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Gloria Belia Sandquist v. State of California, 423 U.S. 900 (1975)

The Supreme Court denied Gloria Sandquist's petition for a writ of certiorari to appeal her conviction for exhibiting allegedly obscene motion pictures under a California statute. Justice Douglas dissented, believing that any ban on obscenity violates the First Amendment. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall, also dissented. He argued that the California statute was overbroad and unconstitutional under the standards established in prior rulings, and that Sandquist deserved a new trial using local community standards to judge the obscenity of the materials.

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31 views3 pages

Gloria Belia Sandquist v. State of California, 423 U.S. 900 (1975)

The Supreme Court denied Gloria Sandquist's petition for a writ of certiorari to appeal her conviction for exhibiting allegedly obscene motion pictures under a California statute. Justice Douglas dissented, believing that any ban on obscenity violates the First Amendment. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Stewart and Marshall, also dissented. He argued that the California statute was overbroad and unconstitutional under the standards established in prior rulings, and that Sandquist deserved a new trial using local community standards to judge the obscenity of the materials.

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423 U.S.

900
96 S.Ct. 204
46 L.Ed.2d 133

Gloria Belia SANDQUIST


v.
State of CALIFORNIA.
No. 74-1430.

Supreme Court of the United States


October 14, 1975

On petition for writ of certiorari to the Appellate Department of the


Superior Court of California for the County of Los Angeles.
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.
Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, being of the view, stated in his previous
opinions2 and those of Mr. Justice Black, 3 that any state or federal ban on,
or regulation of, obscenity abridges freedom of speech and of the press
contrary to the First and Fourteenth Amendments, would grant certiorari
and summarily reverse.
Mr. Justice BRENNAN, with whom Mr. Justice STEWART and Mr.
Justice MARSHALL join, dissenting.

Petitioner was convicted in the Municipal Court of Los Angeles of exhibiting


allegedly obscene motion pictures in violation of California Penal Code
311.2, which provides in pertinent part as follows:

'Every person who knowingly . . . exhibits to others, any obscene matter is


guilty of a misdemeanor.'

As used in 311.2,

"Obscene matter' means matter, taken as a whole, the predominant appeal of

which to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, is


to prurient interest, i.e., shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or excretion;
and is matter which taken as a whole goes substantially beyond customary
limits of candor in description or representation of such matters; and is matter
which taken as a whole is utterly without redeeming social importance.' Id., at
311(a).
5

On appeal, the Appellate Department of the Superior Court of California for the
County of Los Angeles affirmed the conviction. Certification to the Court of
Appeal was sought and denied.

It is my view that 'at least in the absence of distribution to juveniles or obtrusive


exposure to unconsenting adults, the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit
the State and Federal Governments from attempting wholly to suppress sexually
oriented materials on the basis of their allegedly 'obscene' contents.' Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 113, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (1973)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). It is clear that tested by that constitutional standard,
311.2, as it incorporates the definition of 'obscene matter' in 311, is
constitutionally overbroad and therefore invalid on its face. For the reasons
stated in my dissent in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 47, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37
L.Ed.2d 419 (1973), I would therefore grant certiorari and, since the judgment
of the Appellate Department was rendered after Miller, reverse.1 In that
circumstance, I have no occasion to consider whether the other question
presented merit plenary review. See Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483, at 494,
495, 93 S.Ct. 2789, at 2796, 37 L.Ed.2d 745 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).

Further, it appears from the petition and response that the obscenity of the
disputed materials was not adjudged by applying local community standards.
Based on my dissent in Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 94 S.Ct. 2887,
41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974), I believe that, consistent with the Due Process Clause,
petitioner must be given an opportunity to have his case decided on, and
introduce evidence relevant to, the legal standard upon which is conviction has
ultimately come to depend. Thus, even on its own terms, the Court should
vacate the judgment below and remand for a termination whether petitioner
should be afforded a new trial under local community standards.

Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 42-47, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973);
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 70-73, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d
446 (1973); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 426-433, 86 S.Ct. 975,
16 L.Ed.2d 1 (1966); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 491-492, 86

S.Ct. 942, 16 L.Ed.2d 31 (1966); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 508-514,
77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957).
3

Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 476, 86 S.Ct. 942, 16 L.Ed.2d 31
(1966); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 515-518, 86 S.Ct. 958, 16 L.Ed.2d
56 (1966).

Although four of us would grant and reverse, the Justices who join this opinion
do not insist that the case be decided on the merits.

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