PENALOSA, James Ryan S.

Philosophy 31 – C
AB Major in Political Science - III
Logic1

Logic is a language for reasoning. It is a collection of rules we use when doing logical reasoning. Human
reasoning has been observed over centuries from at least the times of Greeks, and patterns appearing in reasoning have
been extracted, abstracted, and streamlined. The foundation of the logic we are going to learn here was laid down by a
British mathematician George Boole in the middle of the 19th century, and it was further developed and used in an
attempt to derive all of mathematics by Gottlob Frege, a German mathematician, towards the end of the 19th century. A
British philosopher/mathematician, Bertrand Russell, found a flaw in basic assumptions in Frege's attempt but he, together
with Alfred Whitehead, developed Frege's work further and repaired the damage. The logic we study today is more or less
along this line.

In logic we are interested in true or false of statements, and how the truth/falsehood of a statement can be
determined from other statements. However, instead of dealing with individual specific statements, we are going to use
symbols to represent arbitrary statements so that the results can be used in many similar but different cases. The
formalization also promotes the clarity of thought and eliminates mistakes.

There are various types of logic such as logic of sentences (propositional logic), logic of objects (predicate logic),
logic involving uncertainties, logic dealing with fuzziness, temporal logic etc. Here we are going to be concerned with
propositional logic and predicate logic, which are fundamental to all types of logic.

A preliminary definition2

The term "logic" came from the Greek word logos, which is sometimes translated as "sentence", "discourse",
"reason", "rule", and "ratio". Of course, these translations are not enough to help us understand the more specialized
meaning of "logic" as it is used today.

So what is logic? Briefly speaking, we might define logic as the study of the principles of correct reasoning. This
is a rough definition, because how logic should be properly defined is actually quite a controversial matter. However, for
the purpose of this tour, we thought it would be useful to give you at least some rough idea as to the subject matter that
you will be studying. So this is what we shall try to do on this page.

Logic is not the psychology of reasoning

One thing you should note about this definition is that logic is concerned with the principles of correct reasoning.
Studying the correct principles of reasoning is not the same as studying the psychology of reasoning. Logic is the former
discipline, and it tells us how we ought to reason if we want to reason correctly. Whether people actually follow these
rules of correct reasoning is an empirical matter, something that is not the concern of logic.

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Logic (02 August 2009). Discrete Structures/Discrete Mathematics Web Course Material. retrieved last 09 April 2010 @
http://www.cs.odu.edu/~toida/nerzic/content/logic/intr_to_logic.html

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Lao, Joe (2004). Critical thinking web: What is logic. retrieved last 09 April 2010 @ http://philosophy.hku.hk/think/misc/project.php
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 The psychology of reasoning, on the other hand, is an empirical science. It tells us about the actual reasoning
habits of people, including their mistakes. A psychologist studying reasoning might be interested in how people's ability
to reason varies with age. But such empirical facts are of no concern to the logician.

The principles of logic

So what are these principles of reasoning that are part of logic? There are many such principles, but the main (not the
only) thing that we study in logic are principles governing the validity of arguments - whether certain conclusions follow
from some given assumptions. For example, consider the following three arguments :

If Tom is a philosopher, then Tom is poor.

Tom is a philosopher.
Therefore, Tom is poor.

If K>10, then K>2.

K>10.
Therefore, K>2.

If Tarragona is in Europe, then Tarragona is not in China.

Tarragona is in Europe.
Therefore, Tarragona is not in China.

These three arguments here are obviously good arguments in the sense that their conclusions follow from the
assumptions. If the assumptions of the argument are true, the conclusion of the argument must also be true. A logician will
tell us that they are all cases of a particular form of argument known as "modus ponens".

Topic neutrality
Modus ponens might be used to illustrate two features about the rules of reasoing in logic. The first feature is its
topic-neutrality. As the four examples suggest, modus ponens can be used in reasoning about diverse topics. This is true of
all the principles of reasoning in logic. The laws of biology might be true only of living creatures, and the laws of
economics are only applicable to collections of agents that enagage in financial transactions. But the principles of logic
are universal principles which are more general than biology and economics. This is in part what is implied in the
following definitions of logic by two very famous logicians :

To discover truths is the task of all sciences; it falls to logic to discern the laws of truth. ... I assign to
logic the task of discovering the laws of truth, not of assertion or thought." - Gottlob Frege (1848-
1925)

From his 1956 paper "The Thought : A Logical Inquiry" in Mind Vol. 65.

