United States v. Contract Steel Carriers, Inc., 350 U.S. 409 (1956)
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Scribd Government DocsUnited States v. Contract Steel Carriers, Inc., 350 U.S. 409 (1956)
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Scribd Government Docs350 U.S.
409
76 S.Ct. 461
100 L.Ed. 482
UNITED STATES of America and Interstate Commerce
Commission, Appellants,
v.
CONTRACT STEEL CARRIERS, Inc.
No. 102.
Argued Feb. 29, 1956.
Decided March 12, 1956.
Mr. Charles F. Barber, Washington, D.C., for appellants.
Mr. Robert N. Burchmore, Chicago, Ill., for appellees.
PER CURIAM.
The Interstate Commerce Commission brings an appeal from a three-judge
district court, 49 U.S.C. 305(g), 49 U.S.C.A. 305(g), that reversed an order
of the ICC, 62 M.C.C. 413, directing appellee Contract Steel Carriers to cease
operations as a common carrier by motor vehicle. D.C., 128 F.Supp. 25.
Appellee holds licenses covering different areas surrounding Chicago, Houston,
and St. Louis. As these are substantially in the same form, a single illustration
will suffice. It covers contract carriage of 'Steel articles, and such materials as
are used or useful in highway construction projects, except cement, rock, sand,
and gravel, over irregular routes, in connection with said carrier's presently
authorized operations,
'From points and places in the Chicago, Ill. Commercial Zone, as defined by the
Commission in 1 M.C.C. 673, to points and places in Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas,
Missouri, Oklahoma, and Texas, and return with no transportation for
compensation.' No. MC 96505 SUB 6.
The facts are fully set out in the reports referred to above. In essence they show
that appellee, by active solicitation from 1951 to 1954 in the areas mentioned,
had secured 69 contracts to serve shippers. These had been filed with the
Commission and there is no charge of any violation of the restrictions of the
license or the requirements of individual contracts except that the appellee has
held itself out by its actions to be a common carrier.1
5
The Commission found this holdingout from an advertisement, run without
legal advice and since discontinued, offering its transportation service without
mentioning whether it was contract or common carriage.
It was also charged that
'* * * the great increase in the number of contracts held by it are attributable in
large degree to aggressive sales activities and affirmative precontract traffic
solicitation, which amounts to a public offer or holding out. In this connection,
it is also asserted that defendant maintained an employee in Des Moines, Iowa,
whose duties included the active solicitation of traffic. * * * There is evidence
that business has been lost by interveners after a representative of defendant
called upon receivers of steel in Iowa, leaving a copy of defendant's schedule of
minimum rates and charges, and a copy of a blank contract to be executed by
such shippers.' 62 M.C.C. 413, 414 415.
It was concluded by the Commission:
'Although the facts here are meager in some respects, they reveal a pattern of
extraordinary expansion in a period of approximately 8 months and an easy
turnover of contracts thereafter. We believe that there is ample evidence to
show that this expansion was brought about, to some extent at least, by
indiscriminate solicitation and advertising, among other things.' Id., at 421.
In Craig Contract Carrier Application, 31 M.C.C. 705, 712, the ICC stated that
the services of a contract carrier must be individual and specialized. A
requirement of specialization is supported by respectable legislative history.
See, e.g., 79 Cong.Rec. 5651. In this case the ICC found that appellee had not
sufficiently specialized its operation. However, we conclude that if
specialization is to be read into 49 U.S.C. 303(a)(15), 49 U.S.C.A. 303(a)
(15) by the legislative history, it is satisfied here since appellee hauls only
strictly limited types of steel products under individual and continuing
contractual agreements with a comparatively small number of shippers
throughout a large area.
We hold also that the fact that appellee has actively solicited business within
the bounds of his license does not support a finding that it was 'holding itself
out to the general public.' A contract carrier is free to aggressively search for
new business within the limits of his license.2 Because the ICC's order is not
supported by evidence in the record and is contrary to the definitions of contract
and common carriers in 303(14) and (15), we affirm the District Court.
10
Affirmed.
11
Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER, whom Mr. Justice HARLAN joins, dissenting.
12
The Motor Carrier Act, 49 Stat. 543, 544, 49 U.S.C. 303(a)(14), 49 U.S.C.A.
303(a)(14), gives to the term "common carrier by motor vehicle" the classic
meaning that 'common carrier' had acquired and maintained during the course
of centuries. In short, the test of what is a 'common carrier' under this Act is
what legal history has established as the test, and we do not find that the
Interstate Commerce Commission has departed from this test. We cannot
believe that if the evidence, as disclosed by the record, which need not be
recited, had appeared in a common-law action against the respondent, a court
would be justified in taking the case from the jury, and that if the jury had
found against the respondent, its verdict would not be allowed to stand. The
finding by the Interstate Commerce Commission that the respondent was a
'common carrier,' and therefore subject to the regulatory provisions of the Act,
ought not to have less weight than a jury's verdict. Accordingly, other issues
raised in the case are not reached, and we would reverse the judgment below.
A common carrier is one 'which holds itself out to the general public to engage
in the transportation by motor vehicle * * * of passengers or property.' A
contract carrier is any 'person which, under individual contracts or agreements,
engages in' such transportation. 49 U.S.C. 303(a)(14, 15), 49 U.S.C.A.
303(a)(14, 15).
'Provided, however, That no terms, conditions, or limitations shall restrict the
right of the carrier to substitute or add contracts within the scope of the permit,
or to add to his or its equipment and facilities, within the scope of the permit, as
the development of the business and the demands of the public may require.' 49
U.S.C. 309(b), 49 U.S.C.A. 309(b).
