National Labor Relations Board v. Vernitron Electrical Components, Inc., Beau Products Division, 548 F.2d 24, 1st Cir. (1977)
National Labor Relations Board v. Vernitron Electrical Components, Inc., Beau Products Division, 548 F.2d 24, 1st Cir. (1977)
2d 24
94 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2380, 80 Lab.Cas. P 11,904
In this case the National Labor Relations Board petitions for enforcement of
various orders against respondent, Vernitron Electrical Components, Inc. The
Board found that respondent had violated 8(a)(2) of the National Labor
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(2), which provides that it is an unfair labor
practice for an employer "to dominate or interfere with the formation or
administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other support
to it." On the same facts the Board also ruled that Vernitron had violated 8(a)
(1), 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1), which forbids an employer "to interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section
(7)." The Board ordered Vernitron, inter alia, to withdraw its recognition of the
allegedly illegally assisted union, Warehouse Employees Local 210, and to
reimburse employees for all union dues exacted pursuant to the collective
bargaining agreement between Local 210 and Vernitron. Respondent challenges
the Board's finding that it violated 8(a) (1) and (2) and the propriety of its
order requiring that all employees be reimbursed.
2
Under 10(e), 29 U.S.C. 160(e), "(t)he findings of the Board with respect to
questions of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered
as a whole shall be conclusive." See also Coppus Engineering Corp. v. NLRB,
240 F.2d 564, 570 (1st Cir. 1957). Having reviewed the record, we think that
the evidence supports the following findings of the Board pertinent to the
alleged violations of 8(a)(1) and (2):1
3
"This
case concerns Respondent's Laconia, New Hampshire, plant . . .. On
September 7, 1973, Respondent's president was informed by his corporate
headquarters in New York that two representatives of Local 210 would be in Laconia
on September 10 to organize the plant and was told to treat them courteously.
4 September 10 Respondent's supervisors were told to, and did, assemble their
"On
employees, by departments, for meetings with the union organizers."
5
"The
series of organization meetings lasted the entire day, employees were directed
to attend them, and all were paid for the time involved. . . . Supervisors, including
Respondent's general foreman, were present for all or part of each meeting. None of
them spoke, but all were in a position to observe the employees while the latter were
executing their authorization cards. By the end of the meetings, Local 210 had
secured authorizations from 101 of Respondent's 125 employees and Respondent
after inspecting the cards granted recognition the very same day."
6
Our task in this case is to determine whether Vernitron's conduct "went beyond
legally protected cooperation over into the proscribed domain of interference
with the freedom of choice of the employees." NLRB v. Keller Ladders
Southern, Inc., 405 F.2d 663, 667 (5th Cir. 1968). While the cases in this area
leave the location of the boundary somewhat in doubt, see Longchamps, Inc.,
205 N.L.R.B. 1025, 1026 (1973) (Chairman Miller dissenting), several guiding
principles are evident to us. The Board need not find that the employer intended
unlawfully to aid the union. ILGWU v. NLRB (Bernhard-Altmann Texas
Corp.), 366 U.S. 731, 739, 81 S.Ct. 1603, 6 L.Ed.2d 762 (1961). Nor is it
necessary for the Board to probe for the employees' subjective reaction to the
employer's support of the union. The Board may base a finding of unlawful
assistance upon the tendency of the employer's assistance to coerce employees
in the exercise of their organizational rights. NLRB v. Link-Belt Co., 311 U.S.
584, 588, 61 S.Ct. 358, 85 L.Ed. 368 (1941); Sheraton-Kauai Corp. v. NLRB,
429 F.2d 1352, 1357 (9th Cir. 1970).
11
12
First, we think that the Board could reasonably find that the employer's
shepherding of employees, department by department, to the union
organizational meetings would create in the employees' minds an impression of
employer support for the union and a sense of pressure in support of the union.
The employer's payment of the employees' wages during the meetings could
only have reinforced these feelings. And, the Board also could find that the
presence of supervisors at the meetings in positions where they could monitor
the employees' execution of authorization cards coerced employees into
supporting the union. Compare NLRB v. Keller Ladders Southern, Inc., supra,
with Coamo Knitting Mills, 150 N.L.R.B. 579, 581 (1964). Finally, we think
that the Board could legitimately conclude that the employer's speedy
recognition of the union occurred at a time when the majority signing cards was
coerced, and that this recognition "locked in" majority support which otherwise
might have eroded after the employer-assisted organizing ceased. The Board
thus legitimately found a violation of 8(a)(1) and (2).
