scheme, which can provide benefits on either a defined benefit or a money
purchase basis (sometimes both). All defined benefit schemes and some
money purchase schemes are provided by employers, and so members benefit
Family Spending
Figure 2.1.
All retired
Men
Women
Socio-economic group
A/B
C1
C2
D
Source: NatWest, 1999
Easy (p.w.)
Difficult (p.w.)
172
211
137
115
128
102
247
189
145
114
155
127
115
106
The Model
3.1 A deterministic model has been used to project forward the income,
expenditure and wealth distributions of a household from a start age to an
`end age', which is the assumed age at death. The output, which is discussed
in the following sections, is determined by controlling the household's
standard of living, or consumption, throughout its lifetime.
3.2 The household can range from one adult to a couple with up to four
children. The household's income can vary, as can the ways in which adults
contribute income to the household. The model permits one member of the
household to take a break from work, and could be extended to incorporate
periods in and out of work, or a changing share of income between adults.
3.3 The household starts with a basic salary and level of debt, controlled
by the user. Income will largely come from earnings, but households can also
draw down on savings and receive means tested benefits. The model permits
`general' spending (everything except house purchase and other saving), and
then allocates everything left over to paying off the initial debt and to the
various savings vehicles. The savings considered are home ownership,
pensions (including defined benefit and defined contribution occupational
schemes and personal pension schemes), ISAs and `unsheltered' vehicles. After
tax, National Insurance, general household spending and contributions to
occupational pension schemes (where appropriate), the priority order is:
(1) mortgage payments;
(2) payment of the initial debt;
(3) personal pension savings;
(4) ISA saving; and
(5) unsheltered saving.
It is assumed that the maximum amount possible will be put into the
relatively tax efficient savings' vehicles. Only any excess cash is invested in
`unsheltered' savings.
3.4 General spending can increase in line with earnings or inflation, if
preferred. Spending also increases by the number of people in the household.
Thus, each additional adult or child increases expenditure by 70% or 50%
respectively. These figures are suggested by the OECD (Hauser, 1997). After
retirement, it is possible to permit the level of spending to change relative to
the spending immediately prior to retirement.
3.5 The tax calculation takes into account most allowances, and
includes adjustments for MIRAS and capital gains, where appropriate.
Similarly, the income calculation takes into account child benefit.
3.6 The household's finances are projected forward, past retirement age,
to their assumed age at death. Any unsheltered savings are used to offset the
mortgage required when a home is purchased, and, in those years when the
net income after tax and general spending is less than required to pay the
mortgage, the household `draws down' on its ISAs. The household can also
borrow against the value of its house, or, if it is sufficiently wealthy, against
its unsheltered savings (this is in lieu of drawing down on those savings).
3.7 Finally, the adults can join either defined benefit or defined
contribution occupational pension schemes. The users can fix the age of
joining, but, thereafter, they are assumed to remain in the scheme for the rest
of their working lives.
All retired
Men
Women
Socio-economic group
A/B
C1
C2
D
Easy
Difficult
2.26
2.78
1.80
1.51
1.69
1.34
3.26
2.49
1.91
1.50
2.05
1.67
1.51
1.40
10
3.12
According to the NatWest (1999) survey, the `average' retired
person needs to achieve a multiple of 2.26 of the minimum spend to feel
financially secure in retirement. From the discussion in Section 2, we know
that there are significant numbers of the working population that cannot
maintain this level of spending, but these results give a broad indication of
what working people might aim towards.
3.13 Another interesting conclusion that we can draw from the
numbers in Table 3.1 is that those in lower socio-economic groups, who will
largely tend to be the less well off, have a very narrow margin between
`financially difficulty' and `financial contentment'. Those in higher economic
groups have a far higher margin, and so have a larger number of
outcomes where they can `make do'. This presumably provides greater
flexibility in saving.
`Standard of Living'
11
Table 4.5.1.
Joint income
Retirement age
30,000
65
At 30 only
60
At 30 and 40
At 30 only
65
At 30 only
60
At 30 and 40
At 30 only
50,000
House purchase
Age at death
Multiple
89
95
89
89
95
1.96
1.94
1.60
1.78
1.77
89
95
89
89
95
3.02
3.00
2.42
2.74
2.72
12
The household with a joint income of 50,000 can meet the overall
target, but undershoots the target for socio-economic group A/B.