"logic" ... [is] ... the name of a discipline which analyzes the meaning of the concepts common to all
the sciences, and establishes the general laws governing the concepts. - Alfred Tarski (1901-1983)

From his Introduction to logic and to the methodology of deductive sciences, Dover, page xi.

Necessity in logic
A second feature of the principles of logic is that they are non-contingent, in the sense that they do not depend on
any particular accidental features of the world. Physics and the other empirical sciences investigate the way the world

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actually is. Physicists might tell us that no signal can travel faster than the speed of light, but if the laws of physics have
been different, then perhaps this would not have been true. Similarly, biologists might study how dolphins communicate
with each other, but if the course of evolution had been different, then perhaps dolphins might not have existed. So the
theories in the empirical sciences are contingent in the sense that they could have been otherwise. The principles of logic,
on the other hand, are derived using reasoning only, and their validity does not depend on any contingent features of the
world.

For example, logic tells us that any statement of the form "If P then P." is necessarily true. This is a principle of the
second kind that logician study. This principle tells us that a statement such as "if it is raining, then it is raining" must be
true. We can easily see that this is indeed the case, whether or not it is actually raining. Furthermore, even if the laws of
physics or weather patterns were to change, this statement will remain true. Thus we say that scientific truths
(mathematics aside) are contingent whereas logical truths are necessary. Again this shows how logic is different from the
empirical sciences like physics, chemistry or biology.

Formal and informal logic

Sometimes a distinction is made between informal logic and formal logic. The term "informal logic" is often used to mean
the same thing as critical thinking. Sometimes it is used to refer to the study of reasoning and fallacies in the context of
everyday life. "Formal logic" is mainly concerned with formal systems of logic. These are specially constructed systems
for carrying out proofs, where the languages and rules of reasoning are precisely and carefully defined. Sentential logic
(also known as "Propositional logic") and Predicate Logic are both examples of formal systems of logic.

There are many reasons for studying formal logic. One is that formal logic helps us identify patterns of good reasoning
and patterns of bad reasoning, so we know which to follow and which to avoid. This is why studying basic formal logic
can help improve critical thinking. Formal systems of logic are also used by linguists to study natural languages.
Computer scientists also employ formal systems of logic in research relating to Aritificial Intelligence. Finally, many
philosophers also like to use formal logic when dealing with complicated philosophical problems, in order to make their
reasoning more explicit and precise.

HISTORY OF LOGIC3

Aristotle: Logic

Aristotle (384-322B.C.) is known as the founder of Logic. In the six treatises which he devoted to the subject,
Aristotle examined and analysed the thinking processes for the purpose of formulating the laws of thought.
These treatises are "The Categories", "Interpretation", "Prior Analytics", "Posterior Analytics", "Topics", and "Sophisms".
These were afterwards given the title of "Organon", or "Instrument of Knowledge"; this designation, however, did not
come into common use until the fifteenth century.
The first four treatises contain, with occasional excursions into the domain of grammar and metaphysics, the science of
formal logic essentially the same as it is taught at the present day. The "Topics" and the "Sophisms" contain the
applications of logic to argumentation and the refutation of fallacies. In conformity with the fundamental principle of his
theory of knowledge, namely, that all our knowledge comes from experience, Aristotle recognizes the importance of
inductive reasoning, that is to say, reasoning from particular instances to general principles. If he and his followers did not
develop more fully this portion of logic, it was not because they did not recognize its importance in principle. His claim to
the title of Founder of Logic has never been seriously disputed the most that his opponents in the modern era could do was
to set up rival systems in which induction was to supplant syllogistic reasoning. One of the devices of the opponents of
scholasticism is to identify the Schoolmen and Aristotle with the advocacy of an exclusively deductive logic.

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Haselhurst, Geoff (N.D.). Philosophy: Logic. retrieved last 09 April 2010 @ http://open-site.org/Society/Philosophy/Logic/History.
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Overview

The history of logic possesses a more than ordinary interest, because, on the one hand, every change in the point
of view of the metaphysician and the psychologist tended to produce a corresponding change in logical theory and
practice, while, on the other hand, changes in logical method and procedure tended to affect the conclusions as well as the
method of the philosopher. Notwithstanding these tendencies towards variation, the science of logic has undergone very
few radical changes from the beginning of its history.

