Railroad Co. v. Baldwin, 103 U.S. 426 (1881)
Uploaded by
Scribd Government DocsRailroad Co. v. Baldwin, 103 U.S. 426 (1881)
Uploaded by
Scribd Government Docs103 U.S.
426
103 U.S. 426
26 L.Ed. 578
RAILROAD COMPANY
v.
BALDWIN.
October Term, 1880
ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Nebraska.
This was an action by Baldwin to recover of the St. Joseph and Denver
City Railroad Company, or its successor in interest, damages for entering
upon his land in Nebraska, and appropriating, in the construction of its
road, a strip two hundred feet in width and two hundred road in length.
The company claimed a right of way over the land of that width, under the
act of Congress of July 23, 1866, c. 212, entitled 'An Act for a grant of
lands to the State of Kansas to aid in the construction of the Northern
Kansas Railroad and Telegraph.' 14 Stat. 210. The first section of the act,
so far as it is material in this case, is as follows:
'Be it enacted, &c., that there is hereby granted to the State of Kansas, for
the use and benefit of the Saint Joseph and Denver City Railroad
Company, the same being a corporation organized under the laws of the
State of Kansas, to construct and operate a railroad from Elwood, in
Kansas, westwardly, via Maryville, in the same State, so as to effect a
junction with the Union Pacific Railroad, or any branch thereof, not
farther west than the one hundredth meridian of west longitude, every
alternate section of land designated by odd numbers, for ten sections in
width on each side of said road, to the point of intersection. But in case it
shall appear that the United States have, when the line or route of said
road is definitely fixed, sold any section, or any part thereof, granted as
aforesaid, or that the right of pre-emption or homestead settlement has
attached to the same, or that the same has been reserved by the United
States for any purpose whatever, then it shall be the duty of the Secretary
of the Interior to cause to be selected for the purposes aforesaid, from the
public lands of the United States nearest to tiers of sections above
specified, so much land in alternate sections, or parts of sections
designated by odd numbers as shall be equal to such lands as the United
States have sold, reserved, or otherwise appropriated, or to which the
rights of pre-emption of homestead settlements have attached as aforesaid,
which lands, thus indicated by odd numbers and selected by direction of
the Secretary of the Interior as aforesaid, shall be held by the State of
Kansas for the use and purpose aforesaid.'
The fourth section is as follows:
'That as soon as the said company shall file with the Secretary of the
Interior maps of its line designating the route thereof, it shall be the duty
of the said Secretary to withdraw from the market the lands granted by
this act in such manner as may be best calculated to effect the purpose of
this act and subserve the public interest.' The sixth section is as follows:
'That the right of way through the public lands be, and the same is hereby,
granted to said Saint Joseph and Denver City Railroad Company, its
successors and assigns, for the construction of a railroad as proposed, and
the right is hereby given to said corporation to take from the public lands
adjacent to the line of said road, material for the construction thereof. Said
way is granted to said railroad to the extent of one hundred feet in width
on each side of said road where it may pass through the public domain;
also, all necessary ground for station buildings, workshops, depots,
machine-shops, switches, side-tracks, turn-tables, and water-stations.'
When the grant was made by Congress, the land claimed by Baldwin was
vacant and unoccupied land of the United States. But the line of the road
over it was not definitely located until October, 1871. He acquired
whatever rights he possession in October, 1869. The defendant contends
that the plaintiff took the land subject to its right of way. He contends that
the grant of the right of way took effect only from the date at which the
company filed its maps designating the route with the Secretary of the
Interior. The District Court of the State agreed with him and gave
judgment in his favor. The Supreme Court affirmed it, and to review it the
cause is brought here.
Mr. John F. Dillon for the plaintiff in error.
Mr. E. E. Brown, contra.
MR. JUSTICE FIELD, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the
court.
