Curtis Eugene Boroff, and Paul L. Rose, Jr. v. Mail-Well Envelope Company, 931 F.2d 62, 10th Cir. (1991)
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Scribd Government DocsCurtis Eugene Boroff, and Paul L. Rose, Jr. v. Mail-Well Envelope Company, 931 F.2d 62, 10th Cir. (1991)
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Scribd Government Docs931 F.
2d 62
Unpublished Disposition
NOTICE: Tenth Circuit Rule 36.3 states that unpublished
opinions and orders and judgments have no precedential value
and shall not be cited except for purposes of establishing the
doctrines of the law of the case, res judicata, or collateral
estoppel.
Curtis Eugene BOROFF, Plaintiff-Appellant,
and
Paul L. ROSE, Jr., Plaintiff,
v.
MAIL-WELL ENVELOPE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 90-1347.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
April 23, 1991.
Before STEPHEN H. ANDERSON, TACHA and BRORBY, Circuit
Judges.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
STEPHEN H. ANDERSON, Circuit Judge.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of this appeal. See Fed.R.App.P. 34(a); 10th Cir.R. 34.1.9. This cause is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff, Curtis Eugene Boroff, appeals a district court order granting
defendant, Mail-Well Envelope Company's ("Mail-Well") motion for summary
judgment. We affirm.
Mr. Boroff was employed by Mail-Well from March 27, 1975, to June 10,
1988. He was injured on the job in April 1988. He then filed a worker's
compensation claim and engaged attorneys to represent him. Mail-Well
terminated Boroff's employment on June 10, 1988, citing Boroff's fight with
another employee as its reason. On May 25, 1990, Boroff sued Mail-Well in
Colorado state district court for breach of contract and wrongful termination
alleging that he was fied in violation of Mail-Well's employment policies and in
retaliation for his worker's compensation claim. Mail-Well removed the case to
the United States District Court for the District of Colorado pursuant to 28
U.S.C. Sec. 1441.
4
Separately, Boroff pursued a worker's compensation claim before the Colorado
State Industrial Commission, seeking post-termination disability benefits.
Those proceedings included a full hearing at which Boroff was represented by
counsel and presented evidence on his own behalf. The cause of his termination
from Mail-Well was an issue since, under Colorado law, an employee is
precluded from post-termination disability benefits if the termination occurs
through the fault of the employee. On June 18, 1990, a Colorado
Administrative Law Judge, Bruce C. Friend, ruled that Boroff was not entitled
to disability benefits because "the claimant's employment was terminated when
he got into a fight with a fellow employee. The claimant was at fault for the
termination." R. Vol. I, tab 17, Ex. A at 4.
Subsequently, Mail-Well amended its answer in the federal court proceedings
and raised the affirmative defense of collateral estoppel, claiming that as a
result of the Colorado administrative proceedings Boroff was estopped to
further litigate the reason for his termination from Mail-Well. Based on that
defense Mail-Well filed a motion for summary judgment which the district
court granted.
On appeal, Boroff contends that the state administrative proceeding cannot be
given preclusive effect in his federal court lawsuit against Mail-Well and, in
any event, the issue before the state industrial commission was not the cause of
his termination but whether he was entitled to permanent partial disability
benefits.
We review de novo an order granting or denying summary judgment, applying
the same standards as the district court. Osgood v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 848 F.2d 141, 143 (10th Cir.1988). We are obliged to examine the record
to "determine whether any genuine issue of material fact pertinent to the ruling
remains, and if not, whether the substantive law was correctly applied." Florum
v. Elliott Mfg., 867 F.2d 570, 574 (10th Cir.1989) (citation omitted); see also
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "In determining whether any genuine issues of material fact
exist, the record must be construed liberally in favor of the party opposing
summary judgment." Setliff v. Memorial Hosp., 850 F.2d 1384, 1391-92 (10th
Cir.1988); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).
8
Since this is a diversity case we must examine Colorado law to determine
whether Colorado courts would give preclusive effect to an administrative law
judge's decision in a worker's compensation proceeding. See Atchison v.