The Nyaya / Indian Syllogism

The Nyaya is a system of philosophy which was studied in India in the fifth century B.C., though it is perhaps, of
much older date, takes its name from the word nyaya, meaning logical argument, or syllogism. This philosophy, like all
the Indian systems, busied itself with the Problem of the deliverance of the soul from bondage, and its solution was that
the soul is to be freed from the trammels of matter by means of systematic reasoning. This view of the question led
naturally to an analysis of the methods of thinking, and to the construction of a type of reasoning which bears a remote
resemblance to the syllogism. The nyaya, or Indian syllogism, as it is sometimes called, consists of five propositions. If,
for instance, one wishes to prove that the hill is on fire, one begins with the assertion: "The hill is on fire." Next, the
reason is given: "For it smokes." Then comes an instance, "Like the kitchen fire"; which is followed by the application,
"So also the hill smokes." Finally comes the conclusion, "Therefore it is on fire." Between this and the clear-cut
Aristotelean syllogism, with its major and minor premises and conclusion, there is all the difference that exists between
the Oriental and the Greek mode of thinking. It is hardly necessary to say that there is no historical evidence that Aristotle
was in any way influenced in his logic by Gotama, the reputed author of the nyaya.

Pre-Aristotelean Logic in Greece

The first philosophers of Greece devoted attention exclusively to the problem of the origin of the universe. The
Eleatics, especially Zeno of Elea, the Sophists, and the Megarians developed the art of argumentation to a high degree of
perfection. Zeno was especially remarkable in this respect, and is sometimes styled the Founder of Dialectic. None of
these, however, formulated laws or rules of reasoning. The same is true of Socrates and Plato, although the former laid
great stress on definition and induction, and the latter exalted dialectic, or discussion, into an important instrument of
philosophical knowledge.

Post-Aristotelean Logicians Among the Greeks

Among the immediate disciples of Aristotle, Theophrastus and Eudemus devoted special attention to logic. To the
former is sometimes attributed the invention of the hypothetical syllogism, although the same claim is sometimes made
for the Stoics. The latter, to whom, probably, we owe the name logic, recognized this science as one of the constitutive
parts of philosophy. They included in it dialectic and rhetoric, or the science of argumentation and the science of
persuasion. They busied themselves also with the question of the criterion of truth, which is still an important problem in
major logic, or, as it is now called, epistemology. Undoubtedly, they improved on Aristotle's logic in many points of
detail; but to what extent, and in what respect, is a matter of conjecture, owing to the loss of the voluminous Stoic treatises
on logic. Their rivals, the Epicureans professed a contempt for logic-or "canonic", as they styled it. They maintained that
it is an adjunct of physics, and that a knowledge of physical phenomena acquired through the senses is the only
knowledge that is of value in the pursuit of happiness. After the Stoics and the Epicureans came the commentators. These
may, for convenience, be divided into the Greeks and the Latins. The Greeks from Alexander of Aphrodisias, in the
second, to St. John of Damascus in the eighth century of our era, flourished at Athens, at Alexandria, and in Asia Minor.
With Photius, in the ninth century, the scene is shifted to Constantinople. To the first period belong Alexander of
Aphrodisias, known as "the Commentator" Themistius, David the Armenian, Philoponus, Simplicius and Porphyry, author

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of the Isagoge (Eisagoge), or "Introduction" to the logic of Aristotle. In this work the author, by his explicit enumeration
of the five predicables and his comment thereon, flung a challenge to the medieval logicians, which they took up in the
famous controversy concerning universals. To the second period belong Photius, Michael Psellus the younger (eleventh
century), Nicephorus Blemmydes, George Pachymeres, and Leo Magentinus (thirteenth century). All these did little more
than abridge, explain, and defend the text of the Aristotelean works on logic. An exception should, perhaps, be made in
favour of the physician Galen (second century), who is said to have introduced the fourth syllogistic figure, and who
wrote a special work, "On Fallacies of Diction".

