Chapter-3 Electrical Protection System
Chapter-3 Electrical Protection System
DESIGN CONSIDERATION
Protection system adopted for securing protection and the protection scheme i.e. the coordinated
arrangement of relays and accessories is discussed for the following elements of power system.
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
Hydro Generators
Generator Transformers
H. V. Bus bars
Line Protection and Islanding
Primary function of the protective system is to detect and isolate all failed or faulted components as quickly
as possible, thereby minimizing the disruption to the remainder of the electric system. Accordingly the
protection system should be dependable (operate when required), secure (not operate unnecessarily),
selective (only the minimum number of devices should operate) and as fast as required. Without this
primary requirement protection system would be largely ineffective and may even become liability.
3.1.1
Reliability of Protection
Factors affecting reliability are as follows;
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
Quality of relays
Component and circuits involved in fault clearance e.g. circuit breaker trip and control circuits,
instrument transformers
Maintenance of protection equipment
Quality of maintenance operating staff
Failure records indicate the following order of likelihood of relays failure, breaker, wiring, current
transformers, voltage transformers and D C. battery. Accordingly local and remote back up arrangement are
required to be provided.
3.1.2
Selectivity
Selectivity is required to prevent unnecessary loss of plant and circuits. Protection should be provided in
overlapping zones so that no part of the power system remains unprotected and faulty zone is disconnected
and isolated.
3.1.3
Speed
Factors affecting fault clearance time and speed of relay is as follows:
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
3.1.4
Economic consideration
Selectivity
System stability
Equipment damage
Sensitivity
Protection must be sufficiently sensitive to operate reliably under minimum fault conditions for a fault
within its own zone while remaining stable under maximum load or through fault condition.
3.1.5
Protection Zones
Overlapping zones of protection are provided so that no part of power system remains unprotected. The
point of connection of the protection with the power system normally defines the zone boundary and
generally corresponds to the position of the current transformers. Current transformers if provided on both
105
sides of circuit breaker overlap Figure 3.1 (a). If they are provided on one side blind spots occur Figure 3.1
(b). Fault between CT and the circuit breaker will not trip the feeder CB and fault current will continue to
flow until cleared by back up protection.
3.1.6
3.1.7
Fault Data
Protective relay systems measure the current, voltage, or a combination of current and voltage during fault
conditions. Fault current magnitude, and the associated change in voltage, varies with the type of fault and
with the location of the fault with respect to the sensing devices.
FEEDER PROTECTION
BUS ZONE
PROTECTION
TRANSFORMER
PROTECTION
GENERATOR
PROTECTION
(a)
(b)
Figure 3.1
106
Therefore, a study of the types of faults that can occur is important to ensure that the selected protection
system can detect and isolate all faulted portions of the electric system. The types of faults that should be
considered are three-phase, phase-to-phase, double-phase-to-ground, and single-phase-to-ground.
3.1.8
3.1.9
Circuit-Interrupting Devices
Fuses are single phase protective devices that combine sensing and interrupting functions into a single unit.
Fuse operation is based on the magnitude and duration of current flowing in each phase of the circuit. The
primary application considerations include maximum load, minimum and maximum fault current available,
interrupting rating, operating time of the fuse relative to the operating time of protective devices on both
the consumer and utility systems, and the effects of single-phase supply due to the operation of one fuse.
Miniature circuit breakers are replacing fuses.
A circuit breaker is an interrupting device designed for normal switching functions as well as for fault
interruption. Circuit breakers offer considerable flexibility and are available in variety of voltage, current,
and fault current interrupting ratings. High-voltage circuit breakers are equipped with separate electrically
operated close and trip coils that can be controlled by any required protection and control package. Lowvoltage circuit breakers can be equipped with shunt trip devices but are usually self-contained with integral
thermal magnetic or solid-state trip units.
A considerations in the application of interrupting devices is the source of control power for the close and
trip coils. A station battery is considered the most reliable source of dc control power, because battery
output voltage is not affected by the ac voltage drop that can occur during short-circuit conditions. A
capacitive trip device will store energy for a short period of time that is sufficient to trip a breaker. This
device may be used under circumstances when it is not practical to use a battery. When capacitive trip is
used, the power to both the trip and close circuits is AC. The location of the ac source must be on the utility
side of the main beaker to ensure power is available to close the main breaker.
107
who performs the study, any results that impact on the design or operation of the interconnection should be
communicated to the concerned parties.
Multi function protective relays may be cost effective for generator and line protection when many
individual relays are required. When multifunctional relays are selected limited back up conventional relays
be provided based upon safety, cost of equipment lost or damaged, repairs. Back up protective relays with
different designs and instrument transformers should be provided for reliably and security and avoid blind
spots.
3.2
INSTRUMENT TRANSFORMER
3.2.1
Introduction
Instruments transformers i.e. current transformer and voltage transformers insulate secondary circuits
from Primary (power) circuit and provide quantities which are proportional to those in primary. These
quantities are used for metering and relaying circuits. Current and voltage transformers are regarded as
constituting part of the protection system and must be carefully matched with the protective relay.
Measuring current transformers for metering are required to accurately perform its function over normal
range of load currents, whereas protective current transformers is required to provide sufficiently accurate
secondary current to provide satisfactory protection over a wide range of fault current from a fraction of
full load to many times of full load. Therefore separate type of current transformers are used for measuring
and protection. In case of voltage transformers same transformers can serve both the purposes.
Protective relays in a. c. power systems are connected in the secondary circuits of current transformers and
potential transformers. In current transformers, primary current is not controlled by condition of the
secondary circuit. Hence primary current is dominant in the operation of current transformers. Instrument
transformers are further classified into two groups:
1.
2.
Protective instrument transformers used in association with relays, trip coils, pilot wires etc.
Measuring instrument transformers used in conjunction with ammeter, wattmeter etc.
As a result, the ratio error is very important in protective current transformers, and phase angle error may
be less important. Voltage transformer is used for transforming voltage from one value to another
(generally lower) value. Both current transformers and voltage transformers come under the title Instrument
transformers. Discussions in this book are based on Indian Standards Mentioned here in under.
Latest version of following Standards may be referred for complete information.
3.2.2
A.
Current Transformer
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
B.
Voltage Transformer
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
Current Transformer
Primary requirement is that current ratio must be constant. Primary winding is connected in series with load
and carries load current to be measured. The winding is connected to the relay or metering unit. Secondary
109
current for relay together with load resistance and winding impedance constitute the burden of the
transformer. Primary current contains two components.
a) Secondary current which is transformed and is in inverse ratio of the turns ratio.
b) Exciting current to magnetise the core and supply eddy and hysteresis losses and is not transformed.
Amount of exciting current depends upon core material and burden requirement.
The ratio error is given by the following expression.
% error =
=
=
=
Ka
Is
Ip
K a I s I p 100
Ip
Rated transformation ratio
Actual secondary current
Actual primary current
As the relay time has reduced to the order of a few mili-seconds in modern protective relays, the transient
behavior of current transformers and voltage transformers needs more attention. In order to prevent
saturation of current transformer cores during sub-transient currents, larger cores and air gaps are
introduced in CTs for fast protective relays.
The standard specifications given by IEC, IEEE and IS cover several aspects about current transformers
such as general requirements, specifications, testing, applications, terms and definitions.
The major criterion of the selection of the current transformer ratio almost invariably is maximum load
current. In other words, the current transformer secondary current at maximum load currents, should not
exceed the continuous current rating of the applied relay. This is particularly applicable to phase type relays
where load current flows through the relays. This criterion applies indirectly to the ground relays even
though they do not receive current because they are generally connected to the same set of current
transformers as the phase relays. Since the ratio has been set on the basis of load current of the phase
relays, this ratio would then apply to the ground relay. The current transformer ratio is selected to provide
around 5 amperes or 1 amp. (in switchyard) secondary for the maximum load current. Where deltaconnected CTs are used, the 3 factors should not be overlooked.
3.2.3
This is generally expressed as a percentage of the rms value of the primary current according to the
expression given below:
Composite error =
Where
IP
T
Kn
is
ip
100 1 T
2
0 (K nis iP ) dt
IP T
110
Accuracy Limit Factor: The ratio of the rated accuracy limits primary current to the rated primary current.
Standard accuracy limit factors are 5, 10, 15, 20 and 30. Rated Accuracy Limit Primary Currents
The value of the highest primary current up to which the transformer will comply with the specified limits
of composite error. It is the product of rated primary current and rated accuracy limit factor.
Excitation Current: The rms value of the current taken by the secondary winding of a current transformer
when sinusoidal voltage of rated frequency is applied to the secondary terminals; the primary and any other
windings being open-circuited.
Standard Accuracy Classes: For protective current transformer, the accuracy class is designated by the
highest permissible percentage composite error at the rated accuracy limit primary current prescribed for
the accuracy class concerned, followed by the letter P (meaning protection). The standard accuracy
classes for protective current transformers are 5P, 10P and 15P.
Standard accuracy class for measuring current transformers are 0.1, 0.2, 0.5, 1, 3and 5.
Knee-Point Voltage: That sinusoidal voltage of rated frequency applied to the secondary terminals of the
transformer, all other windings being open-circuited, which when increased by 10%, causes the exciting
current to increase by 50%.
As per IS: 2705 Minimum knee point voltage (Vk) is specified in accordance with a formula of the type:
Vk
K. Is (Rct + Rb)
Where,
Vk
is the minimum knee point voltage in volts,
K
Is
Rct
Rb
is a parameter to be specified by the purchaser which depends on the system fault level and the
characteristics of the relay intended to be used.
is the rated secondary current of the current transformer (or the secondary current as derived from
a specified turns ratio and primary current)
is the resistance of the secondary winding corrected to 750C (generally left to manufacturer)
is the impedance of the secondary circuit as specified by the purchaser
Phase Displacement: The difference in phase between the primary and secondary current vectors, the
direction of the vectors being so chosen that the angle is zero for a perfect transformer. The phase
displacement is said to be positive when the secondary current vector leads the primary current vector. It is
usually expressed in minutes.
3.2.4
111
Table 3.2: Limits for error for Special Application Accuracy Class 0.2S and 0.5S
Accuracy
Class
(1)
0.2S
0.5S
1
(7)
30
90
(1)
(percent)
(2)
(minutes)
(3)
5P
10P
15P
1
3
5
60
-
5
10
15
Rated Burden: The burden on a protective CT is composed of the individual burdens of the associated
relays or trip coils, instruments (if used) and the connecting leads.
Normally, the standard VA rating nearest to the burden computed should be used,. But attention is drawn to
the fact that a device may have different impedance under different operating conditions. The VA burden
which is effectively imposed on the CT at rated secondary current is given by the following formulas:
Pe
Where
Pe
Pr
Is
Ir
I
= Pr s
Ir
In selecting the most suitable standard rated output it is undesirable to specify a value which substantially
exceeds the burden as computed above; to do so might result in a transformer uneconomic in cost or of
unduly large dimensions. When the nearest standard VA rating is less than the total computed burden, it is
usually satisfactory to adopt the former.
Rated Accuracy Limit Factor: In determining the appropriate accuracy limit factor for a given
application, the important point to consider is the maximum value of primary current up to which
maintenance of ratio is required, other factors however, are also involved. The capabilities of a protective
current transformer are determined by the primary ampere-turns, the core dimension and material, and they
are roughly proportional to the product of the rated burden and the rated accuracy limit factor. With present
day material and normal dimensions, this product has a maximum value of about 150.
Correlation of Burden and Accuracy Limit Factor: Accuracy limit factor higher than 10 and rated
burdens higher than 15 VA are not recommended for general purposes. It is possible, however to combine a
higher rated accuracy limit factor with a lower burden rating and vice versa; but when the product of these
two exceeds the resulting current transformer may be uneconomical and/or of unusually large dimensions.
Moreover, it might not be possible to attain a product of 150 if the current transformers are of the woundprimary type with low ratio and high rated short-time thermal current.
Accuracy Class: The required accuracy class of protection current transformer is dependent upon the
particular application and examples of its selection with particular regard to associated values of rated
accuracy limit and rated burden is in the examples.
3.2.5
For such applications, the current transformers characteristic are normally specified in the following terms:
a)
b)
c)
Knee-point voltage,
The exciting current at the knee-point voltage or at a percentage there of for both
Resistance of the secondary winding
The values of the above terms are dependent on the protection gear involved. In such cases, the designer of
the protective system should specify the additional requirement that may be necessary in consultation with
relay manufacturer.
3.2.6
3.2.6.1 Terminology
Protective Voltage Transformers: - A voltage transformer intended to provide a supply to protective
devices (relay or trip coils). These transformers are required to have sufficient accuracy to operate
protective system at voltages that occur under fault condition.
Accuracy Class Designation: - The accuracy class for protective voltage transformer is designated by the
highest permissible percentage voltage error for the accuracy class concerned from 5 percent of rated
voltage to a voltage corresponding to the rated voltage factor. This expression is followed by letter P for
protective. Voltage transformer and PR for 3 phase residual voltage transformer.
Standard Accuracy Classes: - this is designated by the highest permissible percentage voltage error at
rated voltages prescribed for the frequency class concerned.
The standard accuracy classes for protective voltage transformer are 3P and 6P.
Rated Burden: - The rated burden of a voltage transformer is usually expressed as the apparent power in
volt amperes absorbed at rated secondary voltage. The burden is composed of the individual burdens of the
associated voltage coils of the instruments, relays, trip coils to which the voltage transformer is connected.
The total burden is computed by adding them together after referring the individual value to a common
base i.e. rated secondary voltage.
Normally the standard VA rating nearest to be burden computed should be used. It is undesirable to specify
VA rating much higher than the computed value, as to do so might result in inaccuracies and the
transformer uneconomical in cost or of unduly large dimensions. When the value of the nearest standard
VA rating is less than the computed value, the use of such VA rating should be made in consultation with
the manufacturers.
Accuracy of a voltage transformer is guaranteed for burden variation between 25% to 100% of rated
burden.
3.2.6.2 Limits of Voltage Error & Phase Displacement
The rated residual voltage of a 3 phase residual voltage transformer is as follows:
a.
b.
114
Phase Displacement
120 minutes
300 minutes
Rated secondary voltage of winding connected in broken delta to produce a residual voltage is 110
volts, 110/3 or 110/3 for single phase voltage transformers intended to produce a residual
voltage.
Preferred Value
Volts
100
110
100
3
100
3
100
3
100
3
If preferred value of rated secondary voltage produces a too low residual voltage, non-preferred values may
be used.
Rated Output: - should be as per IS: 3150 and preferred values are 25, 50 and 100 VA.
Accuracy Class: - as per IS accuracy class for a residual voltage transformer i.e. 6 P.
3.2.6.4 Special Application
When using a 3-phase voltage transformer with a generator, whether for metering or protection, it should
have a closed- tertiary delta winding to provide path for the third harmonic component of the excitation
current in the core.
3.2.6.5 Application of Measuring Voltage Transformers
A measuring voltage transformer needs to maintain its accuracy from 80 to 120 % of rated voltage. It is not
required to maintain its accuracy within specified limit during the fault conditions.
3.2.6.6 Accuracy Class
It is undesirable that a higher class of accuracy should be called for, than is necessary for the duty required.
To do so is uneconomical and may result in voltage transformer of excessive dimensions which may
involve modification to the switchgear without serving any useful purpose.
3.2.7
Resistance to Earthquake: Porcelain insulators and bushings of voltage transformer 66 kV and above are
made suitable to withstand the stresses likely to be caused by earthquakes as per IS: 1983 and vibration
tests are specified.
