348 U.S.

236
75 S.Ct. 259
99 L.Ed. 290

UNITED STATES of America, Appellant,

v.
INTERNATIONAL BOXING CLUB OF NEW YORK, Inc., et
al.
No. 53.
Argued Nov. 10, 1954.
Decided Jan. 31, 1955.

Mr.Philip Elman, Washington, D.C., for appellant.

Messrs. Whitney North Seymour, Charles H. Watson, New York City, for
appellees.
Mr. Manuel Lee Robbins, New York City, for New York State Athletic
Commn. amicus curiae.
Mr. Chief Justice WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is a civil antitrust action brought by the Government in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York. The defendantsthree
corporations and two individualsare engaged in the business of promoting
professional championship boxing contests.1 The Government's complaint
charges that the defendants, in the course of this business, have violated 1
and 2 of the Sherman Act.2 After this Court's decision in Toolson v. New York
Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 75 S.Ct. 78, 98 L.Ed. 64, the defendants moved to
dismiss the complaint. The District Court granted the motion in reliance upon
the Toolson decision and Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National
League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 42 S.Ct. 465, 66 L.Ed.
898.3 The case, together with United States v. Shubert, 75 S.Ct. 277, is here on
direct appeal under the Expediting Act, 15 U.S.C. 29, 15 U.S.C.A. 29.

The Government's complaint alleges that promoters of professional

championship boxing contests

'make a substantial utilization of the channels of interstate trade and commerce

to:

'(a) negotiate contracts with boxers, advertising agencies, seconds, referees,

judges, announcers, and other personnel living in states other than those in
which the promoters reside;

'(b) arrange and maintain training quarters in states other than those in which
the promoters reside; '(c) lease suitable arenas, and arrange other details for
boxing contests, particularly when the contests are held in states other than
those in which the promoters reside;

'(d) sell tickets to contests across state lines;

'(e) negotiate for the sale of and sell rights to make and distribute motion
pictures of boxing contests to the 18,000 theatres in the United States;

'(f) negotiate for the sale of and sell rights to broadcast and telecast boxing
contests to homes through more than 3,000 radio stations and 100 television
stations in the United States; and

'(g) negotiate for the sale of the sell rights to telecast boxing contests to some
200 motion picture theatres in various states of the United States for display by
large-screen television.'

10

The promoter's receipts from the sale of television, radio, and motion picture
rights to championship matches, according to the complaint, represent on the
average over 25% of the promoter's total revenue and in some instances exceed
the revenue derived from the sale of admission tickets.4 The complaint alleges
that the defendants have restrained and monopolized this trade and commerce
'the promotion, exhibition, broadcasting, telecasting, and motion picture
production and distribution of professional championship boxing contests in the
United States'through a conspiracy to exclude competition in their line of
business. The conspiracy, it is claimed, began in 1949 with an agreement
among the defendants and Joe Louis, then heavyweight champion of the world,
that Louis would resign his title, that he would procure exclusive rights to the
services of the four leading title contenders in a series of elimination contests
which would result in the recognition of a new heavyweight champion, that he
would also obtain exclusive rights to broadcast, televise, and film these
contests, and that he would assign all such exclusive rights to the defendants.
The defendants have allegedly sought to maintain and effectuate this conspiracy

by the following means: by eliminating the 'leading competing promoter' of

championship matches; by acquiring the exclusive right to promote professional
boxing contests in all the 'principal arenas' where championship matches can be
successfully presented; and by requiring each title contender to agree, as a
condition of fighting for the championship, that if he wins he would, for a
period of three (and sometimes five) years, take part only in title contests
promoted by the defendants. As a consequence of these acts, the complaint
alleges, the defendants have promoted, or participated in the promotion of, all
but two of the 21 championship matches held in the United States between June
1949 and the filing of the complaint in March 1952.
11

These allegations must of course be taken as true at this stage of the

proceeding. And the defendants do not deny that the allegations state a cause of
action if their business is subject to the Sherman Act. The question thus
presented is whether the defendants' business as described in the complaint
the of professional championship boxing contests on a multistate basis, coupled
with the sale of rights to televise, broadcast, and film the contests for interstate
transmissionconstitutes 'trade or commerce among the several States' within
the meaning of the Sherman Act.

