Wood Dust

in Sawmills
Compilation of Industry
Best Practices

May 4, 2012

This document is dedicated to the memory of workers

who have suffered and lost their lives from the hazards
of combustible dusts.It is offered in the hope that it
will help prevent such tragedies in the future.

Table of Contents
Dedication
Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
INDUSTRY INPUT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Best Practices and Housekeeping. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
CanforLoss Prevention Manual: Fire Protection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Canfor Industry Best Practices/Processes for Wood Dust Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
FM GlobalPrevention and Mitigation of Combustible Dust Explosion and Fire. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Interfor Dust Control Method Chart. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
Norbord Combustible Dust Experience. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
Weyerhaeuser Combustible Dust Awareness. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
Wood Machinery Manufacturers of America NFPA 664 Combustible Dusts Overview. . . . . . . . . . . . . 156

Equipment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
Buffalo Turbine Monsoon Atomizing Misters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
FM GlobalWood Processing and Woodworking Facilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Norbord Combustible Dust Experience. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sinclair Forest Products Ltd Possible solutions dust removal systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Van-Ed Equipment Air Mister. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wood Machinery Manufacturers of America NFPA 664 Combustible Dusts Overview . . . . . . . . . . . .

182
201
235
236
238
241

Risk Assessments and Audits. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242

Aon Safety Information Bulletin Combustible Wood Dust in Sawmills: Preventing
and Mitigating the Effects of Fire and Explosions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
BC Forest Safety Council Base Audit Draft Guidelines Version 2.1: Pellet Industry Addendum . . . . . .
Louisiana Pacific Fire Prevention Assessment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
United SteelworkersResource Handout: Controlling Hazards. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Weyerhaeuser Combustible Dust Control Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

243
254
272
275
279

Sampling Results. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284

Wood Pellet Association of Canada Testing of Explosibility and Flammability
of Airborne Dust from Wood Pellets. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285

WORKSAFEBC INFORMATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305

Combustible Dust Strategy (Handout). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306
WorkSafeBC Bulletin: Clean-up of Hazardous Combustible Dust. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 346

REFERENCES AND RESOURCES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 348

References for WorkSafeBC Documents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349
Suggested Additional Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 352

APPENDICES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355
American Industrial Hygiene Conference and Expo (AIHce)NFPA 654, 2011 Edition
Key Changes/Issues/Impacts (by Brice Chastain, CIH, Georgia-Pacific). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 356
Weyerhaeuser Combustible Dust and Hazard Mitigation in Lumber Operations
Weyerhaeuser Experience. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 372

Introduction
Two recent catastrophic fires and explosions occurring at BC sawmills have prompted a series of followup
actions by industry, government and organized labour. One key step was to quickly poll operations and key
organizations on industry practices specific to wood dust cleanup, control and associated fire prevention
and protection measures. This information has been compiled in the attached document and is available
for your consideration. The materials cover a broad spectrum of fire prevention but do have a focus on
combustible wood dust and specifically the cleanup and control of dust in sawmills.
When cleaning up combustible wood dust there is a potential to increase the risks associated with a variety
of tasks and the potential for fire and explosion. The following introductory pages contain important
considerations when addressing dust cleanup and control in your mill.
Of upmost importance
Minimize the use of compressed air for cleanup. Airborne dust can explode when in contact with
potential ignition sources.
Limit your ignition sources when cleanup activity is underway. No hotwork.
Wetdown and misting is effective but be aware of impact and interface with electrical equipment.
Lockout and de-energized equipment will decrease risks of energy contacts and ignition points.
Dust accumulates in awkward locations be aware of workers entering restricted, confined and
workspaces at heights.
Review the considerations following before you direct workers or engage contractors to cleanup.

Key Items for Consideration

1. Responsibilities
Supervisors (need to know..)
Knowledge of combustible dust conditions & controls.
Risk Assessment Process.
Monitoring Requirements (dust exposure, hotwork, permits, risk assessment etc.).
Requirements for first aid coverage during high risk activities.
Emergency evacuation and response procedures.
Control of ignition sources to prevent explosions:
Lockout equipment prior to starting work.
Elimination of Hot Work and propellant-actuated tools (Hilti-guns) during cleanup activities.
Use appropriate electrical equipment and wiring methods.
Control static electricity, including bonding of equipment to ground.
Control smoking, open flames, and sparks.
Control mechanical sparks and friction.
Separate heated surfaces from dusts.

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Workers (need to know..)
Identification & reporting of combustible dust conditions.
Understanding of emergency response procedures.
Understanding of the job planning needed to perform the task safely.
Dust cleaning methods that do not generate dust clouds:
Clean in a manner that eliminates the generation of dust clouds. Blowing down with
compressed air or even vigorous sweeping should be minimized.
Use combination air/water wands or water wash down. A hazard and risk assessment must
be conducted when using water systems in and around electrical components.
Methods that create dust clouds should only be used if the following requirements are met:
Electrical power and other sources of ignition shall be shut down or removed from the area.
Only low gauge pressure 103 kPa (15 psi) compressed air should be used.
No open flames, sparks from spark-producing equipment, or hot surfaces capable of
igniting dust cloud or layer exist.
All fire protection equipment should be in service.
If portable vacuum cleaners are used they shall be industrial vacuum cleaners designed
for Class II Hazardous Locations or alternately a fixed pipe suction systems (non-pvc)
with remotely located exhaust and air material separator dust collectors (cyclones or
bag houses).

2. Pre-Work & Ongoing Hazard/Risk Assessment(s)

Pre-work considerations to identify hazards and develop controls. All field level hazard and risk assessments
should be conducted by a qualified person before cleanup commences.
Assessments need to identify:
Critical areas (Class II Hazardous Locations see description at end).
Identification of areas to clean, order & priority to clean and appropriate cleanup methods eg.,
Open areas
Hidden or enclosed areas
Dust leaking from dust capture systems
Ventilation requirements (start-up procedures prior to work commencing, shut down procedures
after dust clouds are gone).
NOTE: some lockout procedures may shut down area or machine specific ventilation systems.
All ignition sources.
Coordination of work activities (between cleanup , maintenance and/or contractors).
Potential for changing conditions.
Other things that might cause explosions (examples: propane, natural gas)

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3. Lockout
Lockout procedures should be reviewed to address combustible dust issues. The act of pulling electrical
cords from sockets and throwing energy isolating switches can produce ignition sources.
Class II Hazardous Location Lockout:
All Class II Hazardous Locations should have the equipment locked out before the dust is cleaned up.
Wear appropriate PPE (Arc Flash Rated Clothing and other PPE if required).
At the end of the work activities wait until the dust cloud has dispersed before re-energizing the
equipment or removing your electrical cords from sockets.

4. Hot Work
Hot Work is an ignition source.
No Hot Work should take place in any Class II Hazardous Location without first performing a risk
assessment.
All Hot Work should be coordinated with the supervisor who signs all Hot Work permits.

5. Working At Heights
Combustible dust will most likely be found in areas that require working at heights. Some of these areas are:
Structural members
Dust collection systems
Conduit and pipe racks
Cable trays
Above suspended ceilings
Above interior offices
Above operators booths
On equipment
Attics
When workers are working at heights a fall protection plan & system must be in place and workers need to
be instructed in this system.

6. PPE
Almost all wood dust, especially if very fine, can cause allergic reactions in many people and can cause skin
irritation, as well. Workers exposed to wood dust need to understand the potential health effects of such
exposure and take precautions to reduce their exposure.
Appropriate PPE for cleanup activities in Class II Hazardous Locations are:
Steel toed boots
Hearing protection
Gloves
Goggles

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Coveralls
NOTE: Tyvek coveralls with a B suffix do not contain an antistatic agent. Styles like these can
build a static charge and should not be used in areas where there is a potential for dust
explosion.
Respiratory Protection
Elastomeric half-face respirator with P100 cartridges, as a minimum.
Fit Testing needs to take place prior to starting work.
Single use respirator - Where an N95 filtering dust mask is used the requirement for fit testing
would still apply.

7. Confined Spaces
Many confined spaces will also require cleanup and be classified Class II Hazardous Locations. All confined
spaces need to be identified and assessed prior to work commencing. The company needs to have a
confined space program and workers need to be trained in confined space entry procedures. Confined
spaces and combustible dust hazards:
The risk of combustible dust fire/explosion increases in confined spaces because of the
confinement of the dust cloud.
Workers must be properly trained to conduct this work and use the required controls.

8. Electrical Equipment Cleanup

Cleanup of electrical equipment, motor control centers (MCCs), electrical rooms, disconnects and power
distribution centers should be performed by qualified electricians. A hazard and risk assessment must be
performed prior to cleanup activities. Ensure that Arc Flash PPE is being used.

9. Water Misting Systems

Water misting can be used to decrease the combustible properties of wood dust.
Existing water misting systems should be maintained and working during cleanup activities.
Consider installing water misting systems in Class II Hazardous Locations such as:
Canter Bandsaws
Canter cutting heads
Outfeed of VAG
Outfeed of board edgers
Conveyor junctions
Chip screen areas
Any area that becomes a Class II Hazardous Location due to normal operating conditions.

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10. Contractor Management
If companies choose to hire contractors to perform cleanup of Class II Hazardous Locations there needs to
be management coordination of these activities. The company is responsible to ensure that the contractor
has the ability to perform the work safely.
Items to consider for contractor management:
Selection Criteria - contractors should be hired based on their ability to safely perform the task
and not solely based on price. Contractors need to be in good standing with WorkSafeBC. The
contractors have to supply appropriate supervision to ensure that all work activities are carried out
according to the Occupation Health and Safety Regulation and company standards.
Contractors must be supplied with combustible dust and risk assessments, as well as the company
combustible dust control plan.
Contractor work procedures must be reviewed by the company, before the work commences.
Monitoring - contractors need to be monitored by a management representative to ensure that all
work activities are being carried out according to company and regulatory standards.

11. Ongoing Dust Control

The elimination of dust buildup will greatly reduce the potential for a combustible dust explosion. Passive
dust control systems, dust suppression systems and dust collections systems can be installed to reduce
dust buildup. The areas identified as Class II Hazardous Locations should be equipped with engineering
controls to reduce or eliminate dust issues.
Ventilation systems also need to be assessed for potential combustible dust explosions. Spark detection
and deluge systems and explosion controls can be installed to reduce or eliminate these risks.

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Definitions
Class II Hazardous Locations
The second type of hazard listed by the National Electrical Code are those areas made hazardous by the
presence of combustible dust. These are referred to in the Code as Class II Hazardous Locations.

Combustible Dust Explosions

Five elements are necessary to initiate a dust explosion, often referred to as the Dust Explosion Pentagon.
The first three elements are those needed for a fire, i.e., the familiar fire triangle:
1. Combustible dust (fuel);
2. Ignition source (heat); and,
3. Oxygen in air (oxidizer).
An additional two elements must be present for a combustible dust explosion:
4. Dispersion of dust particles in sufficient quantity and concentration; and,
5. Confinement of the dust cloud.
If one of the above five elements is missing, an explosion cannot occur.

Dust Explosion Pentagon

Ignition

Dispersion of
dust particulates

dust cloud
Fire

Combustible dust

Oxygen in air

Hot Work
Hot work means riveting, welding, flame cutting or other fire or spark-producing operations.

Deflagration
Deflagration is the propagation of a pressure wave (at a speed less than the speed of sound) from the
ignition of a combustible dust, and includes both fires and explosions. An explosion can occur if the
deflagration occurs in an enclosed space such as a dust collector, duct, or building.

Typical Ignition Sources Found in Sawmills

Electrical equipment (examples: fixed and portable equipment, plugs, switches)

Electrical rooms
Static Electricity
Hot Work
Propellant-actuated tools (Hilti guns)
Hydraulics systems
Compressors

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Metal tools
Mobile Equipment
Smoking or open flames
Hot surfaces (example: fixed and portable heaters, hot bearings)
Lighting (fixed or portable)

Passive Dust Control

Prevents the escape of airborne dust through minimization, containment, and/or filtration. Typical areas to
apply this would be: Canter lines, chippers and chip screens, vertical arbor gangs, barkers, board edgers,
trimsaws and conveyor junctions.

Dust Suppression
Minimizes the escape of airborne dust by adding moisture to the material and/or the air.

Dust Collection
Removes solid particles from the air by moving dust-laden air through a filter.

Qualified Person
Being knowledgeable of the work, the hazards involved and the means to control the hazards, by reason of
education, training, experience or a combination thereof.

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INDUSTRY
INPUT

13

Best Practices and

Housekeeping

14

Canfor
Canfor Loss Prevention Manual: Fire Protection
Date published: Unknown

15

______________________________________________________________________

Canfor Loss Prevention Manual:

Fire Protection

16

Table of Contents
Page
Canfor Loss Prevention Policy
Components of the Loss Prevention Policy

3
4

Introduction

Hot Work Management

Audit of Hot Work Program

Fire Protection System Inspection and Maintenance

7
8

General Fire Protection Inspection Frequency Reference

Valve Inspection Frequency Reference

10

Dry-Pipe System Inspection Frequency Reference

11

Flushing Investigation Frequency Reference

12

Flushing Investigation Process

13

Fire Protection System Impairment Management

Impairment System Precautions
Housekeeping

15
16
19

Appendix 1 Inspection Form

22

Appendix 2 Dry Pipe Valve Form

24

Appendix 3 Deluge Form

25

Appendix 4 Flushing Investigation Form

26

Appendix 5 Weekly Fire Pump Test Form

27

Appendix 6 Flushing Investigation Materials List

28

Appendix 7 Full Flushing Materials List

33

Appendix 8 Full Flushing Materials List

37

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Canfor Fire Free

Loss Prevention is a Top Priority at Canfor

Loss Prevention Policy Statement
Canfors loss prevention objective is to minimize the potential for risk of asset loss by fire through strictly adhering
to Company-wide Loss Prevention Standards for the following:

Hot Work Control

Fire Protection System Inspection and Maintenance

Housekeeping

Fire Protection System Impairment Management

Thermal Imaging

These human element Loss Prevention Standards are considered critical for the prevention of fire loss and Canfor
will adopt an aggressive approach to promptly deal with any deficiencies relating to these standards.
MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITY:
a. Promote awareness of the Loss Prevention Standards and the importance of loss prevention
b. Implement a company wide Loss Prevention measurement standard (Fire Incident Rating)
c. Report and investigate all loss incidents and further adhere to Canfors abnormality escalation process up to and
including our Board of Directors
d. Maintain Company-wide Loss Prevention Manual detailing the standards relating to the five key human element
programs
e. Implement a continuous improvement process for all human element programs
SUPERVISORS RESPONSIBILITY:
a. Ensure all employees under their direction receive proper loss prevention training, instruction and all work is
performed safely according to Canfors Loss Prevention Standards
b. Initiate actions and follow-up to address any deficiencies identified in adherence to the Loss Prevention
Standards within their areas of responsibility
c. Ensure contractors working on site follow Canfors Loss Prevention Standards
d. Maintain proper documentation to provide evidence of adherence to Loss Prevention Standards
EMPLOYEES RESPONSIBILITY:
a. Maximize property protection by following all Loss Prevention Standards found in Canfors Loss Prevention
Manual
b. Take ownership for loss prevention and notify a Management representative of any potential loss prevention
concerns or near misses
c. Report all loss incidents to Management

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Components of the Loss Prevention Policy:

Hot Work Control
Implementing hot work standards will reduce the likelihood of fires starting at Canfor facilities.
Hot work fires account for nearly one quarter of all fires in the industry, representing the single leading cause of
fires.
Fire Protection System Inspection and Maintenance
Ensuring fire protection equipment is maintained and operating will help ensure that fires that do occur will be
controlled or suppressed before they cause significant damage.
Fire Protection System Impairment Management
Properly managing fire protection system impairments will significantly reduce the risk of a fire developing to where
it is not controllable.
Housekeeping
Keeping Canfors facilities as clean as possible will help reduce the risk of fire and the spread of fire.

Introduction
Purpose of the Loss Prevention Manual:

Act as a resource for all operations as a guide to the company wide loss prevention standards.

Identify additional resource material and training that can be accessed by contacting any one of the above
people.

Loss Statistics in the Forest Products Industry:

79% of losses at woodworking facilities are from Fires/Explosions.

19

The Leading Causes of Fires at Woodworking Facilities are as follows:

13%

24%

Hot Work
Electricity
Spark
Hot Surface
Friction
Exposure/Forest Fire
Other

8%
9%
19%

13%
14%

The Key Factors in Fires that got out of control and resulted in significant losses are as follows:

1%
5%

Shut Valve

1% 13%

AS/Water Supply
34%

No Sprinklers
Human Element

15%

Fixed Extinguisher
31%

Weather
Other

Hot Work Management

Hot Work Defined:
Any temporary operation involving open flames or producing heat or sparks, including braising, cutting, grinding,
soldering, arc welding, and torch-applied roofing.
The Importance of a Hot Work Program:

Hot Work fires are preventable.

Hot Work goes beyond just an exercise in paperwork. The permit is a tool to help with the overall process
of managing Hot Work.

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Almost 25% of all fires at woodworking facilities have hot work as the cause.

Objectives of Hot Work Program:

A solid hot work management program is characterized by good adherence to procedures and demonstrated by the
consistent use of a permit system.
Permits should be properly filled-out. Proper precautions need to be consistently taken and an adequate fire watch
must be included. There must be a process to ensure that sprinklers are in service before any hot work begins.
The entire process needs to be audited regularly to help identify weak areas on which to improve. Education and
feedback must be utilized as part of the audit process.
Common Pitfalls:
Not considering alternatives to performing Hot Work

Lack of time spent on executing the required precautions

Lack of time spent on supervision

Lack of adequate fire watch/monitoring for full 4 hours post hot work

Not having contractors follow hot work standard processes

Lack of a robust hot work permit system auditing program

Hot Work Management

Hot Work Program Review:
Use the following 13-point questionnaire to assess the hot work program at your site:
1.

A written local standard hot work management system exists. The system also
incorporates:
a.
b.
c.
d.

2.

Self audits
Continuing education
Mandates use of hot work permits
Thermal Imaging

The Hot Work Permit System is used for all arc or torch welding/cutting, grinding,

21

use of propane torches, soldering, use of portable open flame heaters, and applying roof coverings.
3.

An acceptable procedure is followed for issuance of permits for any hot work conducted by employees.

4.

An acceptable procedure is followed for issuance of permits for any hot work conducted by contractors and
ensuring that contractors do not conduct unauthorized hot work.

5.

A fire safety supervisor is available on every shift and is empowered to enforce necessary precautions.

6.

Permit precautions are strictly adhered to:

a. Available sprinklers, hose streams and extinguishers are verified to be in service/operable.
b. The 35 ft. rule (see permit) is enforced in all cases as needed.
c. Combustibles are protected with fire-resistive tarpaulins or metal shields, all wall and floor openings are
covered and fire-resistive tarpaulins suspended beneath work.
d. Enclosed equipment is cleaned of all combustibles, and containers purged of flammable liquids/vapours.
e. A continuous fire watch is provided during and for 60 minutes after work, including any coffee or lunch
breaks.
f. Fire watch is supplied with suitable extinguishers and charged small hose.
g. Fire watch is trained in use of this equipment and in sounding alarm.
h. Fire watch may be required for adjoining areas, above, and below.
i. Following the 60 minute continuous watch, the hot work area is periodically monitored for an additional 3
hours, along with a thermal image of the area being taken and attached to the closed permit.

7.

Hot work is prohibited on foam-insulated metal wall, roof, and ceiling panels (where applicable).

8.

Alternatives to hot work are considered and encouraged at all times. The fire safety supervisor is required
to review any such proposed work and determine if alternate methods are available.

9.

Regular, properly documented use of the permit system is evident.

10.

A ready-to-function emergency plan is available at all times.

11.

Safe practices are incorporated into contracts with strict verification that they are followed.

12.

A formal feedback mechanism is available for the responsible manager.

13.

Employees demonstrate support for hot work procedures.

Fire Protection System Inspection and Maintenance

Fire Protection System Inspection and Maintenance Defined:
Fire protection systems that are not functioning cannot respond to a fire, which significantly increases the exposure
to loss. Fire protection equipment inspection and maintenance consists mainly of the following:

Valve inspection/testing

Sprinkler flow testing, trip testing, and flushing investigations

Fire pump inspection/testing

The Importance of a Fire Protection System Inspection and Maintenance Program:

There are three key factors that can lead to an inoperable or compromised fire protection system.
1.

Malfunctioning components during a fire-event: Fire pumps that dont start, valves that dont operate
properly, pipe obstructions preventing adequate water flow, etc

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2.

System is shut down for known or unknown reasons: Shut values, fire pumps left in off position, or any
other component not returned to service after shutdowns.

3.

Failure of a system component during a non-fire event: corroded piping leading to leaks and water damage,
sprinkler heads knocked off causing system to trip, etc

Objectives of Fire Protection System Inspection and Maintenance:

All inspections and maintenance items are completed properly and on-schedule.
Documentation should always be available to confirm that these are being done consistently.
Emergency response plans include a valve operator and fire pump operator where necessary.
Common Pitfalls:

Insufficient documentation on testing/inspection work done (whether using in-house or contracted services)

Lack of understanding or knowledge of the inspection standards

Lack of trained personnel to perform the inspections and maintenance at times where the principal
employee is absent (e.g. during vacations).

Fire Protection System Inspection and Maintenance

General Fire Protection Inspection Frequency Reference:
Frequency

Com ponent

Action

Weekly

Sprinkler Valves
Dry/Deluge/Pre-action Systems
Fire Pump
Water Tank
Open Water Supply Suction Screens
Pressure Reducing Valves
Special Protection Systems
Fire Prevention Inspection
Yard Post Indicator (PIV) type and
Underground (T-bar) type sectional
Sprinkler Control Valves

Visual Inspect
Visual Inspect
Start-Test via Pressure Drop
Inspect
Inspect
Inspect
Inspect
Inspect
Physically Try

Monthly

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Fire Pump Diesel Engine

Pressure Reducing Valves
Sprinkler Water Flow Alarms
Standpipes and Hose
Dry/Deluge/Pre-action Systems
Freezer Protection Systems
Special Protection Systems
Fire Pump Diesel Engine
Sprinkler Valves
Dry/Deluge/Pre-action Systems
Fire Hydrant Control Valves
Main Drain
Fire Hydrants
Back-flow Preventers
Fire Pumps
Fire Pump Diesel Engine
Open Water Supply Suction
Screens
Pressure Reducing Valves Flow
All Special Protection Systems
All Special Protection Systems
Gaseous Protection Systems
Freezer Protection Systems
Underground Main Loop
Sprinkler Systems with an Open
Reservoir Suction Source
Check Valves, Alarm Valves, and
Backflow Preventers
Steel Water Tanks
Dry/Deluge/Pre-action Systems 1
Sprinklers

Quarterly

Semi-Annually

Annually

Every 3 Years
Every 5 years

Every 10 Years

Inspect Batteries
Operational Test
Test
Inspect
Test Alarms
Inspect
Check Agent Quantity
Maintenance
Close and Reopen
Full Flow Trip Test
Inspect/Physically Try
Test
Flow Test
Flow Test
Performance Flow Test
Maintenance
Inspect/Clean
Test
Test Detectors and Actuators
Inspect and Clean Nozzles
Inspect Protected Area
Internal Inspection
Flow Test
Flushing Investigation
Internal Inspection
Internal Inspection
Flushing Investigation
Inspect

Increased to every 5 years after 20 years of service

Fire Protection System Inspection and Maintenance

Valve Inspection Frequency Reference:
Valve Type

Action

Frequency

Outside screw and yoke (OS&Y),

Visually inspect for the full open position and locked.

Weekly

Indicating butterfly valves (IBVs),

Full turn operation, return to and re-lock in the full open

position, and conduct drain test.
Note 1 & 2

Annually

Visually inspect for the open position and locked.

Physically test for the full open position and re-lock in the full
open position. These valves are open if you feel a spring or
tension in the operating rod when you try to turn it beyond
the wide-open position.
Note 1

Weekly
Monthly

Post indicator valve assemblies

(PIVAs)
Post indicator valve (PIV),
Wall post indicator valve (WPIV),
Inside screw gate valves

24

Curb-box/roadway

Full turn operation, return to and re-lock in the full open

position, and conduct drain test.
Note 1 & 2

Annually

Visually inspect cover and for accessibility.

Weekly

Physically test for the full open position and leave in the full
open position. These valves are open if you feel a spring or
tension in the operating rod when you try to turn it beyond
the wide-open position.

Monthly

Note 1
Full turn operation, return to the full open position, and
conduct drain test.
Note 1 & 2

Annually

Note 1: For the monthly physical tests, the valve only needs to be turned closed 3 -4 full turns, then re-open the valve fully
(ensuring that the valve was and remains, fully open). Any physical test or full-turn operation will likely activate any tamper
switch that is electrically supervised. Take proper precautions to ensure the alarm station is notified both before and after any
operation of the valve(s).
Note 2: Annual full turn operation creates an impairment condition and needs to be handled as a planned impairment.

Fire Protection System Inspection and Maintenance

Dry-Pipe System Inspection Frequency Reference:
Frequency

Action

Weekly
Note 1

1. Check to ensure system air and water pressures are adequate.

2. Verify that air supply valves to accelerators and exhausters are open, accelerator/
exhauster air pressure is equalized with system air pressure, and excess water is drained
off.
3. Make sure the valve room/house temperature is at a minimum of 40F (5C).
1. Verify that the automatic drain (ball drip valve) from the intermediate chamber is free to
move.
2. Check the level of priming water above the clapper and drain any excess water.
3. Make sure no air leakage is occurring.
4. Check the operability of accelerators and exhausters without tripping the dry pipe valve.
5. Check the condition of air compressors and air dryers (if required). Follow manufacturers
recommended maintenance schedule for these components.
6. Before and during cold weather check the sprinkler systems low point drains and drain as

Monthly

25

Annually
Note 2

necessary.
Full Flow Trip Test Record air and water pressure. With the water control valve fully open
perform a full flow dry pipe valve trip test using the inspectors test connection to exhaust the
air. Record the time and air pressure at which the system trips and compare to previous
tests. If the time has increased, investigate and fix the deficiency. Be sure to record both
the time when the valve initially trips open, and the total time for water to reach the
inspectors test connection, to enable troubleshooting in the event the trip test yields an
excessive time.
Ensure that the valve trips and water arrives at the inspectors test connection within 60
seconds. Observe condition of the water. Conduct a flushing investigation if scale or debris
sufficient to clog a sprinkler is evident.
Drain the system and inspect internal dry pipe valve components. Clean, repair and replace
components as necessary.
Reset the dry pipe valve per the manufacturers instructions, making sure the water and air
pressures are normal and that the air supply system is working properly. Check and service
the air dryer (if provided) based on the manufacturers guidelines.

Every 10 Years
Note 2, 3, 4, & 5

Perform a 2 in. (51 mm) drain test after the dry pipe valve is placed back in service.
Perform a flushing investigation on plain (black) steel pipe systems.
See Note 5 below for galvanized piping systems.

Note 1: During extreme cold weather (-20F [-11C] below normal low temperature) check the temperature of the valve
room/house and the air and water pressures daily.
Note 2: This test can create an impairment condition and needs to be handled as a planned impairment.
Note 3: Reduced to every 5 years after 20 years of service.
Note 4: Systems in service for 20 years or longer with no history of flushing investigation maintenance are likely obstructed
and a full flushing is required.
Note 5: For internally galvanized piping systems flushing investigations are only required if the suction source is an open
water supply or if obstructions are suspected.

Fire Protection System Inspection and Maintenance

Flushing Investigation Frequency Reference:
Type of System and Conditions

P iping Type

Frequency

Dry Pipe and Preaction fed from Clean Water Supply

Uncoated Ferrous
Sprinkler Piping

Dry Pipe and Preaction fed from Clean Water Supply

Internally Galvanized
Ferrous Sprinkler
Piping

Wet, Dry Pipe or Preaction fed from Open Water

Supply (e.g., ponds, rivers, etc.)

Any

After in service for 10 years,

after 20 years, and every 5
years thereafter.
Flushing investigations for
galvanized piping systems are
only needed when the water
supply is from an open body
of water or when obstructing
materials are suspected
Every 5 years

Dry Pipe or Preaction fed from Open Water Supply

(e.g., ponds, rivers, etc.) where system is tripped more

Any

Annually

26

than 2 times per year.

When any of the following conditions exist:
Discharge of obstructive material is noted during a
yard main water test.

Foreign material is noted in fire pumps, dry pipe

valves or check valves.

Plugging of pipe or foreign material noted coming

from Inspectors Test Connection.

Failure to flush underground piping or surrounding

public mains following new installations or repairs.

Plugged sprinklers or piping found during building

alterations or after a fire.

Defective intake screens for fire pumps taking

suction from open bodies of water.

Any Sprinkler System

or Underground Piping

As soon as the condition is

discovered.

27

Fire Protection System Inspection and Maintenance

Flushing Investigation Process:
Before starting, send in impairment report to Marsh Risk Consulting (see Appendix 8) to report the system that will be
impaired.
Flushing Investigation Equipment/Materials List:

Manpower (2 persons minimum)

Fork lift or manlift and operator

Pipe wrenches, etc.

Spare gasket for replacement in DPV (if necessary)

Strut replacement for accelerator (if applicable)

Two 2 in. hose gate valves

Four 1 in. hose gate valves

Two 2 in. hoses in sufficient length to discharge outside

Minimum of two 1 in. hoses in sufficient length to discharge outside

Bushings to connect the 1 in. hose gate valves to ends of the branch lines

Four 1 in. elbows

Burlap bag to collect foreign material from water discharge

Flushing Investigation Procedure:

1. Trip and flood the system. Maintain the system full of water for a minimum of 24 hours to allow any pipe
scale to soften.
2. Shut the sprinkler control valve and drain the system that was flooded.
3. Check the piping visually with a flashlight while it is being dismantled. Attach hose valves and 2 in. hoses
to the end of the crossmains to be tested.
4. Shut these valves and have air pressure restored on the system and the control valve reopened.
5. Open the hose valve on the crossmain allowing the system to trip in simulation of normal action. Any
obstructions should be cleared from the crossmain before proceeding with further tests.
6. After flowing water through the crossmain, shut its hose valve and test the branchlines by discharging water
through a 1 in. fire hose. Again, collect any foreign material in a burlap bag. Only a representative
number of branchlines need to be tested.
7. After the test, the dry-pipe valve should be internally cleaned and reset. Its control valve should be locked
open and a drain test made.

28

Fire Protection System Inspection and Maintenance

Flushing Investigation Procedure Continued:
Key Points:

The system should be flooded a minimum of 24 hours prior to flushing this is a good opportunity to
conduct a trip test.

All low drain points should be bled off to ensure maximum water is distributed throughout the system.

Depending on the annunciator panel, the sprinkler waterflow switch on the alarm trim should be by-passed
so the panel can be reset to monitor any other sprinkler waterflow alarms.

Fire pumps should be used to provide maximum waterflows. Please refer to the chart below which provides
the minimum recommended waterflows for the given pipe diameter.

The sprinkler piping should be visually inspected while its being dismantled.

Flow water from the crossmains first, then through the branch lines.

Labelling test points will prevent future tests being conducted at the same points.

If ball valves are used, they should be the Full Bore Type valves.

Connect a 2 ft. length of 1 in. pipe with 1 in. couplings on both ends to the ends of the 1 in.
discharge hose this will prevent the hose from closing in on itself and provides a mechanism useful for
gripping.

29

Impairment Management
Fire Protection System Impairment Management Defined:
Impairment management is closely tied to the overall system of managing the fire protection system. It specifically
relates to a formalized program for taking the fire protection system out of service for any reason, either planned or
unplanned.
The Importance of a Fire Protection System Impairment Management Program:
Gives formal notification to Canfor and Marsh Risk Consultingl and allows for a second opinion to understand and
advise on the process being used. Notification helps ensure supervision and a secondary source for follow-up. The
impairment management program also provides a visual indicator of the impairment.
Objectives of Fire Protection System Impairment Management:
All inspections and maintenance items are completed properly and on-schedule.
Documentation should always be available to confirm that these are being done consistently.
Emergency response plans include a valve operator and fire pump operator where necessary.
A good program is in place to manage impairments should they occur. A permit system is used to supervise
occurrence. Strict adherence to the Impairment Permit process including promptly notifying Marsh Risk Consulting
of the impairment by fax.
Common Pitfalls:

Not considering all 3 phases of a fire protection system shutdown

1. Pre planning before impairment
2. During Impairment
3. After Impairment

Not considering alternatives to impairing the fire protection system

Impairment procedures should be used whenever fire protection water supplies, sprinklers, fire pumps or special
protection systems are impaired for any reason, where an unusual fire protection hazard exists, and when specific
fire prevention procedures are necessary. Note that routine testing of fire protection equipment can create an
impairment to the system, and even these brief impairments need to be properly managed. The follow procedures
outlined below to ensure complete precautionary measures are taken and ignition sources are controlled.

30

Impairment Management
System Impairment Precautions
1. Is any hot work (i.e., cutting, welding, brazing, grinding) being allowed in an unprotected area? If so, cease
this potential ignition source while fire protection is impaired.
2. Is smoking allowed in the unprotected area? If so, stop all smoking until fire protection has been restored
to service.
3. Are there hazardous operations in the impaired area? If so, can this operation be stopped until fire
protection is back in service? This could include flammable or combustible liquids and dusts in the area.
4. If this is a planned impairment, is all the pre-work completed prior to impairing the fire protection? This
includes having all piping laid out for new underground work; ensure all piping and sprinklers needed for a
job is on site and available, etc., and that all piping/connections/equipment be installed/completed to the
extent possible before impairing the protection system. If not, can any planned work be completed on a
priority basis so that the amount of time of impaired fire protection is minimized?
5. Ensure that the work being done will be carried out without interruption until completion.
6. Can temporary protection be provided by using fire hoses to the sprinkler system and/or fire hydrant?
Ensure there are charged small hoses and fire extinguishers available in the area that is impaired.
7. If at all possible, schedule any impairment work to be done during idle hours when fewer ignition sources
are present.
8. Contact (either by telephone, fax or e-mail), the FM Global Customer Service Desk to inform them of fire
protection impairments. Explain the impairment in detail, and depending upon what type of fire protection
is impaired, the following information should be provided:
a) What type of system is being impaired (i.e., sprinklers, halon, CO2, Inergen, AFFF, Fire Pumps,
Gravity Tanks/Reservoirs, etc.).
b) If a sprinkler control valve is closed, provide the following information: What valve is being
closed, what area does this fire protection valve protect, the reason why it is being shut, and
approximately how long will this system be impaired. If the fire protection will be impaired for
some time, look into capping off the affected area and reopening the sprinkler control valve so
at least partial protection can be restored to service. Also, look into tying the impaired sprinkler
system into a live adjacent system using fire hoses if applicable.
c) If a fire pump is impaired, provide the following information: Type of fire pump (diesel or
electric), is there another fire pump provided that will remain in service; is there still city water
pressure available with the pump impaired; the reason why it is out of service; can the pump
be started manually in an emergency and if so, will there be someone on site 24 hr./7days per
week that knows how to start this pump in an emergency; and the expected duration of this
impairment.

31

Impairment Management
System Impairment Precautions (continued)
d) If special protection (i.e., Halon, CO2, Inergen, etc.) is impaired, provide the following information:
Type of system that is impaired; what area does this system protect; is there automatic sprinkler
protection available and in service; can this system be manually tripped in an emergency situation
and if so, would personnel be instructed/allowed to do this; reason why this system is being
impaired and an estimated timetable for restoration.
e) If fire alarms are impaired, provide the following information: Is automatic sprinkler protection still
in service; is special protection (i.e., halon, CO2, Inergen, etc.) impaired when these fire alarms are
impaired; if only fire alarms are impaired, ensure there are key personnel assigned to the duty of
calling the public fire service in an emergency; the reason why the alarms are impaired and the
expected duration of this impairment.
f) If a gravity tank, reservoir, etc., is impaired, provide the following information: Is this the only water
supply available for fire protection. If so, is there a way to obtain water from other sources nearby
(i.e., river, lake, etc.). Could the public fire service park a pumper truck at the facility while they
water supply is impaired?
9. Contact the public fire service and inform them of the impaired fire protection.
10. Provide ongoing fire watch patrols of the unprotected area(s).
11. Have someone assigned to respond or stand by the closed valve so it can be opened immediately in an
emergency situation. This is also true of an impaired fire pump that can still be manually started. Once the
above has been provided/obtained, discuss the following:
Obtain and properly fill out the impairment form. The person assigned to close the sprinkler control valve needs to
ensure they count the number of turns it took to close this valve. This is done so that when facility personnel are
reopening this valve (when work is completed), they ensure the valve is completely reopened the same number of
turns it took to close. The tag should then be attached to the closed valve so that anyone walking by will see and
know that the fire protection is impaired. DO NOT LOCK ANY CLOSED SPRINKLER CONTROL VALVES. They should
only be locked after they have been fully reopened and fire protection restored to service.
The original impairment document should be kept by the person responsible or the person who authorized the
impairment, so that they in turn can confirm, and ensure, that all valves have been fully reopened, when the fire
protection is restored to service.

32

Impairment Management
System Impairment Precautions (continued)
Once work has been completed, do the following:
1. After completion and restoration of fire protection equipment, pertaining to the restoration of automatic
sprinkler protection, perform a 2 in. drain test on the downstream side of each valve that was closed. This
test is very important as the final check to ensure that all control valves have been left in the wide-open
position.
To do this test, fully open the drain valve and observe the pressure gauge. A quick return of pressure after
the drain valve is closed indicates the valve is open to allow good flow. A slow return means there is a
partial obstruction. No return means the valve is either totally shut or completely obstructed. Investigate
immediately if drain tests are unsatisfactory.
2. If work was being done to install new underground mains, the new mains should be hydrostatically tested at
200 psi for 2 hr. (or 50 psi greater than the working pressure of the system). This will ensure there are no
leaks in the underground main. Furthermore, any time either a new underground main is installed or an
existing underground main has been repaired, full flushing of the underground is recommended to ensure
there are no rocks or other obstructions in the mains.
3. Ensure the fire pump(s) are in full automatic operation.
4. Ensure all sprinkler control valves are locked in the wide-open position.
5. Ensure that all control actuators are replaced and that all control panels/alarm systems are placed back in
full service.
Confirm with Marsh Risk Consulting that the impairment is completed and all fire protection has been restored to
service.

33

Housekeeping
Housekeeping Defined:
Housekeeping is the process of organizing, cleaning, and maintaining a facility, keeping hazards in check and goods
out of aisles, removing dust, and handling storage properly. Good housekeeping is key component of any loss
prevention program and involves all employees. Effective housekeeping is an ongoing operation: it is not a hit-andmiss cleanup done occasionally.
The Importance of a Housekeeping Program:
The main purpose of good housekeeping in loss prevention is to prevent the spread of fire. It is also linked to
employee safety and accident prevention. Good housekeeping sets the tone for all property loss prevention and
control efforts.
Objectives of Housekeeping Management:
Effective housekeeping results in:

decreased fire and explosion hazards

safer work environment for all employees

lower employee exposure to hazardous substances (e.g. dusts, vapours)

more efficient equipment cleanup and maintenance

better control of tools and materials, including inventory and supplies

Key Components of Housekeeping Management:

A good housekeeping program identifies and assigns responsibilities for the following:

clean up during the shift

day-to-day cleanup

waste disposal

removal of unused materials

inspection to ensure cleanup is complete and address deficiencies

34

Housekeeping
Elements of an Effective Housekeeping Program
1. Regular Dust and Wood Waste Removal
Strive for no more than 1/8-inch dust accumulation on overhead building members and equipment by
providing and maintaining dust collection equipment and supplementing as necessary with scheduled clean
up.
2. Maintenance
The maintenance of buildings and equipment may be the most important element of good housekeeping.
Maintenance involves keeping buildings, equipment and machinery in safe, efficient working order and in
good repair. A good maintenance program provides for the inspection, maintenance, upkeep and repair of
tools, equipment, machines and processes.
3. Clear Aisles and Stairways
Aisles should be wide enough to accommodate people and equipment comfortably and safely. Aisle space
allows for the movement of people, products and materials. Warning signs and mirrors can improve sight
lines in blind corners. Arranging aisles properly encourages people to use them so that they do not take
shortcuts through hazardous areas.
Keeping aisles and stairways clear is important. They should not be used for temporary "overflow" or
"bottleneck" storage.
4. Spill Control
The best way to control spills is to stop them before they happen. Regularly cleaning and maintaining
machines and equipment is one way. Another is to use drip pans and guards where possible spills might
occur. When spills do occur, it is important to clean them up immediately. Absorbent materials are useful for
wiping up greasy, oily or other liquid spills. Used absorbents must be disposed of properly and safely.
5. Organized Tools and Equipment
Tool housekeeping is very important, whether in the tool room, on the rack, in the yard, or on the bench.
Tools require suitable fixtures with marked locations to provide orderly arrangement, both in the tool room
and near the workbench. Returning them promptly after use reduces the chance of being misplaced or lost.
Workers should regularly inspect, clean and repair all tools and take any damaged or worn tools out of
service.
6. Adequate Lighting and Maintenance of Light Fixtures
7. Waste Disposal
The regular collection, grading and sorting of scrap contribute to good housekeeping practices. Allowing
material to build up on the floor wastes time and energy since additional time is required for cleaning it up.
Placing scrap containers near where the waste is produced encourages orderly waste disposal and makes
collection easier. All waste receptacles should be clearly labelled (e.g., recyclable glass, plastic, scrap metal,
etc.).

35

Housekeeping
8. Storage
Good organization of stored materials is essential for overcoming material storage problems whether on a
temporary or permanent basis. The location of the stockpiles should not interfere with work but they should
still be readily available when required. Stored materials should allow at least one metre (or about three
feet) of clear space under sprinkler heads.
Stacking cartons and drums on a firm foundation and cross tying them, where necessary, reduces the chance
of their movement. Stored materials should not obstruct aisles, stairs, exits, fire equipment, emergency
eyewash fountains, emergency showers, or first aid stations. All storage areas should be clearly marked.
Flammable, combustible, toxic and other hazardous materials should be stored in approved containers in
designated areas that are appropriate for the different hazards that they pose. Storage of materials should
meet all requirements specified in the fire codes and the regulations of environmental and occupational
health and safety agencies in your jurisdiction.
Avoid storage of combustible materials in utility rooms such as MCC, PDC, compressor, and mechanical
rooms.

36

Appendix 1
Fire Protection Inspection Form
Account Number:

Sam ple
Only

Index Number:

No one form can be designed to fit all conditions. Use this sample as a basic guide in developing your own form. Items that
do not apply can be omitted; other items can be expanded or added as desired.

Instructions
to Inspector:

Complete this form while inspecting fire protection. Send the completed form to your supervisor for necessary
action.

Facility:

Location:

Date:

Valve Inspections
Visually inspect all locked valves weekly and physically try them monthly as required.* Record both weekly and monthly
inspections.
*Physically try gate valves, including nonindicating and indicator-post-gate valves. Post-indicator-valve assemblies (PIVAs), indicatingbutterfly valves (IBVs) and standard outside-screw-and-yoke (OS&Y) valves do not have to be tried, but should be checked visually at
close range.
All inside and outside valves controlling sprinklers or fire protection water supplies are listed below. Check the condition of the valve.
Do not report a valve open unless you have personally inspected it.
Valve Location

Area Controlled

Open

Shut

Locked

Physically
Turned

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
The impairment system is used to guard against delayed reopening of valves. The impairment form should be used every time a
sprinkler control valve is closed. When the valve is reopened, the 2-in. (51-mm) drain should be flowed wide-open to ensure there is no
obstruction in the piping. The valve then should be relocked.
Were any valves closed since the last inspection?

Yes

No

Was impairment documentation used?

Yes

No

Was the valve(s) reopened fully and a 2-in. (51-mm) drain test
conducted before the valve(s) was relocked?

Yes

No

Comments:

37

Inspect These Items At Least Weekly

Obstructed by high piling (18- to 36-in. [46- to 91-cm] clearance)?

SPRINKLERS

Spare heads available?

Automatic
Sprinklers

Yes

Yes

No

Heat adequate to prevent freezing (40 F [4 C] min.)?

Water
Pressure

(Note broken windows, etc.) min. temp.

DRY-PIPE
VALVES

Any heads disconnected or needed:

Valve Room
Properly
Heated?
Air
Pressure

No

Psi at yard level:

Comments:

No. 1

Min.:
Measured:
42 F/6 C
F/C

No. 2

Min.:
Measured:
42 F/6 C
F/C

No. 3

Min.:
Measured:
42 F/6 C
F/C

No. 4

Min.:
Measured:
42 F/6 C
F/C

No. 1

Min.:
psi/bar

No. 2

Min.:
psi/bar

No. 3

Min.:
psi/bar

No. 4

Min.:
psi/bar

Measured:
psi/bar

Measured:
psi/bar

Measured:
psi/bar

Fire pump pressure:

Start

Stop

Packings cool?

Jockey pump pressure:

Start

Stop

Fuel tank level ( / 4 min.)

Yes
Fire
Pump

Pump room properly heated?

WATER SUPPLIES

Yes

F/C

Full?
Tank
or
Reservoir

No

Mins.

Temp. at cold water return (should be 42 F [6 C] min.):

Yes

No

Heating system in use?

Yes

No

Circulation good?
Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Condition:

Close properly?

General Order
Neatness
Electrical
Equipment
Flammable
Liquid
Smoking
Regulations
Hot Work
Storage

No

Obstructed?

Yes
Good?

No

Blocked open?

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

How often?

Combustible waste removed on schedule?

Yes

No

Accessible?

In good condition?

Inside Hose
Fire Doors

OCCUPANCY

Fire pump started on automatic?

No

Time to overflow tank:

Yes

No

Properly ventilated?

__ F/C min.) Temp.

Measured:
psi/bar

No

Presence of combustible dust, lint or oil deposits on ceilings, beams, machines?

Yes
No If yes, arrange for cleaning and investigate the source.

List areas needing attention, Including yard:

Defects noted?
Yes
Safety cans used?
Yes

No
Low-level vent fans on?
Yes

No

Flammable liquid cabinets used?

No

Yes

Locations where violations noted:

Corrective action taken:

Permits issued for all hot work applications?

Yes

No

Listed precautions taken?

No

Yes

Well-arranged?

Aisles clear?

Yes

Grounding straps, self-closing faucets

and safety buns in use?
Yes
No

No

No

Clear of lamps, heaters (36 in. [91 cm] min.)?

Yes

No

Yes

No

Other items:

Inspect These Items At Least Monthly

MANUAL
PROTECTION

Yes

No

Condition:
Yard Hydrants
and Hose

Any missing?

Charged?

Extinguishers

Yes

No. 1
No. 2

Hydrants drained?
Yes

Other items:

Yes

Location of extinguishers needing attention:

No

No. 3

No. 5

No. 4

No. 6

No. 7

Remarks:
No

Other items:

Sprinkler Alarms

Accessible?
No

Inspect These Items At Least Quarterly

Tested?

Yes

No

Time for alarm

Operation satisfactory? (If no, comment below.)

Yes

No

38

Appendix 2
DRY PIPE VALVES
Caution: Do not use grease or pipe compounds on valve seats.

Dry-pipe valves should be tripped, cleaned and reset annually

Instructions: Use one card for each dry-pipe valve. Post securely in dry-pipe valve enclosure.
Record the data each time the valve trips or is tripped.
VALVE MANUFACTURERS NAME

DATE
TRIPPED

CAUSE OF TRIPPING OR BY WHOM

TRIPPED

MODEL NUMBER

STATIC
WATER
PRESSURE

SYSTEM
AIR
PRESSURE

YEAR INSTALLED

TRIP POINT
AIR
PRESSURE

TRIP TIME
MIN. SEC.

VALVE NO./AREA CONTROLLED

DATE
RESET

RESET
BY

RED TAG PERMITS

USED?
YES

NO

39

Appendix 3
DELUGE OR PRE-ACTION VALVES
Caution: Do not use grease or pipe compounds on valve seats.

Valves should be tripped, cleaned and reset annually

Instructions: Use one card for each valve. Attach securely to valve. Record the data each time the valve trips or is tripped.
VALVE MANUFACTURERS NAME

DATE
TRIPPED

CAUSE OF TRIPPING OR BY WHOM

TESTED

MODEL NUMBER

DETECTION
SYSTEM
NUMBER

TIME
TO
TRIP

YEAR INSTALLED

TRIP POINT
AIR
PRESSURE

TRIP TIME
MIN. SEC.

VALVE NO./AREA CONTROLLED

DATE
RESET

RESET
BY

RED TAG PERMITS

USED?
YES

NO

40

Appendix 4

FLUSHING INVESTIGATION RECORD

Building
Number

System
Number

Wet

Dry

Date
Installed

Date Last
Flushed

Investigated
By

Date

How
Investigated

Type of
Material
Found

Rec.
Flush?

41

Appendix 5
Weekly Fire Pump Test Form
Test all fire pumps weekly. Enter correct settings in shaded column. Make sure all test results are within normal limits. If you
find that repairs are needed, make them immediately and follow manufacturers instructions.
Pump Manufacturer

Year installed

Manufacturers model no.

Pump on ________ psi/bar/kPa
Jockey pump on _______ psi/bar/kPa

gpm/psi rating
Pump off _________ psi/bar/kPa
Jockey pump off ______ psi/bar/kPa

Date tested
By Whom
Pressure at pump startup
method of start
Motor running time (min)
Suction pressure
Discharge pressure
Temp and tightness of
stuffing box glands
Level of water supplies
suction tanks should be overflowed
Temperature of water
Pump room temperature
Engine instrument readings
RPM
Oil pressure
Temperature
Last oil change __________
Next oil change __________
Amps
Fuel tank level
should be at least three-fourths full
Condition of crank case oil
Condition of battery charger
Last time battery charged ________
Battery Electrolyte Level
Normal
________
Cooling system temperature
Cooling system strainer condition
Annual pump flow test results satisfactory

_______ Yes

Explain findings:

Provide a work order for immediate repair.

Follow impairment procedures
Keep records on file for review by appropriate personnel.
Sign off when pump is restored to automatic:

_______ No

gpm a

psi a

rpm a

42

Appendix 6
FLUSHING INVESTIGATION
MATERIALS LIST

Manpower (minimum of 1 person, ideally 2 people)

Forklift-mounted safety cage or "Manlift"

Proper wrenches and other tools

Flashlight

Gasket replacement for Dry Pipe Valve (if needed)

Strut replacement for accelerator (if applicable)

2 in. hose gate valve *

Three 1 in. hose gate valves *

2 in. hose in sufficient length to discharge outside

1 in. hose in sufficient length to discharge outside

Bushing to connect the 2 in. hose gate valve to the ends of the cross main

Bushings to connect the 1 in. hose gate valves to the ends of the branch lines

2 in. elbow

Three 1 in. elbows

Burlap bags

* If ball valves are used, they should be the Full Bore Type valve.

43

Dry-pipe system FLUSHING INVESTIGATION

PROCEDURE SUMMARY
DAY 1
1.

2.

Use the Red Tag Permit System.

Notify Emergency Organization, monitoring station, and Marsh Risk Consulting that the sprinkler
control valve will be closed and that testing will take place.
Close sprinkler control valve, isolate compressor line and bleed air from systems

3.

Select the cross main(s) to be investigated.

Select a representative number of branch lines to be investigated (minimum of 3).
Choose branch lines at the remote end of the system or areas where there is little flow from the riser to
the inspectors test connection. On multi-zone/multi-floor/multi-height ceiling sprinkler systems, it may
be necessary to select 3 branch lines from each zone/floor/etc. plus more than one cross main.

4.

Check the piping (cross mains and branch lines) visually with a flashlight while it is being
dismantled.
Look for obstructing material such as coupons, stones or large pieces of scale. If any of these are
observed either manually remove or visually re-check after flowing water to ensure that piping is clear.

5.

Connect all hose gate valves to the cross-mains and branch lines to be tested. Shut these valves.

6.

Re-pressurize system and reopen sprinkler control valve

7.

Lock the sprinkler control valve in the open position

8.

Do full trip test through the inspectors test connection (ITC). Record the following:
Water pressure acting on the valve: ________

Air pressure before test: ________

Dry-Pipe Valve trip pressure: ________

Dry-Pipe Valve trip time: ________

Water delivery time to ITC: ________

If the water delivery time to ITC exceeds 60 seconds inform Marsh Risk Consulting promptly and ask
for guidance.
See Troubleshooting below for some possible causes.
9.

Leave system wet for a minimum of 24 hours (over night).

This is important to allow any pipe scale to soften.
You will need to bypass the alarm line.

44

Dry-pipe system FLUSHING INVESTIGATION

PROCEDURE SUMMARY
DAY 1 (continued)
10.

11.

Notify the following that the sprinkler control valve has been reopened and that the system will be
wet with no alarm capability:

Emergency Organization

Fire Department

Monitoring station

Marsh Risk Consulting

Provide more frequent watchman rounds if possible.

TROUBLESHOOTING an excessive water delivery time to ITC

Dry pipe sprinkler systems are required and designed to deliver water to the Inspectors Test Connection (which is
the most remote sprinkler on the system) in the shortest time possible but never more than 60 seconds.
If the water delivery time exceeds 60 seconds, the sprinkler system can be expected to take longer to control the fire
and open up more sprinklers, resulting in greater fire damage, more water and more smoke.
If the water delivery time reaches and exceeds 90 seconds, it is expected that the sprinkler system may be unable to
control the fire, resulting in uncontrolled spread of fire!

Possible causes of an excessive water delivery time to ITC:

1. The air pressure in the system is excessive. Consult the manufacturers documentation for the valve model
to determine the acceptable pressure range. If this is the cause a simple adjustment of this pressure will
resolve the issue.
2. Scale or other obstructing material within the piping is restricting the flow of water through the system. The
Flushing Investigation should reveal if this is the case via the quantity and size of material collected. If this
is the cause a full flushing of all the piping of that system will be needed.
3. The way the system was designed, modified or added-to has resulted in a volume of air too great to be pushed
out in time by the water. The valve trip time will help reveal if this is the case. Modification of the system
or the addition of an accelerator are possible solutions.

45

Dry-pipe system FLUSHING INVESTIGATION

PROCEDURE SUMMARY
DAY 2
1.

Use the Impairment System.

Notify Emergency Organization, monitoring station, and Marsh Risk Consulting that the sprinkler
control valve will be closed and that flushing investigation will take place.

2.

Do flushing investigation. Maintain any fire pumps in service to ensure maximum water flow during
the investigation.
a.
Test the cross mains first:
i.
Attach a burlap bag securely to the end of the 2 in hose.
ii.
Open the hose valve on the cross main.
iii.
Flow for a good 10 minutes to allow any obstructions to be cleared from the cross main.
iv.
Shut the hose valve on the cross main.
v.
Retrieve and analyze the material collected in the burlap bag.
If already more than cup OR if particle size is large enough to plug a sprinkler head (any
dimension greater than the orifice size per the table on the next page), a full system flush is
needed. Immediately arrange for a full flush of the system. Keep the material collected.
If less than cup and if particle size is NOT large enough to plug a sprinkler head, proceed
with investigation of branch lines. Keep the material collected.
b.

3.

Similarly test the branch lines selected by discharging water one branch line at a time
through a 1 in. fire hose into a burlap bag.
i.
Flow each branch line for 2 to 3 minutes to allow any obstructions to be cleared from the
branch line.
ii.
If flow appears obstructed, note which line so that piping can be checked visually as soon
as the system is drained.
iii.
Retrieve the material collected in the burlap bag.
Analyze all the material collected in the burlap bag.

If the total collected from the cross-mains and branch lines is more than cup OR if particle size is
large enough to plug a sprinkler head (any dimension greater than the orifice size per the table on next
page), a full system flush is needed. Immediately arrange for a full flush of the system. Keep the
material collected.

