United States v. Bernard Lee Burgess, 858 F.2d 1512, 11th Cir. (1988)
United States v. Bernard Lee Burgess, 858 F.2d 1512, 11th Cir. (1988)
2d 1512
This appeal presents the question of whether appellant, who was sentenced
before the effective date of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. Sec.
3551 et seq. & 28 U.S.C. Sec. 991 et seq. (Supp. IV 1986), can seek
resentencing under that Act pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 35. We hold that he may
not.
On August 11, 1987, the appellant, Bernard Lee Burgess, was sentenced for
income tax evasion to two consecutive sentences of four years each. These
sentences were imposed under the law in effect prior to the effective date of the
Sentencing Reform Act. On December 3, 1987, appellant, proceeding under
Rule 35, moved the court for resentencing, and on January 15, 1988, the court
granted his motion, reducing his sentence to two consecutive terms of two years
each. In resentencing appellant, the court did not consider the sentencing
guidelines which the United States Sentencing Commission had promulgated
pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act.
3
4
establish
sentencing policies and practices for the Federal criminal justice system
that ... provide certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding
unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have
been found guilty of similar criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient flexibility
to permit individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or aggravating
factors not taken into account in the establishment of general sentencing practices.
5
As originally passed, the Sentencing Reform Act implied that the new
sentencing guidelines would apply to all defendants convicted after the
November 1 implementation date.** The constitutionality of this demarcator,
however, was put into question by the Supreme Court's decision in Miller v.
Florida, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987). In Miller, the
Court held that a Florida law which increased the penalties that could be
assessed for certain crimes was an unconstitutional ex post facto law if applied
to defendants who were convicted of a crime that had taken place before the
enactment of the new sentencing provisions. Thus, the Supreme Court
indicated that the date of the offense was the crucial point, not the date of
conviction.
fact that he was resentenced after November 1, 1987 is irrelevant. Congress has
evinced an explicit intent that defendants who have been convicted of crimes
committed prior to November 1, 1987 be sentenced under the old law. The trial
court, therefore, properly refused to apply the Act in passing on appellant's
Rule 35 motion.
8
The appellant further argues that even if the sentencing guidelines did not
govern his Rule 35 hearing, the trial court abused its discretion by not
considering the guidelines. We disagree. While the trial court could have
considered the advent of the sentencing guidelines in assessing Burgess'
sentence, it was under no duty to do so.
AFFIRMED.
Honorable Patricia C. Fawsett, U.S. District Judge for the Middle District of
Florida, sitting by designation
**