Francisco J. Rivera v. Stephen A. Leal, 359 F.3d 1350, 11th Cir. (2004)
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Scribd Government DocsFrancisco J. Rivera v. Stephen A. Leal, 359 F.3d 1350, 11th Cir. (2004)
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Scribd Government Docs359 F.
3d 1350
Francisco J. RIVERA, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Stephen A. LEAL, individually, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 03-11046.
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
Filed February 11, 2004.
Hugh L. Koerner, Ft. Lauderdale, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Samuel Robert Mandelbaum, Scott Kenneth Hewitt, Mandelbaum &
Fitzsimmons, P.A., Tampa, FL, for Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Florida.
Before ANDERSON and BLACK, Circuit Judges, and NANGLE* ,
District Judge.
BLACK, Circuit Judge:
We are called upon to determine whether a prosecutor is absolutely immune to
suits for money damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983, where the prosecutor
obtained the driver's license records of a wrongly-arrested person and one
other, erroneously concluded the second person was actually the wanted party,
and shared that (unsworn) opinion with a state judge during a court proceeding.
We conclude the prosecutor is absolutely immune.
I. BACKGROUND
2
The issue in this case is whether the prosecutor can meet his burden under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) by showing that absolute immunity is
justified for each of Appellant's claims. We are required to "make two
important assumptions about the case: first, that [Appellant's] allegations are
entirely true; and, second, that they allege constitutional violations for which
1983 provides a remedy." Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 261, 113 S.Ct.
2606, 2609, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993). The following "statement of facts is
therefore derived entirely from [Appellant's] complaint and is limited to matters
relevant to [the prosecutor's] claim to absolute immunity." Id.
3
This case concerns three men, each named Francisco Rivera, and the confusion
that has resulted from attempting to determine which one of them committed
grand theft auto in 1993.
Rivera # 1 is the man that actually committed the crime. After he failed to
appear at his arraignment, a capias was issued for his arrest.
By mistake, Rivera # 2 was arrested instead. At the time of the arrest, Appellee
Stephen A. Leal was an Assistant State Attorney in the Thirteenth Judicial
Circuit for Hillsborough County.
After posting bond, Rivera # 2 was released from custody. He then retained an
attorney to represent him. The attorney subsequently contacted Leal and
provided him with various documents demonstrating that his client Rivera #
2 had not entered the United States until 1994 and thus could not have
committed the 1993 offense. These documents included a foreign birth
certificate, foreign educational records, and copies of plane tickets.
The case against Rivera # 2 was continued for a hearing as to whether Rivera #
2 was the same person as Rivera # 1. Prior to the commencement of this
hearing, Leal sought to obtain additional confirmation that Rivera # 2 was not
Rivera # 1 by comparing their respective driver's license records (records). Leal
had no trouble obtaining Rivera # 2's record. Instead of getting Rivera's # 1's
record, however, Leal received that of Rivera # 3 (Appellant).
The records of Rivera # 1 and Appellant contained different social security
numbers, different driver's license numbers, and different dates of birth.
Nevertheless, Leal treated Appellant's record as if it were Rivera # 1's. And,
given that Rivera # 2's record showed him to be a different person entirely, Leal
concluded Rivera # 2 had been erroneously arrested.
Leal appeared in state court for the hearing set to determine whether Rivera # 2
was Rivera # 1. As the following excerpt from the transcript of the proceeding
indicates, Leal neither presented sworn testimony nor requested that a new
capias be issued:
10
Mr. Leal: Your Honor, we had continued this case because [Rivera # 2] who's
10
Mr. Leal: Your Honor, we had continued this case because [Rivera # 2] who's
in court today was maintaining that he was not the person involved in this
particular incident. I researched it and pulled driving records on both
individuals and managed to get photographic IDs of each individual....
11
The wrong person has been arrested in this case. There is ... [Appellant] who
resides in Miami who is the one that we wanted and then there is this person
who is [Rivera # 2]. They've also provided documentation showing [Rivera # 2]
wasn't even in the country at the time this offense occurred.
12
The Court: Okay.
13
Mr. Leal: So at this point in time I'm not sure how best to proceed....
***
14
15
[The court asked Leal a series of questions about the driver's license records, all
of which Leal answered in a straightforward manner.]
***
16
17
The Court: We'll [release Rivera # 2]... and issue a capias for [Appellant].
