First Indian National Army

This article is about the unit formed under Mohan Singh

that existed up to December 1942. For its successor unit
formed under Subhas Chandra Bose, see Indian National
Army.
The First Indian National Army (or the First INA) was
the Indian National Army as it existed between February
and December 1942. It was formed with Japanese aid and
support after the Fall of Singapore and consisted of approximately 12,000 of the 40,000 Indian prisoners of war
who were captured either during the Malayan campaign
or surrendered at Singapore and was led by Mohan Singh.
It was formally proclaimed in April 1942 and declared
the subordinate military wing of the Indian Independence
League in June that year. The unit was dissolved in December 1942 after apprehensions of Japanese motives
with regards to the INA led to disagreements and distrust between Mohan Singh and INA leadership on one
hand, and the Leagues leadership, most notably Rash Behari Bose. A large number of the INAs initial volunteers,
however, later went on to join the INA in its second incarnation under Subhas Chandra Bose.

General Mohan Singh (in turban) of the rst Indian National

Army being greeted by the Japanese Major Fujiwara, April 1942

from within Indian expatriates, and from disaected Indian prisoners-of-war captured while serving with the
British Commonwealth forces.[1] Italy in 1942 created
Battaglione Azad Hindoustan, formed of ex-Indian Army
personnel and Italians previously resident in India and
Persia, led by Iqbal Shedai. This unit ultimately served
under Raggruppamento Centri Militari,[2] but the eort
proved unsuccessful. It was overtly propagandist nature
that ultimately found little acceptance among the Indian
soldiers, while Shedais leadership was seen to be lacking
legitimacy by the troops.[2] By November 1942, following
the defeats in El Alamein, the Italian eorts had failed.

This rst incarnation of the Indian National Army was

involved in operations of espionage in the Burma frontier which, according to some military historians and allied generals, threatened the moral of Indian troops and
fed discontentment and was partly responsible for the failure of the rst Burma oensive. Operatives of the INA
were also landed in the Indian coast by submarine for
planned espionage operations within India. Coming at
the time that the Quit India Movement had raised turmoil within British India, the threat of the INA aecting
British Indian troops and INA operatives mounting espionage within India saw the start of a propaganda campaign in the British Indian Army and a news ban on the
unit that was not to be lifted till after the war ended.

German motives and intentions with relation to India

were more complex. The German Foreign oce wanted
to support Indian revolutionaries and nationalists, but
there is consensus that, ultimately, Hitler held the belief that the British had to rule over the unt Indian
masses.[1][3] However Subhas Chandra Bose, who was
one of the most prominent leaders of the Indian movement at the time (rivalling Gandhi in stature), arrived in
Germany in April 1941 after escaping from house arrest
in Calcutta. He met with Hitler (with whom he had one
meeting) and the Nazi high command, making the case
for raising an Indian unit from Rommel's Indian prisoners of war from the battleelds of Europe and Africa, as
the nucleus of an Indian Liberation force.[4] The Indische
Legion was thus formed. In January 1942, a small contingent parachuted into Eastern Iran with a Brandenburg unit
to commence sabotage operations against the British.[5]
Most of the legion however only ever saw action in Europe, ghting as a Heer unit and later incorporated into
the Waen SS (as were other national legions of the

Indian nationalism in World War

II

Main articles: Battaglione Azad Hindoustan and Legion

Freies Indien
With the onset of the Second World War all the three
major Axis Powers, at some stage of their campaign
against Britain, sought to support and exploit Indian nationalism. They aided the recruitment of a military force
1

2 JAPAN AND INDIAN NATIONALISM

Wehrmacht) after the Allied invasion of France. Nearly

thirty, including the leadership and the ocer corps, were
also transferred to Azad Hind after its formation, and saw
action in the INAs Burma Campaign.[6] A segment of the
Free India Legion fought against British and Polish Forces
in Italy in 1944.[7]

Japan and Indian nationalism

India and Japan, especially from the last decade of the

19th century, had enjoyed a growing exchange of cultural, religious and philosophical ideas. India, as the
home of Hinduism, the birthplace of the Buddha, and
from the second decade of the 20th century, the home of
Gandhian philosophy, had been an attraction for Japanese
and Buddhist and literary gures.[8] India, in the meantime, looked to Japan as an inspiration of a model industrialised, advancing Asian society and nationhood.
The Japanese victory over Russia in 1905 had furthered
the inspiration Japan infused, especially among Indian
nationalists.[9] Noted Indian and Japanese cultural gures,
including Okakura Tenshin and Rabindranath Tagore acknowledged the connection of the two Asian nations,
their heritage, and the vision of pan-Asianism.[10]