Selection of the accuracy class for a particular application should be made in consultation with the
manufacturer.
A protective device is called upon to operate under system fault conditions. As the faults are generally
associated with voltage dips, a protective voltage transformer is required to maintain its accuracy within
specified limit from 5 to the voltage factor of rated voltage.
For applications with protective devices whose operation does not depend on the phase relationship
between the voltage and the current, for example, under voltage, overvoltage and over current relay of limit
importance and accuracy class of 6 P is considered to be quite adequate.
For applications with protective devices whose operation depends on the phase relationship between
voltage and current, for example, directional over current, reverse power and directional distance
protection, voltage transformers of class 3.0 is used.
The selection of accuracy class for any particular application depends on the sensitiveness of the protection
scheme required, and is decided by the purchaser in consultation with the manufacturer.
3.2.8
Typical Example
A typical example of CTs and PTs characteristics fixed for 2 x 10 MW. Mukerian project for protection and
metering is shown in figure 3.4. Protection and metering single line is shown in figure 3.3.
116
66kV FEEDER-1
66kV FEEDER-2
62
62
62
62
NOMENCLATURE
COUPLING VOLTAGE
TRANSFORMER
COUPLING VOLTAGE
TRANSFORMER
27
32
40
41G
46
47
51
51D
51V
27
81L
81H
27
81L
81H
WAVE TRAP
WAVE TRAP
Vs
TZ
TZ
KV
SUPV.
CARRIER
CABINET
E/F
KWH
KW
185
185
TRIPS 52-3
KV
Vs
TRIPS 52-4
CARRIER
CABINET
SUPV.
51 D
KVAR
5 P 10
Vs
TO UNIT
SYNCHRONISING
CURRENT
TRANSFORMER
200/1
CURRENT
TRANSFORMER
200/1
Vs
TRIPS
52-1,52-3
52-5
& UNIT1
SHUT DOWN
52-3
87B1
87B2
51
110V
TRIPS
52-2,52-4
52-5,
& UNIT2
SHUT DOWN
PS
P.T.
RT
RECTIFIER T/F
TZ
TRANSDUCER
UAT
52-4
CT 200/1
PS
PS
52-5
EXCITATION BREAKER
NEGATIVE SEQUENCE RELAY
PHASE SEQUENCE VOLTAGE RELAY
OVER CURRENT RELAY
DIRECTIONAL OVER CURRENT RELAY
OVER CURRENT VOLTAGE RESTRAINT
RELAY
OVER VOLTAGE RELAY
TIMING RELAY
ROTOR EARTH FAULT RELAY
STATOR EARTH FAULT RELAY
BACKUP POWER SYSTEM E/FRELAY
FREQUENCY RELAY (LOW , HIGH)
BUS ZONE CHECK RELAY
BUS ZONE DIFFERENTIAL RELAYS
GENERATOR DIFFERENTIAL RELAY
GEN. TRANSFORMER DIFFERENTIAL RELAY
PHASE COMPARISON RELAY
AVR
E/F
FM
OER
PAR COMP
PF
R
TO UNIT
SYNCHRONISING
PS
PS
/
/ / //
11O V.
5 P 10
CLASS 1
PS
87CH
P.T.
KWH
5 P 10
5 P 10
CLASS 1
66KV
KW
KVAR
59
62
64F
64G
64T
81L/H
87CH
87 B1 ,B2
87G
87GT
185
E/F
3
A
51 D
66 K.V. BUS
5 P 10
LEGEND
PS
PS
PS
51TX
50/51T
PS
C.T. 200/1
5P 10
87GT
INTERPOSING CTs
PS
INTERPOSING CT
CT 600/5
64T
64T
ISOLATOR
11 KV CIRCUIT
BREAKER
50/51
66 KV CIRCUIT
BREAKER
UAT-2
CT 600/5
87GT
87GT
11-1
FUSE
KV SUPV.
TO
AVR
11-2
51
51
RT-1
RT-2
46 40 51V 59
KWH PF KVAR
A
0.5
TO AVR
10MVA 0.9 PF
GWENERATOR
VS
CT 600/5
CLASS 1
87 G
41G
PS
10MVA 0.9 PF
GWENERATOR
41G
OER
CT 600/5
KWH
KVAR PF
TZ
KWHSUPV.
KVARSUPV.
KW SUPV.
G2
PS
64F
OER
CT 600/5
5P 10
87 G
5P10
PS
PS
DISTRIBUTION
TRANSFORMER
UNIT-1
POTENTIAL
TRANSFORMER
KW
64F
KVAR SUPV.
KW SUPV.
32 47
FM
V
0.5
TO AVR
G1
KWHSUPV.
CURRENT
TRANSFORMER
TO VR
TO RECTIFIER
BRIDGE AVR
CT 600/5
CLASS 1
V
KW
3
46
59 51V 40
TO VR
VS
VOLTMETER
RECORDING
INSTRUMENT
TZ
TO UNIT
SYN.
FM
AMMETER
A
V
TO UNIT
SYN.
47 32
TZ
87GT
PS
PS
TZ
RESISTOR
EARTH
TO
AVR
LIGHTNING ARRESTOR
52-2
UAT-1
KV SUPV.
51TX
TRIP & ALARM
PS
52-1
50/51
50/51T
C.T. 200/1
5P 10
64 G
DISTRIBUTION
TRANSFORMER
64 G
UNIT-2
Figure 3.3: Protection and metering single line diagram (Mukerian Stage 2) (Specification)
TO DASUYA FEEDER
CTs DETAILS
PLCC
LMU
NO.
W AVE TRAP
WAVE TRAP
CVT-1
CVT-2
89-4EL
89-3EL
89-4L
89-3L
CORE-5
CORE-4
CT-16
CORE-3
CT17
CORE-2
CORE-1
52-3 C B
CB
52-4
89-3
89-4
PT-A BUS-2
PT-A BUS-1
PT-B BUS-2
PT-B BUS-1
66kV BUS-B
PT-A
66kV BUS-A
ZONE-B CT WIRE
ZONE-A CT WIRE
CHECK ZONE
CT W IRE
PT-B
89-1
VOLTAGE CORE
CT-N
11kV
----CT-P
11kV
11kV
11kV
2
3
----CT-8
CT-10
CT-11
CT-12
CT-14
------CT-15
----CT-16
--------CT-17
---------
CIRCUIT
6
---
6
---
11kV
11kV
11kV
1
2
3
1
11kV
11kV
66kV
66kV
66kV
66kV
66kV
66kV
66kV
66kV
66kV
66kV
66kV
66kV
66kV
66kV
66kV
66kV
66kV
66kV
1
1
1
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
3
4
5
PROTECTION
OVERALL DIFF. PROTECTION
PROTECTION
OVERALL DIFF. PROTECTION
BREAKER BACK-UP PROTECTION
BUS DIFFE. PROTECTION MAIN
BUS DIFFE. PROTECTION CHECK
BUS DIFFE. PROTECTION ZONE A
BUS DIFFE. PROTECTION ZONE B
BREAKER BACK-UP PROTECTION
BUS DIFFE. CHECK
BUS DIFFE. MAIN
METERING
PROTECITON
DIRECTIONAL O/C & E/F PROTECTION
BUS DIFFE. CHECK
BUS DIFFE. MAIN
METREING
PROTECITON
DIRECTIONAL O/C & E/F PROTECTION
89-2
CT-15
NO.
CORE-3
BC
CORE-2
CB
VT-1
CT-14
RATIO
V/V
11000 110 V
3
3
11000 110 V
3
3
QUANTITY
CIRCUIT
VT1
VT2
VT3
52-2
LA
CT-12
12.5MVA,11/66kV
VG YnD11
VT-2
VT-3
TO STATION SERVICE
TRANSFORMER
TO EXCITATION
SYSTEM
CT-11
CT-8
CT-10
BPT A & B
CVT 1,2
PROTECITON
METREING,RELAYING,PROTECTION &
SYNCHRONIZATION
METREING,RELAYING,PROTECTION &
SYNCHRONIZATION
6
6
11000 110 V
3
3
66000 110
110 V
3
3
3
66000 110 V
3
3
CORE-2
0.5
-60
-60
0.2
PS
5P10
5P10
PS
PS
PS
5P10
PS
PS
PS
PS
5P10
PS
PS
0.5
PS
5P10
PS
PS
0.5
PS
5P10
60
-30
30
---45
----60
--60
-60
--60
-60
ACC.
CLASS
CORE-3
CORE-2
CT-N
CORE-1
89LK
R
NGT
Figure 3.4: Protection and Metering CTs & PTs (AHEC Project)
117
PHASE
50
0.2
200
1PH
3P
100
1PH
0.5/3P
100-60
1PH
0.5/3P
50-50
1PH
FIGURE 3.2.12.2: 2x9MW MUKERIAN PROJECT METERING AND RELAYING SINGLE LINE DIAGRAM
9MW,11kV,0.9PF,
3PH,50Hz
BURDEN
VA
0.5
REFRENCES DRAWINGS
CT-P
CORE-1
CT-N
PS
5P10
PS
600/5A
600/5A
600/5A
30/5A
30/5A
30/5A
200/1A
200/1A
200/1A
200/1A
200/1A
200/1A
200/1A
200/1A
400-200/1A
400-200/1A
400-200/1A
400-200/1A
400-200/1A
400-200/1A
400-200/1A
400-200/1A
400-200/1A
400-200/1A
52-G2
CORE-3
CT-P
600/5A
600/5A
600/5A
-6
6
2
6
---3
--3
----3
-----
CORE-1
52-1 C B
RATED
PTs DETAILS
CORE-4
CT-14
QUANTITY
1PH
3.3
GENERATOR PROTECTION
3.3.1
Introduction
Size of individual hydro generating units has risen to over 500 MW. In India 250MW generators are
installed at Nathpa Jhakri on River Satluj and at Tehri Hydro Power Project on river Bhagirthi. 6 x 165
MW units were installed at Dehar hydro power plant of Beas Link Project. Large sized electric generators
running in parallel and connected to long distance transmission lines requires proper protection as the loss
of even a single unit can jeopardize the operation of the power system to which it is connected.
The collective function of all forms of protection applied to large generators is, therefore, to reduce the
clearance time of all fault conditions associated with it. It is of prime importance that the protective devices
should disconnect the machines automatically if the fault is internal or if the external conditions are so
abnormal that the continued operation would result in damage. With the advent of higher transmission
voltages transmitting large blocks of powers at long distances, stability problems have increased and very
low operating times have been provided, a review of hazards is desirable, because these should be
understood when considering the advisability or otherwise of applying specific protective features.
Small hydro power projects from micro hydro range (5 kW-100 kW) and up to 25 MW capacity are being
installed mostly for energy. Desired protection is determined by the interconnected power system and
economic considerations.
3.3.2
LINE SIDE
3.3.3
Possible Faults
There are number and variety of failures to which a generator may be subjected. Several protective systems
are employed, both of the discriminative and non discriminative type. Great care must be exercised in coordinating the systems used and the settings adopted.
Classification of faults
All faults associated with the unit may be classified as either insulation failure or abnormal running
conditions.
An insulation failure will result in either an inter-turn fault, a phase to phase or an earth fault, but most
commonly the latter since most insulation failures eventually bring the winding into direct contact with the
core.
Abnormal Running
The abnormal running conditions in hydro generators to be protected against comprise:a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
Overloading
Loss of excitation
Unbalanced loading
Lubrication oil failure
Failure of prime mover
Over/under speed
Rotor displacement
Excessive vibration
Stator Faults
Break down of winding insulation may result in any of the following types of faults:
(a) Earth faults, (b) Phase faults (c) Inter-turn faults
Other faults originating from defective joints or inadequate or defective end turns or terminals will if
undetected, reach a stage where there is a breakdown of insulation.
A fault to earth is liable to cause arcing to the core which may not only damage the conductor but also
burning and welding of the laminations. To limit this damage it is almost universal practice to connect an
impedance or an earthing resistance between the generator winding neutral and the earth. Practice varies on
the method adopted for earthing and the impedance used. Phase to phase or three phase short circuit are not
limited by the earthing impedance.
Stator core of large hydro generators at Dehar Power Plant (6 x 165MW) of Beas Satluj Link Project
became loose at core joints a few years after commissioning. Stator punching at the location started
vibrating and shifted by 2 to 10 mm resulting in following.
i)
ii)
iii)
Localized hot spots in the stator core can also be produced by improper operation e.g. excessive leading
power factor operation or core fluxing. Hot spots are the result of high eddy current produced from core
flux that finds conducting path across insulation between laminations.
Special Protection required in large size hydro generators is as follows:
i)
Rigidity and strength of stator frame is needed to resist deformation under fault conditions and
system disturbances.
119
ii)
Varying air gap is critical and can result in very large forces radial to the rotating element which
would be transferred to the stator frame and guide bearings with their supports with possible
consequential damage. Vibration measurements or direct dynamic measurements of air gap are
required.
Rotor faults
The field system is not normally connected to earth, so an earth fault does not give rise to any fault current
and is thus not in itself a danger. If a second earth fault develops then, however, a portion of the field
winding may be short circuited, resulting in an unbalanced magnetic pull on the bearing causing rotor
vibration and consequent failure of bearing surface or even displacement of the rotor sufficient to bend the
shaft. In addition to this mechanical trouble, there is a possibility of overheating of field winding due to the
automatic voltage regulator action which may try to maintain the rotor flux in spite of the loss of turns that
have been short circuited by the double earth fault.
Loss of Excitation
Failure of DC excitation causes the machine to run as an induction generator, the stator drawing
magnetizing currents from the Ac system. Due to saliency, normal hydro generators may carry 20-25% of
normal load without field and not lose synchronism. Loss of field when a hydro generator is carrying full
load may cause over loading of the stator by operating at low power factor, and of over heating the rotor
owing to induced currents in the rotor body and damper windings. The unit will impose VAR drain on the
system.
Unbalanced Loading
Unbalanced stator currents can be caused by external faults or unbalanced loading. An unbalanced load can
be resolved into positive, negative and zero sequence components. The positive sequence component is
similar to the normal balanced load, the negative sequence component is similar except that the resultant
reaction field rotates counter to the D C field system and produces a flux which cuts the rotor at twice the
rotational velocity. The double frequency eddy currents thus induced in the rotor are liable to cause heating
of the rotor. Water wheel generators have a low rotational velocity and thus the heating in the rotor caused
by small eddy currents is generally of less practical significance. It is provided as a two stages back up
protection a definite time alarm stage and trip stage in SHP.
Over Voltage
Water wheel generators have a high over speed factor and the provision of over voltage protection is most
desirable so that insulation is not damaged. This protection also serves to avoid damage if the voltage
regulator system fails to operate correctly. The potential danger of such failure cannot be ignored with the
high speed and high range of modern regulators, designed to meet long distance transmission stability
requirements.
System Frequency Swing
Large hydro generator connected to EHV power system sometimes leads to severe system frequency
swings because of the complexity of modern EHV power system. This may cause generator to go out of
step.
Other Abnormal Conditions
IEEE 242 2000 mentions following additional abnormal conditions. Protection for these abnormalities
may be considered especially for large and mega size generators.
i)
ii)
iii)
3.3.4
Thermal Protection
Stator Overheating
Overheating of the generator stator core and winding may result from:
1.
2.
3.
Overloading
A number of the stator laminations becoming short circuited.
Failure of the machines cooling system
Resistance temperature detectors (RTD) of PT100 type are used for detecting this condition in stator
winding. These temperature sensors are embedded at various points in the stator winding and arranged to
provide an indication of the temperature conditions which exist over the whole of the stator winding, thus
ensuring that even localized overheating, such as would occur due to short circuited laminations, is
detected.