12

The question is perhaps a novel one in that this Court has never before
considered the antitrust status of the boxing business. Yet, if it were not for
Federal Baseball and Toolson, we think that it would be too clear for dispute
that the Government's allegations bring the defendants within the scope of the
Act. A boxing matchlike the showing of a motion picture, United States v.
Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 183, 65 S.Ct. 254, 259, 89 L.Ed. 160,
or the performance of a vaudeville act, Hart v. B. F. Keith Vaudeville
Exchange, 262 U.S. 271, 43 S.Ct. 540, 67 L.Ed. 977, or the performance of a
legitimate stage attraction, United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222, 75 S.Ct.
277, 'is of course a local affair.' But that fact alone does not bar application of
the Sherman Act to a business based on the promotion of such matches, if the
business is itself engaged in interstate commerce or if the business imposes
illegal restraints on interstate commerce. Apart from Federal Baseball and
Toolson, it would be sufficient, we believe, to rest on the allegation that over
25% of the revenue from championship boxing is derived from interstate
operations through the sale of radio, television, and motion picture rights.5
Compare United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 225226, 67 S.Ct.
1560, 1564, 91 L.Ed. 2010; Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States,
345 U.S. 594, 602, note 11, 73 S.Ct. 872, 877, 97 L.Ed. 1277; Mandeville
Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 227235, 68 S.Ct.
996, 10011006, 92 L.Ed. 1328; United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, 324
U.S. 293, 297298, 65 S.Ct. 661, 663664, 89 L.Ed. 951; United States v.

Women's Sports-wear Mfrs. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 464, 69 S.Ct. 714, 716, 93
L.Ed. 805; United States v. Employing Plasterers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186, 189, 74
S.Ct. 452, 454, 98 L.Ed. 618; and cases collected in the Shubert opinion. See
also Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 10, 59 S.Ct. 379, 384, 83 L.Ed. 441;
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127128, 63 S.Ct. 82, 9091, 87 L.Ed.
122.
13

Notwithstanding these decisions, the defendants contend that they are exempt
from the Sherman Act under the rule of stare decisis. They, like the defendants
in the Shubert case, base this contention on Federal Baseball and Toolson. But
they would be content with a more restrictive interpretation of Federal Baseball
and Toolson than the defendants in the Shubert case. The Shubert defendants
argue that Federal baseball and Toolson immunized all businesses built around
the live presentation of local exhibitions. The defendants in the instant case
argue that Federal Baseball and Toolson immunized only such businesses as
involve exhibitions of an athletic nature. We cannot accept either argument.

14

For the reasons stated in the Toolson opinion and restated in United States v.
Shubert, 348 U.S. 222, 75 S.Ct. 277, Toolson neither overruled Federal
Baseball nor necessarily reaffirmed all that was said in Federal Baseball.
Instead, '(w)ithout re-examination of the underlying issues,' the Court adhered
to Federal Baseball 'so far as that decision determines that Congress had no
intention of including the business of baseball within the scope of the federal
anti-trust laws.' (346 U.S. 356, 357, 74 S.Ct. 79) We have held today in the
Shubert case that Toolson is not authority for exempting other businesses
merely because of the circumstance that they are also based on the performance
of local exhibitions. That ruling is fully applicable here.

15

Moreover, none of the factors underlying the Toolson decision are present in
the instant case. At the time the Government's complaint was filed, no court
had ever held that the boxing business was not subject to the antitrust laws. 6
Indeed, this Court's decision in the Hart case, less than a year after the Federal
Baseball decision, clearly established that Federal Baseball could not be relied
upon as a basis of exemption for other segments of the entertainment business,
athletic or otherwise. Surely there is nothing in the Holmes opinion in the Hart
case to suggest, even remotely, that the Court was drawing a line between
athletic and nonathletic entertainment. Nor do we see the relevance of such a
distinction for the purpose of determining what constitutes 'trade or commerce
among the several States.' The controlling consideration in Federal Baseball
and Hart was, instead, a very practical onethe degree of interstate activity
involved in the particular business under review. It follows that stare decisis
cannot help the defendants here; for, contrary to their argument, Federal

Baseball did not hold that all businesses based on professional sports were
outside the scope of the antitrust laws. The issue confronting us is, therefore,
not whether a previously granted exemption should continue, but whether an
exemption should be granted in the first instance. And that issue is for
Congress to resolve, not this Court. See United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 561, 64 S.Ct. 1162, 1178, 88 L.Ed. 1440.
16