It did not feature in the plans for Greater East Asia CoProsperity Sphere, which focused on south-east Asia up
to the Indo-Burmese border.[14]
From late 1941 the Japanese began to profess increasing
support for the Indian Independence movement. Exiles
like Rash Behari Bose had already voiced their demands
to the Japanese authorities that support and pursuit of Indian Independence be an aim of the Japanese campaign,
but neither the government nor the Imperial Japanese
army were able to commit to these earlier. Militarily, India was important as the origin (from Assam) of the Ledo
road which supplied Nationalist Chinese and American
forces, as well as the supplies airlifted over the hump.[14]
Also, the idea that the western boundary of Japans empire would be controlled by a more friendly government
was attractive.[14] It would also have been consistent with
the idea that Japanese expansion into Asia was part of an
eort to support Asian government of Asia and against
western colonialism.[14][15] Nonetheless the task of establishing a stable orderly state if the independence movement succeeded would be enormous. The army would
be occupied in China and the Manchuria-Russia border
and in the newly occupied territories. It was widely accepted that the Congress was anti-Japanese.[14] Gandhi,
even during the intense Quit India Movement, had categorically warned the Japanese[16]

After the end of World War I, Japan increasingly became

a haven for radical Indian nationalists in exile, who were
Make no mistake. You will be sadly disprotected by patriotic Japanese societies. Notable among
illusioned if you believe that you will receive a
these included Rash Behari Bose, Taraknath Das, A M
willing welcome from India
Sahay as well as others. The protections oered to these
nationalists eectively prevented British eorts to repa- However, in April 1941, the Consul General to Calcutta
triate them and became a major policy concern.[11][12]
had noted activities of the Forward Bloc. From Berlin,
By the end of the war however, the pan-Asiatic vi- ambassador Oshima Hiroshi had reported on Subhas
sion gradually shifted away from prominence as the Bose's organisation of the Free India Legion.
independence movement in India became engrossed in The successful Malayan campaign, and the subsequent
the issues facing post-war India. Agitations against Burma campaign brought under Japanese administrathe Rowlatt act, the Khilafat Movement protesting the tion a large number of Indian expatriates. Although
removal of the Ottoman Caliph (an inammatory is- not essentially sympathetic to the Japanese (some were
sue among Indias huge Muslim population), as well as even hostile),[17] they held substantial nationalist motives,
Gandhi's Non-cooperation movement in 1922 demand- and sought to exploit the window oered by the revering home rule took the centre stage.[9] By the time that sal faced by the British forces to drive them out from
the pan-Asiatic regained any prominence, Japans aggres- the Indian sub-continent.[14] In these circumstances, the
sive and often nihilistic war in China had robbed her of Japanese military administration encouraged the various
the high ground that Japan held among the Indian popu- disparate Indian nationalist groups in East Asia to form
lation, and among Indian nationalist leadership.[9]
an anti-British alliance.[14] These came together to form
the Indian Independence League (IIL), with its headquarters in Singapore. The IIL was also responsible for the
2.1 Japans India Policy
welfare of Indian communities in East Asia. From the
Japanese point of view, this was primarily a propaganda
See also: Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, I move of initiating anti-British sentiments among civilians
Fujiwara, F Kikan, and Capt. Mohan Singh
and soldiers in South-east Asia, and some Indian organisations like the Thai-Bharat Cultural Lodge held mistrust
At the outbreak of the war in south-east Asia, Japan of the Japanese, and of local Indians who worked with
had not formulated any concrete policy with regards to them.[18] The lodge preferred to work independently,
India.[13] Its headquarters lacked any India experts, while and used Thai-donated equipment and the German emcivilian experts on India were few in Japan.[13] India was bassy in Bangkok to Liaise directly with Subhas Chandra
peripheral to Japanese war plans at least through 1941.[14] Bose.[18]

2.2

F Kikan

Maj. I Fujiwara, who spearheaded Japanese intelligence mission

in South-east Asia early in the Malayan Campaign.

By the end of 1941, India had started featuring prominently in the Japanese policies. By early 1942, Tj's
speeches to the Diet included specic references to the independence of India and to decisions to strike the British
colonial authority in India.[10] Specic plans for the invasion of India were, however, not formulated. The
Japanese IGHQ in October set up the Fujiwara Kikan, or
the F-kikan, in Bangkok, headed by the Major Fujiwara
Iwaichi, chief of intelligence of the 15th army. Tasked
with intelligence gathering and contacting the Indian independence movement, the overseas Chinese and the
Malayan Sultan with the aim of encouraging friendship
and cooperation with Japan,[19] Fujiwaras sta included
ve commissioned ocers and two hindi-speaking interpreters. Fujiwara, later self-described as Lawrence of
the Indian National Army (after Lawrence of Arabia) is
said to have been a man committed to the values which his
oce was supposed to convey to the expatriate nationalist leaders, and found acceptance among them.[20][21]
His initial contact was with Giani Pritam Singh and after
the outbreak of the war and the Malayan invasion, with
Capt. Mohan Singh.[20] Mohan Singh had, as a captain
in the British Indian Army, seen action with the 1/14th
Punjab Regiment against Japanese forces at the Battle
of Jitra, where his troops were outgunned and shattered
by Japanese tanks.[22] Captured by Japanese troops after several days in the Jungle, Singh was taken to Alor
Star to Fujiwara and Pritam Singh at a joint oce of