Temperature sensors for protection of generator stator winding continuously monitor temperature of the
stator winding. The sensors are normally connected to data acquisition system for scanning, recording and
alarm and tripping for abnormal temperature rise.
Failure of Cooler System
Large hydro generators are provided close circuit air cooling system with air/water cooler on the stator
frame. Failure of the cooling system can result in rapid deterioration of the stator core lamination insulation
and or stator winding conductor and insulation. Cooling air temperature, cooling water supply pressure and
temperature for each cooler is monitored for alarm and trip of the machine for abnormal conditions.
Hot Spots
Localized hot spots in the stator core can be produced by lamination insulation failure due to abnormal
running conditions such as leading power factor operation or over fluxing or by vibration due to looseness.
Insulation failure of a number of large machines occurred. It is therefore common practice to specify
conservative temperature rise for the generators e.g. specifying class B temperature rise for class F
insulation is recommended for small hydro generators in IEC-1116.
Rotor (Field) Overheating
Monitoring temperature of main field winding and main rotor body for thermal protection by temperature
sensors is not practical. Generator with static excitation system employing main field collector rings, the
average approximate temperature of the field winding is determined by calculating hot field resistance
using field current and voltage and comparing with known cold resistance. Hot spots cannot be determined.
Filed currents are monitored through shunt and over current indicates overheating and is used for alarm and
tripping of the unit.
Field Over Excitation
Over excitation protection is provided on large generators. This protection is provided by monitoring
current (through shunt) or voltage of the main field or the exciter field. A device is set to pick up when field
current exceeds full load value and is set to a) sound and alarm, b) adjust filed excitation corresponding to
rated full load level or less and c) trip the unit after short time interval (expected system disturbance time).
3.3.5
trip and shut down the machine as quickly as possible to minimize damage. High speed differential relaying
is used for phase fault protection of generator stator windings. It acts by comparing the current magnitude
at the two ends of a phase winding in its most common form.
The method of grounding the generator neutral affects the protection afforded by differential relays. For
example if sufficient grounding impedance is used so that a ground fault at the generator terminal draws
full load current, then for a fault at the midpoint of the winding, the fault current will be approximately one
half of the full load current as only half the phase voltage is available to cause a flow of current. This way a
point can be found at which a fault must be placed so as to pass minimum current to operate the relay. The
winding above this point is the percentage winding protected against the earth fault. Practically the whole
of the winding is protected against phase to phase faults since there is no limiting impedance included in
the fault circuit. With a 10% setting about 90% of the winding is protected against earth fault for the case
referred to above. The unprotected remainder of the winding is at a relatively low potential above earth and
is, therefore, less likely to become faulty than the protected part. With lower impedance grounding the
differential relay protects closer to the neutral. With high impedance grounding, the limit of protection for
ground faults is farther from neutral end and for ungrounded machines (including distribution transformer
earthing) the differential protection is inoperative against earth faults.
High Impedance Type Differential Relay
A relay connection is shown in figure 3.6. A stabilizing resistor is fitted in series with the relay operating
coil to ensure that the relay does not operate for faults external to the protected zone. On external faults the
voltage across the relay will be low while for internal faults, the voltage across the relay is relatively high.
The relay is set to operate for stator winding phase to phase or 3 phase faults current as low as 2%. The
current transformers CTs for high impedance type generator differential protection should have identical
characteristics and are not used for any other function likely to cause unequal secondary loading and
negligible leakage reactance.
The spill current level for the relay to just operate expressed as a percentage of the through fault current
causing it is defined as the percentage bias of the relay; viz.
Spill current for relay operation
%age BIAS =
X 100
Through fault current
Operating characteristics, of this type of relay may be published as a curve, in which the differential current
for operation is plotted against the through fault current. The former is
Figure 3.8 Generator Biased Differential Relay Type DDG Operating Characteristics for 10% Bias
123
87G
87G
Fig: 3.9 Differential protection for two winding per phase 12 bushing generator
(single phase shown)
124
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
125
126
87G
87GT
87TL
87AT
87TL
87GT
UAT
500kVA
11kV/415V
87G
165MW,
11kV,0.95PF
87AT
Figure 3.11 Dehar Power plant generator phase fault, back up overall differential; interlinking line
differential and auxiliary transformer differential
127
3.3.6
Operational advantages
Damages at the point of fault
Sustained or transient over-voltages
Relaying
Thermal rating
Protection against over-voltages
Cost
Generator and low phase winding of the power transformer (delta) is not directly connected to the system
and as such is usually earthed through a much higher impedance than when the generator is connected
direct to the system. Since the available ground fault may be small or limited to low values, it is common
practice to provide separate sensitive ground fault protection for generators depending upon generator
grounding method which may supplement whatever protection that may be provided by differential
relaying.
Low Resistance Earthing
In this scheme the generator neutral is earthed through a suitable resistance of about 10 seconds rating. A
setting of 5% or less of the rated current of the generator by means of a current operated relay with inverse
time characteristics is generally employed. In this case risk of dangerous over-voltage is eliminated for all
practical purposes but it becomes essential to trip the generator as quickly as possible after the occurrence
of an earth fault. Fault current in this practice is limited to 200-300 amperes. In U. S. practice as per IEEE
C 37 102 in low resistance grounding the grounding resistor is selected to limit the generators
contribution to a single phase to ground at its terminals to value in the range of 200 A up to 150% of rated
full load current. The method of grounding is recommended for generator directly connected to station bus.
When the stator neutral is earthed through a resistor, a C.T. is mounted in the generator neutral and
connected to an inverse time relay as shown in figure 3.12. In this case the inverse time relay will require
grading with other earth fault relays in the system. With resistor earthing it is impossible to protect 100% of
the stator winding the percentage of winding protected being dependent on the value of the neutral earthing
resistor and the relay setting. Reducing the fault setting or increasing the current passed through the neutral
earthing resistor does not give proportionate improvements in the amount of winding protected. For
example, with a 100% full load resistor and a 20% setting, 80% of the winding is protected. Doubling the
resistor rating or halving the setting only increase the amount of winding protected by 10%.
In choosing a suitable setting for the protection the above facts should be considered. Further with large
generator-transformer units care must be taken in the selection of settings to reduce the risk of maloperation from earth faults in the H.V. system due to the effect of transformer inter winding capacitance. It
is often advisable with such units to fit two earth fault relays, one instantaneous with a setting of 10-15%
the other time delayed with a setting of 5% of the earth fault current.
Distribution Transformer (High Resistance) Earthing
This scheme consists of earthing the generator, connecting leads and low phase winding of the power
transformer through a small distribution transformer loaded with a resistor on its secondary side. This
method is a compromise between the V. T. and resistance method of earthing and it combines their
advantages and disadvantages. The protection provided consists in connecting a voltage relay in parallel or
a current relay in series with resistor (See figure 3.13) so as to sound an alarm or to trip. A combination of
sensitive alarm and coarser setting of alarm and time delay trip are also used. The latter gives time to
transfer the load to another machine at the hazard of operating with a fault on one phase. Generators of
Bhakra left bank (5 x 90 MW), Dehar (6 x 165 MW) and Pong (6 x 60 MW) have been provided with this
method of earthing and is common method of earthing for unit connected generators. The maximum earth
fault current is determined by the size of the transformer and the loading resistor R. Optimum loading is
when the power dissipated in the resistor equals the capacitive loss in the generator system. At this point
the transient over voltages possible are at a practical minimum. Increasing the power dissipation in the
resistor beyond this point increases the energy in the fault arc and therefore the degree of damage. Primary
voltage rating of the distribution transformer is required to be equal to be generator to neutral voltage and
the practice is to keep it rated generator phase to phase voltage. The secondary winding is 110/220 volts.
The secondary resistor is selected so that for a single phase to ground fault at the generator terminal, the
power dissipated in the resistor is equal to or greater than three time the zero sequence capacitive kVA to
ground of the generator winding and all other equipment that may be connected to machine terminals. This
method is considered high resistance grounding.
RELAY
STEP UP
TRANSFORMER
RELAY
GENERATOR
HV BUS
CB
DISTRIBUTION
TRANSFORMER
Figure 3.13 Distribution transformer grounding scheme for unit connected generator
Calculation carried out for Mukerian (2 x 9 MW) hydro project (single line diagram shown in Figure 3.13)
illustrate the method of calculating the size of loading resistor and transformer.
Neutral Grounding Transformer Calculation
1.
a)
b)
c)
=
=
=
=
=
=
micro farads
0.15 F
2.
0.535 + 0.25+0.15
0.935 F/phase
Calculation of zero phase sequence current (Io) during a line to- ground fault and the charging
capacity (capacitive kVA)
The capacitaive reactance (Xc) and zero phase current (Io) are calculated by following formulas.
Xc
Io
1/ (2**F*C)
1
2 50 0.935 10 6
3404.38 ohm
3* (1/Xc) * (VL-L/3)
3400 ohm
3 11000
3 3400
5.6A
VL-L
Where,
50
3.
(VL-L/3) * Io*10-3
=
=
=
(11000/3)*5.6* 10-3
35.56 kVA
40 kVA (one minute rating)
The neutral grounding transformer was provided with the capacity equal to the capacitive kVA as
calculated above and the capacity was applied on the basis of 1 minute rating.
Transformer kVA (continuous)
Where
8.5 kVA
10 kVA (Nearest standard rating)
Primary/Secondary voltages
11000/220 volts
Frequency
50Hz
Type
N* Io
50 x 5.6
280 Amp.
Where N
11000/220
=
50
The kW loss in the secondary resistor during the ground fault will be equal to the capacitive kVA
Therefore, the secondary resistance (RS) is as follows:
RS
35.54 103
(280)2
0.453 ohm
0.45 ohm
Rated Current
300 Amp.
Voltage
220 Volts
Since the protective relay is arranged to shut down the set completely upon the concurrence of a stator earth
fault, the distribution transformer and loading resistor need not be continuously rated, a one minute or 30
seconds rating being adequate. For Dehar power plant 2 minutes rating was specified.
This is the most common method of large unit connected generator grounding.
Zero sequence voltage relay will detect faults to within 2-5% of the stator neutral. There are several
schemes for detecting ground faults at or near the neutral. The schemes use third harmonic voltage at the
neutral or at the generator terminals as a means to detect faults near the stator neutral. Reference may be
made to IEEE std. C37 102-1995.
Grounding Fault Neutralizer
In this method the generator neutral is earthed through a choke coil the inductance of which neutralizes the
capacitance to earth of the generator, connecting leads and low phase winding of power transformer. The
non compensated capacity current is used for earth fault detection.
In Bhakra Right Bank the maximum capacitive currents worked out to 7.4A and out of which 6.1 amps are
neutralized by a choke coil. A voltage relay connected to the secondary winding of the choke coil actuates
an alarm and tripping. A volt meter connected across to choke approximately determines the point of earth
fault.
With this arrangement over voltages were proposed to be obviated and unit could continue to operate for a
period after an insulation failure with minimum danger of further internal damage and thus improve
continuity of supply.
131
100% Stator Ground fault 3rd harmonic Method for Large Machines
This protection is now being offered in digital protection relays and may be provided in Mega/Large
generators.
Third harmonic neutral under voltage protection covers the final 15% of the stator winding and, in
conjunction with the other ground fault elements, provides 100% ground fault protection for the stator. This
is supervised by a three phase under voltage element. Additional supervision using three phase active,
reactive and apparent power can be enabled if required. A third harmonic neutral over voltage protection is
also provided for applications where the measurement is available at the terminal end of the generator. The
blocking features of the under voltage element are not required for this application.
3.3.7
Potentiometer Method
AC Injection method
DC Injection method
Each scheme relies upon the rotor earth fault closing an electrical circuit, the protection relay forming one
branch of the circuit.
3.3.7.1 Potentiometer method
The scheme for protection against earth is shown in figures 3.14. The earth fault protective gear consists of
centre tapped resistor connected across the field winding and a sensitive relay connected between the centre
tap and earth. These are equipotential point so long as there is no earth fault on the winding. The
occurrence of an earth fault, however, upsets the balance and the relay respond to earth fault occurring over
most of the rotor circuit and about 95% of field winding can be protected. If the tap on the resistor is varied
then complete protection can be afforded. This scheme has been provided in Bhakra Left Bank Power
Units.
The obvious disadvantage to this is that a relay blind spot exist for faults at the centre of the field winding.
To prevent an earth fault in this operation remaining undetected, it is usual to displace the centre tap of the
resistor by a push button or switch. When this type of rotor earth fault protection is employed, it is essential
that station instructions are issued to ensure that the blind spot is checked at least once a shift.
The main advantages of the scheme are its simplicity and the fact that it does not need any auxiliary supply.
3.3.7.2 AC Injection Method
The scheme is shown in figure 3.15. One point of the field circuit is earthed through a static condenser. The
protective condenser is in series with the capacity of the complete exciter circuit. In case of an earth fault in
the field circuit, the secondary circuit of the auxiliary transformer is closed through the voltage relay,
condenser and part of the field circuit and earth fault causing the relay to operate. This scheme has been
adopted in Bhakra Right Bank and provides complete coverage to rotor winding.
EXCITER
EXCITER
BREAKER
FIELD
WINDING
GENERATOR
EXCITER
EXCITER
BREAKER
FIELD
WINDING
GENERATOR
CONDENSER
64F
RELAY
A.C.
SUPPLY
133
EXCITER
FIELD
WINDING
64F
GENERATOR
RELAY
A.C.
SUPPLY
Filed Failure
Failure of the field system results in a generator operating at above synchronous speed as an induction
generator, drawing magnetizing current from the system, provided the system is capable of supplying the
additional reactive power for excitation, which can approach the full load exciter rating of the machine;
134
there is no risk of system instability. However, overloading of the stator and overheating of the rotor result
from continued operation, therefore the machine should be disconnected and shut down if the field cannot
be restored. The size of the machine relative to the system is significant, and where it is assessed that
system instability would result from loss of field, the machine must be disconnected and shut down
immediately.
Two schemes are available for protection against loss of field, one employs an undercurrent relay operating
from a shunt in the main field current, the other comprises an offset mho distance relay connected in to the
stator circuits. The under current method, illustrated in figure 3.17 is simple and cheap, but suffers from a
number of fundamental disadvantages. Firstly, if the relay is to operate for complete loss of field alone it
must have a setting which lies well below the minimum exciting current value, which can be 7 - 8% of the
rated full load current.
GENERATOR
EXCITER
SHUNT
51
T-1
51
T-2
T-1
51
T-1
T-1
TRIP OR
ALARM
MASTER TRIP
86
27
40
DELOADING
96
96-2
96 - ALARM
96-2 GOVERNOR FOR DELOADING
40
46
NEGATIVE SEQUENCE TIME
OVERCURRENT RELAY
3.3.9
3.3.10
Loss of Synchronism
Large machines connected to EHV system having low inertia constant and increased generator per unit
reactance result in reduced critical time to isolate faults near a generating plant before generator loses
synchronism with power system resulting in low system voltage, machine excitation etc. The operation
may cause winding stresses, mechanical stress and damage generator and turbine shaft. The generator
should be tripped during first half cycle of a loss of synchronism. A separate out of step relaying should be
provided on large machines.
Impedance relay are used and most cases generator can be separated before the completion of step cycle.
For specific cases stability studies may be required for selection of an out-of-step relay or scheme. Tripping
of main generator with its auxiliaries is adequate. This scheme was not provided at Dehar Power Plant unit
connected to EHV system.