Latin Commentators

Among the Latin commentators on Aristotle we find almost in every case more originality and more inclination to
add to the science of logic than we do in the case of the Greeks. After the taking of Athens by Sulla (84 B.C.) the works of
Aristotle were carried to Rome, where they were arranged and edited by Andronicus of Rhodes. The first logical treatise
in Latin is Cicero's abridgment of the "Topics". Then came a long period of inactivity. About A.D.160, Apuleius wrote a
short account of the "Interpretation". In the middle of the fourth century Marius Victorinus translated Porphyry's
"Isagoge". To the time of St. Augustine belong the treatises "Categoriae Decem" and "Principia Dialectica". Both were
attributed to St. Augustine, though the first is certainly spurious, and the second of doubtful authenticity. They were very
often transcribed in the early Middle Ages, and the logical treatises of the ninth and tenth centuries make very free use of
their contents. The most popular however, of all the Latin works on logic was the curious medley of prose and verse "De
Nuptiis Mercurii et Philologiae" by Marcianus Capella (about A. D. 475). In it dialectic is treated as one of the seven
liberal arts and that portion of the work was the text in all the early medieval schools of logic. Another writer on logic
who exerted a widespread influence during the first period of Scholasticism was Boethius (470 524), who wrote two
commentaries on the "Isagoge" of Porphyry, two on Aristotle's "Interpretation", and one on the "Categories". Besides, he
wrote the original treatises,"On Categorical Syllogisms", "On Division", and "On Topical Differences", and translated
several portions of Aristotle's logical works. In fact, it was principally through his translations that the early Scholastic
writers, who as a rule, were entirely ignorant of Greek, had access to Aristotle's writings. Cassiodorus a contemporary of
Boethius, wrote a treatise, "On the Seven Liberal Arts", in which, in the portion devoted to dialectic, he gave a summary
and analysis of the Aristotelean and Porphyrian writings on logic. Isidore of Seville (died 636), Venerable Bede (673-735)
and Alcuin (736-804), the forerunners of the Scholastics, were content with abridging in their logical works the writings
of Boethius and Cassiodorus.

The Scholastics

Scholastic logic did not modify the logic of Aristotle in any essential manner. Nevertheless, the logic of the
Schools is an improvement on Aristotelean logic. The Schoolmen made clear many points which were obscure in
Aristotle's works: for example, they determined more accurately than he did the nature of logic and its place in the plan of
sciences. This was brought about naturally by the exigencies of theological controversy. Moreover, the Schoolmen did
much to fix the technical meanings of terms in the modern languages, and, though the scientific spirit of the ages that
followed spurned the methods of the Scholastic logicians, its own work was very much facilitated by the efforts of the
Scholastics to distinguish the significations of words, and trace the relationship of language to thought. Finally, to the
Schoolmen logic owes the various memory-aiding contrivances by the aid of which the task of teaching or learning the
technicalities of the science is greatly facilitated.

Modern Logic

The fifteenth century witnessed the first serious attempts to revolt against the Aristotelean logic of the Schools.
Humanists like Ludovicus Vico and Laurentius Valla made the methods of the Scholastic logicians the object of their
merciless attack on medievalism. Of more importance in the history of logic is the attempt of Ramus (Pierre de La Ramee,
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1515-72) to supplant the traditional logic by a new method which he expounded in his works "Aristotelicae
Animadversiones" and "Scholae Dialecticae". Ramus was imitated in Ireland by George Downame (or Downham),
Bishop of Derry, in the seventeenth century, and in the same century he had a most distinguished follower in England in
the person of John Milton, who, in 1672, published "Artis Logicae Plenior Institutio ad Petri Rami Methodum
Concinnata". Ramus's innovations, however, were far from receiving universal approval, even among Protestants.
Melanchthon's "Erotemata Dialectica", which was substantially Aristotelean, was extensively used in the Protestant
schools, and exerted a wider influence than Ramus's "Animadversiones". Francis Bacon (1561-1626) inaugurated a still
more formidable onslaught. Profiting by the hints thrown out by his countryman and namesake, Roger Bacon (1214-
1294), he attacked the Aristotelean method, contending that it was utterly barren of results in science, that it was, in fact,
essentially unscientific, and needed not so much to be reformed as to be entirely supplanted by a new method. This he
attempted to do in his "Novum Organum", which was to introduce a new logic, an inductive logic, to take the place of the
deductive logic of Aristotle and the Schoolmen. It is now recognized even by the partisans of Bacon that he erred in two
respects. He erred in describing Aristotle's logic as exclusively deductive, and he erred in claiming for the inductive
method the ability to direct the mind in scientific discovery and practical invention. Bacon did not succeed in
overthrowing the authority of Aristotle. Neither did Descartes (1596-1649), who was as desirous to make logic serve the
purposes of the mathematician as Bacon was to make it serve the cause of scientific discovery.