the F-Kikan and the IIL. Along with Pritam Singh, Fujiwara with his sincerity of purpose and belief,[21] convinced Mohan Singh to unite with the Japanese mission
for the greater motive of Indian independence.[20] This included the promise that he would be treated as an ally and
a friend, and not a PoW. Singh initially helped Fujiwara
to take control of the situation of looting and arson that
had developed in Alor Star. By January 1942, Fujiwara
was able to give positive reports on the success of Japans
India policy and suggested an eight-point policy that included aid for both the IIL and the INA, as well as encouragement of the independence movement within India. A liaison conference declared among other aims the
stimulation of the Indian independence movement.[20]
With Fujiwaras encouraging feedbacks in early 1942, the
Japanese government and high-command sought to expand the scope and support for the evolving INA as well as
the Japanese support for the independence movement.[23]
For this it sought the counsel of Rash Behari Bose. Rash
Behari had lived in self-exile in Japan since the 1920s. He
encouraged the formation of the INA, but also sought to
attach it to a central civilian authority speaking for and encouraging Indian civilian Indian population of the region
to become a part of it. The framework of local Indian
associations that existed before the war reached Malaya
were rekindled.

3 The rst INA

In December 1941, after meeting with the Japanese commanding general, Singh was convinced of the feasibility of raising an armed Indian unit. Between himself,
Pritam Singh and Fujiwara, Mohan Singh formulated
plans of contacting Indians in the British Indian Army
in South-east Asia. The fall of Malaya further brought
under Japanese control approximately 45,000 regular Indian troops from Gen. Percival's command in Malaya,[20]
including a large numbers of the remnants of the Indian
III Corps.[24] Even before Singapore fell, the Japanese
troops had started the process of identifying Indian troops
among the captured and separating them from the Australian and British troops. On a number of occasions,
it was noted, British and Australian ocers were killed,
while the Indians spared.[25] Singh began recruiting from
amongst these captured Indian soldiers. Thus the nucleus what came to be the Indian National Army was
born.[20][21]

3.1 Conception
The units that were formed in this predecessor of the INA
numbered about 200. They were volunteers from within
the British Indian soldiers captured in Malaya. They
were issued ries and given arm bands bearing the letter
F.[26] They were organised into units and trained and
worked along with those already under Pritam Singh in

3 THE FIRST INA

Malaya and Thailand. They were further tasked to work

amongst ghting British-Indian Army units to foment dissent and encourage defection.[21] Before the fall of Singapore, these troops grew to number nearly 2,500.[20]
There was signicant deviation from the British Indian
Army. Ocers were organised into a single class, a common kitchen (opposed to caste-based kitchen as had been
the norm), common slogans slogans were adopted etc.
All these eorts attempted to bridge any communal and
casteist rivalries that were accepted or even institutionalised in the British army.[20]
On 10 March 1942, the Indian soldiers at Christmas Island mutinied, allowing the Japanese forces to land unopposed at the Battle of Christmas Island. This was followed by a mutiny in the Ceylon Garrison Artillery in
the Cocos Islands. However, the Cocos Islands Mutiny
failed after it was quickly put down by the Ceylon Light
Infantry. Sri Lankans in Singapore and Malaya formed
the 'Lanka Regiment' of the Indian National Army. An
abortive plan was made to land these troops in Sri Lanka
by submarine.

3.2

Farrer Park

Singapore surrendered on 15 February 1942. On the

evening of the 16th, the Indian troops of the now amalgamated 1/14th and 5/14th Punjab were ordered by the
Malaya command of the Commonwealth forces to assemble at Farrer Park. The British ocers were, in the meantime, ordered to assemble east to Changi. On the morning of 17 February 1942, some 45,000 Indian POWs who
gathered at Farrer Park where addressed by in turns, rst
by a Col Hunt of the Malaya Command, who handed over
the troops to Japanese command under Fujiwara.

disinclined.[30][31]
The Japanese forces, eager to engage the co-operation of
the troops and further lacking the man-power, did not
have the men impounded. The supreme command of the
INA was set up at Mount Pleasant suburbs in the Northern part of Singapore. The PoW headquarters, along
with the largest PoW camp was set up at Neesoon under
M. Z. Kiani. Other smaller PoW camps housing Indian
troops were set up at Bidadari, Tyersall, Buller, Seletar
and Kranji.[32] To Lt. Col N.S Gill went the overall direction of PoW.[32]

3.3 Indian Independence League

Main articles: Indian Independence League and Bidadary
Resolutions
See also: Bangkok Conference
In April 1942, as the discussions and the process of setting up the Indian Independence League and dening the
aims of the movement carried on, Mohan Singh convened
a meeting of a group of his ocers to frame what is
now called the Bidadary resolution. This resolution announced that:[33]
Indians stood above all dierences of caste,
community, or religion. Independence was every Indians birthright. An Indian National
Army would be raised to ght for it.
The resolution further specied that the army would go
to battle only when the Congress and the people of India asked it to.[33] It did not however, specify the army
was to interact with the Japanese forces.[33] This resolution was circulated among the Indian PoWs, followed
by tour of the mainland camps by Mohan Singh and Fujiwara. The PoW headquarters was subsequently dissolved and the sta were transferred to Mohan Singhs
supreme command. On 9 May, Singh began recruiting
for the INA.[33] The process involved identifying units
that were most likely to come up with volunteers. These
units were transferred to Neesoon and Bidadary, while
the other units were shipped away to other camps.[33]