46

Dry-pipe system FLUSHING INVESTIGATION

PROCEDURE SUMMARY
DAY 2 (continued)
4.

Drain piping, including all low points, and remove hose gate valves

5.

Visually check (with a flashlight) any piping that appeared obstructed during testing

6.

Replace gasket in Dry Pipe Valve (if it does not seal properly)

7.

Reset accelerator (if applicable)

8.

Reset Dry Pipe Valve, pressurize system and reopen the sprinkler control valve

9.

Lock the sprinkler control valve in the open position

10.

Return all alarms to service, including the alarm line that was bypassed on Day 1.

11.

Perform an alarm test to confirm that alarms are functioning correctly

12.

Perform a 2 in Drain test to confirm valve is open

13.

Notify the following that the sprinkler control valve has been reopened and that the system alarms
are back in service:

Emergency Organization

Fire Department

Monitoring station
Marsh Risk Consulting

Orifice Size of sprinklers

K factor
5.6
8
11.2
14

Orifice Size (in.)

0.5
0.53
0.64
0.70

K factor
16.8
19.6
22.4
25.2

Orifice Size (in.)

0.77
0.82
0.87
0.95

47

Appendix 7
FULL FLUSHING
MATERIALS LIST

Manpower (2 or 3 people)

Forklift-mounted safety cage or "Manlift"

Proper wrenches and other tools

Flashlight

2 in. hose in sufficient length to discharge outside

1 in. hose in sufficient length to discharge outside

For gridded systems Fig 15 below:

Flexible couplings with short nipple for branch lines

Nipples and caps for ends of cross mains

Fig 13a

For 4, 5, 6 and 8 in. pipes (in risers, feed mains or cross mains):

Reducer from 8, 6 or 5 in. to 4in.

Y or Siamese connection, or 4in. Tee with 2 in. outlets

Two 2 in. elbows

Two 2 in. hose gate valves

Bushings to connect the 2 in. hose gate valve to the ends of the main

For risers, feed mains or cross mains with pipes < 4 in. (ideally 1 set per cross main to minimize the number of
times the system is drained and refilled during flushing) Fig 13a:

2 in. elbow

2 in. hose gate valve

Bushing to connect the 2 in. hose gate valve to the ends of the cross main

For branch lines (ideally more than 1 set, to minimize the number of times
the system is drained and refilled during flushing) Fig 13b:

1 in. elbow

1 in. hose gate valves (use 2 in. valves for larger

branch lines)

Bushing to connect the 1 in. hose gate valve to the ends

of the branch lines

Fig 13b

48

Fire protection system FULL FLUSHING

PROCEDURE SUMMARY
Thoroughly flush yard mains before flushing any interior piping.
FLUSHING YARD PIPING
1. If divisional or other valves are to be closed, use Impairment System. Notify Emergency
Organization, monitoring station, and Marsh Risk Consulting that fire protection control valves will
be closed and that flushing will take place.
2. Flush yard piping through hydrants, allowing the water to run until clear.
Use the flow specified in Table 9a or the maximum flow available for the size of the yard main being flushed.

If the water is supplied from more than one direction or from a looped system, close divisional valves to
produce a high-velocity flow through each single line.

If there are no yard hydrants flush yard piping and sprinkler feeds together as per Step 3 (below).
3. To flush underground feeds from yard mains to sprinkler risers, follow one of the approaches below:
a.

Use the fire service connections on sprinkler risers as flushing outlets by removing or inverting the
check valve.
b.
Install a temporary fitting on the end of riser manifolds. See Fig 14a for suggested connection and
hose sizes.
c.
Install a temporary fitting on the riser, above or below the control and alarm valves. Suggested
connections are illustrated in Fig. 14a.

49

FLUSHING SPRINKLER PIPING (using the hydraulic method)

General Instructions all sprinkler systems
1. Flush feed mains, cross mains and finally the branch lines
To ensure that sufficient water will be discharged to scour the largest pipe in the line, remove small end
piping and connect hose valves to a larger section, if necessary. This will ensure that the flow specified in
Table 9a will be achieved.

2. Dismantle and clean by rodding or other means any piping found solidly obstructed or with material
adhering to pipe walls
3. For systems with pendent sprinkler heads, remove several sample sprinklers per system and inspect
until it can be concluded that all sprinklers are free of obstruction material
Instructions for Flushing Dry/Pre-action Systems
DAY 1
1. Flood the system and leave wet. (This will soften pipe scale and deposits to facilitate removal.)
2. Use Impairment System. Notify Emergency Organization, Fire Department, monitoring station, and
Marsh Risk Consulting that the system will be wet with no alarm capability. Provide more frequent
watchman rounds if possible.

DAY 2
1. Use Impairment System. Notify Emergency Organization, monitoring station, and Marsh Risk
Consulting that sprinkler control valves will be closed and that a flushing will be conducted.
2. Equip riser feed and cross-mains with hose valves and flush individually.
3. Equip branch lines with hose valves and flush individually.
4. Visually inspect and clean smaller piping and sprinkler heads as per General Instructions above.
5. Drain piping, including all low points, and remove hose valves
6. Reset Dry Pipe Valve (and accelerator if applicable), pressurize system and reopen the
sprinkler control valve
7. Notify Emergency Organization, Fire Department, monitoring station, and Marsh Risk
Consulting that the sprinkler control valve has been reopened and that the system alarms are
back in service.

50

Instructions for Flushing tree-type Wet Systems

1. Use Impairment System. Notify Emergency Organization, monitoring station, and Marsh Risk
Consulting that sprinkler control valves will be closed and that a flushing will be conducted.

2. Equip riser feed and cross mains with hose valves and flush individually.
3. Equip branch lines with hose valves and flush individually.
4. Visually inspect and clean smaller piping and sprinkler heads as per General Instructions above.
5. Notify Emergency Organization, Fire Department, monitoring station, and Marsh Risk
Consulting that sprinkler control valve has been reopened.
Instructions for Flushing gridded Wet Systems (Fig 15)
(north, south, east and west references below refer to Fig 15)

1. Use Impairment System. Notify Emergency

Organization, monitoring station, and Marsh
Risk Consulting that sprinkler control valves
will be closed and that a flushing will be
conducted.

2. Disconnect all branch lines and cap all

open ends.
3. Remove the cap from the east end of the
south cross main, flush the main and
replace the cap.
4. Remove the cap from branch line 1, flush
the line, and replace the cap.
5. Repeat Step 3 for the remaining branch lines.
6. Reconnect enough branch lines at the west end of the system so the aggregate cross-sectional area of
the branch lines approximately equals the area of the north cross main. For example, three 1-14 in.
branch lines approximately equal a 2-12 in. cross main. Remove the cap from the east end of the north
cross main, flush the main and replace the cap.
7. Disconnect and recap the branch lines. Repeat Step 5 except reconnect branch lines at the east end of
the system and flush the north cross main through its west end.
8. Reconnect all branch lines and recap the cross main.
9. Notify Emergency Organization, Fire Department, monitoring station, and Marsh Risk Consulting
that sprinkler control valve has been reopened.

51

Appendix 8
Send the following message IMMEDIATELY by Fax or Email for any Fire
Protection Impairment:
Date:
______________________________
TO:
Warren Paolucci, Marsh Canada
SITE:

SITE Fax #:

1-604-633-5289
Fax Number:
Email: [email protected]
SITE Contact
Phone Number:
SITE Contact Name:
SITE Phone #:

AN IMPAIRMENT TO THE FIRE SYSTEM HAS OCCURRED TO:

FIRE MAIN
SPRINKLER SYSTEM
FIRE PUMP
Location:
CO2 SYSTEM
NOVEC
OTHER:
Reason for Impairment:

Impaired By:

Phone:

PRECAUTIONS TAKEN (check as appropriate):

Shift Management Notified
Continuous Work Authorized
Fire Chief Notified (or equivalent)
Ongoing Patrol Of Area
Hazardous Operations Stopped
Hydrant Connected To Sprinkler Riser
Cutting & Welding Prohibited
Pipe Plugs On Hand
Other:
Fire Hose Laid Out
Date Closed:

Faxed

Time Closed:

Estimated Duration of Impairment:

Emailed

RESTORATION OF THE ABOVE NOTED SYSTEM IS COMPLETE

Date Opened:
Restored By:

Faxed

Emailed

52

Canfor
Industry Best Practices/Processes for Wood Dust Control
Date published: April 30, 2012

53
From: Smith, Duncan [[email protected]]
Sent: Monday, April 30, 2012 10:07 AM
To: Walker, Dale
Subject:
RE: Industry Best Practices/processes for Wood Dust Control
Hi Dale,
Here is what Canfor Pulp Limited Partnership has done for control of
wood dust:
- Ongoing capital program to control dust at drop points with enclosures
and skirting on conveyor belts.
- Installation of water misting systems at drop points. These systems
run from May to October but can't be run in the winter months.
- Thermal surveys on conveyor bearings to identify and correct potential
ignition sources.

Duncan Smith
Human Resources Superintendent
Northwood Pulpmill
Canfor Pulp and Paper
250-962-3630

-----Original Message----From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]]

Sent: Thursday, April 26, 2012 11:18 AM
To: [email protected]; [email protected]; Morris
Ettinger; [email protected]; Ryan Johnson; [email protected];
[email protected]; [email protected];
[email protected]; Scott, David; Butow, Gus; 'Brad Evans'; Ian
Fillinger; Grimm, Mike; Coburn, Kathy; [email protected]; Smith,
Duncan
Cc: [email protected]
Subject: Industry Best Practices/processes for Wood Dust Control
Importance: High
Subsequent to the meeting yesterday with the Ministry of Labour, WSBC,
Industry and Labour.
WSBC will be assisting in compiling Combustible Wood Dust Best
practices,

54
processes or procedures
Pls forward details on best practices, processes and procedures to Dale
Walker at WSBC at the above e-mail address
WSBC is looking for all the detailed information we can provide on
equipment, systems, tools, equipment, practices or procedures that you
have
employed in your operations to control wood dust and ignition sources.
Pls ensure that the information provided to Dale. Please ensure the
information forwarded to Dale has worked in you operations and has
improved
the control of wood dust and the potential ignition sources.
Yours submissions should include the detailed information on any product
names, part numbers etc.
Dale and his group will compile the information provided and provide a
working Draft to the working group of industry representatives by
Thursday
May 3 2012.
Pls have all submissions to Dale by Noon May 1, 2012 at the latest so
that
the draft information can be compiled for the working group.
If you have any questions Pls call
Thx
In addition there will likely be a meeting in Vancouver with WSBC,
industry
representatives (including representatives from MAG) and labour sometime
late next week to provide some information on what has been ruled out in
the Babine incident hopefully by the time we have the conference call
tomorrow we will have a date and time.
Kerry Douglas
Corporate Safety-Canada
Office 250-992-0828
Cell 250-255-0805
Fax 250-992-3027
"Safety is a core value and business priority"

55

FM Global
Prevention and Mitigation of Combustible
Dust Explosion and Fire
Date published: March, 2009

56

FM Global
Property Loss Prevention Data Sheets

7-76
March 2009
Page 1 of 56

PREVENTION AND MITIGATION OF COMBUSTIBLE DUST EXPLOSION AND FIRE

Table of Contents
Page
1.0 SCOPE .................................................................................................................................................... 3
1.1 Changes ........................................................................................................................................... 3
2.0 LOSS PREVENTION RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................................................................ 3
2.1 General ............................................................................................................................................. 3
2.2 Room/Building Explosion Hazards .................................................................................................... 5
2.2.1 Construction and Location ...................................................................................................... 5
2.2.2 Occupancy ............................................................................................................................... 7
2.2.3 Protection ............................................................................................................................... 7
2.2.4 Operation and Maintenance ................................................................................................... 9
2.3 Equipment Explosion Hazards ....................................................................................................... 10
2.3.1 General .................................................................................................................................. 10
2.3.2 Explosion Hazard Elimination ............................................................................................... 10
2.3.3 Explosion-Hazard Mitigation ................................................................................................. 11
2.3.4 Ignition Source Control .......................................................................................................... 18
2.4 Dust Collectors and Cyclones ......................................................................................................... 20
2.4.1 Construction and Location .................................................................................................... 20
2.4.2 Protection (3.1.21) ................................................................................................................. 20
2.4.3 Ignition Source Control .......................................................................................................... 20
2.5 Connecting Ducts (3.1.24) ............................................................................................................... 21
2.5.1 Occupancy ............................................................................................................................. 21
2.5.2 Protection .............................................................................................................................. 21
2.6 Silos (3.1.25) ................................................................................................................................... 22
2.6.1 Protection .............................................................................................................................. 22
2.6.2 Equipment and Processes ................................................................................................... 23
2.7 Bucket Elevators (3.1.26) ............................................................................................................... 23
2.7.1 Construction and Location .................................................................................................... 23
2.7.2 Protection .............................................................................................................................. 23
2.7.3 Ignition Source Control ......................................................................................................... 23
2.8 Spray Dryers ................................................................................................................................... 24
2.8.1 Protection .............................................................................................................................. 24
2.9 Bulk Raw-Grain Handling ............................................................................................................... 24
2.9.1 Equipment and Processes ................................................................................................... 24
2.10 Dust Fire Hazards ......................................................................................................................... 25
3.0 SUPPORT FOR RECOMMENDATIONS .............................................................................................. 25
3.1 Comments and Technical Support ................................................................................................. 25
3.1.1 Is There a Housekeeping Problem? (2.2.4.2) ....................................................................... 25
3.1.2 Relocating Explosion Hazards Outdoors (2.3.1.1) ................................................................ 26
3.1.3 Inerting (Phlegmatization) (2.3.2.3) ...................................................................................... 26
3.1.4 FM Global Explosion Effects Calculations DustCalc (2.3.3.1) .......................................... 26
3.1.5 Explosion Quench Pipes (2.3.3.1.2) ..................................................................................... 27
3.1.6 Strength of Vessels (2.3.3.1.3) ............................................................................................. 27
3.1.7 Effects of Explosion Vent Mass (Inertia) (2.3.3.1.6) ............................................................. 28
3.1.8 Effect of Explosion Vent Ducts (2.3.3.1.7) .......................................................................... 29
3.1.9 Re-Closing Explosion Vents (2.2.3.4 and 2.3.3.1.9) ........................................................... 29
3.1.10 Pressure and Fireball Effects from an Explosion (2.3.3.1.11) ........................................... 29
3.1.11 Fixed Obstructions near the Face of Explosion Vents (2.3.3.1.12) ................................... 30
3.1.12 Distribution of Explosion Vents (2.3.3.1.15) ....................................................................... 31

2009 Factory Mutual Insurance Company. All rights reserved. No part of this document may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in whole or in part, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical,
photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without written permission of Factory Mutual Insurance Company.

57

7-76

Combustible Dust Explosion

Page 2

FM Global Property Loss Prevention Data Sheets

3.1.13 Dust Collector Operating Pressures (2.3.3.1.17) ............................................................... 31

3.1.14 Explosion Isolation (2.3.3.2) .............................................................................................. 31
3.1.15 Explosion Isolation: Use of Active Devices (2.3.3.3.4) ...................................................... 31
3.1.16 Rapid-Action Float Valves (2.3.3.3.5) .................................................................................. 32
3.1.17 Vacuum Operation (2.3.3.6) ............................................................................................... 32
3.1.18 Spark Extinguishing Versus Explosion Suppression (2.3.4.1) ........................................... 32
3.1.19 Minimum Ignition Energy (MIE)(2.3.4.2) ............................................................................. 33
3.1.20 Foreign Material Separators, Magnetic or Other (2.3.4.3) ................................................. 33
3.1.21 Clean Versus Dirty Side of Dust Collectors (2.4.2) ............................................................ 33
3.1.22 Cyclone Explosion Venting (2.4.2.3) .................................................................................. 34
3.1.23 Conductive Dust Collector Bags (2.4.3.1) ....................................................................... 34
3.1.24 Connecting Ducts (2.5) ....................................................................................................... 34
3.1.25 Silos (2.6) ............................................................................................................................ 35
3.1.26 Bucket Elevators (2.7) ......................................................................................................... 35
3.1.27 Size-Reduction Equipment (Grinders, Pulverizers, Hammer Mills, etc.) ............................ 36
3.2 Loss History ..................................................................................................................................... 36
4.0 REFERENCES ...................................................................................................................................... 38
4.1 FM Global ....................................................................................................................................... 38
4.2 Other ................................................................................................................................................ 38
APPENDIX A GLOSSARY OF TERMS ...................................................................................................... 39
APPENDIX B DOCUMENT REVISION HISTORY ...................................................................................... 41
APPENDIX C RESEARCH INFORMATION ON DUST EXPLOSION HAZARDS ...................................... 42
C.1 Reprint from Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries: Improved Guidelines for
the Sizing of Vents in Dust Explosions .......................................................................................... 42
APPENDIX D BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................... 56

List of Figures
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.

1. Preferred locations for processes or equipment handling combustible dusts ................................... 6

2. Schematic of rooftop explosion vents that project above the roof line ............................................. 8
3. Rotary Air Lock ................................................................................................................................. 14
4. Rapid-action valve (gate type) ......................................................................................................... 15
5. Rapid action float valve (Ventix ESI ) ............................................................................................ 15
6. Acceptable design parameters for explosion diverters .................................................................... 16
7. Explosion diverter .............................................................................................................................. 17
8. Indoor installation of explosion diverter ............................................................................................ 17
9. High-speed abort gate ...................................................................................................................... 17
10. Example of duct explosion venting at an elbow ............................................................................ 22
11. FM Approved explosion quench pipe (Photo courtesy of Rembe GmbH) ................................... 28

List of Tables
Table
Table
Table
Table
Table
Table

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Construction for Dust Handling Occupancies ................................................................................... 6

Typical Dust Bulk Density .............................................................................................................. 26
Losses by Industry (by Number of Losses) ................................................................................... 36
Losses by Cause (Ignition Source) ................................................................................................ 37
Losses by Dust Type ...................................................................................................................... 37
Losses by Equipment Type ............................................................................................................ 38

2009 Factory Mutual Insurance Company. All rights reserved.

58

Combustible Dust Explosion

FM Global Property Loss Prevention Data Sheets

7-76
Page 3

1.0 SCOPE
This data sheet describes recommended preventive measures to reduce the frequency of combustible dust
explosions, and protection features to minimize damage from a combustible dust explosion. The hazards
of dust fires can be found in other data sheets containing detailed occupancyspecific recommendations.
However, an overview of loss history related to dust fires is included in this document.
This data sheet does not include dust explosion prevention and protection schemes unique to grain handling,
storage, and processing. Loss prevention recommendations for these occupancies are covered in Data Sheet
7-75, Grain Storage and Milling. However, recommendations in this data sheet do apply to hazards at grain
handling facilities that are not unique to those facilities.
The technology of dust explosion hazard evaluation is primarily discussed in metric (SI) units and those are
the units used in this data sheet.
1.1 Changes
March 2009. Minor editorial changes were made for this revision.
2.0 LOSS PREVENTION RECOMMENDATIONS
2.1 General
2.1.1 Treat all equipment that handles combustible dusts, as well as any rooms or buildings where combustible
dusts can be present and might be put into suspension, as having a dust explosion hazard.
2.1.2 Implement a management-of-change process in all facilities handling combustible dusts to be certain
that no changes occur that could increase the severity or consequence of an existing dust hazard or introduce
a dust hazard where none previously existed. Examples of such changes include the following:
Adding new equipment such as blenders, grinders, cutting tools, dust collectors, cyclones, etc.
Increasing temperatures in the process that could result in drier material being handled
Adding new materials
Changing product formulation by adding combustible materials or reducing the proportion of inert materials
Making process changes that reduce the particle size of in-process materials
2.1.3 Where process, equipment, raw material, or product changes are planned that could significantly change
the dust properties, retest the dust for its explosibility.
2.1.4. Ensure your management-of-change process has the following minimum characteristics:
a) Provides a method for identification of changes that should be subject to the management-of-change
process
b) Provides documentation of the proposed change
c) Provides a formal analysis of the loss prevention considerations involved in the proposed change
d) Identifies the need for updated personnel training
e) Provides for communication of the change and the loss prevention consequences to appropriate
personnel such as maintenance, operators, safety, and emergency responders
f) Establishes any administrative procedures needed (documentation, checklists that cover hazards,
training, etc.)
g) Identifies any required authorizations
2.1.5 Where potential for a dust explosion exists, eliminate the potential or minimize the consequences using
one of the following methods:
a) Control fugitive dust releases using enclosures, collection systems and equipment design.
b) Locate dust producing operations in areas separated from different hazard occupancies by construction
(dust-tight and explosion-resistant barriers) or distance.

2009 Factory Mutual Insurance Company. All rights reserved.

59

7-76

Combustible Dust Explosion

Page 4

FM Global Property Loss Prevention Data Sheets

c) Minimize chances for dust accumulation by arranging building elements and equipment to reduce the
likelihood of dust accumulations. Employ features such as smooth, easily cleaned walls, boxed in or
covered horizontal surfaces (beams, joists, etc.), and surfaces sloped a minimum of 60 from the
horizontal.
d) Where fugitive dust release and accumulation exist in buildings, design the structure to safely vent
the potential explosion using damage-limiting construction.
e) Locate dust collection and transfer equipment outside, away from important buildings and utilities.
f) Construct equipment that processes or transfers combustible particles to contain or safely vent a
potential explosion.
g) Where explosion venting or containment in equipment is not possible, eliminate the oxygen in the system
by inerting, or install an explosion-suppression system.
2.1.6 Practice effective maintenance of production and protection equipment. An effective maintenance
program will:
a) Identify and eliminate fugitive dust sources continually.
b) Test and maintain spark detection and extinguishing systems, explosion isolation devices, and relief
vents to ensure they are in working order per manufacturers guidelines, or at least monthly.
c) Test and maintain metal and non-metal detection and extraction equipment to ensure they are in working
order, at least quarterly.
d) Check belts and rotating equipment for alignment at least quarterly to prevent these becoming a source
of friction heating.
e) Lubricate bearings and rotating equipment (fans, blowers, size-reduction equipment) in accordance
with manufacturers guidelines, or at least quarterly
f) Remove accumulated dust on rotating equipment bearings and components to insure free movement
and prevent friction heating, at least quarterly.
g) Assign accountability and keep accurate records.
2.1.7 Ensure a comprehensive dust fire and explosion awareness program exists at all sites where
combustible dust exists either within closed processing systems or as fugitive dust within buildings. Include
the following:
a) Basic education to promote awareness and understanding of the hazards of combustible dusts
b) Instruction of new employees on the particular hazards and on precautions relevant to their departments
c) A minimum of annual instruction, drill, and familiarization of the local public fire service and/or internal
firefighting teams
d) Periodic refresher training for all facility personnel
2.1.8 Strictly control potential dust ignition sources where combustible dusts may be present.
a) Ensure all electrical equipment is rated Class II, Division 1 or 2, or Zone 20, 21, or 22 per NFPA 70,
the National Electric Code, Articles 500, 502, and 506, as appropriate, or international equivalent. (Refer
to Data Sheet 5-1, Electrical Equipment in Hazardous Locations, for additional details regarding area
classification and equipment selection.)
b) Use a hot work permit system to manage all hot work operations. (See DS 10-3, Hot Work Management,
and Hot Work Management Kit, P9601)
c) Prohibit smoking and open flames.
d) Provide grounding and bonding of metal components with a resistance of less than 1 x 106 ohms to
ground. (See DS 5-8, Static Electricity.) At least annually, check for continuity of the metal components and
security of any bonding connections.
e) Subject all electrical equipment to an initial infrared (IR) scan and then at a frequency as dictated by
results and DS 5-20, Electrical Testing.

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2.1.9 Prohibit recycling of air material separator exhaust to buildings or rooms, except where either a or
all of b through h apply:
a) The return air duct discharges into an area that does not contain fugitive dust, combustible equipment
or storage, combustible construction, high-value equipment, or equipment that is critical to production,
OR
b) Install a filter downstream of the dust air separators that prevents return of dust to the enclosure with
a minimum efficiency of 99.9% at 10 microns AND
c) Install a device to measure pressure-drop across the filter with an alarm to indicate when the filter needs
to be cleaned or replaced AND
d) Provide support for the filter with a wire mesh screen or other method that allows the filter to withstand
a pressure equal to or exceeding the value of Pred for the piece of equipment directly upstream from it
AND
e) Provide explosion isolation between the building and the last dust collector in the system (the one
furthest downstream) AND
f) On explosion-isolation system activation, shut down any connected dust- collection equipment AND
g) Combustible vapors, gases, or hybrid mixtures are not involved AND
h) The dust-collection system meets the protection requirements in other sections of this data sheet.
Where these features are present, the recycling of air material separator exhaust would not cause the
building/room to require explosion protection features such as venting, etc. (other factors present in the
building/room could create that need, however).
2.2 Room/Building Explosion Hazards
2.2.1 Construction and Location
Isolate areas handling combustible dusts from other less hazardous occupancies by separation with
construction or distance to minimize damage from the potential explosion or fire. Areas needing isolation
would be where fugitive dust is not readily controlled for example, grinding, sanding, sawing, open conveying,
filing open bins, etc. Excluded would be for example, rooms containing properly vented dust collectors, spray
dryers, fluid bed dryers, etc.
In new construction where some fugitive dust is likely, maximizing explosion venting beyond that calculated
by DustCalc, can provide future flexibility for process or material changes, and often can be done with little
additional cost.
2.2.1.1 Isolate areas handling combustible dusts using the methods listed below in order of preference (also
see Figure 1, Table 1):
a) Detached outside location at least 50 ft (15 m) away from an important building or facility (Fig. 1,
Location 1)
b) Along an exterior wall of an important building, preferably at a corner to limit exposure (Fig. 1, Location 2)
c) Inside an important building on the first floor, either at an exterior corner or along an exterior wall. Avoid
locations on upper floors of multistory buildings. Where above-grade locations are unavoidable, ensure
the floor and ceiling of the room have the same pressure resistance as the walls. (Fig. 1, Locations
3 and 4)
Where confirmed using DustCalc software, the spacing can be reduced to less than recommended in a
above or Distance X in Table 1.

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2.2.1.2 Avoid below-grade locations that cannot be equipped with adequate explosion venting.

Fig. 1. Preferred locations for processes or equipment handling combustible dusts

Table 1. Construction for Dust Handling Occupancies

Location
1 (note 3)

Distance X, ft (m)
> 50 (15)
10 50
(3 15)
< 10 (3)

A
PV
PR

Abutting

DNA

Abutting

3 (note 5)
4 (note 5)

Room/Building Construction
B
Roof
PV
PV or LW
PV
PV or LW

PR

DNA

Abutting

DNA

Inside
Inside

PV
PV

PV

PV or LW

B*

PV

PV

B*

PV

PV

B
PV

B*
PR
PR
PR

Construction of Exposed Wall

C
Any
Any

PR

PR for 10 ft (3 m),
horizontally & vertically
beyond exposing structure
PR for 10 ft (3 m),
horizontally & vertically
beyond abutting structure
PR for 10 ft (3 m),
horizontally beyond
abutting structure
PR for Abutting wall only

PR
PR

DNA
DNA

PV or LW

PR

1. This table addresses only protection against explosion hazard.

2. The types of construction are defined as follows:
PR = Pressure resistant
PV = Pressure venting
LW = Lightweight, noncombustible
3. Where confirmed with calculations by the DustCalc software, location 1 distance X may be less than those listed above.
4. PR construction is also needed for floors and ceilings that have spaces below or above that contain less-hazardous occupancies.
5. Where adequate venting can be provided using the walls alone, roofs (not ceilings) do not need to be pressure-venting.

2.2.1.3 Construct buildings in which a combustible dust hazard exists of noncombustible or FM Approved
Class 1 materials.
2.2.1.4 Ensure physical barriers that isolate dust hazard areas are sealed dust tight using noncombustible
materials. Where the barriers have a fire resistance, ensure the seals maintain that rating.
2.2.1.5 Use door seals, window seals, positive room pressurization, etc. to prevent dust from entering and
accumulating in adjacent areas that otherwise do not have their own sources of fugitive dust.
2.2.1.6 Ensure physical barriers that isolate dust hazard areas have explosion resistance sufficient to prevent
failure before the pressure can be safely vented.
2.2.1.7 Do not allow openings in explosion-resistant walls. Where openings cannot be avoided, keep all doors
in these walls normally closed and make sure they have the same explosion-resistance as the walls
themselves. (See DS 1-44, Damage-Limiting Construction, for design and installation of explosion resistant
doors and windows.)

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2.2.1.8 Provide pressure resistance and vent area in accordance with calculations conducted using FM Global
DustCalc software.
2.2.1.9 In buildings where some fugitive dust is likely despite process design and equipment upkeep, arrange
building elements and equipment to reduce the likelihood and amount of dust accumulation by any or all
of the following, as appropriate:
a) Provide smooth interior walls with minimal ledges.
b) To the extent practical, provide horizontal surfaces such as girders, beams, ledges, and equipment
tops with a sloped cover having a smooth finish, to shed dust settling out of the air.
c) Slope covers at an angle of 60 from horizontal, unless a lesser slope is known to be sufficient.
d) Box in overhead structural steel that is out of the reach of normal vacuuming or sweeping operations
and that has horizontal ledges (such as Ibeams or Ushaped channels in the up or sideways position)
with a noncombustible material to eliminate pockets for dust accumulation.
2.2.2 Occupancy
2.2.2.1 Buildings can be considered as not having a combustible dust hazard if they contain combustible
dust-handling equipment that is designed and protected to control or safely vent an internal explosion, in
accordance with the pertinent sections of this data sheet.
2.2.2.2 Take any or all of the following steps, as needed, where quantities of fugitive dust could be expected
in new operations or are excessive in existing operations:
a) Survey process equipment to identify the sources of dust release.
b) Modify, repair, or replace equipment to eliminate or at least reduce dust escape.
c) Provide permanent vacuum pickup points at the locations that release dust, such as grinding, buffing,
bag dumping, open transfer points in conveying systems, and other equipment/locations where large
quantities of dust are liberated frequently. In some cases this may require construction of a ventilated hood
or containment enclosure for existing equipment.
d) Operate closed dust-handling systems under a slight negative pressure to reduce dust escape.
e) Conduct extra housekeeping in existing operations while equipment is being modified (see Section
2.2.4).
2.2.2.3 Existing buildings containing small, localized amounts (less than 5% of the building area and in no
case exceeding 1,000 ft2 [93 m2]) of fugitive combustible dust can be considered tolerable without explosion
damage-limiting construction, if the following conditions exist:
a) The fugitive dust escape and accumulation rate is very low, i.e., less than 116 in. (1.6 mm) for a dust
with an approximate bulk density of about 36 lb/ft3 (580 kg/m3) per three month period AND
b) The cleaning frequency is high enough to permit one scheduled cleaning to be missed without allowing
dust accumulations to reach the unacceptable level of 116 in. (1.6 mm) noted above.
2.2.3 Protection
2.2.3.1 Construct pressure-relieving and resistant walls in accordance with Data Sheet 1-44, Damage-Limiting
Construction.
a) Design the explosion vent relief pressure (Pstat) as low as the wind-resistance design will permit. In a
low-wind area, Pstat can be as low as 20 psf (0.01 bar), whereas in higher wind areas 30 to 40 psf (0.015
bar) is more typical.
b) Provide pressure resistance and vent area in accordance with calculations conducted using FM Global
DustCalc software.
2.2.3.2 Do not use explosion vents in the roof to provide explosion relief.
2.2.3.3 Where a thorough engineering study shows that explosion-venting walls alone cannot provide the
needed explosion venting area, roof vents may be used to provide a portion of the needed vent area if snow
and ice are not allowed to build up on the vent. Any of the following are acceptable methods:

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a) Position the explosion vents at a minimum 60 angle, either on a roof pitched at that angle or as a
projection above the roof line (see Figure 2). For vents projected above the roof line, the effective vent
relief area to be used in vent sizing calculations is the smallest cross sectional area the combustion gases
would have to flow through.
b) Provide heat tracing along the perimeter and across the surface area of the explosion vent.
1. Leave heat tracing on permanently, or automatically actuate the system whenever the outside
temperature drops to 0C (32F) or lower.
2. Ensure the wiring for the heat trace cabling incorporates enough slack to allow the explosion vent
to deploy as intended.
3. Use FM Approved heat-tracing equipment.
c) Provide explosion venting panels without insulation to allow building heat to melt away snow or ice.
Expect condensation under the explosion vent and take measures to ensure condensation does not cause
problems.

Fig. 2. Schematic of rooftop explosion vents that project above the roof line

2.2.3.4 Where explosion venting devices swing out of the way rather than rupture, use gravity or mechanical
devices to ensure they cannot reclose. (3.1.9)
2.2.3.5 To prevent uncontrolled release of explosion vent panels where they could become missile hazards,
take the following steps:
a) Provide tethering cables to limit the vent movement.
b) Attach tethering cables to no more than two corners, making sure the tethered corners are adjacent.
c) To prevent the tethered panels from swinging back into the vent opening after the explosion, make
connections at the side or bottom of the panel rather than the top. This allows the panels to completely
swing out of the way of the vent opening, leaving an unobstructed path for the combustion gases to flow
along during the explosion, and for fresh air to flow into the protected enclosure after the explosion.
d) Set minimum tether length to that determined by the following equation:
axb
l
2 x (a+b)
where

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l = length of tethering cables

a, b = side dimensions of explosion vent
e) Where the tether length is less than that determined above, consider the explosion vent as a hinged
panel when performing calculations to determine the vent area and vented explosion pressure (Pred). This
will account for the hindrance to the venting process created by the short tethers.
f) Where tethers are located at all four corners, this can be considered tolerable where the cable length
exceeds the minimum set in d, above. Any less and the vent area is restricted to the annular space
determined by the cable length and the dimensions of the panel, rather than on the size of the panel itself.
2.2.3.6 Do not attach sprinkler system piping to any wall, ceiling, or roof that could be displaced by the
pressure of a room or building explosion.
2.2.4 Operation and Maintenance
2.2.4.1 In buildings where fugitive dust is released despite process design and equipment upkeep, incorporate
the following actions into a fugitive-dust-control program:
a) Assign accountability and keep records.
b) Commit time and resources regularly.
c) Create a maintenance schedule and review it periodically to ensure it is adequate.
d) Pay particular attention to eliminating accumulations above floor level, such as equipment tops and
building structural members because this dust is more likely to become suspended (airborne) and create
an explosible cloud if it is disturbed.
e) Use vacuum removal wherever possible using a central, portable, or truckmounted vacuum system
as appropriate.
f) Where vacuuming is impractical, sweeping or water wash-down are other acceptable options.
g) Where compressed air blow-down is the only practical method for cleanup, use the following
precautions:
1. Perform air blown-down frequently enough to prevent hazardous accumulations of dust.
2. Limit the extent of blow-down to small areas at a time with as low a volume and pressure of air as
possible.
3. Shut down electrical equipment not suitable for Class II, Division 2 hazardous locations.
4. Prohibit open flames and hot work, and ensure no hot surfaces exist.
2.2.4.2 Any accumulations of fugitive dust present a potential for a secondary explosion and must be
eliminated in buildings without damage-limiting construction (DLC), and controlled in those with DLC (3.1.1).
a) Base dust-cleaning frequency on preventing accumulations of more than 116 in. (1.6 mm) thickness
over more than 5% of the room floor area.
b) Use fugitive dust exceeding the above, either in thickness or area, as a trigger to initiate cleanup.
c) Ensure the total area of accumulation does not exceed 1,000 ft2 (93 m2).
d) The thickness of 116 in. (1.6 mm) is based on a typical wood or agricultural dust with a bulk density
of about 36 lbs/ft3 (580 kg/m3). The thickness of dust of different density can be based on a ratio of the
bulk densities.
2.2.4.3 Inspect explosion venting devices periodically to prevent their condition or mobility from being
impaired. Possible impairments include the following:
a) Corrosion
b) Improper painting of movable parts or rupture membranes
c) Icing
d) Snow accumulation on or in front of vents

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e) Obstruction by pipes, wires, or other utilities

f) Permanent or temporary equipment located next to the venting device
Any of these can increase effective vent-relief pressure (Pstat) and cause explosion-resisting walls to fail
and/or damage the building structure during an explosion.
2.3 Equipment Explosion Hazards
2.3.1 General
2.3.1.1 Locate all equipment having an explosion hazard outdoors whenever practical (3.1.2).
2.3.1.2 Where equipment has an explosion hazard, take one of the following steps:
a) Eliminate the explosion hazard using any of the techniques detailed in Section 2.3.2,
OR
b) Mitigate the explosion hazard using explosion venting, suppression, containment, or vacuum operation,
or a suitable combination of these, as detailed in Section 2.3.3.
2.3.2 Explosion Hazard Elimination
2.3.2.1 Where equipment handles coarse material, prevent dust from being generated during material
handling by suitable methods or preclean the coarse material to remove all fines from most of the process
equipment.
2.3.2.2 Where equipment handles coarse material, prevent dust from being generated during material
handling by eliminating airborne dust inside the processing equipment using a liquid mist (water or other
compatible liquid) as follows:
a) Apply the liquid suppressant at a point in the process that involves substantial turbulence, e.g., at a
discharge spout, to ensure the suppressant is thoroughly mixed in with the material stream.
b) Install an interlock that will shut down the solid process stream on suppressant spray-system malfunction
if this system is being relied upon as the sole means of hazard control.
c) Confirm the effectiveness of the system to eliminate dust in the equipment by visually checking
equipment while it is running, for example, by opening access or inspection ports.
d) Develop a maintenance and inspection program with written procedures and records of completion to
ensure the dust-suppressant spray system is functioning properly whenever the solid process stream is
being handled.
2.3.2.3 Inert the combustible dust by mixing it with a noncombustible dust (known as phlegmatization)
on the following basis (3.1.3):
a) Perform a test to determine the mixture is non-explosible per ASTM E1515, Standard Test Method
for Minimum Explosible Concentration for Combustible Dust or international equivalent.
b) Ensure the noncombustible dust does not separate from the combustible dust during further material
handling.
2.3.2.4 Reduce the oxygen level in the process with an inert gas in accordance with recommendations in
Data Sheet 7-59, Inerting and Purging of Equipment.
2.3.2.4.1 If values of the Limiting Oxygen Concentration (LOC) are not available from Data Sheet 7-59 for
the particular material being handled, arrange for laboratory testing of materials to determine the LOC.
2.3.2.4.2 Where an inert atmosphere is to be used to safeguard pneumatic conveying of freshly ground or
freshly manufactured light metal powder (aluminum, magnesium, titanium, zirconium):
a) Provide a minimum oxygen concentration of at least 1% to ensure a stable oxide layer can be formed
to passivate the dust.
b) Where the metal powder is not to be exposed to air, or where testing has shown a lower oxygen level
is acceptable, concentrations lower than 1% are acceptable.

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2.3.2.4.3 The metal powders titanium, magnesium, zirconium, uranium, and thorium, will ignite in pure carbon
dioxide. Use argon, helium, or nitrogen (except for titanium, which can be ignited in pure nitrogen) for inerting
processes handling these materials.
2.3.2.5 As an alternative to an inert atmosphere for handling freshly manufactured light metal powder
(aluminum, magnesium, titanium, zirconium) take the following steps:
a) Use wet collectors (water wash) rather than dry type.
b) Remove the accumulated sludge and dispose of it in a safe manner before shutting down the collection
system.
c) Continue collector ventilation at all times until the metal/water sludge is removed from the collector.
Aluminum particularly has a very low MIE (as low as 0.1 mJ) making it easily ignitable and metal powders
in general can have high Kst and be very difficult to provide adequate explosion venting. Aluminum powder
when damp with water can form small amounts of hydrogen so it needs to be kept wet at all times.
2.3.3 Explosion-Hazard Mitigation
2.3.3.1 Venting
2.3.3.1.1 Provide a vent area in accordance with calculations conducted using FM Global DustCalc software
(3.1.4).
2.3.3.1.2 Where indoor equipment with an explosion hazard cannot be relocated outside, provide explosion
venting in one of the following ways:
a) Locate the vessel next to an exterior wall and vent the explosion to the outdoors via a short vent duct.
b) Vent the explosion to the surrounding area through an FM Approved explosion quench pipe (3.1.5).
1. A vent area increase (compared to an open or unobstructed vent) will be needed to accommodate
reduced venting efficiency caused by the quench pipe.
2. Use the venting efficiency for FM Approved quench pipes as listed in the Approval Guide, a publication
of FM Approvals.
Where the above is not practical, implement other explosion hazard mitigation methods described in 2.3.1.2.b.
2.3.3.1.3 For calculations of vent area where equipment design strength data is not available, use the
following values of Pred (maximum allowable pressure) for normally constructed equipment with an
assumption that some vessel deformation may occur in a safely vented explosion:
a) Weak rectangular vessels (e.g., bag-type dust collector): 0.2 barg (2.9 psig)
b) Cylindrical vessels (e.g., cyclone) or strong (reinforced) rectangular vessels: 0.3 barg (4.4 psig) (3.1.6)
2.3.3.1.3.1 For vessels where deformation is not acceptable, obtain the design strength of the equipment
or assume 12 the values given above for Pred.
2.3.3.1.4 Set the explosion vent relief pressure (Pstat) as low as possible in accordance with the following
criteria:
a) Not exceeding 0.05 barg (0.7 psig) when vessel operates below this pressure, OR
b) At least 0.1 barg (1.4 psig) below the assumed Pred for higher operating pressure
2.3.3.1.5 For calculations of vent area where equipment design strength data is available, set the value of
Pred according to the following criteria:
a) Where vessel deformation is acceptable, use a value equal to twice the design strength.
b) Where vessel deformation is to be prevented, use a value equal to the design strength (3.1.6).
2.3.3.1.6 Construct explosion vents of material that is as light in weight (mass per unit area) as possible to
minimize the vent area required. Explosion vents that are rupture membranes (e.g., prefabricated rupture
disks, aluminum foil, etc.) have virtually no inertia, and require no adjustment to the required explosion vent
area (3.1.7).

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2.3.3.1.6.1 Where venting devices are heavier than light-weight membranes, calculate the effect on the vent
area using FM Global DustCalc software.
2.3.3.1.7 Install vent ducts that redirect the combustion products from the vent to a safe area in accordance
with the following:
a) Route the vent to a safe outdoor area.
b) Permit no bends in the duct.
c) Limit the length to diameter ratio (L/D*) of the duct to 1.
d) Ensure the vent duct is at least as strong as the Pred design of the vessel.
e) Permit no closures on the discharge end of the duct that obstruct the free venting of the discharged
material.
f) When the above conditions cannot be met, quantify the effect on the vent area using FM Global DustCalc
software (3.1.8).
* calculate the equivalent diameter (Deff) of a non-circular duct as follows:

Deff =

4Ad

where Ad is the cross sectional area of the duct (m2 or ft2)

2.3.3.1.8 Where a wire mesh screen or other obstruction is to be provided between an explosion vent and
the free atmosphere, adjust the effective area of the explosion vent for the reduction in venting efficiency
as follows:
a) If the screen or obstruction is less than 15% of the explosion vent area, no adjustment is required.
b) If the screen or obstruction is between 15% and 40% of the explosion vent area, calculate the effective
explosion venting area using:
Av,eff = Av,actual X 115-% blockage
100
c) If the screen or obstruction exceeds 40% of the explosion vent area, blockage is excessive. Replace
the screen or obstruction with something that causes a smaller blockage.
2.3.3.1.9 Where explosion venting devices swing out of the way rather than rupture, use gravity or mechanical
devices to ensure they cannot reclose and create vacuum conditions that can collapse/implode the protected
equipment (3.1.9).
2.3.3.1.9.1 Where explosion vents can reclose and there are no other openings that could draw in air, provide
vacuum breakers. (See German engineering standard VDI 3673 for sizing information.)
2.3.3.1.10 To prevent the free release of explosion vent panels where they could become missile hazards,
provide tethers in accordance with 2.2.3.5.
2.3.3.1.11 Do not locate objects subject to fire or pressure damage in the path of explosion vents (3.1.10.1
and 3.1.10.2).
2.3.3.1.12 For new installations, provide a distance of at least two explosion vent diameters between an
explosion vent outlet (face of explosion vent or vent duct) and any large, fixed, flat obstruction (e.g., a wall).
For explosion vent outlets having cross sections other than circular, use the hydraulic diameter as calculated
below (3.1.11).
Hydraulic diameter = 4A/p, where
A = cross-sectional area of vent
p = perimeter of the cross-section

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2.3.3.1.13 Where a weather protection cover (rain hat) is provided over the end of an explosion vent duct,
estimate the effect on the venting efficiency as follows:
a) If there is a distance of at least one explosion vent diameter between the end of the duct and the weather
cover, there is no effect on efficiency.
b) If the distance is between 14 and 1 explosion vent diameter, consider the weather cover as a 90 bend
in the vented flow when calculating the effect of the vent duct.
c) A distance of less than 14 explosion vent diameter away from the vent duct is unacceptable unless it
is designed to fly off in the event of an explosion.
For non-circular ducts, use the hydraulic diameter for these calculations (2.3.3.1.12).
2.3.3.1.14 Do not provide explosion venting if the dust or its combustion products are poisonous, radioactive,
corrosive to nearby equipment or structures, or for any other reason should not be released from an otherwise
closed system. Use alternatives to venting, such as explosion hazard elimination, explosion suppression,
explosion containment, or high vacuum operation.
2.3.3.1.15 Where a vessel requiring explosion venting contains significant obstructions to the free flow of
gases, provide several distributed vents at different places on the vessel rather than one large vent of the
same area (3.1.12).
2.3.3.1.16 Where a vessel contains both suspended combustible dust and flammable liquid vapors or gases
(a hybrid mixture), the reactivity of the mixture will require larger vent areas than the combustible dust on
its own.
a) The presence of a flammable vapor or gas can be ignored if the concentration is at or below 5% of
its Lower Explosive Limit (LEL).
b) Where the gas concentration exceeds 5% of its LEL, determine the reactivity of the mixture by testing.
2.3.3.1.17 The required explosion venting area for a vessel with a dust explosion hazard operating at
pressures exceeding 0.1 barg (1.5 psig) requires special consideration and needs to be carefully analyzed.
FM Global DustCalc software can handle initial pressure up to 4 barg (58 psig) for full-volume explosions.
a) Set the vent-relief pressure, Pstat above the normal maximum operating pressure by at least 0.1 barg
(1.5 psig) (3.1.13).
b) Obtain vent sizing criteria from experts familiar with high initial pressure venting.
2.3.3.1.18 Recoil forces from the venting of an explosion can dislodge even large vessels that are not properly
anchored. Implement one of the following to control recoil forces:
a) Provide equal-sized vents at opposite sides of the vessel.
b) Calculate the magnitude and duration of the dynamic recoil force (or an equivalent static force) from
a vent, and provide anchorage to resist those forces (3.1.10.3).
2.3.3.2 Isolation
Avoid multiple pieces of interconnected equipment containing a dust explosion hazard. Properly protected
equipment can fail when an explosion propagates from another piece of equipment. Isolation systems can
prevent that condition (3.1.14).
2.3.3.2.1 Provide explosion isolation on all connections of vessels (or vessel groups) designed to contain
the explosion pressure (explosion-resistant design).
2.3.3.2.2 Provide explosion isolation on all connections between vessels (or vessel groups) individually
protected by explosion venting (or other mitigation method) but subject to unacceptable property damage
or business interruption by a propagating event.
2.3.3.3 Isolation Systems
This section includes acceptable forms of explosion isolation and the features needed to ensure the systems
serve as effective flame barriers.

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2.3.3.3.1 Chemical Explosion Blocking Systems

a) Install the system in accordance with Data Sheet 7-17, Explosion Protection Systems.
b) Install FM Approved equipment.
c) These systems may be inappropriate under the following conditions:
1. Process flow rates are high.
2. The primary explosion is in a very large vessel.
3. The primary explosion is in a vessel protected by explosion containment.
2.3.3.3.2 Rotary Air Locks
Install devices as follows:
a) Ensure the angle between adjacent vanes and the shape of the housing allows two vanes per side
to be engaged (near the housing wall) at all times.
b) Ensure the vanes (including the tips) are made of metal and have a thickness of at least 18 in. (3 mm).
c) Ensure the gap between the tips of the vanes and the housing between 0.2 and 0.25 mm (less or equal
to 0.1 mm for aluminum dust). Consult reference 17 in Appendix D if additional information on the
allowable gap is required.
d) Interlock the rotary air lock to automatically stop in the event of an explosion, to prevent the passing
of burning matter. An interlock is not required if burning matter would not cause a second fire or explosion
of any significance.

Fig. 3. Rotary Air Lock

2.3.3.3.3 Chokes
Chokes provide explosion isolation by providing an accumulation of powder through which an explosion
cannot propagate.
a) Rotary air locks that dont meet all the criteria in 2.3.3.3.2, can serve as a choke if the height of powder
above the air lock is equivalent to the diameter of the discharge opening and is always present.
b) Screw conveyors can serve as chokes where part of the screw is removed or a baffle is in place that
ensures a plug of material is always in the screw.

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2.3.3.3.4 Rapid Action Valves, Gate- Or Butterfly-Type

Ensure the distance between the explosion detection device and the rapid action valve is sufficiently long
to allow the valve to fully close before the arrival of the dust flame front. (See Section 3.1.15 for how to
estimate the flame front travel time.)

Fig. 4. Rapid-action valve (gate type)

2.3.3.3.5 RapidAction Valve (Float Type)

An example of this type of valve is the Ventex ESI (3.1.16).
a) Locate the valve at least 5 m (26 ft) and no more than 12.5 m (41 ft) from the equipment where the
explosion initiates.
b) Ensure the value of Pstat (the vent opening pressure) for explosion vented equipment upstream or
downstream of the float-type valve exceeds the differential pressure required to shut the valve, typically
about 0.1 barg (1.5 psig).
c) Where the value of Pstat must be below the required differential pressure, arrange an alternate closing
mechanism by installing an optical detection system at the explosion source that will trigger the high-speed
release of compressed gas near the float valve to force it to close.
d) Do not locate a float-type valve in an air stream that has a significant loading of abrasive dust that
would prematurely wear down the surfaces of the moving float.

Fig. 5. Rapid action float valve (Ventix ESI )

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2.3.3.3.6 Flame Front Diverter or Explosion Diverter

a) Do not install this device upstream of an air-moving fan because an explosion originating upstream
of the diverter will propagate past the diverter.
b) Do not use explosion diverters in air streams that have a significant loading of abrasive dust that would
eventually erode through the pressure-relieving diverter cover.
c) Do not use explosion diverters for hybrid mixtures where the flammable vapors exceed the LEL.
d) Flame-front diverters built commercially or inhouse according to design guidelines in Figure 6 are
acceptable.
e) Ensure a prefabricated rupture disk used for the pressure-venting opening has a release pressure equal
to or less than 0.1 barg (1.5 psig).
f) Where the diverter is constructed in house and a prefabricated rupture disk is not used, ensure the
device meets the following criteria:
1. When providing a solid cover, ensure it will quickly and easily release during an explosion.
2. When providing a rupture membrane, use a weak weather-resistant material, such as aluminum
foil or tar paper.
3. Confirm the rupture pressure is at or below 0.1 barg (1.5 psig) by calculations or pressure testing.
Base this calculation on the ultimate tensile strength of the material.

Fig. 6. Acceptable design parameters for explosion diverters

2.3.3.3.7 High Speed Abort Gate

a) Actuate the high-speed abort gate by either pressure detection or infrared explosion detection in the
upstream vessel expected to experience the explosion.
b) Ensure the detection system and abort-gate responses are fast enough to completely close the abort
gate before the dust flame front reaches it. (See Section 3.1.15 for how to estimate the flame front travel
time.)

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Fig. 7. Explosion diverter

Fig. 8. Indoor installation of explosion diverter

c) Ensure the abort-gate reset is manual. Automatic reset is not acceptable.

Fig. 9. High-speed abort gate

2.3.3.3.8 Double-Dump Valve

Provide an interlock to ensure both valves do not open simultaneously.
2.3.3.3.9 Back-Blast Damper
This is essentially a check valve that is effective in stopping explosion propagation in the opposite direction
of normal flow. Ensure the device is provided with an explosion vent downstream from the normal flow in
the system.

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2.3.3.4 Suppression
2.3.3.4.1 Where explosion suppression is the chosen explosion hazard mitigation method:
a) Install explosion suppression systems in accordance with Data Sheet 7-17, Explosion Protection
Systems.
b) Install FM Approved equipment in accordance with its listed limits of application.
2.3.3.5 Containment
2.3.3.5.1 Where explosion containment is the chosen explosion hazard mitigation method, use the explosionresistant-design method. Existing, shock-resistant vessels are tolerable for providing explosion containment.
a) Explosion-resistant design is any vessel with a design pressure of 6 barg (87 psig) or more that would
not be deformed by a dust explosion that occurs at an initial (pre-explosion) pressure of less than 0.1
barg (1.5 psig).
b) Shock-resistant design is any vessel having 3 barg (43 psig) design pressure or more when designed
in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII, or yield strength of 6 barg (87
psig) or more according to other codes. With this design, the vessel may deform but not rupture in the
event of a dust explosion that occurs at an initial (pre-explosion) pressure of less than 0.1 barg (1.5 psig).
c) To prevent damage to other equipment connected upstream and downstream of the vessels protected
by explosion containment, provide explosion isolation.
2.3.3.6 High Vacuum (3.1.17)
2.3.3.6.1 Where high vacuum is the chosen explosion hazard mitigation method, use the following criteria:
a) Operate the dust-handling system at a sub-atmospheric pressure of less than 0.1 bar absolute (1.5
psi absolute)
b) Provide an interlock to automatically inert or shut down the process upon a loss of vacuum.
2.3.4 Ignition Source Control
2.3.4.1 Where a process or system has a high frequency of dust explosions implement the following:
a) Operate the equipment that is the source of sparks or hot/glowing particles in an inert atmosphere,
OR
b) Install a spark-detection system combined with either a spark-extinguishing system or a high-speed
abort gate, AND
c) Locate the spark-extinguishing system or high-speed abort gate upstream of the first piece of equipment
having an equipment explosion hazard, AND
d) On activation of the spark-detection system shut down any connected dust collection equipment.
Installation of spark control as above doesnt eliminate the need for explosion hazard mitigation features
(3.1.18).
2.3.4.1.1 The following are considered to have a high frequency of dust explosions:
a) Woodworking industry: rotary dryers, flash dryers, sanding equipment, particleboard milling equipment
(see Data Sheet 7-10, Wood Processing and Woodworking Facilities, for additional fire and explosion
protection requirements related to this industry)
b) Any mechanical milling equipment with connected equipment such as a downstream cyclone
(exceptions: coal pulverizers and human food-product milling are not considered to have a high frequency
of explosions for the purposes of this recommendation.)
c) Processes that routinely produce sparks or glowing embers (e.g., due to grinding or friction) that can
enter a dust-collection system
d) Any process or system that has experienced two or more explosions within a 10 year period

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2.3.4.2 To minimize dust-cloud ignition due to static electricity accumulation and discharge, implement the
following:
a) Apply all applicable recommendations in Data Sheet 5-8, Static Electricity, to minimize the probability
of ignition. Where plastic ducts are used to transfer material, they do not need bonding or grounding
because the insulating properties of plastic do not normally allow large capacitive charges to discharge
in a hazardous spark. The insulating properties also prevent metal grounding wires touching the duct from
draining charges away from the overall duct surface.
b) If materials are very easily ignitable (Minimum Ignition Energy less than 10 mJ), operate any equipment
with an explosion hazard under an inert environment (see 2.3.2.4) (3.1.19).
2.3.4.3 Provide magnetic separators upstream of all size-reduction equipment e.g., grinders, pulverizers,
hammer mills, or other equipment involving mechanical impact with the process material (3.1.20).
2.3.4.3.1 Separators other than magnetic (e.g., air separators, grates, coarse screens) may be used if
nonferrous metal or other objects (e.g., rocks) could enter the product stream and cause an ignition hazard.
2.3.4.4 Fans and blowers in the fugitive dust-air stream can become an ignition source. Install these devices
as recommended below:
2.3.4.4.1 In negative pressure systems, locate the fan on the discharge side (i.e., clean side) of the dust
collector.
2.3.4.4.2 In positive pressure systems, locate the blower upstream of the dust injection point.
2.3.4.4.3 Where, for design reasons, the fan must be located in the dirty air stream, and the dust/air stream
concentration is higher than the 25% of the MEC:
a) install fans and blowers of Type A or B spark-resistant construction per AMCA 99-0401-86,
Classifications for Spark Resistant Construction
b) comply with the appropriate criteria in 2.5, Connecting Ducts, below.
2.3.4.4.4 Ordinary fans and blowers may be used in a dust-air stream of unlimited concentration if the dust
has been shown by test to be hardtoignite.
2.3.4.4.5 Systems handling wood dust can use ordinary fans upstream of bagtype dust collectors if a cyclone
collector (primary dust collector) is upstream of the fan.
2.3.4.4.6 Ordinary fans and blowers may be used if a high-speed abort gate or FM Approved sparkextinguishing system is provided between the fan and any important or valuable downstream equipment.
2.3.4.5 Prevent materials subject to spontaneous heating from becoming an explosion initiation source by
implementing the following:
a) Prevent accumulation in ductwork by maintaining sufficient transport velocity.
b) Prevent accumulation in equipment by performing frequent cleaning.
c) Do not allow moisture to contact such material; however, automatic sprinklers or spark-extinguishing
systems can be used in ducts, when needed.
d) Clean collectors handling residues subject to spontaneous heating daily or as needed to prevent heating
and hazardous accumulations.
2.3.4.6 Avoid using mechanical drives with high rpm or power as they can cause dust ignition due to heat
generated by friction or sparks.
2.3.4.6.1 Use the following guidelines to determine the potential for hazardous conditions based on the
tangential velocity (v) of the rotating component:
a) When v < 1 m/s (3.3 ft/s): there is no danger for ignition.
b) When 1 < v < 10 m/s, (3.3 < v < 33 ft/s): judge each case separately considering the product and material
specific characteristics such as MIE and particle size (for each, the lower value will tend to be more
susceptible to ignition).