18
The capias that issued with Rivera's #2's release contained all of Appellant's
personal information except for his social security number, which it gave as
Rivera # 1's. Appellant was arrested on this capias and held without bond. After
approximately 14 days, the State dropped its case and released Appellant.
19
Appellant brought this 1983 action for damages against Leal alleging
violation of his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments (Count I:
"Fourth Amendment Claim" and Count II: "Franks v. Delaware Claim").
Appellant also sought relief under Florida law for malicious prosecution (Count
III: "Malicious Prosecution Claim"). Leal moved, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), to
dismiss all of Appellant's claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted. Leal asserted absolute immunity.
20
The district court found Leal's actions were shielded by absolute immunity and
dismissed the suit. Appellant contends the district court erred.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
21
We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). Lotierzo
v. A Woman's World Med. Ctr., Inc., 278 F.3d 1180, 1182 (11th Cir.2002).
III. DISCUSSION
22
The Supreme Court has repeatedly endorsed the use of a "functional approach"
when determining whether a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity.
Buckley, 509 U.S. at 269, 113 S.Ct. at 2613. Thus, we look to "the nature of the
function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it." Id. (quoting
Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229, 108 S.Ct. 538, 545, 98 L.Ed.2d 555
(1988)). The Court has also explained that "the official seeking absolute
immunity bears the burden of showing that such immunity is justified for the
function in question." Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 1939,
114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991).
23
A prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity for all actions he takes while
performing his function as an advocate for the government. Buckley, 509 U.S.
at 273, 113 S.Ct. at 2615-16. The prosecutorial function includes the initiation
and pursuit of criminal prosecution, Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431, 96
S.Ct. 984, 995, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976), and most appearances before the court,
including examining witnesses and presenting evidence, see Burns, 500 U.S. at
492, 111 S.Ct. at 1942. The prosecutorial function, however, specifically does
not include functioning as either an investigator, Buckley, 509 U.S. at 275, 113
S.Ct. at 2617, or as a complaining witness, Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118,
129-31, 118 S.Ct. 502, 509-10, 139 L.Ed.2d 471 (1997).
24
Appellant contends Leal functioned as both an investigator and a complaining
witness. We disagree.
25
A. Whether Leal Functioned as an Investigator
26
A prosecutor functions as an investigator when he "search[es] for the clues and
corroboration that might give him probable cause to recommend that a suspect
be arrested." Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273, 113 S.Ct. at 2616. For example, a
prosecutor so functions if, pre-indictment, he visits a crime scene, endeavoring
to identify the source of a bootprint left there. Id. at 274-75, 113 S.Ct. at 2616.
Similarly, a prosecutor also functions as an investigator when he participates in
the search of a suspect's apartment. Rowe v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 279 F.3d
1271, 1280 (11th Cir.2002).
27
Appellant argues that Leal functioned as an investigator when he obtained the
driver's license records of both Rivera # 2 and Appellant and compared them. In
Appellant's view, at the time Leal obtained the records, he was not in court, and
so could not have been functioning as an advocate.
28
Appellant's argument fails to persuade for several reasons. First, obtaining
public records and examining them constitutes, at most, a minimal degree of
investigation. Unlike the prosecutors in Buckley and Rowe, Leal never left his
normal work environment. He did not go to the scene of a crime, nor did he
participate in a search. All he did was obtain and examine information that was
readily available to anyone. Consequently, it is conceptually difficult to view
his actions as rising to the level of police work.
29
Second, there is no indication that Leal was trying to establish probable cause
to arrest Appellant. In fact, the purpose of the hearing was to establish whether
Rivera #2 was innocent. Leal never even requested a capias. Indeed, the most
he asked the court to do was to provide guidance as to "how best to proceed."
30
Third, Leal consulted the driver's license records only because Rivera # 2
claimed to have been mistakenly arrested. As the Supreme Court has noted, "
[t]here is a difference between the advocate's role in evaluating evidence ... as
he prepares for trial ... and the detective's role in searching for the clues ... that
might give him probable cause to recommend that a suspect be arrested."
Buckley, 509 U.S. at 273, 113 S.Ct. at 2616.
31
The information Rivera # 2 communicated to Leal turned out to be true; thus,
Leal shared it with the court. Had the information provided by Rivera #2 been
false, however, Leal might still have had to address it at trial. Either way, Leal
was functioning as an advocate because he was preparing for "the initiation of
judicial proceedings or for trial." See id. at 273, 113 S.Ct. at 2615.