Wyoming, 763 F.2d 388, 391 (10th Cir.1985); Peffer v. Bennett, 523 F.2d
1323, 1325 (10th Cir.1975). There is abundant Colorado authority for the
proposition that administrative decisions are given preclusive effect in later
administrative proceedings if "the administrative body that made the initial
determination had subject matter jurisdiction." Wilson v. Avon, 749 P.2d 990,
993 (Colo.App.1987); see also Whelden v. Board of County Comm'rs, 782 P.2d
853, 856 (Colo.App.1989); City of Colo. Springs v. Industrial Comm'n, 720
P.2d 601, 602 (Colo.App.1985); Mabry v. Industrial Comm'n, 692 P.2d 1136,
1137 (Colo.App.1984)). Of course, "[t]he applicability of this doctrine may
also be limited by statute." City of Colo. Springs v. Industrial Comm'n, 720
P.2d at 602 (discussing Colorado Employment Security Act). Research has
disclosed no Colorado case discussing whether Colorado courts will give
preclusive effect to administrative agency proceedings. However, in Smith v.
Pinner, 891 F.2d 784, 787 n. 4 (10th Cir.1989), we concluded that Colorado
courts would accord preclusive effect to administrative findings.
In Smith this court estopped a plaintiff from denying the "existence of his
ridesharing arrangement," which the parties had stipulated in the worker's
compensation hearing before the Colorado Industrial Commission. Smith v.
Pinner, 891 F.2d at 787. The stipulated fact had been one reason for denying
benefits. Id. The opinion states:
10
We do not consider the initial administrative context of plaintiff's stipulation an
impediment to invocation of this rule of judicial estoppel, since it is wellestablished in Colorado that the closely related principles of collateral estoppel
and res judicata also apply to administrative decisions, so long as the tribunal in
question possesses subject matter jurisdiction.
11
Smith v. Pinner, 891 F.2d at 787 n. 4.
12
Prior to Smith we held in McCulloch Interstate Gas Corp. v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 536 F.2d 910, 913 (10th Cir.1976) that "[a]n agency's determination
of facts underlying its conclusion that jurisdiction was lacking must be given
[collateral estoppel] effect in subsequent litigation." Likewise, in Rodriguez v.
Bar-S Food Co., 567 F.Supp. 1241, 1245 (D.Colo.1983), the federal district
court in Colorado, following Umberfield v. School Dist. No. 11, 522 P.2d 730
(Colo.1974), concluded that Colorado state courts would give preclusive effect
to an arbitration award in a subsequent judicial proceeding. See also Terrones v.
Allen, 680 F.Supp. 1483, 1485-87 (D.Colo.1988).
13
These cases are consistent with the general rule. Recently, in University of
Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 798 (1986), the Supreme Court stated:
14
[W]hen a state agency "acting in a judicial capacity ... resolves disputed issues
of fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to
litigate," Utah Construction & Mining Co., [384 U.S.] at 422, federal courts
must give the agency's factfinding the same preclusive effect to which it would
be entitled in the State's courts.
15
Id. at 799 (footnote omitted).1 Similarly in Long v. United States Dept. of Air
Force, 751 F.2d 339, 343 (10th Cir.1984), this court, following United States v.
Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966),2 applied res judicata, a
doctrine related to collateral estoppel, to a prior administrative proceeding.
16
In summary, then, we hold that Colorado courts would give preclusive effect to
matters involved in worker's compensation proceedings before the Colorado
Industrial Commission, provided, of course, that the particular issue or claim
sought to be precluded passes muster under rules applying to preclusion
generally.
17
In Colorado the doctrine of collateral estoppel "bars relitigation of an issue
actually litigated in a previous case" if:
18
(1) the issue precluded is identical to an issue actually litigated and necessarily
adjudicated in the prior proceeding;
19
(2) the party against whom estoppel is sought was a party to or was in privity
with a party to the prior proceeding;
20
(3) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior proceeding; and
21
(4) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding.