Fujiwara spoke to the troops in Japanese which was translated into English and then Hindustani. In his speech,
Fujiwara is said to have told the troops of the Asian
co-prosperity sphere under the leadership of Japan, of
Japanese vision of an independent India and its importance to the co-prosperity sphere, and of the Japanese intentions to help raise a liberation army for the independence of India.[27] He invited the troops seated at the park
to join this army. Further, he told the troops, they were
going to be treated not as PoWs, but as friends and allies. In April 1942 the same month as Mohan Singh forFujiwara ended his speech stating he is passing on their mally declared the formation of the Indian National
responsibilities and command to Mohan Singh.[27]
Army he and other representatives of the INA and
Mohan Singhs speech, in Hindustani, was short. He IIL, were invited to attend a conference in Tokyo at
told the troops of forming the Indian National Army to Rash Behari Bose's invitation. Rash Behari also invited
ght for an independent India, and invited the troops to members of the Indian National Council to this meetjoin it. As an Indian Jawan present at the time remem- ing, which saw declaration of the formation of the Allbers, Mohan Singhs speech was powerful and touched Malayan Indian Independence league. The League bea chord, and the troops responded with wild enthusiasm came the liaising organisation with the local Indian popand excitement.[28] It is estimated that nearly half of those ulation and the Japanese. In June, the formation of an
present at Farrer Park later joined the rst INA.[29] Sig- all-Indian IIL was proclaimed at Bangkok. In June 1942,
nicantly however, a large number of Indian ocers de- a second conference was held in Bangkok with Rash Becided not to, which also kept those under their command hari as chair. This conference saw the adoption of a res-

3.5

The end of the rst INA

olution declaring the INA sub-ordinate to the League.[34]

K.P.K Menon, Nedyam Raghavan were civilian members
among the civilian members of the council while Mohan
Singh and an ocer by the name of Gilani were to be the
INAs members.[34] The Bangkok resolution further reafrmed the Bidadary resolution that the INA was only to
go to war when the Congress and the Indian population
wished it to.[35]

3.4

Autumn 1942

Main article: I Kikan

See also: Hideo Iwakuro, Bahadur Group, and Hindustan
Field Force

5
from their men. Over one hundred ocers were separated from their men for such reasons.[38] Some 40,000
men proceeded to pledge their allegiance to Mohan Singh
for Indian independence.[39] The British-Indian army subunit structure was preserved to hasten operational deployments. Almost 16,000 men comprised this rst division of the INA. According to the reviews available,
the INA was to be organised of twelve infantry battalions of 650 troops, organised into four guerrilla regiments of 2000 men. Battalion and regimental commanders were appointed on the 5th of September, and assumed their commands on the 8th and the 9th of September. A few days later it was reviewed by Rash Behari and
Mohan Singh.[40] The rst of these was the Hindustan
Field Force, under the command of J.K. Bhonsle. The
unit was formed at Singapore and comprised three battalions derived from troops of the 17th Dogra Regiment,
Garhwal Ries and the 14th Punjab Regiment (now a
part of the Pakistani Army) and had a strength of nearly
2000 troops. The Hindustan Field force was also to include a heavy gun battalion, a company each of transport corps, signal corps, engineering corps and a company of medical corps.[40] The remaining four regiments,
designated Gandhi, Nehru and Azad regiment, were to
be a part of what was called the Sherdil Guerrilla group,
each with three battalions.[41][42] An additional Special
Services Group was intended for long range inltration,
and a reinforcement group to promote defection amongst
the British Indian Army and recruit new members from
PoWs.[40] [43] 50 ocers and nearly 24,000 men were
surplus volunteers. Armament consisted of 5000 ries,
250 light machine-guns, 500 sub machine-guns, 30 cars
and 50 lorries.[42] Toye points out in his 1959 history of
the army that all of these were British armament captured
by Japanese, which were not subsequently replaced.