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c) When v > 10 m/s (33 ft/s): there is always an ignition potential.

Note: To convert rpm to tangential velocity, use v = rpm x 2r x 1/60, where
v = length (same units as r) per second
r = length of the rotating part, from shaft center to outer tip
2.3.4.6.2 Where low-velocity, high-power equipment is used, usually in grinding operations or screw
conveyors and blenders, the potential for uncontrolled heating due to excessive residence time,
accumulations at bearings, foreign objects, etc., needs to be considered and protected against by using shear
pins, overload detection and alarm, proper maintenance and cleaning, and screens and separators.
2.4 Dust Collectors and Cyclones
In addition to the requirements presented above and in DS 7-73, Dust Collectors, the following are some
specific requirements for dust collectors and cyclones.
2.4.1 Construction and Location
2.4.1.1 For new installations, use separate dust-collection systems for each process area to minimize the
chance of one dust explosion involving many operations. For example, for an operation involving sawing rough
lumber in one area and sanding finished lumber in another, each involving multiple saws and sanding
stations, two separate dust collectors could reduce downtime from a single event. This will be more reliable
than using explosion-isolation devices throughout a manifolded system.
2.4.2 Protection (3.1.21)
2.4.2.1 When determining the explosion venting area for a mediatype dust collector, (e.g., cloth bags, paper
filter sheets or cartridges) include both the clean and dirty air side to calculate the volume of the collector.
2.4.2.2 For mediatype dust collectors, locate explosion vents entirely on the dirty side of the collector volume.
2.4.2.2.1 Where it is necessary to install some venting on the clean side, use the following equation to
calculate the minimum amount of the total explosion venting area that must be provided on the dirty side:
Av,dirty,min (Vdirty/Vtotal)2/3 Av,total
where:
Av,total is the total vent area required
Av,dirty,min is the minimum explosion venting area that should be on the dirty side of the dust collector
Vdirty is the volume of the dirty side of the dust collector
Vtotal is the total volume of the dust collector
2.4.2.3 Cyclone dust collectors can be considered to have adequate explosion relief without any additional
explosion vents if they meet ALL of the following criteria:
a) The dust being processed has a Kst of 80 bar m/s or less, and
b) The exhaust goes directly to atmosphere via the gas outlet at the top of the cyclone, and
c) The gas outlet diameter is at least 45% of the diameter of the cyclone itself, and
d) The free outflow of gases is not obstructed by screening.
1. A rainhat located above the gas outlet hole does not violate this criteria as long as its distance
above the gas outlet is not less than one half the diameter of the gas outlet (3.1.22).
2.4.2.3.1 Calculate explosion vent sizing for all other situations (higher Kst, a smaller gas outlet, gas outlets
with a duct attached exceeding L/D = 1, a duct with a bend, etc.) using FM Globals DustCalc software.
2.4.3 Ignition Source Control
2.4.3.1 Bag-type collectors do not need any type of special conductive bag material to dissipate static
electric charges.
a) Where these special conductive bags have been provided, initiate a schedule of inspection and
maintenance to ensure the straps used to ground the bags are always well-attached to the dust collector
structure.

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b) Regardless of the type of bags used, provide a reliable grounding connection for the bag cages (metal
wire supports) (3.1.23).
2.5 Connecting Ducts (3.1.24)
Ducts connecting pieces of a process or collection system can provide a route for spreading an initial
explosion and may contain enough dust to propagate an explosion of their own. This section does not apply
to clean air ducts downstream of air-material separators or pneumatic transfer of process materials at rates
well in excess of the MEC (dense phase transfer).
2.5.1 Occupancy
2.5.1.1 Control the dust concentration in a fugitive-dustcollection system to prevent a continuous, explosible
atmosphere from developing in the duct using the following methods:
a) When the dust-generation rate is variable, keep the dust below an average concentration of 25% of
the minimum explosible concentration (MEC). Limit peak dust-emission rates above 100% of the MEC for
only a few seconds at any time.
b) When the dust-generation rate is steady without significant peaks, keep the dust concentration to no
more than 90% of the MEC.
2.5.1.2 Where the concentration in a duct regularly exceeds the MEC, provide protection for the additional
in-duct explosion hazard (2.5.2.3).
2.5.1.3 In ducts transporting combustible dusts, maintain an air velocity that exceeds the settling velocity
for the material being transported.
Note: The velocity for typical industrial dusts (e.g., saw dust) can be from 3500 to 4000 ft/min (1070 to 1220
m/min). Where the settling velocity of a material is unknown, consult Data sheet 7-78, Industrial Exhaust
Systems, for generic transport velocity recommendations.
2.5.2 Protection
2.5.2.1 On ducts containing combustible dust in concentrations that are always less than the MEC and that
carry dust at velocities where dust settling out is unlikely, provide explosion-isolation devices as follows:
a) On connections to important pieces of equipment
b) On duct running back to buildings that contain expensive equipment or important processes that could
be damaged, that might contain fugitive dust.
If the value of MEC is not available, an estimate of 30 grams/m3 (0.03 oz/ft3) can be used.
2.5.2.2 Arrange ducts containing combustible dust in concentrations that always or frequently exceed the
MEC, or that carry dust at velocities where dust settling out might be expected, as follows:
a) Route the ducts outside.
b) Provide an explosion-isolation device at each point of connection between the duct and a piece of
equipment.
c) Protect the duct from an explosion propagating in the explosible mixture by one of the following:
1. Provide venting for the duct in accordance with 2.5.2.3.
2. Design the duct to fail at pressures as low as practical but not more than 0.3 barg (4.4 psig).
2.5.2.2.1 Where the duct containing dust above the MEC or conveyed at less than the dust-settling velocity
must be located indoors, take the following precautions:
a) Provide an explosion-isolation device at each point of connection between the duct and a piece of
equipment, AND
b) design the duct to contain the explosion (shock resistant), OR
c) provide venting for the duct in accordance with 2.5.2.3 but route the vents outdoors.

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2.5.2.3 Provide explosion venting along the length of a duct on the following basis:
a) Compute the maximum distance between explosion vents (Lmax) as follows:
Lmax = 7.5 D1/3, D and L in meters, OR
Lmax = 16.5 D1/3, D and L in feet.
For noncircular ducts, calculate the effective diameter for the above equation by:

Deff =
where:

4Ad

Ad = cross sectional area of the duct (m2 or ft2)

b) Provide the vent area at each location at least equal to the cross sectional area of the duct.
c) Provide a full-size vent no more than 2 diameters away from the point of duct connection to a piece
of equipment.
d) Set the explosion vent relief pressures (Pstat) as low as possible, with a maximum value of 0.1 barg
(1.5 psig).
e) Provide an explosion vent at all elbows and end flanges (see Figure 10).
f) When located inside, route the explosion products outside via a short duct (L/D less or equal to 1).

Fig. 10. Example of duct explosion venting at an elbow

2.6 Silos (3.1.25)

2.6.1 Protection
2.6.1.1 When a dust storage silo has a dust collector (other than a simple vent sock) on the breather vent,
provide explosion protection as follows:
a) Treat the collector/silo combination as a single unit if either of the following conditions exist:
1. The duct connecting the silo to the dust collector has an L/D ratio less than 2, OR
2. The cross-sectional area of the connecting duct is at least as large as the explosion-venting area
needed to protect the volume of the dust collector alone.
b) Provide explosion venting for the silo/collector combination based on the total volume of the two units.
c) Install part of the explosion venting on the dust collector if possible, not to exceed the cross sectional
area of the connecting pipe, although all of the explosion venting can be on the silo.
2.6.1.2 Where the dust collector/silo combination does not meet the criteria of a single unit:
a) Provide explosion venting for each component based on their individual volumes.

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b) Provide explosion venting for the connecting duct itself in accordance with 2.5.2.3.
2.6.1.3 Ensure the explosion venting area provided for a silo does not exceed its cross- sectional area (Ax-sect).
Any explosion venting in excess of this value will not help to decrease the explosion pressure.
2.6.1.3.1 If calculations show the explosion venting area required is more than the cross-sectional area, use
an explosion-suppression system or reinforce the silo so it can withstand the value of Pred corresponding
to Av = Ax-sect.
2.6.2 Equipment and Processes
2.6.2.1 Do not use air cannons to break bridges in silos handling combustible materials if there are particles
smaller than approximately 500 microns within the material.
2.7 Bucket Elevators (3.1.26)
2.7.1 Construction and Location
2.7.1.1 Enclosed bucket elevators handling combustible dusts present an explosion hazard and need to
be installed in accordance with one of the following:
a) Locate bucket elevators outdoors.
b) Locate indoor bucket elevators adjacent to an exterior wall so explosion venting can be directed to
the outside via short ducts.
c) Provide the indoor bucket elevator with either explosion suppression or explosion venting through
FM Approved quench pipes.
2.7.2 Protection
2.7.2.1 For enclosed bucket elevators handling dusts with Kst from 100 to 200, provide explosion venting
based on the following design:
a) Locate explosion vents no more than 20 ft (6.1 m) apart along the height of the bucket elevator.
b) Size each explosion vent at least as large as two thirds of the cross sectional area of the elevator leg
enclosure.
c) Vent the head section (i.e., top) of the bucket elevator leg based on a ratio of 1 ft2 of venting for every
20 ft3 of head section volume (1 m2 per 6.1 m3).
d) Provide explosion venting for the up and downside leg casings.
e) Set the explosion vent relief pressure to less than 1 psi (0.07 barg) and construct vents of lightweight
material.
Note: Because this recommendation is based on fullscale tests in a bucket elevator, use it only for this
application.
2.7.2.2 Where the elevator head or boot feeds into equipment or areas that have an explosion hazard (e.g.,
a dusty conveyor gallery), provide an explosion-blocking system using explosion-suppression devices or
other types of physical barriers, such as a product choke or air lock between the head or boot and adjacent
areas or equipment.
2.7.3 Ignition Source Control
2.7.3.1 To help prevent bucket-elevator explosions from occurring:
a) Provide belt driven elevators with a mechanical or electromechanical device to cut the power to the
drive motor and sound an alarm if the belt slows downs more than 20%.
b) Do not locate or expose bearings within the elevator casing.
c) Provide belt-alignment interlocks to shut down the elevator if the belt misaligns.

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2.7.3.2 Use the following preventive measures where practical:

a) Use antifriction bearings on all elevator legs.
b) Maintain all bearings per manufacturers recommendations and keep them free of dust, product, and
excessive lubrication.
c) Limit the use of combustible linings (e.g., plastic, rubber, wood) to impact points, wear surfaces, and
connected hoppers.
d) Install drive belts (e.g., Vbelts, timing belts, and flat belts) that are electrically conductive at 1 megaohm
or less, as well being as fire and oil resistant.
e) Design the drive train with a 1.5 service factor to stall the drive without slipping.
f) Install belts in elevator legs that have a surface resistivity of less than 100 megaohm per square, and
are fire and oil resistant (oil resistance is not needed in flour mills).
g) For elevator legs inside a building whose belt speeds exceed 500 ft/min (2.6 m/sec) provide bearingtemperature monitoring or vibration detection.
2.8 Spray Dryers
2.8.1 Protection
2.8.1.1 Spray dryers often operate with much of the dryer at less than the MEC. Provide explosion protection
in accordance with the following:
a) Obtain accurate calculations to confirm the average dust concentration within the cylindrically shaped
portion is below the MEC of the material being handled. On this basis, only the conical section at the
bottom of the dryer and any downstream equipment (e.g., cyclones, bag collectors) have an explosible
mixture.
b) Use FM Globals DustCalc software for determining the explosion venting area required where a
combustible cloud exists in only a fraction of the total vessel volume.
c) Distribute explosion vents uniformly throughout the dryer surface although vents only near the conical
section are recommended.
2.8.1.2 For protection against fire, see DS 6-9, Industrial Ovens and Dryers, in the section spray dryers
handling dust.
2.9 Bulk Raw-Grain Handling
2.9.1 Equipment and Processes
2.9.1.1 Bulk grain handling presents a dust explosion hazard that can be controlled or eliminated if the
following are implemented:
a) Use oil mist (or other liquid) dust suppression to reduce the dust explosion hazard in rooms or buildings
and equipment used to handle bulk raw grain.
1. The explosion hazard can be considered eliminated in rooms if the oil mist can successfully reduce
fugitive dust emissions low enough to allow normal housekeeping to keep accumulations below
dangerous levels. (See 2.2.4.2 to determine when dust accumulations are at hazardous levels.)
2. The explosion hazard can be considered eliminated from equipment if the oil mist can successfully
prevent any dust from becoming airborne inside the equipment. Confirm this by visually observing
equipment while it is running (i.e., by opening access or inspection ports). Completely eliminating
airborne dust inside the processing equipment can only be done by very thoroughly applying mist to
all of the material being handled.
b) Apply the oil or other liquid suppressant to the grain at a point in the process that includes substantial
turbulence, e.g., at a discharge spout, to ensure the suppressant is thoroughly mixed in with the grain.
1. Do not apply suppressant in bucket elevators as this could lead to slipping of the rubber belts and
possible friction heating.

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c) Develop a maintenance and inspection program to guarantee the dust suppressant spray system is
functioning properly whenever grain is being handled.
d) Install an interlock that will shut down grain handling on suppressant spray system malfunction where
this system is being relied upon as the sole means of explosion protection.
2.10 Dust Fire Hazards
In addition to the explosion hazard addressed by this document, combustible dusts can present a fire hazard
that must be controlled. The following data sheets cover protection and prevention of dust fires in various
equipment or processes:
a) Inside spray dryers: Data Sheet 6-9, Industrial Ovens and Dryers
b) Wood processing and wood working facilities: Data Sheet 7-10, Wood Processing and Woodworking
Facilities
c) Dust collectors: Data Sheet 7-73, Dust Collectors and Collection Systems
d) Grain handling facilities: Data Sheet 7-75, Grain Storage and Milling
e) Ducts: Data Sheet 7-78, Industrial Exhaust Systems
f) Wood dust storage: Data Sheet 8-27, Storage of Wood Chips
3.0 SUPPORT FOR RECOMMENDATIONS
3.1 Comments and Technical Support
3.1.1 Is There a Housekeeping Problem? (2.2.4.2)
The fundamental rule is that any dust accumulations outside of equipment present a potential for a secondary
explosion and should be removed and the source of the release eliminated. Provide DLC for areas that are
subject to such uncontrolled releases that cant be resolved.
As a rule of thumb, 116 in. (0.0625 in., 1.6 mm) of dust is a cause for cleanup. (This assumes wood dust
with approximate bulk density of about 36 lb/ft3 [580 kg/m3]). This is about the thickness of a US quarter.
Where dusts of different bulk density are used, the thickness of the equivalent mass of 116 in. (1.6 mm) wood
dust would be inversely proportional to their bulk densities. For example, for a dust with a bulk density of
about 60 lb/ft3 (950 kg/m3), a layer of about 0.04 in. (1 mm) thick would be equivalent.
Equivalent thickness = 1.6 mm x (580 kg/m3/950 kg/m3) or 1 mm
Any dust accumulations in a small room (200 ft2, 19 m2) would present a severe secondary explosion hazard.
In a larger room, for example 20,000 ft2 (1860 m2), dust covering an area of 200 ft2 (19 m2) would be a
less-severe event.
For practical purposes, some dust accumulations in small parts of large areas without DLC can be considered
tolerable with frequent cleanup and actions to remove the source of the dust. Consider 5% of the area with
116 in. (1.6 mm) dust capable of being thrown into suspension as the limit of tolerable. In any building of
ordinary construction, any area of dust accumulations exceeding about 1,000 ft2 (93 m2) is considered
unacceptable.
Any dust that is elevated above floor level in joists, beams, equipment tops, etc., should be considered as
being capable of being thrown into suspension. Dust that has agglomerated by age, heat, moisture, etc.,
should not be considered as capable of being thrown into suspension but may suggest an ongoing
housekeeping problem or source of uncontrolled release. Dust on the floor could be suspended but is less
of a risk than elevated accumulations.
Pay close attention to dust adhering to walls since this is easily dislodged. Also consider other projections,
such as light fixtures, that can provide surfaces for dust accumulation.
The available surface area for dust deposits on bar joists or steel beams can be roughly estimated at 5%
of floor area. However, some steel beams might have an equivalent surface area as high as 10% of floor area,
such as when spans between columns are longer than average for a given geographical area, or when a
large building elevation difference requires a stronger roof structure due to anticipated snow drift loadings.

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For reference, the following represents typical bulk density data.

Table 2. Typical Dust Bulk Density
Material
lb/ft3
Coal, bituminous, smaller than 420 microns
50
Flour, wheat
35-40
Starch
25-50
Sulfur, powdered
50-60
Wood flour
16-36
Source: Appendix D, Reference 15

kg/m3
800
560-640
400-800
800-960
260-580

3.1.2 Relocating Explosion Hazards Outdoors (2.3.1.1)

A frequent objection to locating dust handling equipment outdoors is that condensation will form on the inside
walls of the vessel during cold weather and introduce moisture into the dust stream. Moisture may be a
process problem if it causes particle agglomeration or offspec product. It can be a hazard with some material
subject to spontaneous heating. Moisture can be eliminated by providing insulation on the dust handling
equipment. However, explosion vents must properly deploy without being affected by the insulating cover.
Prefabricated rupture-type explosion vents are available that have a foam-insulated core to prevent
condensation on the inside of the vent. Additional insulation does not have to be applied over such a vent,
thus ensuring insulation does not hinder vent deployment.
3.1.3 Inerting (Phlegmatization) (2.3.2.3)
Combustible and noncombustible dusts must be intimately mixed to truly create a safe non-explosible product.
Typically, inert dust ranging from 50% to 75% by weight of the total is required.
Carbonates, phosphates, and salts are sometimes used for inerting. In the coal-mining industry, rock dust
is used because it is in abundant supply. Unfortunately, no mathematical correlations can predict the required
limiting inert powder concentration. All mixtures must be tested to establish the inertness of the mixture.
3.1.4 FM Global Explosion Effects Calculations DustCalc (2.3.3.1)
Many recommendations suggest using FM Globals DustCalc software for any calculations involving
predicting explosion pressures based on the specifics of a given situation. This is a proprietary expert system
developed by FM Global and considers the variables listed below to calculate various explosion effects.
The mathematical models are based on years of research by FM Global and others on dust explosions. Some
of the relations have been shared with NFPA and have been adopted in part in NFPA 68 starting with the
2002 edition. To get the full advantage of FM Globals methods, the DustCalc software must be used.
The vessel variables that will have an impact on explosion effects are as follows:
Vessel volume (V)
Dust explosibility constant (Kst) and maximum unvented pressure (Pmax)
Explosion-vent area (Av)
Explosion-vent relief pressure (Pstat)
Explosion-vent panel mass and orientation
Explosion-vent duct length (Ld) and area (Ad), if present
Fraction of vessel volume containing an explosible mixture
Pre-explosion equipment pressure (Po)
This data sheet does not include any explosion vent sizing equations, nor does it have any dust-testing results
to characterize previously tested materials. First, the mathematical correlations developed by FM Global
to predict the outcome of explosions are complex and would be difficult to apply using only a calculator. This

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could easily cause computational errors. Generic data could be useful for preliminary evaluation of existing
venting systems, but data for the specific dust being processed may be different and only specifically
developed test data should be used in design.
DustCalc software is available in all FM Global offices worldwide, but is limited to personnel who have been
trained in the details of its basis and use. This will ensure the results are developed recognizing all the factors
that are important in the design.
A detailed description of the analytical and experimental work leading to the FM Global methodology has
been published in an article in a special dust explosion issue of the Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process
Industries (Spring 1996). The FM Global article from that journal is included as Appendix C, Section C.1.
FM Global has not adopted the German VDI (Verein Deutscher Ingenieure) calculation methods (VDI 3673).
Since much of the data used to develop the VDI guideline was used in developing the FM Global guidance,
in many cases DustCalc and VDI answers are similar. However, due to improvements made to VDIs
methods by FM Global, in addition to other calculation tools developed or improved by FM Global, the
DustCalc software expands on the capabilities of VDI.
For the 2002 version of NFPA 68, FM Global submitted, and the NFPA committee accepted, much but not
all of the FM Global equations and methods. The implementation is with numerous equations and
nomographs. The 2007 edition maintains much of the same methods, but with some additional adjustments.
The other major difference with NFPA 68-2007 was changing from a Guideline to a Standard. This is now
in language that can be adopted as legally binding by local authorities having jurisdiction. As a Guideline, no
AHJ could implement the requirements as binding.
The DustCalc software program can also provide solutions based on the NFPA or VDI methods and will
indicate where, and often why, there are differences with the FM Global method.
3.1.5 Explosion Quench Pipes (2.3.3.1.2)
An explosion quench pipe (Fig. 11) is like a flame arrester fitted onto a rupture membrane-type explosion
vent. As a result there is a reduction in the effective vent area compared to an open vent.
As the explosion is vented through the quench pipe, any burned or unburned dust is retained, combustion
gases are cooled, and no trace of flame exits the quench pipe. In addition, the nearfield blast (pressure) effects
outside the vent are greatly reduced. Thus, the quench pipe can safely vent an explosion to the indoors
without the fear of igniting nearby combustibles or creating damaging pressure in the room. However, the
exit gases are hot (approximately 212F [100C]).
The actual pressure effect of the released gases can be conservatively estimated based on an approximate
gas-exit temperature of 212F (100C) and the following equation:
p = 1.74 p0 V1
V0
where:
V0 is the building volume (m3 or ft3)
V1 is the vented equipment volume (m3 or ft3)
p0 is the ambient pressure (14.7 psia or 1.01 bara)
p is the pressure increase created by the vented gases (psi or bar)
For example, where the equipment volume is 1/100 of the building volume, V1/V0 is 1/100, the pressure
increase is about 37 psf (18 mbar, 1.8 kPa). This would not cause any significant building damage.
The listing of all FM Approved devices includes their vent efficiency, which is the factor by which the effective
vent area of the device is reduced. This is different than the pressure effect calculation above.
3.1.6 Strength of Vessels (2.3.3.1.3)
When the explosion vent design is based on Pred values that allow for vessel deformation, this will prevent
catastrophic vessel failure and allow the forces and products of an explosion to move safely through the
explosion vent. However, this could make the vessel unfit for future use.
If data on vessel strength is unavailable and the assumed values 3 to 4.4 psig (0.2 to 0.3 barg) of Pred are
used for explosion vent sizing, then the vessels will likely not be deformed in the event of an explosion, if

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Fig. 11. FM Approved explosion quench pipe (Photo courtesy of Rembe GmbH)

they are of typical design. However, the possibility of deformation does exist. The innumerable variations in
equipment design can make a vessel weaker than other seemingly comparable vessels. In most cases, the
assumed values will be sufficiently conservative to prevent vessel rupture. Estimates of the pressure that a
generic type of vessel can withstand involve uncertainties. It is always best to try to get actual design
information for any vessel whose protection is being evaluated or planned.
3.1.7 Effects of Explosion Vent Mass (Inertia) (2.3.3.1.6)
A heavy explosion vent relief panel takes longer to move out of the way than a similarly sized lightweight
panel and can produce higher pressures inside the vented enclosure. Because the delay is a continuous
function of the panels weight, its effect needs to be evaluated whenever a panels inertia is greater than zero.
Rupture membranes, which are typically very thin sheets of metal or plastic film, are zero-inertia devices.
However, the effect of any other type of vent panel cannot be neglected and should be calculated.
An extensive review of experimental data generated by numerous organizations worldwide has allowed
FM Global to correlate the data along a theoretical framework to produce an effective predictive tool.
3.1.7.1 Typical Vent Panel Mass (Inertia)
The following are examples of materials that might be used as venting panels or wall construction and their
mass:
Single-layer metal panels: 10 kg/m2 (2 lb/ft2)
Insulated metal sandwich panels: 15 to 20 kg/m2 (3 to 4 lb/ft2)
FM Approved Explovent: 12 kg/m2 (2.5 lbs/ft2)
FM Approved Kalwall panel: 12 kg/m2 (2.5 lbs/ft2)
Note: the following materials have an additional dimension of inch (cm) of thickness.
Gypsum board: 8 kg/m2/cm (4 lb/ft2/in. )
Steel: 77 kg/m2/cm (40 lb/ft2/ in.)
Aluminum: 27 kg/m2/cm (14 lb/ft2/in.)
Glass: 29 kg/m2/cm (15 lb/ft2/in.)
Concrete: 23 kg/m2/cm (12 lb/ft2/in.)

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3.1.8 Effect of Explosion Vent Ducts (2.3.3.1.7)

The effect of the vent duct must be anticipated in the sizing of explosion vents. Placing a duct at the discharge
of an explosion vent can significantly affect the pressure inside the enclosure. Depending on the length and
diameter of the vent duct, the value of Pred can be increased by as much as an order of magnitude (10 times),
which is usually enough to completely destroy the protected vessel.
Two factors are most important when considering the effect of vent ducts on the venting process: (a)
combustion of dust within the duct during the explosion, and (b) the inertia of the air mass inside the duct
before the explosion.
During the early part of the venting process, unburned dust is ejected into the duct ahead of the flame front
from the vessel. When the flame front moves into the duct, dust starts to burn within the duct and generate
additional combustion products. Those combustion products expand in ALL directions, thus slowing down
or even reversing the flow out of the vessel and the pressure builds up within the vessel.
Inertia of the air within the duct also increases explosion pressure within the protected vessel. When the
explosion vent opens and combustion gases first start flowing into the duct, those gases must push all of
the air out of the duct. During the time required to eject the air, the pressure continues to grow within the vessel
because the combustion gases are obstructed from reaching the open atmosphere. In a long duct, that mass
of air can delay the venting of combustion gases enough to significantly increase the pressure in the vessel.
Friction effects from gas flowing through the duct generally have little effect on the explosion, except possibly
from bends or other geometric discontinuities, compared to the previously noted effects of in-duct combustion
and air inertia.
Because Pred sharply rises as vent duct length increases, vessels with a low strength generally cannot be
protected by venting through ducts if the L/D of the vent duct exceeds a value of 1 to 2 unless the vent size
is proportionately increased.
Although fitting an explosion vent duct having a cross-section smaller than the explosion vent will increase
the value of Pred (i.e., create a worse situation), using an explosion vent duct with a cross section larger than
the explosion vent area will not lower the Pred.
FM Globals DustCalc software readily calculates the effects caused by vent ducts.
3.1.9 Re-Closing Explosion Vents (2.2.3.4 and 2.3.3.1.9)
After the combustion of dust inside of a room or vessel has ended and gases are no longer being produced
to generate pressure, explosion vents that can reclose by gravity will do so. The very hot combustion gases
trapped within the room or vessel begin to cool and, unless fresh air moves into the enclosure fast enough
(e.g., via an appropriately-sized vacuum breaker), this will produce a vacuum. This vacuum can result in
vessel damage or equipment implosion. In rooms or buildings, vacuum damage is less severe, but is still
possible.
3.1.10 Pressure and Fireball Effects from an Explosion (2.3.3.1.11)
A dust explosion results in short duration pressure and fireball effects outside of the enclosure. There are
limited studies that allow these effects to be estimated, and suggested equations are shown below:
Estimate the pressure effects close to, and in a direction normal to, the vent using the following equations:
Step 1: Calculate the maximum overpressure (Pblast,max) generated by the explosion outside of the vented
enclosure using the following equation:
Pblast,max (barg) = 0.2 Av0.1 V0.18 Pred
Where
Av is the explosion vent area, m2
V is the volume of vented enclosure, m3
Pred is the reduced pressure in the enclosure during venting, barg
Step 2: Calculate the perpendicular distance (Rmax) from the vent opening to Pblast,max using the following
equation:
Rmax (meters) = 0.25 Lf,max

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Where
Lf,max = maximum flame jet length, m
Step 3: For distances R larger than Rmax, calculate the distance-specific blast pressure by the following
equation:
Pblast (barg) = (Rmax/R)1.5 Pblast,max
Note 1: These calculated pressures are very localized near the fireball ejected from a vented explosion.
This is not the same as the overall explosion pressure (Pred) created throughout the enclosing room or
building. In a large building, this shock pressure might be the largest pressure that the walls located close
to exploding equipment will feel, but, usually, the pressure on the walls of a room enclosing the vented
equipment depends on the quantity of combustion gases produced by the explosion and vented into the
room. Such pressure is essentially uniform throughout the room, regardless of distance of the walls from the
vented vessel.
Note 2: The equations for predicting pressure effects are valid only for a single explosion vent. For multiple
vents that open in the same direction, calculate Pblast,max for each vent, then add the values to estimate
the combined, conservative pressure effect.
3.1.10.2 Estimate the maximum flame jet length in a direction normal to the vent using the following equation:
Lf,max = 8 V(1/3)
where
Lf,max = maximum flame jet length, m
V = Volume of vented enclosure, m3
This equation is valid only for ST1 dusts (i.e., Kst 200) with Pred 1 barg (14.5 psig) and Pstat 0.1 barg
(1.5 psig). There are no published correlations for situations outside the stated limits. It is believed that
changes in Pstat will change the size of the predicted fireball; however, current estimation methods have not
quantified that effect.
3.1.10.3 Estimate the recoil force from an explosion using the following equations (2.3.3.1.18):
a) For dynamic recoil force, use the following formula:
FR = 119 Av Pred
Units: FR (kN), Av (m2), Pred (barg)
FR = 1.2 Av Pred
Units: FR (lb), Av (in2), Pred (psig)
b) For duration of this recoil force, use the following formula (applies only to enclosures without vent ducts):
tf = 10-4 Kst V/(Pred Av)
Units: Kst (bar m/s), V (m3), Pred (barg), Av (m2), 10-4 (s2m-2) a constant
c) As an alternative to dynamic force anchoring design, use an equivalent static force (Fs) as calculated
using the following formula:
Fs = 0.52 FR
Units: kN or lb as in the original equation
3.1.11 Fixed Obstructions near the Face of Explosion Vents (2.3.3.1.12)
A fixed obstruction located too close to an equipment explosion vent opening creates significant resistance
to the free outflow of combustion products from the vented equipment. This is believed to be mainly due
to dust burning after being ejected from the protected equipment. Since the combustion occurs in the
semiconfined area between the vessel and the obstruction, a condition similar to a secondary explosion
occurs. This has significant backpressure effects on the equipment explosion. The state of knowledge
regarding this phenomenon is limited, and it is impossible to quantify the effect. It is also not possible to provide
any guidance on safe distances to nonflat obstructions, due to the complexity of the effects of different
geometries producing partial confinement. The only safe course of action is to locate and orient explosion
vents so they do not point to nearby surfaces.

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3.1.12 Distribution of Explosion Vents (2.3.3.1.15)

If a protected vessel has significant obstructions within it, there are two principles of explosion that make it
important to provide well-distributed explosion venting.
First, if the gases heading toward an explosion vent at one end of the vessel have to flow through obstructed
areas, the gases will not flow out as fast as they would if the volume was unobstructed. Because of this,
the vented explosion pressure Pred can rise above the expected level.
Second, if the gases heading toward the explosion vent flow over any significant obstructions, turbulence
will increase substantially within the vessel. Because the rate of pressure rise of an explosion increases with
increasing turbulence, the obstacles can worsen the explosion.
Vents distributed throughout an entire enclosure will help ensure the gases vented during the explosion take
the shortest path out of the enclosure.
3.1.13 Dust Collector Operating Pressures (2.3.3.1.17)
The normal operating pressure range for dust-collecting and dust-handling systems is +40 to 40 mbar (+16
in. H2O to 16 in. H2O). In this pressure range, no adjustments to the standard explosion venting guidelines
are necessary.
3.1.14 Explosion Isolation (2.3.3.2)
When an explosion occurs in an enclosure protected by pressure containment, both pressure and flame
(i.e., burning dust) propagate down any open, connected ductwork to another enclosure. If that second vessel
also has a pressure-resisting design, it is likely to be insufficient due to an effect often referred to as pressure
piling. The pressure in the second vessel will increase before the source of ignition (i.e., burning material)
arrives, as the pressure disturbance travels from the first vessel to the second at the speed of sound, which
is generally greater than the speed of the flame front. Therefore, at the moment when a dust explosion is
ignited within the second vessel, the initial pressure will be well above the normal (ambient) pressure.
For a given fuel-to-air ratio, the final, unvented pressure of an explosion is directly proportional to the initial
pressure. For example, if the first explosion prepressurizes the second vessel to 3 bar (44 psi) absolute,
then the final pressure of the explosion in the second vessel would increase by a factor of 3. For a dust with
a Pmax value of 9 bara, the final unvented pressure in this example would be 27 bara, well above the strength
of even the most sturdy vessel designed for dust explosion pressure containment. Thus, where explosion
containment is used as a protection method, it is important to provide explosion isolation to prevent
pre-pressurizing a vessel by another explosion.
When one vessel protected by explosion containment is connected to a second vessel protected with
explosion venting, a protection problem exists that is not related to pre-pressurization, but rather to the
turbulence created by the pressure front and a very strong ignition source from the flame front. The result
is a more rapid explosion in the second vessel, unaccounted for in the vent design, with failure of the second
vessel likely.
These effects occur to a lesser extent if the connected vessels are both protected with explosion venting.
Thus, where explosion venting is used as a protection method, it is important to provide explosion isolation
to separate the vented vessel from any connected vessels protected by explosion containment.
3.1.15 Explosion Isolation: Use of Active Devices (2.3.3.3.4)
When using active (as opposed to passive) devices for explosion isolation, the maximum speed the explosion
flame front travels from the point of detection to the isolation device is an important consideration.
An equation has been proposed correlating the speed of flame propagation in a duct as a function of the
pressure developed in the duct. (The duct is filled with an initially quiescent mixture.)
Va =

p po
c

( pp )

1/

where:
Va is the speed of flame propagation (m/s)
p is the maximum pressure in the duct, absolute (Pa) (1 psia = 6897 Pa)

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po is ambient pressure, absolute (Pa)

is density of ambient air (1.18 kg/m3)
c is the speed of sound in air = 347 m/s
is the specific heat ratio = 1.4
This formula is valid for flame speeds up to 500 m/s (1640 ft/s).
To estimate the speed of flame propagation down a duct connected to a vessel in which an explosion has
originated, (p - po) is assigned the value of Pred for vented explosions or Pmax for vessels protected by
explosion containment.
If the flame is propagating in a system where air has been flowing before the time of ignition, add the velocity
of the flow, or subtract it (as appropriate) from the value given by this equation.
As an example, a vessel protected with explosion venting with a Pred value of 0.21 barg (3 psig) has a duct
flame front propagation velocity of approximately 45 m/s (148 ft/s).
3.1.16 Rapid-Action Float Valves (2.3.3.3.5)
These devices actuate either on a differential pressure caused by the approaching flame front or the gas
velocity in the duct. As a result, the vent relief pressure (Pstat ) of the equipment experiencing the explosion
must be high enough, about 0.2 barg (3 psig), to ensure the valve will shut. Where a lower Pstat is needed
to protect the equipment, an additional explosion sensor and helper gas are needed to actuate the valve.
Data on the Ventex device indicate that specified minimum and maximum separation distances are needed
to ensure the device closes properly and no transition to detonation has occurred. These distances are
determined by test but are approximately valid for a broad range of operating conditions. If hybrid mixtures
are involved, both distances will be reduced and the exact figure depends on the valve/pipe size.
Manufacturers data would supersede this general guidance.
Ventex valves are either uni- or bi-directional, i.e., will actuate from a pressure event coming from one direction
only or from either direction. Once closed, they lock in that position and need to be manually reset.
3.1.17 Vacuum Operation (2.3.3.6)
Because the final pressure after an explosion is proportional to the initial (pre-explosion) pressure, a dust
explosion occurring in an environment that is at less than 0.1 bara (1.5 psia) will produce an absolute
explosion pressure of less than 1 bara (14.5 psia). Thus, damage potential from that explosion does not exist.
In addition, if a process operates at a pressure of less than 50 mbar (0.73 psi) (absolute), usually, an
explosion could not be ignited.
3.1.18 Spark Extinguishing Versus Explosion Suppression (2.3.4.1)
Losses have revealed that a misconception might exist as to the capabilities of a spark-extinguishing system.
Spark-extinguishing systems are very effective in reducing the frequency of combustible dust explosions.
However, they do not affect the severity of an explosion, and are not an alternative to explosion venting,
explosion-blocking systems, or explosion-suppression systems.
A spark-extinguishing system, also known as a spark-suppression system, detects and extinguishes sparks
or glowing embers upstream of dust-collection equipment, to prevent these ignition sources from traveling
to the dust collector(s) and initiating an explosion. The detection system uses an infrared sensor to look for
particles passing by at elevated temperatures. The extinguisher is a water spray located downstream from
the detector.
The detector is expected to function regardless of the size of the hot particles passing by. It detects hot
particles as small as sparks or as large as a piece of broken sander belt. However, the extinguisher might
not work if the particles are large. Sparks should all be extinguished, but a large burning or smoldering piece
of material might not be, in which case an explosion could occur if there is an ignitable dust cloud in the
downstream dust-collection equipment.
The spark-extinguishing system will not decrease the severity of the resulting explosion, so the same level
of explosion protection or mitigation needs to be provided for the equipment with the dust explosion hazard.

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A spark-extinguishing system extinguishes an ignition source but cannot suppress an explosion once it has
begun. By preventing an explosible cloud from ever igniting, spark-extinguishing prevents the explosion
altogether.
An explosion-suppression system detects the early phases of an explosion and quenches the explosion to
prevent pressure from rising to a level at which equipment may be damaged or destroyed.
The explosion-suppression system reduces the severity of an explosion, whereas the spark-extinguishing
system only reduces the frequency.
A spark-extinguishing system is only intended to eliminate one ignition scenario: small, hot particles conveyed
to a dust collector where a combustible dust cloud can be ignited. There are other ignition scenarios which
the spark-extinguishing system cannot influence. For example:
Tramp metal (e.g., a screw or nail) aspirated into the dust collection system. The metal creates sparks
as it impacts against ductwork or metal equipment downstream of the spark-extinguishing system.
Ignition sources produced downstream of the spark-extinguishing system; for example, hot surfaces,
cutting and welding on/around dust collection equipment.
For most processes, conveying small, hot particles from the dust-producing process to the dust-collection
system is by far the most common potential dust-explosion ignition source. Installed spark-extinguishing
systems can actuate weekly or more often without incident. This attests to the systems ability to consistently
detect and extinguish even the smallest hot particles.
There are losses where burning material passed through the spark-suppression zone into the dust collection
equipment and triggered an explosion. The burning material possibly got through because of its size or form
or because of a defect in the spark-extinguishing equipment or its installation. Because other damagelimiting features, such as explosion venting or blocking systems may have been lacking or were not fully
adequate, the ensuing explosions damaged the collection equipment. In addition, burning material was forced
(ejected) into the work area either forwards through a warm air return or backwards to the dust pickup points.
Adequate explosion venting combined with safeguards on the warm-air return (recommended here and in
Data Sheet 7-73, Dust Collectors and Collection Systems) could have prevented any burning material from
being ejected into the facility.
3.1.19 Minimum Ignition Energy (MIE)(2.3.4.2)
The vast majority of dusts have MIE values above 10 Mj, so it is not necessary to routinely have dusts tested
for MIE. Such testing is normally pursued only when there are reasons to suspect a dust might be particularly
susceptible to ignition from static. There are currently at least two recognized test standards for MIE, ASTM
E2019 and EN BS 13821. Any test result reporting an MIE of 10 mJ or less should be interpreted as proving
static ignitability.
3.1.20 Foreign Material Separators, Magnetic or Other (2.3.4.3)
Using separators upstream of all equipment that mechanically impacts with the process material prevents
metal and other foreign objects from entering the equipment. Without the separators, tramp metal or other
material entering the equipment can create impact or friction sparks capable of igniting a dust cloud.
3.1.21 Clean Versus Dirty Side of Dust Collectors (2.4.2)
The distinction between the clean and dirty air sides is not important when considering explosion scenarios.
The pressures generated in an explosion frequently rupture the filter media as the explosion propagates
throughout the clean and dirty sides. In addition, there may be a breach of the filter media even before an
explosion (e.g., a bag break), thus allowing dust to enter the clean side.
The issue of where to locate vents relative to the clean and dirty side is both theoretical and practical. Most
testing is based on an enclosure with no internal obstructions and with the vent remote from the ignition.
Bags or other obstructions can change the explosion and the venting process. Bags generally fail early in
the explosion and have a minor effect on the venting process, but the tube sheet dividing the clean and dirty
sides can be more of an impediment. The equation specifying the minimum amount of explosion venting
that must be on the dirty side is based on providing fully adequate explosion venting for a dirty-side explosion
if the bags do not get damaged and do not allow any gases to vent out through the clean side of the collector.

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3.1.22 Cyclone Explosion Venting (2.4.2.3)

Calculations for explosion venting a cyclone based on typical design proportions show that the typical gas
outlet whose diameter is one half the diameter of a cyclone provides an adequate explosion venting area for
dusts with Kst values up to 80, based on the assumption of a pressure resistance of about 0.3 barg (4.4 psig).
Dusts with Kst values as low as 80 are typically rather coarse (e.g., sawdust, corn meal), have a very low
volatiles content (e.g., charcoal), or have very low combustion energy (e.g., iron dust, FRP with high inert
fibers content).
The adequacy of explosion venting cannot be assumed if the cyclone has a duct with L/D>1 extending above
the gas outlet. As with any vessel provided with a duct on the explosion vent, explosion pressure calculations
will be needed to quantify the effect.
Due to significant backpressure effects produced by bends in vent ducts, any gas outlet provided with a 180
duct (gooseneck) will not likely have adequate explosion venting. If practical, replace the gooseneck with
a rainhat over an open gas outlet.
Typical cyclone proportions include a diameter D, cylinder height and cone height each 2D and gas outlet
diameter of 12 D.
3.1.23 Conductive Dust Collector Bags (2.4.3.1)
Conductive bags typically have fine wire woven or fastened into their cloth. The grid of conductive wires
is connected to one or more grounding straps/wires, which must be attached to the dust-collector structure.
Because there is no dependable mechanism to migrate charges from the surface of the nonconductive bag
material to the nearest grounded wire, measurable (and sometimes substantial) potential differences
between the bag surface and wires can exist.
The need for any kind of special bag to prevent dust ignition due to static has never been established. With
ordinary, nonconductive bags, static electricity may build up over the entire surface of a bag, but a static
discharge can only release the energy built up over a very small area. This energy release is not likely to
be enough to ignite even the most ignitionsensitive dusts.
There is another concern related to conductive bags. There is the possibility of the grounding straps
detaching and turning the bag into a giant capacitor. All the embedded wires collecting charges from the bag
surface could suddenly release enough static electricity to ignite a dust cloud. The repeated shaking or air
blasts to clean the bags could cause one or more ground straps to break or disconnect. Maintenance and
inspection activities are needed to prevent this from happening.
3.1.24 Connecting Ducts (2.5)
Dusts are transferred in ducts either as part of a fugitive-dust-control system or to move the product from
one part of the process to another. Fugitive-dust transfer is almost always at much less than the MEC, while
process transfer may be at much greater than the MEC. Process transfer might be referred to as dense phase
transfer.
To properly understand the hazard, the transfer conditions need to be known. This can be determined by
knowing the amount processed/collected over some period of time, or measured by sampling or monitoring
the actual flow in the duct. Sometimes this data can be obtained by occupational safety and health
professionals on staff.
The hazard in the duct can be affected by the actual transfer rates or by dust that settles out and accumulates
from insufficient flow velocity in the duct. It is important that this not occur; it can be controlled by maintaining
sufficient airflow typically on the order of 35004000 ft/min (10701220 m/min). Dust that has accumulated
can be re-entrained by the pressure wave from an explosion and create localized combustible concentrations,
moving with the pressure wave and ignited by the trailing flame front. After considerable propagation, this
turbulent jet flame becomes a very strong ignition source that destroys seemingly properly protected
equipment.
A remarkably small amount of deposited dust can propagate an explosion. For a circular duct of diameter
D with a dust layer of thickness h settled on 14 of its inner circumference (i.e., at the bottom), the
concentration of dust dispersed homogeneously throughout the cross section of the duct would be C = bulk
h/D. As an example, a dust with a bulk density of 31 lb/ft3 (500 kg/m3), a layer thickness of only 1/125 in.

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(0.2 mm), and a duct of 8 in. (0.2 m) diameter, could generate a dust concentration of 500 g/m3. This
concentration is well above the MEC of virtually any dust, and therefore can propagate an explosion.
The settled dust is most likely not homogenously dispersed throughout the duct, but research by the US
Bureau of Mines has shown that explosions can propagate through ducts even at average dust concentrations
that are as little as half the MEC. All that is required for propagation is a continuous path of mixture that is
above the MEC. This condition can be satisfied even though there is not enough dust to fill the entire volume
of the duct with a mixture above the MEC. Thus, even very small amounts of dust can be sufficient to create
a propagating explosion so the air velocity through the duct should be sufficient to prevent any settling of
the transferred dust.
Explosion venting in duct work is not provided to save the duct, usually of low value and easily replaced,
but to reduce the violence of a potential explosion propagating down its length. This would not stop the
explosion propagation but would expose connected equipment containing suspended dust to a less energetic
ignition source. Designing the duct to fail at low pressure rather than installing explosion vents could be an
acceptable alternative approach where there is no exposure to equipment.
Explosion isolation systems may be needed for connecting ducts where the consequence of an unprotected
event in equipment or flash-back to a building is unacceptable. For example, a large panel sander might
have six dust pickup points, three on the top and three on the bottom, all joining into a common duct. Each
pickup pipe would not need an isolation device. Explosion isolation would best be provided on the main duct
after it leaves the building to prevent an explosion in the dust collector from propagating back towards the
sander.
3.1.25 Silos (2.6)
Silos can also have a dust explosion hazard, even when they are used with granular material having a very
small portion of fines. As the course material continually transfers into the silo, it will fall to the bottom of
the silo, but the finest, most explosible material will remain in suspension. If transfer operations continue long
enough, the airborne combustible dust concentration will exceed the MEC and create an explosion hazard.
When a dust collector is mounted directly onto a silo (i.e., with a short connecting pipe of sufficiently large
diameter), any explosion igniting in the dust collector will create the same silo explosion effects as if the
explosion had originated within the silo, so the dust collector can be considered part of the silo. As long as
any explosion venting provided on the silo and dust collector assembly are sized on the basis of the sum of
both volumes, explosion venting should be adequate, regardless of whether the explosion originates in the
silo or the attached dust collector.
When the dust collector is separated from the silo via a small or elongated pipe, the silo and dust collector
no longer act as a single volume during an explosion. If an explosion originates in a dust collector that has
no explosion venting of its own, the jet flame will propagate down the connecting pipe, igniting any combustible
dust cloud within the silo. This would cause a much more violent explosion in the silo than if the silo explosion
was ignited by a conventional (weaker) ignition source.
Air cannons used to break up bridging material can disperse fines in the bulk material into the silo headspace.
Even if the percentage of fines is very small (e.g., 1%-2%), repeated air blasts will concentrate the fines
at the top of the bed. Repeated air-cannon operation creates more fines at the top of the bed and a higher
concentration of dust in the head space at every air cannon firing. Only an ignition source is needed for a
potentially severe dust explosion.
Additionally, certain combustible materials such as coal, grain, and wood are susceptible to spontaneous
heating, and introducing air over an extended period of time can increase the probability of such spontaneous
heating. Air introduced to glowing combustion could fan it into flame or ignite a dust explosion.
Alternative solutions to air cannons include using vibratory wands inserted temporarily or permanently into
the bottom portion of the silo or using acoustic horns and lances.
3.1.26 Bucket Elevators (2.7)
Even though bulk combustible material may have a very small percentage of fines mixed in with material
too coarse to constitute a dust explosion hazard, handling that bulk material will likely create an explosion
hazard in a bucket elevator enclosure. Because of the high degree of turbulence within the bucket elevator

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enclosure, any fines will be easily picked up into suspension. Because more fines are continuously added
to the air space in the elevator with very little are falling out, the concentration can exceed the MEC and create
a dust explosion hazard.
An example of this involves unground soybean extraction grouts, which are not explosible. Most of this product
is very coarse material (median particle size approx. 1000 microns) but about 3% of fines are smaller than
63 microns. In one instance, after conveying this product in a bucket elevator for several minutes, the fines
were liberated and an ignition and explosion occurred.
3.1.27 Size-Reduction Equipment (Grinders, Pulverizers, Hammer Mills, etc.)
Size-reduction equipment presents the inherent hazard of mechanical impact in the presence of combustible
dusts. The mechanical impact can create frictional and impact heating. Sparks may occur if unintended metal
enters the machine. The result can either be glowing particles leaving the equipment to become an ignition
source in downstream equipment or actual ignition of the dust cloud in the equipment. These machines are
most frequently of substantial construction and able to withstand an internal explosion without damage.
Explosion venting or other protection techniques are not needed.
Maintain these devices regularly to ensure adequate lubrication is provided, proper clearances are
maintained, and dust and debris dont accumulate and become ignited or impair proper operation.
3.2 Loss History
Loss history was surveyed for dust explosion losses for the period 1983 through 2006. A total of 166 losses
at FM Global client locations resulted in a gross loss of US$284 million (all figures indexed to 2007 dollars).
The losses by industry group are shown in Table 3. In five of the top six categories there was one event
that was substantially larger than typical in terms of gross loss. This will skew any estimate of average loss
based on the total number of losses. In fact, the top 2 losses account for almost 60% of the loss cost.
Loss history is best used to help prioritize what materials, processes, and equipment should be the focus
of protection efforts.
Table 3. Losses by Industry (by Number of Losses)
Industry Type
Woodworking
Food
Metals
Chemical/Pharmaceutical
Pulp/Paper
Mineral
Utility
Plastics
Rubber
Printing
Textile
Other
Total

No. Losses
64
26
18
14
12
11
7
5
5
1
1
2
166

Table 4 examines the loss data for the ignition source that caused the event. Friction and sparks have been
commonly considered the major ignition source and the loss data shows that. Hot work is also a significant
contributor.

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Table 4. Losses by Cause (Ignition Source)

Cause Type

No. Losses
50
38
16
13
10
6
6
4
2
21
166

Friction
Spark
Chemical Action
Hot Work
Burner Flame
Electricity
Static Electricity
Overheating
Hot Surface
Unknown/No Data
Total

Another informative approach to investigate would be the dust group involved in the loss. Table 5 shows
that the wood group is by far the most significant by number of losses.
Table 5. Losses by Dust Type
Dust Group
Wood
Food
Chemical
Metal
Coal
Plastic/Rubber/Resin
Paper
Various
Grand Total

No. Losses
70
25
17
15
14
13
8
4
166

Looking at the equipment type involved, the losses in Table 6 clearly show that dust collectors are by far
the leading piece of equipment to experience explosions. Obviously, a dust collector has dust that is
suspended in air. Also, because a dust collector is designed to handle material produced elsewhere, the
ignition source does not have to come from within the dust collector. A source picked up in the dust production
area can ignite an explosion in the dust collector.
Explosions in impact equipment are also frequent. The data shows 22 incidents involving grinders, sanders,
pulverizers, ball and hammer mills, chippers, shredders, etc. The mechanical energy expended in these
processes can translate into the generation of heat or spark energy required to ignite a dust cloud.
In Table 6, the various category consists of 30 single-occurrence items.

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Table 6. Losses by Equipment Type

Equipment Type
Dust Collector
Impact Equipment
Storage Silo
Processing Equipment
Oven
Conveyor
Grain Elevator
Spray Dryer
Dryer
Boiler
Storage Silo/Dust Collector
Waste Bin
No Data
Storage Bin
Various
Total

No. Losses
66
22
8
7
5
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
2
2
30
166

The data was also analyzed to see the effect of adequate damage-limiting construction on the size of the
average loss. For buildings, the protected loss was about 45% of the unprotected. For equipment, the
protected loss was about 25% of the unprotected loss.
4.0 REFERENCES
4.1 FM Global
Data
Data
Data
Data
Data
Data
Data
Data
Data
Data
Data
Data
Data

Sheet
Sheet
Sheet
Sheet
Sheet
Sheet
Sheet
Sheet
Sheet
Sheet
Sheet
Sheet
Sheet

1-44, Damage Limiting Construction

5-1, Electrical Equipment in Hazardous Locations
5-8, Static Electricity
5-20, Electrical Testing
6-9, Industrial Ovens and Dryers
7-10, Wood Processing and Woodworking Facilities
7-17, Explosion Protection Systems
7-32, Flammable Liquid Operations
7-59, Inerting and Purging of Tanks, Process Vessels and Equipment
7-73, Dust Collectors and Collection Systems
7-75, Grain Storage and Milling
7-78, Industrial Exhaust Systems
10-3, Hot Work Management

Hot Work Management Kit (P9601)

4.2 Other
Air Movement and Control Association (AMCA). Classifications for Spark Resistant Construction. AMCA
99040186, latest edition.
American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM). Standard Test Method for Minimum Explosible
Concentration of Combustible Dusts. Standard E1515, latest edition.
American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM). Standard Test Method for Minimum Ignition Energy of
a Dust Cloud in Air. ASTM E2019, latest edition.
American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM). Standard Test Method for Pressure and Rate of Pressure
Rise of Combustible Dusts. Standard E1226, latest edition.
British Standards Institute (BSI). Potentially Explosive Atmospheres - Explosion Prevention and Protection
- Determination of Minimum Ignition Energy of Dust/Air Mixtures. BS EN 13821, latest edition.
International Organization for Standardization (ISO). Explosion Protection Systems Part 1: Determination
of Explosion Indices of Combustible Dusts in Air. ISO 6184/1, latest edition.