However, it does not undershoot by so much that it will find life
financially difficult.
4.5.3 We can investigate how sensitive the results are to some of the
household's general characteristics. The results for households with only one
member of the couple in paid employment, for households where spending
falls in retirement, and for households where one member of the couple takes
a career break are given in Tables 4.5.2 to 4.5.4. In each case the household
purchases one house at age 30, and reaches age 89.
4.5.4 Comparing the results in Tables 4.5.1 and 4.5.2, we can see, for
example, that the household with two incomes of 25,000 and a retirement
age of 65 has a standard of living 14% higher than the household where the
joint income of 50,000 is received by only one adult. This arises because the
former household gets the benefit of two single persons' tax allowances and
has a smaller proportion of income taxed at 40% (although a higher
proportion will incur National Insurance contributions). However, the
former household would presumably incur additional childcare costs relative
to the latter household, and these have not been built into the model.
4.5.5 The data presented in Family Spending suggest that a household
with an income of around 50,000 would be spending about four times
Table 4.5.2. Couple with two children; results where income is paid to one
member of couple; assuming one house purchase at age 30
Joint income
Split
Retirement age
Multiple
15,000
100%/0%
65
60
0.97
0.88
30,000
100%/0%
65
60
1.75
1.58
50,000
100%/0%
65
60
2.62
2.38
Table 4.5.3. Couple with two children; results where expenditure falls at
retirement; assuming 50/50 income split and one house purchase at age 30
Joint income
Retirement age
Fall in expenditure
Multiple
50,000
65
0%
10%
25%
50%
3.02
3.10
3.23
3.48
13
Table 4.5.4. Couple with two children; results where one parent takes a
ten-year break from paid employment; assuming 50/50 income split, one
house purchase at age 30 and retirement at age 65
Joint income
Length of break
Multiple
30,000
10 years
1.62
50,000
10 years
2.51
the minimum spend, but also saving too little to maintain that lifestyle
in retirement. This appears to be borne out by the results of our
calculations.
4.5.6 Although it is becoming increasingly common for both partners to
work, even with young children, the calculations have been repeated to
consider the consequences of a working parent taking a break from
employment after the birth of the first child.
4.5.7 Comparing these figures with those in Table 4.5.1, we see that the
effect of a ten-year break is to reduce lifetime spending by about 15%.
Alternatively, considering the results in Table 4.5.2, we see that returning to
work can increase living standards considerably.
4.6 Occupational Pension Scheme
4.6.1 The majority of employees have access to an occupational pension
scheme at some point in their careers. This is a source of additional saving,
since employers have to contribute to occupational schemes, effectively by
deferring the employee's pay. The results in Table 4.5.1 can be reproduced
assuming membership of an occupational scheme, and some of these are
presented in Table 4.6.1.
Table 4.6.1. Couple with two children; results where one spouse joins an
occupational pension scheme; assuming 50/50 income split and one house
purchase at age 30; both spouses still contribute to personal pension
Joint income
Scheme
Retirement age
Multiple
30,000
DB
65
60
65
60
2.09
1.88
1.99
1.82
65
60
65
60
3.24
2.92
3.10
2.82
DC
50,000
DB
DC
14
4.6.2 The calculations used to produce this table assume that the
individual joins at age 25 and remains a member until retirement age. This is
not entirely realistic, particularly for the defined benefit scheme, since it
ignores the effect of job changes.
4.6.3 Both the defined benefit (DB) and defined contribution (DC)
schemes are assumed to have a 5% member contribution. The defined benefit
scheme has 1/60ths accrual and the defined contribution scheme has a 5%
employer contribution. Neither scheme is assumed to contract out.
Comparing the results with those in Table 4.5.1, we see that the effect of the
defined benefit scheme is to increase general spending by between 6% and
7%. The defined contribution scheme does not increase the spending level of
the household quite so much (approximately 2%), but this will vary
according to the underlying assumptions. These answers seem reasonable,
since the pension schemes provide between 30% and 50% of income at
retirement.
