0% found this document useful (0 votes)
45 views4 pages

United States v. George Wilson, 264 F.2d 104, 2d Cir. (1959)

This document is a court opinion regarding an appeal of a conviction for possession of heroin and conspiracy to violate federal narcotics laws. The defendant claimed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence from an allegedly illegal search and seizure of his residence was erroneous. The court disagreed, finding the search was proper as incident to a valid arrest based on a previous ruling in a related case. The defendant also claimed his privilege against self-incrimination was violated because police did not advise him of his right to remain silent, but the court found no constitutional violation occurred as he voluntarily admitted his guilt when questioned. The court ultimately affirmed the conviction.
Copyright
© Public Domain
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF or read online on Scribd
0% found this document useful (0 votes)
45 views4 pages

United States v. George Wilson, 264 F.2d 104, 2d Cir. (1959)

This document is a court opinion regarding an appeal of a conviction for possession of heroin and conspiracy to violate federal narcotics laws. The defendant claimed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence from an allegedly illegal search and seizure of his residence was erroneous. The court disagreed, finding the search was proper as incident to a valid arrest based on a previous ruling in a related case. The defendant also claimed his privilege against self-incrimination was violated because police did not advise him of his right to remain silent, but the court found no constitutional violation occurred as he voluntarily admitted his guilt when questioned. The court ultimately affirmed the conviction.
Copyright
© Public Domain
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF or read online on Scribd
You are on page 1/ 4

264 F.

2d 104

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,


v.
George WILSON, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 223, Docket 24850.

United States Court of Appeals Second Circuit.


Argued Feb. 3, 1959.
Decided Feb. 27, 1959.

Daniel H. Greenberg, New York City, by assignment, for defendantappellant. John C. Lankenau, Asst. U.S. Atty., S.D.N.Y., New York City
(Arthur H. Christy, U.S. Atty., and Mark F. Hughes, Jr., Asst. U.S. Atty.,
New York City, on the brief), for appellee.
Before CLARK, Chief Judge, MADDEN, Judge, United States Court of
Claims, n1 and HINCKS, Circuit Judge.
MADDEN, Judge.

Defendant-appellant appeals from his conviction for possession of heroin, and


conspiracy to violate the Federal narcotics law. One of the grounds for his
appeal is that the denial by the trial judge of his motion to suppress evidence
seized by an allegedly illegal search and seizure of his residence was reversible
error. The facts constituting the allegedly illegal search and seizure are the
same facts as those in a companion case involving one Mary Lee Garnes with
whom the appellant resided. United States v. Garnes, 2 Cir., 258 F.2d 530. In
that case this Court held that the search and seizure was proper as an incident of
a valid arrest. Although a petition for certiorari is pending in the Garnes case,
we will not await the Supreme Court's disposition of that case. We conclude, as
this Court did in Garnes, that there was no illegal search or seizure.

Another ground of appeal is the appellant's claim that his privilege against selfincrimination under the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States was violated by the failure of the police officer making his arrest to
advise him that he had a right to remain silent and that any statements made by
him could be used against him.

The facts of this case are briefly as follows: Bureau of Narcotics Agents
arrested one Becknell as he was in the act of selling heroin to Narcotics Agent
Bailey. This occurred about 1:00 a.m. on June 1, 1957 in the City of New York.
Shortly thereafter the agents arrested Gayles who was identified by Becknell as
his source of supply. Upon questioning these two prisoners, the agents learned
that Gayles had obtained the narcotics from Wilson, the appellant, and Mary
Lee Garnes, at their apartment. Gayles did not remember the exact address of
the apartment but did recall the telephone number, from which the agents were
able to learn the address. Gayles also informed the agents that he believed the
rest of the heroin was still in the apartment and that Garnes, and perhaps the
appellant also, would be in the apartment at that time. The agents telephoned
another Narcotics Agent who had previously used Gayles as an informer and
ascertained that Gayles' information was reliable. The telephone call was made
at 2:30 a.m. Because of the lateness of the hour and the danger of removal or
destruction of the contraband, the agents proceeded to the apartment without a
warrant and placed Garnes under arrest at approximately 3:00 a.m. The
apartment was searched incident to the arrest, and the search disclosed some
narcotics on the kitchen table, together with the apparatus for using narcotics,
and some narcotics in a handkerchief under the mattress of the bed. As stated
above, this court in the Garnes case found that this search was lawful as
incident to a valid arrest.

The search consumed about one-half hour. Shortly thereafter defendant


returned to the apartment and let himself in with his key. He was placed under
arrest. In response to Agent Bailey's statement 'I guess you know why we are
here,' defendant replied, 'Yes, you got me.' Upon further questioning defendant
stated that he was in the apartment that night when the heroin was cut, that it
was Gayles' sale, and that all the narcotics in the apartment were his,
appellant's.

The inculpatory statements of the appellant at the time of his arrest were
admitted in evidence at his trial and, no doubt, contributed heavily toward his
conviction. He asserts that they should not have been admitted, because the
officers to whom he made the statements did not advise him of his right to
remain silent, nor warn him that if he spoke what he said might be used against
him at his trial. He points to that provision of the Fifth Amendment which says
that an accused person shall not

'be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.'

It would be difficult, indeed, as a matter of language, to make the


Constitutional provision fit the appellant's case. He was not 'compelled' to say

anything. He was questioned, and he gave answers admitting guilt. The stretch
of the Constitutional language for which the appellant contends could only be
justified upon the hypothesis that there lurks in such situations an evil
analogous to the evil of compelled testimony at which the Constitutional
provision is expressly aimed, and that the protection of the Constitution ought
to be extended, by generous interpretation, to strike down the comparable evil.
8

It is not an evil thing for one accused of crime to voluntarily admit his guilt. It
is a good thing. It removes his crime from the list of unsolved crimes and
enables the police to get about the task of solving other crimes on the list. It
enables the Criminal Courts and their juries to reach decisions free from the
uncertainties which trials involving principally circumstantial evidence involve.
It brings down upon the accused no worse than is his due, the punishment
prescribed by law for his crime.

If the activities of the police were of a sporting nature, they might well spurn
the assistance which a voluntary admission of guilt gives them, or at least
discourage it by suggesting to the accused that he should not lighten their task.
They might in effect tell him that in the contest between them, as the protectors
of society, and those who are accused of crime, they always win, and are
therefore quite indifferent as to whether they win easily, as by default, or after
the contest is played out to the end.

10

If the police said that, they would not be speaking the truth. They don't always,
nor nearly always, solve crimes and bring the guilty to justice. They always
have more useful things to do than to play the game of cops and robbers out to
the end when they could have won it by letting the arrested person talk.

11

We feel no urge to elevate to the dignity of a Constitutional right a practice


which, perhaps even as a matter of etiquette, may, in the present condition of
society, be an unwarranted extravagance.

12

Pertinent precedents are United States v. Mitchell, 322 U.S. 65, 64 S.Ct. 896,
88 L.Ed. 1140; United States v. Heitner, 2 Cir., 149 F.2d 105.

13

The Court expresses its appreciation of the able services of Mr. Daniel H.
Greenberg as assigned counsel for the appellant.
The judgment is

14

Affirmed.

14

Affirmed.

--------------15

1 Sitting by designation pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 291(a).

You might also like