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National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). Recommended Practice for the Classification of Combustible
Dusts and of Hazardous (Classified) Locations for Electrical Installation in Chemical Process Areas. NFPA
499, latest edition.
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). Recommended Practice on Static Electricity. NFPA 77, latest
edition.
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). Standard on Explosion Prevention Systems. NFPA 69, latest
edition.
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). Standard on Explosion Protection by Deflagration Venting. NFPA
68, latest edition.
Verein Deutscher Ingenieure (VDI). VDI Guideline 3673, Part 1, Pressure Venting of Dust Explosions. Latest
edition.
APPENDIX A GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Av: Explosion venting area
Air material separator: A broad term for a device designed to separate powders from the air in which it is
transported. Most commonly, this would be a cyclone or dust collector.
Bara: bar, absolute (unit of pressure).
Barg: bar, gauge (unit of pressure)
Bonding: Electrical connection between two electrically-conductive objects that minimizes any difference in
electrical potential between them.
Damage-limiting construction (DLC): Construction designed to minimize the damage from a deflagration
(explosion) in equipment or building. This can be pressure resistive, pressure relieving, or some combination
of the two. Most commonly this would be vent panels on enclosures (buildings or equipment) releasing at
a pressure below the strength of the enclosure.
Deposit velocity: The minimum air (or other gas) velocity needed to prevent dust-particle fallout during
pneumatic-material conveying and to pick up any dust particles deposited during airflow interruption. The
velocity varies with particle weight, density, and aerodynamic properties.
Design strength: Pressure to which a vessel can be exposed without any risk of damage (because a safety
factor has been applied to the yield strength).
Double dump valve: An arrangement of two gate or butterfly valves in series. Only one is open at a time.
This valve is often used where material discharged from one vessel is gravity fed to another vessel (i.e., not
pneumatically conveyed) such as a dust collector discharging into a hopper below it or a material blender
or grinder discharging into a pneumatic conveying system.
Dust: Any sample of solid particles with a median size smaller than 500 microns. For the purposes of this
data sheet, it refers only to combustible dusts.
Dust, combustible: Established by tests that expose the material to ignition sources of various intensities,
such as a spark, a match flame, a Bunsen burner, or a Meker burner. Any organic material, unoxidized metal
particles, or other oxidizable materials (e.g., zinc stearate) should be considered combustible unless testing
proves otherwise. A combustible dust is not always an explosible dust.
Dust, explosible: Established by ASTM test E1226 (Test Method for Pressure and Rate of Pressure Rise
for Combustible Dusts) or E1515 (Test Method for Minimum Explosible Concentration of Combustible Dusts),
or National/International equivalent (e.g., ISO 6184/1, Explosion Protection Systems Part 1: Determination
of explosion indices of combustible dusts in air). Dust with a median particle size greater than 500 microns
can be assumed to be non-explosible as long as particles smaller than 500 microns cannot be segregated
during material handling.
Explosion isolation: System or single device that prevents the propagation of explosion effects from one
volume to an adjacent volume.

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Explosion mitigation: Methods used to reduce damage from the explosion after the explosion has started.
Explosion prevention: Methods used to prevent an explosion by controlling either the air, fuel, ignition source,
or a combination of these.
FM Approved: References to FM Approved in this data sheet mean the product or service has satisfied
the criteria for FM Approval. Refer to the Approval Guide for a complete listing of products and services that
are FM Approved.
Grounding: Electrical connection between a conductive object and the ground that minimizes the difference
in the electrical potential between the object and ground.
Kst: The dust explosibility constant, defined as the maximum rate of pressure rise of a dust explosion in a
1 cubic meter vessel. The units are bar meter per second (bar m/s). The test method used to obtain this
constant is standardized worldwide. This value (Kst) is used in all modern dust explosion vent sizing to
characterize the reactivity (i.e., explosibility) of a particular dust. Only metric units are used for this constant.
MEC: Minimum explosible concentration, the lowest concentration of dust that can support a self-propagating
explosion. (The terms LEL [lower explosible limit] or LFL [lower flammable limit] mean the same, but are
not often used in the context of dust explosions.)
Media type collector: A device (enclosure) that separates dry, solid material from air by passing the air through
a dry filtering medium. Examples are enclosures with bag-type filters, cartridge-type filters (normally a pleated
filter arranged in a cylindrical shape, similar to automobile air filters), rotary drum filters, and panel filters.
(See Data Sheet 1-45, Air Conditioning and Ventilating Systems, and Data Sheet 7-73, Dust Collectors and
Collection Systems, for information on filter types.)
MIE (minimum ignition energy): The minimum amount of thermal energy released at a point in a combustible
mixture to cause indefinite flame propagation under specified test conditions. The lowest value of MIE, known
as LMIE, is found at a certain optimum mixture. It is this value that is usually reported as the MIE.
Phlegmatization: The process of mixing inert dusts with combustible dusts to reduce or eliminate the explosion
hazard.
Pblast,

: The localized pressure as a result of the fireball and pressure from a vented explosion.

max

Pmax: The maximum pressure developed in the 20-liter sphere when testing dust for explosibility
characteristics by ASTM E1226 method. It is factor used to help size explosion vents.
Pred: Highest explosion pressure in a vessel protected with explosion vents; usual units are barg or psig.
Pstat: Explosion vent relief pressure; usual units are barg or psig.
Psia: Pounds per square inch, absolute (unit of pressure).
Psig: Pounds per square inch, gauge (unit of pressure).
Strong ignition source: A strong ignition can provide more than approximately 100 Joules of energy.
a) Examples of a strong ignition source include open flame, welding arc, gas or dust explosion, and electric
arc/short.
b) Consider the presence of combustible building construction or large amounts of combustible storage
along with unacceptable levels of fugitive dust as presenting the possibility of a dust cloud coincident with
a flame (strong ignition source).
c) Conversely, examples that would not be considered a strong ignition source include frictional sparks,
mechanical impact sparks, static sparks, cigarettes, hot surfaces, overheated electrical components.
Strong vessel: A vessel that can withstand explosion pressures in excess of 0.2 barg (3 psig) without being
damaged or destroyed. This includes most process vessels constructed or used in Europe.
Tube sheet: The mounting plate for cartridge-type filters or bag-type filter tubes and cages.
Ultimate strength: Pressure at which an enclosure will be torn open (i.e., ruptured).

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Weak vessel or enclosure: A structure that cannot withstand explosion pressures in excess of 0.2 barg (3
psig) without being damaged or destroyed. This includes most rooms, buildings, and many North American
process vessels.
Yield strength: Pressure at which an enclosure will be deformed without rupturing.
APPENDIX B DOCUMENT REVISION HISTORY
March 2009. Minor editorial changes were made for this revision.
January 2009. Correction to the equation in Section 2.4.2.2.1 was made.
May 2008. Reformatted the document for clarity and ease of use, especially the recommendations.
Added more construction and location guidance on preferred locations for dust hazard occupancies.
Emphasized explosion-hazard elimination and mitigation features.
Added chokes as an isolation method.
Refined the criteria on fans and blowers located in fugitive dust air streams where they can become an
ignition source in an atmosphere that may exceed the MEC.
Simplified the criteria for protection of vessels of unknown strength.
Resolved inconsistencies with other data sheets, especially Data Sheet 7-73, Dust Collectors.
Simplified the Support for Recommendations section.
May 2006. Minor editorial changes were done for this revision.
New section 3.2.3.9.1, Typical Vent Panel Mass (inertia) was added.
May 2005. Added recommendations to implement a management of change program.
January 2005. Minor editorial changes
May 2004. Minor editorial changes
May 2003. Minor editorial changes
January 2001. The document was reorganized to provide a consistent format.
August 1995. Major revisions implementing Kst based vent sizing technology and abandoning the prior method
of vent area to protected volume method.
This data sheet includes many new recommendations which were not in the 1976 edition but many locations
will require less protection than the previous version required. The following exceptions have been made
to the general explosion protection requirements:
Explosion venting is not needed for cyclones handling dusts with a Kst less than 80 (weakly explosible)
and having an open gas outlet on top whose diameter equals or exceeds 45% of the cyclone diameter.
Systems operating at a pressure below 0.1 bara (1.5 psia) require no protection.
Spray dryers operating at below the minimum explosible concentration (MEC) require a reduced amount
of explosion venting compared to other equipment with the same volume. Note: the explosion venting area
for spray dryers and for other equipment is now calculated using the FM Global Research DustCalc
software.

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APPENDIX C RESEARCH INFORMATION ON DUST EXPLOSION HAZARDS

C.1 Reprint from Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries: Improved Guidelines for the Sizing
of Vents in Dust Explosions

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APPENDIX D BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Bartknecht, W. Dust Explosions: Course, Prevention, Protection. Springer-Verlag, New York, NY, 1989.
2. Alfert, F., and K. Fuhre. Flame and Dust Free Venting of Dust Explosions by Means of a Quenching Pipe.
CMI-Report No. 89-25820-1. Chr. Michelsen Institute (Norway), 1989.
3. Eckoff, R. K. Dust Explosions in the Process Industries. Butterworth-Heinemann, Oxford, 1991.
4. van Wingerden, K. Prediction of pressure and flame effects in the direct surroundings of installations
protected by dust explosion venting. Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries (Vol. 6, No. 4,
1993): 241249.
5. WirknerBott, I., et. al. Dust Explosion Venting: Investigation of the Secondary Explosion. Paper presented
at the Seventh International Symposium on Loss Prevention and Safety Promotion in the Process Industries,
Taormina, Italy, 1992.
6. Lunn, G. A. Dust Explosion Prevention and Protection Part 3 Venting of Weak Explosions and the Effect
of Vent Ducts. Rugby: Institute of Chemical Engineers, 1988.
7. Cooper, M. G., et. al. On the Mechanisms of Pressure Generation in Vented Explosions. Combustion
and Flame (1986) 65: 114.
8. Cubbage, P. A., and W. A. Simmonds. An Investigation of Explosion Reliefs for Industrial Drying Ovens.
I-Top Reliefs in Box Ovens. Transactions of the Institute of Gas Engineers (1955) 105: 470-526.
9. Siwek, R., and O. Skov. Modellberechnung zur Dimensionierung von Explosionsklappen auf der Basis
von praxisnahen Explosionsversuchen. VDI Berichte (1988) 701: 569-616.
10. Pineau, J. P. Protection Against Fire and Explosion in Milk Powder Plants. Europex First International
Symposium, Antwerp, Belgium, April 1619, 1984.
11.Hurlimann, H. Results from Real Scale Explosion Tests. Third International Symposium on Loss
Prevention and Safety Promotion in the Process Industries, Basel, Switzerland, 1980.
12. van Wingerden, C. J. M., and H. J. Pasman. Explosion Venting of Partially Filled Enclosures. Conference
on Flammable Dust Explosions, St. Louis, Missouri, USA, November 24, 1988.
13. Zeeuwen, J. P., and G. G. M. van Laar. Explosion Venting of Enclosures Partially Filled with Flammable
DustAir Mixtures. International Symposium on Control of Risks in Handling and Storage of Granular Foods,
Paris, France, April 2426, 1985.
14. Siwek, R. New Knowledge About Rotary Air Locks in Preventing Dust Ignition Breakthrough. Plant
Operations Progress (July 1989) Vol. 8, No. 3: 165-176.
15. Green, D. W., and R. H. Perry. Perrys Chemical Engineers Handbook, Eighth Edition (Chemical
Engineers Handbook). New York: McGraw-Hill, 2007.
16. DeGood, R. Isolation: Another Way to Take the Bang out of Explosions. CPI Equipment Reporter
(Jan-Feb 1988).
17. Siwek, R. A Review of Explosion Isolating Techniques. Europex International Seminar, March 1996.
18. Richmond, J. K., et. al. A Physical Description of Coal Mine Explosions, Part II. Seventeenth International
Combustion Symposium 1978) 1257-1268.

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Interfor
Dust Control Method Chart
Date published: April 30, 2012

113

Dust Control Method Chart

Dust Control Method
1. Water misters

2. Water log storage

Pro
Knocks down airborne dust
Can be timed to work in
conjunction with dust source
activity
Prevents drying-out of logs

3. Sprinklers on log
decks

Wets/washes dust off logs

4. Wall/Roof fans

Keeps air moving, so reduces dust

settlements
May be constantly run; does not
require scheduling
Immediate, targeted
Can be used to reach most
locations, including at elevations

5. Blow downs

6. Water Hose Down

Immediate, targeted
Can be used to reach most
locations, including at elevations
Wets the dust, lowers airborne dust
concentrations compared to blow
down

Con
Water freezing limits use to
seasonal
Water pooling/housekeeping issues

Last Revision Date:

April 30, 2012
Best Use/Location
Fine dust at the source
Contained area
Seasonal

Storage/process imitations based on

operation
Water freezing limits use to
seasonal
Water pooling/housekeeping issues
Ineffective in large areas
Brings in outside conditions (cool:
winter, hot: summer)

Those operations that have

ample water storage
Log decks and infeeds

Labor intensive; slow process

Sweep and shovel must be done as
much as possible prior
Ignition sources must be controlled
(hot work, etc)
Does not remove dust, just moves it
to lower areas
Increases atmospheric dust
concentrations during the blow
down
Regulate air pressure as appropriate
Labor intensive; slow process
Does not remove dust, just moves it
to lower areas
Water freezing limits use to
seasonal
Water pooling/housekeeping issues
Electrical equipment restrictions

High build-up
Elevated horizontal levels and
walls

Enclosed areas

Seasonal
High build-up
Elevated horizontal levels
Restricted from electrical
equipment

114
Dust Control Method
7. Sweep/Shovel

Pro
Immediate, targeted
Limits risk of aerating dust

Con
Labor intensive; slow process

8. Contract Vacuum
Truck

Immediate, targeted
Can be used to reach most
locations, including at elevations
Removes dust without increasing
airborne dust concentrations
Removes most volume of dust
without the need for
manpower/scheduling
Gracon spark detectors
Added cleanout doors the
facilitate easier and more frequent
cleanout which increasing the
efficiency of the system
Equipment dust vacuuming
Contains dust around source,
away from larger areas.

Slow process
Limited access
Cannot reach higher locations
without extensive scaffolding

9. Dust Collection
Systems

10. Suction/vacuuming
11. Smaller Enclosures

12. Enclosing and

skirting conveyors
13. Sloping horizontal
structures

Contains dust around source and

prevents dust aeration
Keeps dust from settling on
horizontal surfaces

14. Circulating Fans

Keeps dust from settling so larger

exhaust fans or suction may
remove dust
Ensuring the cleanup crew knows
the expectations and the risks of
not meeting requirements.
Stress to all people on the plantsite to all help with clean-up,
controlling risk

15. Education

Best Use/Location
Areas noted that have build-up
that do not reach a level of
priority for an engineered
control
Specific, enclosed small areas

Capital required
Not absolute fix
Removes heat

At source

Smaller, higher risk areas

Does not remove dust, only contains
Must work in conjunction with other
dust control means (misters,
suction, etc) to ensure the airborne
dust concentration is within limits
Custom design often required

Electrical equipment
Around machines

Custom design often required

Unproven
Difficult access for maintenance
Procedural not engineered control

At drop-off and transfer

junctions
High concentration, elevated
areas
Limited access
Rafter structure

All workers

115

Norbord
Norbords Combustible Dust Experience
Date published: March 29, 2011

116

Norbords Combustible Dust Experience

March 29, 2011

Peter Quosai
General Manager, EH&S

Jason Homme
Process Tech

Justin Smyth
Project Engineer

Toronto, Canada
416-777-4440
[email protected]

Norbord Minnesota - Bemidji

[email protected]

Norbord South Molton, England

[email protected]

117

Norbord
Approximately 2,000 employees
Based in Toronto, Canada
North America
9 OSB mills (7 US, 2 Quebec)
Europe/United Kingdom
2 OSB mills
3 PB/MDF lines
1 added value plant lamination and RTA furniture

118

Agenda
Norbords dust explosion experience South Molton,

England
Our overall approach to reducing combustible dust risks
Examples of quick wins in a Minnesota OSB plant
Experience with vacuum systems in European panel mills

119

The South Molton PB explosion

A wake-up call
PB line explosion - 2004

120

The South Molton PB explosion

How did it happen?

Material
infeed
Material
transport fan

Keller wind
sifter

Dry
material
discharge

Grit
removal

121

The South Molton PB explosion

What was the consequence?

Risk to employees
Prohibition notice from the UK Health and Safety Executive
Extended downtime business continuity risk
Cost - 1.4M to bring the plant back on line
Immediate ban on the use of compressed air for cleaning

and dry brushing

Prohibition extended to other Norbord UK facilities

122

The South Molton PB explosion

What contributed to the explosion?

Wood dust has the ability to be explosive

Contamination in the material
Maintenance was poor
Philosophy to keep running at all costs
Housekeeping standards were poor
No protection systems fitted to the plant to safely vent

pressure
Process interlocking poor

123

The South Molton PB explosion

What did we do about it?
Plant blow downs replaced with wash downs or vacuum

systems
Dust leak management program put in place
Explosion protection systems installed
Process interlocks improved
Employee awareness training rolled out

Similar action plans also implemented in Norbords other

EU mills

124

Norbords general approach

So far
Treat all dust as potentially explosive
Increase awareness and training assign champions
Keep as much wood in the systems as possible
Eliminate historic accumulations
Understand where dust is coming from
Systematically identify sources
Reduce or eliminate use of compressed air for cleaning
Set guidelines for use
Explore and encourage vacuum alternatives
Developed clear and documented program expectations

125

Addressing the source of dust

Quick wins in Minnesota OSB
First we developed a Dust Recognition Form
Trained employees what to look for and to use the form
Then we identified the areas that were the largest dust

contributors that could be a Quick Win

We created a list of projects that would produce the best
results for containment or capturing fugitive dust
With the help of contractors we are maximizing the use of
our air systems
Within a year we have been able to complete about 20 of
our heavy hitters!

126

Belt cleaner on the outfeed

conveyor for the dryer, this
cleaner has reduced the amount
of dust by 75% going to the take
up pulley which normally would
end up falling on the floor

Below the take up pulley, the

amount of dust here has been
reduced from one and a half
bobcat buckets to a shovel full
in 8 hours

127

Outfeed end of the flatline

dryer, we installed the hood
from K air system to collect the
dust from the outfeed end of the
dryer

Blower for the outfeed end of

the dryer, this is used for
separating the dust from the
wafers so the hood in the
previous slide can collect the
dust

128

Rotary dryer outfeed

conveyor take up pulley has
been fully enclosed. Clean up
now is done from the bottom
door, its just shoveled into a
wheel barrow. This keeps a lot
of dust from being blown around
when doors are open on the
building

Woodroom tail ends of the

wet wafer conveyors, they
have been fully enclosed to
keep the dust contained inside

129

Mat conveyor return

pan, this has been
closed up and the dust
is directed to the bin
below. Prevents the
dust from being blown
around

130

Vacuum Systems
Inverness OSB
Gotland BagVac
Portable
12HG, 1200m3/hr
4 (100mm) flex hose

connection
Dedicated area specific 4
collection network
Direct dump to hopper or
bag

131

Vacuuming has its advantages

Does not compromise

Before Vacuuming

existing extraction systems

or reduce negative pressure
from bunkers/conveyors
Reduces risk of
contaminants from floor
making it into floor pick-ups
etc.
Reduces ignition
sources in extraction
equipment
Handles materials only once
After Vacuuming

132

there is much more to do.

Reinforce housekeeping and leak detection routines
Continue training and communication
Develop habit to identify and fix leaks
Establish acceptable housekeeping expectations
Quantify residual risk
Characterize/test remaining dust
Classify areas
Plan investments for improvement (dust extraction etc.)
Review suitability of fire protection and control
Review engineering for explosion venting, etc.
Limit propagation - explosion detection, inerting

systems, etc.

133

Weyerhaeuser
Combustible Dust Awareness
Date published: Unknown

134

Combustible Dust
Awareness

135

Combustible Dust
Every day, dust is created as a byproduct of
many work processes.
When conditions are right, very small particles
of dust can catch on fire and cause an
explosion.
Even small amounts of combustible dust can be
extremely dangerous.

136

Sources of Combustible Dust

At Weyerhaeusers sites, potential sources of
combustible dust include:
Wood dust
Paper dust
Pulp dust
Fly ash
Pet coke

137

OSHA Emphasis
OSHA has renewed emphasis
on combustible dust because
of incidents:
Pet coke Massachusetts foundry
dust fire and explosion in 1999
killed 3 and injured 9
Combustible dust above suspended
ceilings in a North Carolina
pharmaceutical plant fueled a
2003 explosion that killed 6 and
injured 38
Another fatal dust explosion in
2003 at a Kentucky acoustics
insulation manufacturing plant
left 7 dead and 37 injured
A dust explosion at a sugar
refinery in Georgia took the lives
of 14 workers and injured 10
others in February 2008

138

Combustible Dust Hazards

If you work in a site where combustible dust
may be present, you should be aware of the
hazards of combustible dust and the control
measures to eliminate build up of hazardous
levels of combustible dust.

139

Combustible Dust Explosion

(Typical Event Sequence)

Initial fire
starts when
ignition source
contacts dust
build-up

Initial fire
leads to a
small
explosion

Shock from
initial
explosion
knocks dust
off of
elevated
horizontal
surfaces

Measured in milliseconds !

Dust from
elevated
surfaces
ignites,
expanding the
fire and
leading to a
bigger
explosion

140

Hazardous Conditions
Conditions that can potentially trigger a
combustible dust explosion include dust that is:
Small in size (less then 420 microns)
Dispersed in the air in significant
concentration
In the presence of an ignition source
Confined within a building or equipment

141

Hazardous ConditionsSize
Size matters: smaller fuel particles take
less energy to ignite (starting a fire)
Particles 420 microns or smaller are prime
for being combustible dusts
Common Material

Size (microns)

Table salt

100

White granulated sugar

450-600

Sand

50+

Talcum (baby) powder

10

Mold spores

10-30

Human hair

40-300

Flour

1-100

Source: Filtercorp International Ltd.

142

ConditionsDispersion
When particles are dispersed (spread through
the air) fires and explosions can be much more
severe.
Why? Combustible dust explosions typically
involve two phases:
An initial smaller explosion at the ignition
source that blows fine, dry, settled dust off
elevated horizontal surfaces, making it
airborne
A more catastrophic secondary explosion when
the newly airborne fine, dry, dust ignites,
resulting in an expanding fireball

143

ConditionsDispersion
To prevent dispersion (and potential secondary,
more catastrophic explosions) dust
accumulations must be minimized, especially
at higher locations such as beams, pipes, or
ducts.

144

ConditionsDispersion
Knowing how much dust accumulates and could
be dispersed is important:
OSHA considers any dust accumulation in
excess of 1/32 inch, covering more than 5% of
the surface area of the room, to be excessive
and a combustible dust hazard
Weyerhaeusers best practice is to limit dust
build-up to 1/8 inch or less due to the lighter
bulk densities of our dusts

145

ConditionsIgnition Sources
Ignition sources can start the initial fire.
Common ignition sources at our sites can
include:
Electrical equipment
Static electricity
Mechanical sparks & friction
Open flames
Heating systems & hot surfaces
Tools & vehicles
Maintenance activities, such
as grinding and welding

146

ConditionsConfinement
Confinement of dust increases the effect of an
explosion.
A small dust explosion, when contained,
generates extreme pressure that can lead to a
catastrophic and destructive explosion.
If dust clouds are ignited within confined areas
such as buildings or equipment, dangerous
pressures can be generated, possibly exceeding
the building or equipments design strength.

147

Best PracticesHousekeeping
Maintain a strong emphasis on housekeeping at
all times to eliminate the build-up of dust.
Housekeeping practices include:
Limit dust build-up to 1/8th inch or less on any
surface
Clean accumulated dust in a timely manner
Above-floor-level areas such as on machine tops, beams,
joists, ducts, pipes and cable trays should be cleaned
regularly

Inspect hidden areas for dust residues at

regular intervals

Be certain to inspect for dust on and within electrical

equipment, such as on the surface of and inside MCC
cabinets

148

Best PracticesHousekeeping
Use cleaning methods that do not generate
dust clouds, especially in areas where ignition
sources are present. Vacuum, water wash, use
wet rags or soft bristle brooms.
Evaluate the hazards of using water near electrical
equipment and MCCs (motor control centers) before using
wet methods

Minimize use of high-pressure compressed air

to clean (blowdown) dust accumulations

If dust is to be blown off overhead areas,

de-energize all electrical equipment in the area, and use
a hot work permit system

149

Best PracticesHousekeeping
Consider using contractors
that specialize in
industrial vacuuming.
Consider installation of a
central vacuum system.
Follow required hot work
procedures including
removing combustibles
from the area, preventing
sparks from reaching
unprotected areas, and
posting a fire watchalways follow all hot work
permit requirements.

150

Best PracticesEquipment Inspection

Ensure your process dust-control/ventilation
systems are properly maintained and
regularly inspected, including:

Source ventilation hoods, blowpipes, ducting, cyclones, bag

houses, and associated fire, spark, and explosion
suppression systems

Dust escaping from these systems indicates

improper design, insufficient capacity,
blockage and/or inadequate maintenance

Place these systems on regular Preventive Maintenance

(PM) inspections using Maximo or SAP

151

Control Measures
In areas where it is difficult to control
fugitive dust, to prevent dust from collecting:
To the extent practical, provide horizontal
surfaces such as girders, beams, ledges, and
equipment tops with a sloped cover having a
smooth finish, to shed dust settling out of the
air
Sloped covers should be at an angle of at least
60 degrees from horizontal

152

Control Measures
Separator devices are used to remove foreign
materials capable of igniting combustible
dusts, such as a piece of metal that could
create a spark
MSDSs for materials that could become
combustible dust under normal operations
are available to employees
Employees are educated on the explosion
hazards of combustible dusts and the
education is documented

153

Control Measures
Dust containing equipment such as cyclones
bag collectors, bins, formers, and silos are
located outside of buildings whenever
possible
Buildings and equipment handling combustible
dust are designed to withstand dust
explosions or vent explosionsexplosion
venting is directed to a safe location away
from employees
Dust collector systems have spark detection
and explosion/fire suppression systems
The site has isolation devices to prevent
sudden and intense fires from spreading
between pieces of equipment connected by
ductwork

154

Control Measures
A current emergency action plan is reviewed
with all employees annually
Site uses a Hot Work Permit program
Non-smoking areas are posted with No
Smoking signs
Emergency exit routes are maintained
properly and designated with signs
Site selects and uses powered industrial
trucks (e.g. forklifts) that are approved for
combustible dust locations
Employees always use appropriate personal
protective equipment (PPE)

155

Additional Resources
Weyerhaeusers Combustible Dust website
Health & Safety Network, 9.6 Fire and
Explosion Risk Reduction (Combustible Dust )
OSHA Combustible Dust website
iLevel Combustible Dust Best Practice website

156

Wood Machinery
Manufacturers of America
NFPA 664 Combustible Dusts Overview
Date published: February 21, 2011

157

NFPA 664 Combustible Dusts Overview

does not cover hybrid mixtures or gas
The National Fire Protection Association - NFPA has issued several standards and it can be quite difficult to get a good overview of these
standards. WMMA Dust Task Force has developed this tool to help you to get a simplified way to get an overview of the requirements set out
in the NFPA standards. It is important for the user to understand that in each case the user must consult with the applicable standard to
assure the particular facility/process being assessed comply with the correct standard.
Multiple sections of this guide is protected under: Copyrights (multi years) National Fire Protection Association, all rights reserved.
NFPA and National Fire Protection Association are registered trademarks of the National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, MA 02169.

Instructions of how to navigate the guide

Link to NFPA

WMMA companies who can assist

Click on logo to visit website

Click on green arrow to start

Other hyperlinks instructions
Click this link to get back to this page
Home
Click this link to go to index
If you want to view this guide page by page you can use
PgDn and PgUp on you computer

This presentation/guide is for informational

purpose only. WMMA makes no warranties,
express, implied or statutory, as to the
information in this document.
WMMA does not accept any liability whatsoever
for any loss or damage, which may be caused
as a result of the transmission of this document
by copy, mail, fax, web download or email.

Page 1
02/21/2011

158
The requirements of the NFPA standards are complex. The standards have a lot of interrelated references and often
segments are confusing and subject to interpretation.
The ultimate responsibility for compliance is the responsibility of the Owner/Operator.
Some issues have to be managed by the Owner/Operator and others he can be supported by a qualified Supplier/Vendor.
To help the Owner/Operator get an overview of the issues and costs related to compliance with NFPA 664 the WMMA Dust
Task Force has developed this tool

Owner/Operator

Click on subject
you want to get
more information
about

Supplier/Vendor

Awareness and Education

Collector Location

Housekeeping

Isolation

Compressed Air Cleaning

Spark Detection

Maintenance & Repair

Enclosureless Dust Collectors

Each rectangle is
a hyperlink

Documentation

Equipment Documentation
Operating and Maintenance
manual

Click

OSHA - NEP

Designer Qualifications

Hot Work Permit

Return Air High Speed Abort

Forklifts

Return Air Chemical

Isolation

Dust Layer

Ductwork and Duct Design

10

Authority Having Jurisdiction

10

Hazardous Location

on each page to
get back here

Dust Testing
Home

Resource Material

159

Awareness and Education

Dust

Dust settles on flat

surfaces

Some event
disturbs the
settled dust
into a cloud
Dust cloud is
ignited and
explodes

Lack of awareness of the danger of fires

and explosions in wood dust can cause
this to happen

Employees need to know

The safe work practices applicable to their job tasks,
The overall plant programs for dust control and ignition
source control.
Employee training must be
Before he/she initially start work
Periodically to refresh their knowledge
When reassigned
When hazards or processes change

Home

Only thing left intact of the

plant was the dust collector

160

Housekeeping

See details in
NFPA 664
Chapter 11

Housekeeping is your first line of defense.

Work area must be kept clean for dust accumulation
Machinery should be equipped with engineered dust collection hoods

(click here for NFPA 664)

Dust accumulation must be kept below minimum layer thickness

Remove dust from up-facing surfaces i.e. beams, piping and ductwork, machine enclosures etc
Watch out for hot surfaces and or potential ignition sources
Use proper equipment for housekeeping
Do not use compressed air for cleaning

Click here for rule on compressed air cleaning

All hot sources must be shut down and cooled off before commencement of cleaning
Use only vacuum cleaners certified to work in dusty environment
Alternative install central vacuum system with vacuum device placed outside
Electric
Explosion proof

Air
Explosion proof

Cost:

Cost:

$8,000 +up
Home

$5,000 +up

Electric
General duty

Cost:

$3,000 +up

Fixed system

Electric
General duty

Cost:

$4,000 +up

Cost:

$20,000 +up

Compressed Air Cleaning

161

Compressed air cannot be used for cleaning.

Exemption
the area first has been cleaned by vacuum up all accessible areas
All heat producing components has been turn off
All lighting fixtures are rated Class II division 2G
Air pressure is reduced to 15 PSIG (30 PSI)

Home

Maintenance and Repair

162

Inspection and Maintenance.

Record and
maintain for
each event

An inspection, testing, and maintenance program shall be developed to ensure that fire and explosion protection
systems are in accordance with NFPA 664 Chapter 9.
The inspection, testing, and maintenance program shall be a documented program detailing the equipment inspected,
testing performed, test results formulated, and maintenance or repair requirements.
Process controls, equipment, and machinery shall be inspected, tested, and maintained in accordance with the
manufacturers recommended guidelines and safe practices.
In addition to inspecting the fire and explosion protection systems that could be in place, such a program should include,
but not be limited to, inspections of dust collection system components, electrical transformers, switchgear and
switches, large motors (e.g., greater than 200 hp), hydraulic and lubricating systems, rotating machinery (e.g.,
debarkers, chippers, mills, refiners, dryers, roll presses, planers, sanders etc.), and deficiencies with electrical devices
(e.g., arcing, lighting, and damaged wiring) in and around dust-producing processes. Arcing switches, worn bearings,
worn belts, damaged wiring, and misaligned parts, including gears, pulleys, guards, and fairings, have all been identified
as being sources of ignition.
Record Retention.
Records of inspections, tests, and maintenance of fire protection equipment and components shall be retained and made
available to the authority having jurisdiction upon request.
All records required to be kept shall be retained until their usefulness has been served or until no longer required by the
applicable standard or authority having jurisdiction.
Records shall be maintained on-site by the owner/Operator.
Retained records shall indicate the procedure performed (e.g., installation, inspection, testing, training, or maintenance),
the organization that performed the work, the results, and the date the work was performed.
Home

Documentation

163

Owner must have complete set of Drawings and Specifications for

his facility and process on file for the life of the process
A Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) must be done for the process
and updated when changes to the process made procedural
changes or equipment changes and at least every 5 years.
Owner must have a Management of Change Procedure
documented and executed for each facility and process change
Owner must have Training procedures documented - regular retraining at least annually each activity must be documented
Owner must have Inspection and Maintenance procedures
documented - each activity must be documented
Owner must have Housekeeping procedures documented each
activity must be documented.

Home

OSHA - NEP

OSHA Combustible Dust

National Emphasis Program

164

OSHA implements National Emphasis

Program(NEP) for combustible dust.
CPL 03-00-008 Provides policies
and procedures for inspecting
workplaces that create or handle
combustible dusts that could cause
deflagration, fire or explosion
800 inspections Oct. 2007 October 2009
164 in wood
123 in food
103 in chemical
Issued 4,900 violations
74% serious
Average violations per visit 7
Average $1,300 per serious violation
Only 20% were in compliance
80% dust collectors inside building
Selection by Industry Type .
Or Employee Complaint
Or Incident

Home

165

Hot Work Permit

HOT WORK PERMIT
Date _________________

_________________________________________
(company name)
Time_________________________

Name of Person(s) Performing Work ____________________________________________________

Specific Location of Work _________________________________
Yes
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___

No
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___

___
___
___
___

___
___
___
___

___
___
___
___
___
___

___
___
___
___
___
___

Cutting or welding permitted in an area that has been made fire safe.
All movable fire hazards in the vicinity have been taken to a safe place.
Guards used to contain the heat, sparks and slag if fire hazards cannot be removed.
Floor or wall openings or cracks, open doorways and windows protected or closed.
Fire extinguisher available for instant use.
Fire watch in areas where other than a minor fire might develop such as around combustible material.
Floors swept clean of combustible material for a radius of 35'.
Combustible floors have been kept wet, covered with damp sand or protected by fire resistant shields.
Welding/cutting done only in areas authorized by management. No welding/cutting in sprinkled building when sprinkler
system is impaired or in presence of explosive atmosphere, or in area of storage of readily ignitable material.
Dusts and conveyor systems that might carry sparks to distant combustibles protected or shutdown.
Cutter/welder is trained in safe operation of equipment and the safe use of the process.
Any on-site contractors advised about flammable material or hazardous conditions of which they may not be aware.
Welding or cutting containers:
Container thoroughly cleaned and ventilated;
Any pipe lines or connections to containers disconnected or blanked.
PPE used as needed e.g., eye protection, helmet, protective clothing, respirator, gloves.
Warning sign posted to warn other workers of hot metal.
Appropriate ventilation provided.
When working in confined spaces a permit has been issued as per 1910.146.

For specific requirements refer to General Industry Standards 1910.146; 1910.252; .253;, .254 and .272
and Construction Standards 1926.803; .350; .352 and .353.

____________________________
Authorized Signature Supervisor

Home

CSB 5/28/05 Rev 1

166

Forklifts

OSHA 29 CFR 1910.178 regulates powered industrial trucks in dust areas

When powered industrial trucks are used in CLASSIFIED AREAS they must be
rated in accordance with the link below

Link to
OSHA
Powered Industrial
Trucks

Home

167

Dust Layer
Deflagration Hazard
potential for flash fire and explosions

A deflagration hazard shall be determined to exist when either of the two following conditions exists:
1. Layer of accumulated fugitive dust exceed 1/8 th inch over 5% of the area or 2,000 ft 2, whichever is smaller.
This layer thickness can be adjusted for settled bulk density (on dry weight bases) using following formula:
Allowable thickness, Tp =

0.125 x 20 (lb/ft3)
inch
Measure Bulk Density (lb/ft3)

2. Deflagrable wood dust in the air at a concentration in excess of 25% of MEC (Minimum Explosive Concentration) under
normal operating conditions

NFPA 664
- 3.2 mm (1/8") thickness

(Bulk density 20 lb/ft3)

Home

< OK
> NO

Authority Having Jurisdiction - AHJ

168

Who makes the final decision about compliance?

It is the Authority Having Jurisdiction or AHJ.
The problem for the Owner/Operator is that the authority is held by several
entities and they may work from different guidelines and codes.
Here are some of the authorities that may apply:
OSHA
Local Fire Marshall
Local Building Inspector
Insurance Company
Corporate Mandate or Guidelines
Ultimately it is the Owner/Operator that must assure and document that he
has a safe workplace.

Home

See details in
NFPA 664
Chapter 3.2.2

(click here for NFPA 664)

Collector Location
Dust collectors shall always be
installed outside with explosion vents
exhausting to a safe area

Exemptions:
1. Inside with explosion vent exhausting
to and outside safe area (See NFPA 68)

2. Enclosureless dust collector meeting

specific requirements

Click here for

special requirements
for Enclosureless
Dust collectors
Home

169

170

Isolation
If an explosion happen in a dust collector the system
must be designed to prevent the transfer of energy
to upstream and downstream areas and equipment
Downstream to work area
through return air duct

Trunk line isolation methods:

Explosion Isolation Flap
Chemical Isolation
Fast acting Valve
Return air duct isolation methods:
High speed abort gate
Chemical Isolation
Fast acting Valve

Energy release
Downstream equipment isolation methods:
Upstream to work area
through trunk line

Connected equipment
relay line

Install compliant rotary valve on collector

RV must stop immediately on event
Chemical Isolation
Fast acting Valve
Note: If enclosed vessel is downstream
special engineering required.

Pneumatic
duct

Explosion Isolation Flap

Cost:

$2,500 - $8,000

Home

High Speed Abort Gate

Cost:

$8,000 - $20,000+
Click here for
more info on
abort gate

Chemical Isolation
Cost:

$12,000 - $25,000+
Click here for more
info on chemical
isolation

High Speed Gate Valve

Cost:

$20,000 +up

Compliant Rotary Valve

Cost:

$3,000 +up

Spark Detection

Cost:

$5,000 to $8,000
per zone/duct
(<30")+pump if
required

Home

171

Enclosureless Dust Collector

172

If your dust collection requirement is below 5,000 cfm then an

enclosureless dust collector that complies with the NFPA664
design practices can be used inside your facility as long as;
Your are collecting just wood dust no metal no lacquers.
You empty the waste containers at least once daily.
It is 20 away from where people egress.
It is 20 away from any other enclosureless dust collectors
The fan is a TEFC design.
The collector will not be extracting from wide-belt sanders or
other machinery with a mechanical feed.

Home

173

Equipment Documentation -Operating and Maintenance Manual

Design and submittal documentation:

Mfg. data sheet & instruction manuals

Design calc. inc. final reduced (Pred) pressures
General specifications
Explosion prevention system equipment list
Sequence of operation for each system
End user inspection and maintenance forms
User conformity with applicable standards and the appropriate
chapter of this standard
Combustible material properties and source of data
Process hazard review
Process plan view including protected process, placement location
of all explosion prevention devices, and personnel work locations
Process elevation view
Electrical wiring diagram, including process interlock connection
details
Mechanical installation drawings and details
Electrical installation drawings and details
Process interlocks identifying each equipment interlock and function
(P&ID)
Employee training

Mechanical Installation:

Must follow drawings as system requirements are location sensitive

Manufacturers requirements must be followed related to environmental
conditions and process material handled
Safe access for inspection, service and maintenance
Electrical Installation:

Must comply with NFPA 70, National Electrical Code

Hazardous areas identified in accordance with NFPA 70, 497 and 499 must
be documented and information kept on file for life.
Wiring and control circuits must be properly isolated and shielded from other
circuits
Control systems shall be installed, maintained, and isolated from the basic
process control system
Minimum functional testing must be performed
Special requirements for type A and B circuits as described in NFPA 72
An reliable source of electrical energy shall be used that meets the
requirements of the manufacturer

Installation Checkout and Commissioning:

Prior to start up and use of a protection system following steps are

applicable:
Walkthrough and inspect that the right equipment is installed in the location
Inspect each components for mechanical and electrical integrity
Conduct control unit function test
Make point-to-point wiring checks of all circuits
Ensure continuity and conditions of all field wiring
Inspect sensing pathway and calibrate initiating devices

Home

Verify installation of all system components

Verify system sequence of operation by simulating activation to verify
system inputs and outputs
Conduct pre-validation testing. verify systems interlock, and shutdown
circuits
Complete record of system commissioning inspection, including hardware
serial numbers, operational data, air flow readings, power readings, as
appropriate
Conduct user training
Turn system over to Owner/Operator

Designer Qualifications

174

Designer and Installer Qualifications systems to be designed and installed under supervision
of qualified engineers who are knowledgeable of these systems and their associated standards
WMMA companies who can assist
Click on logo to visit website

See details in
NFPA 664
Chapter 4.4

(click here for NFPA 664)

Home

Return Air High Speed Abort Gate

175

Recycling of exhaust from dust collectors to buildings shall only be permitted if following are met:
1. it is from wood dust only and the collector efficiency is greater that 99.9% at 10 m
2. the system is equipped with a listed spark detection system installed in accordance with NFPA 72
3. the exhaust air duct conveying the recycled air back to the building is equipped with a high speed
abort gate w/ manual reset
Click here for more Information on
Spark Detection

Alternatively chemical
isolation can be used
in return air ducting
Click here for more
Information on
Chemical isolation

Home

High Speed Abort Gate

Cost:

$8,000 - $20,000+

Return Air Chemical Isolation

176

Chemical isolation
Flame front is
halted by barrier
released from
chemical
suppressor
Pneumatic
duct

Chemical Isolation
Cost:

$12,000 - $25,000+

Home

Ductwork and Duct Design

177

Processes that generates sparks, flames or hot material i.e. grinding wheels, welding, sanding shall not
be manifolded into ducts conveying flammable or combustible material.
An exhaust system shall be inherently balanced or a means shall be provided to balance the system
Inherently balanced means it is designed using the velocity pressure method

The velocity must be high enough to keep the duct interior clean and free of residual material
Branch ducts shall not be added or removed without redesign of the system.
Removal of branch duct also require redesign of system to assure required velocity is maintained.
If the dust is combustible determine the concentration of combustible dust and compare it to the MEC
for the product conveyed. (if >25% of MEC explosion relief may be required).
Changes in duct sizes shall be designed to prevent accumulation of material by utilizing tapered
transition with the included angle of taper not more than 30 degrees (preferred) or 45 degrees if
necessary.
When duct passes through physical barriers that is erected to segregate dust deflagration hazards,
physical protection shall be provided to prevent propagation of deflagration between segregated
spaces.
Ductwork shall be metallic. Exception: Flexible duct is only permitted at an inlet when movability or
portability is required.
Ductwork shall be bonded and grounded
Home

Ducts shall be isolated to prevent propagation of deflagration to other vessels.

Hazard Locations

178

The NEC (National Electrical Code) establishes the criteria for electrical safety for Hazardous
Locations in Article 500 through 504.
The sole concern of NEC is preventing the electrical service from serving as an ignition source
or electrical shock hazard.
Class I Hazard Locations are areas containing gasses and vapors
Class II Hazard Locations are areas containing combustible dusts
Class II Division 1 areas

Class II Division 2 areas

A location where:

A location where:

Combustible dust is in the air under normal operating

conditions in quantities sufficient to produce explosive
or ignitable mixtures

Combustible dust may be present in the air in quantities

sufficient to produce explosive or ignitable mixtures,
due to abnormal operations

Mechanical failure or abnormal operation of machinery

or equipment might cause such explosive or ignitable
mixtures to be produced and might also provide a
source of ignition through simultaneous failure of
electrical equipment, through operation of protection
devices, or from other causes

Combustible dust accumulations are present but are

normally insufficient to interfere with normal operation
of electrical equipment or other apparatus, but could
become suspended in the air as a result of infrequent
malfunctioning of handling or process equipment

Group E (combustible metals) combustible dusts may be

present in quantities sufficient to be hazardous
None Hazardous areas are Unclassified or
general purpose areas
Home

Combustible dust accumulations on, or in vicinity of

electrical equipment could be sufficient to interfere
with the safe dissipation of heat from electrical
equipment, or could be ignited by abnormal operation
or failure of electrical equipment

179

Resources
OSHA Occupational Safety
and Health Administration

Click on subject you want to view

Combustible Dust
OSHA Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

NFPA National Fire

Protection Association

NFPA 664 Standard for the Prevention of Fire and

Explosions in Wood Processing and Woodworking Facilities
NFPA 654 Standard for the Prevention of Fire and Dust
Explosions from the Manufacturing, Processing and
handling of Combustible Particulate Solids
NFPA 68 Standard on Explosion Protection by
Deflagration Venting
NFPA 69 Standard on Explosion Prevention Systems

FM Global Insurance
Company

Loss Prevention Data Sheet 7-73, Dust Collection Systems

Loss Prevention Data Sheet 7-76, Prevention and
Migration of Combustible Dust Explosions and Fires

Congress

US Chemical Safety Board

Linkedin The Combustible Dust Forum

Building Code Reference Library

Home

Combustible Dust Policy Institute

Imperial Sugar Company Dust Explosion

and Fire

180

Dust Testing

As part of the Process (Hazard) Analysis as outlined in NFPA 664 Chapter 4.2 the Owner/Operator must establish the
severity of a potential explosion in the materials handled in the process.
Chapter 4.2.2 says:
The design of systems and facilities that handles combustible particulate solids shall address the physical and chemical
properties and hazardous characteristics of the materials in the hazard area
This means that sampling of potentially Combustible Dusts must be taken and analyzed and tested to establish its
characteristics.
This information is required and used by the designer of the dust handling systems.
The data is established through testing at specialized laboratories using test methods established by ANSI.
OSHA may require its own standardized tests if you are inspected under the NEP program.
Typical tests required on wood dust
Explosion Severity Test (Pmax, dP/dtmax, KSt)

Cost: $1500 - $2,500

Minimum Explosible Concentration (MEC)

Cost: $900 - $1,500

OSHA Combustible Dust NEP Testing

Cost: $4,000 - $5,000

Multiple test may be required for each facility/process.

Owner/operator should engage professional assistance for Process (Hazard) Analysis and dust testing

Home

181

Equipment

182

Buffalo Turbine
Monsoon Atomizing Misters
Date published: Unknown

183

Products

Model #

g
Monsoon Gasoline KB w/ 2 wheel trailer and tongue

BT-CKB4M

Monsoon Diesel KB w/ 2 wheel trailer and tongue

BT-DCKB3M

Monsoon Gasoline KB Skid Mount (No Trailer )

BT-CKB4SM

Monsoon Diesel KB Skid Mount (No Trailer )

BT-DCKB3SM

Monsoon Electric Skid Mount

BT-EL08M

Monsoon Skid Steer Hydraulic

BT-HYSS1M

Monsoon 8000

BT-CYC8KM

Monsoon PTO

BT-CPTOM

Monsoon Electric Complete

BT-MEC

Monsoon Gasoline Complete

BT-MGC

Monsoon Diesel Complete

BT-MDC

Monsoon Hydraulic w/ Oscillation

BT-MHO

*PurchaseandRentalratesdonotincludefreightandpackagingcharges.
*P
h
dR t l t d
t i l d f i ht d
k i
h
PurchasingFinancingavailable.
Pricingsubjecttochange

184

PROUD TO BE PART OF:

185

Why the Buffalo Turbine Debris Blower?

BUFFALO
BUFFALO TURBINE
Since 1945 Buffalo Turbine has
utilized high volume, high velocity
turbine style
y fan for spraying,
p y g, debris
blowing, dust suppression and odor
control.
PERFORMANCE AND RELIABILITY
Designed and Built for the harshest
environments while exceeding our
customers demanding expectations
every day
VALUE
Over 10 different models
models, Strategically
priced, offering great value giving the
you the opportunity to utilize the right
misting system for your desired
application.

186

y First
Industry
Industry First Turbine Style Blower / Sprayer for Dust Control
Industry First Gasoline Engine Sprayer for Dust, Smoke, Odor Control
Industry First Diesel Engine Sprayer for Dust, Smoke, Odor Control
Industry First Air Driven Atomizing Nozzle for Dust, Smoke, Odor Control
Industry First Wireless Remote Nozzle Control
Industry First Wireless Remote Throttle Control

187

DUST

SMOKE ODOR CONTROL

Applications
Demolition
D
liti
Metal Scrap Recycling
Waste Transfer
C&D Scrap Recycling
Raceways
Aggregate Crushing
Aggregate Processing
Aggregate Recycling
L dfill
Landfills
Torch Areas

Concrete
C
t C
Crushing
hi
Asphalt Recycling
Mining
g
Asphalt Milling
Wood Recycling
Wood Processing
Port Loading / Unloading
Coal Handling
E
Excavation
ti
Controls Most Airborne Fugitive Dust

188

GYRATORY ATOMIZING NOZZLE

Why It Works GAN

1. Driven by high velocity wind

generated by Turbine style Blower,
Blower at
speeds over 5000 rpm.
2. Fluid passes through a Mesh screen
at perimeter of rotating hub that
immediately pulverizes fluid into
uniform spectrum of atomized
droplets.

3. <50 200 micron size droplets are

broadcast 90-150 ft. in neutral wind
conditions and begin collecting and
trapping dust and other particulates
resulting of an immediate reduction of
airborne fugitive dust pollution on
site.

189

Benefits of utilizing Fluid for

Airborne Dust Suppression
1. Currently one of the best available control
g
for airborne fugitive
g
dust is to utilize
technologies
an atomized mist wet suppression method.
2 Smaller atomized fluid particles have a greater
2.
ability to attract to fugitive airborne dust
particulates than larger
p
g water droplets.
p
3. Utilizing water based dust control makes it easier
and
d more costt effective
ff ti to
t add
dd many types
t
off d
dustt
control suppressants and agents if fluid is
p p y
atomized properly.

190

Why GAN Better Than Spray Nozzles

Spray nozzles
nozzles, Tee Jets , and other small orifice spraying
equipment needs to filter out very small particulates from all
water sources and will tend to plug very easily reducing
efficiency well before replacement is required
required.
Buffalo Turbine Monsoon GAN will not plug as long as fluid is
prescreened for larger particulates when drawn from nonpotable sources. No screening is necessary if drawn from
Potable water source.
p y Nozzles require
q
higher
g
pressures
p
of fluid to cause
Spray
proper atomization. This is done with booster pumps and
other methods which adds expense to purchase and maintain.
Buffalo Turbine Monsoon GAN runs effectively at lower
pressures and does not require high pressure pumps. The
GAN is easily cleaned in less than 10 minutes as compared to
the expense of fine mesh filters and nozzle tips which can be
time consuming to clean and costly to replace.

191

Monsoon Compared Stationary Spray Systems

Stationary spray systems require a large investment for
installation, repairs, and once installed are mostly
permanent. They use small orifice nozzles that are not
effective as pointed out in the previous section on nozzle
tips.
Buffalo Turbine Monsoon is very portable and can be moved
easily by a single person or by towing. The Oscillation and
angle of pitch can be adjusted in accordance with changing
wind and other conditions.
The ease of portability of the Buffalo Turbine Monsoon
system makes it possible to safely and easily maneuver
around a jobsite as it is needed or to relocate to an entirely
different jobsite making it the most versatile Dust
Suppression system available today.

192

Monsoon Compared to Water Trucks and Fire Hoses.

Fire Hoses and Water trucks are very effective for
saturating areas on the ground or on piles, however not
effective for removing particulates from the air.
Will utilize more water than necessary and usually
require a laborer to operate which can be time
consuming and costly.
Buffalo Turbine Monsoon is very portable and can be
operated with an attendant nearby performing other
tasks while inspecting the unit periodically.
periodically
generate many
y millions of
Buffalo Turbine Monsoon will g
particulate trapping droplets utilizing much, much less
fluid on a daily basis.

193

Gasoline: 27 HP Kohler Command Engine

Diesel : 17.4hp Kohler Diesel
Gyratory Atomizing Nozzle for Spraying
12 Round Blower Nozzle for Debris Blowing
Wi l
Wireless
Throttle
Th ttl and
d 360 Nozzle
N
l C
Control
t l
Ability to Skid Mount
DOT Trailer available
Two Position Tongue

Gasoline KB Model # BT-CKB4M

Diesel KB Model # BT-DCKB3M

194

27 HP Kohler Command Engine

Gyratory Atomizing Nozzle for Spraying
12 Round Blower Nozzle for Debris Blowing
Wireless Throttle and 360 Nozzle Control
Heavy Duty Steel Construction
Oscillating Stand w/Three Settings 30-55-80 Degrees
12 Volt Oscillation Motor
3 Wheel Off Road Removable Trailer package
p
g
Fork Pockets for Moving and Lifting

BT-MGC (Contains Part Numbers)

BT-CKB4SM
Gasoline Monsoon KB Skid Mount
BT-OS12-28.5
12 Volt Oscillation Stand
1695
3 Wheel Trailer Package

195

17.4 HP Kohler Diesel Engine

Gyratory Atomizing Nozzle for Spraying
12 Round Blower Nozzle for Debris Blowing
Wireless Throttle and 360 Nozzle Control
Oscillating Stand w/Three Settings 30-55-80
30 55 80 Degrees
3 Wheel Off Road Removable Trailer package
Heavy Duty Steel Construction
12 Volt Oscillation Motor
Fork Pockets for Moving and Lifting

BT-MDC (Contains Part Numbers)

BT-DCKB3SM Gasoline Monsoon KB Skid Mount
BT-OS12-28.5
12 Volt Oscillation Stand
1695
3 Wheel Trailer Package

196

460 Volt 3 Phase 15 HP Emerson Electric Motor

Gyratory Atomizing Nozzle for Spraying
Manual pitch adjustment up to 45 degrees
Oscillating Stand w/Three Settings 30-55-80 Degrees
3 Wheel Off Road Removable Trailer package
Heavy Duty Steel Construction
460 Volt Oscillation Motor
Fork Pockets for Moving
g and Lifting
g

BT-MEC (Contains Part Numbers)

BT-EL08M
Electric Monsoon Skid mount
BT-OS460-22
460 Volt Oscillation Stand
1695
3 Wheel Trailer Package

197

Gyratory Atomizing Nozzle

Garden Hose Connection
12 volt Remote Nozzle Control w/ 12ft cable
Direct Drive Gearbox
12 Round Blower Nozzle for Debris Blowing
12
Cost Effective
Lightweight Heavy Duty Steel Construction
Low Maintenance
Mi i
Minimum
20 HP required
i d att th
the PTO
Anti Skid Roller

198

Great For Portable Applications with Small Coverage Area

Gyratory Atomizing Nozzle
Garden Hose Connection
12 Round Blower Nozzle for Debris Blowing
Cost Effective
12.75 HP Kohler Engine or Honda GX320
12 volt Remote Nozzle Control w/12ft cable
Lightweight Heavy Duty Steel Construction
T Position
Two
P iti St
Stub
b Axle
A l
Two Position Tongue
Ability to skid mount

199

Industry First Twin Turbine Style Blower For Misting Applications

Gyratory Atomizing Nozzles for Spraying
12 Round Blower Nozzles for Debris Blowing
40 HP Kohler Engine
Independent Nozzle Control
Wireless Remote Throttle Control
Wireless Remote Nozzle Control
Aerospace Polymer Nozzles
Heavy Duty Steel Construction
Two Position Tongue
Ability to skid mount
Garden Hose Connection

200

Hydraulic Debris Blowers for Skidsteers and Utility Vehicles with Skidsteer quick mount plate.
Will Quickly
Q i kl Mount
M
t to
t mostt Makes
M k off Skidsteers.
Skid t
Hydraulically driven Blower runs off of any existing equipments auxiliary Hydraulics.
Minimum 14gpm and Max 25gpm Hydraulic GPM required.
Available in Basic skid mount
Hydraulic Monsoon w/ Oscillation
G t
Gyratory
Atomizing
At i i Nozzle
N
l
12 volt Oscillation stand is available.

