William Jameson & Co. v. Morgenthau, 307 U.S. 171 (1939)
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Scribd Government DocsWilliam Jameson & Co. v. Morgenthau, 307 U.S. 171 (1939)
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Scribd Government Docs307 U.S.
171
59 S.Ct. 804
83 L.Ed. 1189
WILLIAM JAMESON & CO., INC.,
v.
MORGENTHAU, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury of the United
States, et al.
No. 717.
Argued May 1, 1939.
Decided May 15, 1939.
Mr. William D. Mitchell, of New York City, for appellant.
Messrs. Robert H. Jackson, Sol. Gen., and Phillip E. Buck, of
Washington, D.C., for appellees.
PER CURIAM.
Appellant, an importer and distributor of alcoholic beverages, having been
denied the right to import its product into the United States under the label of
'blended Scotch whisky', upon the ground that it was improperly labeled,
brought this suit against the Secretary of the Treasury and other officials to
enjoin them from refusing to release the product from customs custody upon
payment of the required customs duties. Appellant also asked for a declaratory
judgment that the Federal Alcohol Administration Act, 49 Stat. 977, 1965,
5(e), 27 U.S.C.A. 205(e) is unconstitutional and void and that Regulations
No. 5 promulgated thereunder, and particularly Sections 21(k), 34(f) and 46(a)
of these Regulations, are unenforceable as against appellant and are without
warrant of statutory authority.
In the view that the question of the Validity of an Act of Congress was involved
and that the suit was within the purview of Section 3 of the Act of Congress of
August 24, 1937, 50 Stat. 751, 28 U.S.C.A. 380a, the case was heard below
by a court of three judges, which denied an application for preliminary
injunction and dismissed the complaint. D.C., 25 F.Supp. 771. From its decree
a direct appeal has been taken to this Court.
Section 3 of the Act of Congress of August 24, 1937, providing for a court of
three judges and a direct appeal to this Court, is not applicable unless the
questions raised as to the constitutional validity of an Act of Congress are
substantial. California Water Service Company v. Redding, 304 U.S. 252, 254,
255, 58 S.Ct. 865, 866, 867, 82 L.Ed. 1323.
Here, the Federal Alcohol Administration Act was attacked upon the ground
that the Twenty-first Amendment to the Federal Constitution, U.S.C.A., gives
to the States complete and exclusive control over commerce in intoxicating
liquors, unlimited by the commerce clause, and hence that Congress has no
longer authority to control the importation of these commodities into the
United States. We see no substance in this contention.
The other contentions of appellant assailed the Regulations and administrative
action thereunder rather than the Act of Congress. So far as the Federal Alcohol
Administration Act itself is concerned, no substantial question of constitutional
validity was raised.
Section 3 of the Act of Congress of August 24, 1937, while providing for a
procedure analogous to that under Section 266 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C.
380, 28 U.S.C.A. 380, creates a distinction which we think is controlling.
Section 266 of the Judicial Code provides for a court of three judges where an
injunction is sought to restrain the enforcement 'of any statute of a State' or 'of
an order made by an administrative board or commission acting under and
pursuant to the statutes of such State', upon the ground of unconstitutionality.
The provision in relation to administrative orders was added by an amendment
to the original section. Act of March 4, 1913, 37 Stat. 1013. While that addition
has been said to be unnecessary, as such orders were previously covered
(Oklahoma Natural Gas Company v. Russell, 261 U.S. 290, 292, 43 S.Ct. 353,
67 L.Ed. 659, Congress adopted the amendment out of abundant caution. But
with these provisions of Section 266 before it, Congress in enacting Section 3
of the Act of August 24, 1937, did not refer to 'any statute' or to administrative
orders, but confined its requirement to cases of attack upon an 'Act of Congress'
upon the ground that 'such Act or any part thereof is repugnant to the
Constitution of the United States'. This is not an apt description of
administrative regulations or orders. We must regard the choice of language as
deliberate and as indicating a limitation deemed to be advisable. It does not
appear to have been the intention of Congress that direct appeal should lie to
this Court when administrative action and not the Act of Congress is assailed.
While we are of the opinion that the Court is without jurisdiction to review the
merits on this appeal, the Court does have jurisdiction to make such corrective
order as may be appropriate to the enforcement of the limitations$ which
Section 3 imposes, and in the circumstances disclosed the appropriate action is
to vacate the decree below and to remand the cause to the District Court for
further proceedings to be taken independently of Section 3 of the Act of August
24, 1937. See Gully v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 292 U.S. 16, 54 S.Ct. 565, 78
L.Ed. 1088; Oklahoma Gas Co. v. Oklahoma Packing Co., 292 U.S. 386, 392,
54 S.Ct. 732, 734, 78 L.Ed. 1318.
8
It is so ordered.
Decree vacated.