The act of Congress of July 23, 1866, c. 212, makes two distinct grants: one of
lands to the State of Kansas for the benefit of the St. Joseph and Denver City
Railroad Company in the construction of a railroad from Elwood in that State to
its junction with the Union Pacific via Maryville; the other of a right of way
directly to the company itself. The lands consisted of alternate sections,
designated by odd numbers, on each side of the line of the proposed road. The
grant of them was subject to the condition that if, at the time the line of the road
was definitely fixed, the United States had sold any section or a part thereof, or
the right of pre-emption or homestead settlement had attached to it, or the same
had been otherwise reserved by the United States for any purpose, the Secretary
of the Interior should select an equal quantity of other lands nearest the sections
designated, in lieu of those appropriated, which should be held by the State for
the same purposes. The limitations upon the grant are similar to those found in
numerous other grants of land made by Congress in aid of railroads. Their
object is obvious. The sections granted could be ascertained only when the
routes were definitely located. This might take years, the time depending
somewhat upon the length of the proposed road and the difficulties of
ascertaining the most favorable route. It was not for the interest of the country
that in the mean time any portions of the public lands should be withheld from
settlement or use because they might, perhaps, when the route was surveyed,
fall within the limits of a grant. Congress, therefore, adopted the policy of
keeping the public lands open to occupation and pre-emption, and appropriation
to public uses, notwithstanding any grant it might make, until the lands granted
were ascertained, and providing that if any sections settled upon or reserved
were then found to fall within the limits of the grant, other land in their place
should be selected. Thus settlements on the public lands were encouraged
without the aid intended for the construction of the roads being thereby
impaired. The language of the act here, and of nearly all the congressional acts
granting lands, is in terms of a grant in proesenti. The act is a present grant,
except so far as its immediate operation is affected by the limitations
mentioned. 'There is hereby granted' are the words used, and they import an
immediate transfer of interest, so that when the route is definitely fixed the title
attaches from the date of the act to the sections, except such as are taken from
its operation by the clauses mentioned. This is the construction given by this
court to similar language in other acts of Congress. Missouri, Kansas, & Texas
Railway Co. v. Kansas Pacific Railway Co., 97 U. S. 491; Leavenworth,
Lawrence, & Galveston Railroad Co. v. United States, 92 id. 733.
But the grant of the right of way by the sixth section contains no reservations or
exceptions. It is a present absolute grant, subject to no conditions except those
necessarily implied, such as that the road shall be constructed and used for the
purposes designed. Nor is there anything in the policy of the government with
respect to the public lands which would call for any qualification of the terms.
Those lands would not be the less valuable for settlement by a road running
through them. On the contrary, their value would be greatly enhanced thereby.
3
The right of way for the whole distance of the proposed route was a very
important part of the aid given. If the company could be compelled to purchase
its way over any section that might be occupied in advance of its location, very
serious obstacles would be often imposed to the progress of the road. For any
loss of lands by settlement or reservation, other lands are given; but for the loss
of the right of way by these means, no compensation is provided, nor could any
be given by the substitution of another route.
The uncertainty as to the ultimate location of the line of the road is recognized
throughout the act, and where any qualification is intended in the operation of
the grant of lands, from this circumstance, it is designated. Had a similar
qualification upon the absolute grant of the right of way been intended, it can
hardly be doubted that it would have been expressed. The fact that none is
expressed is conclusive that none exists.
We see no reason, therefore, for not giving to the words of present grant with
respect to the right of way the same construction which we should be
compelled to give, according to our repeated decisions, to the grant of lands had
no limitation been expressed. We are of opinion, therefore, that all persons
acquiring any portion of the public lands, after the passage of the act in
question, took the same subject to the right of way conferred by it for the
proposed road.
The fact that the right of way over land in Nebrasks was granted to a
corporation in Kansas does not alter the case. Nebrasks was at the time a
Territory of the United States, and it was entirely competent for Congress to
confer upon any corporation of a State a right of way for a railroad to be
constructed by it through the lands of the United States situated in that
Territory. And in February, 1869, after the Territory had become a State, its
legislature, by an express enactment, authorized railroad companies organized
under the laws of Kansas, Missouri, or Iowa to extend and build their roads into
the State, and declared that, upon complying with certain conditions, they
should possess all the powers, franchises, and privileges of railroad companies
incorporated under its laws. It is not shown that the company here has not
complied with the prescribed conditions, even if such an objection could be
raised by any other party than the State itself. But independently of this
consideration, where Congress has conferred upon a railroad corporation of a
State a right of way over the public lands of the United States in any one of
their Territories, it may be doubted whether the State subsequently created out
of the Territory could prevent the enjoyment by such corporation of the right
conferred. It could do so only on the same terms that it could refuse a
recognition of its own previously granted right, for in such matters the State
would succeed only to the authority of Congress over the Territory.
7
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Nebraska must, therefore, be reversed,
and the cause be remanded to it with directions that further proceedings be had
in accordance with this opinion; and it is
So ordered.