The issue was, in fact, before Congress only recently. In 1951, four identical
bills were introduced in Congressthree in the House and one in the Senate
forbidding the application of the antitrust laws 'to organized professional sports
enterprises or to acts in the conduct of such enterprises.'7 Extensive hearings on
the three House bills were conducted by the Subcommittee on Study of
Monopoly Power of the Committee on the Judiciary; no hearings were held on
the Senate bill.8 At the conclusion of its hearings, the House Subcommittee
unanimously declared its opposition to the four bills. Its report states:9

17

'The requested exemption would extend to all professional sports enterprises

and to all acts in the conduct of such enterprises. The law would no longer
require competition in any facet of business activity of any sport enterprise.
Thus the sale of radio and television rights, the management of stadia, the
purchase and sale of advertising, the concession industry, and many other
business activities, as well as the aspects of baseball which are solely related to
the promotion of competition on the playing field, would be immune and
untouchable. Such a broad exemption could not be granted without
substantially repealing the antitrust laws.' (Italics added.)

18

With respect to baseball, the Subcommittee recommended a postponement of

any legislation until the status of Federal Baseball was clarified in the courts.10
No further action was taken on any of the bills; Congress thus left intact the
then-existing coverage of the antitrust laws. Yet the defendants in the instant
case are now asking this Court for precisely the same exemption which
enactment of those bills would have afforded. Their remedy, if they are entitled
to one, lies in further resort to Congress, as we have already stated. For we
agree that 'Such a broad exemption could not be granted without substantially
repealing the antitrust laws.'

19

As in the Shubert case, we are concerned here only with the sufficiency of the
Government's complaint. We hold that the complaint states a cause of action
and that the Government is entitled to an opportunity to prove its allegations.
The judgment of the court below is reversed.

20

Reversed.

20

Reversed.

21

Mr. Justice BURTON, retaining the views expressed in his dissent in the
Toolson case, 346 U.S. 356, 357, 74 S.Ct. 78, 79, 98 L.Ed. 64, joins the opinion
and judgment of the Court in this case. Mr. Justice REED joins in this
concurrence.

APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT.

22

The complaint describes the 'Nature of Trade and Commerce Involved' as

follows:

23

10. Boxers usually compete in amateur tournaments as a preliminary to

becoming professionals. As amateurs they receive no pay and box under the
sponsorship of local independent boxing clubs, associations or other
organizations. When they become professionals, they contract to box an
opponent on a per bout basis for local promoters and receive a fee. If their skill
as professional boxers results in an increasing willingness of the public to pay
to view their contests, they can demand higher fees and a greater percentage of
receipts from the sale of tickets and other rights. If their skill increases, they
engage in preliminary and other bouts throughout the United States and
eventually participate in major bouts. The fee for a major bout is usually a sum
guaranteed by the promoter or a predetermined percentage of the net receipts
from the sale of tickets and motion picture, radio and television rights.

24

11. The most lucrative asset to a professional boxer is recognition and

designation by the various state athletic commissions and others as 'world
champion' in the division in which he competes. These divisions are:

25

flyweight.......................... 112 lbs.

26

bantamweight....................... 118 "

27

featherweight...................... 126 "

28

lightweight........................ 135 "

29

welterweight....................... 147 "

30

middleweight....................... 160 "

31

light heavyweight.................. 175 "

32

heavyweight........................ All above 175 lbs.

33

A 'world champion' gains his title by defeating the existing champion or by

eliminating all contenders, and remains world champion in his division until he
is, in turn, defeated by a contender or resigns the title. Such a title affords to its
holder financial returns from personal appearances and exhibitions throughout
the United States, from endorsements and other activities, as well as a greater
percentage of the receipts from his bouts. The promotion of professional
championship boxing contests is also more lucrative than the promotion of
other boxing contests.

34

12. Of the various 'world championships,' the heavyweight division is the most
important to boxers and promoters, as it returns the greatest financial benefits.
The flyweight and bantamweight divisions are not of substantial importance in
the United States because very few American boxers are of such light weights.
No championship contest has been held in the flyweight division in the United
States since 1935; none in the bantamweight division since 1947.

35

13. The promotion of professional championship boxing contests, in which the

winners achieve 'world champion' titles, includes negotiating and executing
contracts with boxers for the main and preliminary bouts, arranging and
maintaining training quarters, leasing suitable arenas, such as stadia or ball
parks where substantial numbers of the public may be seated to view the
contest, negotiating and executing contracts for the employment of
matchmakers, advertising agencies, press agents, seconds, referees, judges,
announcers and other personnel; organizing, assembling, and arranging other
details necessary to the exhibition of the contests; selling tickets and rights to
make motion pictures of the contests and to distribute them throughout the
United States and in foreign countries; and selling rights to transmit the contests
by radio or television throughout the United States and foreign countries.