Monsoon Skidsteer Hydraulic

201

FM Global
Wood Processing and Woodworking Facilities
Date published: May, 2010

202

FM Global
Property Loss Prevention Data Sheets

7-10
May 2010
Page 1 of 33

WOOD PROCESSING AND WOODWORKING FACILITIES

Table of Contents
Page
1.0 SCOPE ................................................................................................................................................... 3
1.1 Changes .......................................................................................................................................... 3
2.0 LOSS PREVENTION RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................................................................... 3
2.1 Construction and Location ............................................................................................................... 3
2.2 Protection ......................................................................................................................................... 3
2.3 Equipment and Processes .............................................................................................................. 5
2.3.1 Lumber Sorters ...................................................................................................................... 5
2.3.1.1 Horizontal Tray Sorters .............................................................................................. 6
2.3.1.2 Diagonal and Vertical Bin Sorters ............................................................................. 6
2.3.2 Dry Kilns ................................................................................................................................ 6
2.3.3 Veneer and Fiberboard Dryers .............................................................................................. 8
2.3.4 Humidifying and Tempering Ovens ..................................................................................... 10
2.3.5 Hot Presses ......................................................................................................................... 13
2.3.6 Thermal Oil Heating Systems ............................................................................................. 16
2.3.7 Rotary Dryers ...................................................................................................................... 16
2.3.8 Flash Dryers ........................................................................................................................ 17
2.3.9 Particleboard Milling Equipment .......................................................................................... 17
2.3.10 Composite Panel Formers ................................................................................................. 22
2.3.11 Hazardous Dust Collection and Dust Handling Systems .................................................. 22
2.3.12 Raw Material and Wood Waste Fuel Storage Buildings ................................................... 22
2.3.13 Wood Waste Burners (Incinerators) .................................................................................. 22
2.3.14 Finishing Operations Using Flammable Liquids ................................................................ 23
2.4 Operation and Maintenance .......................................................................................................... 23
2.4.1 Sprinkler System Flushing ................................................................................................... 23
3.0 SUPPORT FOR RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................................. 23
3.1 Loss History ................................................................................................................................... 23
4.0 REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................................... 26
4.1 FM Global ...................................................................................................................................... 26
4.2 NFPA Standards ............................................................................................................................ 26
APPENDIX A GLOSSARY OF TERMS ..................................................................................................... 27
APPENDIX B DOCUMENT REVISION HISTORY ..................................................................................... 28
APPENDIX C MAJOR OCCUPANCIES AND PROCESS HAZARDS ...................................................... 28
C.1 Process Descriptions .................................................................................................................... 28
C.1.1 Sawmills .............................................................................................................................. 28
C.1.2 Panel Products ................................................................................................................... 29
C.1.3 Plywood .............................................................................................................................. 29
C.1.4 Particleboard ....................................................................................................................... 30
C.1.5 Waferboard ......................................................................................................................... 31
C.1.6 Oriented Strand Board (OSB) ............................................................................................. 31
C.1.7 Fiberboard ........................................................................................................................... 31
C.1.8 Medium-Density Fiberboard (MDF) .................................................................................... 31
C.1.9 Hardboard ........................................................................................................................... 32
C.2 Special Hazards ............................................................................................................................ 32
C.2.1 Veneer and Fiberboard Dryers ........................................................................................... 32
C.2.2 Hot presses ......................................................................................................................... 32

2010 Factory Mutual Insurance Company. All rights reserved. No part of this document may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in whole or in part, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical,
photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without written permission of Factory Mutual Insurance Company.

203

7-10

Wood Processing and Woodworking Facilities

Page 2

FM Global Property Loss Prevention Data Sheets

C.2.3 Rotary Dryers ...................................................................................................................... 33

C.2.4 Flash Dryers ........................................................................................................................ 33

List of Figures
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.
Fig.

1.
2.
3.
4.

Horizontal tray sorter. .......................................................................................................................... 6

Diagonal and vertical bin sorters. ....................................................................................................... 7
Typical indirect-heated dry kilns. ........................................................................................................ 8
Typical arrangement of deluge protection for standard veneer dryer. See Fig. 5 for additional
protection details. ................................................................................................................................ 9
5. Typical arrangement of deluge protection for standard veneer dryer. (Section A-A of Fig. 1.) ......... 9
6. Typical arrangement of deluge protection for vertical jet-type dryer. See Fig. 7 for
additional protection details. ............................................................................................................. 10
7. Typical arrangement of deluge protection for vertical jet-type dryer. Section A-A of
dryer shown in Fig. 6. ....................................................................................................................... 11
8. Typical arrangement of deluge protection for special vertical jet-type dryer.
See Fig. 9 for additional protection details. ...................................................................................... 11
9. Typical arrangement of deluge protection for special vertical jet-type dryer. ................................... 12
10. Typical arrangement of automatic sprinkler protection for wicket-type veneer dryer. .................... 12
11. Typical arrangement of spray nozzle protection for multi-tier wood fiberboard or veneer dryer. . 13
12. Detail A-A of dryer shown in Fig. 11. .............................................................................................. 14
13. Section B-B of dryer shown in Fig. 11. ........................................................................................... 14
14. Section C-C of dryer shown in Fig. 11. .......................................................................................... 14
15. Wood panel press pit protection. .................................................................................................... 15
16. Dryer without windbox. ................................................................................................................... 18
17. Dryer without windbox-interlock logic. ............................................................................................ 19
18. Dryer with windbox. ........................................................................................................................ 20
19. Dryer with windbox-interlock logic. ................................................................................................. 21
20. Wood processing/working F&EC/DIC losses by peril (percent number of losses [1583]). ............ 24
21. Wood processing/working fires by cause (percent number of losses [531]). ................................ 26
22. Typical sawmill process flow schematic. ........................................................................................ 28
23. Typical panel products process flow schematic. ............................................................................ 30

List of Tables
Table
Table
Table
Table
Table
Table

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Sprinkler Demand for General Manufacturing Areas ...................................................................... 4

Commodity Classification of Wood Products .................................................................................. 4
19801989 Wood Processing/Working F&EC/DIC Losses By Engineering Peril (1990 $) ......... 24
19801989 Wood Processing/Working Fire By Prime Factor (1990 $) ........................................ 25
19801989 Wood Processing/Working Fires By Cause (1990 $) ................................................ 25
19801989 Wood Processing/Working Fires Sprinkler Protection Analysis (1990 $) ................. 26

2010 Factory Mutual Insurance Company. All rights reserved.

204

Wood Processing and Woodworking Facilities

FM Global Property Loss Prevention Data Sheets

7-10
Page 3

1.0 SCOPE
This data sheet gives guidelines for protecting wood processing and wood working facilities. Wood processing
facilities manufacture basic construction materials (lumber, veneer, plywood and composite panels such as
particleboard, fiberboard, hardboard and oriented strand board). Woodworking facilities remanufacture these
basic products into other consumer products such as doors, windows, cabinets, furniture, paneling, etc.
NFPA 664 also covers these occupancies, and is in general agreement with this standard.
1.1 Changes
May 2010. Minor editorial changes were done for this revision.
2.0 LOSS PREVENTION RECOMMENDATIONS
2.1 Construction and Location
2.1.1 Noncombustible construction is preferred.
2.1.2 Process areas which are susceptible to wide-spread dust or resin accumulations on roof framing
members should have draft curtains to define the sprinkler operating area. Typical areas with this problem
are particleboard raw material screening and storage buildings, wood waste fuel houses, and ceiling areas
above hot presses and plywood veneer dryers. Draft curtains should be at least 4 ft (1.2 m) deep, and fit
flush with the underside of the roof. For laminated wood beam roof framing with decking flush with the top
of the structural members, additional draft curtains are not needed.
2.1.3 Refer to Data Sheet 7-76, Prevention and Migration of Combustible Dust Explosions and Fires, for
other general construction criteria for facilities which have a dust explosion potential.
2.2 Protection
2.2.1 Water supply quantity, flow, and pressure requirements will vary according to yard storage and special
hazard protection needed at each facility. Thorough review of this and other referenced data sheets should
be done to determine the greatest demand.
2.2.2 Two-way hydrants should be located throughout the plant site in accordance with Data Sheet 3-10,
Installation and Maintenance of Private Fire Service Mains and Their Appurtenances. All hydrants should have
repair gate valves, and hydrants in high traffic or yard storage areas should have substantial barriers to help
prevent physical damage. Refer to Recommendation 2.2.8 for hydrant protection of log storage and chip
pile areas.
2.2.3 Provide automatic sprinkler protection according to Table 1 throughout all general manufacturing areas
(i.e., areas not identified elsewhere in this data sheet as needing special sprinkler protection). Refer to
Section 2.3, Equipment and Processes, for sprinkler design criteria for lumber dry kilns, lumber sorters,
hardboard humidifying and tempering ovens, or areas containing significant quantities of flammable liquids
such as press pits, thermal oil process heating systems, and coating/spraying finishing operations.

2010 Factory Mutual Insurance Company. All rights reserved.

205

7-10

Wood Processing and Woodworking Facilities

Page 4

FM Global Property Loss Prevention Data Sheets

Table 1. Sprinkler Demand for General Manufacturing Areas

Density1,2
gpm/sq ft(mm/min)

Type System
Wet

.20 (8)

Head Temp3
F (C)
286 & 212
(141 & 100)
165 (71)
286 & 212
(141 & 100)
165 (71)

Dry

Area2
sq ft
(sq m)
3000
(280)
4000
(370)
4000
(370)
5000
(460)

NOTES:
1
Sprinkler spacing should not exceed 100 sq ft (9.3 sq m). Calculations should include 500 gpm (1900 l/min) for hose streams. Duration
is two hours.
2

This table anticipates the presence of scattered, small hydraulic units (100 gal [378 cu dm/min] or less), localized dust accumulations,
etc. which can result in sprinkler demands larger than those for low-piled product storage areas. Refer to Data Sheet 7-98, Hydraulic Fluids,
if large hydraulic systems are present.
When draft curtains are needed (e.g., particleboard raw material screening and storage buildings, wood waste fuel houses, and ceiling
areas above hot presses or plywood veneer dryers), the area to be calculated should be the curtained area if larger than the area in this
table. When laminated wood beam roof framing is used in lieu of draft curtains, use the area defined by the major laminated beams
(2 ft [0.6 m] or more in depth) as the curtained area.

Roof areas over major equipment subject to cyclical heating (e.g., veneer dryers, hot presses, thermal oil systems, large ovens or dryers,
etc.) should have sprinklers with glass bulb-type thermal elements. If maximum ambient temperatures are expected to exceed 150F (66C),
use 286F (141C) rated heads. If these high temperatures are accompanied by high moisture content (e.g., dryer and hot press areas,
etc.), do not use galvanized pipe.

2.2.4 Provide automatic sprinkler protection for indoor wood product storage areas according to Data
Sheet 8-9, Storage of Class 1, 2, 3, 4 and Plastic Commodities, using the commodity classifications listed
in Table 2.
Table 2. Commodity Classification of Wood Products
Class I
Class II
Class III

All GREEN wood products

(moisture content = 20 percent or more)1
All DRY wood products
(moisture content less than 20 percent)1
All FLAMMABLE-COATED wood products
(regardless of moisture content)2

The storage configuration (e.g., stuck lumber vs. solid-piled) has little effect on the degree of hazard. The moisture content is the primary
factor. If green wood products might be stored for extended periods allowing them to dry (one to three months, depending on climate), design
protection for dry wood products (Class II).

Typical products in this category are timbers treated with creosote or oil-based preservatives, asphalt saturated fiberboard (insulation
board), etc.

2.2.5 Outdoor storage of wood products (e.g., lumber, veneer, etc.) should be arranged and protected as
follows (See Recommendation 2.2.8 for chip and log storage areas):
a) The water supply from all sources combined, including fire department pumpers, should be able to
provide the following demand flows at a residual pressure of 80 psi (5.5 bar):
Total yard storage
(bd. ft1000)
up to 1000
1000 to 2000
over 2000

Waterflow
(gpm)
1000
1500
2000

(cu dm/min)
3800
5700
7600

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Duration
(hrs)
2
3
4

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b) Keep blocks of storage as small as possible so that all areas are accessible for manual fire fighting.
Contiguous stack areas should be limited to approximately 10,000 sq ft (920 sq m) with 20 ft (6 m)
separation between adjacent stack areas.
c) Provide clear space between large aggregate blocks of storage arranged as above so that no more
than 2.5 million board feet is in any one aggregate area. Use Data Sheet 1-20, Protection Against Exterior
Fire Exposure (From Buildings or Yard Storage), to determine suitable separation distances between large
aggregate blocks of storage.
d) Yard storage should not be located under important structures (e.g., conveyors). Storage is considered
to be under a structure if it is less than 20 ft (6 m) away horizontally. Where this is unavoidable, provide
automatic sprinkler protection beneath the structure on ordinary hazard pipe schedule using 165F (74C)
heads located 12 ft (3.7 m) on centers. Yard storage should never be located below power lines.
e) Keep separation spaces and areas adjacent to storage free of weeds or other combustibles.
f) Mobile equipment should not be parked or refueled in storage areas.
2.2.6 Large wood chip and fine storage silos or bins should be protected according to Data Sheet 8-27,
Storage of Wood Chips. Automatic water spray protection is an acceptable alternative to automatic sprinklers,
and is preferred if there is a dust explosion potential. Small bins which can quickly dump their contents (e.g.,
clam shell type truck dump bins) do not need internal protection.
For important detached bins or silos where it is not economically practical to provide automatic protection,
a fixed manual water spray system connected to a dry standpipe should be provided. A hose connection from
the standpipe to a nearby hydrant can provide quick, effective fire fighting capability which is particularly
beneficial if the stored material has a dust explosion potential.
Waterspray nozzles in dusty bins or silos should be protected from plugging (e.g., dust caps, plastic bags,
or poppet valve style nozzles).
2.2.7 Buildings or other important structures should be protected from yard storage exposures by applying
Data Sheet 1-20. A minimum separation of 5 ft (2 m) between large blocks of storage and important buildings
should be maintained at all times for fire fighting access, even if Data Sheet 1-20 will permit less separation.
2.2.8 Refer to Data Sheet 8-27, Storage of Chips and Data Sheet 8-28, Pulpwood and Outdoor Log Storage,
for protection recommendations for outdoor storage of wood fractions (chips, sawdust, shavings, bark, etc.)
and logs, respectively. When storage separations are less than recommended in those data sheets, Data
Sheet 1-20 can be used as an alternative method of exposure evaluation. Consider chips and similar
materials as a Class I commodity, and logs as a Class II commodity.
2.3 Equipment and Processes
2.3.1 Lumber Sorters
The following recommendations should be completed:
1. Provide automatic sprinkler protection beneath sorters when the floor below is combustible, when the
area is not kept clear of combustible debris or when there is a potential for a flammable liquid spill (e.g.,
hydraulic fluid). Use 165F (74C) rated heads on 100 sq ft (9.3 sq m) maximum spacing and ordinary hazard
pipe schedule. To prevent damage from falling lumber, locate heads and piping under sorter structural
members. Sidewall heads can be used if necessary. These heads do not need to be included in any
calculations for ceiling sprinklers.
2. Provide 112 in. (38 mm) small hose stations in all sorter buildings so that all sides of the sorter can be
reached. If the sorter is under an open-sided canopy, adequate hydrant protection will suffice in lieu of small
hose stations.
3. Sorters should be emptied as much as is practical during idle periods and debris on the floor below sorters
should be removed regularly. Sorters should also be emptied, if practical, if a fire should occur in or adjacent
to the sorter.

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2.3.1.1 Horizontal Tray Sorters

2.3.1.1 Provide additional sprinkler protection for horizontal tray sorters according to one of the following
options (see Fig. 1):

Fig. 1. Horizontal tray sorter.

a) Provide automatic sprinklers at ceiling level designed to protect an equivalent height of lumber storage
(see Section 2.2). An equivalent height is defined as one foot (0.3 m) for each tray. Use the appropriate
commodity classification according to the type of lumber (green or dry) being sorted. In no case should
this density/area be less than that recommended for general manufacturing areas as defined in Table 1.
OR
b) When the equivalent height in part a, above, is the limiting case and the required ceiling density
cannot be met, provide ceiling sprinklers designed for general manufacturing areas per Table 1, and
supplement them with automatic sprinklers along both sides of the sorter. Each side should have one line
of heads at the top tray level, and additional lines spaced every six to eight trays vertically. Use 12 in.
(12.7 mm) orifice, 165F (74C) rated, horizontal sidewall heads spaced no more than 10 ft (3 m) on lines
and staggered vertically and side-to-side. Hydraulically design the sidewall heads to provide a minimum
pressure of 20 psi (1.4 bar) when flowing the 10 most remote heads (five on each side). Balance this
demand with the ceiling sprinkler demand.
c) The above ceiling protection should extend over and for 20 ft (6 m) beyond the sorter.
2.3.1.2 Diagonal and Vertical Bin Sorters
2.3.1.2.1 Provide ceiling-level automatic sprinkler protection designed to protect indoor lumber storage the
same height as the maximum height of lumber which can accumulate in the vertical or diagonal bins (see
Fig. 2). In no case should the ceiling density/area be less than that recommended for general manufacturing
areas as defined in Table 1.
2.3.2 Dry Kilns
2.3.2.1 Provide automatic sprinklers throughout dry kilns as follows (see Fig. 3):
a) Provide sprinklers over the lumber loads to protect an equivalent height of dry indoor lumber storage.
An equivalent height is the actual height of the lumber (excluding the kiln cart). The area of operation
should be the entire kiln. Heads should be located such that the top and sides of the lumber loads are

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Fig. 2. Diagonal and vertical bin sorters.

wetted. Consideration must be given to obstructions such as heating coils and movable airflow baffles
which could block sprinkler discharge when the kiln is in operation. In no case should the density be less
than .15 gpm/sq ft (6 mm/min).

Fig. 3. Typical indirect-heated dry kilns.

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Exception: If the kiln is heated by a thermal oil system and the lumber load area is subject to an oil spill
or spray fire, a .25 gpm/sq ft (10 mm/min) density should be used. Flow of thermal oil to the kiln should be
automatically stopped on sprinkler waterflow or detection of oil loss in the kiln heating loop. Manual shutoff
is acceptable where alarms for sprinkler waterflow and loss of oil annunciate at an on-site constantly attended
location, the oil isolation valve is readily accessible and not exposed by a kiln fire, and the emergency
response team includes a person assigned to this task.
b) Provide automatic sprinklers throughout the fan plenum space on 130 sq ft (12 sq m) maximum
spacing. Hydraulically calculate these heads to provide .15 gpm/sq ft (6.1 mm/min) over the entire kiln.
Exception: If the kiln is heated by a circulating thermal oil system and the plenum space is subject to an
oil spill or spray fire, a .25 gpm/sq ft (10 mm/min) density should be used.
Interlock flow of thermal oil to the kiln as described in Part a., above.
c) Assume simultaneous operation of the heads over the lumber and in the fan plenum space. Hydraulic
calculations should be balanced for the two operating areas.
d) Calculations should include 500 gpm (1900 cu dm/min) for hose streams. Duration is 112 hours. It is
acceptable to include more than one pump or source to meet the total demand, if necessary.
e) A dry pipe system should be used if sprinkler piping is subject to freezing when the kiln is idle. Do
not use galvanized piping since the high temperature and humidity will lead to accelerated pipe
deterioration.
f) Use sprinkler heads with glass bulb-type thermal elements rated for approximately 50F (nominal 30C)
above the maximum normal operating temperature.
2.3.2.2 Combustion controls and interlocks should be provided for burners supplying kiln heat in accordance
with Data Sheet 6-9, Industrial Ovens and Dryers.
2.3.2.3 Roofs or canopies over kiln outfeed cooling areas (dry lumber) and infeed areas (green lumber)
should have the same automatic sprinkler protection as indoor lumber storage of the same height. If no roof
exists, evaluate the exposure to the kiln the same as any other yard storage.
2.3.3 Veneer and Fiberboard Dryers
2.3.3.1 Provide automatic deluge water spray protection for all multi-tiered (more than two tiers) dryers
processing plywood veneer, fiberboard, etc., where the moisture content of the material being dried is reduced
to 40 percent or less, or where fines and other combustible residues can collect on interior surfaces. (Small
veneer dryers with only one or two tiers and good internal housekeeping do not need internal protection.)
The following design criteria should be used (see Figs. 4 to 14):
a) Design systems to provide a minimum pressure of 20 psi (1.4 bar) for the end 14 in. (6.4 mm) nozzles
to ensure an adequate spray pattern. For the 12 in. (12.7 mm) orifice open sprinklers normally provided
in air plenums and in exhaust stacks the end sprinkler pressure should be at least 7 psi (0.5 bar). Design
by density is impractical because of the multi-tier nozzles arrangement in most dryers.
b) Where two or more deluge systems are provided in long units the water demand should be designed
for two systems operating at one time. These units may have water demands in excess of 2000 gpm
(7570 cu dm/min).
c) Provide strainers before the deluge valves for nozzles with orifices smaller than 38 in. (9.5 mm) to
remove wood sawdust, chips or fibers. This is particularly important for system supplied from penstocks,
flumes, ponds or rivers.
d) Provide heat detectors or a pneumatic pilot head system to actuate the deluge system. Figures 5, 6,
8 and 9 show suggested locations of the detectors or pilot heads. A pneumatic pilot system is preferred
where moderate or heavy accumulation of resin is experienced and routine washdown is made using the
deluge system or hoses.
e) Interlock the dryer fans and heat source to shut down when the deluge system(s) trip.
f) Provide water traps (Figs. 5, 6 and 9) to prevent air movement from plugging deluge piping with dust
and resin.

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Fig. 4. Typical arrangement of deluge protection for standard veneer dryer. See Fig. 5 for additional protection details.

Fig. 5. Typical arrangement of deluge protection for standard veneer dryer. (Section A-A of Fig. 1.)

g) Provide inspection and fill top openings in the traps for weekly inspection of the water level. A mill-use
hose should be provided for refill of the traps.
h) Provide open sprinklers in the exhaust stacks supplied by the deluge system.
i) For all deluge systems, locate the control valves for ready access by the operator.
j) Trip test the deluge system regularly to remove accumulated lint and resins in the piping. This should
preferably be done weekly as part of the dryer cleaning program, but may be extended to monthly as
long as the tests show that nozzle plugging is not occurring.
k) Provide manual-pull stations for the deluge system on both sides of the dryer near opposite ends.

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Fig. 6. Typical arrangement of deluge protection for vertical jet-type dryer. See Fig. 7 for additional protection details.

2.3.3.2 Standard multi-tier dryers (Fig. 4) should have nozzles on both sides so that one nozzle on each
vertical line is at alternating tier levels and below the bottom tier. The nozzles should be arranged to spray
at least 34 of the way across the tier providing dual coverage in the middle of the unit. Nozzles should be wide
angle spaced along the side of the unit providing overlapped coverage in the center of the dryer. The cooling
section should have nozzles on each tier level.
2.3.3.3 Where nozzles are arranged to discharge from only one side of a vertical jet type dryer, one nozzle
on each vertical line should be located at each tier and below the bottom tier. See Figures 6 and 7. Provide
the same type of nozzle on each vertical line, with wide-angle nozzles on one vertical line and narrow-spray
nozzles on the alternating line.
2.3.3.4 Provide standard upright open sprinklers in the top and side plenum chambers of both standard and
vertical jet-type dryers spaced approximately 913 ft (34 m) or 120 sq ft (11 sq m) maximum.
2.3.3.5 Provide spray nozzle and open sprinkler deluge system for special vertical jet-type dryers as shown
in Figures 8 and 9.
2.3.3.6 Provide roof level sprinkler systems for Wicket type dryers (see Fig. 10).
2.3.3.7 The ceiling areas above these dryers should receive regular cleaning to eliminate accumulations of
dust and resin buildup. Particular attention should be given to ceiling exhaust fan openings since these areas
will have the largest accumulations, and the fan drives are frequent ignition sources.
2.3.4 Humidifying and Tempering Ovens
Provide automatic waterspray deluge protection throughout the oven. Design the system similar to that used
for standard veneer dryers.

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Fig. 7. Typical arrangement of deluge protection for vertical jet-type dryer. Section A-A of dryer shown in Fig. 6.

Fig. 8. Typical arrangement of deluge protection for special vertical jet-type dryer.
See Fig. 9 for additional protection details.

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Fig. 9. Typical arrangement of deluge protection for special vertical jet-type dryer.

Fig. 10. Typical arrangement of automatic sprinkler protection for wicket-type veneer dryer.

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Fig. 11. Typical arrangement of spray nozzle protection for multi-tier wood fiberboard or veneer dryer. Dryers, especially
fiberboard dryers, can be up to 500 ft (153 m) long. Symbols apply also to Figs. 1214 showing additional protection
details.

2.3.5 Hot Presses

2.3.5.1 Refer to Data Sheet 7-98, Hydraulic Fluids, for protection guidelines for the hydraulic oil reservoir
and pumps. Water-based (nonflammable) or FM Approved less-flammable hydraulic fluids should be used
where feasible.
2.3.5.2 Provide automatic deluge sprinkler protection for all new press pits which utilize either flammable
hydraulic fluid which is not FM Approved or thermal oil heat transfer fluid. Activation should preferably be by
combination fixed temperature/rate-of-rise heat detectors, although wet or dry pilot lines are also acceptable.
Provide manual trip stations on the operating floor on both sides of the press.
2.3.5.3 Automatic sprinklers on a closed head system are acceptable for existing or new press pits when
water-based non-flammable or FM Approved less-flammable hydraulic fluid is used, there is no thermal oil
heating, and the sprinkler design is otherwise in accordance with this standard.

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Fig. 12. Detail A-A of dryer shown in Fig. 11.

Fig. 13. Section B-B of dryer shown in Fig. 11.

Fig. 14. Section C-C of dryer shown in Fig. 11.

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2.3.5.4 Provide sidewall heads spaced 8 to 10 ft (2.43 m) apart around the perimeter of the press pit.
Horizontal sidewall heads may be needed for larger pits to assure coverage at the center of the pit.

Fig. 15. Wood panel press pit protection.

Provide additional heads in shielded areas under the press which cannot be protected by perimeter sprinklers
(see Fig. 15). Open heads on deluge systems should be protected against plugging (e.g., loose fitting plastic
bags).
2.3.5.5 Sprinklers should be hydraulically calculated to provide a minimum density of .20 gpm/sq ft
(8 mm/min) over the entire pit area. If the press is heated by thermal oil, increase the density to
.25 gpm/sq ft (10 mm/min). Include 500 gpm (1890 cu dm/min) in the calculations for hose streams. Duration
is two hours.
Note: Presses utilizing flexible wire cauls can have very large pit areas and many shielded areas due to
the caul return conveyor system. In these cases, the area requiring this special protection would be defined
by the size of a potential oil spill, giving consideration to floor slope, curbing, drainage, etc.

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2.3.5.6 Presses supported on steel columns should have column protection in the form or a sidewall sprinkler
head pointing inward at the top of each steel column under the press or FM Approved fire resistive coating.
Nearby adjacent heads cannot be relied upon to provide column protection.
2.3.5.7 Interlock the press hydraulic system to shutdown on sprinkler waterflow. Presses which will try to
open via gravity can maintain pressure on the hydraulic system if the hydraulic pumps are shut off while the
press is closed. In these cases it is acceptable to first open the press before the hydraulic system is shut
off, but the sequence should be automatic and initiate without delay on waterflow.
Exception: Presses utilizing water-based nonflammable hydraulic fluids do not need this interlock.
For pits protected with dry pipe sprinkler systems, an acceptable alternative to interlocking on waterflow would
be to use thermal detection in the pit. This should preferably be combination fixed temperature/rate-of-rise
heat detectors, but other simple methods can be used. One such method is spring-loaded switches held open
by cables routed around the press pit and under the press. The cables have fusible links no more than 10 ft
(3 m) on centers. If a link fuses, the cable releases the spring-loaded switch and shuts down the press
hydraulic system.
2.3.5.8 Interlock the press heating system to shut off on sprinkler water flow (i.e., stop flow of steam or thermal
oil to the press, or de-energize RF energy heating systems). When the pit is protected by a dry pipe sprinkler
system, the alternative methods for interlocking mentioned in Recommendation 2.3.5.7, above, can be used.
2.3.5.9 Press pits should be cleaned regularly to eliminate accumulations of wood waste or oil. Oil leaks
should be promptly repaired.
2.3.5.10 The ceiling areas above presses should receive regular cleaning to eliminate accumulations of dust,
oil and resin build- up. Particular attention should be given to exhaust fan openings since these areas will
have the largest accumulations, and the fan drives are frequent ignition sources.
2.3.6 Thermal Oil Heating Systems
2.3.6.1 Refer to Data Sheet 7-99, Heat Transfer by Organic and Synthetic Fluids, for recommendations for
thermal oil heating systems.
2.3.7 Rotary Dryers
2.3.7.1 Dryers should preferably be located outdoors. If they must be inside, they should be in a separate
building from the main production line, and the cyclone collection system should be located outdoors.
2.3.7.2 Provide a spark detection/extinguishing system and process interlocks arranged as follows:
a) Provide a spark detection/extinguishing system on the main airflow duct between the dryer drum and
cyclone. The extinguishing system should activate every time a single spark is detected. It will reset after
a few seconds (if no additional sparks have been detected) and the dryer can continue to operate. The
spark counting features available in some Approved extinguishing systems can be used to shut down
dryers when an excessive number of sparks are encountered, but should never be used as a measure
of when to actuate the extinguishing spray.
b) Provide a second fail-safe detection point on the duct between the spark extinguishing nozzles and
the cyclone collector. Detection at this location should be interlocked to safely shut down the dryer as
follows:
i) Isolate the dryer cyclone outfeed to prevent smoldering material from being conveyed into
downstream process areas. This should be accomplished by stopping rotary feeders or diverting
material to a fire dump via reversing conveyors or diverter gates. Refer to Data Sheet 7-76, Prevention
and Mitigation of Combustible Dust Explosions and Fires, for effective isolation techniques.
ii) Stop material infeed to the dryer and shut off all dryer heating sources.
iii) Initiate an automatic waterspray deluge in the dryer cyclone. Flush mounted, spring-loaded poppet
nozzles (similar to those on the spark extinguishing system) are preferred because they are resistant
to plugging and do not protrude into the airflow where dried material can collect or cause damage.
Automatic sprinklers are less desirable but can be accepted on existing installations. The second
detection zone is still needed for isolation purposes, however. Be sure the water has a way to drain out

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if the cyclone and its supports cannot handle the weight of accumulated water. Steam should not be
used as the sole extinguishing medium.
iv) The dryer conveying fan and dryer drum drive should be left running to purge material from the
system and help prevent warping of the drum.
c) Rotary dryers which incorporate a wind box on the dryer outlet where the majority of the conveyed
material drops out should have an additional spark detection zone, isolation measures, and waterspray
deluge protection similar to the main cyclone.
d) When the dryer duct on which spark detectors are mounted is subject to resinous accumulations, test
lights should be mounted across the duct from each detector. This will permit remote testing to be sure
the detector lens has not become blinded by accumulations.
2.3.7.3 Provide high temperature limit switches on the inlet and outlet of the dryer drum interlocked to initiate
all of the functions in 2, above, as well as actuate waterspray deluge in the dryer inlet and outlet.
2.3.7.4 For dryers processing particleboard furnish or other material having a similar high concentration of
fines, provide explosion venting on the cyclone if it does not exhaust directly to atmosphere and on the
windbox (if provided). A vent area equal to the full cross sectional area of the exhaust duct is normally
sufficient for cyclone venting. Use Data Sheet 7-76 for windbox venting guidelines. Venting is not required
on dryers processing furnish for waferboard or oriented strand board.
Figures 16 to 19 show typical protection schematics and interlock logic for rotary dryers.
2.3.8 Flash Dryers
2.3.8.1 Dryers should preferably be located outdoors. If they must be inside, they should be in a separate
building from the main production line, and the cyclone collection system should be located outdoors. Dryer
tube explosion vents should have relief ducts extending through the roof or walls to safely vent an explosion
outdoors.
2.3.8.2 Protect flash dryers with spark detection/extinguishing systems, isolation methods, and automatic
deluge systems in cyclones similar to Recommendation 2.3.7.2 for rotary dryers. Flash dryer protection differs
only in that there is no dryer drum. The fail-safe detector should also initiate a waterspray deluge at the
head end of the dryer tube in addition to the cyclone.
2.3.8.3 Provide high temperature limit switches on the dryer duct at the material inlet and entrance to the
cyclone. These detectors will act as backup detection to the fail-safe spark detector and should initiate the
same functions.
2.3.8.4 Flash dryers should have explosion venting on the dryer tube and cyclone. Vents should be smooth
and flush fitting on the inside to prevent material build-up. Refer to Data Sheet 7-76 for venting guidelines.
2.3.8.5 If fiber buildup inside the dryer duct (and subsequent ignition) is a problem, a diverter on the fiber
injection pipe to direct fiber to a dump area on initial startup of the material feed may help solve the problem.
2.3.8.6 The dryer duct should be regularly checked for fiber accumulations, and cleaned if needed.
2.3.9 Particleboard Milling Equipment
2.3.9.1 Locate milling equipment in a building separate from the main production forming line building. It is
acceptable to incorporate milling and drying equipment in a common facility, but the milling area should be
separate from the drying area.
2.3.9.2 Provide explosion protection on each flaker, knife hog or hammermill used in particleboard,
medium-density fiberboard, or dry process hardboard material preparation.
Exception: Disk refiners and steam aspirated flakers will not normally warrant this protection.
Protection should consist of either explosion suppression systems or explosion venting combined with spark
detection to initiate process shutdown. Protection should extend upstream and downstream from this
equipment to the point where a choke (e.g., rotary airlock) is provided to isolate the explosion. Refer to
Data Sheet 7-76 for additional details.

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Fig. 16. Dryer without windbox.

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Fig. 17. Dryer without windbox-interlock logic.

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Fig. 18. Dryer with windbox.

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Fig. 19. Dryer with windbox-interlock logic.

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2.3.10 Composite Panel Formers

2.3.10.1 Install automatic sprinklers or waterspray nozzles to protect the inside of formers. Heads should
be located at the top of the former. When the formers are in view of an operator who is properly trained to
respond, manual waterspray systems are acceptable.
2.3.10.2 Install explosion suppression systems on formers (felters) used to produce medium-density
fiberboard and dry-process hardboard.
2.3.11 Hazardous Dust Collection and Dust Handling Systems
Refer to Data Sheet 7-73, Dust Collectors and Collection Systems, and Data Sheet 7-76, Prevention and
Mitigation of Combustible Dust Explosions and Fires.
2.3.12 Raw Material and Wood Waste Fuel Storage Buildings
2.3.12.1 Provide explosion-relieving construction for new buildings. Venting should be designed in
accordance with Data Sheet 7-76. Conventional lightweight, pre-engineered metal panel on steel frame
buildings will meet the intent of this recommendation.
2.3.12.2 Construction should minimize horizontal ledges where dust can accumulate.
2.3.12.3 Sprinkler piping should be protected against explosion damage according to Data Sheet 2-8N,
Installation of Sprinkler Systems.
2.3.12.4 Buildings which store only green wood waste should have electrical equipment suitable for Class
II, Div. 2 hazardous areas.
Any areas handling dry wood waste should have Class II, Div. 1 electrical equipment.
2.3.12.5 Diesel powered front-end loaders used for material reclaim in Class II, Div. 1 classified buildings
should have the following provisions:
a) Protect the engine and hydraulic oil compartments with fixed, automatic dry chemical extinguishing
systems.
b) Loaders rated for use in DY classified hazardous areas should be used, but are not readily available
and may not be practical if the loader must have electrical equipment such as lights for night-time
operation. As an alternative, the following safeguards are acceptable:
i) Only essential electrical equipment should be used, and wiring should be in metal conduit. Air
operated starting is preferred, but batteries may be used if they are mounted in enclosures rated for
Type EX hazardous areas.
ii) Where practical, a water-cooled manifold and muffler should be used.
iii) Loaders which are certified to meet the Mining Enforcement and Safety Administrations
Schedule 31 criteria are also acceptable in lieu of i & ii above.
c) Loaders should have a high degree of maintenance and cleaning. Frequent cleaning (daily in some
cases) of the engine compartment with compressed air may be necessary. Periodic steam cleaning should
also be done.
d) Loaders should never be parked or left unattended in the storage building.
2.3.13 Wood Waste Burners (Incinerators)
2.3.13.1 Wood waste burners should be located as far as practical from yard storage and important buildings
of combustible construction. A separation of 400 ft (120 m) is desirable.
2.3.13.2 The screen on the burner top should be kept in good repair to minimize the chance of escaping
embers.
2.3.13.3 Where sparks from wood waste burners could reach roof areas of important combustible buildings
that are not readily accessible using hydrant hose streams, provide 112 in. (38 mm) hose stations in each
building on a dry pipe system so that all such areas can be reached.

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2.3.13.4 When dry wood fines, such as planer shavings or sander dust, are burned in wood waste burners,
the burner should be at full operating temperature before the fines are introduced. This can be accomplished
by manual observation if an operator is present at the burner to control the introduction of fines. If fines can
be introduced into the burner by remote control without a local operator to confirm the status of the burner,
a temperature interlock should be provided to assure the burner is ready to receive the material. This will
assure an explosive dust cloud cannot form in the burner and be subsequently ignited.
2.3.14 Finishing Operations Using Flammable Liquids
2.3.14.1 Finishing operations using flammable sealers, coatings, paints, etc. should be protected in
accordance with the applicable parts of Data Sheets 7-9, Dip Tanks, Flow and Roll Coaters and Oil Cookers;
7-32, Flammable Liquid Operations; and 7-27, Spray Application of Flammable and Combustible Materials.
These operations should be cut off from other manufacturing areas, preferably in a separate building.
2.3.14.2 Ovens or dryers used in these operations should be protected in accordance with Data Sheet 6-9,
Industrial Ovens and Dryers.
2.4 Operation and Maintenance
2.4.1 Sprinkler System Flushing
Dry-pipe sprinkler systems that are prone to frequent nuisance tripping (several times per year) should receive
the following routine maintenance:
a) Perform annual trip tests by opening the inspectors test connection with the control valve wide open,
allowing the water to flow until it is clear (one minute minimum).
b) Sprinkler systems fed from open water supplies (e.g., ponds, rivers, etc.) should have flushing
investigations every five years. Based on the results of the investigations, flushing frequency should be
adjusted as needed to assure piping does not become obstructed. In no case should the flushing frequency
be longer than that for systems with clean water supplies.
c) Sprinkler systems fed from public water systems or other clean supplies should have flushing
investigations on the following frequencies after being placed in service:
Galvanized Pipe
15 years
25 years
every 5 years thereafter

Plain Pipe
10 years
20 years
every 5 years thereafter

3.0 SUPPORT FOR RECOMMENDATIONS

3.1 Loss History
Recent losses involving wood processing facilities utilizing thermal oil heat transfer fluids have illustrated
the need for adequate separation, protection and interlocks. A recent loss exceeded $10 million.
During the period 19801989, there were 1,583 F&EC/DIC losses. They totaled $178.5 million net insurance
company liability (indexed to 1990 dollars). There were 725 fire losses that amounted to $113.6 million. A
complete breakdown of losses involving wood processing facilities is provided in Table 3 and Figure 20.

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Table 3. 19801989 Wood Processing/Working F&EC/DIC Losses By Engineering Peril (1990 $)

No. of Losses
Engineering Peril
Fire
Collapse
Explosion
Wind or Hail
Flood
Riot & Civil Commotion
Water Damage
Miscellaneous
Sprinkler Leakage
Lightning
Impact
Vehicle
Burglary & Theft
Transportation
Rigging
Other
Total

No.
725
57
89
198
10
25
40
74
114
54
5
45
56
36
11
44
1,583

%
45.8
3.6
5.6
12.5
0.6
1.6
2.5
4.7
7.2
3.4
0.3
2.8
3.6
2.3
0.7
2.8
100.0

Fig. 20. Wood processing/working F&EC/DIC losses by peril (percent number of losses [1583]).

Lacking or obstructed sprinkler systems or defective water supplies were considered a prime factor in 27.6
percent of the losses. These losses represent 80 percent of the total reported loss amount (over $88 million).
A complete breakdown of prime factors in fire losses is provided in Table 4.

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Table 4. 19801989 Wood Processing/Working Fire By Prime Factor (1990 $)

No. of Losses
Prime Factor
Sprinklers Needed1
Sprinklers Out-of-Service (ICVs)2
Sprinkler System Defects3
Water Supply Defects4
Inadequate Housekeeping
Combustible Building Construction
Miscellaneous Human Element
Inadequate Cut/Weld Procedures
Inadequate Dust Handling
Defective Electrical Equipment
Inadequate Flammable Liquid Handling
Inadequate Maintenance
Defective Protective/Safety Equip.
Other
TotalFactors Recorded
Unknown/No Data
TotalAll Losses

No.
109
10
19
5
57
6
67
16
30
23
11
40
11
115
519
206
725

%
21.0
1.9
3.7
1.0
11.0
1.2
12.9
3.1
5.8
4.4
2.1
7.7
2.1
22.1
100.0

Cutting and welding activities were considered the probable cause of 10 percent of the reported fires. These
losses represent 33 percent of the total reported loss amount (over $36 million). A complete breakdown of
reported probable causes is provided in Table 5 and Figure 21.
Table 5. 19801989 Wood Processing/Working Fires By Cause (1990 $)
No. of Losses
Cause
Cutting/Welding
Misc. Electricity
Incendiarism
Firebox Spark
Smoking
Spont. Ignition/Chem. Action
Gas Burner Flame
Chimney Spark
Hot Electric Motor Surface
Overheated Dryer, Kiln, Oven
Manufacturing Process Friction
Lightning
Exposure
Mechanical Spark
Other
TotalCause Recorded
Unknown/No Data
TotalAll Losses

No.
56
121
48
12
10
39
6
9
2
15
40
8
13
28
124
531
194
725

%
10.5
22.8
9.0
2.3
1.9
7.3
1.3
1.7
0.4
2.8
7.5
1.5
2.4
5.3
23.3
100.0

Table 6 provides a comparison of losses with sprinkler system presence and effectiveness. For example,
fires involving out-of-service sprinkler systems resulted in an average insurance company liability of
$1,986,000. Fires controlled by adequate sprinkler protection resulted in an average liability of $168,000.

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Fig. 21. Wood processing/working fires by cause (percent number of losses [531]).

Table 6. 19801989 Wood Processing/Working Fires Sprinkler Protection Analysis (1990 $)

Sprinkler Protection
Out-of-Service (ICV)1
Sprinkler Equipment Deficiency
Water Supply Deficiency
NoneSprinklers Needed
YesMore Sprinklers Needed
YesProtection Adequate
NoneNone Needed
Total
1

No.of
Losses
13
23
11
65
76
180
7
375

Improperly closed valves.

4.0 REFERENCES
4.1 FM Global
Data
Data
Data
Data
Data
Data
Data
Data
Data
Data
Data
Data
Data
Data

Sheet
Sheet
Sheet
Sheet
Sheet
Sheet
Sheet
Sheet
Sheet
Sheet
Sheet
Sheet
Sheet
Sheet

1-20, Protection Against Fire Exposure (From Buildings or Yard Storage).

2-8N, Installation of Sprinkler Systems (NFPA).
3-10, Installation/Maintenance of Private Service Mains and Their Appurtenances.
6-9, Industrial Ovens and Dryers.
7-9, Dip Tanks, Flow/Roll Coaters and Oil Cookers.
7-27, Spray Application of Flammable and Combustible Materials.
7-32, Flammable Liquid Operations.
7-73, Dust Collectors and Collection Systems.
7-76, Prevention and Mitigation of Combustible Dust Explosions and Fires.
7-98, Hydraulic Fluids.
7-99, Heat Transfer by Organic and Synthetic Fluids.
8-9, Storage of Class 1, 2, 3, 4 and Plastic Commodities.
8-27, Storage of Wood Chips.
8-28, Pulpwood and Outdoor Log Storage.

4.2 NFPA Standards

NFPA 664 Standard for the Prevention of Fires and Explosions in Wood Processing and Woodworking
Facilities.

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APPENDIX A GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Approved: references to Approved in this data sheet means the product and services have satisfied the
criteria for FM Approval. Refer to the Approval Guide, a publication of FM Approvals, for a complete listing of
products and services that are FM Approved.
Composite Panels: comprise a wide range of products manufactured from wood fractions bonded with resin
and pressed into panels. The term particleboard has been used as a generic name for many of these
products; however, this is misleading. There is not even consistency within the industry in defining these
various products, but the following descriptions give a general differentiation of the major products:
Particleboard: a non-structural pressed panel product made primarily from small, non-fibrous wood
particles or flakes such as planer shavings, sawdust, and wood scrap processed through hogs,
hammermills, or special flakers. Particle size runs from wood dust up to flakes of about 14 in. (6.3 mm)
across and 1/16 in. (1.6 mm) thick. The boards are usually formed with the coarser material in the core
and finer material on the surface layers, with finished boards ranging from 14 in. (6.3 mm) to 112 in. (3.8
mm) thick. Principal uses include floor underlayment in wood frame construction and core stock to be
laminated with a veneer (wood or plastic laminate) for furniture, cabinets, paneling, etc. Panel density
ranges from 25 to 70 lbs/cu ft (4001120 kg/cu m) and may also be referred to as flakeboard or chipboard.
Waferboard: a structural pressed panel product made of wafers cut from logs by special rotating knife
chippers, or waferizers. Wafers can be rectangular or nearly square shaped, about an inch long (25 mm)
and 1/16 in. (2 mm) thick, with the grain running in the plane of the wafer, like a small piece of veneer.
The boards are usually homogeneous with random wafer orientation, although they may be formed in
layers. Rectangular wafers may be somewhat aligned to give higher strength. Typical uses are for
underlayment, soffits, or as a substitute for plywood sheathing for the stronger waferboards.
Oriented Strand Board (OSB): a structural pressed panel product similar to waferboard except the strands
are longer and narrow, nearly finger-sized in dimension. Forming is in three or five layers, with strands
on the surface layers oriented along the long dimension of the finished board, and internal layers at 90
orientation to adjacent layers. The orientation of layers give this product greater strength than waferboard,
and equivalent to plywood in most cases. Typical uses are similar to softwood plywood.
Fiberboard: a non-structural light-weight panel manufactured from small needle-like resinated wood fibers
produced by defiberization of wood chips in rotating disc refiners. Panels are formed by flowing a thick
fiber slurry onto a moving forming wire. Panels have a finished density of 10 to 30 lbs/cu ft (160180 kg/cu
m) with 4 by 8 ft (1.22.4 m) by 12 in. (12.7 mm) thick being a standard size. The most common use is
insulating sheathing for standard wood frame construction. Fiberboard is sometimes coated with hot
asphalt to act as a vapor barrier.
Medium-Density Fiberboard (MDF): a non-structural pressed panel product formed from fibers similar to
those in fiberboard, however the panels are formed dry in formers like particleboard, and pressed to final
thickness in a hot press. Density ranges from 31 to 55 lbs/ft3 (496880 kg/m3). Most common end uses
are in furniture and cabinet manufacture. This product is commonly referred to as MDF within the industry.
Hardboard: non-structural dense pressed panel product which can be formed in a wet process like
fiberboard or in a dry process like medium-density fiberboard. Density ranges from 31 to 90 lbs/ft3
(4861440 kg/m3). Common end uses are for paneling and siding in standard wood frame construction.
Panel thickness is commonly between 18 and 12 in. (3.213.0 mm). Specialty products can be made by
in special presses to produce molded products such as decorative door skin panels.
Plywood: a structural panel made by gluing together multiple layers of wood veneer. A primary use for
softwood plywood is sheathing for walls, floors, and roofs in conventional wood frame construction. Another
common use is for furniture, cabinets, decorative wall panels, etc., where hardwood veneers may be used
for appearance. The standard size is a 48 ft (1.22.4 m) sheet.
Sawmill: a plant which reduces logs to standard-sized dimensional lumber and timbers for use in conventional
wood frame joisted construction, or into boards for other construction or specialty use. Dimensional lumber
is usually made of conifer softwood species such as fir and pine. Boards for construction use are also made
of similar species, while hardwood such maple and oak may be cut into boards to be used in furniture
manufacture, wood trim, or other specialty uses.
Wood Processing: manufacture of basic construction materials (lumber, veneer, plywood and composite
panels such as particleboard, fiberboard, hardboard and oriented strand board) from whole logs.

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Woodworking: remanufacture of basic construction products from wood processing plants into a wide variety
of consumer products such as doors, windows, cabinets, furniture, paneling, or other commodities which
use wood components as the basic construction material.
APPENDIX B DOCUMENT REVISION HISTORY
May 2010. Minor editorial changes were done for this revision.
September 2000. This revision of the document has been reorganized to provide a consistent format.
April 1991. Complete rewrite.
September 1998. Reformatted.
APPENDIX C MAJOR OCCUPANCIES AND PROCESS HAZARDS
This section gives descriptive information of typical processes and special equipment found in sawmills and
panel products (plywood and composite panels) manufacturing facilities. Wood working facilities which
re-manufacture these basic commodities into consumer products are too numerous and varied to describe
here, but some of the process hazards are similar to those found in the facilities described below. This is
especially true for dust collection systems used on all the specialty finishing planers, molders, sanders, etc.
Flammable liquid operations such as paint spraying and roll or flow coating are much more prevalent in wood
working facilities than in wood processing facilities. This is perhaps the most significant loss exposure, but
is not covered in detail here since protection for the various hazards are covered in other FM Global data
sheets.
C.1 Process Descriptions
C.1.1 Sawmills
Older softwood sawmills were designed to cut very large logs, up to 6 ft (1.8 m) in diameter in some cases.
Modern softwood forestry practices harvest trees at a fairly young age to get maximum yield. Southern
softwood trees grow very fast, and may be cut after only 20 years of growth. Newer sawmills are designed
to cut only small logs of about 18 in. (457 mm) maximum diameter. Common sizes of dimensioned lumber
runs from 24 in. (51102 mm) up to 214 in (51356 mm). Common timbers run from 44 in. (102102 mm)
up to 614 in. (152356 mm). All dimensions are nominal, and actual sizes are about 12 in. (13 mm) less
than nominal. Laminated wood beams are a specialty product made by gluing standard lumber together.
Special sizes, shapes and strengths can be engineered to order.

Fig. 22. Typical sawmill process flow schematic.

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Figure 22 shows a process flow schematic of a typical sawmill producing both green and dry dimensional
lumber. Logs are reclaimed from yard storage by large mobile stackers and fed into the debarker. Debarkers
remove bark from the logs either mechanically via rotating rings with toothed claws or hydraulically via jets
of high pressure water. Slasher saws cut the logs to the desired length. Bark is reduced in size by mechanical
hogs to be burned as hog fuel in waste fired boilers or incinerated in tepee burners.
Debarked logs move to the head rig which cuts them longitudinally into large rectangular cants. Head
rigs are usually large band saws, but rotary saws may be used for smaller logs. In older mills, logs are
positioned in the head rig manually by skilled sawyers. Modern facilities use laser scanning equipment to do
this automatically. The side trim from the head rig is re-sawn to recover usable lumber with the remainder
reduced to chips for pulp/paper mills. Special equipment (Chip n Saw is a common term) can do this in one
operation. Cants are further reduced by edger saws and then gang saws which produce several pieces
of lumber cut to rough final dimension in one pass.
Rough cut lumber is graded (usually manually) according to species and quality, then cut to length. Trimmed
ends are either chipped to be sold as by-product, or hogged for use as fuel or by-product for composite panels
raw material. Green lumber is sorted to length and sent to the planer operation for final dimensioning or to
yard storage to await processing through the dry kilns.
Lumber sorters convey lumber on chain conveyors, detect the length of each piece, and divert it into a bin
or tray with similar sized pieces. Figure 1 shows a horizontal tray sorter. Figure 2 shows both diagonal bin and
vertical bin sorters, also referred to as drop sorters or J-bar sorters in the industry. Another variety of
vertical bin sorter is the sling sorter which collects lumber in fabric slings.
Lumber which is to be dried is first prepared by stacking in uniform loads with each layer of lumber separated
by a sticker of wood approximately 1 in. (25.4 mm) square. The loads of stuck lumber are stacked on
wheeled carts which run on tracks to convey the loads into each dry kiln. Kilns may be heated indirectly by
steam or thermal oil heat exchangers, or directly by fossil fuel or wood dust fired burners (refer to Data Sheet
7-99, Heat Transfer by Organic and Synthetic Fluids, for a discussion of hot oil systems).
Figure 3 shows two typical indirect heated dry kilns. Once the drying cycle is complete, kiln loads are removed
and placed in a cooling shed (usually just a canopy) to cool before the stickers are removed. Some plants
may dry lumber by air drying rather than kilns. This is done by simply leaving the stuck lumber outside until
it is dried to the desired moisture content. This typically takes from one to three months, depending on the
ambient temperature, humidity and rainfall.
Following drying, lumber is passed through rotating knife planers for final dimensioning. Sometimes highspeed belt sanders similar to wood panel sanders are used for final dimensioning. This is most common on
boards such as pine where the knots tend to be chipped out by conventional knife planers. Planer shavings
are collected for use as fuel or as a by-product material for composite panel products.
Lumber is sorted again, if necessary, prior to unitizing for final shipment. Lumber loads are usually secured
with a metal band, and an end sealer applied to the exposed lumber ends to prevent water penetration. Dry
lumber may also be wrapped if it is to be stored outside. Handling by mobile equipment usually limits storage
to about 16 ft (5 m) in height. Indoor storage using cranes can reach 30 ft (9 m) in height before pile stability
becomes a concern.
C.1.2 Panel Products
Panel products include both plywood and composite panels made of small wood fractions held together by
resin binders. The processes which manufacture these products have as many similarities as they do
differences. The pressing and finishing operations are very similar for all panel products. The forming of the
panels constitutes the primary differences. Figure 23 shows typical process flows for all these products on
one schematic to highlight these similarities and differences.
C.1.3 Plywood
Logs are debarked in equipment similar to the debarking operation of a sawmill. Slasher saws cut the logs
to length, usually just over 8 ft (2.4 m) long. These peeler logs are thawed (in cold climates) and/or softened
in steam or hot water vats. Once softened, the peeler logs are conveyed to the veneer lathe. In older mills,
the lathe operator uses his or her experience to position the log in the lathe spindle for maximum yield.
Modern facilities use laser scanning equipment to assist in the positioning. Veneer from the lathe is trimmed
to square up the edges. The peeler core remaining from each log after all usable veneer is removed is either

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Fig. 23. Typical panel products process flow schematic.

chipped or processed through a Chip N Saw to recover lumber from the center and chips from the sides.
Green veneer may be stored to await drying. Piles are usually flat on-side, up to a height about 12 ft (4 m),
but occasionally veneer may be stacked vertically.
Refer to the Section 2.3.3, Veneer and Fiberglass Dryers, for a description of veneer dryers.
Dried veneer may be stored before further processing such as patching and gluing or stitching to join smaller
pieces together. The layup process prepares the veneer for pressing. Successive layers of veneer are coated
with glue and laid on top of each other, with the veneer grain alternately placed lengthwise and crosswise
for panel strength. The quality of outside face sheets of veneer depends of the end use for the panels. Plywood
to be used for furniture or cabinetry may have a solid lumber core. Plywood glue is typically urea formaldehyde
resin for indoor applications and phenol formaldehyde resin for exterior grades, although new resins are
being sought to eliminate consumer concerns (such as formaldehyde emission) with the finished products.
The glued veneer is then conveyed to the hot press to cure the resin, forming rigid panels.
Refer to the Section 2.3.5, Hot Presses, for a discussion of hot presses.
Pressed panels may be processed through a board cooler which is little more than a hood with a high induce
airflow. The hood area creates a shielded space, which usually warrants automatic sprinkler protection.
Panels are trimmed to final dimension, and if their end use dictates, sanded to final thickness or surface
smoothness. Panel sanders are large high-speed belt sanders causing frequent sparks and fires in their dust
collection systems due to belt breakage, jammed panels, and bearing failure. Further machining (e.g.,
tongue-and-groove edging, face grooving for paneling, decorative painting) may be done depending on end
use. Finished products are unitized, usually by metal banding, and stored flat up to 20 ft (6 m) in height.
C.1.4 Particleboard
Dry wood waste material (called furnish) is stored in large silos or open bay buildings, often referred to
as RMS (raw material storage) buildings. RMS buildings have an inherently dusty atmosphere due to the
free-fall formation of piles from over head conveyors or pneumatic conveying systems. Green sawdust may
be stored outside. Diesel front end loaders are commonly used to reclaim material from the piles. Magnets
and air separators are used to remove foreign material from the furnish prior to milling.