4.6.4 Although the schemes do not appear to have much affect on
consumption, by this measure, they do have a significant affect on the
pattern of saving and replacement rates for the household. This is shown in
Section 6.
4.7 Household with No Children
4.7.1 Results similar to those in Section 4.5 can be presented for
households with no children.
Table 4.7.1.
Joint income
Household status
Retirement age
Multiple
30,000
Couple
65
60
65
60
2.29
2.09
3.57
3.24
65
60
65
60
3.59
3.26
5.35
4.84
65
60
1.91
1.74
Single
50,000
Couple
Single
15,000
Single
4.7.2 Comparing these results with those in the previous sections, we see
that, as most parents realise, having children reduces one's standard of
living.
15
4.7.3 It is also interesting to compare the outcome for the couple with
an income of 30,000 with the single household with an income of 15,000.
The former household benefits from greater tax allowances whilst in work,
which enables a higher standard of living.
4.8 Different Order of Investments
4.8.1 Each household's standard of living will vary according to how
well its savings perform. Section 8 considers the results if investment returns
are different from those expected for this section. However, the return on
savings also depends on the investment media chosen. In this section we
consider the effect of different priority orders on savings on a household's
standard of living.
4.8.2 The results in Section 5 assume that personal pension scheme saving
takes precedence over ISA saving, and that no attempt is made to pay off the
mortgage early. We will consider what might happen when paying off the capital
outstanding under the mortgage is given priority over investing in an ISA.
4.8.3 Pay Off Mortgage
4.8.3.1 Savings for house purchase and in an ISA have some similar
characteristics: they are both made from net income; and they can both be
realised without incurring capital gains tax (assuming that the house is the
main home). The main differences are:
Flexibility. ISAs are liquid, whereas property is illiquid. However, in
this model we have assumed that the household can borrow against its
equity in the house. This provides liquidity, although, because of the cost
of borrowing, it is less cost efficient than drawing down on an ISA.
Return. ISAs are invested in mixed bond and equity portfolios that are
subject to an expense deduction. House purchase, therefore, gives a
higher rate of return, particularly since it reduces the cost of the
outstanding mortgage.
4.8.3.2 For most of the households that we are considering, altering the
investment order has very little effect on the level of consumption. Any
benefit depends, firstly, on the extent to which the household has free cash to
put towards the mortgage, and, secondly, on the cost of borrowing relative
to the return from investment. Most of the households have very little spare
cash, and rely on borrowing in retirement. Although, in isolation, paying off
the mortgage early seems optimal, as a consequence the households make
less investment. As a result, they need to borrow more in retirement, so the
cost of the mortgage is just deferred.
4.8.4 Give Priority to ISAs over Personal Pension Schemes
4.8.4.1 Personal pension schemes and ISA savings have quite different
characteristics (Cook & Johnson, 2000):
16
Personal pension scheme saving is made out of gross pay, whereas ISA
saving is made from net pay.
Disinvestment from an ISA is flexible, and does not incur tax. On the
other hand, personal pension scheme investments only become available
when the policyholder retires. At retirement, 25% of the fund may be
taken as a tax free lump sum, but the remainder must be taken as income
that is taxed at the policyholder's marginal rate. So, for example,
households that pay tax at the higher rate whilst in work, but at the lower
rate whilst in retirement, are likely to get a better return from personal
pension scheme saving.
There are maximum contributions that can be made to both forms of
saving. For an ISA the amount is fixed (currently 7,000 p.a.), whereas, for a
personal pension scheme, the amount is a percentage of pay (up to a cap).
It is not possible to borrow against personal pension scheme savings.
4.8.4.2 The return available from each type of investment will depend
on the underlying assets. The model assumes that they are similarly invested,
so that the only difference in return arises because dividends received by an
ISA have a tax credit of 10% until 2004, so should provide a marginally
higher yield.
4.8.4.3 Because ISA and personal pension scheme savings are treated so
similarly by the model, altering the order does not have much effect on a
household's standard of living. The crucial difference appears to be the
flexibility afforded by ISA savings, which can be drawn down when income is
low relative to expenditure. If most of a household's savings have been
directed toward a personal pension scheme, then the household would have
to borrow instead, and this is relatively more expensive.