On the back of the success of the INA, Fujiwara suggested in January 1942 expanding the work of the FKikan to all parts of Asia.[29] In the spring of 1942,
based on Fujiwaras own proposals, he was replaced by
Col. Hideo Iwakuro.[29][36] The Iwakuro Kikan (I-Kikan)
was considerably larger, with some 250 ocers and with
oces in Rangoon, Penang, Saigon and Hong Kong.
Iwakuro, the founder of the Army intelligence school
Rikugun Nakano Gakko, was aware that the IGHQ did
not have immediate plans to invade India.[36] Using his
expertise in intelligence and special missions, Iwakuro
sought to train the Indian forces in sabotage, espionage
and special operations. The I-Kikan and the League
trained a number of INA recruits and civilian volunteers from Malaya in intelligence and subversion activities. Some of these training schools were opened in
Burma and Singapore, the latter under the direction of
N. Raghavan were called Swaraj (Independence in Hindi)
schools. Graduates from these schools were sent by submarine or parachuted into India for starting intelligence
work, subversion, and sabotage activities.[37] Some historians suggest the intelligence services played a signicant 3.5
role in the failure of Noel Irwin's First Arakan Oensive.
Earnest organisation of the INA in preparation for battle
began after news of Quit India had reached South-east
Asia.[38] This uprising within India was taken to be the
signal from Congress and Indian people that the INA and
the league had been waiting for. Iwakuro visited Tokyo in
August 1942, and on his return had expected to train and
equip 15,000 men over three months. These men were
to be moved to Burma in stages to avoid concentrating
in Singapore.[39] Mohan Singhs ambition however outpaced Iwakuro. Lists of men intending to enlist were collected from individual camp commanders. Hugh Toye, a
British intelligence ocer in South-east Asia during the
war, noted in his 1959 history of the army that although
Mohan Singh may not have personally approved forcible
recruiting, the Bidadary Concentration Camp became
notorious for beatings by sweeper Nimbu.[38] Mohan
Singh himself however admitted to severity when it came
to recruiting, warning non-volunteer ocers to not inuence their men.[38] Persistent oenders were separated

The end of the rst INA

It was mainly from the intelligence and subversion training schools schools that the rst frictions arose between
the Indians and Japanese, as the trainees began to be sent
before completing their training and without knowledge
or consent of the Indian leaders. By late 1942, the divisions appeared as the Indian troops increasingly felt as
pawns in the hands of the Japanese. Anticipating a thrust
towards Imphal, both the Japanese strategists and INA
command envisaged a role for the Indian troops. Initially
this was to begin with intelligence gathering missions. Niranjan Singh Gill was in charge of intelligence and long
range penetration groups being deployed in Burma-India
border. Amongst operatives Gill sent to Burma was a
close associate who subsequently defected back to Commonwealth forces, followed by nearly eight other men.
This was followed by the capture of a number of other
operatives by Commonwealth forces.[44] Both Hugh Toye
and Joyce Lebra conclude in their research that Gill was
in fact intending to escape back to commonwealth forces

also. However, he was summoned back from Burma to

Singapore by this time in November. Other members of
the Indian Council also voiced their concerns and displeasure at what was seen as Japanese intrusion into INAs
work. Raghavan, in charge of Swaraj schools training
intelligence and espionage agents in Singapore, was enraged to nd a number of his students dispatched to India
without his approval or permission.[45] Japanese eorts
to censor Indian broadcasting in Singapore also brought
forth rank disagreements which had culminated in the arrest of the Indian director of broadcasting. In addition
to this, non-committal replies from Japan on the points
raised by the council for action in the Bangkok resolutions raised the ire of Mohan Singh and League members. The nal straw to this was a report to the council by
an ocer of the situation in Burma, where Japanese military administration refused or prevaricated to handover
abandoned Indian property to the league, as demanded
n the Bangkok resolutions. A group of Japanese ocers meeting league members had very candidly declined
to attach any importance to the Bangkok resolutions or
to Indians.[45] Amidst worsening tensions, a repeated attempt by the Council for action to obtain Japanese reassurance and commitment was rebued by Iwakuro.
By November, Mohan Singh and K.P.K. Menon refused
to send a previously planned batch of INA soldiers to
Burma, with the Council for action rallying behind them.
Despite Rash Behari Boses attempts to smooth over differences between the INA and Japanese, a second demand for 900 INA men by the Japanese was refused.
This was followed by a Japanese attempt to take command of Indian troops who had not enlisted in the INA,
who had so far been under the custody of INA. In December N.S. Gill was arrested from Mohan Singhs home
in Singapore, precipitating resignations of both the INA
command and members of the Council for action, along
orders from Mohan Singh for the INA to disband. Mohan
Singh was subsequently arrested by the Japanese and exiled to Pulau Ubin. A number of the Indian troops who
chose to revert to PoW were subsequently sent away to
labour camps in New Guinea or to work in the Death railway. Between December 1942 and February 1943, Rash
Behari Bose tried but failed to keep the IIL and INA going. Thousands of INA soldiers returned to the status of
POWs again and most of the IIL leaders resigned.