3.3.11
137
3.3.12
3.3.13
3.3.14
P342
P343
P344
Settings
1
1
1
1
87
Differential
Interturn (split phase)
50/51/67
50N/51N
67N/67W
Sensitive directional
ground fault
64
51V
21
Under impedance
59N
2M/2D
2M/2D
2M/2M
27/59
Under/over voltage
2/2
2/2
2/2
81U/81O
Under/over frequency
2/4
2/4
2/4
81AB
32R/32L/32O
earth
139
fault/wattmeteric
40
Loss of field
46T
46OC
Directional/Non directional,
sequence over current
47
49
24
Over fluxing
78
Ploe slipping
27TN/59TN
negative
phase
rd
50BF
CB fail
RTDS x 10 PT 100
Option
Option
Option
OFF
59/27
OVER/UNDER VOLTAGE
81(O/U)
OVER/UNDER FREQUENCY
47
VOLTAGE ASYMMETRY
27
47
50
59
32
81O
32R
81U
32
OVERLOAD
32R
REVERSE POWER
32F
REDUCED POWER
46
UNBALANCE LOAD
40Q
RE-ACTIVE POWER
LOSS OF EXCITATION
50/51
51V
32F
40Q
TIME-OVERCURRENT
VOLTAGE RESTRIANT
TIME-OVERCURRENT
46
ANSI
7SJ60
7SJ61
7SJ62
7SJ63/64
7UM61
49
64G
50G
67G
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
50
51
46
64R
32
59
40
Frequency protection
81
38
50BF
Programmable logic
Control functions
2/3
Interconnection of all hydro electric plants with grid including micro hydro from economical
consideration as well as for continuity of power supply in remote area electrified by microhydro.
ii)
Isolated operation for supply of power to local areas in case of grid failure. A large unbalance in 3
phases was observed in such cases. Commercial generators used in small hydro allow a maximum
30% variation in phase currents. Protection for phase unbalance is required.
141
1.
Generator
Rating
Gen. up to
1000 kW
i.
ii.
2.
Gen. above
1000 kW
and up to
5000 kW
Over-current/earth
fault
relay (51 & 64) if the
generator and the step up
transformer are connected in
unit system.
Over/under voltage
Over/under
frequency
Reverse power
Over-current/earth
fault
relay may not be provided if
generator circuit breaker
with thermal overload and
instantaneous magnetic short
circuit release is provided on
the line terminal.
Stator temperature
IEC Standard
1116 SHP E & M
Equipment up to
3 MW unit size
generator
Bearing temperature
of
the
Suitable back
protection
provided
Category 2 (P343)
where differential
protection is required
c) Generators 5 MW to
25 MW
3.3.16.2 Typical Protection scheme provided for small hydro by conventional relays
Figure 3.22 (a), (b) & (c) for micro hydro and Generators up to 300 kW unit size.
Figure 3.23 (a) & (b) for Generator above 300 kW.
Figure 3.24 (a) & (b) for Generators 301 kW to 5000 kW
142
up
be
ACB
50
51
32
46
32
46
27/59 81U/O
27/59 81U/O
G
G
51G
(Preferred)
(Alternate)
27/59
Under/over voltage
32
46
50
51N
Figure 3.22 (a) & (b) Generator Protection - (Micro Hydro & SHP up to 300 kW)
(AHEC Practice)
143
3.3kV VOLT
3
51V
1
40
1
32
3
46
51V
1
40
1
32
46
27/59
81U/O
TO VOLTAGE
3
87G
3
87G
49
49
51V
PREFERRED LOCATION
51G
64
Figure 3.23 (a) & (b) Generator SHP 300 to 5000 kW with conventional relays
144
Protection for small hydro unit suitable for interconnection with grid as per practice is shown in figure 3.23
(a) & (b) and consist of following devices.
27/59
32
46
49
50
51G
51V
64F
64G
81U/81O
87G
Under/over voltage
Reverse power relay
Phase unbalance (current)
Temperature relay to monitor winding temperature
Over current - 2 phases
Ground time over current relay
Voltage restraint/controlled over current
Generator field ground relay
Generator ground fault current
Under over frequency
Generator Differential Relay (Impedance type)
Mechanical protections
Overspeed
Bearing temperature
3.3.16.3 Typical protection schemes with multifunction numerical generator protection relays
Protection scheme for Halaipani Project in North-East given in figure 3.24
Notes:
1.
2.
Protection scheme for large generators may be provided as shown in figure 3.25 (a).
3
87B
87B
GENERATOR TRANSFORMER
GENERATOR TRANSFORMER
59
51V
40
32
46
51V
87GT
60
64F
27/59
81U/O
40
32
46
87GT
DIGITAL P343
AREVA OR
EQUIVALENT
60
64F
27/59
81U/O
DIGITAL P344
AREVA OR
EQUIVALENT
64G
64G
Although (v) & (vi) they are not generator protection, they provide high speed clearing of bus fault and
therefore generator back up over-current relays are not required to perform this primary function.
146
1.
2.
O. D. THAPAR Electrical Protection of Large Hydro-Electric Generators (Power Engineer, 1961, Vol.
11, No. 1, PP. 12-17
3.
IEEE std. C37. 102 1995 IEEE Guide for AC Generator Protection
4.
www.areva-ted.com
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
www.govconsys.com/woodwar_prtective-relays.htm
10.
147
3.4
3.4.1
Introduction
Power transformers associated with hydro-electric power station comprise of following special types.
i)
ii)
iii)
Generator Transformers Step up transformers for stepping up generator voltage to that required for
transmission of power, to load centre/grid.
Interlinking transformers to connect up two different step up voltage if provided e.g. in Dehar Power Plant
(6 x 165 MW) power plant 2 unit are interconnected to 220 kV grid by 11/220 kV generator transformer
and four units are stepped up to 420 kV by 11kV/420 kV generator transformers. 220 kV and 420 kV buses
are interlinked by an interlinking 245/420 kV Auto transformers.
Station transformers for auxiliary power supply, these transformers are generally about 500 kVA for unit
auxiliaries and up to 1000 kVA or more for station auxiliaries.
Generator transformers and interlinking transformers are oil filled, normally placed in open
switchyard/transformer deck. Auxiliary transformers are generally dry type.
Protective relays are required to be provided for transformers to achieve following.
a)
b)
c)
Cost effective, technically, feasible, scheme of protection of required sensitivity, speed and selectivity is
required for minimizing following.
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
3.4.2
Possible Faults
Electrical winding and the magnetic core in a transformer are subject to different forces during operation
including expansion and contraction due to thermal cycle, vibration, local heating due to magnetic
excessive heating due to overloading and external short current or inadequate cooling.
According to statistics in USA (IEEE std. 242-2001) maximum failures (37%) occurred due to winding
failures followed by 22% for tap changer failure. Core failures are rare.
External short circuits may only be limited by transformer reactance. Typical value of the transformer
impedance values are given in IS: 2026 and short circuit withstand capability is also given in IS: 2026.
Transformer faults may be caused by following conditions.
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
g)
3.4.3
Miscellaneous causes core insulation break down, bushing current transformer failure, transformer
oil leakage due to poor welds or tank damage etc.
Over excitation on generator transformer see Para 3.4.4 (c).
3.4.3.1Gas Analysis
Many transformer faults in their early stages are incipient and deterioration is gradual. Combustible gases
formed can be detected by gas detective relays (alarm) and periodical gas analysis by portable gas analyzer
can be performed by manual or automatic methods to forestall serious outages. Key gases indicating
location of fault are as follows:
a)
b)
c)
d)
3.4.4
d)
e)
3.4.5
Magnetizing inrush current:- magnetizing inrush current when transformer is energized. The
inrush currents lasting from a few cycles to many seconds can cause unbalance and false operation
of differential relays. Magnetizing inrush currents contain harmonics especially second harmonics.
Unbalance by CT ratio:- very small change in magnitude of current when a limited number of
turns are shorted. Approximately 10% or more of winding will have to be shorted for detection by
overload relays.
Over Excitation:- Over excitation may be caused especially in hydro generation due to sudden
load rejection and during normal starting and shut down sequence for maintaining nominal voltage
while speed is below normal. This may over heat core and damage transformer. The distorted
wave form has harmonic content. Field excitation application on unit connected generators at low
speeds 15 35% of synchronous speed (during starting) excites step up transformer and unit
station service transformer. Harmonic restraint relays and unit voltage per unit frequency (V/Hz)
may be required.
Phase shifting and connection provided on generator transformer create 300 phase shift.
Compensation by auxiliary CTs increase the effective burden. The CTs may be connected to
create the same phase shift as in primary transformer winding. This can be done by connecting
CTs in on the Y side of the transformer and in Y on side of transformer. The relay will not see
any phase shift.
CT connection on the Y side will trap zero sequence current on ground fault on HV side and
prevent mismatch formal-operation.
Combination of protective system to be employed is dependent on the size, voltage class and importance of
the transformer with respect to the grid. Protective system combination to be provided is discussed with
specific reference to generator transformer, interlinking transformer and unit and station service
transformer. Usual practice is to provide over current and instantaneous earth fault protection to small sized
unit and station service transformers. For large and more important unit transformers restricted earth fault
schemes are applied (Refer Figures 3.25 & 3.26). Differential protection is recommended for transformers
of approximately 10 MVA three phase (self cooled rating) and above (IEEE committee report B 49).
Practice in India is to generally provide protection schemes as per voltage class of transformers. Protection
scheme recommended by Central Board of irrigation and Power (CBI & P Manual on transformer 1987) for
transformers, interlinking transformers etc. is as follows.
A.
B.
Generator transformers for 145 class; 245 class and 420 kV class transformers.
i)
Overall differential current relay covering generator zone also in addition to transformer
differential protection.
ii)
iii)
Over-flux relay
iv)
v)
vi)
vii)
viii)
ix)
x)
Pressure release device with trip contacts for transformers rated 100 MVA and above
xi)
Oil flow indicator with one contact for alarm (if applicable)
xii)
Water flow indicator with one contact for alarm (if applicable)
ii)
iii)
Back up over current and earth relay on both primary and secondary sides.
iv)
v)
vi)
vii)
viii)
Winding temperature indicator with three sets of contacts for alarm, trip and control of fans
(ONAN/ONAF) and four sets of contacts (ONAN/ONAF).
ix)
x)
Oil surge protection for OLTC diverter tank with trip contact
xi)
Lightning arrestors on both primary and secondary sides when the transformer is located outdoors
and is connected to overhead lines.
xii)
Pressure release device with trip contact for transformer rated 100 MVA and above
150
600/0.578
600/1
64
CIRCUIT BREAKER
OPERATING COIL
87
600/1
RESTRAINING COILS
100MVA,11/220kV
POWER TRANSFORMER
87
87
GENERATOR
5/1
6000/5
Figure 3.25: Separated Overall Differential and restricted Earth Fault Protection
1/0.578
600/1
64
CIRCUIT BREAKER
OPERATING COIL
EARTHING RESISTOR
87
RESTRAINING COILS
600/1
100MVA,11/220kV
POWER TRANSFORMER
87
87
GENERATOR
5/1
6000/5
C.
D.
E.
ii)
iii)
Neutral displacement relay or restricted earth fault relay for protection against faults in the tertiary
winding/associated connections depending upon the tertiary earthing arrangements.
iv)
IDMT or DMT (over current and earth fault) or impedance relays for back up protection.
v)
vi)
vii)
viii)
ix)
x)
xi)
Percentage biased differential relay (without harmonic restraint) for power transformer up to 100
MVA.
ii)
High speed differential relay with harmonic restraint feature ) for power transformer of capacities
above 100 MVA
iii)
iv)
Back up over current and earth fault relay on the secondary side
v)
vi)
vii)
Winding temperature indicator with alarm and trip contact. (For transformer having capacity up to
10 MVA)
viii)
Winding temeprtaure indicator with three contacts one each for alarm, trip and control of fans (for
transformer having capacities above 10 MVA)
ix)
x)
Lightning arrestors on both primary and secondary sides when the transformer is located outdoors
and is connected to overhead lines
xi)
Oil surge protection for on load tap changer diverter tank with trip contact
xii)
Pressure release device with trip contact for transformer rated 100 MVA and above
36 kV class power transformer of capacities ranging from 3.15 MVA and above
ii)
Percentage biased differential relay (without harmonic restraint) for power transformer up to 10
MVA.
iii)
High speed differential relay with second harmonic restraint differential device for power
transformer of capacities above 10 MVA
iv)
IDMT type over current relay with high set elements on the primary side
v)
IDMT type over current and earth fault relay on the secondary side
vi)
Oil temperature indicator with alarm one electrical contact for alarm or trip contact.
vii)
viii)
Winding temperature indicator with three electrical contacts for (a) alarm (b) trip & (c) Fan
control for transformers above 10 MVA
152
F.
ix)
Lightning arrestors on both primary and secondary sides when the transformer is located outdoors
and is connected to overhead lines
x)
Oil surge protection for on load tap changers (OLTC) (if provided) diverter tank with trip contact
xi)
Pressure release device with trip contact for transformer rated 100 MVA and above
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
Lightning arrestors on both primary and secondary sides when the transformer is located outdoors
and is connected to overhead lines
Differential Protection System: Most commonly used protection for transformer is current differential
relying. Relays of three general classes of current differential are as follows:
a) Time over current relay which may include an instantaneous trip unit having high current setting.
b) Percentage bias differential with restraint actuated by input and output currents
c) Percentage bias differential relay with restraint actuated by one or more harmonics in addition to the
restraint actuated by the input and output currents.
CT connection and ratios must be such that the net current in the relay operating coil or elements for any
type or location or location of external fault is effectively zero.
3.4.6
Remote large hydro generator transformers connected to grid by large EHV lines are provided with high
ceiling voltages static excitation systems from stability considerations. On sudden unit unloading due to
system fault clearing when the unit may be at ceiling voltage, the unit transformer may be excited with
voltage exceeding 130% of normal. Transformer iron core may saturate due to over excitation with exciting
current exceeding 25 % of the unit current rating. Differential relay unless provided for over excitation
restraint capability may mal-operate. This problem can be solved by special CT connections as explained in
IEEE std. C37.91-2000 and shown in principle in figure 3.27.
3.4.7
the actual frequency should not exceed 1.1 times the ratio of transformer rated voltage to the rated
frequency on a sustained basis:
Generator terminal voltage
Actual frequency
Over excitation relays with a definite time delay or inverse time over excitation characteristics are
recommended for use on generator transformers as well as at receiving end transformer.
3.4.8
3.4.9
Type
P631
P632
P633
2 wind.
2 wind.
3 wind.
87
DIFF
Differential protection
87N
REF X
50
DTOCX
51
IDMTX
49
THRM x
27,59
V< >
81
f<>
24
V/f
MCM x
LOGIC
Programmable logic
154
CIRCUIT BREAKER
GEN.
TRANSFORMER
87
GENERATOR
R - RESISTANCE COIL
Figure 3.27: Special Percentage Differential Relay Connection for Overall Protection of Unit Generation
Transformer with High Ceiling Voltage Excitation System
Type P631 is for use as small hydro generator transformer, P632 and P633 for Large hydro generators for
Large and Mega generators transformers and interlinking transformers in consultation with Areva.
A typical unit connected transformer numerical relay protection for Halaipani Project Transformer is shown
in figure 3.29. Generator transformer overall differential protection provided for unit connected
transformers acts as back up for generator.
3.5
3.5.1
General
Bus bars and switchgear are the parts of the system which are used to direct the flow of power to various
feeders. To isolate bus faults, all circuits connected to the bus are opened electrically. This disconnection
shuts down all feeders supplied by the bus and may affect other parts of the system. Bus bars are
sectionalized into bus zones to avoid complete shutdown.