36

14. Promoters of professional championship boxing contests make a substantial

utilization of the channels of interstate trade and commerce to:

37

(a) negotiate contracts with boxers, advertising agencies, seconds, referees,

judges, announcers, and other personnel living in states other than those in
which the promoters reside;
(b) arrange and maintain training quarters in states other than those in which

38

(b) arrange and maintain training quarters in states other than those in which
the promoters reside;

39

(c) lease suitable arenas, and arrange other details for boxing contests,
particularly when the contests are held in states other than those in which the
promoters reside;

40

(d) sell tickets to contests across state lines;

41

(e) negotiate for the sale of and sell rights to make and distribute motion
pictures of boxing contests to the 18,000 theatres in the United States;

42

(f) negotiate for the sale of and sell rights to broadcast and telecast boxing
contests to homes through more than 3,000 radio stations and 100 television
stations in the United States; and

43

(g) negotiate for the sale of and sell rights to telecast boxing contests to some
200 motion picture theatres in various states of the United States for display by
large-screen television.

44

15. Motion picture films of professional championship boxing contests are

distributed and exhibited in theatres throughout the United States and in foreign
countries. Similarly, radio and television broadcasts of such contests are
transmitted throughout the United States and radio broadcasts of them are also
transmitted to foreign countries.

45

16. The 21 major professional championship boxing contests promoted in the

United States since June 1949 have produced a gross income from admissions
and the sale of motion picture, radio and television rights of approximately
$4,500,000.00. The total such gross income for all professional boxing contests
in the United States during this period, including the championship contests,
has been approximately $15,000,000.00.

46

16(a). A promoter of a professional championship fight usually derives

substantially all of his revenue from two sources: (a) sale of tickets of
admission and (b) sale of rights to telecast, broadcast and produce and distribute
motion pictures of the fight. In such fights, sale of television, radio and motion
picture rights account for a substantial proportion of the promoter's total
revenue. Since 1949 sale of these rights has represented, on the average, over
25% of the total revenue derived from championship fights, and has exceeded,
in some instances, the revenue received from sale of tickets of admission. With

the progressive and continuing expansion of television facilities, the proportion

of the promoter's total revenue derived from television, radio and motion
pictures, has been on an ascending curve, in relation to revenue derived from
sale of tickets of admission. In the Marciano-Walcott heavyweight
championship fight of May 15, 1953, at Chicago, Illinois, promoted by
defendants IBC (N.Y.), IBC (Ill.), James D. Norris and Arthur M. Wirtz, the
promoters' receipts from sale of tickets of admission were, after federal
admission taxes, $253,462.37, while their television, radio and motion picture
revenue was approximately $300,000.
47

Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER, with whom Mr. Justice MINTON joins,

dissenting.

48

It would baffle the subtlest ingenuity to find a single differentiating factor

between other sporting exhibitions, whether boxing or football or tennis, and
baseball insofar as the conduct of the sport is relevant to the criteria or
considerations by which the Sherman Law becomes applicable to a 'trade or
commerce.' 1, 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C. 1, 15 U.S.C.A. 1. Indeed, the
interstate aspects of baseball and the extent of the exploitation of baseball
through mass media are far more extensive than is true of boxing.* If the
intrinsic applicability of the Sherman Law were the issue, no attempt would be
made to differentiate the two sports.

49

In 1922, the Court found commercialized baseball outside the scope of the
Sherman Law. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of
Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 42 S.Ct. 465, 66 L.Ed. 898. Last
Term the Court refused to re-examine 'the underlying issues' of this
adjudication and adhered to it. Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S.
356, 74 S.Ct. 78, 98 L.Ed. 64. What were the 'underlying issues'? They were
the constituents of baseball in relation to the Sherman Law. By adhering to that
decision, the Court refused to depart from a judgment necessarily based on
these constituent elements. To my understanding, that is what is meant by '(w)
ithout re-examination of the underlying issues.' The Court decided as it did in
the Toolson case as an application of the doctrine of stare decisis. That doctrine
is not, to be sure, an imprisonment of reason. But neither is it a whimsy. It can
hardly be that this Court gave a preferred position to baseball because it is the
great American sport. I do not suppose that the Court would treat the national
anthem differently from other songs if the nature of a song became relevant to
adjudication. If stare decisis be one aspect of law, as it is, to disregard it in
identic situations is mere caprice.

