Bengzon Vs Drilon Case Digest
Bengzon Vs Drilon Case Digest
GR 103521
April 15, 1992
Gutierrez, Jr. J.:
FACTS:
In 1957, Republic Act No. 1797 was enacted and provided for the adjustment of
pensions of retired Justices. Such privilege was extended to retired members of
Constitutional Commissions by Republic Act No. 3595 and later to retired members of
the Armed Forces by PD No. 578. In 1975, President Marcos issued PD No. 644 which
repealed the foregoing Acts. Shortly after, President Marcos restored automatic
readjustments of pensions for retired Armed Forces officers only. The apparent
unfairness led the Congress to pass House Bill No. 16297 in 1990 to restore the
repealed provisions by PD No. 644. President Aquino vetoed the House Bill. Meanwhile
in 1991, PD No. 644, upon petition of retired Justices, was declared to be null and void
for lack of a valid publication pursuant to Tanada vs Tuvera. Pursuant to the ruling, the
Congress included in the General Appropriations Bill of 1992 appropriations for the
payment of adjusted pension rates of the retired Justices. President Aquino vetoed all
that related to the use of savings for augmenting items for the payment of said pension
rates for the reason, among others, that it nullified her veto of House Bill No. 16297 in
1990. Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of presidential vetoes.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the presidential vetoes contravene the constitutional provision on the
Judiciarys fiscal autonomy
HELD:
Yes. Fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary contemplates a guarantee of full
flexibility to allocate and utilize resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs
require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates
of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized buy law xxx and pay plans
of the government and allocate such sums as may be provided by law and prescribed
by them in the discharge of their functions. It means freedom from outside control. In the
case at bar, the veto of the subject provisions (which relate to the use of savings for
augmenting items for the payment of pension differentials) of the General
Appropriations Act is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary how its funds should be
utilized. The veto impairs the power of the Chief Justice to augment other items in the
Judiciarys appropriation, in contravention of the constitutional provision on fiscal
autonomy.