Bus bar faults may be due to the followings.
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
High speed for prompt fault clearance, to minimize damage and maintain system stability.
Must be absolutely stable for all faults external to the switchgear installation, since failure to
stabilize would cause unnecessarily widespread interruption of supply.
Must be capable of complete discrimination between zones to ensure that the minimum number of
circuit breakers are tripped to isolate the fault.
Freedom from incorrect operation preferably without using complicated interlocks.
Isolation of all circuits from a faulted bus zone regardless of whether they are capable of supplying
fault current or not.
Individual control of all circuit breakers through separate trip relays.
3.5.3
transformer feeding the discriminating relay. The several insulators associated with each bus bar section are
all treated in this manner, the guard rings being earthed in groups rather than individually. A neutral current
check features is employed.
The disadvantage of the scheme is that it provides no protection for faults other than insulator flashover but
since such faults probably constitute at least 80% of the total number of busbar earth faults this is not such
a draw back as might appear at first sight. The system has the compensating advantage that it is relatively
cheap as well as being simple to apply and maintain. It is recommended especially for use up to 132 kV bus
bar.
3.5.4
3.5.5
Typical Schemes
Single Bus Arrangement: The application of the simple high impedance bus zone protection scheme to a
sectionalized single bus installation is shown in figures 3.31. Here four generator transformers are
supplying four outgoing feeders. Current transformers were arranged on one side of the bus section breaker
for the two zones of protection for economic considerations. Each set of bus-wires is connected to a relay.
It may be noted that sectionalizing breaker faults are not covered by zone 2 and over current relay was
provided for isolation. This scheme was successfully provided for 220 kV bus system in Bhakra Right
Bank and Dehar 220 kV single sectionalized bus system (figure 3.3). Similar arrangement for Mukerian
Projects is shown in figure 3.3 and 3.4.
Double Bus Arrangement: Discrimination between the two zones of protection is obtained by means of
the current transformers at the bus section breaker, which unbalance the faulty side and cause the
appropriate protective relay to operate.
In the case of a double bus arrangement, discrimination of zones are selected through the bus bar isolator
auxiliary switches, which connect all current transformer secondaries to the appropriate bus bars. The
switchgear installation is provided with three over lapping zones of protection, two on the main bus and on
the reserve bus. It should be noted that the secondaries, of the current transformers associated with the bussection breaker and bus coupler are permanently connected to the appropriate zone bus service. Figure
3.54shows bus differential scheme as proposed for 420 kV bus bar system.
3.5.6
Check Features
The principle of two lines of defence is invariably applied to large high voltage stations using a circulating
current scheme. This is obtained with a check feature, operating from separate current transformers, in
addition to the discriminating feature already described. Both the main and check features are usually of the
circulating current type. Check feature only supervises the incoming and outgoing circuits as shown in
figure 3.31.
3.5.7
Circuit Supervision
On important installation it is usual to monitor the continuity of the current transformer secondaries by
employing a sensitive alarm relay, which is normally connected across the buswires of each protected zone.
Should an open circuit or a cross connection occur in the secondary wiring while load current is flowing the
primary circuit, an unbalanced condition prevails and the relay operates to initiate an alarm and take
protection of the affected zone out of service by shorting the appropriate buswires.
3.5.8
type of circuit protection on generator and transformer circuits, it is usual to fit an interlock over current
relay which is controlled by the busbar protection and arranged to shut down the generator or trip the other
side of the transformer if fault current continuous to flow after operation of the bus bar circuit breakers
similarly when the current transformers are located on one side of the circuit breakers, a fault between the
current transformers and the breaker can only be seen by the circuit protection. To isolate the fault in these
circumstances, an over current relay is arranged to by-pass the bus-bar protection relays.
3.6
3.6.1
Introduction
Protection and relaying system for outgoing lines for power evacuation from hydro stations is important
because lines are the most exposed elements of the system. Majority of faults on high voltage lines begin
with the flashover of the insulation at one point; that is, a L-G fault, due to lightning or extraneous objects
on lines such as trees, kites etc. However, L-L-G faults are quite common due to lightning and
occasionally a simultaneous L-L-L-G fault due to lightning will occur. The L-G and L-L-G faults will
produce a residual current on a grounded neutral system but the L.L.L.G fault does not usually do so.
Faults of the L.L and L.L-L type will occur in wind or sleet storms, due to conductors swinging together.
These faults do not produce residual currents. Line protection must, therefore, cover phase-to-phase faults
which are free of ground as well as phase-to-ground faults. Detailed system short circuit studies are
required to be carried before deciding the protection for the transmission lines. EHV system requires
special consideration and discussed in Para 3.7.
The general requirements for ideal line protection are as follows:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
General Considerations
Small hydro are generally interconnected with the grid by sub transmission lines at 11 kV and 33 kV. Large
hydro generators are interconnected by transmission lines. All these transmission lines are generator
transformer ended at sending end. The transformer neutrals are solidly earthed.
General considerations involved in designing suitable protection and relaying system for the outgoing
transmission lines are as follows:
i)
ii)
iii)
160
220kV FEEDERS
51
87B1
87B2
220kV BUS
CB
135MVA,11/220kV
TRANSFORMER
G1
G2
G4
G3
G5
120MW,11kV
GENERATOR
GROUND FAULT
NEUTRALISER
Figure 3.31: Bus Zone Differential Protection (Bhakra Right Bank - 5 x 120 MW
And Mukerian Project Refer Drawing No. 3.3 & 4) (As Designed)
SOURCE IMPEDANCE
SOURCE
STEP-UP
TRANSFORMER
IR
LINE IMPEDANCE
ZL
VR
HYDRO GENERATOR
R
SOURCE IMPEDANCE
LINE IMPEDANCE
ZS
ZL
VR
The minimum fault voltage for a fault at the reach point to which the relay will remain accurate varies with the
type of relay, that is, impedance, mho or reactance and also with type of comparator employed.
According to IEEE std. 37.113 a short line is one in which the ratio of the source impedance to the line impedance
called system impedance ratio (SIR) is large. Ratios of approximately four or greater generally define a short line.
Medium lines are those having SIR from four down to 0.5. Long lines are those having SIRs that are very small i.e.
0.5 or less. A short line at one voltage may be a medium or long line at another voltage. Protective system applied
depends on the power to be transmitted on line and operating voltage. Voltage of a line has a significant effect on
the SIR and classification of line.
3.6.2.2 Type of Line
In radial feeders fault power can flow in only one direction. In case of grid interconnections and parallel
feeders power may flow in either direction. In such feeders directional relays are employed.
3.6.2.3 Criticality of Line
Criticality of the line to the system defines desired level of reliability and determines redundancy in
protection, instrument transformers communication and even for d. c. auxiliary supply. Less critical lines
may be protected with over-current system or step distance relays.
No voltage closing is provided on receiving end breaker and check synchronizing at sending end of grid
interconnecting lines.
3.6.2.4 System Factors
System factors affecting application of transmission line protection include following.
a)
b)
c)
Fault clearing time: - System stability requirement are affected by fault clearing time and affect relay
application.
Generating capacity and operating source strength determine fault current levels and operating
voltage constraints affect protection system design.
Line Configuration: - shunt reactors or series capacitors (extra high voltage system) require special
protection system and not discussed in this chapter.
3.6.2.5 Communication
Many transmission line protections depend on communications between line terminals. Communication
system selected i.e. power line carrier, microwave, fibre optic, metallic pair or leased telephone lines
should be compatible with the protection system chosen. Power line carrier is the most commonly used
communication system In India.
3.6.2.6 Old Versus New Technology
These are discussed in Chapter 1 However benefit of new technologies are in areas such as reduced
maintenance requirements and additional information. Old technologies are tried and can be trusted. Due
considerations need be given to these factors.
3.6.2.7 Redundancy and Back up Consideration
Different protection operating systems in parallel are employed on important lines. The degree of
duplication in CTs, VTs, d c. sources etc. is determined by the importance of line.
Local back up schemes e. g. power circuit breaker failure to trip condition may be employed in addition to
remote back up protection.
162
3.6.2.8 Reclosing
Reclosing is employed for considerations of stability, continuity of supply etc.
3.6.3
3.6.4
Following types of over current relays may be used for the protection of outgoing feeders:i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)
The inverse definite minimum time (IDMT) relay having a characteristics which conforms to the
requirements of IS 1885 Part IX.
A combined IDMT relay and high set instantaneous relay, with low transient over reach.
A very inverse definite minimum time relay
Extremely inverse definite minimum time relay
Definite time over-current relay
Relay selection and settings is governed by the following Time - Current Characteristics of over current
relays.
i)
ii)
iii)
Time delay
Instantaneous and
Combination of (i) and (ii)
Time delay is provided by time multiplier setting which varies the time in which the relay will close its
contacts for given value of fault current.
Plug setting - Varies range of current setting at which relay will operate.
Characteristics of the relay are given in IS: 38642 Part-1.
Definite time current relays operate at a constant time predetermined by adjustment and are independent of
current magnitude as long as it is sufficient to operate the relay.
IEEE std. 37.113 recommends three phase and one ground time over current relay and instantaneous over
current relays for sub transmission line feeder. Phase currents are used as operating quantity. Typical
163
connection is shown in Figure 3.33. Phase over current relays operate for all possible faults types, but
require pick up settings to be higher than the maximum expected normal or emergency load flow condition.
Over current relays in the neutral 50/51 N do not operate for balanced loads or for 3 phase faults but
operate for ground faults or unbalanced load and pick up settings are kept well below expected load.
51
50
51
50
51
50
50N/51N
50/51
50
51
50N
51N
Instantaneous tripping can be applied if the pickup point of the instantaneous unit can be set higher than the
maximum contribution to faults outside the protected line. The percentage of a line that can be protected by an
instantaneous over-current relay will vary with line length and source impedance. To protect an entire non-radial
line, time delays are generally required to achieve coordination with primary protective relays. Figure 3.34 shows
how coordination is achieved between a relay with a time and instantaneous element (the primary relay), and an
upstream (back up relay) with only a time element. To ensure proper coordination, the pickup point of the
instantaneous unit should be set higher than the maximum contribution to faults outside the protected line.
The pickup value of the time element should be set to prevent tripping for the maximum load current that can flow
in either direction on the line. The time adjustment (i.e. dial) should generally be set to produce the fastest operating
time that will not result in miscoordination with other protection behind or in front of the terminal.
3.6.4.1 Direction Over current Relay
Directional over current relays respond to faults in one direction only. This is accomplished by providing the relay
with a measured quantity for reference. This input can be voltage, a current or both.
Application of different types of over current time relays as per IS: 3842 is given in table 3.8.
The basic directional over current relay scheme consists of four time over current relay units or element one for
each phase and one for ground fault (residual) current. Instantaneous trip unit which may or may not be directional
can be added to provide high speed relay operation for close in faults. Three CTs located at the line terminal one
for each phase unit and sum of the three for residual unit are provided. The arrangement is same as for non
directional over current relay and co-ordination with other devices is also similar.
164
10
PRIM ARY RELAY
BACKUP RELAY
TIME (SECOND)
1.0
0.1
M AXIM UM CONTRIBUTION
TO FAULTS OUTSIDE THE
PROTECTED LINE
0.01
1.0
100
CURRENT
Figure 3.34: Time graded over current relays coordination as backup relays
Directional over current element is generally used to supervise the output of the over current element. In this
method, the over current element is free to operate for any current in excess of its pick up setting. However, tripping
occurs only when directional element also operates. Typical connections are shown in figure 3.35.
In the other method directional element controls input to the current measuring protection of the over current
element preventing its operation unless directional element operates. This is referred to as torque control.
Phase directional relays are polarized by phase voltage (delta) while ground directional relays may also use zero
sequence current which is obtained from the transformer star point earth as shown in figure 3.36.
Phase directional over current relay schemes are also used on parallel feeders when fault and/or load current can
flow in either direction. The pickup of the time over current elements has to be set higher than maximum load flow
in forward direction. The instantaneous element pickup, time current characteristics and time adjustment setting
requirements are similar to those of non directional over current relays. Directional ground over current relays are
commonly applied on all types of transmission lines. Time over current elements are generally used for backup
protection. High set ground directional elements are generally used for direct tripping for close up ground faults.
Table 3.8: Application of different types of over-current time relays
Definite time relays
Instantaneous relays
Very-inverse relays
Extremely
inverse relays
Characteristics
Definite time
Operating time up to
240 ms
1. Transformer
feeders
2. On systems with
variations of fault
current due to wide
variations in source
2. Places where
there is substantial
difference in shortcircuit currents
IT = K
I2 T = K
Applications
1. feeders or loop circuits
having large number of
sections in series with
difference in fault current
between relay location
2. On systems where
system fault current at a
particular point does not
vary very widely due to the
1. Distribution
network
165
2. System
where
discrimination
with fuses is
impedance
changes in source
impedance
3. Back-up for distance
protection
required
3. Places where
there are large
in-rush currents
after an outage
PRIMARY
WINDING
POLARISING
VOLTAGE
SECONDARY
WINDING
3.6.5
Figure 3.35: Directional Over current with Voltage Polarizing (open delta)
Distance Relays
Distance relays operate by measuring both voltage and current (VR and IR in figure 3.37) at the terminal
(power house end) of the transmission line feeder to determine if the fault is in the relays zone of
protection. The operating characteristics can be described using R X diagram as shown in figure 3.37 on
two terminal lines without tap lines, the impedance of the transmission line is fixed and reach of the relay is
largely due to network changes.
The term impedance relay is sometimes used interchangeably with the term distance relay. There are
several distance relay characteristics of which impedance relay is only one. The basic distance relay
characteristics are as follows:
a)
Impedance. The impedance relay does not take into account the phase angle between the voltage and
the current applied to it. For this reason, the impedance characteristic in the R X plane is a circle
166
with its center at the origin. The relay operates when the measured impedance is less than the setting
(i.e., it is within the circle). The relay has a current coil producing torque equal to K 1 I and a voltage
restraining coil producing a torque equal to K 2 U. Relay operation occurs when
JX
ZR
LINE IM PEDANCE
REGION OF NON
OPERATION IS
OUTSIDE CIRCLE
ZL
LOAD
REGION OF RELAY
OPERATION
K
U
(=Z) < 1 . This unit, when used to trip, must be supervised by a directional unit or
I
K2
be time delayed.
X
X
JX
JX
ZONE 3
ZONE 2
O
ZONE 1
R
Figure 3.38
Figure 3.39
Figure3.40
167
Figure 3.41
b)
Mho. The characteristics of the mho relay is a circle whose circumference passes through the origin.
The relay operates if the measured impedance falls within the circle (figure 3.39). The mho relay is
inherently directional and is suitable for long lines.
c)
Offset mho. The characteristics of an offset mho relay in the R X plane is a circle that is shifted
and includes the origin, thus providing better protection for close-in faults. This unit, when used to
trip, must be supervised by a directional unit or be time-delayed (figure 3.40). Offset mho relay has
four principal applications.
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
d)
Reactance. The reactance relay measures only the reactive component of impedance. The
characteristics of a reactance relay in the R X plane is a straight line parallel to the R axis. The
reactance relay must be supervised by another function to ensure directionality and to prevent
tripping under load (figure 3.41). The relay measures
U
sin = X and would be independent of
I
atmospheric effects, terrain, tower footing resistance and fault or arc resistance for a radial line.
Numerous other distance relay characteristics e.g. ohm (blinder relays, Quadrilateral, lenticular
modified mho) have been designed by combining the above described basic impedance
characteristics. The response of the various characteristics is affected by the polarizing signal.