32
Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, it is squarely in the public interest for
prosecutors to be absolutely immune with respect to their efforts to clear
innocent persons wrongly arrested. A hallmark of effective judicial process is
the care taken to ensure that nobody is erroneously charged, arrested, or
incarcerated. When the system fails, even temporarily, and a prosecutor has
knowledge of that failure, as did Leal, the prosecutor is expected to do what he
can to correct the error.
33
Qualifying prosecutorial immunity here would undercut the broader public
interest by potentially constraining "the vigorous and fearless performance of
the prosecutor's duty" upon which the system relies. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at
427-28, 96 S.Ct. at 993-94. Just as a prosecutor is absolutely immune for his
actions relating to the initiation and pursuit of a criminal prosecution, id. at 431,
96 S.Ct. at 995, so too must he be absolutely immune when his actions are
directed at clearing the name of an innocent person.
34
We certainly sympathize with Appellant. Even though Leal's actions were
directed at the admirable objective of clearing Rivera # 2's name, they were
also the proximate if unwitting cause of Appellant's arrest and
incarceration. As Judge Learned Hand observed, however, it is our task to
balance the evils. See Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir.1949),
quoted in Imbler, 424 U.S. at 428, 96 S.Ct. at 994. This we have done. If the
impact of our holding is that prosecutors seeking the release of an innocent
person are permitted to "investigate" slightly more than they otherwise can and
still be absolutely immune, so be it. The alternative creating an environment
where a prosecutor in Leal's situation might fear exposure to vexatious
litigation would be far worse. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 428, 96 S.Ct. at 994
(quoting Gregoire, 177 F.2d at 581) ("`[B]etter to leave unredressed the wrongs
done ... than to subject those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of
retaliation.'").
35
In sum, we hold that Leal was functioning as an advocate for the State and
not as an investigator when he obtained and compared driver's license
records. As such, absolute immunity shields those actions from suit.
36
B. Whether Leal Functioned as a Complaining Witness
37
Generally, prosecutorial actions that occur in court are shielded by absolute
immunity, see Burns, 500 U.S. at 491-92, 111 S.Ct. at 1942; Imbler, 424 U.S. at
430-31, 96 S.Ct. at 995, even where the prosecutor knowingly proffers perjured
testimony or fabricated exhibits, Rowe, 279 F.3d at 1279-80. An exception,
however, is when a prosecutor personally swears to the truth of information he
shares with the court. Kalina, 522 U.S. at 129-30, 118 S.Ct. at 509. In such
cases, the prosecutor functions as a complaining witness and is no longer
protected by absolute immunity. See id. at 131, 118 S.Ct. at 510.
38
Appellant argues that, because Leal made statements about him to the court,
Leal functioned as a complaining witness, and not as a prosecutor. Moreover,
because Leal's statements to the court provided the sole basis for the issuance
of the capias that led to Appellant's arrest, Appellant contends it is irrelevant
that Leal's "testimony" was unsworn.
39
We disagree. The sworn/unsworn distinction is more than critical; it is
determinative. In Kalina, a prosecutor filed three documents with the court: (1)
an information charging the defendant in that case with burglary; (2) a motion
for an arrest warrant; and (3) a sworn certification of probable cause, which
contained two inaccurate factual statements. 522 U.S. at 121, 118 S.Ct. at 505.
The Supreme Court held that the prosecutor acted as an advocate except for his
swearing to the truth of the certification. Id. at 129, 118 S.Ct. at 509. In that
regard alone, the Court held that the prosecutor functioned as a complaining
witness, which meant that he was not protected by absolute immunity so far as
the contents of the certification were concerned. See id. at 130, 118 S.Ct. at 510
("Testifying about facts is the function of the witness, not of the lawyer.").
40
In this case, Leal never personally swore to the truth of any information he
shared with the court. There is also no indication that Leal sought the issuance
of a capias. Accordingly, we conclude that he did not function as a complaining
witness. Granted, some of his information was inaccurate and he was careless
to share it without checking further, but that does not change the fact that
absolute immunity shields his actions as an advocate.
IV. CONCLUSION
41
For the reasons stated, we hold Leal did not abandon the role of advocate to
function as either an investigator or a complaining witness. Accordingly, his
actions are shielded by absolute immunity, and the district court's dismissal of
Appellant's claims is
42
AFFIRMED.
Notes:
*
Honorable John F. Nangle, United States District Judge for the Eastern District
of Missouri, sitting by designation