.
Figure 5.1.
17
Figure 5.2.
18
5.3 Comparing the two figures, we see that planning for retirement is
more straightforward if your family status does not change. Figure 5.1 shows
how single people are able to save a stable proportion of their income
throughout their working lives. The savings vehicles shown are largely
housing and a personal pension scheme, because the individual has relatively
low earnings. Someone with higher earnings would have greater opportunity
to save, and so could take advantage of other types of saving.
5.4 Figure 5.2 illustrates how households with changing family
circumstances can have long periods when saving is not possible. This is a
deliberate consequence of the way in which the model is set up, since it
assumes that the household wants to maintain its level of consumption.
However, it illustrates that savings need not be constant throughout ones
working life in order to maintain ones standard of living in retirement.
5.5 We can also see that both of these households manage to continue
saving during the first part of their retirement. The single household first
pays off the debt that helped finance consumption whilst of working age, and
then saves to an ISA. As they get older, both households need to borrow
against the value of their homes and their ISA savings to maintain their
standards of living in real (with respect to earnings) terms.
5.6 The model also produces output that shows how sources of income
change on reaching retirement. Figures 5.3 and 5.4 show the income
distribution for couples with a starting household income of 50,000, shared
equally between the two partners. Between ages 50 and 65 household incomes
are not expected to grow faster than the rate of inflation. This assumption
can be varied, but the rate of increase in earnings does tend to decline after
about age 50. The income received after age 69 is also level, since at that age
Figure 5.3.
Figure 5.4.
19
the household stops drawing down on its ISA and personal pension savings,
and purchases annuities linked to the RPI. It is partly to balance RPI linked
income and wage linked expenditure that the households used for Charts 5.1
and 5.2 have to borrow in retirement.
5.7 Figure 5.3 would only change slightly if the household had no
children. There would be no child benefit and no need to draw down on the
ISA before retirement, and the level of income in retirement would be
greater. Figure 5.4 shows how the income distribution of the household used
for Figure 5.3 would change if one member took a 10-year break.
5.8 In both cases there is a single house purchase at age 30, and neither
member of the couple joins an occupational pension scheme:
Note how the ISA is used by the second couple to cover expenditure
whilst one partner is taking a break from employment. When the ISA is
exhausted, the model assumes that they are able to defer mortgage
payments until their level of income recovers.
Note also that, whilst the sources of income in retirement are similar in
both cases, the level of income is, of course, lower for the household
where one member has a career break. Because ISA savings were needed
during the career break, they are not available at retirement. This is a
useful illustration of the benefit of saving in ISAs rather than in personal
pension schemes, since the latter do not afford this flexibility.
5.9 To sustain its level of consumption, as well as relying on the ISA
during the career break, this household has to borrow and defer paying off
the mortgage. It only pays off its mortgage by age 75, and still has a small
amount of debt at age 89, although it can meet the debt out of its
`inheritance'. Figure 5.5 shows its expenditure distribution.
20
Figure 5.5.
Figure 6.1.
Figure 6.2.
21
22
Figure 6.3.
Figure 6.4.
23
24
Household status
Joint income
Replacement ratio
Average saving
Retire aged 65
15,000
50,000
15,000
50,000
15,000
50,000
15,000
50,000
74.3%
66.3%
66.3% (49.8% at 60)
59.3% (48.1% at 60)
88.1%
83.5%
93.6%
75.8%
15.9%
19.2%
19.2%
23.6%
13.2%
16.8%
20.3%
24.0%
Retire aged 60
Career break
DB scheme
Table 6.2.
Joint income
Member of household
Replacement ratio
50,000
Partner 1
Partner 2
111%
56%
appears to have a lower level of saving. This is because the household has
to continue saving in retirement to pay off the debt incurred during the break
from work, so that it does not result in a higher standard of living.
6.12 Similarly, it might be necessary for one member of the household
to achieve a far higher replacement rate than the other, if the household is to
achieve its desired replacement rate. The results presented in Table 6.2
illustrate this point.