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Screens may be also be used to remove the very fine dust for use as fuel. Special rotating-ring knife flakers
are used to reduce the furnish to acceptable size. The furnish is then dried to the desired moisture content,
usually less than 10 percent (dry basis), in rotary drum dryers.
Dried material is screened again to remove additional fines, and conveyed to surge bins. Material from the
surge bins is convey to blenders where resin, and sometimes wax, is added. Urea formaldehyde is the
common resin, but like plywood, alternate resins are being sought which do not have an emission problem.
The blended resin is weighed and metered into formers which distribute the free-falling furnish onto a moving
belt. There are usually at least three formers, two for surface material and one for core material. The material
is normally deposited on metal caul plates to carry the furnish into the hot press, but is sometimes done
without using a using a caul and pre-press roll instead to help the mat stay together as its loaded into the
hot press.
Refer to Section 2.3.5 for a discussion of hot presses. Following pressing, the finishing line is similar to that
described for plywood.
C.1.5 Waferboard
Whole logs are the primary raw material in waferboard manufacturing. Log preparation is identical to that
described for plywood. Waferboard is commonly produced in the northern United States and Canada in areas
where softwood is less prominent, allowing local hardwoods (aspen is a common species) to be used. Hot
water soaking vats are common to thaw logs and soften then prior to processing in special wafer chippers
called waferizers. Following waferizing, the furnish is processed through rotary dryers, forming, pressing,
and finishing similar to particleboard as described above. Because large wafers are used as furnish, the
process is much less dusty than particleboard. Once fines are screened out of the furnish, the process has
about the same hazard as plywood manufacturing.
C.1.6 Oriented Strand Board (OSB)
The process and its hazards are virtually identical to waferboard. Oriented is the newest composite panel
product in North America. Powdered resins (usually phenol formaldehyde, a combustible dust) are sometimes
used instead of liquid resins. The handling of powdered resins can present some additional dust explosion
hazards. Also, this process usually forms and presses very large panels (nominally 8 ft wide by 24 ft [2.47.3
m] long) which are subsequently cut into standard 4 by 8 ft (1.22.4 m) sheets.
Refer to the Section 2.3.5 for a discussion of hot presses.
C.1.7 Fiberboard
Like particleboard, wood waste is the primary raw material. Since fiberboard is formed in a wet process,
the material does not need to be dried and can be stored outdoors. The initial removal of foreign material
and screening is similar to particleboard. Processing of the furnish is different in that it passes through a
pressurized steam digester to help soften the furnish, and then is reduced to fibers in rotating disk refiners,
which may also be pressurized. Resin is added during the refining process. The fiber flows from the refiners
as a wet slurry, similar to thermo-mechanical pulp. Also like pulp, the slurry is formed into a mat on a
moving-wire former (Fourdrinier is a common former manufacturer). Water is removed from the formed
mat by vacuum and de-watering press rolls.
The mat is then cut into individual panels and dried in a multi-tier dryer (see Section 2.3.3, Veneer and
Fiberglass Dryers, for a discussion of these dryers.) The dried fiberboard is trimmed to final size, usually 4
by 8 ft (1.22.4 m) panels, and unitized for storage prior to shipping. Some fiberboard products are coated
with hot asphalt in a roll-coating process (refer to Data Sheet 7-9, Dip Tanks, Flow Roll Coaters, and Oil
Cookers, for hazards and protection details).
C.1.8 Medium-Density Fiberboard (MDF)
MDF furnish is also formed from wood waste, but the forming process is dry and raw material which is not
green is usually stored in large open bay buildings like particleboard. Reclaim using diesel front-end loaders
is also common. Following the usual foreign material separation and screening, raw material is broken down
into fibers by rotating disc refiners, which are usually steam pressurized. The damp fibers are dried to final
moisture content (usually less than 10%) in flash dryers (see Section 2.3.8, Flash Dryers, for a discussion
of these dryers.) Some processes inject resin (usually urea formaldehyde) into the furnish as it is enters
the flash dryer. This is known as blowline blending.
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Dried fiber may be further screened before it is conveyed (usually pneumatically) to surge bins. Fiber is
conveyed from the surge bins (again, commonly by pneumatic blowlines) to blenders for resin addition (unless
resin was added in the drying process), then to weigh belts before dropping into formers (commonly called
felters in this process). Like other dry formers, the material free-falls onto a moving belt. In this process,
the belt is usually a wire mesh with suction applied to the underside to help form the mat. Although the mat
is usually formed by at least three felters laying down successive layers of fiber, there is usually little
difference between the surface and core material, resulting in a homogeneous board. The fiber used in this
process is typically fine enough to be explosive.
From the forming line, the mat is cut in panel lengths and run through pre-press rolls before entering a hot
press for final pressing and resin curing (see Section 2.3.5 for a discussion of hot presses). The finishing
line operations are similar to those described above for particleboard.
C.1.9 Hardboard
The raw material preparation and forming of wet process hardboard is similar to fiberboard as described
above, except that the mat is processed through a hot press rather than a multi-tier dryer. Dry process
hardboard manufacturing is virtually identical in equipment and hazards to medium-density fiberboard.
The finishing process for hardboard products usually has one additional step to temper or stabilize the
moisture content in the panels. This consists of processing the panels in steam heated batch humidifying
ovens which are similar in size to lumber dry kilns. Panels are typically placed horizontally separated by thin
stickers on wheeled carts much like stuck lumber. Carts are loaded into the ovens in very close arrays,
such that sprinkler penetration into the loads is difficult. The hazard is more like a multi-tier fiberboard or
veneer dryer, and waterspray deluge protection should be used for that reason. Additional cutting of hardboard
panels may be done to make lap-siding products.
C.2 Special Hazards
C.2.1 Veneer and Fiberboard Dryers
Dryers and ovens having multi-tiers are used for drying plywood veneer and fiberboard as well as other similar
combustible material. The tiers very from three to twelve inches apart.
Generally, dryers have one or two zones and are protected by a single deluge system. Long units where
the water demand is high (e.g., 2000 gpm or 7560 cu dm/min) may require two or more deluge systems.
Figure 11 (top) shows the elevation view of a typical five zone dryer. Figure 11 (bottom) shows a general plan
view. Detailed sketches of the deluge system installation are shown in Figures 12 to 14.
In wicket type veneer dryers (see Fig. 10), sheets are placed on horizontal arms, lifted to a vertical position,
dried passing through the unit and then fall out when the arms slope downward. There are no obstructions
to roof level sprinkler protection.
Vertical jet-type dryers have airflow plenum arm extensions which extend across the dryer. These extensions
have openings along their length which cause jets of hot air to impinge vertically on the top and bottom of
the veneer. This airflow can help support the veneer sheet and assist its travel through the dryer. The normal
design will only accommodate spray nozzles along one side of the dryer (see Figs. 6 and 7). One special
design is very similar to an airborne pulp dryer, with such restricted internal configuration that it is only practical
to locate deluge heads in the main inlet and outlet plenum on both sides of the dryer (see Figs. 8 and 9).
C.2.2 Hot presses
Hot presses are used to cure the resins in panel products and press them to their approximate final thickness.
The most common presses have multiple openings, perhaps 15 or more, to press many boards in one press
cycle. Single opening continuous presses utilizing top and bottom platen segments on revolving tracks
(much like the tracks on a bulldozer) exist, but are rare in North America. Presses (and the forming line
equipment) are commonly of European manufacture, with lead time for replacement of a year or more.
Press platens were traditionally heated by flowing steam through them, but newer presses are using hot oil
instead of steam. Some presses do not heat the platens at all, but rather use radio-frequency energy to heat
and cure the resin (much like a microwave oven).

2010 Factory Mutual Insurance Company. All rights reserved.

234

Wood Processing and Woodworking Facilities

7-10

FM Global Property Loss Prevention Data Sheets

Page 33

Hot presses typically have loading and unloading panel accumulators which move vertically to quickly load
and unload boards from the press. Sprinkler protection in these portions of the pit are practical around the
perimeter only. Horizontal sidewall heads may be needed to reach the center pit areas. Solid metal caul plates
used in composite panel manufacturing usually progress through the press along with each panel. They are
separated from the panels upon unloading and are returned to the forming line at operating floor level along
the side of the press. Newer presses which use flexible wire cauls recirculate them underneath the press. This
can result in very long, deep pit areas below the press with areas shielded by the caul conveyors.
Multi-opening presses are closed during the press cycle by large hydraulic cylinders in the pit directly below
the press. The hydraulic system contains thousands of gallons of hydraulic fluid on larger presses. The press
pit provides natural containment for an hydraulic or thermal oil spill, but exposes the press to a severe fire
hazard.
C.2.3 Rotary Dryers
Rotary dryers used in composite panel manufacturing consist of steel drums which are oriented horizontally
and rotate on trunion bearings, similar to a kiln. Dryer drums are commonly 8 to 10 ft (2.43 m) in diameter
and 3050 ft (915 m) long. The drums have internal baffles, or flights which lift the material and advance
it through the dryer as the drum rotates. Dryers are either single-pass or triple-pass design. In single-pass
designs, the material enters one end and exist the other end after traversing the dryer once. Triple-pass
types have a labyrinth of drum passages inside the outer drum, such that material enters one end and
traverses the length of the dryer three times before exiting the far end. Heated air is induced through the dryer
to dry the furnish and assist movement through the system.
Material exiting the drum is collected in a fall-out chamber called a wind box (if the dryer has one), or in a
cyclone. Dryer exit temperature is used to control the firing rate of the burner. Direct firing of the dryer is typical,
with gas, oil, or wood dust used as fuel. Occasionally, waste heat from boilers or thermal oil heaters may
be ducted to rotary dryers as a base-load heat source.
C.2.4 Flash Dryers
Flash dryers used in composite panels manufacturing are little more than pneumatic transport blowpipes
35 ft (0.91.5 m) in diameter, with the conveying air heated to dry the material as it is conveyed. Occasionally,
vertical sections of duct with increased diameter may be used to increase the dwell time in the dryer (similar
to pulp flash dryers). Fuel and firing rate control are similar to rotary dryers, with the exception that indirect
heating using steam or hot oil heat exchangers are sometimes used.

FM Engr. Comm. April 1991

2010 Factory Mutual Insurance Company. All rights reserved.

235

Norbord
Norbords Combustible Dust Experience
(see document in Best Practices and Housekeeping section)
Date published: March 29, 2011

236

Sinclair Forest Products Ltd

Possible solutions dust removal systems
Date published: April 30, 2012

237
From: Walker, Dale
Sent: Monday, April 30, 2012 8:29 AM
To: Walker, Dale
Subject:
FW: Possible solutions - dust removal systems
Forwarded by Kerry Douglas/CRP/WestFraser on 04/30/2012 07:52 AM

http://www.qair.com/
Heres what seems to be the most plausible site Ive found so far.
Thanks Kerry
Michel Richard MBA CEC
Operations Manager
Sinclar Forest Products Ltd
Tel: (250) 614-7655
Cell: (250) 612-9317
Fax: (250) 562-0914

238

Van-Ed Equipment
Air Mister
Date published: Unknown

239

Description

Metric

Imperial

Min

li e /h

1 gph

rev. airmister11D05

240

GG
GG
GG
GG
GG
GG

rev. airmister11D05

241

Wood Machinery
Manufacturers of America
NFPA 664 Combustible Dusts Overview
(see document in Best Practices and Housekeeping section)
Date published: February 21, 2011

242

Risk Assessments
and Audits

243

Aon
Aon Safety Information Bulletin Combustible
Wood Dust in Sawmills: Preventing and Mitigating
the Effects of Fire and Explosions
Date published: April 26, 2012

244

Aon Safety Information Bulletin April 26th, 2012

Combustible Wood Dust in Sawmills: Preventing and
Mitigating the Effects of Fire and Explosions
Two separate, recent catastrophic events affecting sawmills in BC have served as a critical
reminder of how large a role strong risk management practices play in this industry segment. Aon is
committed more than ever to our clients in the management of risk with a strong focus on safety and
property conservation.
The most recent provincial developments in BC included the Labour Minister, Margaret MacDiarmid,
instructing WorkSafeBC to take the "extraordinary step" of sending orders to sawmill employers in
BC to conduct "full hazard identification, risk assessment and safety reviews, with particular focus
on sawdust accumulation and potential ignition sources.
th

On April 25 , 2012, WorkSafeBC informed to the media that inspection officers will be conducting
on-site follow-ups at each sawmill within two weeks to ensure compliance.
On the same date, the union representing sawmill workers in B.C. has reported to be in talks with
the Ministry of Labour to create regulations that will require employers to deal with sawdust
accumulation in their mills.

Purpose
This Safety Information Bulletin highlights:
Hazards associated with wood combustible wood dusts;

Work practices and guidelines that reduce the potential for a wood combustible dust explosion, or
that reduce the danger to employees if such an explosion occurs; and,

Training to protect employees from these hazards.

Background
Dust Fire and Explosion
Combustible dusts are fine particles that present an explosion hazard when suspended in air in
certain conditions. A dust explosion can be catastrophic and cause employee deaths, injuries, and
destruction of entire buildings.
Regrettably, in many combustible dust accidents, employers and employees were unaware that a
hazard even existed.

245

According to a report issued by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration of the US in
October 2009, there have been nearly 280 dust fires and explosions at industrial sites across North
America over the prior 25 years. Those accidents have caused 130 fatalities and about 780 injuries.
Like most fires, a dust fire occurs when fuel (the combustible dust) is exposed to a source of ignition
in the presence of oxygen. Removing any one of these elements of the fire "triangle" eliminates the
possibility of a fire.
For dust explosions, two additional conditions are required: dispersion and confinement. Suspended
dust burns more rapidly and confinement allows for pressure build-up. Incidents of dust explosions
can sometimes reveal a pattern of multiple subsequent explosion. The initial explosion can disturb
dust that has settled over a period of time causing it to become airborne resulting in a secondary
explosion that propagates throughout the plant often with catastrophic results. On occasions, there
have been more than one subsequent explosion.
In addition to sawmills and wood working operations, various other industries are at risk of dust
explosions including but not limited to: wood product manufacturing; combustible metal processing;
chemical manufacturing; food and pharmaceutical production; grain storage, sugar mills, fabrication
of rubber and plastic products; and coal-fired power plants.
Combustible materials which have been implicated in some dust explosions include: wood dust; coal;
chemicals; rubber; grain dust; sugar; flour; and a number of metals such as aluminum.
Causal factors usually listed in incident forensic investigation reports include inadequacies in the
following areas:

Housekeeping to control dust accumulations;

Ventilation system design;

Maintenance of ovens, driers and furnaces;

Equipment safety devices.

Hazard assessment, and

Hazard communication.

Elements Needed for a Fire (the "Fire Triangle")

1.

Combustible dust (fuel);

2.

Ignition source (heat); and,

3.

Oxygen in air (oxidizer).

Additional Elements Needed for a Combustible Dust Explosion

4.

Dispersion of dust particles in sufficient quantity and concentration; and,

5.

Confinement of the dust cloud.

246

Figure 1. Explosion Pentagon

The addition of the latter two elements to the fire triangle creates what is known as the "explosion
pentagon" (see Figure 1). If a dust cloud (diffused fuel) is ignited within a confined or semi-confined
vessel, area, or building, it burns very rapidly and may explode. The safety of employees is
threatened by the ensuing fires, additional explosions, flying debris, and collapsing building
components.
An initial (primary) explosion in processing equipment or in an area where fugitive dust has
accumulated may shake loose more accumulated dust, or damage a containment system (such as a
duct, vessel, or collector). As a result, if ignited, the additional dust dispersed into the air may cause
one or more secondary explosions (see Figure 2). These can be far more destructive than a primary
explosion due to the increased quantity and concentration of dispersed combustible dust.

247

If one of the elements of the explosion pentagon is missing, a catastrophic explosion cannot occur.
Two of the elements in the explosion pentagon are difficult to eliminate: oxygen (within air), and
confinement of the dust cloud (within processes or buildings). However, the other three elements of
the pentagon can be controlled to a significant extent, as it is discussed further in this document.
Facility Dust Hazard Assessment
A combustible wood dust explosion hazard may exist in your plant. Aon has devised a Facility
Sawdust Hazard Assessment specifically tailored to address concerns in sawmills and wood working
plants. It produces effective risk control recommendations that will help you manage your exposure
while keeping your total cost of risk at a bay. Contact your Aon representative for more information.
See list of contacts at the end of this bulletin.
Facility Analysis Components
Facilities should carefully identify the following in order to assess their potential for dust explosions:

Materials that can be combustible when finely divided;

Processes which use, consume, or produce combustible dusts;

Areas where combustible dusts may build up;

Hidden areas where combustible dusts may accumulate;

Means by which dust may be dispersed in the air; and

Potential ignition sources.

Dust Combustibility
The primary factor in an assessment of these hazards is whether the dust is in fact combustible. Any
"material that will burn in air" in a solid form can be explosive when presented in finely divided
particulates.
Combustible dust is defined by NFPA 654 as: "Any finely divided solid material that is 420 microns or
smaller in diameter (material passing a US No. 40 Standard Sieve) and presents a fire or explosion
hazard when dispersed and ignited in air."
Different dusts of the same wood material may have different ignitability and explosibility characteristics, depending upon many variables such as particle size, shape, and moisture content. Additionally,
these variables can change while the material is passing through process equipment. For this reason,
published tables of wood dust explosibility data may be of limited practical value. In some cases, dusts
will be combustible even if the particle size is larger than that specified in the NFPA definition (
especially if the material is fibrous). Also, industrial settings may contain high-energy ignition sources
such as welding torches or open flame devices that can provide the ignition energy necessary to ignite
larger particulate sizes.
The pine beetle epidemic in BC has had an impact on raw timber supply for many sawmills. Some mills
that process these logs may have experienced a noticeable increase in combustible dust generation
which, in turn, significantly increases the overall hazard associated with dust management and the
need for adequate housekeeping practices that are commensurate with the exposure.

248

Electrical Classification
The facility analysis must identify areas requiring special electrical equipment classification due to the
presence (or potential presence) of combustible dust. Detailed requirements for equipment and for
electrical installations in hazardous areas are in NFPA 70, the National Electrical Code.
Further guidance on area classification is contained in NFPA 654, Standard for the Prevention of Fire
and Dust Explosions from the Manufacturing, Processing, and Handling of Combustible Particulate
Solids. The overall dust hazard designation for electrical requirements is Class II. This is further
broken down into Divisions which represent the probability of dust being present at any given time.
Additionally, each dust is assigned a group (E, F, or G), representing the dust types (metal,
carbonaceous, organic and other, respectively) with different properties. For instance, group G dusts
includes atmosphere that may present combustible dusts of wood, flour, grain, plastic, and some
chemicals.
For Class II locations, Groups E, F, and G, the classification involves the tightness of the joints of
electrical assembly and shaft openings to prevent the entrance of dust in the dust-ignition proof
electrical enclosure, the blanketing effect of layers of dust on the equipment that may cause
overheating, and the ignition temperature of the dust. It is necessary, therefore, that equipment be
identified not only for the class but also for the specific group of dust that will be present.
Sections 500.7(A) through (L) of the NFPA 70 provides acceptable protection techniques for electrical
and electronic equipment in hazardous (classified) locations.
Other Hazard Analysis Considerations
The amount of dust accumulation necessary to cause an explosive concentration can vary greatly.
This is because there are so many variables the particle size of the dust, the method of dispersion,
ventilation system modes, air currents, physical barriers, and the volume of the area in which the dust
cloud exists or may exist. As a result, simple rules of thumb regarding accumulation (such as writing
in the dust or visibility in a dust cloud) can be subjective and misleading. The hazard analysis should
be tailored to the specific circumstances in each facility and the full range of variables affecting the
hazard.
Many locations need to be considered in an assessment. One obvious place for a dust explosion to
initiate is where dust is concentrated. In equipment such as dust collectors, a combustible mixture
could be present whenever the equipment is operating. Other locations to consider are those where
dust can settle, both in occupied areas and in hidden concealed spaces. Fugitive dust can occur
where conveying systems change direction or at transfer points. For sawmill operations, areas that
must specifically be considered include (but are not limited to) the following:

Debarking operations;

Primary breakdown operations (saws);

Chipper enclosures;

Chip screening operations; and,

Conveying and transfer points.

A thorough analysis will consider all possible scenarios in which dust can be dispersed, both in the
normal process and potential failure modes.

249

After hazards have been assessed and hazardous locations are identified, one or more of the
following prevention, protection and/or mitigation methods may be applied.
Dust Control
NFPA 654, Standard for the Prevention of Fire and Dust Explosions from the Manufacturing,
Processing, and Handling of Combustible Particulate Solids, contains comprehensive guidance on
the control of dusts to prevent explosions. The following are some of its recommendations:

Minimize the escape of dust from process equipment or ventilation systems;

Use dust collection systems and filters;

Utilize surfaces that minimize dust accumulation and facilitate cleaning;

Provide access to all hidden areas to permit inspection;

Inspect for dust residues in open and hidden areas, at regular intervals;

Clean dust residues at regular intervals;

Use cleaning methods that do not generate dust clouds, if ignition sources are present;

Only use vacuum cleaners approved for dust collection;

Locate relief valves away from dust hazard areas; and

Develop and implement a hazardous dust inspection, testing, housekeeping, and control
program (preferably in writing with established frequency and methods).

Ignition Control
NFPA 654, Standard for the Prevention of Fire and Dust Explosions from the Manufacturing,
Processing, and Handling of Combustible Particulate Solids, also contains comprehensive guidance
on the control of ignition sources to prevent explosions. The following are some of its
recommendations:

Use appropriate electrical equipment and wiring methods;

Control static electricity, including bonding of equipment to ground;

Control smoking, open flames, and sparks;

Control mechanical sparks and friction;

Use separator devices to remove foreign materials capable of igniting combustibles from
process materials;

Separate heated surfaces from dusts;

Separate heating systems from dusts;

Proper use and type of industrial trucks;

Proper use of cartridge activated tools; and

Adequately maintain all the above equipment.

The use of proper electrical equipment in hazardous locations is crucial to eliminating a common
ignition source. The classification of areas requiring special electrical equipment is discussed in the
Facility Dust Hazard Assessment section above. Once these areas have been identified, special
Class II wiring methods and equipment (such as "dust ignition-proof" and "dust-tight") must be used

250

as required by NFPA 70 Article 500. It is important not to confuse Class II equipment with Class I
explosion-proof equipment, as Class II addresses dust hazards, while Class I addresses gas, vapor
and liquid hazards.
Damage Control
NFPA 654, Standard for the Prevention of Fire and Dust Explosions from the Manufacturing,
Processing, and Handling of Combustible Particulate Solids, contains comprehensive guidance to
minimize the danger and damage from an explosion. The following are some suggested protection
methods:

Separation of the hazard (isolate with distance);

Segregation of the hazard (isolate with a barrier);

Deflagration venting of a building, room, or area;

Pressure relief venting for equipment;

Provision of spark/ember detection and extinguishing systems;

Explosion protection systems (also refer to NFPA 69, Standard on Explosion Prevention
Systems);

Sprinkler systems; and

The use of other specialized suppression systems.

Training
Employees
Workers are the first line of defense in preventing and mitigating fires and explosions. If the people
closest to the source of the hazard are trained to recognize and prevent hazards associated with
combustible dust in the plant, they can be instrumental in recognizing unsafe conditions, taking
preventative action, and/or alerting management. All employees should be trained in safe work
practices applicable to their job tasks, as well as on the overall plant programs for dust control and
ignition source control. They should be trained before they start work, periodically to refresh their
knowledge, when reassigned, and when hazards or processes change.
Management
A qualified team of managers should be responsible for conducting a facility analysis (or for having
one done by qualified outside consultants*) prior to the introduction of a hazard and for developing a
prevention and protection scheme tailored to their operation. Supervisors and managers should be
aware of and support the plant dust and ignition control programs. Their training should include
identifying how they can encourage the reporting of unsafe practices and facilitate abatement actions.
* Aon has developed an effective sawmill dust hazard assessment survey that has been proven to
help sawmills and woodworking facilities control these exposures while keeping the total cost of risk
management under check. Contact your Aon representative for more information.
Aon has designated team of experts that will be readily available to look after your needs for sawdust
risk control including full hazard identification, risk assessment and safety reviews, with particular
focus on sawdust accumulation and potential ignition sources.

251

Aon Contacts

Insurance

Risk Control

Joe Hawk, CRM, A.I.I.C.

Tel: 604.443.3308 | Cell: 604.376.0848 | Fax: 604.443.5247
[email protected]

Luis Marin, CIP

Nick Holtby, A.I.I.C., CRM

John Healy, P. Eng.

t 604.443.3347 | f 604.443.2529
[email protected]
Leslie Cormack-Wilson, CIP
t 604.443.2473 I c 604.351.1657 I f 604.443.2529
[email protected]

t 604.443.2458 | f 604.682.4026
[email protected]

t 604.443.2458 | c 604.657.4127 | f 604.443.2501

[email protected]

Corneliu Banesiu
t 604.443.2405 | c 604.763.8661 | f 604.443.2501
[email protected]
Dan Stevens, P. Eng.
t 604.443.3366 | c 604.318.8205 | f 604.443.2501
[email protected]
Corey Gardiner
t 250.413.2219 | c 250.217.2943 | f 250.388.5164
[email protected]

252

References
1.

Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the Massachusetts Office of the State
Fire Marshall, and the Springfield Arson and Bomb Squad. "Joint Foundry Explosion
Investigation Team Report." OSHA, Springfield, MA, (No date).

2.

Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB). "Investigation Report: West
Pharmaceutical Services, Inc. Dust Explosion." CSB, Washington, DC, September 2004.

3.

Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB). "Investigation Report: CTAAcoustics,
Inc. Combustible Dust Fire and Explosions." CSB, Washington, DC, September 2004.

4.

Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB). "CSB Investigators Find Likely Source
of Dust Explosion at Indiana Automotive Plant." CSB News Release, Washington, DC,
November 5, 2003.

5.

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). "Industrial Fire Hazards Handbook," 3rd Edition.
NFPA, Inc., Quincy, MA, 1990.

General Information
FM Global, "Prevention and Mitigation of Combustible Dust Explosions and Fire", Data Sheet No. 776, January 2005.
Eckhoff, Rolf K. "Dust Explosions in the Process Industries," 3rd Edition, Gulf Professional Publishing,
2003.
Bartknecht, W. "Dust Explosions: Course, Prevention, and Protection," Springer- Verlag, 1989.
Hatwig, M., and Steen, H. (eds.), "Handbook of Explosion Prevention and Protection," Wiley-VCH,
2004.
Frank, Walter. "Dust Explosion Prevention and the Critical Importance of Housekeeping," Process
Safety Progress, vol. 23, no. 3, September 2004, pp. 175-184.

253

Limiting Conditions
All Aon Reed Stenhouse Inc. information bulletins are purely advisory and are provided for the
purpose of assisting clients and the industry at large in risk control practices and safety procedures.
The observations and recommendations expressed in this bulletin do not purport to refer to, or
guarantee compliance with, any or all regulations which may be applicable to such risk control
practices and safety procedures. This bulletin should not be considered a definitive listing of all
existing hazards nor an absolute solution to all indicated hazards. It is not intended to imply that no
other risks exist or that no other precautions need be taken. No responsibility for the implementation,
management and operation of risk control and safety procedures is assumed by Aon Reed
Stenhouse Inc., and Aon Reed Stenhouse Inc. assumes no responsibility for loss or damage of any
kind or nature resulting from reliance upon the statements and information contained in this bulletin.
Any use which a third party makes of this bulletin, or any reliance or decisions made based on this
report or any part of it, are the responsibility of such third parties. Aon Reed Stenhouse Inc. assumes
no r esponsibility for l oss or dam age of any k ind or nature suffered by any third party as a result of
decisions made or actions based on this bulletin.

254

BC Forest Safety Council

Base Audit Draft Guidelines Version 2.1:
Pellet Industry Addendum
September 13, 2011

255

BASE AUDIT
DRAFT
GUIDELINES
Version 2.1
Pellet Industry
Addendum
Designed for
Wood Pellet Mills

420 Albert Street, Nanaimo, BC V9R 2V7

Phone: 250-741-1060 | Toll Free: 1-877-741-1060 | Fax: 250-741-1068 | www.bcforestsafe.org

256
BC Forest Safety Council
SAFE Companies Program
Pellet Addendum Guidelines

Table of Contents
BASE AUDIT APPLICATION ................................................................................................................................................................ 3
BASE AUDIT INSTRUCTIONS .............................................................................................................................................................. 3
AUDIT SCORING ................................................................................................................................................................................ 3
INDIVIDUAL QUESTION GUIDELINES ................................................................................................................................................. 4
PA. RAW FIBRE STORAGE............................................................................................................................................................................ 4
PB. PRIMARY BUILDING CONSTRUCTION ........................................................................................................................................................ 6
PC. FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS .................................................................................................................................................................. 7
PD. FIBRE IN-FEED .................................................................................................................................................................................... 9
PE. FIBRE SIZING ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 10
PF. FIBRE DRYING.................................................................................................................................................................................... 12
PG. PELLETIZING ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 13
PH. PELLET COOLING ............................................................................................................................................................................... 14
PI. FINISHED PRODUCT STORAGE ................................................................................................................................................................ 15
PJ. DUST COLLECTION AND VENTILATION ..................................................................................................................................................... 16
DEFINITIONS ................................................................................................................................................................................... 17

This publication is the property of the BC Forest Safety Council. Reproduction in any form by any means, in whole or in part, or use of this publication for other than its intended purposes is prohibited.

Pellet Guidelines

Revised: 2011-09-13

Page 2 of 17

257
BC Forest Safety Council
SAFE Companies Program
Pellet Addendum Guidelines

BASE Audit Application

The BASE (Basic Audit and Safety Evaluation) Audit Pellet Industry Addendum standard applies to companies
involved in the manufacturing of wood pellets, regardless of the size of the company.
Company certification follows the same protocol as the main BASE audit. The initial audit for the Addendum
must be performed by a certified external BASE audit with pellet industry competency. Successful completion
of a BASE audit is a co-requisite (i.e. the company must already be certified to the BASE standard or
simultaneously complete the main BASE audit with the pellet addendum.)

BASE Audit Instructions

The BASE Audit Guidelines provide instructions and interpretation for the BASE Audit Questions. Please
refer to that document for the exact question text.

Audit Scoring

Scoring for the audit is very prescriptive. Auditors are given very particular instructions and there must be valid
reasons for awarding or not awarding points. Scoring is discussed further in the audit guidelines. Scoring is
important. As a basic requirement, every company that undertakes an audit must meet a minimum standard as
determined by the sector through the Council.

Companies must obtain at least 51% in each of the applicable 9 elements PA-PJ and an overall
mark of 80% to meet the addendum standard.

Contact the BC Forest Safety Council (Toll Free: 1-877-741-1060) at any time for assistance or go the
Councils website at www.bcforestsafe.org for safety audit advisor staff contact information.

This publication is the property of the BC Forest Safety Council. Reproduction in any form by any means, in whole or in part, or use of this publication for other than its intended purposes is prohibited.

Pellet Guidelines

Revised: 2011-09-13

Page 3 of 17

258
BC Forest Safety Council
SAFE Companies Program
Pellet Addendum Guidelines

Individual Question Guidelines

PA. Raw Fibre Storage
This section of the audit deals with the storage of raw material from receipt until drying/sizing. Storage may be
indoors or outdoors and the stored fibre may be in any form, such as chips, shavings, hog fuel, whole log
and/or non-tree biomass. Both wet and dry storage is to be considered.
Applies only at manufacturing sites with storage facilities. Does not apply with direct-feed from adjacent mills if
stockpiles are not present on site.
PA. Raw Fibre Storage (Wet and/or Dry)
PA1. Fibre Piles
Guideline
Question
PA1.1

O - If all raw fibre (shavings, hog fuel, sawdust, logs or other wood) is stored in piles or a building, structure or
silo that is 30m or more away from all major buildings and 10m away from any access roads, award 5 points..

PA1.2

O- If 100% of observations of fibre piles are less than 150m long, 100m wide and 20m tall, award 5 points

PA1.3
PA1.4

O- If all piles or structures or silos of fibre separated by a distance of not less than 10m, award 5 points.
D If program documents specify a maximum safe thermal limit in piled materials (excluding logs) of 60C or
less, award 4 points. If the program documents specify a warning limit of 40C followed by a 10C rise in 24
hours, or a more stringent limit, award an additional point.
D- If documents show that the internal temperature of piles is monitored at least weekly, award 5 points.

PA1.5

PA1.6

I- Award up to 5 points based on % of interviewed supervisors able to explain how they are ensuring piles are
rotated regularly and managed on a FIFO (First In, First Out) basis for piles of the same type of material. It is
recognized that blending recipes may draw down piles of some materials faster than others.
O- Award up to 5 points based on the % of buildings and silos used for dry fibre storage that are equipped
with automatic sprinkler or other automatic fire suppression system.
If all fibre is stored outside, then score this question as Not Applicable and deduct 5 points from the available
score.
O Award up to 5 points based on the % of raw fibre stored on a paved, cement or otherwise sealed surface
that will not introduce debris into the process.

PA2. Mobile Equipment

Guideline
Question
PA2.1

O Award up to 5 points based on the % of mobile equipment used to transport raw fibre that is equipped
with fire suppression systems using the following formula
(% of equipment equipped with a fixed suppression system with or without a portable system) * 5 +
(% of equipment with a portable system only) * 2

This publication is the property of the BC Forest Safety Council. Reproduction in any form by any means, in whole or in part, or use of this publication for other than its intended purposes is prohibited.

Pellet Guidelines

Revised: 2011-09-13

Page 4 of 17

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BC Forest Safety Council
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PA. Raw Fibre Storage (Wet and/or Dry)
PA2.2

D Award up to 5 points based on the % of mobile equipment used for fibre handling that has daily records of
inspection for cleanliness and/or cleaning.
I Award up to 5 points based on the % of operators of mobile equipment used for fibre handling that report
completing daily inspection or cleaning forms. The inspection must specifically include cleanliness.

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PB. Primary Building Construction

This section of the audit applies to manufacturing, storage, transportation and end-user
PB. Primary Building Construction
PB1. Construction Materials
Guideline
Question
PB1.1

O- If all primary manufacturing buildings are of non-combustible construction, award 20 points

PB1.2

O- Award up to 5 points based on the % of combustible components (open wood truss roof structures, open
wood framed walls, etc.) that are enclosed in a non-combustible material.
If there are no combustible components, score this question as Not Applicable and deduct 5 points from the
available total.

PB2. Dust Isolation

Guideline
Question
PB2.1

PB2.2

D- Award up to 10 points based on the % of building features that allow for the accumulation of wood dust
(i.e. wall ledges, horizontal structural members, horizontal piping, roof trusses, etc.) enclosed or shielded with
sheet metal angled at least 60 to shed dust.
D If less than 5% of the floor area of the plant has dust accumulations of greater than 3mm (1/8), award 5
points.
O- If all mechanical and electrical rooms are separated from the main manufacturing area, award 2 points. If
the separation is a 2 hour fire rated enclosure on all walls, floor, ceiling and self-closing doors as applicable,
award a further 2 points, provided that no mechanical or electrical room door was found to be blocked or left
open. If the mechanical room is at positive pressure, award 1 point.

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PC. Fire Suppression Systems

Applies to all sites
PC. Fire Suppression Systems
PC1. Sprinklers
Guideline
Question
PC1.1
PC1.2

O- If all primary manufacturing buildings are sprinkler protected, award 4 points.

If all separate support buildings (i.e, office, shop, etc.) are sprinkler protected, award an additional 1 point.
D- If the annual sprinkler system testing and service was performed by a qualified person in the last 12
months award 2 points.
If there were no corrective actions, or if all corrective actions are completed, award an additional 3 points.

PC2. Hoses and Hydrants

Guideline
Question
PC2.1
PC2.2

O- If fire hose stations are provided throughout the interior of production buildings, award 5 points.
O- If fire hydrants (private or municipal) spaced not less than 100m apart and 100m from manufacturing
buildings, storage silos and fire storage piles, award 5 points

PC3. Water Supply

Guideline
Question
PC3.1

PC3.2

D- If the company can show that the water supply volume calculation, as performed by a qualified engineer,
is sufficient to satisfy the hydraulic demands of the sprinkler system and the hose stream allowance, award 5
points.
D- If there is documentation to show that the water supply has a minimum duration of 90 minutes, award 5
points. The duration must be for both the sprinklers and the hose stream allowance simultaneously. Public
utility water connections are to be considered as sufficient unless documentation to the contrary exists.
Private water supplies (fire reservoir, lake, pond, etc.) must have documentation on site.

PC4. Pumps
Guideline
Question
PC4.1

PC4.2

O- If fire pumps are required, award 5 points if they are approved (UL or FM) pumps with either
Dual system (electric driver and diesel driver) or
Electric with an on-site diesel generator to provide a back up power supply
Fire pumps are required for private water supplies or where specified by the qualified engineer who provided
the water supply volume calculation.
D- If there are records showing that the fire pump (whether diesel or electric) is started weekly in at least 90%
of the weeks in the scope of the audit and the records indicate the date, result, and identify the personnel
performing the test, award 2 points.
If there were no corrective actions, or if all corrective actions are completed, award an additional 3 points.

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PC. Fire Suppression Systems
PC4.3

D- If there are records showing that the fire pump annual performance test has been performed by a qualified
person in the last 12 months, award 2 points.
If there were no corrective actions, or if all corrective actions are completed, award an additional 3 points.

PC5. Spark Detection and Suppression

Guideline
Question
PC5.1

PC5.2

D- If maintenance records all support that spark detection and suppression systems are inspected, cleaned
and tested internally by trained personnel on a regular basis in accordance with the manufacturers
instructions, award 5 points.
D- If there are records showing that all annual inspections and tests of
Spark detection systems
Spark suppression systems
Back draft dampers
High speed abort gates
have been performed by a qualified person in the last 12 months, award 2 points.
If there were no corrective actions, or if all corrective actions are completed, award an additional 3 points.

PC6. Operational Programs

Guideline
Question
PC6.1

PC6.2

D- If documentation supports that the responding fire department has completed pre-incident planning and
site visits of the mill within the last 3 years or since the last major process change, whichever is more recent,
award 5 points. The responding fire department may be salaried, volunteer or a company fire brigade,
provided the brigade meets NFPA 1081 standard. Documentation may include posted Fire Department
inspection results.
D- If there are records showing that all annual thermographic scanning inspections and tests of the electrical
distribution system has been performed by a qualified person in the last 12 months, award 2 points.
If there were no corrective actions, or if all corrective actions are completed, award an additional 3 points.

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PD. Fibre In-Feed

Covers in-feed into the manufacturing process, as opposed to in-feed into the property.
Applies to all sites.
PD. Fibre In-Feed
PD1. Screening
Guideline
Question
PD1.1

I- If the supervisor can describe a reasonable process for raw fibre screening or sorting prior to processing
that is designed to remove any oversized materials or foreign contaminants such as rocks or tramp metal,
award 10 points

PD2. Training and Education

Guideline
Question
PD2.1

O- If there is observed to be an effective magnetic separation and/or other metal detection process at the infeed into the process, award 5 points
D- If records support regular inspection and removal of the metal from the separation / detection process,
award 5 points.
I If all qualified operators interviewed can describe how the metal is removed from the process stream,
including the method and frequency of inspection of the separation equipment, award 5 points.

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PE. Fibre Sizing

Fibre Sizing covers both pre- and post-drying sizing of the fibre.
Not applicable if no sizing on site (i.e. at a transportation / storage facility)

PE. Fibre Sizing

PE1. Foreign Object Removal
Guideline
Question
PE1.1
PE1.2
PE1.3

O- If the fractionating equipment (hammer mill, hogger, etc.) is equipped with magnetic separation and/or
interlocked ferrous material detection, award 5 points.
O- If rock drops and/or other means of removing non-ferrous contaminants are present on all fractionating
equipment, award 5 points.
D- If there is a policy / program on the inspection and cleaning of the magnets or other apparatus in the
magnetic separation / detection equipment, award 2 points
D If there are records supporting that the equipment is inspected and cleaned daily, award 3 points.

PE1.4

I - If at least 90% of interviewed qualified operators state that they follow the prescribed protocol, including
the maintenance of records, award 5 points.
D- If there is a policy / program on the inspection and cleaning of the fractionating equipment, award 2 points
D If there are records supporting that the equipment is inspected and cleaned daily, award 3 points.
I - If at least 90% of interviewed qualified operators state that they follow the prescribed protocol, including
the maintenance of records, award 5 points.

PE2. Fire Detection

Guideline
Question
PE2.1

O- If an approved (UL or FM) spark detection and suppression system, including, but not limited to
Clarkes
GreCon
Flamex
Firefly
Is installed following the fractionating equipment, award 15 points.
D If the design documents indicate that the system has multiple spark detection that will shut down the
equipment if limits are exceeded, award 10 points

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PE. Fibre Sizing
PE2.2

O If the device used for bearing temperature monitoring has a current calibration on or with it, award 5
points.
D If a readout shows the current bearing temperature or daily logs indicate the temperature readings for all
fractionating equipment bearings, award 5 points.
I- If at least 80% of sampled qualified operators state the fractionating equipment is provided with bearing
temperature monitors or that a hand-held remote thermometric device is used on a daily basis to examine
bearing temperatures, award 5 points.

PE3. Equipment Location

Guideline
Question
PE3.1

PE3.2

PE3.3

O- If the fractionating equipment is either

Located outside the main manufacturing facility, or
Isolated in a 2 hour fire enclosure within the main plant
Award 5 points
O- If the equipment AND the ductwork leading from the equipment has explosion-relieving panels that vent to
the exterior of the building in an area or location where pedestrians are excluded by physical design
(elevation, barriers, etc.) or by administrative controls (signage), award 5 points.
O Award up to 5 points based on the % of observable electrical wiring, fittings and other devices that are
properly sealed and maintained (i.e. no open electrical boxes, no connections outside of junction boxes, no
frayed wires, no portable heaters in manufacturing areas, etc.)
D if the electrical wiring and lighting is marked for use as per National Electrical Code and NFPA 70, award
5 points
Enclosed location Class III, Division II, Group G
Exterior location (need the reference for exterior weather protection rating)

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PF. Fibre Drying

Covers horizontal drum driers, single, triple and other pass styles
(Not applicable if site is a transportation / storage site or otherwise has no drying)
PF. Fibre Drying
PF1. Incident Reports
Guideline
Question
PF1.1

PF1.2

PF1.3
PF1.4
PF1.5

PF1.6

D- If there is an approved (UL or FM) spark detection and suppression system provided on the outfeed of the
dryer, award 5 points.
O- If both the internal and out-feed temperatures of the dryer are continuously monitored in a control room,
award 2 points.
D If system design documentation indicates that the dryer will shut down or purge material to a fire dump at
a safe location if the monitored temperature exceeds the limit value, award 3 points. Emergency shutdown
must include shutting down and/or diverting heat from the dryer as well as stopping the material in-feed.
O- If there is an automatic water deluge system (with or without a manual system) on both the dryer in-feed
and out-feed award 5 points. If there is a manual system without automatic activation, award 3 points.
D- If the operating instructions describe how the feed of materials into the dryer is monitored and interlocked
to shut off or divert heat from the burner if the feed of material is interrupted, award 5 points.
O- If there is a fire dump or other safe area provided for the purging of dryer contents if high temperature limit
switches are exceeded, award 5 points. The area must be location where pedestrians are excluded by
physical design (elevation, barriers, etc.) or by administrative controls (signage).
O- If there is a backup generator or secondary driver (with an independent power source) for the drum
rotation drive, award 5 points. The backup system needs to be able to maintain drum rotation during
emergency shut down or power failure to prevent warping of the drum.

PF3. Inspections
Guideline
Question
PF2.1

F3.2

O- If the dryer operation monitored with programmable logic controllers (PLC), award 5 points.
D- If records show that the annual logic testing of the dryer PLC system has occurred in the last 12 months,
award 2 points. If there were no deficiencies, or all deficiencies have been corrected, award an additional 3
points.
D- If there are records showing the duct work after the dryer is inspected for creosote build up and cleaned
on a quarterly basis, award 5 points.
I- If interviews with at least 80% of sampled qualified operators describe a cleaning frequency and method
that is at least quarterly and compliant with operating instructions, award 5 points.

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PG. Pelletizing
(not applicable at a site without pelletizing, such as a transportation or storage facility or at a final user)
PG. Pelletizing
PG1. Load Sensing
Guideline
Question
PG1.1

O- If the pellet presses are all equipped with PLC to monitor their operation, award 5 points.
D- If the control room readouts include load sensors or electrical current monitoring with both high and low
limits, award 5 points

PG2. Reserve Hopper

Guideline
Question
PG2.1

O- If there is a reserve hopper for either each press or for all presses proved for material being fed into the
presses to prevent the presses from running out of feed stock, award 5 points. If the hopper is equipped with
both high and low level material sensors, award 5 additional points.
I- If 80% of the interviewed qualified operators can correctly describe how the low material sensor alerts the
operator and automatically suspends operations of the press(es) connected to that hopper, award 5 points. If
there is no hopper and/or no low level material sensor, score the interview portion as zero. Do not deduct 5
points from the total.

PG3. Auxiliary Materials

Guideline
Question
PG3.1

D- If documentation shows that 100% of any additives used in the pelletizing process have an ignition
temperature above the maximum operating temperature of the press, award 5 points. If no additives are
used, score this portion as N/App and deduct 5 points from the available total.
D If documentation shows that 100% of any die cleaners (ie diesel fuel, waste oil, vegetable oil, etc.) used
in the pelletizing process have an ignition temperature above the maximum operating temperature of the
press, award 5 points. If no die cleaners other than air and mechanical effort are used, score this portion as
N/App and deduct 5 points from the available total.
Documentation reviewed for this question should include the operating control limits of the press and product
specification or material safety data sheets (MSDS).

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PH. Pellet Cooling

Pellet cooling can be using individual or common coolers.
(Not applicable if at a transportation, storage or end-user site)
PH. Pellet Cooling
PH1. Cooler Equipment
Guideline
Question
PH1.1

PH1.2
PH1.3
PH1.4
PH1.5

D- If there is a clear display in the control room indicating temperature of the cooler that will alert the operator
and automatically stop the process in-feed and out-feed from each affected cooler, for all coolers, award 5
points.
O- If there is an automatic water deluge system (with or without a manual system) within all coolers, award 5
points. If there is a manual system without automatic activation, award 3 points.
O- If all coolers vent to atmosphere outside the building in a safe location, award 5 points. The system must
not capture residual heat for use anywhere else in the process or for seasonal heating.
D- If there is an approved (UL or FM) spark detection and suppression system provided on the ventilation
system of the cooler, award 5 points.
O- If the duct from the cooler to the baghouse contains a high speed abort gate, award 5 points. If there is no
baghouse, score this question Not Applicable and deduct 5 points from the available total.

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PI. Finished Product Storage

This portion of the audit only applies if the company has storage silos for finished product. The entire section
of the audit is to be scored Not Applicable if the company produces solely bagged product and the storage
volume of product between cooled pellet and bag is one shift or less. If the intermediate storage is a greater
volume than one shift, then this portion of the audit applies.
Applies at transportation, storage and end-user sites.
PI. Finished Product Storage
PI1. Silo Construction
Guideline
Question
PI1.1
PI1.2

O- If silos are all located outside of manufacturing building and provided with a clear space of at least 10m on
all sides for firefighting efforts, award 10 points.
O- If there is explosion-relief venting at the top of the silos that is directed away from buildings or where
personnel congregate, award 5 points.

PI2. Silo Emergency Response

Guideline
Question
PI2.1

PI2.2
PI2.3

D- If there is a clear display in the control room indicating temperature of the silo that will both audibly and
visually alert the operator and automatically stop the process in-feed to each affected silo, for all silos, award
5 points.
D If the system documentation specifies a maximum safe limit of 60C or less, award 4 points. If the
program documents specify a warning limit of 40C followed by a 10C rise in 24 hours, or a more stringent
limit, award an additional point.
O- If there is an automatic water deluge system (with or without a manual system) within all silos, award 1
point. If the system is a pre-action, water mist or inert gas system, award 4 points
D- If the written emergency response procedure for an actual or suspected silo fire includes fully emptying
the silo with due consideration to avoid bottom-feeding a silo fire with air, award 5 points

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PJ. Dust Collection and Ventilation

Applies at manufacturing, storage and end-user sites
PI. Finished Product Storage
PH1. Bag Houses
Guideline
Question
PJ1.1
PJ1.2

PJ1.3

D- If dust collection equipment and ductwork from the collection equipment to the bag house is grounded,
award 5 points
O- If the dust collection system is located outside the building more than 10m from the building or separated
by a minimum 2 hour fire wall, award 5 points. A location on the roof of the building is acceptable if the roof is
also fire rated for a minimum of 2 hours.
O - Are cyclones or bag house type collectors that are connected to process equipment with a potential to
produce sparks or embers;
Equipped with an approved spark detection system (1 point)
Equipped with an approved sprinkler system both above and below the collector bags (1 point)
Equipped with a high-speed abort gate (1 point)
Provided with counterweighted back draft dampers on in-feed duct work (1 point)
Provided with explosion-relief panels directed away from buildings where personnel congregate (1
point)
Process equipment with a potential to produce sparks or embers includes, but is not limited to:
Fractionating equipment
Rotary drum driers
Pellet coolers

PJ2. Procedures
Guideline
Question
PJ2.1

D- If there is a written program defining the frequency of inspection of the bag house structure, the bags and
unit grounding as being annual or more frequent, award 5 points.
I If all interviewed qualified operators state that replacement bags are on-site or available off-site in less
than 24 hours, award 5 points.

PJ2.2
PJ2.3

I- If all interviewed qualified operators can correctly describe the automatic sequential shut down of process
equipment and activation of an audible and visual alarm on baghouse shut down, award 5 points.
O If the primary method of dust cleanup is observed to be vacuum (as opposed to air wand), award 10
points. It is recognized that some equipment, such as the internals of pelletizers, cannot be vacuumed due to
impacted materials. Vacuums may be any combination of portable, fixed and centralized.

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Definitions
Word or Phrase
Any definitions
specific to pellets??

Definition

Ready for definitions if there are any

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Louisiana Pacific
Fire Prevention Assessment
Date published: September 2010

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Fire Prevention Assessment
Dust
Mill Location:
Auditor(s):
Date:
RATING
NE = No evidence of any action/process/procedure or training
VE = Visible evidence but no documentation / documentation but no visible
evidence
VEP = Visible evidence and partial documentation
CED = Clear evidence of compliance with thorough documentation

PROCESS
OWNER
Operations

Maintenance
Safety
Fire Technician

PRIORITY
Level 1 (High Priority) - Situations that may present substantial risk to employees, stockholders, the company or reputation.
Level 2 (Priority Action) - Does not meet the criteria for level 1, but is more than an isolated or occasional situation. These actions
should not continue past the short term.
Level 3 (Action Required) - May be administrative in nature or involve an isolated or occasional situation.

Instructions for completing 1st Party Fire Assessments

1.
1st Party Fire Assessments should be done with a small team of people at each location.
2.
Each element must be covered annually. All annual evaluations are to be complete by the end of the third quarter.
3.
Review each question in detail.
4.
Rate each element of each question (Documentation, Training, Execution). It is acceptable for certain questions to answer some elements as NA.
5.
List a Process Owner for each item.
6.
Answer all questions in narrative form in the findings section.
7.
Provide detailed information for each question (where information is located, how it is documented and maintained, who performs required checks/inspections, how often checks/inspections are completed, how verified).
8.
Once complete, cover the responses and recommendations with the site staff and personnel responsible for recommendations.
9.
For each item that does not score CED there should be a recommendation to strengthen the element. Recommendations should be detailed and specific to allow auditing. Recommendations should be transferred to CAP Tracker.
10. Send a copy of the completed assessment to your corporate safety contact.
The documentation for the following areas may be contained in one or more documents.

Areas

Is there a process in place to assure the process areas will be

free of dust buildup in excess of 1/8"?

Execution

Training

Documentation

Rating

Process
Owner

Finding

Recommendation

Priority

In buildings or areas fugitive combustible dust is released, are

the following actions incorporated into a housekeeping/dust
control plan? Guidelines should be established as appropriate:
2

3
4

5
6
7

8
9

Regular cleaning frequencies shall be established and a person

assigned responsibility for executing for walls, floor, and
horizontal surfaces, such as equipment, ducts, pipes, hoods,
ledges, beams, and above suspended ceilings and other
concealed surfaces, to minimize dust accumulations within
operating areas.
Is there evidence of fugitive dust leaks around fire dump
vault/bunker areas?
Is it ensured that all covers, infeeds and distributions are
closed, sealed and in good repair to prevent any leaks or dust
build-up (level sensor holes closed and sealed to prevent
leaks)?
Are all lids closed, sealed and in good repair to prevent any
leaks or dust build-up? No leaks are acceptable.
Are conveyor pulley areas kept clean?
Has a comprehensive dust mitigation and fire awareness
program where combustible dust exists either within closed
processing systems or as fugitive dust within building areas
been developed with LP Safety/Marsh Risk Consulting to
coordinate the training?
Is process in place to assure process areas will be free of
leaking flake, wood dust/fines from piping?

2
1

1
1
2

1
1

274
Fire Prevention Assessment
Dust
Mill Location:
Auditor(s):
Date:
RATING
NE = No evidence of any action/process/procedure or training
VE = Visible evidence but no documentation / documentation but no visible
evidence
VEP = Visible evidence and partial documentation
CED = Clear evidence of compliance with thorough documentation

PROCESS
OWNER
Operations

Maintenance
Safety
Fire Technician

PRIORITY
Level 1 (High Priority) - Situations that may present substantial risk to employees, stockholders, the company or reputation.
Level 2 (Priority Action) - Does not meet the criteria for level 1, but is more than an isolated or occasional situation. These actions
should not continue past the short term.
Level 3 (Action Required) - May be administrative in nature or involve an isolated or occasional situation.