4
4.1

Operations involving the rst

INA
Southeast Asia

The rst INA, especially at the time of its inception with F

Kikan, was involved in espionage and sabotage. From the
time of initial Japanese landings in Malaya, INA volunteers inltrated British-Indian battle lines inducing Indian
soldiers to defect to the INA. This it did with considerable

OPERATIONS INVOLVING THE FIRST INA

success. After formal proclamation, the INA committed

a force of two companies of a hundred men each, under
the command of Capt Allah Ditta, to the Singapore operations, accompanying the Konoe Imperial Guards. This
token force played a marginal but signicant role in the
Battle of Singapore, helping the Konoe guards feint the
attack on Ubin island on 7th and 8 February.[46] In the
subsequent ghting in Burma, the INA continued to operate espionage to draw Indian soldiers out of the commonwealth forces. The activities of these agents were
addressed at the Sepoys and these found enough support
to successfully encourage defection without attracting the
attention of the ocers commanding the units. Soon, defection by British Indian troops had become a problem
signicant and regular enough in the Burma theatre to
form a regular part of the intelligence summaries in the
rst half of 1943.[47]
The Quit India movement had reached a crescendo within
India, while the continuing British reversals at Burma further aected the morale of the army. The Irwin's First
Campaign had been contained and then beaten back by
inferior Japanese forces at Donbaik. Intelligence analysis of the failure, as well as Irwins own personal analysis
of the campaign attributed signicant demoralisation and
rising discontentment amongst Indian troops due to the
subversive activity of INA agents at the frontline, as well
as rising nationalist (or "Pro-Congress") sentiments.[47]

4.2 Espionage in India

Although the Congress had conditionally supported the
Allied war eort, following failure of the Cripps mission,
the Quit India Movement was launched in India on 8 August 1942 that called for the British Raj to leave India or
face a massive Civil Disobedience. Forewarned, the Raj
quickly arrested the Congress leadership. However, foreplanning on the part of the Congress meant the movement
continued at the local level, and quickly deteriorated into
a leaderless act of deance and descended into violence
and general anarchy and mayhem. The movement created alarm amongst the high-command and signicantly
hindered the Allied war eort. In south-east Asia, this
was perceived as the signal that the INA and the League
expected to receive to start its war.[48]
Intelligence summaries initially did not believe the INA to
be a substantial force or have any purpose more than propaganda and espionage purposes. However, by the end of
1942, they had become aware of trained Indian espionage
agents (of the INAs Special services group) who had inltrated into India for the purpose of collecting intelligence,
subversion of the army and the subversion of civilian loyalty. These information were derived to a large extent
from some of the agents themselves who gave themselves
up to the authorities after reaching India. However, the
intelligence was also aware at this point of misinformation being spread about the INA itself by the agents who
concealed their purpose and professed to pass on intel-

5.2

British Indian Army

ligence from local knowledge.[47] More troubling for the 5.2 British Indian Army
military command were the activities of the INA agents
in the battle elds of Indias eastern frontier in Burma.
British intelligence was unaware of the formation of the
army until around July 1942. The existence of fth
columnists inuencing Indian troops had been noted
even during the Malayan campaign.[53] In some units,
British ocers were shot by their own troops during the
5 Interactions
Japanese onslaught in Malaya. Even then British intelligence was unclear of the scale, purpose and organisa5.1 Japan
tion of the INA till much later.[54] The propaganda threat
of the INA, coupled with the lack of concrete intelliThe armys co-existence with Imperial Japan was an un- gence on the unit early after the fall of Singapore, led to
easy one. Misgivings about Japanese intentions existed considerable consternation among the political and milfrom early in the history of the army. Col N.S. Gill, in itary leadership of the Government of India when rst
overall charge of Pow Camps, regarded Japanese over- reports started reaching it.[55] In operational terms, the
tures and intentions with caution[33] Further, the close work of the Hindustan eld force threatened to destroy
relation of Fujiwara and Mohan Singh was not repli- the Sepoy's loyalty in the British Indian Army,[47] This
cated after the I-Kikan replaced Fujiwaras oce.[36] threat was perceived signicant enough that the failure of
Iwakuro was considered less idealistic and romantic than the First Arakan Oensive was attributed by CommonFujiwara.[49] Iwakuro took his post at a time the Pacic wealth commanders to the lack of marital skills of eastWar faced a higher priority among Japanese forces for ern races.[56][57] British intelligence began the Jis promateriel.[29] and did not use his expertise to encourage paganda campaign after this to preserve the sepoy's moral
the true Indian army that Fujiwara had envisioned. By and loyalty. At this time also began eorts to improve
some accounts he only engaged in as much development morale the Sepoy in order to consolidate and prepare for
of the INA as would keep Mohan Singh happy.[36] Within defence of Manipur. These measures included imposing
the league, members of the original Indian delegation a complete news ban on the INA, that was not lifted till
to the Tokyo conference held reservations about serving four days after the fall of Rangoon two years later. NoRash Behari, and of ultimate Japanese intentions with tably however, a number of the units rst deployed forregards to independent India.[50] Rash Behari had lived ward by the INA (most of which were intelligence and esin Japan for a considerable length of time, married a pionage units) either defected back to British or were capJapanese woman, and his son had enlisted in the Imperial tured on intelligence given away by defectors. The allearmy. Among the thirty-four points of the Bangkok reso- giance and loyalty of Indian ocers trained in Sandhurst
lution, the INA and the IIL raised a number of questions may have played a part in this conict of loyalties.[58]
and sought clarications. These included the role and position of India in Japans co-prosperity sphere, Japans intentions in and towards an independent India etc.
These were presented via the Iwakuro Kikan after the 6 Second INA
Bangkok conference, and a point-by-point answer were
demanded for each. Tokyo, however, was not able to give Main article: Indian National Army
assurances of the kind sought by the league and the INA,
which was seen as unacceptable to the council formed at Between December 1942 and February 1943, Rash Bethe time of the Bangkok conference.[49][51]
hari struggled to hold together the INA. On 15 February
The Indian National Congress had conditionally supported the Allied war eort, and the Indian expatriate
nationalists were concerned during this early phase that
they might be seen as Quislings.[52] This was particularly strong amongst members of the Thai-Bharat Cultural Lodge, which together with the IIL formed what was
called the Indian National Council. Swami Satyananda
Puri, a prominent member of the Lodge reportedly mentioned before the Tokyo conference that Nehru had forbidden Indians residing outside India from interfering in
her internal politics.[18] It was in this context that in a
meeting in Singapore in March 1942, a unanimous decisions were taken to seek approval of the Indian National Congress for taking Japanese assistance, and to
press for Subhash Chandra Bose to assume leadership of
the movement.[18]