6.13 Ignoring the contribution to the occupational pension scheme, both
partners have similar savings ratios. (Partner 2 saves marginally less, since it
is assumed that all elective tax allowances, apart from the single person's
allowance, go to partner 1). However, partner 1's employer's occupational
scheme imposes a certain level of forced saving, as well as providing an
additional source of saving. Effectively, the employer's saving replaces part
of partner 2's saving.
6.14 The model does not allow for family breakdown. If the trends
observed in the 1990s continue, it is likely that there will be an increased
number of single households, many arising from divorce (Murphy & Wang,
1999). In view of Pension Sharing and other divorce legislation, it might be
reasonable to assume that partner 2 has not adopted too much risk by
reducing saving (and, therefore, contributing more to general expenditure) in
the expectation of benefiting from partner 1's higher replacement ratio.
Generally, however, the financial outcomes from divorce are not equitable,
and one member (the one who has the main child caring responsibility,
usually the woman) ends up being significantly worse off.
6.15 We see from the results in this section that a replacement ratio of
2/3rds, including state benefits, is quite modest, even for higher income
25
Means Testing
Buy house at 30
Rent inheritance
Means test?
Multiple
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
1.14
1.34
0.83
0.95
1.23
Rent no inheritance
Notes: # average saving to age 65
*
figure in brackets is saving averaged over lifetime
7.4 (11.4)
6.9 (11.2)
20.8 (29.1)
26.0 (33.9)
9.0 (6.6)
26
27
#
*
Priority
Multiple
Inheritance
Consumption
Inheritance
Consumption
0.83
1.00
1.00
1.23
Average saving
20.8%#
10.3%
23.0%
8.9%
(29.1%)*
(2.6%)
(26.4%)
(6.6%)
Inheritance
100%
26%
70%
0%
10-year break
No children
Single parent (15 K)
Single parent (7.5 K)
Notes:
#
*
Housing
Multiple
Purchase
Rent
Purchase
Purchase
Purchase
1.20 (0.95)y
0.85 (0.65)
1.33 (1.31)
1.72 (1.47)
1.47 (0.83)
9.6
27.0# (33.7) *
13.4
15.0
29.9
28
7.12 The standard of living of the household with two children, where
one parent takes a ten-year break from paid work after the birth of the first
child, is about 12% less than that of the household where both parents work
throughout. They also have different income and expenditure patterns. The
latter household pays off its mortgage by age 59, having had to accrue extra
debt when the second child is born. Once it has paid off this debt (and its
initial debt), it does not have to borrow (apart from the mortgage), apart
from a small amount each year after age 65. This could be viewed as equity
release on the house.
7.13 In contrast, the former household does not pay off its mortgage
until its death, having made no payments for the seven years between the
birth of the second child and the `caring' partner's return to work.
7.14 Both households pay tax and National Insurance throughout their
working lives, and continue paying tax throughout retirement.
7.15 Turning to income, the household where one parent takes a break
receives more means tested benefits during that break than the household
where no break is taken, even though the latter household is eligible for child
care support. The household that rents also receives housing benefit during
this period. Once in retirement, the former household also receives more
means tested benefit, although, once the `caring' partner returns to work, it is
able to save towards a personal pension.
7.16 The household without children has an easier time, financially. It
pays off its initial debt and mortgage within the allotted time, and is able to
save from age 30 towards a personal pension. It receives virtually no means
tested benefits whilst in work, and only becomes eligible for means tested
benefits aged 78. By age 85, about 10% of its income is due to the MIG.
7.17 The single parent with an income of 15,000 has the highest
standard of living of those in this section. Whilst in work, the household
receives means tested benefits similar to those of the other households with
two children, as means testing is based on household income. However, the
MIG is lower for a single person than for a couple, and this person's savings
are sufficient to lift the household above the eligibility threshold for the
single person's MIG.
7.18 The household with a single parent and an income of 7,500
receives a significant proportion of its income, at all ages prior to retirement,
from means tested benefits. It has to extend the period over which it pays
back its initial debt, and it takes an extra two years to pay off its mortgage.
At the same time, it is able to save enough so that, in retirement, it can
generate sufficient income to be ineligible for the MIG until reaching age 79.