Instructions for completing 1st Party Fire Assessments

1.
1st Party Fire Assessments should be done with a small team of people at each location.
2.
Each element must be covered annually. All annual evaluations are to be complete by the end of the third quarter.
3.
Review each question in detail.
4.
Rate each element of each question (Documentation, Training, Execution). It is acceptable for certain questions to answer some elements as NA.
5.
List a Process Owner for each item.
6.
Answer all questions in narrative form in the findings section.
7.
Provide detailed information for each question (where information is located, how it is documented and maintained, who performs required checks/inspections, how often checks/inspections are completed, how verified).
8.
Once complete, cover the responses and recommendations with the site staff and personnel responsible for recommendations.
9.
For each item that does not score CED there should be a recommendation to strengthen the element. Recommendations should be detailed and specific to allow auditing. Recommendations should be transferred to CAP Tracker.
10. Send a copy of the completed assessment to your corporate safety contact.
The documentation for the following areas may be contained in one or more documents.

Areas

10
11
12
13
14
15

16
17

Are superstructure/framework and support beams, decking and

stairs, guarding, drop chutes (infeed and outfeed) seals, doors
clean?
Cable trays?
Storage (tools, etc.)?
How does the facility check and account for forces in the PLC's
that control alarms or safety trips?
Is the cleaning method used in this order of preference - 1.
vacuum, 2. sweeping, 3. water wash, 4. air blow down?
Use brooms and brushes first for layers exceeding 1/8" in
depth.
Vacuum removal suitable for Class II, Division II (This includes
appropriate grounding and bonding) should be used wherever
possible using a central, portable, or truck mounted vacuum
system as appropriate.
Is compressed air being used in areas where alternative
cleaning methods are practical?
In overhead blow down areas, are electrical devices within 10
feet dust tight to prevent dust entry?

18
Has a list been developed of where compressed air can be
used for cleaning?
19

20

Has a sample of the material that accumulates in the ductwork

of the multi-cyclones been tested for minimum ignition
temperature (MIT) annually?

Are corrective actions identified and tracked to completion in

21 the CAP Tracker?

Execution

Training

Documentation

Rating

Process
Owner

Finding

Recommendation

Priority

1
1
1
1

3
2
2
3

3
3

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United Steelworkers
Resource Handout: Controlling Hazards
Date published: Unknown

276

Resource Handout

CONTROLLING HAZARDS
Once hazards have been identified, the next step is to control the hazards. Hazard controls
are methods used to eliminate or limit workers exposure to a hazard. While there are
many different types of hazards (such as toxic chemicals, unguarded machinery and
equipment, working in high places), there are certain principles guiding hazard control
that apply to all hazards.
The Hierarchy of Hazard Controls
The best way to control a hazard is to eliminate it. If a hazard can not be eliminated all
together, there are several other ways to limit worker exposure to the hazard. Some of
these ways are more effective than others. When all of these different hazard control
methods are put in a chart, going from the most effective to the least effective way to
control the hazard, the chart portrays the "hierarchy of hazard controls." It is considered
good occupational safety and health practice to follow the hierarchy of controls.
HIERARCHY OF HAZARD CONTROLS
Most Effective

Least Effective

1.

Elimination

2.

Substitution

3.

Engineering Controls (Safeguarding

Technology)

4.

Administrative Controls (Training and

Procedures)

5.

Personal Protective Equipment

Examples of Each Step in the Hierarchy of Hazard Controls

1.

Elimination
The best way to control a hazard is to eliminate it and remove the danger. This
can be done by changing a work process in a way that will get rid of a hazard;

277

substituting a non-toxic chemical for a toxic substance; having workers perform

tasks at ground level rather than working at heights; implementing needle-less IV
systems in health care facilities to eliminate needles; and other methods that
remove the hazard all together.

2.

Substitution
The second best way to control a hazard is to substitute something else in its place
that would be non-hazardous or less hazardous to workers. For example, a nontoxic (or less toxic) chemical could be substituted for a hazardous one.

3.

Engineering Controls (Safeguarding Technology)

If a hazard cannot be eliminated or a safer substitute cannot be found, the next
best approach is to use engineering controls to keep the hazard from reaching the
worker. This could include methods such as using noise dampening technology to
reduce noise levels; enclosing a chemical process in a Plexiglas "glove box";
using needles that retract after use; using mechanical lifting devices; or using
local exhaust ventilation that captures and carries away the contaminants before
they can get in the breathing zone of workers.

4.

Administrative Controls (Training and Procedures)

If engineering controls cannot be implemented, or cannot be implemented right
away, administrative controls should be considered. Administrative controls
involve changes in workplace policies and procedures. They can include such
things as:
Warning alarms,
Labeling systems,
Reducing the time workers are exposed to a hazard, and
Training.
For example, workers could be rotated in and out of a hot area rather than having
to spend eight hours per day in the heat. Back-up alarms on trucks that are
backing up are an example of effective warning systems. However, warning signs
used instead of correcting a hazard that can and should be corrected are not
acceptable forms of hazard control. For example, it is neither effective nor
acceptable to post warning signs by an unguarded machine cautioning workers to
work carefully.

5.

Personal Protective Equipment

The use of personal protective equipment (PPE) is a way of controlling hazards
by placing protective equipment directly on workers' bodies. Examples of

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personal protective equipment include: respirators, gloves, protective clothing,

hard hats, goggles, and ear plugs.
Personal protective equipment is the least effective method for protecting workers
from hazards. PPE should be used only while other more effective controls are
being developed or installed, or if there are no other more effective ways to
control the hazard. This is because:

The hazard is not eliminated or changed.

If the equipment is inadequate or fails, the worker is not protected.
No personal protective equipment is fool-proof (for example, respirators
leak).
Personal protective equipment is often uncomfortable and can place an
additional physical burden on a worker.
Personal protective equipment can actually create hazards. For example,
the use of respirators for long periods of time can put a strain on the heart
and lungs.

While there are some jobs, such as removing asbestos, where wearing adequate
personal protective equipment is absolutely essential, there are many jobs where
employers hand out personal protective equipment when in fact they should be
using more effective hazard control methods.
A Word of Caution
When planning for hazard controls, remember that the control selected must not eliminate
one hazard while creating another. For example, it is not acceptable to remove air
contaminants from one area by venting them to another area where another group of
workers will be exposed. Hazard control measures should eliminate or reduce hazards for
all who are potentially exposed to them.
Hazard Control: Whose Responsibility?
The ability and responsibility to design jobs safely in the first place, or redesign them
when a hazard is detected, lies with management. It is the role of workers and unions to
promote the use of the "Hierarchy of Controls," making sure that employers are providing
the most effective methods for hazard control possible. Remember: fix the workplace, not
the worker!

279

Weyerhaeuser
Combustible Dust Control Program
Date published: November 6, 2009

280

Combustible Dust Control Program

1. Objective
The objective of the combustible dust control program is to reduce the risk of
deflagrations, explosions and fires caused by combustible dust. Risk reduction will be
achieved by effectively controlling wood dust and other dust accumulations by following
the reliable processes identified in this program. This program also identifies training to
protect employees from combustible dust hazards.
2. Definitions
Combustible Dust - Any finely divided solid combustible material that presents a
deflagration or explosion hazard when dispersed and ignited in the air.
Deflagration - A technical term describing subsonic combustion that usually propagates
through thermal conductivity. Hot burning material heats the next layer of cold material
and ignites it. Most fire found in daily life, from flames to explosions, is technically
deflagration.
Explosion - The bursting or rupture of an enclosure or a container due to the
development of internal pressure from deflagration.
3. Background
A deflagration may occur when the right concentration of finely divided dust suspended
in air contacts a source of ignition. An explosion could result if the combustible dust is
dispersed within a confined enclosure such as a vessel, storage bin, ductwork, room, or
building and the confined enclosure does not contain sufficient deflagration venting
capacity to safely release the pressures.
A initial deflagration can disturb and suspend dust which has accumulated in the
workplace, which could then serve as the fuel for a secondary (and often more
damaging) deflagration or explosion. Combusting dust can also ignite other fires in the
surrounding area.
In Wood Products mills combustible dust is most often composed of wood ground into
very small particles. This dust is usually generated by the manufacturing processes and
equipment. It accumulates in the workplace if it is not collected, transported and stored
by a dust collection system. Dust that is not collected by the dust collection system
must be manually removed.

281

The site has developed procedures to identify areas where combustible dust may be
generated, where it may accumulate, and where it could potentially become airborne
and come in contact with an ignition source. When an area is identified the site will
develop a plan to control, remove or prevent hazardous accumulations of combustible
dust.
4. Identification of Hazardous Areas
The site has completed a thorough review of its manufacturing process to identify:
Areas where there is the potential for combustible dust accumulation
Process equipment that collects, transfers and stores combustible dust
Work practices that might cause combustible dust accumulations to become
airborne
Sources of ignition that may come into contact with combustible dust
The site has also reviewed Incident investigation reports of fires that have occurred in
the past 3 years. Root causes of the fires have been reviewed and implementation of
the corrective actions to prevent reoccurrence has been confirmed.
The site has identified the following areas of the site where there is a potential of
accumulation of dust greater than 1/8th of an inch.
Likely areas of dust accumulations within the site are:

Structural members in both planer and sawmill.

Pipe racks and cable trays in sawmill basement

Cable trays in planer sorter area

Main floor in planer and sawmill

Above ceilings

On and around equipment

Additionally the site has identified the following areas that either collects, transfers or
stores combustible dust:

Planer infeed area, including under decks

Planer room
PDC room in planer room
Planer chipper room
Sawmill chipper area

Underneath sawmill chip screens

Planer Chip screen room - wall ledges

MSR room - plastic on wall

Hog building and Hog infeed.

#4 chip tower.

The area under the barkers and between the Barker / COS refuse conveyors.
5. Procedures to Minimize the Risk Associated with Combustible Dust

282

Sources of Ignition
The site maintains effective electrical grounding and bonding methods, for dissipating
electrostatic charges that could be generated.
The site follows a strict permitting procedure when hot work is performed in areas
where combustible material may be present. The Hot Work permitting process requires
removal of combustible material in the area where the hot work will occur and the
appropriate level of fire watch during and after the hot work has been completed.
Fire and Property Insurance Investigation
The site utilizes Weyerhaeusers incident investigation process to investigate process
and building fires to root cause. Corrective actions are identified and assigned to a
competent employee to ensure completion.
The site also utilizes the services of its property/casualty insurance carrier (FM Global)
or its designate (Global Risk Consultants) to conduct periodic (minimum annually) fire
insurance inspections. High-priority findings will be addressed as soon as possible, if
not immediately, following the sites receipt of the audit report.
Dust Collection Systems (Engineering Controls)
The site maintains a system to collect dust generated in the manufacturing process.
The dust collection system includes source exhaust ventilation hoods, ductwork
(blowpipes), dust collectors (cyclones) with technology to minimize a dust fire or
exposure inside the system. Such technology includes explosion venting and spark
detection and suppression equipment in the ducting and a deluge system in the bag
cyclone themselves to suppress fires and explosions. To keep these systems
operating efficiently and as designed, this equipment is on a regular preventative
maintenance (PM) schedule which includes inspection, cleaning and servicing. Specific
information includes
Fugitive Dust Control
The sites housekeeping program establishes regular cleaning frequencies for floors
and horizontal surfaces, such as ducts, pipes, hoods, ledges, and beams, to minimize
dust accumulation. The housekeeping programs also inspects equipment that may
generate or leak dust (such as sanders and dust collectors) to ensure they are
maintained in a manner that minimizes dust accumulation.
Housekeeping inspection tours are held regularly to ensure the effectiveness of the
program. Inspection findings are documented and presented to the sites leadership
team. Corrective actions are assigned and tracked through completion.
Work Practices
Whenever feasible, the site uses cleaning methods that do not generate dust clouds,
especially in areas where ignition sources are present. Vacuum, water wash or
soft bristle brooms are the preferred approaches. The site minimizes use of high-

283

pressure compressed air to clean (blow down) dust accumulations. If dust is to be

blown off overhead areas, all electrical equipment in the area is de-energized and
appropriate respiratory protective equipment (such as disposable dust masks) is
used, when necessary.
Contractors that specialize in industrial vacuum cleaning will be used for large
dust-cleaning jobs. Capturing the majority of the dust at the source, before it is
distributed throughout the work area, is the desired standard. Twice annually we
will use the contractors to do a site wide cleanup.

6. Training
All leaders are expected to complete the Weyerhaeuser online training module:
Combustible Dust Awareness, which was developed to inform facility personnel of the
hazards of combustible dust and how to minimize the potential for a combustible dust
fire or explosion.

Revision #
01

Revision Details
Using developed the Combustible dust Plan
for the Site

Date
Nov 6,
2009

284

Sampling
Results

285

Wood Pellet Association

of Canada
Testing of Explosibility and Flammability
of Airborne Dust from Wood Pellets
Date published: November 2, 2008

286

Testing of Explosibility and Flammability

of Airborne Dust from Wood Pellets
Staffan Melin
Research Director

Wood Pellet Association of Canada

November 2, 2008

1. Introduction
This report is a summary of the findings from physical characterization and testing the
explosibility and flammability of dust collected during handling of white pellets as well as
bark pellets. Explosions and
fires are quite common in the
industry processing wood,
including the wood pellet
industry, as can be seen in the
diagram on the right hand side
illustrating the officially
recorded incidents in USA. It
is of interest to notice the
relatively small rate of
incidents in the coal mining
industry which traditionally
has had a reputation of having
many serious incidents.
To better understand the
significance of dust generated
during handling, the report
includes some rudimentary
particle physics to give a
perspective on the behavior of
dust suspended in air since it
is the basics of much of the
procedures for testing
explosibility.
(Courtesy R. Stahl
Schaltgerte GmbH)

287

2. Particulate Physics Orientation

Airborne dust from wood pellets is the cause of many fires and explosions when exposed to
ignition source or heat and often results in substantial damage and injuries. Airborne dusts are
part of the wide spectrum of aerosols and are classified in the following main categories with
typical size range indicated in the diagram below;
- Combustion generated particles
- Mechanically generated particles
- Spores
- Bacteria
- Viruses

COMBUSTION PARTICLES
(FUME)
MECHANICAL GENERATION
(DUST OR MIST)

BACTERIA

VIRUSES

SPORES

0.001

0.01

0.1

1.0

10

100

PARTICLE SIZE (AED) m

Particulates smaller than 425 m (screen 40) are classified by OSHA as dust. To give a
perspective on the size of particulates, cement dust range from 2-100 m, diesel exhaust
0.001-1 m and a human hair 20-180 m. The actual size of particles is difficult to measure
with any accuracy since they almost always appear in large numbers with individual shapes
and sizes and each particle is almost always irregular in shape, often with porosity. The shape
and size is often also affected by changes in moisture and temperature. In the industry the size
is often determined by mechanical sieving with results affected by the geometry and duration
of the vibrations of the sieving equipment. The result of mechanical sieving is often in
question since the mesh through which the material is passing has no way of discriminating
particles of different density and particles with non-spherical (ideal) shape or particles smaller
than a certain diameter. Particles such as fibers with an aspect ratio larger than 1:5 are
particularly difficult to classify by mechanical sieving.

288

An alternative method of classifying particles is machine vision using a high resolution

scanner and image processing software. Both methods are approximations although the
machine vision should be considered more accurate.
Particles which are not in the sediment state are often in an agitated and lofted stage by the
media in which they habitate. The agitation is due to
FLUID DRAG FORCES
external forces acting on the particles such as
turbulence, buoyancy, fluid drag, static electricity,
BUOYANCY
Brownian forces, Van der Waal forces and gravity.
The dynamics of how particles propagate in a media,
such as air, is of fundamental importance in dust
PARTICLE
control. Practically all particles are non-uniform in
shape and have different density depending on
material and porosity and therefore are transported at
different speed in air due to the forces of gravity,
GRAVITY
buoyancy and fluid drag forces as illustrated to the
right.
Some of the critical factors with all aerosols is the concentration in any given area and the
speed at which concentrations may occur. An understanding of the net effect of the forces

289

exerted on the particle is essential and is quantified in terms of sedimentation (settling) speed
of the particles under still as well as turbulent conditions. The sedimentation speed is primarily
affected by the physical size, surface structure and density of the particle. The concept of
Aerodynamic Equivalent Diameter (AED) is a way to relate the particle characteristics to
the sedimentation speed at normal temperature and atmospheric pressure (NTP). One method
is based on a determination of the projected area of the particle and the other is based on the
volumetric determination of the particle, both normalized to an equivalent droplet of water
with density 1,000 kg/m3. The two methods results in an (AED). The sedimentation speed is
then calculated using Stokes formula.
The two methods are illustrated below with parametric values to arrive at the same
sedimentation speed.
THREE METHODS OF ESTIMATING PARTICLE DIAMETER
BASED ON SEDIMENTATION SPEED
VOLUME EQUIVALENT
DIAMETER

STOKES EQUIVALENT
SPHERE

deq = 5.0 m
3
= 4.0 g/cm
Form factor = 1.36

ds = 4.3 m
3
= 4.0 g/cm

AERODYNAMIC
EQUIVALENT DIAMETER
dae = 8.6 m
3
= 1.0 g/cm

H 2O

In turbulent air particles remain airborne for a longer period of time, particularly smaller
particles. The sedimentation time has a direct impact on the concentration of particles in a
given containment as well as the time it takes to build up a sediment layer. In still air larger
particles settle much quicker than smaller particles as illustrated in the figure below.

290

PARTICLE SEDIMENTATION TIME IN STILL AIR

0.5 m

1.0 m

3.0 m

10.0 m

100 m

41 hours

12 hours

1.5 hours

8.2 min

5.8 sec

TIME TO SETTLE 5 FEET BY UNIT DENSITY SPHERES

Source: NIOSH

The airborne dust generated during handling of pellets range in size from 500 to a few micron
(see section on Samples below). The above figure indicates a sedimentation (settling) time
from a few seconds to several hours in still air. The time is even longer in turbulent air.
The smaller the particle is the larger the relative surface area, which means increased exposure
to the oxygen in the air. The larger the oxygen exposure is of combustible material the higher
the risk is for open flame combustion in the presence of an igniting source or a source of heat.
Aside from the safety and infectious aspect of some particles we are also concerned with
health effects from exposure to particles with an AED less than 100 m. Depending on size,
aerosol particles easily deposit in various parts of our airways as we inhale and subsequently
causes illnesses such as acute reactions, chronicle reactions or tumors. The most serious
damage is done by particles less than 10 m AED which are able to enter our bloodstream
through the alveolars where the gas exchange (oxygen uptake) takes place in our lungs. The
medical field is using the following classifications for particles with penetration illustrated in
the figure below;
- Inhalable particulates
< 100 m AED
- Thoracic particulates
< 25 m AED
- Respirable particulates
< 10 m AED

291

Regional Particle Deposition in the Airways

As a curiosum, it is estimated that during a lifetime an average person is inhaling over 10 m3
of air per 24 hours which translates in to about 4,000 m3 per year or 320,000 m3 during an 80
year lifespan. A typical outdoor particle concentration is about 3 g/m3 inhaled. This translates
in to about 3 g of particulates inhaled during a lifetime, which is about 3 teaspoons full of
particles 1. The surface of the head region exposed to air is about 0.5 m2, the bronchial-thoracic
region about 2 m2 and the respiratory alveoli region about 100 m2.
3. Dust Samples Tested
Samples of dust from wood pellets used in the testing of explosibility and flammability in this
report were collected in areas where the dust had settled which means that the particles were
representative of the entire spectrum of sizes encountered in a typical working environment
for bulk handling of pellets. The particles had been airborne and transported a distance before
settling and therefore can be classified as passing through a band pass filter. Sample A from
white pellets was collected at a downstream transfer point between conveyors at a shiploading
terminal. Sample B from bark pellets was collected at girts, ledges and bin tops on the
production floor inside a pellet mill. No grinding or hammer milling of the material was done
after sampling. The samples were kept in sealed plastic bags until opened at the lab
immediately before testing.
The particle size spectrum for the two samples was established by means of wire cloth sieving
as well as by use of a new machine vision system developed at University of British
Columbia. The result of the size determination is shown in diagram below. For comparison,

Partiklar och Hlsa, Gudmundsson, 2008.

292

the diagram is also including typical particle size distribution for Pittsburgh coal and
Lycopodium spores.

100

AIRBORNE DUST SIZE DISTRIBUTION

90

Percent in Pan

80
70
60

White Wood
Dust

50

Bark Dust

40
30
20
10
0

The Lycopodium spores are often used as a reference since the spores have very predictable
and consistent particle size of 20-30 m and is naturally
suspended in air (see picture to the right). The spore also has a
large surface area and therefore has a high level of explosivity.
In comparison, the dust generated during coal mining operations
varies from 1 to 200 m depending on the mineral composition
and the mining process. The particle size distribution is very
similar to the dust from wood pellets.
For this report the ASTM Standards have been followed. Similar testing standards are also
published under ISO, EN and some national standards in Europe. The tests have been
performed on screen 230 materials (particles 63 m or less) since over 80 % of the dust
particles are 75 m or less and about 50 % or more is 63 m or less. Based on the size
distribution the most representative particle size would be somewhere between screen 200 and
230 (see diagram above). The ISO Standards recommend 63 m as the norm for testing
purposes.

293

4. Explosibility
Explosion is used as a general characterization of a violent event emitting sound and light and
often immediately followed by fire. There are two main categories of explosions. Detonation
generated from a sudden expansion of gas in to a supersonic
shock wave (molecular speed is higher than the speed of
sound). An example is nuclear explosions such Castle Romeo
2 nuclear test 1954 (to the right). The other is deflagration
generated by an initial violent oxidation followed by a frontal
combustion propagating outward as long as fuel and oxygen
is present in sufficiently high concentrations (see deflagration
flame supported by fuel to the right).
Explosions occur in dust suspended in air as well as dust sediments on hot surfaces. The
explosibility is a function of particle concentration, oxygen
concentration, energy of the ignition source or the
temperature of the heat exerted on the dust. In order to
emulate real live conditions as close as possible a number of
Testing Standards are available. The following table
summarizes the results of the tests which have been
conducted on dust from white pellets as well as bark pellets.
Standards tests are conducted on Dust Clouds as well as Dust Layers. The result of the tests
generates a Dust Classification which is used as a guideline for how the product generating
the dust should be handled and how the handling facility should be designed.

Dust Layer

Dust cloud

Test
Mode

Table 4.0 Results from testing dust from white pellets and bark pellets
White
Bark
Coal Lycopodium
Dust
Dust
Spores
Test Parameter (dust <63 m)
Measure Dust
Auto-ignition Temp
o
C
450
(Godbert-Greenwald)
Tc
450
585
430
Min Ignition Energy
MIE
mJoule
17
17
110
17
8.1
bar
8.4
7.3
7.4
Max Explosion Pressure
P max
537
595
426
511
Max Explosion Pressure Rate
dP/dt max bar/sec
146
Deflagration Index
K St
bar.m/sec
162
124
139
Min Explosible Concentration
Limiting Oxygen Concentration
Hot Surface Ignition Temp (5 mm)

MEC
LOC
Ts

g/m3
%
o
C

70
10.5
300

70
10.5
310

Hot Surface Ignition Temp (19 mm) Ts

260

250

Auto-ignition Temp

225

215

TL

Dust Class (>0 to 200 bar.m/sec)

Dust Class (Explosion Severity (ES > 0.5)

St 1
St 1
Class II Class II

65
12.5

Testing Standards
ASTM E1491
ASTM E2019
ASTM E1226
ASTM E1226
ASTM E1226

30 ASTM E1515
14 ASTM E1515 mod
ASTM E2021
ASTM E2021
USBM (Bureau of
Mines) RI 5624

St 1

St 1

ASTM E1226
OSHA CPL 03-00-06

The smaller the particle is the higher the explosibility. The bark dust contains noticeably
higher percentage smaller particles compared to the white dust. This translates in to higher
explosion pressure.
The minimum explosivity concentration (MEC) for coal dust is practically the same as for
dust from wood pellets. Coal dust explosions can be mitigated partly by injection of

294

incombustible mineral dust (e.g. limestone) at air intakes in order to keep the dust
concentration below the critical 65 g/m3 level of coal dust. This option is not practical for
operations handling wood pellets.
The following sections describe each test in principle. These methods were used in 2008 for
testing dust from pellets manufactured in British Columbia and Nova Scotia in August 2008.
The results are the basis for the data documented in the MSDS. For more information, see the
actual Standards and the related reference documentation. It should be noted that the data
obtained from the testing as outlined in the Standards is not necessarily intrinsic to the tested
material but may be used for assessing the risk for explosions and fires together with local
conditions and sizing of explosion vents.
The moisture of the samples to be tested shall not exceed 5 % in order to avoid a substantial
influence from the moisture on the results.
4.1 Minimum Auto-Ignition Temperature in Dust Cloud - TC (ASTM E1491-06)
The general principle of this testing is to have dust disbursed in to a cloud and expose the
cloud to radiated heat. The minimum auto-ignition temperature is defined as the temperature
at which the cloud ignites. The detailed requirement to achieve reproducible results is found in
the ASTM E1491 Standard. There are several apparatuses recommended in the Standard as
illustrated below (courtesy ASTM E1491-06 Standard).
The Godbert-Greenwald
apparatus (see schematic to the
right) was used for the testing
of material from British
Columbia and Nova Scotia in
August 2008. The Pyrex tube
has a volume of 0.27 Liter
(diameter 3.8 cm and length
30.5 cm) and is feed from the
top with a predetermined
amount of dust cascading down,
injected by an air bust from the
exit at the bottom is an
furnace temperature is measured with type N
thermocouples.
The apparatus on the right called BAM is defined
by Bundesanstalt fr Materialforschung und
Prfung. A predetermined amount of dust is fed
horizontally in to the oven from the right and
dispersed by the deflection surface inside the oven
with the flame exiting on the left hand side upon
ignition.

top. A flame observed at the

indication of ignition. The

295

The apparatus on the right is defined by the US Bureau of

Mines with a volume of 1.2 Liter is fed from the bottom.
When the dust ignites the burst diaphragm at the top will
break and a flame will appear at the top.

The different methods produce results within 5

% with an increasing variance for materials with
higher minimum temperature. A typical result
from testing a material is illustrated in the graph
to the right. Obviously, the concentration of
particulates in the cloud is an important variable.

4.1 Minimum Ignition Energy in Dust Cloud MIE (ASTM E2019-03)

The general principle with this test is to estimate the energy required to ignite a dust cloud by
means of an electrical discharge. Since the ignition of the dust is dependent on the
concentration of the dust, dust-air turbulence and the discharge energy the test is iterative to
find the least concentration in combination with the least energy in the discharge spark. A
typical apparatus consists of a chamber, spark electrodes and a spark generation circuit. The
idea is to create a non-turbulent dust-air mixture with a known dust concentration by means of
a delayed discharge after the dust has been injected into the chamber from the bottom. A 1.2
or 0.5 Liter Hartmann tube may be used as a chamber. The spark gap shall be 2-6 mm and a
gap resistance of 1012 is required for a minimum ignition energy (MIE) of 1 mJ and 1010
for an MIE of 100 mJ and the discharge voltage is several thousand volts (see ASTM Standard
for further details). The apparatus discussed in Section 4.2 may also be used for this test.

296

(Courtesy Adolf Khner AG)

(Courtesy Physikalische-Technishe Bundesanstalt PTB)

Electrostatic discharge from person to a metal surface during summertime is typically 20 mJ

and about 60-80 mJ during wintertime when the humidity in the surrounding air is lower.
The relation between product moisture and
MIE is illustrated in the diagram on the right
hand side.

4.2 Maximum Explosion Pressure (Pmax), Pressure Rate (dP/dtmax) and Deflagration
Index (Kst) in Dust Cloud (ASTM E1226-05)
The general principle is to test the severity of explosions in a dust-air mixture in a closed
spherical chamber with a volume of 20 Liter. The maximum pressure and the maximum rate
of pressure rise are measured. The most common apparatus used is the spherical 20 Liter
Siwek explosion chamber as depicted below.

297

(Courtesy Adolf Khner AG)

The Pressure is measured in bar (usually called bar-g meaning gauge reading) and designated
Pmax, the Pressure Rate in bar/second dP/dtmax and the Deflagration Index KSt in bar.m/s
measured at maximum dust concentration. The KSt is extracted from the following formula
normalized to 1.0 m3:
where P is pressure in bar
t is time in seconds
V is Volume in m3
Kst is bar meter per second

The results of the testing is very much dependent upon the concentration of dust, particle size,
turbulence in the chamber, geometry of the vessel, energy dissipated by the ignition source,
homogeneity of the air/dust mixture, initial pressure and initial temperature. The following
diagrams illustrate typical recordings of explosions with the single explosion data on the left
hand side and the iterative data on the right hand side as a function of dust concentration.

298

(Courtesy ASTM E1226-05 Standard)

In case of mild deflagration of less than 150 bar/s the pressure curve for the ignitor may
impact the interpretation of the result. As an example, with an ignitor energy of 10,000 J the
pressure tangent for the dust under test may be drawn after 50 ms to minimize the effect of the
ignitor as illustrated in the diagram below (Courtesy ASTM E1226-05 Standard).

The KSt is the basis for Dust Explosibility Classification in the following three ranges;
Dust Explosibility Class
St 1
St 2
St 3

Kmax [ bar.m/s ]
>0 - 200
201 - 300
>300

299

The value obtained from the Siwek apparatus is normalized to 1 m3 by using a formula in
order to be compatible with the nomograms in NFPA 68 Standard for sizing of deflagration
vents. The calibration of the values between the ISO chamber and the Siwek chamber are
made by means of explosibility of certain well known compounds such as Lycopodium Spores
and Pittsburgh Seam Bituminous Coal Dust with a maximum variance of 20 %.
In case the deflagration is difficult to achieve in a 20 Liter chamber using a 5,000 or a 10,000 J
ignitor, it is recommended that a 1 m3 chamber is used as specified in the ISO 6184/1 Standard
using a 10,000 J ignitor.
4.3 Minimum Explosible Concentration in Dust Cloud MEC (ASTM E1515-07)
The Minimum Explosible Concentration (MEC) is also referred to as Lower Explosibility
Limit (LEL) or Lean Flammability Limit (LFL). Data from this test provides a relative
measure of the minimum concentration of well dispersed dust capable of propagating a
deflagration. The Siwek apparatus as described in Section 4.2 is used for the MEC testing. A
less common alternative is a chamber specified by US Bureau of Mines may be used as
illustrated below.

(Courtesy ASTM E1515-07 Standard)

Attention has to be given when dust with low explosibility limit is tested to make sure the
pressure from the ignitor is not confused with the pressure generated by the dust explosion.
The following diagrams illustrate the pressure recording for a weak and a moderate dust
deflagration.

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4.4 Limiting Oxygen Concentration in Dust Cloud LOC (ASTM E1515 mod.)
The general principle of this test is similar to the MEC described above using the same
equipment with a slight modification to the procedure of operating the unit. The oxygen
concentration in the chamber is successively adjusted by injection of nitrogen and the pressure
prior to injection of dust is lowered to -0.6 bar. The pneumatic injection of dust brings the
pressure up to 1 bar followed by the ignition. The lowest value of oxygen is reached close to
the lowest cloud density.
4.5 Hot Surface Ignition Temperature of Dust Layers TS (ASTM E2021-06)
The general principle for this test is to establish the temperature at which a layer of dust with a
certain thickness will ignite or self-heat when residing on a hot surface. The test is conducted
by placing a ring of metal with a diameter of 100 mm and a certain depth on a hot plate and
the ring is filled with dust. The temperature of the hot plate is set at different temperatures and
the temperature within the dust layer is measured with a thermo-couple. The depth of the ring
may be selected to mimic realistic thicknesses found in the area of concern in a location where
dust accumulates. In the case of the testing reported in this document a ring with a depth of 5
and 19 mm respectively were used. The test setup is depicted below.

301

(Courtesy ASTM E2021-06 Standard)

Ignition is deemed to have occurs if within a 60 minute
period the sample temperature rises to 50 oC, or more above the hot plate temperature, or a red
glow or a flame is observed in the sample. The following diagram illustrates the definition of
ignition at +290 oC but not at +280 oC.

(Courtesy ASTM E2021-06 Standard)

The ignition temperature for other thickness of dust layers can be estimated using
extrapolation or interpolation based on a minimum of two experimental numbers using a linear
relationship within a certain constraint.
This method of measuring the ignition temperature is assuming no or very little movement of
air in the immediate vicinity of the sample. The method outlined in Section 4.6 on the other
hand is based on a steady flow of air in the space immediately surrounding the sample.
4.6 Auto-ignition Temperature in Dust Layer TL (Bureau of Mines RI 5624)
The general principle for this test is to establish the temperature at which a layer of dust with a
certain thickness will ignite or self-heat when residing on a hot surface. The test is conducted

302

by placing a sample basket (2.54 cm in diameter) in the center of a vertical tube furnace with a
diameter of 3.6 cm and a length of 22.9 cm as illustrated below.

(Courtesy Kidde-Fenwal)
The furnace temperature as well as the sample temperatures are measured by thermo-couples
and a steady flow of air at a rate of 1.3 Standard Liter per minute is fed from below to make
sure the sample has sufficient supply of oxygen at all times.
This method is less accurate than the method presented in Section 4.5. The minimum ignition
temperature is considered reached if the sample temperature reaches 25 oC above the
temperature of the furnace within 5 minutes, or 50 oC without time restriction. The reporting
criteria for Auto-ignition Temperature is defined as follows;
The minimum ignition temperature of a dust layer is the temperature which causes ignition
after approximately 5 minutes (25 oC above furnace temperature) or, the average of the
lowest temperature which causes ignition in less then 30 minutes and the highest
temperature which fails to cause ignition in 30 minutes.
4.7 Safety Classification (29 CFR 1910.307)
The US Code of Federal Regulations 29 CFR 1910.307 stipulate certain standards for
equipment located in locations where hazardous dusts are present under normal operating
conditions. The US National Fire Prevention Association guidelines NFPA 70 National
Electrical Code defines the conditions in more detail. The US National Materials Advisory
Board NMAB 353-3-80 Classification of Combustible Dusts in Accordance with the National
Electrical Code defines dusts having Ignition Sensitivity (IS) greater than or equal to 0.2, or
Explosion Severity (ES) greater than or equal to 0.5 to be appreciable explosion hazards
requiring electrical equipment suitable for Class II locations.
Explosion Severity (ES) =
where

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- subscript 1 refers to Pittsburgh seam bituminous coal dust (3,110 bar2/s)

- subscript 2 refers to the dust under evaluation
The data obtained from testing dust cloud from white pellets manufactured in BC and dust
from bark pellets manufactured in Nova Scotia forming the base for Table 4.0 is summarized
in the following Table 4.7.

Parameter
Pmax
Rmax
Pmax x Rmax
ES
Dust Classification

Measure
bar - g
bar/s
bar2/s

Table 4.7
White Pellets Dust
8.1
537
4,350
1.40
Class II combustible

Bark Pellets Dust

8.4
595
4,998
1.61
Class II combustible

Dust Classification Criteria according to the OSHA Directive CPL 03-00-06 is defined as
follows;
Test Results
ES > 0.5
ES < 0.4
0.4 < ES < 0.5
Pmax < 1 bar

Dust Classification
Class II combustible
Not Class II combustible
Combustible but not Class II
Not combustible

Concluding from the test data, installations exposed to the white pellet dust as well as the bark
pellet dust require equipment classified as Class II compatible. In daily language, such dust is
often called Class II dust although the classification refers to the equipment.
5. Flammability (UN Test N.1 Class 4 Division 4.1 Substances)
The objective of the test is to establish if the material under test shall be classified as
flammable or not under the criteria stipulated by the Standard. A material burning a distance
of 200 mm in 2 minutes or less, is classified as flammable. The flammability or burning rate of
dust is investigated using an elongated mould 250 mm long with a triangular cross section
with an inner height of 10 mm and width of 20 mm as depicted in the schematic below.

304

(Courtesy UN Manual of Tests and Criteria, rev. 3, 2000)

The mould is loosely filled with dust and the top of the mould is leveled off by a ruler. The
material in one end of the mould is heated by a torch until it ignites and the time for burning to
the opposite end of the mould is clocked. If less than 2 minutes the material is considered
flammable. If the opposite end of the mould is not reached within 2 minutes the material is
considered not flammable. The results of the tests conducted on dust as received as well as
sieved with mesh 230 (<63 m) are summarized in the following Table 5.0.
Table 5.0 Burning Rate of Dust from Pellets
Material
Burning Rate
White Pellet Dust as received
20 mm/2 min
Bark Pellet Dust Received
22mm/2 min
Obviously the two types of dust tested are not classified as flammable as it relates to the UN
MTC criteria. Classification of flammability is relevant for packaging requirement during
transportation and is regulated by for example 49 Code of Federal Regulation.
6. Pyrophorocity (UN Test N.4 Class 4 Division 4.2 Substances)
The ability of the material to ignite on contact with air is tested by exposure to air and
determining the time to ignition. One or two ml of the powdery substance to be tested should
be poured from about 1 m onto a non-combustible surface and it is observed whether the
substance ignites during dropping or within 5 minutes of settling. This test is primarily of
interest for metallic materials. No pyrophoric reaction was observed for the materials tested.
Obviously, the two types of dust tested are not classified as pyrophoric as it relates to the UN
MTC criteria.
Classification of pyrophorocity is relevant for packaging requirement during transportation
and is regulated by for example 49 Code of Federal Regulation.

305

WORKSAFEBC
INFORMATION

306

Combustible Dust Strategy Phase 1 (Sawmills)

(Handout)

307

Combustible Dust
Strategy Phase I
(Sawmills)

308

Table of Contents
Reference Material ............................................................................................................... 4
OHSR Guideline G5.81 Combustible Dust Sawmill facilities ..................................... 4
Regulatory excerpts ...................................................................................................4
Section 5.81 of the OHS Regulation ("Regulation") ............................................. 4
Combustible dust .......................................................................................... 4
Section 5.71 of the Regulation ............................................................................ 4
Flammable air contaminants ......................................................................... 4
Section 115 of the Workers Compensation Act ("Act") ........................................ 4
General duties of employers.......................................................................... 4
Section 3.5 of the Regulation .............................................................................. 5
General requirement ..................................................................................... 5
Introduction ................................................................................................................5
Ventilation for flammable air contaminants ................................................................5
Combustible dust program .........................................................................................5
Hazard mitigation ................................................................................................ 5
Facility risk assessment ...................................................................................... 6
Written combustible dust control program ........................................................... 7
Communication of program, including training ............................................... 8
Further resources ......................................................................................................9
OHSR Guideline G4.42 Cleaning with Compressed air Hazards of Combustible Dusts
......................................................................................................................................10
Regulatory excerpt...................................................................................................10
Purpose of guideline ................................................................................................10
Discussion ...............................................................................................................10
Managing combustible dusts ...................................................................................10
OHSR Guideline G5.71(3) Location and Construction of Dust Collectors ...................12
Regulatory excerpt...................................................................................................12
Purpose of guideline ................................................................................................12
Background .............................................................................................................12
What is a "dust collector having an internal volume greater than 0.6 m3 (20 cu.
feet)?" ................................................................................................................13
What is a combustible dust? ..............................................................................13
What is a dust explosion? ..................................................................................14
Location and construction of dust collectors .......................................................15

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Location of a dust collector...........................................................................15

Construction of a dust collector ....................................................................16
Explosion relief venting and suppression ...........................................................17
Definitions .....................................................................................................................18
Areas of Dust Build Up ..................................................................................................21
Ignition Sources.............................................................................................................22
Additional information on possible ignition sources ..................................................23
Dust Handling Systems .................................................................................................24
Types of Equipment Used in Dust Handling.............................................................24
Dust Collectors ..................................................................................................25
Silos and Hoppers ...................................................................................................25
Enclosed spaces and ducts .....................................................................................25
Cutting operations WorkSafeBC Officer comments...............................................26
Clean-up of Hazardous Combustible Dust.....................................................................27
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) .............................................................................28
Other Regulations to Consider.................................................................................32

Issued: April 2012

Combustible Dust Strategy Phase I (Sawmills)

Reference Material

310

Reference Material
OHSR Guideline G5.81 Combustible Dust Sawmill
facilities
Issued April 25, 2012; Editorial Revision May 1, 2012

Regulatory excerpts

Section 5.81 of the OHS Regulation ("Regulation")

Combustible dust
If combustible dust collects in a building or structure or on machinery or equipment, it must
be safely removed before accumulation of the dust could cause a fire or explosion.

Section 5.71 of the Regulation

Flammable air contaminants
(1) If an operation or work process produces a combustible or flammable air contaminant in
concentrations that may present a risk of fire or explosion, the employer must provide a
separate exhaust ventilation system for the operation or work process.
(2) Electrical components of an exhaust ventilation system required by subsection (1) must
comply with Class I Division I requirements of CSA Standard C22.1-94, Canadian
Electrical Code, Part 1 if the components contact the air stream.
(3) A dust collector having an internal volume greater than 0.6 m3 (20 ft3) and being used to
control combustible dusts must be located and constructed so that no worker will be
endangered in the event of an explosion inside the collector.

Section 115 of the Workers Compensation Act ("Act")

General duties of employers
(1) Every employer must
(a) ensure the health and safety of
(i) all workers working for that employer, and
(ii) any other workers present at a workplace at which that employer's work is being
carried out, and
(b) comply with this Part, the regulations and any applicable orders.

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(2) Without limiting subsection (1), an employer must

(a) remedy any workplace conditions that are hazardous to the health or safety of the
employer's workers.

Section 3.5 of the Regulation

General requirement
Every employer must ensure that regular inspections are made of all workplaces, including
buildings, structures, grounds, excavations, tools, equipment, machinery and work methods
and practices, at intervals that will prevent the development of unsafe working conditions.

Introduction
Combustible dusts are fine particles that present an explosion hazard when suspended in
air under certain conditions. A dust explosion can cause catastrophic loss of life, injuries,
and destruction of buildings. In many cases, employers and workers may be unaware of the
potential for dust explosions, or fail to recognize the serious nature of dust explosion
hazards.
This guideline provides information about the mitigation of hazards associated with
combustible dusts, including the conduct of risk assessments, development of a dust control
program and training of workers at workplaces. The focus of the guideline is on combustible
dusts at sawmills and related facilities.

Ventilation for flammable air contaminants

Section 5.71 of the Regulation provides requirements for exhaust ventilation systems and
dust collection where operations or work processes present a risk of fire or explosion. Refer
to G5.71(3) Location and construction of dust collectors for guidance on locating and
constructing dust collectors used to control combustible dusts so that workers will not be
endangered in the event of an explosion inside the collector.

Combustible dust program

Hazard mitigation
Hazard mitigation strategies for combustible dust at sawmills should include the following
elements discussed in more detail herein:

Facility risk assessment

Written combustible dust control program
Implementation of program, including training

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Facility risk assessment

The factors that should be identified and included in assessing the potential for dust
fires/explosions include the following:

Materials that can be combustible when finely divided

Consideration of the physical properties of dust including, moisture content, particle size
and combustibility
Processes which use, consume, or produce combustible dusts
Open areas where combustible dusts may build up
Hidden or enclosed areas where combustible dusts may accumulate
Means by which dust may be dispersed in the air
Potential ignition sources such as, hot work locations, friction points, electrical
equipment, static charges, and confinement areas
Mechanisms of dispersion of air including, discharge from saws, equipment vibration,
compressed air use
Areas with risk of secondary deflagration (adjacent dust is dispersed by initial
combustion and creates conditions for rapid propagation).

313

Written combustible dust control program

The combustible dust program should be in writing and include the following elements:
ELEMENT

List of all combustible dust sources,

locations and control equipment
Engineering controls including,

Housekeeping inspection schedules and

procedures for preventative maintenance
including inspection of

NOTES

Description of dust clean-up program

including methods of removal such as,
The criteria or thresholds that have been
established
Specific safe work procedures including,

Third party inspections (e.g., insurance

inspections and findings)

Local exhaust ventilation, use of

appropriate electrical equipment,
grounding of material conveyance
systems, and misting systems
Equipment that may act as an ignition
source (produces heat or sparks if not
properly maintained)
Elevated horizontal surfaces such as
machine tops
Beams, joists, purlins, ducts, pipes and
cable trays
Vertical surfaces (walls, etc.)
Hidden areas
On the surface of, and within electrical
equipment (e.g., motor control cabinets)
Vacuums, compressed air, water,
specialized tools
As a guide, limit surface to accumulation
of 1/8 inch or less
Hot permit program, smoking control and
emergency preparedness, equipment deenergized during clean-up activities

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Implementation of program, including training

The training of workers must include making workers aware of all known or reasonably
foreseeable hazards to which they are likely to be exposed, and making workers aware of
their rights and responsibilities under the WCA and the Regulation. The dust control
program should be communicated to all workers and include training on the program
elements, including hazard awareness, specific safe work procedures, hazcom
documentation and emergency preparedness.

315

Further resources
RESOURCE

LINK

NFPA 664 Standard for the Prevention of

Fires and Explosions in Wood Processing
and Woodworking Facilities (2007)

http://www.nfpa.org/

OSHA - Combustible Dust National

Emphasis Program

http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.s
how_document?p_table=directives&p_id=38
30

Combustible Dust: An Insidious Hazard

(video)

http://www.csb.gov/videoroom/detail.aspx?vi
d=30&F=0&CID=1&pg=1&F_All=y

316

OHSR Guideline G4.42 Cleaning with Compressed air

Hazards of Combustible Dusts
Regulatory excerpt
The OHS Regulation states:
4.42 (1) Compressed air or steam must not be used for blowing dust, chips, or other
substances from equipment, materials and structures if any person could be exposed
to the jet, or to the material it expels or propels and an injury or health hazard due to
fire, explosion or other cause is likely to result.

Purpose of guideline
This guideline is intended to set out the circumstances under which cleaning equipment or
work areas with compressed air is permitted, and the controls that need to be put in place in
order to ensure that cleaning with compressed air does not create a hazard due to fire,
explosion or other cause.

Discussion
Cleaning equipment with compressed air provides a convenient and effective way of
removing small particulate matter from inaccessible areas in and around equipment and
other contained work areas.
Cleaning with compressed air, however, can release combustible dusts into the air, creating
an explosion hazard. Combustible dusts are fine particles that present an explosion or fire
hazard when suspended in air under certain conditions. A dust explosion can cause
catastrophic loss of life, injuries, and destruction of buildings.
While cleaning with compressed air can present serious risks if done incautiously, the OHS
Regulation does permit it, provided it is done in a way that does not create an explosion or
fire hazard. Cleaning with compressed air should be minimized, however, and should only
be done where other methods of cleaning are not practicable.

Managing combustible dusts

Combustible dust explosions occur when dusts are dispersed into the air in concentration
and come into contact with an ignition source, including potential static charge dissipation of
the dust cloud. Cleaning with compressed air must be done in a way that ensures that these
risk elements are controlled. Cleaning must occur in a way that minimizes the amount of
dust that is dispersed into the air, does not allow dusts to spread, and ensures that dusts do
not come into contact with any potential source of ignition. Prior to undertaking cleaning with
compressed air, employers should consider the nature of the dust created by the work
process and its combustibility.

317

Necessary controls include:

1. Minimizing dust

The work area, equipment and other areas near the cleanup area (e.g. floors,
sills and other surfaces) should be swept and/or vacuumed prior to cleaning, and
dust removed from the cleanup area as much as possible

2. Minimizing dispersion

Cleaning with compressed air should only occur in localized or isolated areas;
cleaning of a number of work areas should occur in stages
Where practicable, the area should be washed with water or a water mist should
be applied
Compressed air pressure must be kept as low as practicable to complete the
cleaning. NFPA Standard 664 Standard for the Prevention of Fires and
Explosions in Wood Processing and Woodworking Facilities sets out a maximum
of 15 psi for the use of compressed air for blowing down equipment
Compressed air must not be used to consolidate dust into piles or clean open
areas
Care must be taken to ensure that the compressed air stream does not contact a
dust deposit containing a smoldering nest, which occurs when a dust deposit or
layer rests on a heated surface. Dust in a deposit that has not yet burnt can form
an explosible dust cloud.

3. Eliminating Sources of Ignition

Machinery and equipment in recent operation must be allowed to cool prior to

blowdown, and other hot surfaces must be identified and cooled or removed
Electrical equipment in the area must be de-energized and locked out,
Sources of open flame, sparks or static discharge must be identified and
eliminated

4. Emergency Response

Fire protection equipment must be readily available and in service.

The NFPA Standard 654 Standard for the Prevention of Fire and Dust Explosions form the
Manufacturing, Processing, and Handling of Combustible Particulate Solids provides more
information on managing combustible dusts in all phases of the manufacturing, processing,
blending, pneumatic conveying, repackaging and handling of combustible particulate solids
or hybrid mixtures, and also provides more detail on cleaning with compressed air.

318

OHSR Guideline G5.71(3) Location and Construction

of Dust Collectors
Issued April 27, 2010

Regulatory excerpt
Subsection 5.71(3) of the OHS Regulation ("Regulation") states:
A dust collector having an internal volume greater than 0.6 m3 (20 ft3) and being
used to control combustible dusts must be located and constructed so that no worker
will be endangered in the event of an explosion inside the collector.

Purpose of guideline
This guideline explains terms used in Regulation subsection 5.71(3) and provides guidance
for locating and constructing dust collectors used to control combustible dusts so that
workers will not be endangered in the event of an explosion inside the collector.

Background
WorkSafeBC considers the relevant National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) standards
to provide acceptable guidance with respect to combustible dust collectors. There are a
series of NFPA standards that are relevant to the control of fire and explosion hazards from
combustible dusts and an employer should review the standard(s) relevant to the application
in question. Information in this guideline references mainly the following NFPA standards,
which are available for review online at http://www.nfpa.org/.

NFPA 61 Standard for the Prevention of Fires and Dust Explosions in Agricultural and
Food Processing Facilities (2008)
NFPA 484 Standard for Combustible Metals (2009)
NFPA 654 Standard for the Prevention of Fire and Dust Explosions from the
Manufacturing, Processing, and Handling of Combustible Particulate Solids (2006)
NFPA 655 Standard for Prevention of Sulfur Fires and Explosions (2007)
NFPA 664 Standard for the Prevention of Fires and Explosions in Wood Processing and
Woodworking Facilities (2007)

In addition, there are specifications in the BC Building Code (e.g., edition 2006, articles
3.3.1.20 and 6.2.2), BC Electrical Code Regulation (2009) - Chapter 18, and the BC Fire
Code, (e.g., edition 2006 article 5.3) with respect to protection from fires and explosions of
combustible dust.
Employers should not rely solely on the generic information in this guideline to minimize
hazards that could lead to a dust explosion. The entire relevant standard(s) or code(s)
should be consulted for complete information.

319

What is a "dust collector having an internal volume greater than 0.6 m3

(20 cu. feet)?"
A dust collector is one component of a dust collection system. The collection system is a
pneumatic conveying system that is specifically designed to capture dust at the point of
generation, sometimes from multiple pieces of equipment, and convey the particulate to a
point of collection. The system includes the collection hood, conveyance ducting, and
flexible hoses, exhaust fan, motor, and dust collector. The dust collector, also called an airmaterial separator, is a device used to separate the particulate material from the air stream,
and includes but is not limited to cyclones, baghouse and media-type filter collectors, wettype collectors, electrostatic precipitators, and enclosureless units.
A cyclone is defined in NFPA 664 as a cylindrical type of dust collector used to separate
particulate from the air stream by centrifugal force, having an enclosure of circular crosssection, a tangential air and material inlet, an air exhaust outlet, and a material discharge. In
order to determine whether subsection 5.71(3) is applicable, the internal volume of the dust
collector needs to be determined. The internal volume of a cyclone is considered to be the
volume of the collector from the tangential inlet through the cylindrical and conical area, and
includes the chute and dust container that holds the captured dust.
A baghouse dust collector is an air-material separator designed and used to remove dust
from the transport air through a filter medium of suspended bags that are contained within
an enclosure. The internal volume is considered to be the total volume inside the enclosure
from the entrance point of the air-particle mixture, and includes the volume of the container
designed to hold the captured dust.
NFPA 664 defines an enclosureless dust collector as an air-material separator where
filtration is accomplished by passing dust-laden air through filter media, collecting the dust
on the inside of the filter media and allowing cleaned air to exit to the surrounding area
(Note: See also Regulation section 5.70 and guideline G5.70 for information about
requirements for discharged air). The filter medium is not enclosed, is hand shaken and is
under positive pressure during use. Removal of the collected dust is not continuous or
mechanical. The internal volume of an enclosureless dust collector is considered to be the
air volume inside all the bags plus the air volume of the container designed to hold the
captured dust.
If the manufacturer's specifications for a dust collector do not include the internal volume of
the dust collector, this volume can be calculated from measurements of height and area.

What is a combustible dust?

NFPA 654 defines combustible dust as a combustible particulate solid that presents a fire or
deflagration* hazard when suspended in air or some other oxidizing medium over a range of
concentrations, regardless of particle size or shape. This definition replaces a previous
definition that required the particles to be, on average, less than 420 micron (0.017 inch)
diameter (capable of passing through a U.S. No. 40 Standard Sieve). The newer definition
applies more broadly to include elongated particles such as paper dust and some
agglomerates, for which particle diameter is not a useful concept.

320

*NFPA Standards and this guideline use the term "deflagration." Deflagration is the
propagation of a pressure wave (at a speed less than the speed of sound) from the ignition
of a combustible dust, and includes both fires and explosions. An explosion can occur if the
deflagration occurs in an enclosed space such as a dust collector, duct, or building.
Not all dusts are combustible. For example, substances that are stable inorganic oxides
(e.g., silicates, sulphates, phosphates, and carbonates) are not combustible. Therefore dust
clouds of Portland cement, sand, limestone, etc. are not combustible.
Materials that are combustible and that can give rise to dust explosions include, but are not
limited to

Food products (e.g., grain, cellulose, powdered milk, sugar, flour, starch, etc.)
Natural organic materials (e.g., wood dust, wood flour, textiles such as cotton dust and
nylon dust, biosolids, etc.)
Synthetic organic materials (plastics such as phenolics and polypropylene, resins such
as lacquer and phenol-formaldehyde, organic pigments, pharmaceuticals, pesticides,
etc.)
Coal and peat
Metals (e.g., aluminum, magnesium, zinc, iron, etc.)

Combustible dusts have varying limits of flammability. These are usually expressed in terms
of grams per cubic metre. For example, aluminum dust may be listed as requiring an
airborne concentration of 30 grams per cubic metre for a combustible atmosphere to exist
whereas coal dust may require 60 grams per cubic metre. A layer of dust as thin as a dime
dispersed throughout a room can create an explosion hazard.
NFPA 499 Recommended Practice for the Classification of Combustible Dusts and of
Hazardous (Classified) Locations for Electrical Installations in Chemical Process Areas
(2008) includes a table of selected combustible materials. This is not a comprehensive list
and a dust should be considered to be combustible unless it is known otherwise. For certain,
substances that are combustible as particulates should be considered as combustible dusts.
OSHA also publishes a list of substances for which there is a risk of combustible dust
explosion, at http://www.osha.gov/Publications/combustibledustposter.pdf.

What is a dust explosion?

A dust explosion/deflagration is essentially the very rapid combustion of a dust cloud or
suspension of dust in air, during which heat and pressure is generated at a very high rate.
The conditions necessary for an explosion are a sufficiently dense dust cloud of combustible
dust in an enclosed area, adequate oxygen/air to support combustion, and an ignition
source.
Dust explosions can be very destructive. Often there is a series of explosions in which the
primary explosion/deflagration is relatively small. The pressure from the primary explosion
can be intense enough to dislodge dust off walls, beams, ledges, machines, and other
surfaces. This dislodged dust then mixes with air, creating a much larger dust cloud which
can then be ignited and react explosively creating a secondary catastrophic explosion. This
secondary explosion/deflagration can be much larger than the primary explosion.