13
Vernitron next argues that if we sustain the Board's conclusion that the
company violated 8(a)(1) and (2), we should not enforce its order that the
company reimburse employees for all union dues checked off pursuant to the
collective bargaining agreement. In reviewing the remedies ordered by the
Board we are constrained to give considerable deference to the Board's
discretion. NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 349, 73 S.Ct. 287,
97 L.Ed. 377 (1952). "But the power of the Board 'to command affirmative
action is remedial, not punitive, and is to be exercised in aid of the Board's
authority to restrain violations and as a means of removing or avoiding the
consequences of violation where those consequences are of a kind to thwart the
purposes of the Act.' " Carpenters Local 60 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651, 655, 81
S.Ct. 875, 876, 6 L.Ed.2d 1 (1961), quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB,
305 U.S. 197, 236, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938). It is necessary, therefore,
that a causal relationship exist between Vernitron's unfair labor practice and the
payment of dues. See Carpenters Local 60 v. NLRB, supra, 365 U.S. at 654-55,
81 S.Ct. 875. Here the employer checked off dues under a collective bargaining
agreement which it entered into with a union which did not represent an
uncoerced majority of the employees. We think that the dues check-off may be
viewed as coerced or caused by the employer's unfair labor practice. In order to
restore the coerced employees to the status quo ante, the Board has ordered the
company to cease bargaining with the union and to give no further effect to the
contract. We think that it was also permissible for the Board to extirpate the
effects of the illegal employer assistance to the union by ordering
reimbursement of dues which had been exacted under the union security clause
of the collective bargaining agreement. Komatz Construction, Inc. v. NLRB,
458 F.2d 317, 323 (8th Cir. 1972); NLRB v. American Beef Packers, Inc., 438
F.2d 331, 333 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 919, 91 S.Ct. 2232, 29 L.Ed.2d
691 (1971).
14
In sustaining the Board's order we are mindful that employees may have
benefited financially from the union's representation. This fact, however, does
not require the Board to order less than full reimbursement of dues. Virginia
Electric & Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 543-44, 63 S.Ct. 1214, 87 L.Ed.
1568 (1943); NLRB v. Drivers Local 886, 264 F.2d 21, 23 (10th Cir. 1959);
NLRB v. Teamsters Local 404, 205 F.2d 99, 104 (1st Cir. 1953). Nor was it
necessary for the Board to determine which employees were uncoerced in their
support of the union and to permit Vernitron to abstain from reimbursing them.
The Board's reimbursement order may rest on substantial evidence that the
majority supporting the union had been coerced. See NLRB v. Forest
City/Dillon-Tecon Pacific, 522 F.2d 1107, 1110 n.2 (9th Cir. 1975); NLRB v.
Cadillac Wire Corp., 290 F.2d 261, 263 (2d Cir. 1961); NLRB v. Revere Metal
Art Co., 280 F.2d 96, 101 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 894, 81 S.Ct. 225, 5
L.Ed.2d 189 (1960).
15
Where both the union and employer are respondents, equity may require the
Board to apportion the burden of dues reimbursement according to degree of
fault, see NLRB v. Revere Metal Art Co., supra, 280 F.2d at 101, or at least to
provide for joint and several liability, see Local 1424, IAM v. NLRB, 105
U.S.App.D.C. 102, 264 F.2d 575, 582 (1959), rev'd on other grounds, 362 U.S.
411, 80 S.Ct. 822, 4 L.Ed.2d 832 (1960); NLRB v. Broderick Wood Products
Co., 261 F.2d 548, 558-59 (10th Cir. 1958). See also Komatz Construction, Inc.
v. NLRB, supra at 325. Here, however, the union was not named as a
respondent in the charge filed with the NLRB and the Board correctly notes
that it is without power to add the union as a respondent. Radio Officers' Union
v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 54, 74 S.Ct. 323, 98 L.Ed. 455 (1954); NLRB v.
Operating Engineers Local 57, 201 F.2d 771, 774 (1st Cir. 1953). Though it
might be more equitable to require the union to bear some portion of the
reimbursement costs, the unavailability of the union as a respondent does not
render unenforceable the Board's order that the sole respondent, Vernitron, bear
the full cost of remedying the unfair labor practice. Radio Officers' Union v.
NLRB, supra.
16
Some of Vernitron's arguments are plainly irrelevant. For example, the Board's
conclusion rested entirely on the conduct of the employer in supporting Local
210's organizing efforts. Hence, we fail to see the relevance of Vernitron's
reliance on 8(c)'s protection of an employer's right to non-coercive verbal
communications concerning unionism. Vernitron is also clearly wrong in
asserting that a finding of scienter is a necessary component of employer
liability for assistance to a union in violation of 8(a)(1) and (2). See ILGWU
v. NLRB (Bernhard-Altmann Texas Corp.), 366 U.S. 731, 739, 81 S.Ct. 1603, 6
L.Ed.2d 762 (1961)