However, the ability to save is a function of the model. When awarding a
mortgage or permitting borrowing, the model does not exercise credit ratings
nor deal with the effects of social exclusion. In its world, payment of the
mortgage can be extended and increased borrowing allowed, to the extent
that it is secured against the inheritance. In real life, people in lower income
29
Sensitivity Analysis
30
Joint
income
Retirement
age
30,000
65
At 30 only
60
At 30 and 40
At 30 only
65
At 30 only
60
At 30 and 40
At 30 only
50,000
House
purchase
Age at
death
Multiple
(`poor')
Multiple
(`normal')
89
95
89
89
95
1.84
1.82
1.52
1.64
1.62
1.96
1.94
1.60
1.78
1.77
89
95
89
89
95
2.80
2.76
2.27
2.47
2.44
3.02
3.00
2.42
2.74
2.72
8.1.4 The groups that lose most in these circumstances are the
households with no children, since they have been able to save more than
those with children. They lose both because their savings grow less than
expected and because they produce a lower income. The results in Table 8.1.2
show standards of living falling by over 10% in some cases. Again, this
presupposes that they have saved enough to compensate them for lower
investment returns. Had they anticipated the higher rates of return, they
would experience a further fall in their standard of living in retirement.
8.1.5 Defined benefit occupational pension schemes are the only
private savings that households in the model have access to that are (at least
notionally) protected from poor investment returns, but `public' savings
have similar characteristics. State pensions are essentially defined benefit,
Table 8.1.2.
Joint
income
Household
status
Retirement
age
Multiple
(`poor')
Multiple
(`normal')
30,000
Couple
65
60
65
60
2.11
1.87
3.27
2.89
2.29
2.09
3.57
3.24
65
60
65
60
3.24
2.85
4.84
4.30
3.59
3.26
5.35
4.84
65
60
1.80
1.59
1.91
1.74
Single
50,000
Couple
Single
15,000
Single
31
and so provide a floor below which income cannot fall, thus limiting an
investors' `downside' risk. Similarly, means testing cushions savers, to some
extent, from the effect of poor investment returns. For example, allowing for
means testing, the standard of living of the single person with an income of
15,000, retiring at age 60, would only fall to 92% rather than 91% of the
Table 4.7.1 level. Couples with children on this level of income would only
see a fall of 2%, if there were means tested benefits, rather than of 6%, if
there were no means tested benefits. However, we have seen, in Section 7,
that means tested benefits are only significant at quite low levels of income.
It is unlikely that those with earnings greater than average would want to
retire with incomes that leave them eligible for the MIG.
8.2 Inheritance
8.2.1 Assuming that households leave the full value of their homes as an
inheritance clearly limits their ability to spend whilst in retirement. In this
section we repeat some of Table 4.5.1, but allow for different levels of
inheritance.
Table 8.2.1.
Joint income
30,000
50,000
At 30 only
Inheritance
Multiple
0%
50%
100%
0%
100%
2.21
2.08
1.96
2.12
1.60
0%
100%
3.44
3.02
8.2.2 We see that households which make only one house purchase can
increase their standard of living by about 13% if they are able to spend
against the value of their home. The household with two purchases can
increase its standard of living by about 32%. The difference represents the
higher value of the second house, as well as the relatively favourable rate of
property growth that the model assumes.
8.2.3 This demonstrates the potential attractiveness of equity release
schemes, where they can be devised in a way acceptable to both the consumer
and the provider (Le Grys et al., 2001).
8.3 Annuitisation
8.3.1 Given the current interest in income drawdown and forced
32
Joint
income
Retirement
age
30,000
65
At 30 only
60
At 30 and 40
At 30 only
65
At 30 only
60
At 30 and 40
At 30 only
50,000
House
purchase
Age
at death
Multiple
(d/d)
Multiple
(d/d stops)
89
95
89
89
95
1.97
1.90
1.61
1.80
1.74
1.96
1.94
1.60
1.78
1.77
89
95
89
89
95
3.05
2.93
2.43
2.77
2.66
3.02
3.00
2.42
2.74
2.72
Conclusion
33
household receiving about twice the median income could experience a long
time when it will be unable to save (when it has children). When children
eventually leave home, we can also see that it is important that the income no
longer needed to support the child is saved, in order to maintain the
standard of living in retirement.