50

Congress, on the other hand, may yield to sentiment and be capricious, subject

only to due process. As a matter of fact, one of the explicit factors that led to
the result in Toolson was the recognition of congressional refusal to upset the
Federal Baseball decision. But as the Government with commendable candor
recognizes, Congress was not asked to avert the threat of litigation against
baseball by providing a specific exemption of that sport from the provisions of
the Sherman Law. The sponsors of this relief did not ask immunity for baseball
as such. The 'legislation' to which reference was made in the Toolson case
consisted of bills which sought exemption for 'organized professional sports
enterprises (and) acts in the conduct of such enterprises.' (H.R. 4229, 4230,
4231, and S. 1526, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.) Since, in the light of all the
circumstances, Federal Baseball was left undisturbed by Toolson, I cannot
bring myself to construe the respect that ws thus accorded to stare decisis to be
narrower than that all situations identic with what was passed on in the Federal
Baseball case should be covered by it. I cannot translate even the narrowest
conception of stare decisis into the equivalent of writing into the Sherman Law
an exemption of baseball to the exclusion of every other sport different not one
legal jot or tittle from it.
51

Between them, this case and Shubert illustrate that nice but rational distinctions
are inevitable in adjudication. I agree with the Court's opinion in Shubert for
precisely the reason that constrains me to dissent in this caes. Within a year
after Federal Baseball the Court, again unanimously and through the same
writer, found that a bill against the show business based on the Sherman Law
was not so frivolous as to call for dismissal. Hart v. B. F. Keith Vaudeville
Exchange, 262 U.S. 271, 43 S.Ct. 540, 67 L.Ed. 977. For more than 30 years,
therefore, these two decisions stood as the law. The Shubert case plainly falls
within the adjudication of Hart. By the same process of reasoning, boxing falls
within Federal Baseball, which this Court revitalized in Toolson despite all the
new factors on which the dissent in Toolson relied.

52

Whatever unsavory elements there be in boxing contests is quite beside the

mark. The States to which these exhibitions are distasteful are possessed of the
honorable and effective remedy of self-help. They need not sanction pugilistic
exhibitions, or may sanction them only under conditions that safeguard their
notions of the public welfare.

53

Mr. Justice MINTON, dissenting.

54

To make a case under the Sherman Act, two things among others are essential:
(1) there must be trade or commerce; (2) such trade or commerce must be
among the States.

55

In the Federal Baseball case, 259 U.S. 200, 42 S.Ct. 465, 66 L.Ed. 898, this
Court held that baseball was not trade or commerce. It said, 'personal effort, not
related to production, is not a subject of commerce', and since the baseball game
was an exhibition wholly intrastate, there could be no trade or commerce
among the States. 259 U.S. 200, 209, 42 S.Ct. 465, 466.

56

In the Baseball case, this Court held that traveling from State to State to play
the game and all the details of arrangements were incident to the exhibition. In
Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 74 S.Ct. 78, 98 L.Ed. 64,
we did not overrule the Federal Baseball decision; in fact, we reaffirmed the
holding of that case.

57

When boxers travel from State to State, carrying their shorts and fancy dressing
robes in a ditty bag in order to participate in a boxing bout, which is wholly
intrastate, it is now held by this Court that the boxing bout becomes interstate
commerce. What this Court held in the Federal Baseball case to be incident to
the exhibition now becomes more important than the exhibition. This is as fine
an example of the tail wagging the dog as can be conjured up.

58

We are not dealing here with the question of whether the appellees have
restrained trade in or monopolized the radio and television industries. That is a
separate consideration. What others do with pictures they are allowed to take of
a wholly local spectacle or exhibition by thereafter using the channels of
interstate commerce to exhibit them does not make a package deal. The
appellees have nothing to do with the transmission of sound or the pictures.
Because these incidents are not directly involved, no effort was made to bring
the radio and television companies and the sponsors into the case.