3.6.5.1 Distance Schemes
In distance relays the fault distance impedance actually measured depends on the actual magnitude of
current and voltage, the relay connections, type of fault and impedances in the fault in addition to the line
impedance. It is impossible to successfully eliminate these additional features in distance measurement for
all possible operating conditions. Therefore composite schemes employing several relays and different
relay characteristics are employed.
Starter Relays for Distance Protection: Primary function of starting relays, sometimes referred to as fault
detectors is to control the timing relay for extending the reach of measuring relay into second and third
zone. They must have directional features when used with impedance and reactance measuring system.
A distance scheme comprises starting relays, impedance measuring unit, zone timers and tripping relays.
To cater for the economic and technical requirements of any particular network, a range of schemes is
necessary from which a choice may be made. The schemes generally employed to meet the protection
requirements of low, medium and high voltage networks may be classified into three main groups:
a)
b)
c)
Typical schemes, falling under the three categories are given in table 3.9 as per IS: 38642 (part I) for details
refer IS: 38642.
168
Table 3.9
TYPICAL DISTANCE PROTECTION SCHEMES
Sl No. Schemes
Basic Units
a)
b)
c)
a)
2
b)
c)
d)
a)
b)
3.
d)
e)
f)
Combination of distance and starter relays commonly used as per IS 3842 (part V).
a)
Directional; and over current relays as starters for use with impedance type of
distance relay.
b)
Over current units only for use with mho type of distance relay (sometime under
voltage relays are also used specially on resistance earthed systems).
c)
Mho starters for any type of distance relay
d)
Impedance starters for reactance or impedance type of distance relay
directionalized by a separate mho relay or a directional relay.
e)
Current dependant under impedance starters for distance relays when heavy loads
on medium lines are expected. Oh heavy loads the reach of the starting relay reduces and at low
currents the reach increases; and
f)
Current and angle dependant under impedance starters for distance relays where on heavy loads
and long lines the reach, even at high current, is to be maintained in the fault area.
3.6.5.2 Step Distance Schemes
Step distance protection relays are those where pilot application Is not used. Several zones are employed to
protect a transmission line. Typical time distance characteristics for a three step relay is shown in Figure
3.42.
ZONE-3
ZONE-3
(TIM E DELAYED)
ZONE-2
(TIM E DELAYED)
ZONE-1
(INSTANTANEOUS)
ZONE-2
ZONE-1
(INSTANTANEOUS)
ZONE-1
ZONE-1
(INSTANTANEOUS)
ZONE-2
ZONE-2
(TIM E DELAYED)
ZONE-3
ZONE-3
(TIM E DELAYED)
ZONE-2
NORM AL ZONE 2 TIM E
ZONE-1
ZONE-2
ZONE-1
SHORT LINE
LONG LINE
Figure 3.43
170
Although zone 1 and zone 2 provide full protections to the transmission line, a third forward reaching zone
3 is employed as back up for zone 2 and may be employed as remote backup. This relay must be time
delayed to coordinate with the remote zone 1and zone 2 relay. Further discussion on time setting of zone 3
may be made to IEEE std. C-37113.
In order to detect faults in the second and third zones it is necessary to include starting relay sensitive
enough to detect faults occurring beyond third zone under minimum generating condition, but capable of
discrimination between this and normal load conditions at the end of the first section of line.
3.6.6
For longer line lengths capital and running costs are lower;
Transmission path is fully controlled by the operating authority;
The signaling channel is not affected by faults in electrically independent circuits;
The transmission medium is robust and therefore reliable.
Signal injection on the power line and extraction from it are achieved through high voltage capacitors used
in conjunction with drainage coil, in order to provide isolation of the equipment from high voltage line. It is
practice to provide coupling capacitors and capacitor dividers with intermediate voltage terminal for a
electromagnetic unit of coupling voltage transformers. The capacitor is rated at feeder voltage and is
designed to pass through the carrier frequency for communication and provide low voltage for protection
and metering. The coupling capacitors should comply with the provisions of IS 9348 1998. A high
frequency barrier line trap is installed on the station side of the injection (or receiving) side of the
transmission line to prevent dissipation of signal throughout the system. Figure 3.44 shows the general
arrangement of the terminal equipment when power line carrier facilities are used in the protection scheme.
The protection relays are energized from voltage and/or current transformers depending on the type of the
protection schemes.
171
COUPLING
CAPACITOR
LINE
COUPLING
FILTER
CARRIER
EQUIPM ENT
CVT
LINE TRAPS
LINE
PROTECTION
RELAYS
CT
Figure 3.44: Line Protection Relay Scheme Using Power Line Carrier
3.6.6.2 Channel (Pilot) Aided Distance Protection Scheme for High Voltage Line for Large Power Station
Interconnection
Following pilot aided protection schemes are used for high voltage lines for interconnecting large hydro.
Communication channels are used in connection with distance relays to speed up fault clearance for internal
zone 2 (end zone) fault. Communication channel is used either to provide tripping signal for internal zone 2
faults or to prevent (block) tripping in case of external faults. Communication channel power line carrier is
mostly used in India. Following pilot aided schemes are used. For details refer IEEE std. 37.113. A typical
example of selection is given in Para 3.7 (EHV lines).
Special schemes have been developed for following conditions and need to be provided for large hydro
interconnecting lines.
a)
b)
c)
For comprehensive information on the subject reference may be made to IEEE std. 37.113 Guide for
protective relay application to transmission lines.
172
3.6.7
50BF
12X
12Y
P123
P127
46BC
86
Multi-functional line protection distance numerical relays includes the following (Areva relays catalogue
for MICOM relay) and should be used as primary protection. The secondary protection in that case should
be by static /electromagnetic relays.
3.6.8
Typical Protection Schemes for Two Terminal Transmission Lines (Interconnection with Grid)
3.6.8.1 Typical Protection Schemes for Two Terminal Transmission Lines 66kV to 220 kV
(Interconnection with Grid of Large Hydro)
220 kV Lines
Primary Protection: Pilot aided (carrier communication) Phase comparison or Directional comparison
type carrier relaying for phase to ground and phase to phase faults with additional distance elements for
three phase faults (digital).
Secondary protection: i) High speed three stage directional distance protection relays, employing nonswitched mho/reactance type relays with stepped characteristics (static/electromagnetic) with separate
instrument transformer. ii) Back up protection: Time graded earth fault directional over current relays.
Dehar- Ganguwal 220 kV line was provided the above protection.
66 kV & 132 kV Feeder Protection
Primary Protection: Pilot aided (carrier communication) High speed 3 step directional distance protection
for phase to phase and phase to earth and three phase faults (digital) or phase comparison type carrier
relaying for short important lines.
66kV FEEDER-1
NOMENCLATURE
62
62
PLCC
27
LMU
81L
81H
CVT
WAVE TRAP
25
Vs
TZ
TRIPS 52-3
KV
185
SUPV.
67N
25
27
40
50Z
67
62
81L/H
185
67N
FM
PF
TZ
LEGEND
67
LIGHTNING ARRESTOR
KWH
KVAR
KW
3
A
Vs
50Z
5 P 10
5 P 10
EARTH
ISOLATOR
11 KV CIRCUIT
BREAKER
CURRENT
TRANSFORMER
200/1
66 KV CIRCUIT
BREAKER
CLASS 1
TO UNIT
SYNCHRONISING
P.T.
PS
/
/ / //
66KV
3
11O V.
FUSE
PS
A
V
52-3
110V
AMMETER
VOLTMETER
RECORDING
INSTRUMENT
CURRENT
TRANSFORMER
POTENTIAL
TRANSFORMER
Main Protection: Phase comparison relay/ Digital Quadra talaral phase and grout distance protection
Secondary Protection: Directional over current and earth fault relays.
A typical example is shown in figure 3.47 for 66 kV line interconnecting Mukerian Project with grid by
short lines.
3.6.8.2 Typical Protection Schemes for Two Terminal Sub Transmission Lines (Interconnection with Grid of
Small Hydro)
33 kV Lines
Directional over current and earth fault relays
Over frequency, under frequency, over voltage, under voltage
A typical example is shown in figure 3.48 of interconnection of Sikasar project by 33 kV interconnecting
line. Check synchronizing at sending end is provided as generator protection. Dead line charging (under
voltage relay) was provided at the receiving end 33 kV circuit breaker.
52
27
NOMENCLATURE
67 -------- DIRECTIONAL OVER CURRENT RELAY
67N -------- EARTH FAULT RELAY
59 -------- OVER VOLTAGE RELAY
27 -------- UNDER VOLTAGE RELAY
81 -------- OVER FREQUENCY RELAY
49 -------- UNDER FREQUENCY
L.A.
81
49
59
27
33k V
/3
//
110V
OPEN
DELTA
110V
/3
/ /
/
As
LEGEND
ISOLATING SWITCH
HV CIRCUIT BREAKER
67
67N
KVAR
PF
kW
k Wh
As
CT 250/125/1A
CORE-1, 5P10
CURRENT TRANSFORMER
CT 250/125/1A
CORE-2, M ETERING
ACC.CLASS 1-0
POTENTIAL TRANSFORMER
87CH
LIGHTNING ARRESTOR
Vs
FUSE
EARTH
//
/
TO UNIT
SYNCHRONISING
33kV
/3
52-3
110V
/3
33kV BUS
Figure 3.48: Sikasar Project Grid Interconnection Two Terminal 33 kV Line Protection
(As designed)
11 kV Lines
a.
Combined over current (two phases) /earth fault is shown in figure 3.49. Reverse power and check
synchronizing relays provided on each generator breaker. Over-frequency/under-frequency relay is also
being provided.
176
b.
Group Interconnection with Grid: A typical group interconnection of small hydro to 33 kV grid substations as
proposed is shown in figures 3.50 (a) & (b).
3.6.8.3 Typical Protection Schemes for Interconnection with Grid of Micro Hydro
Relay protection is provided on the generators. Lines are protected by HRC fuse see figures 3.22 (a), (b) &
(c). Over current protection is adjustable over load to cater to provide protection when overloads are less
than short circuit due to part load operation in water shortage months when water inflows are low.
Figure 3.49: Dhelabagh Project Grid Interconnection Two Terminal 11 kV Line Protection (AHEC Project)
177
MATHURAPUR 132/33kV
GRID SUB STATION
30kM
15kM
LEGEND
TRANSFORMER
33kV BUS
33kV VCB
POTENTIAL TRANSFORMER
OUTDOOR
CURRENT TRANSFORMER
ISOLATING SWITCH
LIGHTNING ARRESTOR
CB
NOTES
LA
5MVA,33/11kV
NEAR NASRIGANJ
CONTROL
ROOM
KEY
INTERLOCK
KEY
INTERLOCK
11kV RABBIT
CONDUCTOR
AAAC
KEY
INTERLOCK
9 kM
5.4 kM
11kV WEASEL AAAC
KEY
INTERLOCK
EXISTING
EXISTING
415/11kV
1600kVA
415/11kV
1600kVA
415/11kV
1600kVA
415/11kV
1600kVA
DHELABAGH
(2 X 500kW)
PHARMA
(2 X 500kW)
NASRIGANJ
(2 X 500kW)
SEBARI
(2 X 500kW)
Figure 3.50 (a): Group Interconnection of Four SHP 415 Volts generators to grid at 33 kV
(As designed)
178
TO M ATHURAPUR
132k V GRID SUBSTATION
TO AM ETHI 33k V
GRID INTERLINKING SUBSTATION
As
As
67
67N
67
67N
27
59
27
SYNHCRONIZING
25
59
27
LEGEND
51
50
27/59
26
81
64T
87
63
87T
51
50-51
67-67N
25
60/61N
64T
26
63
50BF
46BC
27
59
81
51
50/51N
50/51
50/51N
kW
27-1
k Wh
Vs
50/51
50/51N
kW
k Wh
Vs
27-1
11k V
110V
/3
/3
PT
110V
/3
LA
50/51
kW
k Wh
Vs
27-1
11k V
110V
/3
/3
PT
110V
/3
LA
11k V
110V
/3
/3
PT
110V
/3
LA
3.7.1
Introduction
i)
Large sized hydro units at remote points require provision of heavy transmission ties for transferring bulk
loads from the generating station to the interconnected grid. Transmission at E.H.V. at 420 kV and above is
being provided in the country. E.H.V. lines have not only higher power capabilities but also higher fault
capability. It becomes, therefore, increasingly important to clear all E.H.V. faults with high speed relaying
and faults must be cleared quickly to prevent adverse effects on the interconnected power stations involved.
179
ii)
iii)
3.7.2
Planning, engineering and selection of relaying for 420 kV and above E.H.V. system requires special
consideration and is outlined with special reference to Dehar Power Plant 420 kV system of the Beas
project. This power plant located on Beas-Sutlej Link was designed to have 4 units of 165 MW each in the
first stage. Two more units of similar capacity were proposed to be added at a later date.
This power plant is characterized by its remote location with respect to load centre. 245 kV double circuit
64 km long line to Ganguwal substation and a single circuit 420 kV line 280 km long to Panipat was
proposed for interconnecting the power plant to the grid in the first stage. A second 420 kV line was
proposed to be added along with second stage units. Special problems that are likely to arise in the
applications of relaying to an E.H.V. system, in the initial stages of its development due to weak system
lower short circuit level are discussed.
Description of 420 kV System
Figure 3.51 shows the interconnected 420 kV system. Dehar E.H.V. 420 kV sending end step up substation
has a double bus arrangement and 420 kV breaker arrangements are as shown in Figure 3.51. The
interconnection of the 420 kV system with the existing 245 kV network was proposed by 420/245 kV autotransformer at Dehar and Panipat substations. Switched shunt reactors connected to tertiary winding of
transformers at receiving end were proposed to be provided for the purpose of voltage control. E.H.V.
shunt reactors directly connected to the E.H.V. line were to be provided to control line over voltages after
further studies.
3.7.3
Design Consideration
Various considerations and problems areas in selection of suitable relaying for E.H.V. systems may be
classified as follows:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Fault currents
Stability requirements
Substation bus arrangements
Protective relay design
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Maximum Generating Conditions Four generators, in operation at Dehar All lines in.
Maximum Generation Four generators in operation on 245 kV bus at Dehar All lines in.
Minimum Generation Only one generator in operation on 245 kV bus at Dehar All lines in.
Minimum Generation Only one generator in operation on 420 kV bus at Dehar All lines in.
Fault currents and post-fault voltages for three phase fault studies for 420 kV system are shown
Figure 3.52. Fault currents and post fault voltages for single phase fault studies for 420 kV
systems are shown in Figure 3.53.
These studies showed that it is not possible to apply phase comparison solid state relaying for 420
kV lines as further detailed in a subsequent paragraph. Further due to low residual voltages at
Dehar 420 kV bus in the post-fault period high speed dependable relay operation is considered
essential. Low fault levels in the initial stage of development of E.H.V. line in the region further
indicated that sensitivity of relays will play a major role for proper relay selection.
In the early stages of design of power plant it was decided that generators with normal
characteristics be specified and parameters of stability be achieved by optimizing parameters of
static excitation system and fault clearance time. Detailed digital computer studies for the purpose
were carried out with the help of M/s English Electric Co. in U.K.
ii.
The stability criteria adopted was with the main aim to design a system which would be transiently
stable for a permanent fault on the 420 kV line involving unsuccessful reclosure on to the fault,
and dynamically stable for all conditions where the 420 kV line was removed. It was considered
desirable that these aims be met under three phase fault conditions; the probability of such faults
occurring in practice although small, were not considered small enough to be regarded as an
acceptable risk.
iii.