9.2 From Section 6, we see that, whilst saving rates can be low, or even
zero, at younger ages, once children have left home they should be increased
to around 30% of earnings. In many cases it could be necessary to continue
saving in retirement. This pattern is not sensitive to income, and savings'
rates at each age increase only slowly with household income. However, the
model assumes that the adults in the household can continue to find paid
employment, and that their earnings maintain their real value until
retirement. For many people this is not the case. Households that follow the
investment strategy that the model appears to recommend, and then find
themselves without paid employment in the years prior to retirement, will be
very vulnerable in retirement.
9.3 Although it is not optimal in terms of consumption, a more cautious
approach would be to vary one's standard of living and maintain a more stable
saving's rate. Although this might lead to some hardship whilst with young
children, for example, it could have the advantage of bringing forward saving,
thus reducing vulnerability to loss of employment prior to retirement.
9.4 Other sources of information (for example, NatWest, 1999) imply
that, whilst wealthier households need a higher weekly pension in order to be
`content' in retirement, there is a large difference in the level of income for
contentment or distress. Wealthier households, thus, have a wide margin of
error when setting the target for their savings. Households with lower
incomes have narrower margins between contentment and distress, so they
are more vulnerable to downside risk. Downside risk could arise due to
market falls, the increasing cost of annuitisation, or because households
underestimate the level of saving required. Section 8 gave some indication of
how households might be affected by these events. In the example used for
poor investment returns, consumption had to fall by 1/5th.
9.5 The usual target for income in retirement is 2/3rds salary, which the
model's output suggests is quite low (see Section 6). Occupational pension
schemes cannot provide a replacement rate higher than 2/3rds, so even those
with good expectations from their employer's scheme should probably be
saving elsewhere.
9.6 The most certain ways currently available to protect against adverse
experience are through insurance or through state support. The results in
Section 7 showed how means testing could protect the downside risk of lower
income households, but also demonstrated that it could have other
consequences that were not desirable, such as reducing the incentive to save.
`As of right' benefits, such as the BSP and S2P, also reduce downside risk,
but might not have the same effect on saving.
34
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Cook, M. & Johnson, P. (2000). Saving for retirement: how taxes and charges affect choice.
FSA Occasional Paper Series 8.
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/occpapers/op08.pdf
FSA (2000). FSA factsheet: stakeholder pensions and decision trees.
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/public/cred27ap.pdf
Feldstein, M. (1987). Should social security be means tested? Journal of Political Economy,
95, 3, 468-484.
Friedberg, L. (1999). The labor supply effects of the Social Security Earnings Test. NBER
Working Paper No. W7200.
Hamilton, M. (2000). Retirement saving strategies for Canadians. CIA National Symposium
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Le Grys, D.J. et al. (2001). Report on equity release mechanisms.
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Murphy, M. & Wang, D. (1999). Forecasting British families into the twenty-first century. In
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NAPF (2000). Annual survey 2000. National Association of Pension Funds.
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Limited.
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Pension Forecasting Advisory Group (PFAG) (2000). Planning your future.
http://www.dss.gov.uk/publications/dss/2000/penfor/penfor.pdf
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of Economics, University of Birmingham.
36
Household Statistics
Start age
Retirement age
Drawdown age
Age at death
Household type
Household income
Share
House purchase
Rent
Spending
Annuity
A.2
25
60 and 65
69
89 and 95
Single; couple; couple with two children
15,000; 30,000; 50,000
100%, 0% and 50%, 50%
Two times income at 30; two times income at 30,
and four times income at 40
3,600 p.a. (before purchase of first house),
increasing in line with inflation
`poverty' spend 3,945, no drop and drop at
retirement
Index linked
Economic Assumptions
Inflation
Real salary growth
Dividend yield
Real dividend growth
Real bond yield
Real property growth
Mortgage interest
Investment expenses
Cost of unsecured
borrowing
Standard basis
`Poor' basis
0%
1.5% (in excess of inflation)
2.0%
3.5%
2.0%
3.5%
1.0% in excess of bond yields
1.0%
0%
1.5% (in excess of inflation)
1.0%
2.0%
1.5%
3.0%
1.0% in excess of bond yields
1.0%
37