The Port Royal Logic ("L'Art de penser" 1662), written by Descartes's disciples, is essentially Aristotelean. So,
though in a less degree are the logical treatises of Hobbes (1588-1679) and Gassendi (1592-1655), both of whom
underwent the influence of Bacon's ideas. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Father Buffier, Le Clerc (Clericus),
Wolff, and Lambert strove to modify the Aristotelean logic in the direction of empiricism, sensism, or Leibnizian
innatism. In the treatises which they wrote on logic there is nothing that one might consider of primary importance.

Kant and the other German Transcendentalists of the nineteenth century took a more equitable view of Aristotle's
services to the science of logic. As a rule, they recognized the value of what he had accomplished and, instead of trying to
undo his work, they attempted to supplement it. It is a question, however, whether they did not do as much harm to logic
in one way as Bacon and Descartes did in another. By withdrawing from the domain of logic what is empirical, and
confining the science to an examination of "the necessary laws of thought", the Transcendentalists gave occasion to Mill
and other Associationists to accuse logic of being unreal, and out of touch with the needs of an age which was, above all
things, an age of empirical science. Most of the recent German literature on logic is characterized by the amount of
attention which it pays either to historical inquiries, or to inquiries into the value of knowledge, or to investigation of the
philosophical foundations of the laws of logic. It has added very little to the technical portion of the science. In England,
the most important event in the history of logic in the nineteenth century was the publication, in 1843, of John Stuart
Mill's "System of Logic". Mill renewed all the claims put forward by Bacon, and with some measure of success. At least,
he brought about a change in the method of teaching logic at the great English seats of learning. Carrying Locke's
empiricism to its ultimate conclusion, and adopting the association theory of the human mind, he rejected all necessary
truth, discarded the syllogism as not only useless but fallacious, and maintained that all reasoning is from particulars to
particulars. He did not make many converts to these views, but he succeeded in giving inductive logic a place in every
textbook on logic published since his time. Not so successful was the attempt of Sir William Hamilton to establish a new
logic (the "new analytic"), on the principle that the predicate as well as the subject of a proposition should be quantified.
Nor, indeed, was he quite original in this: the idea had been put forward in the seventeenth century by the Catholic
philosopher Caramuel (1606-82). Recent logical literature in English has striven above all things to attain clearness,
intelligibility, and practical utility in its exposition of the laws of thought. Whenever it indulges in speculation as to the
nature of mental processes, it is, of course, colored by the various philosophies of the time.

Summary of History of Logic

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 Indeed, the history of logic is interesting and profitable chiefly because it shows how the philosophical theories
influence the method and the doctrine of the logician. The empiricism and sensism of the English school, descending from
Hobbes through Locke, Hume, and the Associationists, could lead in logic to no other conclusion than that to which it
does lead in Mill's rejection of the syllogism and of all necessary truth. On the other hand, Descartes's exaltation of
deduction and Leibniz's adoption of the mathematical method have their origin in that doctrine of innatism which is the
opposite of empiricism. Again, the domination of industrialism, and the insistence for recognition on the part of the social
economist, have had in our own day the effect of pushing logic more and more towards the position of a purveyor of rules
for scientific discovery and practical invention. The materialism of the last half of the nineteenth century demanded that
logic prove its utility in a practical way. Hence the prominence given to induction. But, of all the crises through which
logic has passed, the most interesting is that which is known as the "Storm and Stress of Scholasticism", in which
mysticism on the one side rejected dialectic as "the devil's art", and maintained that "God did not choose logic as a means
of saving his people", while rationalism on the other side set no bounds to the use of logic, going so far as to place it on a
plane with Divine faith. Out of this conflict issued the Scholasticism of the thirteenth century, which gave due credit to the
mystic contention in so far as that contention was sound, and at the same time acknowledged freely the claims of
rationalism within the limits of orthodoxy and of reason. St. Thomas and his contemporaries looked upon logic as an
instrument for the discovery and exposition of natural truth. They considered, moreover, that it is the instrument by which
the theologian is enabled to expound, systematize, and defend revealed truth. This view of the theological use of logic is
the basis for the charge of intellectualism which Modernist philosophers imbued with Kantism have made against the
Scholastics. Modernism asserts that the logical nexus is "the weakest link" between the mind and spiritual truth. So that
the contest waged in the twelfth century is renewed in slightly different terms in our own day, the application of logic to
theology being now, as then, the principal point in dispute.