Initial transient stability studies with a constant voltage behind transient reactance representation
carried out indicated that the aim might not be realized in the severe case of unsuccessful
reclosure. The case of a three phase fault at Panipat end of the 420 kV line followed, however, by
successful reclosure indicated significant deviations from the normal frequency though there was
no loss of synchronism between machines. These results indicated that if the aims described above
were to be at all possible to attain minimum fault clearance time and high value of excitation
system response will have to be provided.
iv.
Fault clearance time on the E.H.V. 420 kV system was proposed 80 milliseconds based on the
equipment available at that time. This time is composed of 40 milliseconds for circuit breaker
operation and 40 milliseconds for protection operation. It was considered that with modern
industry practice in relays, the above fault clearance times could be achieved.
181
182
All transient stability studies were carried out with a total fault clearance time of 0.1 sec. the
detailed transient stability studies were carried out with detailed representation of excitation
system, governors and generators. The stability run was continued up to a period of 8 to 10 sec.
real time. Following fault clearing times based on the most advanced relay schemes available at
that time for high voltage transmission system were accordingly considered desirable.
vi.
Main I (Normal) Clearing: Tripping initiated by Main I protective relays 4 cycles (2 cycles for
relay operations and 2 cycles for breaker operation).
vii.
viii.
End zone faults of 420 kV line are thus to be fully cleared in 80-100 milliseconds through carrier
intertripping channel.
ix.
Circuit breaker Failure Clearing: Tripping initiated by main I relays or zone 1 of main II relays
12-15 cycles (tentative), tripping initiated by zone 2 of Main II (back-up) relays 35 cycles
(tentative). Further studies were contemplated to find out critical fault clearance times and fix
clearance time accordingly for back-up protection. Stability studies, however, indicated fast
clearing of all faults. The proposed protection scheme is shown in Figure 3.54.
183
Taking into consideration large power that is carried by 420 kV line, it was considered desirable to
protect 420 kV lines by two breakers at the sending end. This could be done by providing a ring bus,
double bus, breaker and a half arrangement or other similar arrangements as feasible at site. Taking into
consideration very high costs of E.H.V. breaker installations, practice is now developing of relaying
receiving end E.H.V. transformer as apart of E.H.V. line and thus save the cost of E.H.V. breaker
installations at the receiving ends.
ii. Bus and breaker arrangements proposed for Dehar step up station are shown in Figure 10.8 (main single
line). Outgoing 420 kV line is proposed to be protected by two breakers. It was further considered that in
the first stage of operation when only one 420 kV line is in operation one of the two 165 MW generating
units supplying the Dehar 420 kV bus may be switched out simultaneously with the line so as to aid
stability. The other machine on 420 kV bus could remain connected and feed the system through 245 kV
network. Thus in the event of disconnection of the faulted 420 kV line the system would lose capacity
equal to only one machine of 165 MW. Spinning reserve of this magnitude was likely to be available in
the grid to cater to machine outage of this magnitude.
3.7.3.4 Protective Relay Design
Protective relaying problems encountered in the Dehar 420 kV system were thus due to the initial
development of 420 kV E.H.V. line resulting in low short circuit levels due to weak system. Long distance
of the E.H.V. line and critical transient stability conditions added to the problem. High speed relaying
became a major consideration because of these considerations. Normal clearing of line faults including end
zone faults was proposed to be accomplished in about 2 cycles employing solid state carrier relaying and
circuit breakers with two cycles interrupting time. As solid state relays for bus and transformer protection
may not be available, clearing time for this equipment may be of the order of 50 milliseconds (2 cycles).
Back-up clearing times were proposed to be the fastest practical times obtainable with electro-mechanical
relay devices available at that time. The main features of the protection system proposed were as follows:
(a)
Provision of two independent high speed main protection called Main I and Main II (back-up)
protections, one solid state carrier relay acting as a primary protection and the other high speed
electro-mechanical distance protection with separate carrier channels for isolating the line from
both ends.
Numerical relays now available are preferred as Main I protection as software logic replaces
many components and thus increasing reliability.
(b)
Separate current transformers for the two main protections for the two main protections so as to
obtain maximum isolation.
(c)
One potential device per phase for each line terminal with separate secondary winding
(independently fused) supplying potential to the primary and back-up relays.
(d)
Two independent remote tripping systems in case receiving end transformers connected
without breaker.
(e)
Provision of separately fused D.C. tripping with separate auxiliary tripping relays or devices.
(f)
3.7.4
Failure of Main I and Main II relays to function due to failures in their control circuits.
Failure of a breaker or a faulted circuit breaker to operate or interrupt.
Phase comparison type static carrier relaying for phase to ground and phase to phase faults with additional
distance elements for three phase faults has got the following main inherent advantages and had
accordingly been employed on many recent E.H.V. installations at that time.
But before this relay is adopted for an E.H.V. line it is necessary to ascertain that this type of relay can be
applied on the E.H.V. line and will not maloperate especially for long lines of over 160 km in length.
Following factors in this respect need consideration.
Attenuation: The transmitted level and the receiver sensitivity must be such as to ensure satisfactory
signal transmission, under worst condition of signal attenuation to be expected. This requires that
lower carrier frequencies be reserved for longer lines.
Charging current: it requires to be ascertained that relay will not maloperate and cause incorrect
tripping due to line charging currents leaving both terminals, i.e., appearing to the relay as an internal
fault.
185
Fault Levels: the minimum fault level must exceed the load prior to fault plus charging current required
by the impulse setting network.
Stability for External Fault:
Possibility of incorrect tripping due to phase angle error caused by
phase shift on account of capacity currents and low load currents or clearance of external faults also
needs to be ensured.
A phase comparison relay, therefore, cannot be considered if line lengths are more than 300 to 400 km
long approximately.
On Dehar-Panipat 420 kV line of Beas Project the maximum and minimum load as per load flow
studies was as follows:
Maximum load current
on 420 kV line
Minimum load on
420 kV line
Sending End
220 MW
15 MVA
(Leading)
Receiving End
218 MW
87 MVA
(Lagging)
44 MW
66 MVA
(Leading)
The fault currents are indicated in Figure 3.52 and Figure 3.53.
Taking into consideration the above factors it was found at that time phase comparison type of relaying
cannot be effectively applied to Dehar-Panipat 280 km long line unless the fault currents increase 3 to
4 times.
It was accordingly decided to provide solid state directional comparison distance carrier blocking
scheme type of relaying as first main (primary) protection for this line.
Main I protection proposed for Dehar-Panipat 420 kV line consists of directional comparison/distance
static type protection scheme using carrier current blocking principle. The scheme may basically
consist of three-step-static mho distance scheme using an end to end signaling channel to give high
speed clearance of both phase to phase and phase to earthfaults anywhere on the line. The total
protection operating time including time required for relay operation blocking signal time for end zone
faults and conventional tripping relay time may not be greater than 40 m.s. Provision for fuse failure
relays and out of step blocking relays was also proposed to be made. The scheme may have provision
of independent high speed zone 1 protection in the absence of carrier blocking signal and/ or if the
signal channel is faulty or taken out of service. Zone 2 and zone 3 may have independently adjustable
time delay range. Main I and Main II relaying were specified to be connected to separate current
transformers and separate windings of the capacitive voltage transformers (coupling capacitor potential
devices).
Measured zero sequence voltage does not represent actual protected line drop unless compensated.
Zero sequence mutual reactance between parallel lines.
Likelihood of high fault resistance on ground fault.
Effect of transient.
Modern relays provide compensation for most of the above mentioned conditions.
The relays for Main II back-up protection for Dehar-Panipat E.H.V. 420 kV line are detailed below.
186
For the secondary protection of this line, very high speed, 3 step directional distance (Mho, type)
protection relaying scheme, with provision of carrier inter-tripping for isolating the line without time
lag for end zone faults were proposed. It was proposed that the protection be provided for phase to
phase, phase to ground and three-phase faults with equal speed of operation. The total protection
operating time including time required for relay operation, inter tripping for end zone fault and
conventional tripping relay time may not be greater than 40 milliseconds. PT fuse failure blocking
device and out of step blocking relays were also proposed to be provided. The distance protection
scheme may work in conjunction with carrier communication equipment for the purpose of carrier
inter tripping channel.
3.7.6
3.7.7
i.
In the case of a spreading fault (e.g., a fault that starts on one line and spreads to other line), the
common timer is kept energized and may operate even though breaker of both lines could have
cleared the fault normally.
ii. if the bus breakers have different rated interrupting times, the timer has to be set for the lowest
breaker, thus sacrificing some clearing speed, which could otherwise be gained for the faster
breakers.
stop the appropriate carrier blocking signal to the remote terminal. The circuit breaker failure may also
block auto-reclosing scheme, if provided at a later stage.
Stability considerations
Operating restrictions imposed by transient over voltage conditions.
Desirable method of reclosing, i.e., whether 3 phase or single phase, whether instantaneous reclosing or
delayed reclosing needs to be carefully investigated. Although instantaneous reclosing is generally
desirable to maintain stability and provide better operation, but may not be applicable to a particular system
as in Keystone. In particular the required circuit dead time for 420 kV is approximately 20 cycles. If this is
a system separation time, it may be too long to retain in synchronism when reclosing is affected. Further in
case of critical stability conditions effect on the system of unsuccessful reclosure, i.e., reclosing into a fault
also needs to be ascertained.
Delayed reclosing provided for necessary dead time and transient overvoltage conditions do not remain and
is quite frequently applied. In the British system at that time very much delayed 3-phase reclosing is
applied.
Single pole automatic reclosing was employed to maintain synchronous stability for single phase to ground
faults, but application of this type of reclosing introduces many problems. Determination of the nature and
duration of secondary arcs is important before single pole automatic reclosing is adopted. Staged fault tests
have been performed to determine the acceptable reclosing time and other unknown aspects of single pole
switching at 525 kV voltage level. In general the longer the time the lower the stability limit is likely to be
189
and the shorter the tolerable outage time on the faulted phase. However, the longer the line the greater is the
capacitive coupling between phases and a longer outage time required to extinguish the secondary arc. At
some point these two requirements become incompatible and successful reclosing cannot be achieved.
Further application of single pole reclosing introduces some very pertinent question the selection of a
relaying scheme. If phase comparison is used, it is necessary to develop suitable faulted phase selectors. If
circuits have ground wires and low tower footing resistance, then ground distance relays can provide
faulted phase selection. If directional comparison is used with permissive over-reaching ground relays
suitable faulted phase selectors will have to be provided.
For Dehar 420 kV system, the question of providing reclosing was not decided although equipment was
being procured which will be suitable for single phase or 3-phase reclosing. This aspect was proposed to be
studied after the installation of reactors and their size finalized so that operating restrictions imposed by
transient overvoltage conditions can be fully ascertained. Further, duration of secondary arcs for single
phase automatic reclosing also needed to be established.
Relaying scheme for 3-phase reclosing proposed for second stage of operation at Dehar is shown in Figure
3.54.
3.7.9
Other Relaying
Shunt reactors are employed in E.H.V. system for controlling over voltages. Permanently connected E.H.V.
reactors are generally used to lower temporary and switching surge over voltages. Shunt reactors in the
tertiary winding of receiving end transformer are generally used for the purpose of voltage control in the
system.
Relaying for low voltage shunt reactor generally consists of differential protection, backed by over current
relays, ground relays and ground pressure relays are also used. A typical diagram is shown in Figure 3.57.
E.H.V. reactors primary protection is usually provided by one or a combination of the following relays.
Line relay; over current relays; differential relays; reactor distance relays and rate of rise pressure relays.
3.7.10
Conclusion
One EHV line can transmit as much power as several 245 kV lines. Because of its great importance to the
operation of a power system, the relaying selected for protecting this equipment must be of the highest
reliability and have a high security factor. Accordingly E.H.V. lines should be protected by two main
protections one numerical and the other solid state static type/electro-magnetic type. Back-up protection
should include local breaker back-up protection.
In the initial stage of development of E.H.V. system in the regional grids in India stability conditions are
liable to be critical because the EHV line has the capability of transmitting large amount of fault current
and consequently have a damaging effect on the entire system. This requires high speed relaying. Low fault
levels in the weak regional systems demand application of not only more sensitive relaying but also proper
selection of the type of relays.
Planning, engineering and selection of relaying for E.H.V. be generally based on its specific requirement as
a result of system studies which may include load flows, fault studies and stability studies.
3.7.11
FEATURE
87
21P/21G
85
50/27
68
78
67N
50/51/67
50N/51N/67N
51N/67N/SEF
67/46
46BC
49
27
59
59N
81U/O/R
Ground elements
CVT transient overreach elimination
Load blinder
Easy setting mode
Mutual compensation (for fault locator and distance zones)
Communication aided schemes, PUTT, POTT, blocking, Weak
Infeed
Accelerated tripping-loss of load and Z1 extension
Switch on to fault and trip on recluse elements for fast fault
clearance upon breaker closure
Power swing blocking
Out of step
Directional; earth fault (DEF) unit protection
Phase over current stages, with optional directionality
Earth/ground over current stages, with optional directionality
Sensitive earth fault (SEF)
Negative sequence over current stages, with optional
directionality
Broken conductor (open jumper), used to detect open circuit
faults
Thermal overload protection
Under voltage protection stages
Over voltage protection stages
Residual voltage stages (neutral displacement)
A 4-stage underfrequency, 2-stage overfrequency and advanced
191
MODEL (P547
80TE)
5
Mho and quadrilateral
4
4
4
2
2
2
50BF
CTS
VTS
79
25
Figure 3.58: Functional Overview - MICOM Distance Protection Relay for High
and Extra High Voltage System
3.8
3.8.1
General
The protective relays required for generators, their associated step up unit auxiliary transformers, including
interlinking transformers, bus bars and out-going transmission lines is described with special reference to
protective equipment specified for Dehar power Plant of Beas Satluj Link Project. 6 units of 165 MW each
including 4 1st stage unit are provided in the power plant. Two 1st stage unit are stepped up to 245 kV and
the other 4 units are stepped up to 420 kV by unit connected transformers. 245 kV and 420 kV bus bars are
interlinked by 245/420 kV interlinking transformers. A 40 MVA 245/145/12 kV transformers is provided to
feed local area loads. Single line diagrams is shown in figure 3.51 special considerations involved in
selecting relaying for 420 kV EHV system in its initial development stage are outlined in 3.7. Main single
line diagram is shown in figure 10.8
192
The power plant is located in seismic zone. Therefore, the protective equipment was specified for suitable
operation at site and the electromagnetic relays were specified according to mechanical stability class index
S2 of BS: 142 1966. Mercury contacts in the relays were specified to be unacceptable.
Static relays in place of electromagnetic relays were specified to be quoted separately along with operating
experience and other technical details. Unit transformers in single phase units because of transport
restriction were located in the power house on the transformer deck. Outdoor switchyard is about 1 km
away.
The protective relays for outgoing lines (420 kV, 245kV and 145 kV), busbars, interlinking transformer and
245/145/12 kV 40 MVA transformer were proposed to be mounted in the control room.
The secondary current CTs located in switchyard were specified to be normally 1 ampere. The CT
secondary current may be of 0.5 ampere also. The tenderer were asked to recommend the secondary current
rating (1 ampere/0.5A) for CTs located in switchyard for ensuring efficient and accurate operation of their
protective scheme.
3.8.2
b)
Self Monitoring: Watch dog timers facility to monitor operating status on continual basis is
required to be provided so that any potential malfunction is identified and communicated to control
room and possibility of a non functional relay in the plant protective relay system is avoided. This
means communication channel should be available to the relay.
iii)
Communication: Digital communication scheme which allows the relay to communicate with the
control system is required and the serial data ports should be based on IEC protocol.
iv)
Calibration: Relays are to be provided a self calibration routine in the relay software programme.