22
Industrial Comm'n v. Moffat, 732 P.2d 616, 619-20 (Colo.1987) (footnote
omitted) (citing People v. Hearty, 644 P.2d 302, 312 (Colo.1982); Pomeroy v.
Waitkus, 517 P.2d 396, 399 (Colo.1973)). Here, the issue sought to be
precluded is the cause of Boroff's termination.
23
As to that issue we find, first, that the cause of termination is a question
identical to both proceedings and was necessary to Judge Friend's ruling. In his
objection to Mail-Well's motion for summary judgment, Boroff argued that
"the only issue determined or to be determined [in the administrative hearing]
was whether the plaintiff was entitled to permanent partial disability benefits....
[N]o other issues were necessarily determined by Judge Friend." R.Vol. I, tab
23 at 3-5. On the contrary, as Mail-Well argued in its Reply Brief concerning
its summary judgment motion, it asserted at the hearing that Boroff "was not
entitled to any benefits after his termination from employment with Mail-Well
because, among other reasons, the termination was his own fault and he was
therefore precluded from benefits under Monfort of Colo. v. Husson, 725 P.2d
67 (Colo.App.1986)." R.Vol. I, tab 28, Affidavit of Pamela Musgrave. In
Monfort of Colo. v. Husson, 725 P.2d at 69, the Colorado Court of Appeals
stated that "[w]here a temporarily disabled employee is determined to be at
fault for his termination, subsequent wage loss is caused not by the injury, but
rather by the employee's act which led to the termination." Therefore, "the issue
of fault with reference to the termination is the dispositive consideration." Id.
24
The parties do not dispute the second element. With respect to the third
element, we do not agree with Boroff that his appeal of Judge Friend's decision
makes it not final for the application of collateral estoppel. R.Vol. I, tab 23 at 5.
In Colorado, the "pending appeal of [a] prior administrative ruling does not
prevent application of [the] doctrine of collateral estoppel in [a] subsequent
administrative proceedin[g]." Bunnett v. Smallwood, 768 P.2d 736, 740
(Colo.App.1988) (citing Jefferson County School Dist. v. Industrial Comm'n,
698 P.2d 1350 (Colo.App.1984)); see also Miller v. Lunnon, 703 P.2d 640, 643
(Colo.App.1985) ("a judgment otherwise final remains so despite the taking of
an appeal unless what is called an appeal actually consists of a trial de novo."
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments Sec. 13 comment f (1982)).
Common sense tells us that as between an administrative proceeding and a
subsequent court proceeding that is not the review of the first, the same
principle would apply.
25
Finally, Boroff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the reason for his
employment termination. This reason was central to Judge Friend's decision to
deny benefits to him. Boroff was represented by counsel, testified, and had the
opportunity both to present evidence and cross examine witnesses.
26
In conclusion, we find that the Colorado state courts would have applied the
doctrine of collateral estoppel to preclude Boroff from relitigating the reasons
for his employment termination. Therefore, the district court correctly applied
the Colorado doctrine of collateral estoppel to the case below. Consequently, no
issues of material fact remain to be determined by a jury.
27
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court's grant of summary judgment on all
issues. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall not be cited, or
used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except for purposes of establishing
the doctrines of the law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th
Cir.R. 36.3
Title VII claims are exceptions to the application of the collateral estoppel
doctrine to administrative findings later raised in a federal court. University of
Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. at 796
The United States Supreme Court in United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining
Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966) applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel in a contract
dispute between the government and a private contractor when both the contract
dispute clause and the Wunderlich Act "state[d] that administrative findings on
factual issues relevant to questions arising under the contract shall be final and
conclusive on the parties." Id. at 419 (footnote omitted). The "administrative
findings [in question] ... were appropriately made and obviously relevant to
another claim within the jurisdiction of the board." Id. The Court then stated:
"Although the decision here rests upon the agreement of the parties as modified
by the Wunderlich Act, we note that the result we reach is harmonious with
general principles of collateral estoppel." Id. at 421 (footnote omitted)