321

Location and construction of dust collectors

The guidance in this guideline is taken mainly from the five NFPA standards listed above in
the Background section. Information provided here represents some of the control measures
from the NFPA standards. In addition, NFPA 69 Standard on Explosion Prevention Systems
(2008) provides information on preventing and controlling deflagrations.
The NFPA standards also contain specifications not directly related to location or
construction of the dust collector (e.g., electrical protection, ventilation, control of ignition
sources, spark detection and arrest, isolation devices, ductwork, partitioning, preventing
dust accumulations on horizontal surfaces, sprinkler and other fire suppression systems,
relief venting, etc.). These specifications are not directly related to Regulation subsection
5.71(3) but many are related to other regulatory requirements. Employers should not rely
solely on the generic information in this guideline to minimize hazards leading to dust
explosions. The entire relevant standard(s) should be consulted for complete information.

Location of a dust collector

Regulation subsection 5.71(3) specifies that a dust collector used to control combustible
dust be located so that no worker will be endangered in the event of an explosion inside the
collector. Dust collectors used for collection of combustible dust are appropriately located
outdoors - this is usually the preferred location with respect to compliance with this section
of the Regulation. Under certain circumstances and conditions, it is acceptable to locate a
dust collector indoors. The relevant B.C. Codes and NFPA standard(s) should be consulted
for complete information on these circumstances and conditions, but some general guidance
is provided here.
The BC Fire Code (2006) specifies in Division B Section 5.3 that a dust collector having a
flow capacity greater than 0.5 m3/s be located outside of a building and be equipped with
explosion venting to the outdoors of not less than 0.1 m2 of vent area for each cubic metre
of dust collector enclosure volume.
The BC Fire Code allows a dust collector to be located inside a building if it is
a) Provided with explosion venting to the outdoors
b) Equipped with an automatic explosion venting system
c) Located in a room with fire separations having a fire-resistance rating of not less than 1
hr and provided with explosion venting to the outdoors
The BC Fire Code also requires, when exhausted air is returned to the building, that the
dust-collection system be designed so that the exhaust fan and ancillary equipment are
automatically shut down in the event of a fire or an explosion inside the dust collector.
Construction of a dust collector should also include isolation devices where ductwork
returning to a building from the dust collector can provide a path for a fireball and a pressure
wave to enter the building.
A number of NFPA standards also provide guidance for the location of a dust collector, and
this guidance is acceptable as long as it does not contradict British Columbia code

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requirements such as the BC Fire Code. For example, NFPA 61 Chapter 10 specifies
location criteria for dust collectors used in agriculture and food processing facilities,
including operations involving dry agricultural bulk materials and their by-products, and
dusts that include grains, oilseeds, agricultural seeds, legumes, sugar, flour, spices, feeds,
and other related materials. An outside location of the dust collector is required, with several
exceptions listed in the standard.
NFPA 484 describes specific dust collector location criteria for a number of combustible
metals and has specific chapters for control of combustible dust hazards from alkali metals,
aluminum, magnesium, niobium, tantalum, titanium, zirconium, and other combustible
metals.
NFPA 654 provides specifications for control of dust explosions from materials not
specifically addressed by another more specific NFPA standard. This standard specifies
that, where an explosion hazard exists, air-material separators be located outside of
buildings. The standard provides some exceptions to this specification in Chapter 7.
NFPA 655 provides general specifications for control of fires and explosions from processes
involving sulfur dust, and includes specific location criteria for the dust collector.
NFPA 664 provides specifications for selecting the location for a dust collector in wood
processing and woodworking facilities. Outdoor locations are recommended. The standard
recommends that dust collectors not be located on the roof of a building. Indoor locations
are permitted by the standard under special circumstances, which are listed in the standard
for enclosed and enclosureless dust collectors.

Construction of a dust collector

Dust collectors used for combustible dust need to be designed and constructed entirely of
non-combustible material suitable for the use intended (Note: the use of aluminum paint on
the inside of a metal dust collector increases the fire hazard and should be avoided. If the
aluminum flakes off or is struck by a foreign object, the heat of impact could be sufficient to
cause ignition of the aluminum particle, thereby initiating a fire). However, filter bags and
explosion vent panels fabricated from combustible material are acceptable. Dust collectors
need to be constructed to prevent leakage of dust into the rest of the workplace and to
minimize internal ledges or other points of dust accumulation (e.g., hopper bottoms should
be sloped; surfaces and seams should be smooth). This is important since an accumulation
of as little as 0.8 mm (1/32 inch) thick of combustible dust on horizontal surfaces (both inside
and outside the dust collector) may lead to a secondary and more damaging explosion
following any primary explosion. Dust collectors need to have independent supporting
structures capable of supporting the weight of the collector, the material being collected, and
any water from extinguishing systems that will not readily drain from the system.
NFPA 61 Chapter 10 specifies criteria for construction of a dust collector used for
agricultural and food processing operations.
NFPA 484 describes construction criteria for dust collection in metal operations.
NFPA 655 provides general specifications for control of fires and explosions from processes
involving sulfur dust, and includes specific construction criteria.

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NFPA 664 describes location and construction criteria for wood processing and
woodworking facilities (see especially section 8.2).

Explosion relief venting and suppression

Explosion relief vents are panels or doors that are deliberate points of weakness. If they are
of the correct size and construction, and properly positioned, they can help to safely vent an
explosion in a dust collector so that workers are not endangered. These relief vents should
be designed and constructed by experts. NFPA 68 Standard on Explosion Protection by
Deflagration Venting (2007) addresses the design, location, installation, maintenance, and
use of devices and systems that vent the combustion gases and pressures resulting from a
deflagration within an enclosure. The standard specifies that deflagration venting be
arranged to avoid injury from the vent discharge and that the material discharged from an
enclosure during the venting of a deflagration be directed outside to a safe location.
NFPA 654 includes information on deflagration venting, suppression systems, mechanical
and chemical isolation systems, flame front diverters, and abort gates to lower the risk to
workers in the event of

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Definitions
Class II locations. Class II locations are those that are hazardous because of the presence
of combustible dust.
The following are Class II locations where the combustible dust atmospheres are present:
LOCATION

DESCRIPTION

Group E

Atmospheres containing combustible metal

dusts, including aluminum, magnesium, and
their commercial alloys, and other
combustible dusts whose particle size,
abrasiveness, and conductivity present
similar hazards in the use of electrical
equipment.

Group F

Atmospheres containing combustible

carbonaceous dusts that have more than 8
percent total entrapped volatiles (see ASTM
D 3175, Standard Test Method for Volatile
Matter in the Analysis Sample of Coal and
Coke, for coal and coke dusts) or that have
been sensitized by other materials so that
they present an explosion hazard. Coal,
carbon black, charcoal, and coke dusts are
examples of carbonaceous dusts.

Group G

Atmospheres containing other combustible

dusts, including flour, grain, wood flour,
plastic and chemicals.

The following is a partial listing of definitions based on NFPA standards and 29 CFR
1910.399, the definitions provision of Subpart SElectrical, that relate to combustible dust.
TERM
Combustible dust

DEFINITION
A combustible particulate solid that presents a fire or
deflagration hazard when suspended in air or some other
oxidizing medium over a range of concentrations,
regardless of particle size or shape.

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TERM

DEFINITION

Combustible Particulate Solid

Any combustible solid material composed of distinct

particles or pieces, regardless of size, shape, or chemical
composition.

Hybrid Mixture

A mixture of a flammable gas with either a combustible

dust or a combustible mist.

Deflagration

Propagation of a combustion zone at a speed that is less

than the speed of sound in the unreacted medium.

Deflagration Isolation

A method employing equipment and procedures that

interrupts the propagation of a deflagration of a flame front,
past a predetermined point.

Deflagration Suppression

The technique of detecting and arresting combustion in a

confined space while the combustion is still in its incipient
stage, thus preventing the development of pressures that
could result in an explosion.

Detonation

Propagation of a combustion zone at a velocity that is

greater than the speed of sound in the unreacted medium.

Dust-ignition proof

Equipment enclosed in a manner that excludes dusts and

does not permit arcs, sparks, or heat otherwise generated
or liberated inside of the enclosure to cause ignition of
exterior accumulations or atmospheric suspensions of a
specified dust on or in the vicinity of the enclosure.

Dusttight

Enclosures constructed so that dust will not enter under

specified test conditions.

Explosion

The bursting or rupture of an enclosure or a container due

to the development of internal pressure from deflagration.

Lower Flammable Limit (LFL)

The lowest concentration of material that will propagate a

flame from an ignition source through a mixture of
flammable gas or combustible dust dispersion with a
gaseous oxidizer.

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TERM

DEFINITION

Upper Flammable Limit (UFL)

The highest concentration of a combustible substance in

an oxidizing medium that will propagate a flame.

Minimum Explosible
Concentration (MEC)

The minimum concentration of combustible dust

suspended in air, measured in mass per unit volume that
will support a deflagration.

Minimum Ignition Energy (MIE)

The lowest electrostatic spark energy that is capable of

igniting a dust cloud.

Minimum Ignition Temperature

(MIT)

The lowest temperature at which ignition occurs.

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Areas of Dust Build Up

The use of air wands for scheduled clean-up and clearing machinery quickly of debris during
routine or break down maintenance is probably the single largest contributor to the
accumulation of fine dust particles in a sawmill. Typically air lines used for clean-up are
simply tapped into main mill air lines that run at 80 to 120 PSI straight from the compressor.
It would be rare to see such a line equipped with a regulator to step down the pressure.
Materials coming from any of the process machines in a sawmill are generally a mix of large
chips and splints, coarse sawdust and shavings and a component of fine and very fine
sawdust. Any circular saw that cuts thick material such as cants can create a large amount
of fine sawdust mixed with the coarser sawdust. This is because some of the initial sawdust
contained in the gullet of the saw does not have enough time to fully exit the gullet before
the tooth re-enters the cut. Sawdust carried thru the cut is reduced further to finer sawdust.
Cross cutting perpendicular to the grain also creates very fine sawdust.
When high pressure air is used to clear machines or clean up accumulations of cutting
material, the heavier coarser material remains on or just above the floor and the employee is
able to direct the bulk of materials to a waste chute or other collection area by blowing down
with an air wand. Smaller particles are raised into the air and settle in a short time. Often
they are too large to cling to vertical or angular surfaces and fall back to the floor level. The
very fine dust is suspended in air and can remain that way for several minutes or longer.
This dust moves about throughout the mill and eventually settles in areas with little or no air
movement. This fine component of dust is generally the most volatile and accumulates over
time. When something disturbs this dust, it may create a dense mixture of very combustible
material suspended in air. Under the right conditions, this material can explode with
disastrous consequences.
Any horizontal surfaces and some vertical surfaces if the texture is rough such as plywood
walls and wooden beams will hold dust. Vertical corrugated sheeting can also hold wood
dust.
Roofs contained within the mill canopy such as lunch rooms, washrooms, offices, air
compressor rooms, maintenance shops etc. are generally out of the main operating areas
where there is minimal air flow and disturbance. Good areas for fine materials to settle. The
roofs of these structures collect sawdust over a long period which can be disturbed by the
shock wave of an initial explosion and introduce a huge amount of fuel into the atmosphere
very quickly. Because these surfaces are fairly high above the mill floor, they tend to
accumulate the finest sawdust that has floated up to that level due to normal mill processes
or as a result of clean up or maintenance personnel using air wands to clean up below.
Beams, piping and electrical trays are all potential dust traps and should be inspected for
obvious dust accumulations.
Trim saws, chippers, hoppers, chip screening rooms, canter lines and edgers generate
significant volumes of fine dust. Inspections of surfaces in the vicinity of these machines
should be a priority.

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Ignition Sources
The following chart is from the OSHA Combustible Dust Training Program (C-DuST) which
depicts possible ignition sources.

Static Electricity 9%
Smolder Spots 9%
Friction 9%

Fire 8%

Unknown 11.5%
Electrical
Equipment 3.5%
Other 2.5%

Hot Surfaces 6.5%

Self-Ignition 6%

Mechanical
Sparks 9%

Welding 5%

Additional information on possible ignition sources

A number of ignition sources are equipment and process related. A control program
should include inspection and maintenance to ensure potential ignition sources are
managed. Below are examples of items to consider
Motor control centers (MCC's). Potential sparks inside cabinets when various relays and
contacts are energized. When inspecting a mill, look for door panels that have inadvertently
been left open after resetting switches that have kicked out or other trouble shooting
activities associated with maintenance.
Inspection plates on electrical motors. The plates are not always replaced, this exposes
wiring to potential arcing if a metal object comes into contact. Inspect these areas to ensure
cover plates are in place and secure.

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Fixed guards on power transmission components. Often fixed guards around belt and
pulley assemblies are removed for various reasons and not replaced properly. Sometimes
they are not properly aligned with mounting points which can result in a belt or part of a
sheave or sprocket rubbing on the metal guard. Another issue with these type of guards is
deformation. If an object strikes and deforms the guard, it can push the mesh into the
moving parts resulting in friction. Inspect guards for clearance to moving parts and proper
installation. Also, lumber and other objects can fall onto unguarded power transmission
components and create friction.
V-belts. Worn or loose drive belts can slip on sheaves when a load is imposed on the drive
such as a jam up in a conveyor or a heavy load in the conveyor. Slipping belts create huge
friction and often burn right off the sheave. These should be regularly inspected and on
maintenance program
Hogs and chippers. Friction caused by sawdust build up or other materials pushing against
chipper discs and hog screens can ignite and cause fires. Dull chipper knives will not feed
material properly and will often heat up causing a fire. Inspect for general housekeeping,
proper maintenance ( knife changes at regular intervals) and evidence of heat. If a chipper
or hog catches on fire, it will fill the mill with smoke quickly.
Unprotected lighting. Old style filament bulbs and large, high intensity mercury / sodium
vapour bulbs are a potential ignition source if they are broken when struck by an object. This
type of lighting is more common in older mills and inspection should focus on cages or other
means of protecting an exposed bulb.
Extension cords and welding cables. Worn and abraded welding cables will arc when
they come into contact with steel. Extension chords should be GFCI or maintained in an
assured grounding program but can easily be cut when dragging to a location or through
conveyors where sharp surfaces exist. Inspect for obvious wear and stripped off insulation.
They should also be properly stored and not left laying strung out in the mill. A steel wheeled
cart crossing a cable could cut through and arc.

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Dust Handling Systems

The following information provides some examples of dust generating equipment in saw
mills have been associated with dust explosions.
The following information are excerpts summarized from the OSHA Dust Handling
Equipment presentation.

Types of Equipment Used in Dust Handling

There are several types of equipment, dust transportation systems and containers that are
used in the storage and handling of combustible dusts. The following are some of the types
of equipment used at combustible dust handling facilities:

Dust Collectors
Silos and Hoppers

Dust Collectors
Dust emitted from the handling and processing of combustible dusts is generally controlled
by dust collectors which include cyclone separators, electrostatic precipitators, Fabric filters,
(Baghouses) and wet scrubbers.
Dust emitted from handling and processing can be collected and controlled by the following
equipment.

Cyclone Separators- less susceptible to fires and explosions; proper grounding and
bonding critical to avoid static build-up
Electrostatic Precipitators- used where high collection efficiency is required, less likely to
see around sawmills.
Fabric Filters most common, presence of easily ignitable fine dust and high turbulence
Wet Scrubbers-usually do not pose a fire or explosion hazard because the particles are
wet. If the scrubbing liquid flow (water) is stopped there is an increased potential

Baghouses are composed of number of compartmented filter bags, and a bag cleaning
mechanism. These are enclosed in a shell and provided with a hopper to receive collected
dust. There are several types of baghouses; Shakers, reverse flow, pulse-jet, etc..
Locate baghouses outside see WorkSafeBC guideline G5.71 (3) for additional
information regarding explosion prevention in dust collectors.

331

Silos and Hoppers

Normally Silos (or bins) are very large vessels used for long term storage.
Fires and explosions can occur: from dust clouds generation from powders mechanically
conveyed or pneumatically conveyed into the hoppers or silos.
Prolonged storage can cause smoldering from self heating.
While Smoldering is still limited to a small portion of the interior of the pile, the detection of
the possibility of smoldering can be achieved by the use of thermal monitoring devices. This
can be achieved by: infrared system or by installing some type of temperature monitor
(thermistors) within the pile interior.

Silos and hoppers shall be located outside the buildings with some exceptions
Air cannons not to be used to break bridges in silos

Detection of smoldering fires in bunkers, silos and enclosed dust collectors can be achieved
with either CO or hydrocarbon vapor detector, or with infrared monitoring of silo wall
temperature. In the case of coal bunkers, NFPA 850 recommends alarming at
concentrations of 1.25%.

Pressure containment, inerting, and suppression systems can also be used protect
against explosions
Venting is the most widely used protection against explosions.

Enclosed spaces and ducts

Look for enclosed spaces around the machines where dust can accumulate.
To maintain a healthy duct system, make sure there is the correct air speed in the duct
system to prevent fallout of wood dust and avoid explosive dust-air mixtures. Also look for
clean out point/doors in the ductwork. They should be used to clean ducts in case they get
clogged.

332

Adequate air speed inside of the duct is 3,500 to 4,000 fpm to prevent dust settling.

Cutting operations
Cross cutting timber can produce very fine sawdust. The type of equipment normally used
for this includes trim saws, chop saws, finger jointers.
There are a few factors that relate to the production of fine sawdust in these processes.
Most significant is cutting perpendicular to the structure of the wood cells. This creates
shorter (finer) particles.
Trim saws and cut off saws generally have a higher tooth count than saws designed to rip
wood parallel to the grain due to cell orientation. Higher tooth count in the saw blades
results in a smaller bite per tooth. In addition, these saws are generally run at high speed to
produce a clean fine finish in the cut.
Chip screening rooms and trim block chippers - particularly in planer mills where trim ends
are often kiln dried also tend to generate a lot of fine sawdust.
Efforts to provide local exhaust ventilation on these saws should significantly reduce
accumulation of fine sawdust on adjacent surfaces.

333

Clean-up of Hazardous Combustible Dust

Wood dust is a combustible dust. If the dust is disturbed and a sufficient amount becomes
airborne and a source of ignition is present, then the dust may explode. Uncontrolled
cleaning activities may generate a dust cloud that could explode.
In order to clean safely, use cleaning methods that do not generate dust clouds, especially
in confined areas where ignition sources (flames, sparks, and static electricity) are present.
These cleaning methods would include:

Vacuuming, using a vacuum approved for dust collection

Water wash or wet rags (do not use water near live electrical equipment). First apply a
water mist and then increase the flow to a high velocity water stream. Be cautious not to
plug the drain piping.
Soft bristle brooms on telescopic poles (to clean high areas)
Compressed air pressure must be kept as low as practicable to complete the cleaning.
NFPA Standard 664 Standard for the Prevention of Fires and Explosions in Wood
Processing and Woodworking Facilities sets out a maximum of 15 psi for the use of
compressed air for blowing down equipment

Likely areas of dust accumulations may include:

Structural members
Conduit and pipe racks
Cable trays
Floors
Above the ceiling (if a suspended ceiling is present)
On and around dust collection equipment
The interior of a dust collector and ductwork

Horizontal and vertical surfaces should be cleaned (where dust could settle). Dust and wood
waste must be cleaned up at regular intervals:

At least once per shift, or

Sooner, if dust and wood waste accumulates quickly, or
Immediately, if dust spills from a machine or device (this information should be reported
to a supervisor or manager

Disposal of waste dust must be conducted safely.

The cleaned area should be inspected to ensure the cleaning is complete and any
deficiencies addressed. Tools and equipment for clean-up should be kept in a designated
area.
Workers cleaning up hazardous dust must wear personal protective equipment that includes
eye goggles and a respirator (elastomeric half-face respirator with P100 cartridges, as a
minimum).

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Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)

QUESTION

ANSWER

1. What is a combustible dust?

Any combustible material (and some

materials normally considered
noncombustible) can burn rapidly when in a
finely divided form. A combustible dust is
particulate solid that presents a fire or
deflagration hazard when suspended in air
over a range of concentrations, regardless of
particle size or shape. For wood dusts the
combustibility increases as the particle size
decreases and the moisture content is
reduced.

2. What is secondary deflagration?

Deflagration is a rapid propagation of

combustion. It occurs when the pressure
from an initial combustion event disturbs
other combustible dusts and causing a
mixture of dust air that readily supports the
propagation of the combustion. The
propagation can continue as long as there is
the fuel and air to support it. It is important
to keep in mind that the initiating source of
combustion may not be dust related.

3. Are all wood dusts and shavings a

problem?

No. The potential for explosion is based on

the characteristics and composition of the
material. While most wood wastes are a
combustible material, for an explosion to
occur the material must be easily dispersed
and suspended in air. The risk is with the
finer dry dust fractions which can settle out
on, or adhere to elevated surfaces.

4. Is there a maximum allowable airborne

concentration or combustible limit and
can it be measured?

Given the variable characteristics of wood

dusts in terms of species, particle size,
moisture content and combustibility
properties, minimal explosive concentrations
can vary dramatically. There is no
established standard for a maximum
concentration of combustible dust in air.
Explosive mixtures of dust in air occur at
fairly high concentrations that will be found

335

QUESTION

ANSWER
only in isolated locations or as a result of an
activity or event which creates this condition.
In addition, these conditions may exist only
for short instances. Therefore, the
measurement of an explosive concentration
is neither practicable nor reliable. The focus
should be on identifying and evaluating the
dust sources, sources of ignition and dust
dispersion mechanisms.

5. We have assessed dust exposure levels

for respiratory hazards and found them
to be acceptable. Are we okay?

Exposure monitoring is not representative of

potentially explosive conditions. As
mentioned above explosive mixtures of dust
in air occur at very high concentrations and
will be found only in isolated locations or as
a result of an activity or event which creates
this condition.

6. Are all wood dusts and shavings

explosive?

No. The potential for explosion is based on

the characteristics and composition of the
material. While most wood wastes are a
combustible material, for an explosion to
occur the material must be easily dispersed
and suspended in air. The risk is with the
finer dry dusts which can settle out on, or
adhere to elevated surfaces.

7. Should I focus on cleaning up the mill as

a first step?

The order was to conduct a risk assessment

and develop a control plan. It is very
important that the clean-up activities are
carefully planned and consider not only the
risks associated with the combustible dusts
but also the other risks such as working at
heights, safe access, confined space and the
need for protective equipment.

8. Is blow down of dusts prohibited?

Section 4.42 states that blowdown with

compressed air is prohibited where it is likely
to result in an injury or health hazard due to
fire or explosion or other cause. As a result,
blowdown is permitted where it is managed
adequately to ensure that the risk of fire or
explosion and any other risk of injury is
eliminated or minimized to the extent
practicable. Many mills use blow down to

336

QUESTION

ANSWER
clean machines and elevated areas that are
otherwise difficult to access. Employers
must ensure that specific written procedures
are put in place that minimize the use of
blowdown, and that eliminate the risks of fire
and explosion, by eliminating sources of
ignition and minimizing dust dispersion from
the process.
Reference the 4.42 guideline for more
information.

9. Where do we start on the risk

assessment and develop the control
plan?

A guideline has been established in relation

to OH&S 5.81. This guideline identifies a
number of items which need to be
considered when conducting the risk
assessment, and developing and
implementing the control plan. The guideline
focus is on identifying and controlling the
elements or conditions that are necessary to
support a dust explosion (fuel sources,
ignition sources, conditions and mechanisms
were the dust can be dispersed in air).
There are also links to additional resources
(NFPA and OSHA) provided with in this
Guideline.
Employers should be looking closely at their
processes including all product and waste
processing streams and work activities
including clean up and maintenance work
which could potentially create the conditions
necessary for a fire or explosions.

10. Does the risk assessment and dust

control program need to be
documented?

There is no explicit requirement for

documentation in the OH&S Regulation, but
the guideline calls for a written control
program. This is a complex issue and it is
extremely unlikely the employer could
demonstrate that an effective control
program is established and implemented
without documentation.

11. When do we stop work?

Work should stop when there is a high

probability that all conditions necessary for a

337

QUESTION

ANSWER
dust explosion exist or are likely to exist. i.e.
a significant accumulation of dry, finely
divided dust is or will likely be dispersed in
air within an enclosed environment with
uncontrolled ignition sources present.

12. What regulations relate to the control of

fires and explosion hazards?

A list of other requirements that may apply is

attached.

338

Other Regulations to Consider

REGULATION

EXCERPT

4.42 Cleaning with compressed

air

(1) Compressed air or steam must not be used for

blowing dust, chips, or other substances from
equipment, materials and structures if any person
could be exposed to the jet, or to the material it expels
or propels and an injury or health hazard due to fire,
explosion or other cause is likely to result.

5.23 Permitted quantities

(1) The amount of a hazardous substance in a work area

must not exceed the quantity reasonably needed for
work in progress, normally in one work shift.
(2) Bulk or reserve quantities must be stored in a
designated area separate from the work area.

5.24 Incompatible substances

Substances which are incompatible must not be stored in

a manner that would allow them to mix in the event of
container leakage, breakage or other such circumstance.

5.25 Storage practices

A hazardous substance must be stored in a designated

area, in a manner which ensures that it will not readily fall,
become dislodged, suffer damage, or be exposed to
conditions of extreme temperature.

5.26 Storage area

The designated storage area for a hazardous substance

must be
(a) designed and constructed to provide for the safe
containment of the contents,
(b) clearly identified by signs, placards or similar means,
(c) designed and maintained to allow the safe movement
of workers, equipment and material,
(d) provided with adequate ventilation and lighting, and
(e) in a location not normally occupied by workers, and
not in a location such as a lunchroom, eating area,
change room, clothing storage locker or passenger
compartment of a vehicle.

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REGULATION
5.27 Ignition sources

EXCERPT
(1) When a flammable gas or a flammable liquid is
handled, used or stored, all sources of ignition must
be eliminated or adequately controlled.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) sources of ignition
include open flame, spark-producing mechanical
equipment, welding and cutting processes, smoking,
static discharge and any electrical equipment or
installation that is not approved for hazardous
locations, as specified by the Electrical Safety Act.
(3) If the work involves more than one employer, the
principal contractor or, if there is no principal
contractor, the owner must ensure that sources of
ignition resulting from the work of one employer are
eliminated or adequately controlled in any work area
where a flammable gas or a flammable liquid is
handled, used or stored by any other employer.

5.28 Grounding or bonding

Metallic or conductive containers used to transfer

flammable liquids must be electrically bonded to each
other or electrically grounded while their contents are
being transferred from one container to the other.

5.29 Electrostatic charge

If glass, plastic or other non-conductive container with a

capacity of 23 litres (5 imp gal) or more is used to transfer
a flammable liquid, the accumulation of electrostatic
charge near the surface of the liquid must be eliminated
or controlled by
(a) limiting the flow velocity of the liquid to less than 1 m/s
(200 fpm),
(b) using a grounded lance or nozzle extending to the
bottom of the container,
(c) limiting free fall,
(d) using anti-static additives, or
(e) other effective means.

340

REGULATION
5.30 Dispensing (G)

EXCERPT
If a flammable liquid is dispensed or transferred inside a
flammable liquids storage room,
(a) the storage room must be mechanically ventilated at a
rate of at least 18 m3/hr per square metre of floor
area (1 cfm/sq ft), but not less than 250 m3/hr (150
cfm),
(b) exhaust air must be discharged to the outdoors, and
makeup air provided,
(c) any makeup air duct passing through a fire separation
must be equipped with an approved fire damper, and
(d) doors must be self-closing.

5.31 Flammable gas or vapour

If it is not practicable to maintain the airborne

concentration of a flammable gas or vapour below the
applicable exposure limit, for example, in a temporary
situation or an emergency,
(a) only the minimum number of workers necessary for
the work may be exposed,
(b) every worker exposed must be adequately trained
and equipped to safely perform the required duties,
(c) the concentration of the flammable gas or vapour
must not exceed 20% of the lower explosive limit
(LEL), and
(d) in a life-threatening emergency only, exposure of
emergency response workers is permitted above 20%
of the LEL, provided that only those qualified and
properly trained and equipped workers necessary to
correct the unsafe condition are exposed to the
hazard and every possible effort is made to control
the hazard while this is being done.

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REGULATION
5.32 Manual cleaning

EXCERPT
A flammable liquid must not be used as a manual
cleaning solvent unless
(a) a thorough review of alternative solvents by the
employer indicates that a suitable non-flammable
substitute is not available,
(b) appropriate written safe work procedures are
implemented to effectively control flammability and
health hazards,
(c) the quantity of liquid used is minimized,
(d) the worker is instructed and trained in the safe work
procedures, and
(e) the work procedures have been submitted to the
Board.

5.33 Permitted quantities

Except for the quantity reasonably needed for immediate

use, or that is present for display or sale in public areas of
a mercantile facility, the quantity of combustible and
flammable liquids stored outside an approved storage
cabinet, storage room or storage area in any fire
compartment (2 hour fire separation) of a building must
not exceed
(a) in closed containers, 600 litres (132 imp gal) of liquids
having a flash point below 93.3C (200F) of which
not more than 100 litres (22 imp gal) may be liquids
having a flash point below 22.8C (73F) and a boiling
point below 37.8C (100F), and
(b) in storage tanks or portable tanks, 5,000 litres (1,100
imp gal) of liquids having a flash point below 93.3C
(200F) and a boiling point at or above 37.8C
(100F).

5.34 Combustible materials

Except for packaging used to contain flammable or

combustible liquids, combustible shelves, racks and other
materials are not permitted inside a flammable or
combustible liquids storage room or storage cabinet
unless required as part of a fire separation.

342

REGULATION

EXCERPT

5.35 Cabinet vent

If a flammable liquids storage cabinet is vented, the vent

must be a steel pipe at least 5 cm (2 in) in diameter which
is connected directly to the outdoors.

5.36 Containers

(1) A tank, cylinder, bottle or other vessel containing a

substance under pressure, together with any
associated pressure or flow regulator and piping or
conveyance system, must be
(a) protected from sparks, flames, excessive heat,
physical damage, electrical contact or corrosion,
and
(b) equipped with suitable pressure relief mechanisms
installed so that no worker will be endangered in
the event of discharge.
(2) Hand-held aerosol spray cans are exempt from the
requirements of subsection (1)(b).

5.37 Pressure testing

A compressed gas container which requires pressure

testing must bear a valid and current indication that it has
been pressure tested.

5.38 Handling and securing

cylinders

(1) A compressed gas cylinder must not be hoisted by a

sling or magnet, dropped, subjected to impact,
handled by the regulator or used as a roller or work
support.
(2) A compressed gas cylinder must be secured to
prevent falling or rolling during storage, transportation
and use, and where practicable, must be kept in the
upright position.

5.39 Cylinder markings

A compressed gas cylinder must be marked to indicate its

rated pressure and the type of gas it contains.

343

REGULATION
5.40 Cylinder valves

EXCERPT
(1) The valve on a compressed gas cylinder must be kept
closed when the cylinder is empty or not in use.
(2) A worker must not stand directly in front of a regulator
attached to a compressed gas cylinder when the
cylinder valve is being opened.
(3) Any valve, regulator or fitting connected to a
compressed gas cylinder must be a standard fitting,
designed and manufactured for the type of cylinder
and compressed gas for which it will be used, and
must include provisions for flashback arresters where
necessary.
(4) Unless a compressed gas cylinder is equipped with
an integral valve guard, the valve cover must be in
position when the cylinder is not connected for use.

5.41 Fittings

Only standard fittings designed for the specific

compressed gas service may be used with a compressed
gas system.

5.43 Empty cylinders

An empty compressed gas cylinder must be identified as

being empty and must be stored separately from other
compressed gas cylinders.

5.44 Acetylene cylinders

(1) A compressed gas cylinder containing acetylene must

be used only in the upright position.
(2) If the cylinder has been stored or transported in a
horizontal position, it must be placed in the upright
position for at least 1 hour before it is used.
(3) A suitable device for closing the valve on an acetylene
cylinder must be immediately available when the
cylinder is connected for use.

5.45 Restriction on use of

copper

A fitting or tube made of copper or any alloy containing

more than 67% copper must not be used in a system
carrying acetylene gas, except for copper torch tips and
lengths of copper tubing 30 cm (1 ft) or less in length
which are open to the atmosphere.

344

REGULATION
5.46 Restriction on use of
oxygen

EXCERPT
(1) Oxygen gas must not be used in any circumstance
where it can contact a substance that oxidizes readily,
such as a petroleum product, natural fibre or metal
powder.
(2) Oxygen gas must not be used to

5.47 Cleanliness

5.71 Flammable Air

Contaminants

(a) operate a pneumatic tool,

(b) start an internal combustion engine,
(c) clean equipment or clothing,
(d) create pressure in a container, or
(e) ventilate a workplace.
A worker must not permit oil or grease to contact an
oxygen cylinder valve, regulator, or fitting.
(1) If an operation or work process produces a
combustible or flammable air contaminant in
concentrations that may present a risk of fire or
explosion, the employer must provide a separate
exhaust ventilation system for the operation or work
process.
(2) Electrical components of an exhaust ventilation
system required by subsection (1) must comply with
Class I Division I requirements of CSA Standard
C22.1-94, Canadian Electrical Code, Part 1 if the
components contact the air stream.
(3) A dust collector having an internal volume greater
than 0.6 m3 (20 ft3) and being used to control
combustible dusts must be located and constructed
so that no worker will be endangered in the event of
an explosion inside the collector.

5.81 Combustible Dust

If combustible dust collects in a building or structure or on

machinery or equipment, it must be safely removed
before accumulation of the dust could cause a fire or
explosion.

345

REGULATION
5.98 Inventory

EXCERPT
(1) An inventory must be maintained which identifies all
hazardous substances at the workplace in quantities
that may endanger workers in an emergency including
controlled products covered by WHMIS, explosives,
pesticides, radioactive materials, hazardous wastes,
and consumer products.
(2) The inventory must identify the nature, location, and
approximate quantity of all such substances, and the
location of MSDSs.

5.99 Risk assessment

Part 12 Welding and Painting

related

An employer must ensure that an assessment is

conducted of the risks posed by hazardous substances
from accidental release, fire or other such emergency.

346

WorkSafeBC Bulletin:
Clean-up of Hazardous Combustible Dust

347

Clean-up of Hazardous Combustible Dust

Wood dust is a combustible dust. If the dust is disturbed and a sufficient amount
becomes airborne and a source of ignition is present, then the dust may explode.
Uncontrolled cleaning activities may generate a dust cloud that could explode.
In order to clean safely, use cleaning methods that do not generate dust clouds,
especially in confined areas where ignition sources (flames, sparks, and static
electricity) are present. These cleaning methods would include:
Vacuuming, using a vacuum approved for dust collection
Water wash or wet rags (do not use water near live electrical equipment).
First apply a water mist and then increase the flow to a high velocity water
stream. Be cautious not to plug the drain piping.
Soft bristle brooms on telescopic poles (to clean high areas)
Compressed air should only be used as a last resort. Vacuum all accessible
dust first. Use a maximum 15 psig compressed air to move dust out of
inaccessible areas. Ensure that any electrical equipment in the area is locked
out and de-energized, and any hot equipment or other surfaces are cooled
down and no open flames exist.
Likely

areas of dust accumulations may include:

Structural members
Conduit and pipe racks
Cable trays
Floors
Above the ceiling (if a suspended ceiling is present)
On and around dust collection equipment
The interior of a dust collector and ductwork

Horizontal and vertical surfaces should be cleaned (where dust could settle). Dust
and wood waste must be cleaned up at regular intervals:
At least once per shift, or
Sooner, if dust and wood waste accumulates quickly, or
Immediately, if dust spills from a machine or device (this information should
be reported to a supervisor or manager)
Disposal of waste dust must be properly and safely.
The cleaned area should be inspected to ensure the cleaning is complete and any
deficiencies addressed. Tools and equipment for clean-up should be kept in a
designated area.
Workers cleaning up hazardous dust should wear personal protective equipment
that includes eye goggles and a respirator (elastomeric half-face respirator with
P100 cartridges, as a minimum).

348

REFERENCES AND
RESOURCES

349

References for
WorkSafeBC
Documents

350

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)

Title:
Date:
URL:

NFPA 68: Standard on Explosion Protection by Deflagration Venting

2007 Edition
http://www.nfpa.org/aboutthecodes/list_of_codes_and_standards.asp?cookie%5Ftest=1

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)

Title:
Date:
URL:

NFPA 654: Standard for the Prevention of Fire and Dust Explosions from the Manufacturing,
Processing, and Handling of Combustible Particulate Solids
2006 Edition
http://www.nfpa.org/aboutthecodes/list_of_codes_and_standards.asp?cookie%5Ftest=1

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)

Title:
Date:
URL:

NFPA 655 Standard for Prevention of Sulfur Fires and Explosions

2007 Edition
http://www.nfpa.org/aboutthecodes/list_of_codes_and_standards.asp?cookie%5Ftest=1

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)

Title:

Date:
URL:

NFPA 664 Standard for the Prevention of Fires and Explosions in Wood Processing and
Woodworking Facilities
2007 Edition
http://www.nfpa.org/aboutthecodes/list_of_codes_and_standards.asp?cookie%5Ftest=1

Oregon Occupational Safety and Health Association (OSHA)

Title:
Date:
URL:

Hazard Alert Combustible Dust

June 2008
http://www.orosha.org/pdf/hazards/2993_05-2008_combustdust.pdf

US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board

Title:
Date:
URL:

Combustible Dust: An Insidious Hazard

July 2009
http://youtu.be/3d37Ca3E4fA

US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board

Title:
Date:
URL:

Investigation Report: Combustible Dust Hazard Study

November 2006
http://www.csb.gov/assets/document/Dust_Final_Report_Website_11-17-06.pdf

US Department of Labor National Emphasis Program

Title:
Date:
URL:

Status Report on Combustible Dust

October 2009
http://www.osha.gov/dep/combustible_dust/combustible_dust_nep_rpt_102009.html

351
U.S. Department of Labor Occupational Safety and Health Administration
Title:
Date:
URL:

OSHA Instruction: Combustible Dust National Emphasis Program (Directive # CPL 03-00-008)
March 11, 2008
http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=directives&p_id=3830

U.S. Department of Labor Occupational Safety and Health Administration

Title:

Date:
URL:

Safety and Health Information Bulletin Combustible Dust in Industry: Preventing and
Mitigating the Effects of Fire and Explosions
July 31, 2005
http://www.osha.gov/dts/shib/shib073105.html

U.S. Department of Labor Occupational Safety and Health Administration

Title:
Date:
URL:

Hazard Communication Guidance for Combustible Dusts

2009
http://www.osha.gov/Publications/3371combustible-dust.html

US National Archives and Records Administration

Title:

Date:
URL:

Federal Register: Department of Labour Occupational Safety and Health Administration

Combustible Dust; Proposed Rule
October 21, 2009
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2009-10-21/pdf/E9-25075.pdf

Weyerhaeuser
Title:
Date:
URL:

Combustible Dust Risk and Hazard Mitigation in Lumber Operations Weyerhaeuser Experience
May 26, 2010 (for Forest Products Industrial Hygiene Forum at AIHce Denver 2010)
N/A (See document in Appendices section)

352

Suggested Additional
Resources

353
American Industrial Hygiene Conference and Expo (AIHce)
Title:
Date:
URL:

NFPA 654, 2011 Edition Key Changes/Issues/Impacts (by Brice Chastain, CIH, Georgia-Pacific)
May 26, 2010 (for Forest Products Industrial Hygiene Forum at AIHce Toronto 2010)
N/A (See document in Appendices section)

Chemical Engineering Transactions, Volume 19

Title:
Date:
URL:

CNA

Title:
Date:
URL:

State of the art: Promotion of early inherently safer design against dust explosions
2010
http://www.aidic.it/cet/10/19/060.pdf

Risk Control Bulletin: Combustible Dust Wood Dust Exposures & Controls
2010
http://www.cna.com/vcm_content/CNA/internet/Static%20File%20for%20Download/
Risk%20Control/PropertyProtection/RC_Property_BUL_combustibledust_CNA.pdf

Factory Mutual Insurers

Title:
Date:
URL:

FIKE

Title:
Date:
URL:

FIKE

Title:
Date:
URL:

Combustible Dust Hazard Recognition an Insurers View

May 13-14, 2009
http://www.nfpa.org/assets/files/PDF/Foundation%20proceedings/Combustible_Dust_
Hazard_Recognition.pdf

EPIC: Explosion Protection Integrated Components

Unknown
http://www.fike.com.br/pdf/epic.pdf

Explosion Protection Application Profile: Bucket Elevators

April 2010
http://www.fire-protection.com.au/files/BucketElevators.pdf

Health and Safety Executive

Title:
Date:
URL:

Safe Handling of Combustible Dusts: Precautions against explosions

October 2003
http://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/books/hsg103.htm

Health and Safety Executive

Title:
Date:
URL:

Safe collection of wood waste: Prevention of fire and explosion

June 2011
http://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/wis32.pdf

New Zealand Department of Labor

Title:
Date:
URL:

Dust Explosions in Factories: Precautions required with combustible dusts

1985
http://www.osh.govt.nz/order/catalogue/archive/dustexplosions.pdf

354
Ontario Office of the Fire Marshal
Title:
Date:
URL:

Ontario Fire Code: Section 5.10 Combustible Dust Producing Processes

August 27, 2010
http://www.ofm.gov.on.ca/en/Legislation%20Directives%20and%20Technical%20Guidelines/
fire%20code/Archived%20Documents/Illustrated%20Commentary/pdf/processes.pdf

Unknown Original Source

Title:
Date:
URL:

Sawdust Cannon YouTube video

August 3, 2007
http://vimeo.com/260680 <http://vimeo.com/260680

US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board

Title:
Date:
URL:

Inferno: Dust Explosion at Imperial Sugar

October 2009
http://youtu.be/Jg7mLSG-Yws

U.S. Department of Labor Occupational Safety and Health Administration

Title:

Date:
URL:

Combustible Dust Expert Forum Meeting Summary Report Prepared by Eastern Research
Group, Inc.
Forum held on May 13, 2011; Report prepared on July 20, 2011
http://www.osha.gov/dsg/combustibledust/expert_forum_summary_report.pdf

355

APPENDICES

356

American Industrial Hygiene

Conference and Expo (AIHce)
NFPA 654, 2011 Edition Key Changes/Issues/Impacts
(by Brice Chastain, CIH, Georgia-Pacific)

357

NFPA 654, 2011 Edition

Key Changes / Issues / Impacts
Brice Chastain, CIH
Georgia-Pacific
Forest Product IH Forum
AIHCE - Toronto
26 May 2010

358

NFPA 654
Standard for the Prevention of Fire and Dust
Explosions from the Manufacturing
Manufacturing,
Processing, and Handling of Combustible
Particulate Solids 2006 Edition
2011 Edition pending issue June/July 2010

359

NFPA 654 Revision Cycle Summary

R
t on P
l
d (J
((January
J
09 - Atl
t
Report
Proposall (ROP) d
developed
January
Atlanta
and March 09 - via teleconference)
Proposals
p
voted on by
y committee members in April
p 09
Report of Proposals (ROP) presented on NFPA website for
review & comment by Public - June 09
Public comments submitted for review
review-- Sep 09
Committee met Sep 2424-25, 2009 in Baltimore with several
subsequent teleconferences through Nov 09 to review public
comments & finalize proposed 2011 edition
NITMAMs filed April 10, 2009 to address issues with
document for floor vote at NFPA Convention in Las Vegas
June 7
7--10
If NITMAMS fail; 2011 edition issued by NFPA Standards
C
Council
il iin June/July
J
/J l 2010
New 2011 edition effective (July
(July Aug 2010)
2010)

360

Key Changes / Issues

Dust hazard area identified by:
Fire Hazard Criterion (people protection (95%);
mass basis)
Explosion Hazard Criterion (structure protection;
mass basis)

Mechanical and chemical isolation devices

replace abort gates and diverters as only
reliable protection for AMS supply & return
ducts
4

361

Dust Accumulation Allowance Present 2006 Edition Density Equation

All
Allowable
bl Thi
Thickness
k
(i
(inches)
h )=
[(75 lbs/ft3)(1/32 inch)] / settled bulk density,
lb
lbs/ft
/ft3
Densityy Allowance
75 lbs/ft3 = 1/32 inch
18
18--20 lbs/ft3 = 1/8 inch
2 lbs/ft3 = 1.2 inches
1 lb/ft3 = 2.3 inches
5

362

New Dust Allowance Criteria

Two new criteria proposed
proposed 2 simple / 2 complex theoretical equations
(1) P
Protect
t t St
Structure
t
(D
(Dustt E
Explosion
l i H
Hazard)
d)
(2) Protect Personnel from Fire (Dust Fire Hazard)
Mass/area - based ((kg/m
g 2) vs Density
y ((lbs/ft3) - thickness based ((inches))
Both complex equations require dust explosivity tests (~$2K)
Complex Fire
Fire equation includes Entrainment
Entrainment Factor
Factor of 0
0.25
25
Complex Building equation includes Dynamic Load Factor addressing
weakest component in building not intended to fail
Equations are theoretical and not validated with no loss history to support their
use
Will be more difficult for general industry and regulators to use than existing
settled bulk density equation & thickness criteria
6

363

Two Simple Equations

Threshold mass establishing a building or
room as a dust explosion hazard volume
(building damage criterion):
M basic
basic--exp = 0.004 x A floor x Height
Threshold dust mass establishing a building
or room as a dust deflagration hazard
volume (personnel fire explosion criterion):
M basic
basic--fire = 0.02 x A floor
7

364

Two Simple Equations

Extremely conservative (reduces allowable
dust mass by 40% for paper dust)
L
Lumps
allll d
dustt ttypes ((plastics,
l ti
paper,
starch, coal, petcoke, etc) together as if
th have
they
h
the
th same deflagration
d fl
ti /
explosion risks
8

365

Two Complex Equations

(alternate equations to the two simple equations)

366

Personnel Fire Hazard Equation

Mfire=0.05[Cw
=0 05[Cw ][Pinitial/(Pinitial+Pmax)][(AfloorxD)/ d]
Mfire = allowable threshold dust mass (kg) based on personnel damage
criterion ((5% of occupants
p
on floor not p
protected))
Cw = worst case concentration(kg/m3) at which max raterate-of
of--pressurepressure-rise
results per ASTM E1226
Pinitial = 1 bar absolute
P
Pmax
= max pressure d
developed
l
d during
d i MEC ttests
t
Afloor = lesser of floor enclosure area (sq m) or 2000 m2
D = personnel height (1.93 m [6 ft - typical person height])
d = entrainment fraction (e
(e.g.
g 0
0.25
25 1.0
1 0 unless determined; default 0
0.25
25*))
* Note: 0.25 entrainment fraction not validated; presently validated
methodology
gy for determining
g EF nonnon-existent;; development
p
~ 33-5 y
years
away)
10

367

Building Damage/Explosion
Equation
Mexp= [Pes/DLF] [Cw/Pmax] [(Afloor
fl
x H)] / d
Me p = allowable
Mexp
allo able threshold d
dust
st mass (kg) based on b
building
ilding damage
criterion
Pes = the enclosure strength evaluated based on static pressure
calculations for the weakest building structure element not intended to fail
(per NFPA 68)
DLF = dynamic load factor, the ratio of maximum dynamic deflection to static
deflection (per NFPA 68)
Cw = worst case concentration (kg/m3) at which max raterate-ofof-pressure
pressure--rise
results per ASTM E1226
Pmax = max pressure developed during ASTM E1226 tests
Afloor = lesser of floor enclosure area (sq m)
H = height of enclosure ceiling (m) not to exceed 12 m
d = entrainment fraction (e.g. 0.25 1.0 unless determined; set at 0.25)
11

368

New Isolation Requirements Eliminate Abort

Gates/Diversion Devices in Supply/Return
Ducts
Based on vendor laboratory tests indicating
abort g
gates are 0.25 seconds slower than
isolation devices in reacting to deflagration
Committee considered no loss history or actual
case histories in deliberation
Abort gates have served the Wood Products
Industry well over the past 30 years
Replacement costs can double cost of existing
abort g
gate/diversion device (($15K to 25K))
12

369

OPPORTUNITY TO AFFECT
OUTCOME OF NFPA 654 - 2011 EDITION
Notice to File a Motion (NITMAMs) will be presented as
challenges to elements of the new revised proposed
standard
t d d on NFPA convention
ti floor
fl
1-5 PM
PM,
Wednesday, June 9, 2009
Majority vote of members on convention floor in favor of
NITMAMs sends NFPA 654 back to committee for
rework and resolution of issues
NITMAMs supported by AF&PA, Paper
Shredders/Recyclers, and Edison Electric Institute
(representing Private Power Generation Facilities), John
Cholin expert consultant & past chair of NFPA 664 and
Cholin,
member of NFPA 654
13

370

Successful NITMAM Impacts

Delays issue of NFPA 654, 2011 Edition for 66-12
months or longer
New equations likely will be reworked or
possibly presented in annex as alternate method
to
o settled
se ed bulk
bu density
de s y method
e od for
o establishing
es ab s g
dust allowance criteria
Issues
Issues with new equations & return air
isolation/diversion become more visible to OSHA
possibly
p
y affecting
g rulemaking
gp
process
14

371

QUESTIONS

B i Ch
Brice
Chastain
t i
[email protected]

15

372

Weyerhaeuser
Combustible Dust and Hazard Mitigation in Lumber
Operations Weyerhaeuser Experience

373

Combustible Dust Risk and Hazard

Mitigation in Lumber Operations
Weyerhaeuser Experience
Forest Products Industrial Hygiene Forum
Ignition Source
May 26, 2010
AIHCE Denver 2010
Dispersion

Greg K. Ellisor, CIH, CSP

Corporate Health & Safety Manager
Combustible Dust

Deflagration
Explosion
FIRE

Confinement

Oxygen in
Air

374

OUTLINE
Response to the Combustible Dust NEP
Weyerhaeuser hazard mitigation strategies
and best practices

Administrative

controls
Engineering controls

Lumber experience with OSHA combustible

dust inspections

375

RESPONSE TO THE COMBUSTIBLE DUST NEP

Task team including corporate safety, industrial
hygiene and property insurance/fire protection
manager
Does the NEP apply to our operations?

Cellulose Fibers (Kimberly-Clark)

Wood Products (Deltic Lumber)

Combustible dust intranet site

iLevel combustible dust best practice

Deflagration

Explosion
Detonation

376

WEYERHAEUSER HAZARD MITIGATION

STRATEGIES AND BEST PRACTICES
Facility dust hazard assessment
Hazard communication, training
Written combustible dust control program
Housekeeping, physical conditions
inspections
Equipment inspection and maintenance
Third-party property/fire insurance
inspections and follow up
Hot work permit program, smoking control
and emergency preparedness

377

FACILITY DUST HAZARD ASSESSMENT

Facilities should carefully identify the following in
order to assess their potential for dust
fires/explosions:

Materials that can be combustible when finely divided

Processes which use, consume, or produce combustible

dusts

Open areas where combustible dusts may build up

Hidden areas where combustible dusts may accumulate

Means by which dust may be dispersed in the air

Potential ignition sources and confinement areas

378

SURFACE DUST ACCUMULATION LIMITS

NFPA 654 Equation

NEP does not consider differences in dust bulk density

Assumes heavy bulk density of 75 lb/ft3 (typical of metals)

Uses 1/32-inch surface accumulation limit for all dusts

Wood dust bulk density = 1650 lb/ft3

1/8th inch NFPA wood dust accumulation limit (BD: 20
lb/ft3)
1/16th inch FM wood dust accumulation limit (BD: 36 lb/ft3)
Cellulose/pulp dust bulk density = 2.515.5 lb/ft3
1/4th inch FM pulp dust accumulation limit (BD: 10 lb/ft3)

379

HAZARD COMMUNICATION
Train

employees on the explosion hazards of

combustible dusts
On-line course developed by task team
Focused on employees role in minimizing risk
of CD fire/explosion
Hot

work, smoking, housekeeping, cleaning

methods, etc.

Provide

MSDS on combustible dust to employees

Review a current emergency action plan with all
employees annually

380

WRITTEN COMBUSTIBLE DUST CONTROL PROGRAM

List of all CD sources and control equipment

Housekeeping inspection schedules and
procedures
Preventive maintenance schedules and job plans
Awareness training and hazcom documentation
Safe work practices
Property/casualty/fire insurance inspection findings
and corrective actions

381

HOUSEKEEPING PRACTICES

Limit surface dust accumulation to 1/16-inch or less

Pay particular attention to elevated horizontal
surfaces such as machine tops, beams, joists,
purlins, ducts, pipes and cable trays

Can make up 5-10% of total surface area of facility

Dont neglect vertical surfaces (walls, etc.)

Inspect hidden areas for dust residues regularly
Be certain to inspect for dust on and within
electrical equipment, such as on the surface of and
inside motor control center (MCC) cabinets

382

383

384

SLOPED LEDGE COVERS

Provide horizontal surfaces such as girders, beams,

ledges, and equipment tops with a sloped cover having
a smooth finish, to shed dust settling out of the air
Sloped covers should be at an angle of at least 60
degrees from horizontal

385

HOUSEKEEPING CLEANING METHODS

Use

cleaning methods that do not generate dust

clouds, especially in confined areas where ignition
sources are present
Vacuum,

water wash, use wet rags or soft bristle

brooms
Evaluate

the hazards of using water near

electrical equipment and MCCs before using wet
methods
Minimize use of high-pressure compressed air to
clean (blow down) dust accumulations
If dust is to be blown off overhead areas,
de-energize and cover all electrical equipment in
the area, and use a hot work permit system

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MANUAL CLEANING TOOLS BLOW DOWN

ALTERNATIVE

Bendable brush

Stationary brush

Feather Duster

http://www.ungerglobal.com/professional/products/highaccess/

388

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EQUIPMENT INSPECTION & MAINTENANCE

Ensure

process dust-control/ventilation systems are

regularly inspected and properly maintained
Source

ventilation hoods, blowpipes, ducting, cyclones and bag

houses
Dust

escaping from these systems indicates improper

design, insufficient capacity, blockage and/or inadequate
maintenance
Associated fire, spark, and explosion suppression systems
when operating properly can save a facility from a
catastrophic fire and/or explosion
Place all these systems on regular preventive
maintenance (PM) inspection schedules

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392

OSHA CD INSPECTIONS WY EXPERIENCE

Several CD-focused OSHA inspections in

the past 2 years in Lumber operations
Inspection activity higher in Northwest U.S.
vs. South
No particular emphasis on planer mills vs.
sawmills
Common findings

Dust

samples collected, typically from

elevated horizontal surfaces where dust is fine
and dry
Explosion tests completed (Kst)

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OSHA CD INSPECTIONS WY EXPERIENCE

Common findings (continued)

Dusts

are confirmed as combustible

Citations typically against housekeeping
standard, general duty clause, NFPA 654, NFPA
664
Accumulations

Non-serious

>1/16-inch over 5% surface area

to serious in nature with penalties

relatively low
Willingness to lower penalty amounts with quick
resolution of violations

394

RESOURCES

OSHA Combustible Dust website

FM Data Sheet 7-76 Prevention and Mitigation of
Combustible Dust Explosions and Fire
NFPA 654 Prevention of Fire and Dust Explosions from the
Manufacturing, Processing, and Handling of Combustible
Particulate Solids
NFPA 664 Standard for the Prevention of Fires and
Explosions in Wood Processing and Woodworking Facilities
NFPA 499 Classification of Combustible Dust
NFPA 68 Deflagration Venting Systems
NFPA 69 Explosion Prevention Systems
NFPA 91 Exhaust Systems

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Comments, questions?
Combustible Dust Risk and Hazard
Mitigation in Lumber Operations
Weyerhaeuser Experience
Forest Products Industrial Hygiene Forum
May 26, 2010
AIHCE Denver 2010
Greg K. Ellisor, CIH, CSP
Corporate Health & Safety Manager

THE END
THANK YOU !!!