59

The Court says: 'The conspiracy, it is claimed, began in 1949 with an

agreement among the defendants and Joe Louis, then heavyweight champion of
the world, that Louis would resign his title, that he would procure exclusive
rights to the services of the four leading title contenders in a series of
elimination contests which would result in the recognition of a new
heavyweight chamption, that he would also obtain exclusive rights to broadcast,
televise, and film these contests, and that he would assign all such exclusive
rights to the defendants.' Of course, there was at the time only one champion,
Joe Louis. He had a monopoly on that, and while he got it by competition, he
did not get it in trade or commerce. I do not suppose that Joe Louis had to go
back into the ring and be walloped to a knockout or a decision before he could
surrender his championship. And if he arranged with four other fellows to fight
it out in elimination contests for the championship and no one else was

restrained from doing the same, it is difficult for me to see how there was any
conspiracy. If other promoters wanted to start an elimination contest they were
free to do so. Whether they received public acceptance depended upon
something other than trade or commerce. What does a boxer or athlete have for
sale but 'personal efforts, not related to production,' which, as Justice Holmes
said, is not commerce? Such services they may contract about free from any
control of the Sherman Act. Suppose the appellee did, as the Court states,
control what the parties called all but two of twenty-one championship contests,
what trade or commerce have they restrained?
60

As I see it, boxing it not trade or commerce. There can be no monopoly or

restraint of nonexistent commerce or trade. Whether Congress can control
baseball and boxing I need not speculate. What I am saying is that Congress has
not attempted to do so. If there is a conspiracy, it is not one to control
commerce between the States.

The corporate defendants are International Boxing Club of New York, Inc.,
International Boxing Club, and Madison Square Garden Corporation. The
individual defendants are James D. Norris and Arthur M. Wirtz. The individual
defendants, together with Madison Square Garden Corporation, own 80% of the
stock of International Boxing Club of New York, Inc., and International Boxing
Club. The nature of the business involved is described in an appendix to this
opinion.

15 U.S.C. 1 and 2, 15 U.S.C.A. 1, 2. These sections provide:

1. * * * Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal * * *. Every person who shall make
any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy declared by sections 1
7 of this title to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor * * *.
2. * * * Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part
of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor * * *.'
Section 4, 15 U.S.C.A. 4, confers jurisdiction on the district courts 'to prevent
and restrain violations of sections 1 7 of this title' in equity proceedings
instituted under the direction of the Attorney General.

The District Court's opinion was oral and not transcribed. All the parties agree,

however, that the dismissal was based on Federal Baseball and Toolson.
4

The complaint further alleges that 'With the progressive and continuing
expansion of television facilities, the proportion of the promoter's total revenue
derived from television, radio and motion pictures, has been on an ascending
curve. * * *'

All three media are concededly engaged in interstate commerce. E.g., Federal
Radio Comm. v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266, 279, 53
S.Ct. 627, 633, 77 L.Ed. 1166 (radio); Allen B. Dumont Laboratories, Inc., v.
Carroll, 3 Cir., 184 F.2d 153, 154, certiorari denied, 340 U.S. 929, 71 S.Ct. 490,
95 L.Ed. 670 (television); United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131,
68 S.Ct. 915, 92 L.Ed. 1260 (motion pictures).

Shall v. Henry, 7 Cir., 211 F.2d 226, was decided subsequent to the decision
below. So also was Peller v. International Boxing Club, unreported, Civil 52 C
813, April 23, 1954 (D.C.N.D.Ill.). The unreported decision (D.C.N.D.Ill.)
which Shall v. Henry affirmed was decided prior to the decision below but after
the filing of the Government's complaint.

H.R. 4229, 4230, 4231, and S. 1526, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. These bills were
introduced 'by friends of baseball because they feared that the continued
existence of organized baseball as America's national pastime was in substantial
danger by the threat of impending litigation.' H.R.Rep. No. 2002, 82d Cong.,
2d Sess., p. 1.

The House hearings were stated to be on 'the problem of whether or not

organized baseball should be exempted from the operation of the antitrust laws.'
Hearings on 'Organized Baseball' before the House Subcommittee on Study of
Monopoly Power of the Committee on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., p. 1.

H.R.Rep. No. 2002 (entitled 'Organized Baseball'), 82d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 230.
Between the hearings and the report, the Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly
Power was reconstituted as the Antitrust Subcommittee. The report was
submitted directly to the full House pursuant to H.Res. 95, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.

10

Id., at 134136, 231232.

This opinion is concerned only with the sport as such, and not with the
arrangements by which mass media show or report bouts. Such arrangements
clearly are beyond the scope of the Toolson case, infra.