Programmable set points: Disc operating system (DOS) software programme be provided with
detailed instruction and recommended set points for each protective relay function based on system
characteristics.
v)
Event Storage: Provision of recording waveform before and after the protective relay has operated
as an oscilograph record is required to be provided.
vi)
193
3.8.3
3.8.5
3.8.6
As a secondary protection for phase to phase, three phase as well as for phase to ground fault,
suitable high speed three stage directional distance protection relays, employing fully non-switched
mho/reactance type electromagnetic relays shall be offered. The relays shall have stepped
characteristics with three zones of operation. First zone will have instantaneous operation, 2nd and
third zones shall operate with adjustable time delays. The setting time and ranges shall be clearly
indicated. The scheme shall be suitable for inter tripping through carrier channel to ensure
instantaneous clearance of end zone faults. Carrier inter tripping for secondary protection shall be
offered if separate transmitters and receivers are not required, and the scheme is suitable for operation
in conjunction with carrier communication equipment, which is being procured under a separate
196
contract. The inter tripping time shall be clearly mentioned, which shall be complete with carrier
starting relays, starting relays meant for measuring units and other equipment required to complete
the scheme. The protection schemes working on distance measuring principle when offered shall be
complete with PT fuse failure blocking device. Out-of-step blocking relay shall also be required and
should be included in the offer and detailed description of scheme should be given. Full details suc as
CT requirements, carrier boost facility required to cater for extra attenuation under internal fault shall
be supplied.
ii)
As a further back up protection for phase to ground faults, time graded earth-fault directional overcurrent relays shall be provided. the relays shall be current polarized through neutral CTs however
voltage polarized directional relays may also be offered. Potential from bus PTs broken delta tertiary
winding can be made available for the polarization of earth fault element.
The scheme shall be complete in all respects including auxiliary relays required for various trip,
alarm annunciation and various other purposes.
3.8.7
3.8.8
3.8.9
The scheme shall incorporate built in test facility. It shall be possible to carry out a limited test with the
equipment in service and this test should automatically be suppressed in case a fault occurs on the line
during testing. The scheme operating time under such condition shall not be greater than its normal time.
The scheme shall be complete in all respects including auxiliary relays required for various trip, alarm
annunciation, tests and other purpose etc.
Main II Protection: For the secondary protection of 280 K.M. long single circuit, 400 kV line, very high
speed, 3 step, directional distance (Mho type) protection relaying scheme, with provision of carrier inter
tripping , for isolating the line without time lag for end zone faults shall be offered. The protection scheme
shall be capable of offering with equal speed of operation, protection against phase to phase, phase to earth
and three phase faults. The scheme shall be suitable for single and/or three phase tripping. The total
protection operating time including time required for relay operation, inter tripping for end zone fault and
conventional tripping/relay time shall not be greater than 40 ms.
The design of the starting elements be such that if required they can be given an offset characteristics of
reach up to 20% of their rated forward reach. Further, they should be capable of tripping the scheme
instantaneously on current alone such as closing on a line with earthing clamps on. It should be ensured that
under such tripping, auto-reclosing circuits are blocked so that no auto-reclosing can take place.
The scheme measuring elements should have negligible transient overreach by employing well designed
and continuously adjustable line and neutral replica impedance. Further, the measuring units should be
continuously adjustable within a range of 450 750.
The protection scheme shall be complete with PT fuse failure blocking device. Out of step blocking relay
shall also be required and shall be included in the offer and detailed description of scheme should be given.
The distance protection shall be suitable for operation in conjunction with carrier equipment, on carrier
inter tripping principle. That is to say that the remote end relays should trip directly through the fault
detector contacts on receipt of a carrier signal without loosing time by first extending the reach of
measuring relays, allowing them to operate and then trip. The scheme should also be suitable for single and
/or three phase auto-re closing. Auto-reclosing circuitry should automatically be blocked when the scheme
trips in either zone II or III time or when carrier fails. The distance protection supplier shall undertake, to
co-ordinate with the carrier and circuit breaker equipment suppliers for successful working of his scheme.
Transistorized relay scheme will be accepted provided its accuracy and life are guaranteed under site
conditions where ambient temp. can vary from 00 C to + 500 C and relative humidity may be as high as
100% during monsoon month.
Directional over current relays: Suitable time graded Earth fault directional over current relays, which
shall be used as backup protection for ground faults will be offered.
3.8.10
Auto-Reclose Relaying for 245 kV Lines, Bus Coupler and 420 kV Line
The auto reclosing scheme for 245 kV lines, bus coupler on 420 kV line may be installed at a future date.
The tenderer may however, supply the detailed scheme, keeping the following requirements in view:Bus Coupler and 245 kV Lines: A typical auto-reclose scheme, which shall be suitable for single shot and
single and /or three phase auto-reclosing of air-blast circuit breakers may be offered. The scheme may be
such that one end of line is reclosed after no voltage check and the other end reclosed when it is energized,
voltage established and after synchronizing check. Provision may be made such that the circuit breaker
failure shall block auto-reclosing scheme. The relay supplier may have to undertake to coordinate with the
circuit breaker supplier to ensure satisfactory working of the auto-reclose scheme.
420 kV line: For 420 kV line which is controlled by two breakers at Power house end, one breaker shall be
reclosed after no voltage check and the other breaker, after it is energised, voltage established and after
synchronizing check. Provision may be made such that the circuit breaker failure shall block auto-reclosing
scheme (Refer Para 3.7.7). The relay supplier may have to undertake to coordinate with the circuit breaker
supplier to ensure satisfactory working of the auto-reclose scheme.
198
3.8.11
3.8.12
3.8.13
3.9
3.9.1
General
Single line diagram is at figure 3.59 and metering & relaying at figure 3.60.
3 x 2 MW synchronous generating units coupled to pelton turbines synchronized at 3.3 kV, brushless
excitation and governing systems being digital.
i)
ii)
iii)
3 step up generating transformers of the rating 3.3 kV/33 kV, 3.15 MVA
2 nos. 33 kV feeder
1 no. 315 kVA, 3.3kV/415V station transformer
3.9.1.1 Metering
(a)
(b)
All panel meters shall be digital at least 2 cm digit size, at least three and-a-half digit LED display
accuracy class of 1.0.
Energy meters on feeders and generators shall be microprocessor based trivector meters of
appropriate class.
Each generator and generator transformer shall be provided with a multifunction digital relay
incorporating all protection functions, measurements and fault data logging features.
Generators and generator transformers shall have additional back up protection using static relays.
Digital relays shall be provided for the protection of feeder and station transformer.
199
3.9.1.3 Protection
Protection relay panels for the generating units and 3.3/33 kV generator transformers shall use
microprocessor based (digital) and static (analog) relays as described in Generator protection. The 33 kV
feeder shall be protected with microprocessor based digital relay as described in 33 kV line protection
herein after. Protective relays for other equipment shall be digital type. Details of protection requirements
are shown in drawing No. 3.9.2.
3.9.1.3 Protection and Metering Details
Requirements of metering and protection/metering and the function performed by various relays are
explained in following tentative drawings:
Figure 3.59:
Figure 3.60:
200
(a)
33 kV FEEDER-II
33 kV FEEDER-II
(b)
33 kV SIDE
FUSE
415 VOLTS SIDE
25
MEASURING EQUIPMENT
V
A
VOLTM ETER
AM M ETER
DF
k Wh
kW
KILO WATT
DV
k V AR
PF
As s
POWER FACTOR
Vss
F
DV
DF
S
RATIO
//
33kV
/3
110V
3
LA
LA
LA
315kVA, 33kV/415V
DELTA STAR T/F
V
EARTH FAULT
O/C INST.
50
51
64
Vss
O/C IDMT.
50k W, 415V
DIESEL SET
//
415kV
450/5 CLASS .2
BURDEN 15 VA
/3
CLASS.2
110V 50VA
3
METERING C.T.
M CCB
(50k A)
415 VOLTS
3.3kV,2223 kVA,0.9 PF
GENERATOR
3.3kV,2223 kVA,0.9 PF
GENERATOR
3.3kV,2223 kVA,0.9 PF
GENERATOR
M CCB/M CB
STATION SUPPLIES
UNIT-I
UNIT-III
(SAME AS UNIT-I)
UNIT-II
(SAME AS UNIT-I)
201
kW
As
kWh
33 kV FEEDER-I
GENERATOR MULTIFUNCTION
PROTECTION RELAY
30 kV, 10 kA LA
(a)
SYNCHRONISING
PANEL
//
33KV
RATIO
/3
110V
33kV 630 Amps., (12.5 kA) LINE
ISOLATOR
CLASS .2 100VA
27
25
S
DF
Vss
F
200-100/5 CLASS
5P10 30VA
EXPORT/IMPORT EXPORT/IMPORT
kW
64
51
MULTI-FUNCTION FEEDER
PROTECTION RELAY
Ass
PF
kWh
81
59
50
DV
METERING C.T. (CORE I)
200-100/5 CLASS.2 30VA
87G
51V
97
59G
59G1
27G
12G
33kV
/3
//
110V
64GT
(b)
50/51/64
33 kV FEEDER PROTECTION
50/51/64
50/51/64
33 kV SIDE
FUSE
415 VOLTS SIDE
40G
46G
27
59
81
FREQUENCY RELAY
MEASURING EQUIPMENT
V
A
kWh
RATIO
VOLTMETER
AMMETER
KILO WATT HOURMETER
KILO WATT
kW
kVAR
49T
38T
87T
PF
Ass
Vss
F
DV
DF
S
INTERPOSING CT
PROTECTION CT
45/5 5P10 30VA
TRANSFORMER
MULTI-FUNCTION
PROTECTION
RELAY
45/5 PS
LA
45/5 5P10
GT E/F
PROTECTION
38T
64GT
450/5 CLASS PS
49T
87GT
50/51/64
GEN.DIFF.
59G
METERING + PROTECTION + SYNCHRONISING
3.3KV
110V
RATIO
CLASS .2 VT,100VA
3
3
AVR
SENSING VT
RATIO
3.3KV
/3
CLASS .2
//
110V
//
TO SYNCHRONISING
PANEL
97
59G1
100VA
27G
SURGE DIVERTOR
(.25 MICRO FARAD)
12G
LIGHTNING ARRESTOR
3 kV,10 kA
40G
38
3.3kV,2223 kVA,0.9 PF
GENERATOR
PROTECTION C.T.
46G
97A
F
450/5 CLASS .2 30VA
SHORT CKT.MAINTENANCE
C.T. FOR AVR
87G
Vss
METERING C.T.
450/5 CLASS .2 30VA
kWh
kW
kVAR
PF
A
Ass
450/5 CLASS PS
NEUTRAL GROUNDING
TRANSFORMER RATIO
3.3kV/110V,50Hz,1PH
32
49
64R
51V
12
AVR C.T.
GENERATOR
MULTI-FUNCTION
PROTECTION
RELAY
GEN.DIFF. C.T.
64GA &
64GB
Figure 3.60: 3 x 2000 kW SHP Metering & Relaying Single Line Diagram
(AHEC Project)
All the protective relays will be housed in the control room of the power plant. The tentative locations of
CTs and PTs housed in Generator terminal (GT) and Neutral grounding (NG) cubicle for the protection and
metering.
202
The final drawings for the protection & metering shall be submitted by the contractor and will be subject to
the approval by the purchaser.
All current and voltage transformers required for protection system of the unit shall have adequate VA
burdens knee point voltage, saturation factor and characteristics suitable for the application. Special
Features of proposed Protection System
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
The protection system shall be built on latest technology and the bidder has to guarantee for
supply of spares for at least 10 years. Moreover, the bidder should have range of manufacturer of
the system offered.
Wide setting ranges with fine setting steps for each protection shall be available.
The offered system shall have proven record of satisfactory performance for at least 2 years and in
two power stations.
The protective relays shall preferably be housed in draw out type of cases with tropical finish.
Common tripping relays (each for similar functions) will be provided with lock-out facilities. All
these relays shall have potential free contacts for trip and alarm purpose and externally hand reset
type of flag indicators.
Generator
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
vii.
viii.
ix.
x.
3.9.3
Transformer
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
vii.
Following protection provided on the generator transformers shall also be integrated with the main
protection described above:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
Resistance temperature detectors (pt. -100) in stator core (12 no.) and in the bearings for
indication, alarm and recording. RTDs are to be provided by generator suppliers.
Turbine and generator bearing, metal and oil temperatures alarm/shutdown
Governor oil pressure low to block starting and very low for emergency tripping.
Over speed for normal and emergency shutdown depending upon its extent.
Note: Though the generator shall be synchronized at 33 kV neutral displacement protection
should be provided through a neutral grounding transformer of 5 kVA rating with a ratio of
3.3/
/110/
volts (Ratings are tentative and subject to confirmation). There shall be a
provision in the relay for time grading to avoid operation of the relay function on 33 kV bus fault.
The ratings of this transformer are tentative; the bidder shall submit detailed calculations.
3.9.4
33 kV Line Protection
A numerical directional inverse over current and earth fault relay and over/under voltage and relay
frequency with high set unit shall be provided on 33 kV line.
204
References
(1)
DEWEY, C.G. and MODGES, M.E.: Transistorized phase Comparison relaying. Principles and
Circuit, AIEE trans., Power Apparatus and System, Vol. 79, pp. 373-381, August 1960.
Specification No. 25 BLD Beas project Unit -1 Dehar Power Plant July 1971.
(2)
(3)
SUTTON HOWARD J.: The Application of Relaying on an E.H.V. System IEEE Trans. On
Power Apparatus and systems. Vol. 86, pp. 408-415. April 1967.
(4)
COMMITTEE REPORT, Relaying the key stone 500 kV Systems. IEEE Transaction on Power
Apparatus and System, Vol. 87, pp. 1434-1439, June 1968.
(5)
(6)
HALL, J.E. & SHACKSHAFT, G.: Development in the Stability Characteristics of the Power
System of England and wales. 32-05, CIGRE, Session, 24 August-2 September, 1970.
(7)
HINMAN, W.I.: Breaker Failure Relaying. Presented to 23rd Annual Conference for Protective
Relay Engineers, Taxes A & M University, College Station, Taxes April 20-22, 1970.
(8)
CORCORAN, DR. J.C.W.; GUPTA, DR. S. and PAL, Dr. M.K. in COLLABORATION WITH
GRADE, DR. V.P. and THAPAR, O.D.: System Studies to Determine Excitation Characteristics
of Dehar Generators. Engineering Report No. PSD 884/2- June 1971, Power System Department
English Electric Power Transmission Ltd., Stafford, England.
(9)
EDWARD, LEO; CHADWICK, J.W.; REISCH; H.A. and SMITH, L.E. : Single Pole Switching
on TVAs paradise- Davidson 500 kV line Design Concepts and Staged fault Test Results. T.P.
IEEE Winter Power Meeting, New York, January 31, February 5, 1971.
(10)
THAPAR O. D. Relaying for EHV System; Proceedings research Design; Central Board of
Irrigation & Power June 1972.
(11)
(12)
IEEE std. C37. 102 1995 IEEE Guide for AC Generator Protection
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
IS: 2026 Power Transformer Part 1: General; Part 2, Temperature rise Part 3; Insulation Level
and Dielectric tests
(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)
(22)
www.areva-ted.com
(23)
www.govconsys.com/woodwar_prtective-relays.htm
(24)
(25)
205