1943, the Army itself was put under the command of Lt.
Col. M.Z. Kiani.[59] A policy forming body was formed
with Lt. Col J.R. Bhonsle,Director of the Military Bureau, in charge and clearly placed under the authority of
the IIL. Under Bhonsle served Lt. Col. Shah Nawaz Khan
as Chief of General Sta, Major P.K. Sahgal as Military
Secretary, Major Habib ur Rahman as commandant of
the Ocers Training School and Lt. Col. A.C. Chatterji (later Major A.D. Jahangir) as head of enlightenment and culture. A number of the ocers and troops
who had returned to PoW camps, or had not volunteered
in the rst place, made it known that they would be willing to join the INA only on the condition that it was led
by Subhash Chandra Bose.[49] Bose was a hard-line nationalist, previously having won the presidency of Indian
National Congress in the 1930s in the face of staunch

8 NOTES

opposition from Gandhi, who disagreed with Boses approach to radical nationalism. Bose had, at the start of
the war in Europe, escaped from house arrest[60] to make
his way rst to Soviet Union and then to Germany, reaching Berlin on 2 April 1941. In a series of meetings between the INA leaders and the Japanese in 1943, it was
decided to cede the leadership of the IIL and the INA to
Subhas Chandra Bose. In January 1943, the Japanese invited Bose to lead the Indian nationalist movement in East
Asia.[61] He accepted and left Germany on 8 February.
After a three-month journey by submarine, and a short
stop in Singapore, he reached Tokyo on 11 May 1943,
where he made a number of radio broadcasts to the Indian
communities, exhorting them to join in the ght for Indias Independence. The INA was revived, and the units
of dissolved INA were incorporated into Boses army.
The Hindustan Field Force formed the nucleus of the new
INAs 2nd division, to form the 1st Infantry regiment.[62]
The rst INA therefore formed the nucleus of the army
under Boses leadership, which he proclaimed the army
of his Provisional Government of Free India. It drew a
large number of civilian volunteers from Indian diaspora
in south-east Asia, eventually growing to a unit of almost
forty thousand soldiers.

[10] Lebra 1977, p. 22

[11] Dignan 1983
[12] Brown 1986, p. 421
[13] Lebra 1977, p. 19
[14] Lebra 1977, p. 20
[15] Freedom Depends on Nippon Victory. The Syonan Sinbun, 26 January 1943
[16] Fay 1993, p. 134
[17] Fay 1993, p. 89
[18] Lebra 2008, p. 41
[19] Lebra 1977, p. 23
[20] Lebra 1977, p. 24
[21] Fay 1993, p. 75
[22] Fay 1993, p. 74
[23] Fay 1993, p. 90
[24] Moreman 2005, p. 24
[25] Fay 1993, p. 70

See also
Iwaichi Fujiwara
Mohan Singh
Rash Behari Bose
Battle of Singapore
Joyce Lebra
Peter Fay

[26] Green 1948, p. 47

[27] Fay 1993, p. 83
[28] Fay 1993, p. 84
[29] Lebra 1977, p. 25
[30] Fay 1993, p. 87,95,111
[31] Fay 1993, p. 25
[32] Fay 1993, p. 88
[33] Fay 1993, p. 94

Hugh Toye

[34] Fay 1993, p. 108

Tilak Raj Sareen

[35] Fay 1993, p. 111

[36] Fay 1993, p. 109

Notes

[37] Fay 1993, p. 145

[1] Hauner 1981, p. Part I

[38] Toye 1959, p. 30

[2] Lundari 1940, p. 90

[39] Toye 1959, p. 29

[3] Cohen 1983, p. 351

[40] Toye 1959, p. 32

[4] Tojo 1943

[41] Fay 1993, p. 138,140

[5] Littlejohn 1987, pp. 137138

[42] Toye 1959, p. 33

[6] Kurowski 1997, p. 137

[43] Fay 1993, p. 139

[7] Munoz 2002

[44] Toye 1959, p. 37

[8] Lebra 1977, p. 21

[45] Toye 1959, p. 38

[9] Friedman 1940, p. 18

[46] >Lebra 2008, p. 29,36

[47] Fay 1993, p. 410

[48] Fay 1993, p. 112,134

Friedman, Irving S. (1940), Pacic Aairs, Vol.

