Andrew Taylor Hutchinson v. Wexford Health Services, Inc., 11th Cir. (2016)
Andrew Taylor Hutchinson v. Wexford Health Services, Inc., 11th Cir. (2016)
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government entities; instead, the complaint should have been initially screened
under 42 U.S.C. 1997e(c)(1) and reviewed under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915A, district courts are required to screen civil
complaints filed by prisoners against governmental entities or employees, and
dismiss any portion of the complaint that is frivolous, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or seeks relief from a defendant who is immune from
such relief. A similar provision appears in 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B), but that
provision applies to in forma pauperis complaints. And, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(c)(1)
applies to claims brought in the district court before administrative remedies have
been exhausted.
Here, Hutchinson is a prisoner filing suit against persons and entities who
contracted with the Florida Department of Corrections to perform a public function
of providing medical services at a state correctional facility. Hutchinson brought
his complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Given 1983 requires defendants to act
under the color of state law, Hutchinson could not have brought the complaint
unless the named defendants were state actors. Therefore, 28 U.S.C. 1915A is
the correct statute under which Hutchinsons claim should be reviewed, and, under
that review, Hutchinsons complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted (see Part II, infra). Indeed, even if the district court erred in reviewing
the complaint under 1915A, review under 1915(e)(2)(B) would have the same
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result because Hutchinson proceeded in forma pauperis and failed to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. Moreover, 1997e(c)(1) is inapplicable
because the district court did not dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies.
II.
Hutchinson next argues that he stated a claim upon which relief could be
granted against each defendant by listing his serious medical conditions and the
deliberately indifferent actions of the defendants in his complaint. He claims he
established a pattern of deliberate indifference to his serious medical conditions
that violated his constitutional rights.
We review de novo a district courts sua sponte dismissal for failure to state
a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915A, taking the allegations in the complaint as
true. Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006). The facts as pled
in a complaint must state a claim [for] relief that is plausible on its face to avoid
dismissal for failure to state a claim. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.
Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Hutchinson raises claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. A claimant is
entitled to redress under 1983 if he can prove that a person acting under color of
state law committed an act that deprived him of some right, privilege, or immunity
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protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Hutchinsons claims are
based on alleged violations of the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Eighth Amendment to prohibit
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners. Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S. Ct. 285, 291 (1976). To prevail on a deliberate
indifference to serious medical need claim, [a plaintiff] must show: (1) a serious
medical need; (2) the defendants deliberate indifference to that need; and
(3) causation between that indifference and the plaintiffs injury. Mann v. Taser
Intl, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 130607 (11th Cir. 2009).
In his complaint, Hutchinson pled some, but not all, facts needed to establish
a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. While Hutchinson established that he
has serious medical conditions and that the medical staff was aware of them
through his filed grievances and medical records, he has not pled facts to establish
that the medical staff disregarded any risks associated with the medical conditions.
Instead, in response to his inquiries, the medical staff told him to seek medical
treatment if any symptoms arose.
Furthermore, Hutchinson received consistent and continuous treatment, as
shown by the lengthy grievances he filed. Rather than being deprived treatment,
Hutchinson simply disagreed with the specific medication he received. See Estelle,
429 U.S. at 10708, 97 S. Ct. at 29293 (holding that a disagreement over matters
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Additionally, Hutchinson has not stated a claim under the First or Fourteenth
Amendments. While Hutchinson stated broadly that his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights
were violated, he pled no facts that would give rise to a claim under those amendments. Viewing
the facts liberally, Hutchinson has not raise[d] a right to relief above the speculative level. See
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007). Therefore, the
district court did not err in dismissing Hutchinsons complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted.
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IV.
Upon reviewing the record and considering Hutchinsons arguments on
appeal, we find no reversible error. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the
district court.
AFFIRMED.