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Thomas McCleary v. Jose G. Navarro, Et Ux, 504 U.S. 966 (1992)

The dissent argues that the Supreme Court should reverse and remand a Ninth Circuit decision regarding qualified immunity in a Section 1983 case. The Ninth Circuit applied the wrong legal standard when it held that it was for the jury to decide whether the officer acted reasonably in drafting a search warrant affidavit. The appropriate inquiry is whether a reasonable officer could have thought his actions were constitutional. Questions of immunity should be decided by the court, not the jury. The dissent would remand for the Ninth Circuit to reexamine its decision in light of the correct legal standards established in Hunter v. Bryant.
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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
81 views2 pages

Thomas McCleary v. Jose G. Navarro, Et Ux, 504 U.S. 966 (1992)

The dissent argues that the Supreme Court should reverse and remand a Ninth Circuit decision regarding qualified immunity in a Section 1983 case. The Ninth Circuit applied the wrong legal standard when it held that it was for the jury to decide whether the officer acted reasonably in drafting a search warrant affidavit. The appropriate inquiry is whether a reasonable officer could have thought his actions were constitutional. Questions of immunity should be decided by the court, not the jury. The dissent would remand for the Ninth Circuit to reexamine its decision in light of the correct legal standards established in Hunter v. Bryant.
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112 S.Ct.

2324
504 U.S. 966
119 L.Ed.2d 243

Thomas McCLEARY, petitioner,


v.
Jose G. NAVARRO, et ux.
No. 91-1550.

Supreme Court of the United States


June 1, 1992

On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit.
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.
Justice WHITE, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Justice O'CONNOR
and Justice THOMAS join, dissenting.

Respondents filed this lawsuit after police, who were attempting to execute a
search warrant, began kicking at their door at 11 o'clock one night. The police
were looking for a suspected cocaine dealer, but they got the wrong house. The
question presented is whether petitioner, the officer who drafted the search
warrant affidavit describing the house to be searched, is entitled to qualified
immunity. Because the Court of Appeals applied the wrong legal standard in
answering that question, I would reverse and remand for further consideration.

Petitioner, a detective, received a tip from a confidential informant that one


Andres Villa had drugs in his home, one of several small houses on an access
road to a plant. The first building was set back from the road, along a separate
driveway. The informant did not count this structure when he told petitioner
that Villa lived in the second house on the right. Consequently, the warrant that
petitioner obtained directed officers to go to the second house on the right. The
officers executing the warrant counted differently, so they ended up at the
wrong house.

Respondents sued petitioner and others not party to this petition under 42
U.S.C. 1983, alleging a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. The
District Court denied petitioner's motion for summary judgment on grounds of
qualified immunity. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding "that the question
in this case is whether a police officer in [petitioner's] position would
reasonably have described the location with sufficient particularity to direct
those executing the warrant to the correct house on the right" and "that it is for
the jury to decide whether [petitioner] acted reasonably. . . ." Navarro v.
Barthel, 952 F.2d 331, 333 (1991) (per curiam).

The decision of the Court of Appeals was entered just a few days after our
judgment in Hunter v. Bryant, --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 534, 537, 116 L.Ed.2d
589 (1991), in which we explained that the appropriate inquiry was whether a
reasonable officer could have thought that he had acted in accordance with the
Constitution, and not whether an officer would have acted otherwise (the
standard applied by Ninth Circuit in Hunter and the present case). This
distinction provides "ample room for mistaken judgments," because qualified
immunity protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly
violate the law." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 343, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092,
1097, 1096, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986), quoted in Hunter, supra, --- U.S., at ----,
112 S.Ct., at 537.

In Hunter we also reiterated the principle that questions of immunity ordinarily


should be decided by the court, not by the jury, id., at ----, 112 S.Ct., at 536,
because "[t]he entitlement is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense
to liability." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2815, 86
L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). See Hunter, supra, --- U.S., at ----, 112 S.Ct., at 537
(collecting cases).

Because the Court of Appeals did not have the benefit of our decision in Hunter
when it was deciding this case, I would summarily reverse and remand so the
Ninth Circuit may reexamine its decision in light of the correct legal standards.

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