13, No. 1., Pacic Aairs, University of British
Columbia., ISSN 0030-851X.

[49] Lebra 1977, p. 27

[50] Fay 1993, p. 91,108
[51] Fay 1993, p. 93,108
[52] Lebra 2008, p. 32
[53] Aldrich 2000, p. 45

Ghosh, K.K (1969), The Indian National Army: Second Front of the Indian Independence Movement.,
Meerut, Meenakshi Prakashan.
Green, L.C. (1948), The Indian National Army Trials. The Modern Law Review, Vol. 11, No. 1. (Jan.,
1948), pp. 4769., London, Blackwell..

[54] Fay 1993, p. 409

[55] Martson 2014, p. 117
[56] Aldrich 2000, p. 163
[57] Aldrich 2000, p. 159
[58] Lebra 2008, p. 86
[59] MZ kiani. World news. Retrieved August 12, 2011.
[60] Subhas Chandra Bose in Nazi Germany. Sisir K. Majumdar. South Asia Forum Quarterly. 1997. pp. 1014.
Retrieved August 12, 2011.
[61] Total Mobilisation. National Archives of Singapore.
Retrieved August 12, 2011.

Hauner, Milan (1981), India in Axis Strategy. Germany, Japan and Indian Nationalists in the Second World War, Stuttgart, Klett-Cotta., ISBN 3-12915340-3.
Kaushik, Karuna (1984), Russian Revolution (1917)
and Indian nationalism:Studies of Lajpat Rai, Subhash Chandra Bose and Ram Manohar Lohia, Delhi,
Chanakya Publications..
Kurowski, Franz (1997), The Brandenburgers
Global Mission., Fedorowicz (J.J.),Canada., ISBN
0-921991-38-X.

[62] Historical Journey of the Indian National Army. National Archives of Singapore. Retrieved 2007-07-07.

Lebra, Joyce C. (1977), Japanese trained armies in

South-East Asia, New York, Columbia University
Press, ISBN 0-231-03995-6.

Lebra, Joyce C. (2008), The Indian National Army

and Japan, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.,
ISBN 978-981-230-806-1.

Bibliography
Aldrich, Ricjard J (2000), Intelligence and the War
Against Japan: Britain, America and the Politics of
Secret Service, Cambridge University Press, ISBN 0521-64186-1.

Littlejohn, Davis (1987), Foreign Legions of the

Third Reich, Vol 4: Poland, the Ukraine, Bulgaria,
Romania, Free India, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Finland and Russia, San Jose, Bender Publishing.,
ISBN 0-912138-36-X.

Allen, L. (1971), (in Reviews) Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1. (1971)pp. 8992., Cambridge
University Press..

Lundari, Giuseppe (1989), I paracadutisti italiani

1937/45, Milan, E.M.I..

Brown, Emily (1986), (in Book Reviews; South

Asia). The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 45, No.
2., Pacic Aairs, University of British Columbia.,
ISSN 0030-851X.

Moreman, T.R. (2005), The Jungle, the Japanese

and the British Commonwealth Armies at War 1941
1945: Fighting Methods, Doctrine and Training for
Jungle Warfare., London and New York: Frank
Cass., ISBN 0-7146-4970-8.

Cohen, Stephen C. (1983), (in Book Reviews) Pacic

Aairs, Vol. 56, No. 2. pp. 350352, New York,
Columbia University Press, ISBN 0-231-03995-6.
Dignan, Don. (1983), The Indian revolutionary
problem in British Diplomacy,19141919., New
Delhi, Allied Publishers..
Fay, Peter W. (1993), The Forgotten Army: Indias
Armed Struggle for Independence, 19421945., Ann
Arbor, University of Michigan Press., ISBN 0-47208342-2.

Munoz, Antonio J. (2002), The East Came West:

Muslim, Hindu & Buddhist Volunteers in the German
Armed Forces, 19411945., Axis Europa Books.,
ISBN 1-891227-39-4.
Slim, W. (1961), Defeat into Victory., New York,
David McKay., ISBN 1-56849-077-1.
Tojo, Hideki (Premier) . (1943), Axis War Makes
Easier Task of Indians. Chandra Boses Berlin
Speech. Syonan Simbun, Domei.

10

10

Toye, Hugh (1959), The Springing Tiger: A Study

of the Indian National Army and of Netaji Subhas
Chandra Bose, Allied Publishers.

10

External links

From Banglapedia
Article on Bose
Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose & Indias Independence
Speeches of Netaji
Centre of South Asian Studies, University of Cambridge
Centre of South Asian Studies, University of Wisconsin
BBC Report: Hitlers secret Indian army
BBC report about the Indian Army ghting the
Japanese during World War II

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